Internal Security Architecture Shortcomings – Key Forces, NIA, IB, CCTNS, etc.

Internal Security Architecture Shortcomings – Key Forces, NIA, IB, CCTNS, etc.

Understanding the ‘Prisoner’s Dilemma’: A Lesson in Cooperation

Note4Students

From UPSC perspective, the following things are important :

Prelims level: Prisoner's Dilemma

Mains level: Read the attached story

Prisoner's Dilemma

Central Idea

  • Defence Minister invoked the concept of the “Prisoner’s Dilemma” to emphasize the importance of international collaboration over competing interests.
  • He highlighted the need for countries to find solutions that promote cooperation, trust-building, and risk mitigation in international relations.

What is the Prisoner’s Dilemma?

  • Game Theory Basis: The Prisoner’s Dilemma is a renowned concept in Game Theory, a scientific branch that studies decision-making in various scenarios.
  • Complex Decision-Making: It illustrates that real-life decisions involve complexity and uncertainty, and outcomes depend on the actions of others.
  • Paradox of Conflict: When applied to international relations, it reveals situations where countries engage in actions, such as arms races, driven by mutual fear and mistrust.

Prisoner’s Dilemma Scenario

  • Crime Investigation: Imagine two individuals, A and B, facing questioning for a crime without strong evidence.
  • Police Offer: The police offer them a choice:
    1. If one implicates the other, the informant goes free, while the implicated receives a 15-year jail term.
    2. If both stay silent, both serve one year in prison.
    3. If both confess, they each get 10 years.

Prisoner’s Dilemma Matrix:

A Stays Silent A Confesses
B Stays Silent A: 1 year, B: 1 year A: 15 years, B: 0 years
B Confesses A: 0 years, B: 15 years A: 10 years, B: 10 years

Dilemma and Decision

  • Optimal Outcome: On the surface, staying silent seems best, resulting in both serving just one year in prison.
  • Uncertainty: However, if one stays silent, they risk a 15-year sentence if the other implicates them.
  • Paradox: To avoid the maximum penalty, confessing becomes the rational choice if trust in the other’s silence is uncertain.
  • Cooperation Ideal: The best outcome lies in cooperation, where both prisoners stay silent, serving only one year.

Real-Life Applications

  • Business Strategy: Similar dilemmas occur in business, such as price wars between companies selling identical products. Cooperation to maintain sustainable pricing can lead to healthier profits.
  • Geopolitical Agreements: Countries can avoid ruinous arms races and protect their economies by establishing ground rules in geopolitics, fostering cooperation over competition.

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Internal Security Architecture Shortcomings – Key Forces, NIA, IB, CCTNS, etc.

Analysis of the Maoist Attack and The Way Forward

Note4Students

From UPSC perspective, the following things are important :

Prelims level: Local Security forces and their mandate

Mains level: Challenges for employing local tribal youth against Insurgency and solutions

Maoist

Central Idea

  • The April 26 attack on District Reserve Guard (DRG) personnel and a civilian driver by Maoists in Dantewada, Chhattisgarh highlights the need for a comprehensive approach to tackling the insurgency. Despite claims of a weakened Maoist movement, the attack shows that they still have the ability to strike at will.

About District Reserve Guards (DRG)

  • District Reserve Guards (DRG) is a special unit of the police force in some Indian states, primarily in Chhattisgarh, that is trained and equipped to combat Naxalite and Maoist insurgency.
  • DRG personnel are typically drawn from local tribal communities and are familiar with the local terrain, which makes them effective in fighting the insurgency.
  • They are provided with specialized training in guerrilla warfare, jungle warfare, and use of modern weaponry.
  • The DRG is often at the forefront of anti-Naxalite operations and is considered a vital component of the Indian government’s efforts to counter the Maoist insurgency in the country.

Maoist ability to strike at will

  • Strategic planning by Maoist Central Committee: A strike such as the one carried out on April 26 cannot be the brainchild of a local Maoist unit; it is highly likely that this was a trap laid out under the directions of the Maoist Central Committee, indicating the sustained hierarchy of the Maoists.
  • Timing of attacks: The Maoists carry out maximum attacks against security forces during the tactical counter-offensive campaign which is the period between February and June every year. Out of a total of 17 major strikes in Chhattisgarh (2010-2023), six were carried out in April alone, indicating a pattern that should give the government enough leads to plan its strategy.
  • Flouting of standard operating procedures: Standard operating procedures and protocols were blatantly flouted during the unfortunate strike on April 26. It is imperative that the security forces remain extra cautious during the months of the tactical counter-offensive campaign by strictly adhering to standard operating procedures and protocols.

Challenges associated with employing local tribal youth for the DRG

  • False sense of empowerment: When armed, local tribal youth often get a false sense of empowerment, which can lead to feuds with the Maoists. This is because they are familiar with the ecosystem of the Maoists and may harbor resentment towards them.
  • Intelligence network: During the April 26 incident, the intelligence network of the DRG was outclassed by that of the Maoists. This highlights the need for better training and support for local tribal youth who are employed by the DRG.
  • Ad-hoc planning: The DRG personnel, in this case, seem to have acted independently, exposing their ad-hoc planning. This demonstrates the need for better coordination and control over the DRG by the state police.
  • Lack of discipline: Although the combat-worthiness of the DRG is beyond doubt, it is not complemented by the rigor of discipline, which is an imperative quality for troops in any protracted counter-insurgency campaign. The track record of the DRG regarding discipline is not too encouraging, with many of the cadres having been cashiered on disciplinary grounds and some having been found to be involved in crime. This highlights the need for better training and support to ensure that the DRG personnel are adequately disciplined and accountable for their actions.

Way ahead: Lasting solutions

  • Effective Policing: Effective policing in insurgency-affected regions is the function of a strong State police force. It is widely acknowledged that Central police forces should supplement and not supplant the State police.
  • Vacancies in State Police Force: According to data of the Bureau of Police Research and Development, there are many vacancies in the State police forces. Without comprehensive transformation of the State police, Central forces would achieve little beyond random and misplaced killings.
  • Control on Local Tribal Youth: Local tribal youth should be employed for the DRG in a controlled manner by the State police. Security should not be simply outsourced to them.
  • DRG Personnel Discipline: The combat-worthiness of the DRG is beyond doubt, but it is not complemented by the rigour of discipline. This is an imperative quality for troops in any protracted counter-insurgency campaign. The track record of the DRG regarding discipline is not too encouraging.
  • Deeper reflection on the discontent and dispossession of tribal people: The incident calls for a deeper reflection on the discontent and dispossession of the tribal people of central India, who are in all respects the most disadvantaged of citizens.
  • Perception management: The government needs to pay adequate attention to perception management. The government should communicate that extensive road construction projects in Bastar will ease the lives of the local population and not just enhance the reach of the security forces.
  • Weaken the Maoist ideology: The futility of the Maoist ideology in current times is not adequately exposed to weaken the insurgency. Security is no doubt necessary, but the focus needs to be beyond security and development.

Conclusion

  • The Dantewada attack highlights the need for a comprehensive approach to tackling the insurgency, taking into account the tactical counter-offensive campaign, the need for strong state police forces, and the controlled employment of DRG personnel. The government should focus on addressing the root causes of the insurgency, paying attention to perception management and exposing the futility of Maoist ideology

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The Maoist Insurgency: Challenges and The Way Forward

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Internal Security Architecture Shortcomings – Key Forces, NIA, IB, CCTNS, etc.

The Maoist Insurgency: Challenges and The Way Forward

Note4Students

From UPSC perspective, the following things are important :

Prelims level: Security agencies and anti Naxal guards

Mains level: Insurgency, challenges and way ahead

Insurgency

Central Idea

  • The recent ambush of the convoy in Chhattisgarh’s Dantewada district resulting in the deaths of 10 personnel of the District Reserve Guards (DRG) highlights that the Maoist insurgency remains a significant threat in India. The Home Minister has repeatedly given the impression that the end of the Maoist problem is near, but history has shown otherwise.

What is mean by Insurgency?

  • Insurgency refers to a violent uprising against the established government or authority of a country, typically carried out by a group of individuals or an organization that seeks to challenge the existing political, economic, or social order.
  • It often involves armed conflict, sabotage, and other forms of violence aimed at destabilizing the government or seizing power.
  • The ultimate goal of an insurgency is to overthrow the existing government and establish a new political system that is more in line with the insurgents’ ideology or goals

Rise of Insurgency India

  • The Communist Party of India (Marxist) split in 1967, with a section of the party rejecting the electoral path and advocating for armed struggle to overthrow the Indian state.
  • The Naxalbari uprising in West Bengal in 1967, where a group of peasants led by Charu Majumdar and Kanu Sanyal revolted against the local landlords and police. The uprising was brutally crushed by the state, but it gave birth to the Naxalite movement.
  • The formation of the Communist Party of India (Marxist-Leninist) in 1969, which became the political front of the Naxalite movement.
  • The formation of the People’s War Group in Andhra Pradesh in 1980, which became one of the most active Naxalite groups in the country.
  • The merger of the People’s War Group with the Maoist Communist Centre in 2004, to form the Communist Party of India (Maoist), which is the largest Naxalite group in India today.
  • The expansion of the Naxalite movement from West Bengal and Andhra Pradesh to other states, including Chhattisgarh, Jharkhand, Bihar, Odisha, and Maharashtra, among others.
  • The violent attacks by Naxalites on the state and central police forces, government officials, politicians, and civilians, resulting in the loss of thousands of lives over the years.

Facts for prelims

District Reserve Guards (DRG)

  • District Reserve Guards (DRG) is a special unit of the police force in some Indian states, primarily in Chhattisgarh, that is trained and equipped to combat Naxalite and Maoist insurgency.
  • DRG personnel are typically drawn from local tribal communities and are familiar with the local terrain, which makes them effective in fighting the insurgency.
  • They are provided with specialized training in guerrilla warfare, jungle warfare, and use of modern weaponry.
  • The DRG is often at the forefront of anti-Naxalite operations and is considered a vital component of the Indian government’s efforts to counter the Maoist insurgency in the country.

What are the flaws in the anti-Naxal strategy?

  1. Outsourcing operations to central armed police forces:
  • In most states, there is a tendency to outsource the operations against Naxals to the central armed police forces.
  • This strategy is flawed because unless the local police, who know the language and terrain, take the lead in anti-Naxal operations, the problem would linger.
  1. Imposed development paradigm:
  • The development paradigm pursued since independence has always been imposed on the tribal communities and has been insensitive to their needs and concerns. As a result, government plans have ended up in destroying their social organization, cultural identity, and resource base and generated multiple conflicts.
  • The tribals want schools and hospitals, but they neither need nor want capital-intensive plants or factories, which are inevitably accompanied by deforestation and displacement.
  1. Insensitivity towards tribal communities:
  • The development paradigm pursued since independence has always been imposed on the tribal communities and has been insensitive to their needs and concerns. As a result, government plans have ended up destroying their social organization, cultural identity, and resource base and generated multiple conflicts.
  1. Lack of an overall strategic plan:
  • There is no overall strategic plan against the Naxals. States have been carrying out anti-Naxal drives according to their individual understanding.
  • Territorial domination is essential, and security forces are able to achieve that, but that should be followed by the administrative apparatus establishing its network in the affected areas.
  1. Absence of peace talks:
  • The government should seriously think of applying the healing touch. If it can have peace talks with the Nagas and several other insurgent outfits in the Northeast, there is no reason why it should not take the initiative to have a dialogue with the Maoist leadership. This would not be seen as a sign of weakness on the contrary, it would be taken as a magnanimous gesture.

The way ahead to address the Naxal insurgency in India

  • Multi-pronged approach: The government should adopt a multi-pronged approach to address the Naxal problem that includes development initiatives, security measures, and dialogue with the Naxal leadership.
  • Focus on development: The government should focus on development initiatives in Naxal-affected areas that are tailored to meet the needs of the local population. This includes building infrastructure like schools, hospitals, and roads, creating employment opportunities, and addressing land rights issues.
  • Empowering local police: The state police should be empowered to take the lead in anti-Naxal operations as they have a better understanding of the local language and terrain.
  • Humanitarian approach: The government should adopt a humanitarian approach in dealing with the problem. The use of excessive force should be avoided, and care should be taken to ensure that the local population is not adversely affected.
  • Dialogue with Naxal leadership: The government should initiate a dialogue with the Naxal leadership to address their grievances and concerns. This would help in building trust and confidence between the two sides and pave the way for a peaceful resolution of the problem.
  • Coordination among states: The states should coordinate their efforts to address the Naxal problem. The sharing of intelligence, resources, and best practices would go a long way in addressing the issue.
  • Strengthening of institutions: The government should strengthen institutions like the police, judiciary, and administrative machinery to ensure that they are better equipped to deal with the problem.
  • Long-term vision: A long-term vision should be adopted to address the Naxal problem. This requires sustained efforts over a period of time to ensure that the problem is effectively tackled.

Conclusion

  • India’s Maoist insurgency problem is not one that can be solved by just law and order enforcement. It is crucial to address the underlying social and economic aspects of the problem. The government should acknowledge the flaws in its anti-Naxal strategy and undertake a comprehensive approach to solve the problem. It must ensure that the local police take the lead in anti-Naxal operations, and the development policies must be sensitive to the needs and concerns of the tribal communities. Initiating peace talks with the Maoist leadership could also go a long way in resolving the issue.

Mains Question

Q. The recent events of violent attacks on security forces highlights that the Maoist insurgency remains a significant threat in India. In light of this discuss what are the flaws in anti-Naxal strategy and what is needed to address the Naxal insurgency in India?

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Village Defence Guards (VDG): A sense of security and confidence

 

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Internal Security Architecture Shortcomings – Key Forces, NIA, IB, CCTNS, etc.

What is ‘Z’ Category Security?

Note4Students

From UPSC perspective, the following things are important :

Prelims level: Categories of security

Mains level: Need for security to politicians

A noted Parliamentarian from Hyderabad has rejected the ‘Z’ category security by the Central Armed Police Forces (CAPF) accorded to him.

Security Provisions in India

  • In India, security is provided to high-risk individuals by the police and local government.
  • The level of security needed by any individual is decided by the Ministry of Home Affairs, based on inputs received from intelligence agencies which include the IB and R&AW.
  • Individuals such as PM, home minister, and other officials such as the National Security Advisor generally get security cover because of the positions they occupy.
  • In addition to this, persons who are believed to be under threat also receive security cover.

What is ‘Z’ Category Security?

In India, the category covers are X, Y, Y-plus, Z, Z-plus, and SPG (Special Protection Group).

  • X Category: The protectee gets one gunman. Protectees in the Y category have one gunman for mobile security and one (plus four on rotation) for static security.
  • Y Plus category: It receives the cover of two gunmen (plus four on rotation) for mobile security, and one (plus four on rotation) for residence security,
  • Z Category: It has six gunmen for mobile security and two (plus 8) for residence security. They get 10 security personnel for mobile security, and two (plus 8) for residence security.
  • Z Plus Category: It is provided by National Security Guard commandos whereas the other category of security is provided by the Delhi police or the ITBP or CRPF personnel.

What about Special Protection Group (SPG) Cover?

  • The SPG cover is meant only for the PM and his immediate family.
  • After Indira Gandhi was assassinated by her own security guards in 1984, the Rajiv Gandhi government decided to create a special cadre of security personnel for the PM.
  • In March 1985, following the recommendations of a committee set up by the Home Ministry, a special unit was created for this purpose under the Cabinet Secretariat.
  • This unit, initially called the Special Protection Unit, was renamed as Special Protection Group in April 1985.

 

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Internal Security Architecture Shortcomings – Key Forces, NIA, IB, CCTNS, etc.

Politics, geography and demography shape Naxal movement

Note4Students

From UPSC perspective, the following things are important :

Prelims level: Not much

Mains level: Paper 3- Factors making Naxal moment a complex security challenge

The article explains the issues with the two common themes adopted for explaining the Naxal movement in India.

Two approaches to explain Naxal movement

1) Root cause and alienation approach

  • The recent attack in and around Tekulagudem village in Sukma district demonstrates the threat posed by Maoists.
  • The post-incident analysis of such setbacks comes in two flavours.
  • The most popular theory amongst our intelligentsia and media is the root cause and alienation approach. 
  • This approach states that it is the failure of the Indian state to provide economic development and social justice to the tribals living in these areas that has fuelled the Naxal movement and sustained it for five decades.
  • As a prescription, a development-centric approach and negotiations are suggested as the way forward.

Issues with root cause and alienation approach

  • There are several problems with this approach.
  • First, it ignores the ideological foundations of the movement, specifically its rejection of India’s Constitution and democracy.
  • Second, it fails to see that social and economic deprivation is not unique to the jungles of Chhattisgarh.
  • Third, it doesn’t account for the possibility that while alienation and deprivation may help in igniting the spark of revolution, once lit the flames draw oxygen from many sources.
  • Fourth, the role of external forces in fomenting and sustaining this movement is deliberately underplayed.
  • Fifth, the grubby ground reality of the praxis of revolution is conveniently swept under the carpet.
  • The organised extortion racket from all economic stakeholders in the Naxal-affected areas by our alienated revolutionaries seldom gets talked about.
  • Sixth, the extensive ideological, financial and logistical ecosystem that provides sustenance to these revolutionaries in the jungle is seldom acknowledged.

2) Leadership issue

  • According to this view, our tactical failures against the Maoists are entirely due to the poor quality of leadership provided by the Indian Police Service.
  • The when, where, how of a setback simply don’t matter.
  • When in doubt, identify the first IPS officer in the chain of command and hoist him on the petard of tactical incompetence.
  • This view completely ignores the many successes of IPS leadership in counterinsurgency operations in Punjab, Andhra Pradesh, Uttar Pradesh and most recently in Odisha.
  • Even in the Northeast and Jammu and Kashmir, where the Indian Army provides the backbone of the counterinsurgency grid, the police forces of the respective states and their IPS leadership play a crucial role in gathering intelligence and in executing operations.
  • So, the failures and setbacks in the Naxal areas of Chhattisgarh need to be placed in perspective.

Way forward

  • The fact that the Indian state has adopted a broad policy of economic development, military restraint and gradual attrition and rejected indiscriminate violence in the Naxal theatre is the democratically prudent and morally just course of action.
  • This hasn’t dissuaded Maoist sympathisers from gaining international attention through relentless propaganda against our security forces.
  • However, such attacks also help in exposing their true nature and hardening public resolve against them.
  •  \We have enough examples of successful, police led CI Ops in our country.
  • Why we are not able to replicate these successes in Chhattisgarh is a matter of larger political issues, well beyond the narrow scope of operational tactics and individual lapses of police leadership.
  • Not just the politics, the geography and demography of the Naxal-affected areas, make it an even more complex challenge of internal security.

Consider the question “What are the factors that make Naxal movement a persistent threat to India’s internal security? ” 

Conclusion

Not just the politics, the geography and demography of the Naxal-affected areas, make it an even more complex challenge of internal security.

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Internal Security Architecture Shortcomings – Key Forces, NIA, IB, CCTNS, etc.

Maoist Attack in Sukma

Note4Students

From UPSC perspective, the following things are important :

Prelims level: Not much

Mains level: Paper 3- Challenge of left wing extremism

The article deals with the counterinsurgency strategies to deal with the issues of left wing extremism in India

Threat of left-wing extremism

  • The killing of 22 security personnel by Maoists serves as a grim reminder that left-wing insurgency continues to be one of the biggest internal security threats for the country.
  • In the past few years, Maoist violence seemed to have been on a downward spiral.
  • The figures associated with the key indicators of violence like the number of incidents also support the contention that “insurgency is on the downward spiral”.
  • But the attack should thus serve as a wake-up call to those who had begun to get complacent about the Maoist threat.

Approach in counterinsurgency strategy

  • One school believes that given the Maoist insurgency posturing itself as a “people’s war”, the mandate is for a people-centric approach of “winning hearts and minds”.
  • Others argues that an enemy-centric approach predicated on kinetic operations is best suited for the Maoist insurgency, where the fear of the population seceding from India is remote.
  • The success of the erstwhile state of Andhra Pradesh in curbing the Maoist problem is often attributed to this enemy-centric approach.
  • However, there is robust scholarly work available that shows that the Andhra government based its counterintelligence strategy on a judicious mix of the enemy-centric and population-centric approaches.
  •  Andhra Pradesh had successfully implemented short-gestation-period developmental works in the Maoist-affected rural areas.
  • Moreover, the erstwhile state is also the first state to have a comprehensive surrender-cum-rehabilitation policy.
  • After the 2014 guidelines of the central government were brought out, many states have crafted attractive surrender and rehabilitation policies.
  • Another important question is whether the government should keep the option of talking to Maoists open.
  • The willingness to talk to rebel groups seems to incentivise insurgents and may demonstrate that violence pays.
  • But bringing an end to civil war invariably involves negotiating with the enemy.

Way forward

  • Indian counterinsurgency has to work with a dual objective of defeating the insurgents militarily and fully quell the insurgent impulses.
  • This will need institutional overhauls.
  • In the last decade or so, insurgency-affected states have started to raise special forces on the lines of Greyhounds.
  • These forces are being given rigorous training in “counter-guerrilla” tactics and jungle warfare.
  •  Besides, the jungles around the interstate borders have always been the preferred hiding spaces for the Maoists.
  •  States must do more to synergise their efforts by launching coordinated operations, thereby denying Maoists any space for manoeuvrability.
  • These efforts need to be supplemented by well-crafted development schemes.
  • It is also important to segregate the population from the insurgents both operationally and ideologically.
  • The conflict over the distribution of resources can be mended with economic development.
  • But the bigger challenge would be to create a system where the tribal population feels that the government is representative, not repressive.
  • Opening negotiation channels and policies like surrender and rehabilitation can give such a representative sense to the rebels.

Consider the question “Discuss the causes of left wing extremism in India. Suggest the way forward to deal with the issue.”

Conclusion

The government needs to follow these policies to end the challenge of left wing extremism from India.

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Internal Security Architecture Shortcomings – Key Forces, NIA, IB, CCTNS, etc.

Private: National Security Act (NSA), 1980 

Note4Students

From UPSC perspective, the following things are important :

Prelims level: National Security Act (NSA)

Mains level: NSA and its situational implementation, Issue of misuse

Context

  • The Indore district administration invoked the National Security Act (NSA), 1980,against four persons accused of instigating residents of a locality to pelt stones and chase away health workers.
  • Health workers were in the locality to trace the contact history of a Covid-19 patient.

What is the National Security Act, 1980?

  • The National Security Act of 1980 is a law that aims to provide for preventive detention in certain cases that can pose a threat to the security of the country.
  • This Act, consisting of 18 sections, applies to the whole of India.
  • It empowers the Central Government and state governments to detain an individual to prevent him/her from acting in any manner that may hurt India’s security, its relations with foreign countries, for the maintenance of public order, or the maintenance of supplies and services essential to the community.
  • The law also gives power to the governments to detain foreign nationals to regulate his/her presence or expel from the country.

How did the National Security Act come to be?

  • The National Security Act is not the first law of its kind to be enacted in India.
  • Preventive detention laws in India date back to early days of the colonial era when the Bengal Regulation III of 1818 was enacted to empower the government to arrest anyone for defence or maintenance of public order without giving the person the judicial proceedings.
  • A century later, the British government enacted the Rowlatt Acts of 1919 that allowed confinement of a suspect without trial.
  • The Rowlatt Acts empowered the state to detain citizens without giving detainees any right to move to the court and even get the assistance of lawyers.
  • The Jallianwalla Bagh tragedy was a direct result of the protest against these Rowlatt Bills.
  • The Government of India Act, 1935 empowered the state to undertake preventive detention for reasons related to defence, external affairs or discharge of functions of the Crown in its relations with the Indian States.
  • After the enactment of the Indian Constitution, Article 21 guaranteed every individual the right to life and liberty, which could not be denied to him/her without honouring the due procedure established by law.
  • In K. Gopalan’s case, the Supreme Court distinguished “the procedure established by law” from the “due process of law”, saying that any procedure duly enacted would be a “procedure established by law”.
  • However, this view currently stands reversed after Maneka Gandhi’s case where the top court held that the “procedure established by law” must also be just, fair and reasonable.
  • Article 22 of the Indian constitution laid down procedures under which a preventive detention law could be enacted.
  • After independence, India got its first preventive detention rule when the Nehru Government enacted the Preventive Detention Act of 1950, which expired on 31st December 1969.
  • In the year 1971, Prime Minister Indira Gandhi had brought in the controversial Maintenance of Internal Security Act (MISA), giving similar powers to the government.
  • Later, the MISA was repealed in 1977 and was replaced by the National Security Act (NSA).

What are the provisions of NSA?

i.Detention:

  • The power to preventively detain an individual under the National Security Act is given to the Police Commissioner or District Magistrate if the state government is satisfied that it is “necessary to do so”.
  • The Act provides that a detained individual have to be informed of the grounds of detention within 5 days of detention, which may extend up to 10 days in exceptional circumstances.
  • At the same time, the Act also states that the authority has the right to not disclose the facts, which it deems to be against the public interest to disclose.
  • The maximum permissible period of detention under the NSA is 12 months.
  • However, the order for preventive detention can be modified or revoked any time earlier or can be extended indefinitely beyond 12 months.

ii.Grounds of Detention:

  • An individual can be detained under the NSA in the presence of the following grounds:
  • Acting in a manner prejudicial to India’s defence, foreign relations or security
  • Regulating the continued presence of any foreigner in India or to make arrangements for his expulsion from India
  • To maintain public order
  • To maintain supplies and services that are essential to the community

iii.Constitution of Advisory Board:

  • Under the NSA, if any detention is made, then it has to be referred to an Advisory Board within three weeks from the date of detention.
  • This Advisory Board has to submit its report within 7 weeks from the date of detention.
  • The Central or State government shall constitute one or more Advisory Boards.
  • An Advisory Board consists of 3 persons who are qualified to be appointed as judges for the High Courts
  • Here, the detained person does not have the right to be legally represented.
  • Also, the board proceedings are not brought to the public and the reports are confidential.
  • The Advisory Board analyses whether or not the grounds of detention is sufficient or not.
  • If the Advisory Board finds that the grounds are sufficient, then the appropriate government may confirm the order for detention.
  • However, if the Advisory Board finds no appropriate grounds to permit detention, the government should release the detenu.

iv.No legal proceedings against governments:

  • Section 16 states that no suit or other legal proceedings can be taken against Central or State governments, or any other person, for anything that is being done in good faith or intended to be done in pursuance of this Act.

Why is NSA criticised?

  • Under the normal circumstances, if an individual is arrested, he/she is guaranteed certain fundamental rights.
  • These include the right to be informed of the reasons behind the arrest.
  • Section 50 of the Criminal Procedure (CrPC) mandates that the arrested individual should be informed of the grounds of arrest and the rights to bail.
  • Sections 56 and 76 of the CrPC also provide that an individual has been produced before a court within 24 hours of arrest.
  • Furthermore, Article 22(1) of the Constitution states that an arrested person cannot be denied the right to consult and to be defended by a legal practitioner of his/her choice.
  • However, none of these aforementioned rights is allowed under the NSA.
  • Article 22(3) of the Constitution does not extend the safeguards of the criminal system to preventive detention.
  • NSA provides major loopholes for the government and the police to circumvent the formalities of the Criminal Procedure Code and the justice system.
  • This Act provides neither transparency nor accountability of the government.
  • Furthermore, the National Crime Records Bureau (NCRB), which collects data pertaining to crime in India, doesn’t list out the cases under the NSA as no FIRs are registered in this regard. This makes it impossible to know the exact number of detentions that have been made under this Act.
  • These limitations allow the government to use the law arbitrarily and without any reasonable cause.

Some of the instances of government misusing this NSA include:

  • Uttar Pradesh government, in January 2019, arrested three individuals under the NSA in connection with alleged cow slaughter.
  • In December 2018, a journalist from Manipur was detained for 12 months under the NSA, where he has posted an offensive post against the Chief Minister on Facebook
  • Though this Act provides for maintenance of law and order within the country, it lacks reasonableness.
  • Currently, there is no recourse available against these provisions, allowing for the ignorance of basic human rights for the detained persons.

Way Forward

  • It needs to be noted that the Act is 40 years old. Changes are required to ensure that the Act is not used arbitrarily.
  • Arbitrary use of the Act hampers democracy and basic rights of an individual.
  • Even, the Supreme Court has held that the law of preventive detention has to be strictly construed and meticulous compliance with the procedural safeguards, is mandatory and vital.
  • Given that India occasionally staggers through spasmodic bouts of violence and disorder, it is possible that very narrowly tailored preventive detention laws with stringent judicial controls could be appropriate to counter such threats, at least in times of particular unrest.
  • Increasing the accountability of the governmental authorities,
  • Tailoring the law more narrowly to the truly serious threats to India’s security, and
  • Refining the language of the NSA so as to make it less vague and, therefore, less susceptible to abuses and creative interpretations from executive authorities, are fundamental if abuses are to be checked.

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Internal Security Architecture Shortcomings – Key Forces, NIA, IB, CCTNS, etc.

Explained: What is the NIA Act, and why is Chhattisgarh challenging it?

Note4Students

From UPSC perspective, the following things are important :

Prelims level: NIA Act

Mains level: Policing Issues with NIA

The Chhattisgarh state govt. moved the Supreme Court against the 2008 National Investigative Agency (NIA) Act, stating it is violative of the Constitution. In its civil suit, the government told the apex court the NIA should have no power over state policing matters.

What is the NIA Act, 2008?

  • The NIA Act, 2008 governs the functioning of India’s premier counter-terror agency.
  • It was introduced by then home minister P Chidambaram in the wake of the 26/11 Mumbai terrorist attacks and was passed in Parliament with very little opposition.
  • The Act makes the NIA the only truly federal agency in the country, along the lines of the FBI in the United States, more powerful than the CBI.
  • It gives the NIA powers to take suo motu cognizance of terror activities in any part of India and register a case, to enter any state without permission from the state government, and to investigate and arrest people.

Objections made by CG

  • In its petition, the Chhattisgarh govt. said the Act is “ultra vires the Constitution” and “beyond the legislative competence of the Parliament”.
  • According to the state, the 2008 Act allows the Centre to create an agency for investigation, which is a function of the state police.
  • ‘Police’ is an entry in the State List of the Constitution’s 7th Schedule.
  • The petition says the 2008 Act takes away the state’s power of conducting an investigation through the police, while conferring unfettered, discretionary and arbitrary powers” on the Centre.
  • The provisions of the Act leave no room of coordination and pre-condition of consent, in any form whatsoever, by the Centre from the State govt. which clearly repudiates the idea of state sovereignty as envisaged under the Constitution.

Changes made to the NIA’s powers last year

  • The 2019 NIA Amendment Act expanded the type of offences that the investigative body could investigate and prosecute.
  • The agency can now investigate offences related to human trafficking, counterfeit currency, manufacture or sale of prohibited arms, cyber-terrorism, and offences under the Explosive Substances Act, 1908.
  • The amendment also enables the central government to designate sessions courts as special courts for NIA trials.
  • The Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Amendment (UAPA), also passed in 2019, allows an NIA officer to conduct raids, and seize properties that are suspected to be linked to terrorist activities without taking prior permission of the DG of Police of a state.
  • The investigating officer only requires sanction from the Director General of NIA.

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