Foreign Policy Watch: India-China

Foreign Policy Watch: India-China

Preventing a China-Taiwan conflict

Note4Students

From UPSC perspective, the following things are important :

Prelims level: NA

Mains level: Reason behind the maintaining in China-Taiwan conflict

Why in the News?

India, with growing national interests, faces entanglements in disputes like Taiwan. While China claims Taiwan, India is unlikely to engage militarily, focusing on safeguarding its economic and security interests.

Context:

  • The Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) recently achieved an unprecedented third consecutive term in Taiwan’s legislative elections, defying China’s threats and hostilities.
  • Taiwan’s legislative assembly faces a unique scenario with no clear majority for the first time in twenty years, which complicates policymaking and interactions with China.

Three reasons for Indian Government to maintain the Status quo:

  • Firstly, India is interested in maintaining the current state, wherein Taiwan operates as a self-governing territory without asserting independence.
  • Secondly, Chinese aggression against Taiwan would be catastrophically costly for India. A recent Bloomberg study estimates that the costs of a conflict would amount to over 10% of global GDP. India’s economy would suffer a greater shock than the U.S. economy and its most valuable sectors, from electronics to pharmaceuticals, would run dry of components and materials.
  • Thirdly, if China wins, it could become more confident and expand its influence, possibly reaching the Indian Ocean. This could pose significant challenges to India’s strategic interests and territorial integrity, potentially leading to increased tensions, especially in Arunachal Pradesh.

Scope for Indian Government:

  • Utilize International Law: India can leverage international legal frameworks to advocate for peaceful resolutions and oppose aggression against Taiwan.
  • Narrative Building: India can shape narratives against aggression, highlighting the risks and consequences of military conflict.
  • Diplomatic Coordination: India can work with other nations to coordinate diplomatic efforts aimed at dissuading China from military action.
  • Economic Measures: India can undertake economic de-risking measures to minimize vulnerabilities and reduce dependence on China like economic relations with other countries
  • Information Operations: India can engage in information campaigns to support the Taiwanese people and raise awareness about the situation.
  • Military Support: India can support U.S. forces in the Indian Ocean, enhancing deterrence capabilities and signalling commitment to regional stability.

Conclusion: India, prioritizing economic and security interests, maintains the Taiwan status quo. To prevent conflict, it leverages international law, builds narratives against aggression, coordinates diplomacy, and considers economic diversification while supporting regional stability.


Mains PYQ

Q China is using its economic relations and positive trade surplus as tools to develop potential military power status in Asia’, In the light of this statement, discuss its impact on India as her neighbor. (UPSC IAS/2017)

Q With respect to the South China sea, maritime territorial disputes and rising tension affaire the need for safeguarding maritime security to ensure freedom of navigation and ever flight throughout the region. In this context, discuss the bilateral issues between India and China. ( UPSC IAS/2014)

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Foreign Policy Watch: India-China

China objects to US recognizing Arunachal as Indian Territory

Note4Students

From UPSC perspective, the following things are important :

Prelims level: Border dispute between India and china

Mains level: role of usa in resolving dispute between India and China

Why in the news? 

China on Thursday said it firmly opposes the US recognition of Arunachal Pradesh as part of Indian territory

Context-

  • China’s strong reaction came hours after US State Department Principal Deputy Spokesperson Vedant Patel’s remarks that the United States “recognises Arunachal Pradesh as Indian territory.
  • US representative strongly oppose any unilateral attempts to advance territorial claims by incursions or encroachments, military or civilian, across the Line of Actual Control.

Border Issues between Indian and China-

  • Aksai Chin: China administers it as part of Xinjiang, while India claims it as part of Ladakh.Aksai Chin holds strategic importance due to its proximity to the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) and its potential as a military route.
  • Arunachal Pradesh: China claims the entire state as “South Tibet,” while India administers it as a northeastern state.
  • Lack of Clear Demarcation: The border between India and China lacks clear demarcation throughout. The Line of Actual Control (LAC) was established after the 1962 Indo-China war, contributing to the complexity of the situation.Absence of a mutually agreed Line of Actual Control (LAC) along certain stretches leads to ambiguity and potential for conflicts.

Military Standoffs between India and China- 

  • 1962 Sino-Indian War– It was a conflict over border disputes, primarily centered around Aksai Chin and Arunachal Pradesh, resulting in a decisive victory for China.
  • Confrontations have escalated since 2013-The most serious  conflict were in Galwan Valley in Ladakh in 2020 and in Tawang in Arunachal Pradesh in 2022.

Border Dispute Settlement Mechanisms between India and China-

  • Panchsheel Agreement of 1954: The Panchsheel doctrine distinctly expressed a commitment to respect each other’s sovereignty and territorial integrity.
  • Peace and Tranquility Agreements1993: Both countries have signed several agreements aimed at maintaining peace and tranquility along the border, such as the Agreement on the Maintenance of Peace and Tranquility along the Line of Actual Control (LAC) in the India-China Border Areas signed in 1993.
  • The Agreement on Confidence Building Measures in the Military Field along the LAC- It was signed in 1996, which laid down pledges on non-aggression, prior notification of large troop movements, and exchange of maps to resolve disagreements over the LAC.
  • Working Mechanism for Consultation and Coordination on India-China Border Affairs (WMCC): This mechanism, established in 2012, aims to address day-to-day management of the border, enhance communication, and prevent misunderstandings or conflicts.
  • Joint Military Exercises: India and China occasionally conduct joint military exercises aimed at improving mutual understanding and cooperation, which indirectly contributes to confidence-building measures. For example Hand in Hand.

Suggestive measures to resolve the border dispute between India and China:

  • Diplomatic Dialogue: Both countries should engage in sustained diplomatic negotiations at various levels to address the underlying issues causing the dispute.
  • Bilateral Agreements: Continuation and reinforcement of existing bilateral agreements aimed at maintaining peace and tranquillity along the border.
  • Border Management Mechanisms: Strengthening and enhancing border management mechanisms such as Border Personnel Meetings (BPMs) and the Working Mechanism for Consultation and Coordination on India-China Border Affairs (WMCC) to effectively manage and resolve disputes.
  • Clarification of LAC: Work towards mutual clarification and delineation of the Line of Actual Control (LAC) to reduce ambiguity and prevent misunderstandings.
  • Disengagement and De-escalation: Prioritize efforts to disengage troops and de-escalate tensions in disputed areas along the border.
  • Conflict Prevention: Implement measures aimed at preventing confrontations and conflicts, such as prior notification of military exercises and troop movements.
  • Third-Party Mediation: Consider the involvement of neutral third-party mediators or international organizations to facilitate dialogue and negotiation.
  • People-to-People Contacts: Promote cultural and people-to-people exchanges to foster better understanding and trust between the two nations.

How USA can help to resolve border dispute between India and China- 

  • Facilitate Diplomatic Dialogue: The USA can encourage and facilitate diplomatic dialogue between India and China to resolve the border dispute peacefully.
  • Mediation Role: Offer to mediate or provide assistance as a neutral third-party mediator if both parties consent to such involvement.
  • Provide Strategic Support: Offer strategic support and expertise in conflict resolution to help address the complex issues underlying the dispute.
  • Pressure for Peaceful Resolution: Use diplomatic channels to exert pressure on both India and China to prioritize peaceful resolution of the dispute.
  • Regional Stability: Emphasize the importance of resolving the border dispute for regional stability and economic development.
  • Support Existing Mechanisms: Support existing border dispute settlement mechanisms, such as the Working Mechanism for Consultation and Coordination on India-China Border Affairs (WMCC), through funding or technical assistance.

Conclusion-

China’s objection to the US recognizing Arunachal Pradesh as Indian territory underscores the need for diplomatic dialogue. The US can play a constructive role by facilitating negotiations and supporting existing mechanisms for peaceful resolution. 

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Foreign Policy Watch: India-China

China’s Xiaokang Border Defence Villages along LAC

Note4Students

From UPSC perspective, the following things are important :

Prelims level: Xiaokang Border Defence Villages

Mains level: China's motive to populate LAC

Xiaokang

Introduction

  • Recent reports reveal a concerning development along India’s northeastern border with China as the Chinese people have begun occupying several Xiaokang border defence villages. Let’s delve into the details of these villages, their significance, and India’s response to this escalating situation.

About Xiaokang Border Defence Villages

  • Construction Initiative: China initiated the construction of 628 Xiaokang or “well-off villages” along India’s borders with the Tibet Autonomous Region over five years ago, including areas along the Line of Actual Control (LAC).
  • Infrastructure: These villages boast mostly double-storey, spacious buildings, designed for dual-use purposes, raising concerns from a defense standpoint.

Purpose and Concerns

  • Dual-Use Infrastructure: The exact purpose of these villages remains unclear, but they are perceived as strategic assets, capable of serving both civil and military functions.
  • Territorial Assertions: Many in the strategic community view these villages as a means for China to assert its claims over specific areas along the LAC, exacerbating tensions between the two nations.

India’s Response

  • Vibrant Villages Programme: In response, India launched the Vibrant Villages Programme in 2022, aiming to modernize border villages and promote tourism.
  • Pilot Projects: At least 17 border villages along the China-India border have been selected for development, including areas in Ladakh, Himachal Pradesh, Uttarakhand, Sikkim, and Arunachal Pradesh.
  • Focus on Northeast: Villages in Arunachal Pradesh’s eastern region and the Tawang area are specifically targeted for development, highlighting India’s strategic focus in this region.

Infrastructure Developments

  • China’s Initiatives: China has been actively constructing infrastructure along the LAC, including roads, bridges, and housing in Bhutanese territory.
  • India’s Countermeasures: India is also bolstering its border infrastructure, focusing on enhancing connectivity and developing alternate routes to the LAC, particularly in the northeast region.

Conclusion

  • The occupation of Xiaokang border defence villages by China raises significant concerns about regional stability and territorial integrity.
  • India’s proactive response through developmental initiatives underscores its commitment to safeguarding its borders and promoting socio-economic progress in border areas.
  • As tensions persist, both nations continue to navigate this complex geopolitical landscape with vigilance and strategic foresight.

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Foreign Policy Watch: India-China

Complex China-Taiwan Relations: A Historical Perspective

Note4Students

From UPSC perspective, the following things are important :

Prelims level: Read the attached story

Mains level: China-Taiwan Relations

taiwan

Introduction

  • Taiwan’s presidential election on January 13, which saw the victory of the ruling party candidate Lai Ching-te, carries significant implications not only for the island but also for global geopolitics.
  • To understand the dynamics at play, it’s crucial to delve into the complex history and evolving relationship between China and Taiwan.

Taiwan Tension: A Historical Background

  • Early Settlement: Taiwan’s first known settlers were Austronesian tribal people, believed to have migrated from southern China.
  • Chinese Records: Chinese records from AD 239 mention Taiwan, forming part of China’s territorial claim.
  • Qing Dynasty and Japan: Taiwan was administered by China’s Qing dynasty and later ceded to Japan after the First Sino-Japanese War.
  • Post-World War II: After World War II, Taiwan was officially considered occupied by the Republic of China (ROC), with the consent of the US and UK.

Civil War and Exile

  • Civil War: A civil war broke out in China, leading Chiang Kai-shek and his Kuomintang (KMT) government, along with supporters, to flee to Taiwan in 1949.
  • Dictatorship Era: Chiang established a dictatorship that ruled Taiwan until the 1980s.
  • Transition to Democracy: After Chiang’s death, Taiwan embarked on a transition to democracy, holding its first elections in 1996.

Status of Taiwan

  • Disagreement: There is disagreement regarding Taiwan’s status.
  • Independent Governance: Taiwan has its own constitution, democratically-elected leaders, and an armed forces.
  • Decline in Recognition: Over time, the number of countries recognizing Taiwan as the ROC government has dwindled, largely due to diplomatic pressure from China.

Evolving Relations with China

  • 1980s Improvement: Relations started improving in the 1980s as Taiwan relaxed rules on visits and investments in China.
  • One Country, Two Systems: China proposed the “one country, two systems” option, which Taiwan rejected.
  • Political Shift: The election of Chen Shui-bian in 2000 marked a shift, as he openly backed Taiwan “independence.”
  • Anti-Secession Law: China passed an anti-secession law in 2005, threatening non-peaceful means against Taiwan.
  • Cross-Strait Relations: Cross-strait relations soured under President Tsai Ing-wen, with China cutting off official communications due to her refusal to endorse a single Chinese nation concept.

US Involvement

  • US-Taiwan Relations: The US officially recognizes Beijing but remains Taiwan’s significant international supporter.
  • Defensive Commitment: The US is bound by law to provide Taiwan with defensive weapons, and President Joe Biden has stated a commitment to defending Taiwan militarily.
  • Contested Issue: Taiwan remains a contentious issue in US-China relations, with Beijing condemning perceived US support for Taipei.
  • Increased Tensions: China has intensified its “grey zone warfare” around Taiwan, sending fighter jets and conducting military drills in response to US-Taiwan exchanges.

Conclusion

  • The results of Taiwan’s presidential election and the evolving China-Taiwan relationship have far-reaching implications for global politics.
  • Balancing diplomatic recognition, territorial disputes, and US involvement, the delicate equilibrium in the Taiwan Strait will continue to shape the course of international relations in the Asia-Pacific region.

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Foreign Policy Watch: India-China

The outlook for 2024, for the world and India

Note4Students

From UPSC perspective, the following things are important :

Prelims level: na

Mains level: importance of fortified Center-State relations for efficacious governance

Central idea 

The editorial examines the heightened global risks in 2024, navigating a precarious era marked by challenges to the existing international order. It anticipates potential flashpoints, including the war in Ukraine and Middle East tensions, while also scrutinizing India’s prospects and internal dynamics. Emphasizing the importance of robust Center-State relations, the editorial envisions a turbulent period demanding strategic foresight and diplomatic acuity.

Key Highlights:

  • The editorial explores the expected global risks and uncertainties in 2024, highlighting a period of significant danger.
  • Challenges to the existing international order are emphasized, coming not only from its supporters but also from those declaring it outdated.
  • Potential flashpoints, such as the ongoing war in Ukraine and escalating tensions in the Middle East, are identified.
  • Changing geopolitical dynamics in West Asia, where emerging alliances challenge Western dominance, are carefully examined.
  • India’s prospects in 2024, including the upcoming general election and potential economic challenges, are concisely discussed.
  • Sino-Indian relations are predicted to remain strained, with a focus on possible provocative actions by China.
  • The editorial acknowledges challenges to India’s influence in its neighborhood and the evolving landscape of West Asia.
  • Internal dynamics in India, encompassing a politically charged atmosphere and turmoil in Parliament, are thoughtfully explored.
  • The editorial underscores the importance of strong Center-State relations for effective governance.

Key Challenges:

  • The global landscape is filled with risks and uncertainties, presenting formidable challenges to stability.
  • The existing international order faces challenges not only from its critics but also from supporters questioning its relevance.
  • Potential flashpoints, including the enduring war in Ukraine and escalating tensions in the Middle East, increase geopolitical vulnerabilities.
  • Changing geopolitical dynamics introduce challenges to established Western leadership paradigms.
  • India faces potential challenges in the upcoming general election and contends with economic uncertainties.
  • Strained Sino-Indian relations and potential provocations by China introduce security challenges.
  • Internal challenges in India include heightened political tensions and parliamentary disarray.

Key Terms and Phrases:

  • Global risks and uncertainties
  • Rules-based international order
  • Geostrategic contradictions
  • Flashpoints
  • Shifting geopolitical dynamics
  • Unforeseen challenges (“black swans”)
  • Adventurist actions
  • Center-State relations

Key Quotes:

  • “Navigating an epoch of substantial peril.”
  • “Challenged by architects of the ‘rules-based international order’ and those deeming it antiquated.”
  • “An era fraught with substantial peril.”
  • “Potential ‘adventurist actions’ by China.”
  • “An impending period of turbulence.”
  • “Politically charged atmosphere.”
  • “Expulsion of the Trinamool Congress Member of Parliament, Mahua Moitra.”

Anecdotes:

  • Exploration of the enduring war in Ukraine and its potential ramifications on the U.S. presidential election.
  • Insight into the Israel-Hamas conflict as a catalyst for heightened tensions in the Middle East.
  • Brief anecdote concerning the ruling dispensation’s assurance in India’s forthcoming general election.

Key Statements:

  • “The world stands on the brink of a period marked by significant peril.”
  • “The existing international order grapples with multifaceted challenges.”
  • “Geostrategic contradictions are poised to escalate.”
  • “The internal landscape demands vigilant observation.”
  • “The nation approaches a potential turning point.”

Key Examples and References:

  • The enduring war in Ukraine and its potential influence on the U.S. presidential election.
  • Israel-Hamas conflict as a driver of heightened tensions in the Middle East.
  • Shifting geopolitics in West Asia and emerging alliances challenging Western leadership.

Critical Analysis:

  • The editorial furnishes a nuanced analysis of potential challenges and uncertainties on a global scale and within India.
  • Emphasis on the importance of fortified Center-State relations for efficacious governance.
  • Recognition of potential “black swans” and unforeseen challenges.

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Foreign Policy Watch: India-China

India’s growing neighbourhood dilemmas

Note4Students

From UPSC perspective, the following things are important :

Prelims level: NA

Mains level: focus on reducing anti-India sentiments

McMOHAN LINE | UPSC Current Affairs | IAS GYAN

Central idea

The central idea revolves around the challenges in India’s neighborhood, marked by politically anti-India regimes, China’s growing influence, and a changing geopolitical landscape. The dilemmas stem from a shift in power dynamics, policy stances, and mistaken assumptions, necessitating a realistic approach, proactive diplomacy, and addressing workforce shortages for effective foreign policy implementation.

Key Highlights:

  • Neighbourhood Challenges: The Achilles heel of Indian foreign policy lies in its neighbourhood, posing three types of dilemmas: politically anti-India regimes, structural challenges from Beijing’s growing influence, and the overarching geopolitical architecture.
  • China’s Rising Influence: China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and strategic outreach in South Asia present challenges, making India geopolitically vulnerable within an unfriendly neighbourhood.
  • Causes of Dilemmas: Regional geopolitical architecture, China’s ascendance, normative approach vs. China’s non-normative stance, and the shift from resident to non-resident power dynamics contribute to India’s dilemmas.
  • Policy Stance Dilemma: India’s status quo bias in dealing with regional politics and a focus on power centers contribute to path-dependencies and sometimes alienate other centers of power or opposition leaders.
  • Mistaken Assumptions: Assumptions that South Asia minus Pakistan would align with Indian geopolitical reasoning and that cultural connections would ensure better relations have proven inaccurate.

Key Challenges:

  • Changing Balance of Power: India must adapt to the changed balance of power in Southern Asia, acknowledging China’s emergence as a serious contender for regional primacy.
  • Involvement of External Actors: Proactively involving friendly external actors in the region is crucial to prevent it from becoming Sino-centric.
  • Flexible Diplomacy: Indian diplomacy needs to be flexible, engaging multiple actors in each neighboring country and focusing on lessening anti-India attitudes rather than solely dealing with those in power.
  • Diplomatic Workforce Shortage: The shortage of diplomats is a critical challenge, hindering India’s ability to implement foreign policy effectively and respond to global opportunities or crises.

Key Quotes:

  • “India’s neighbours and periphery are China’s too, even if we do not like it.”
  • “Dealing with whoever is in power is a good policy, but engaging only those in power is a bad policy.”

Critical Analysis:

  • India faces complex geopolitical challenges in its neighborhood, requiring a pragmatic approach to the changed power dynamics. The need for a mental switch, proactive diplomacy, and addressing workforce shortages emerges as critical. The evolving scenario necessitates a shift from traditional assumptions and a more nuanced engagement strategy.

Way Forward:

  • Realistic Framing: India should acknowledge the fundamental changes in the regional balance of power and operate within the framework of a new geopolitical reality.
  • External Actor Engagement: Actively involve friendly external actors to counterbalance China’s influence in the region.
  • Flexible Diplomacy: Adopt a flexible diplomatic approach that engages with multiple actors in neighboring countries, focusing on reducing anti-India sentiments.
  • Diplomatic Workforce Enhancement: Address the shortage of diplomats by significantly enhancing India’s diplomatic workforce to effectively implement foreign policy objectives.

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Foreign Policy Watch: India-China

Places in news: Julian Felipe Reef

Note4Students

From UPSC perspective, the following things are important :

Prelims level: Julian Felipe Reef

Mains level: Not Much

Julian Felipe Reef

Central Idea

  • The Philippines confirmed that more than 135 Chinese vessels made incursion on Julian Felipe Reef (also known as Whitsun Reef), a place off its coast.

About Julian Felipe Reef

  • Julian Felipe Reef is part of the Spratly Islands, located in the West Philippine Sea, a portion of the South China Sea.
  • It lies within the Philippines’ exclusive economic zone.
  • It is a large boomerang-shaped shallow coral reef.

Recent Dispute

  • The reef gained international attention in early 2021 when a large number of Chinese vessels, described by the Philippines as maritime militia, were spotted at the reef.
  • It is subject to a territorial dispute involving several countries, primarily the Philippines, China, and Vietnam.
  • The Philippines claims the Reef as part of its territory, specifically within its 200-nautical-mile exclusive economic zone, under the UNCLOS.
  • This dispute is part of the larger and complex South China Sea territorial disputes involving various countries in the region.
  • The Philippines has sought international arbitration under UNCLOS to assert its claims.

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Foreign Policy Watch: India-China

Places in news: Julian Felipe (Whitson) Reef

Julian Felipe Reef

Central Idea

  • The Philippines confirmed that more than 135 Chinese vessels made incursion on Julian Felipe Reef (also known as Whitsun Reef), a place off its coast.

About Julian Felipe Reef

  • Julian Felipe Reef is part of the Spratly Islands, located in the West Philippine Sea, a portion of the South China Sea.
  • It lies within the Philippines’ exclusive economic zone.
  • It is a large boomerang-shaped shallow coral reef.

Recent Dispute

  • The reef gained international attention in early 2021 when a large number of Chinese vessels, described by the Philippines as maritime militia, were spotted at the reef.
  • It is subject to a territorial dispute involving several countries, primarily the Philippines, China, and Vietnam.
  • The Philippines claims the Reef as part of its territory, specifically within its 200-nautical-mile exclusive economic zone, under the UNCLOS.
  • This dispute is part of the larger and complex South China Sea territorial disputes involving various countries in the region.
  • The Philippines has sought international arbitration under UNCLOS to assert its claims.

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Foreign Policy Watch: India-China

How Racism overshadowed India-Taiwan Co-operation

Note4Students

From UPSC perspective, the following things are important :

Prelims level: NA

Mains level: India Taiwan Relations

taiwan

Central Idea

  • Recent reports of India and Taiwan considering a MoU to facilitate Indian workers’ employment in Taiwan have revealed underlying issues of racism and stereotypes.
  • These negative perceptions have implications for both countries and the need for addressing such biases is paramount.

Racism in Taiwan and Stereotypes

  • MoU Announcement: Reports of a MoU between India and Taiwan sparked racism in Taiwan towards Indian men.
  • Negative Stereotypes: Taiwanese netizens labeled Indian men as dirty, uneducated, and even used derogatory terms like ‘rapists.’
  • China-Backed Media: China-backed media amplified stereotypes, perpetuating narratives about women’s safety in India.
  • Taiwan’s Response: Taiwan clarified that the news of Indian workers’ arrival was ‘inaccurate’ but acknowledged ongoing talks with India.

Reality of Indian Workers Globally

  • Worldwide Presence: Indian workers, both blue-collar and white-collar, are present globally, contributing significantly to economies.
  • Remittances: According to a World Bank report, Indian laborers remittances abroad reached a record USD 100 billion in 2021, highlighting their global acceptance.

Misconceptions and Global Gender Issues

  • Misplaced Blame: Associating crimes and issues with specific nationalities hinders cooperation.
  • Global Gender Inequality: Issues such as unequal pay, workplace harassment, and unfair work burdens affect women worldwide.

India-Taiwan Cooperation: Mutual Benefits

  • Taiwan’s Aging Population: Taiwan faces an impending ‘super-aged’ society by 2025 and requires a younger workforce.
  • India’s Labor Force: India can provide a youthful and skilled workforce to fill Taiwan’s labor gap.
  • Economic Benefits: Such cooperation benefits both countries by addressing unemployment and boosting foreign remittances for India and supporting Taiwan’s economy.

Taiwan’s Focus on India

  • Historical Perspective: Taiwan has traditionally focused on Europe and the US for economic growth, trade, and funding.
  • Need for Attention: India, as an economic and strategic partner, deserves more attention for stronger ties.

Taiwan’s Racism Problem

  • Past Instances: Taiwan has faced criticism for discriminatory policies against Southeast Asian workers during the COVID-19 outbreak.
  • Exploitative Practices: Some foreign workers in Taiwan experience exploitative practices bordering on forced labor.

Taiwan’s Reputation and India’s Support

  • Positive Image: Taiwan’s democratic credentials and resistance to China’s influence have earned it a positive image among Indians.
  • India’s Support: India’s support for Taiwan enhances its international standing and challenges China’s efforts to isolate it.

Conclusion

  • Addressing racism, stereotypes, and discriminatory policies is essential for nurturing the growing strategic and economic ties between India and Taiwan.
  • Both nations must work towards fostering a friendly and inclusive environment to protect the investment made in their relationship and counteract divisive narratives.

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Foreign Policy Watch: India-China

1962 India-China War: Sudden Ceasefire and Withdrawal Explained

Note4Students

From UPSC perspective, the following things are important :

Prelims level: NA

Mains level: India-China rivalry

1962 India-China War

Central Idea

  • On November 21, 1962, in a surprising move, China declared a ceasefire in a war against India, a conflict it seemed to be winning.
  • This war was a critical event for both countries, impacting India’s Prime Minister Nehru and showcasing China’s military strength.

Origins of the 1962 India-China War

  • India’s ‘Forward Policy’: India’s strategy of establishing outposts in contested areas is often seen as a trigger for the war. Critics suggest that these moves by an underprepared Indian Army might have forced China’s hand.
  • Sheltering the Dalai Lama: India’s choice to offer refuge to the Dalai Lama, fleeing from Chinese rule in Tibet, was another significant factor. China saw this as a chance to assert its dominance in Asia.
  • China’s Internal Struggles: Inside China, there was growing dissatisfaction with Mao Zedong’s Great Leap Forward, a policy aimed at rapid modernization. A successful war could help improve Mao’s standing.

Ceasefire and Withdrawal

  • Stretched Chinese Supply Lines: China’s quick advance stretched its supply lines thin. With the Indian Army putting up a strong defense and the harsh winter setting in, the situation became more favorable for India. The difficult mountainous terrain also posed a challenge for China.
  • International Involvement: Nehru’s call for help to the US and UK led to quick support. President Kennedy sent weapons and supplies to India, and the Royal Air Force joined in. This global response hinted at a possible escalation of the conflict, which China might have wanted to avoid.
  • Changing Global Opinion: China’s capture of Tawang could have been a strategic stop, but its further advance into Indian Territory after October 24, 1962, shifted global opinion. Western powers started to view the situation more seriously, putting pressure on China.

Understanding China’s Strategy

  • A Tactic for Negotiation: Chinese scholar Hong Yuan suggested that China’s involvement in the war was not for conquest but for negotiation. The PLA’s military actions, reaching as far as New Delhi, were meant to facilitate peace talks.
  • Ensuring Long-Term Peace: The victory secured a peaceful border for China for the next fifty years. It showed that while war was a means to an end, it wasn’t the ultimate goal.

Conclusion

  • The 1962 India-China war, marked by China’s ceasefire and strategic retreat, is a complex and layered part of Indian history.
  • This ceasefire, though temporary, has a profound impact on the geopolitical landscape of the region and the world even today.

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Foreign Policy Watch: India-China

Explained: Border Peace and Tranquility Agreement (BPTA)

Note4Students

From UPSC perspective, the following things are important :

Prelims level: BPTA

Mains level: India-China Border disputes

bpta

Central Idea

  • India and China, historical adversaries who fought a war in 1962, reached their first-ever border agreement, known as the Border Peace and Tranquility Agreement (BPTA), in 1993, following years of border disputes.
  • The BPTA aimed to maintain peace along the Line of Actual Control (LAC) and reduce the risk of unplanned confrontations.

Why discuss this?

  • Thirty years later, the legacy of this historic agreement is continued by contested interpretations and unfulfilled commitments, while the ongoing border crisis further highlights the challenges both nations face in reaching a resolution.

BPTA: A Historic Yet Contested Agreement

  • Context: The BPTA was negotiated in the aftermath of the Sumdorong Chu standoff, marking a significant diplomatic achievement in the early 1990s.
  • Signing: The agreement was signed in 1993 during the tenure of PV Narasimha Rao as PM.
  • Peaceful Coexistence: The agreement committed both nations to avoid using or threatening force against each other. It emphasized strict adherence to the LAC and mutual reduction of military forces to maintain friendly relations.
  • Legacy: While it played a crucial role in maintaining peace for nearly two decades, the BPTA also spurred infrastructure development and frequent incidents, ultimately leading to the Galwan clash in 2020.

Ambiguity Surrounding the LAC

  • Inherent Ambiguity: The primary issue undermining border agreements is the inherent ambiguity surrounding the LAC, which was embedded in the BPTA.
  • LAC Problem: India’s discomfort with the term “LAC” proposed by China in 1959 remained a contentious issue.
  • Ambiguous Formulation: The BPTA allowed both sides to clarify the LAC wherever necessary, implying a lack of shared perception about the 1959 LAC.
  • Compromised Clarity: This formulation didn’t definitively reject China’s version of the LAC but aimed to prevent constant confrontation.

Impact on Subsequent Agreements

  • Positive Developments: The BPTA paved the way for additional agreements, such as confidence-building measures in the Military Field along the LAC (1996) and the appointment of Special Representatives (2003).
  • Unfinished Business: Negotiations for a final boundary settlement stalled, and the mechanisms to clarify LAC claims remained incomplete.

Infrastructure Development and Tensions

  • Race for Facts on the Ground: Ambiguity over the LAC drove both countries to strengthen their claims through infrastructure development and increased patrols.
  • Frequent Encounters: Frequent encounters between patrols exacerbated tensions along the border.
  • Unforeseen Consequences: The BPTA inadvertently contributed to a slowdown in boundary negotiations, as both sides aimed to bolster their positions along the LAC.

The Current Crisis

  • Blatant Disregard: The ongoing crisis, beginning in 2020, saw both nations cast aside the commitments made in the first article of the BPTA.
  • Stalled Boundary Negotiations: Amidst the crisis, efforts to settle the boundary dispute have almost completely stalled.
  • A Challenging Relationship: The 30-year-old border remains unsettled, mirroring the broader complexities of the India-China relationship.

Conclusion

  • The BPTA reached 30 years ago, marked a significant milestone in India-China relations.
  • However, its legacy remains deeply contested and fraught with ambiguities.
  • As the ongoing border crisis unfolds, the challenges in achieving a lasting resolution and fostering peaceful coexistence between the two nations persist.

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Foreign Policy Watch: India-China

Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) and India

Note4Students

From UPSC perspective, the following things are important :

Prelims level: Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC)

Mains level: Read the attached story

Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC)

Central Idea

  • The Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) Leaders’ Week is currently underway in San Francisco, bringing together leaders from the Asia-Pacific region to discuss pressing economic and trade issues.
  • Although India is not an APEC member, is participating at the forum.

Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC): An Overview

  • Founding: APEC, established in 1989, is a regional economic forum aimed at promoting regional economic integration and greater prosperity in the Asia-Pacific region. It consists of 21 member economies, termed “economies” due to their focus on trade and economic matters.
  • Member Economies: APEC’s member economies include Australia, Brunei, New Zealand, Papua New Guinea, Hong Kong (as part of China), the Philippines, Indonesia, Malaysia, Vietnam, Singapore, Thailand, Chinese Taipei (Taiwan), China, Japan, South Korea, Russia, Canada, the United States, Mexico, Peru, and Chile, strategically located around the Pacific Ocean.

APEC’s Role over the Years

  • Champion of Free Trade: APEC has consistently advocated for free trade, reduction of trade tariffs, and economic liberalization.
  • Seoul Declaration: The 1991 Seoul Declaration marked the establishment of a liberalized free trade area around the Pacific Rim as APEC’s primary objective.
  • Economic Impact: APEC initiatives have contributed significantly to the development of a growing middle class in the Asia-Pacific region. APEC economies, comprising 2.9 billion citizens, account for approximately 60 percent of global GDP and 48 percent of global trade as of 2018.

India’s Interest in APEC

  • Historical Interest: India expressed interest in joining APEC in 1991, coinciding with the initiation of economic reforms for liberalization and globalization.
  • Rationale: India’s interest in APEC is based on its geographical location, the potential size of its economy, and its trade interactions with the Asia-Pacific.
  • Challenges: APEC has maintained an informal moratorium on expanding membership, despite India’s interest. The US-India Joint Strategic Vision for the Asia-Pacific and Indian Ocean Region in 2015 welcomed India’s interest in joining APEC but no formal progress has been made.

Highlights of APEC Summit 2023

  • Biden-Xi Meeting: The meeting between US President Biden and China’s President Xi Jinping is a significant highlight. While it may not result in immediate changes in US-China relations, it reflects ongoing high-level engagements.
  • Indo-Pacific Economic Framework (IPEF): The summit will focus on progress related to the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework (IPEF), initiated after the US withdrawal from the Trans-Pacific Partnership. Fourteen members, including Fiji and India, are part of the IPEF, with the rest being APEC members.

Conclusion

  • The APEC Summit 2023 brings together leaders from the Asia-Pacific region to address economic and trade issues, with the Biden-Xi meeting and discussions on the IPEF among the key highlights.
  • Despite India’s historical interest in APEC, membership expansion remains a challenge, underscoring the importance of regional economic forums in shaping global economic policies and partnerships.

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Foreign Policy Watch: India-China

Bhutan-China Border Talks and Indian Concerns

Note4Students

From UPSC perspective, the following things are important :

Prelims level: Bhutan-China Border Talks

Mains level: Read the attached story

Bhutan-China Border Talks

Central Idea

  • In Beijing, the 25th round of Bhutan-China Border Talks culminated with the signing of a significant Cooperation Agreement.
  • This historic agreement reflects the progress made in their quest for border resolution, carrying forward the 3-Step Roadmap initiated in 2021.
  • Amid the backdrop of a seven-year gap in talks, these recent developments bear immense significance.

Bhutan-China Border Talks

  • Complex Border: Bhutan and the Tibetan Autonomous Region share an extensive contiguous border, spanning approximately 470 km. Prior to 2016, the two nations engaged in 24 rounds of talks to address border disputes.
  • Positive Momentum: Talks had been stalled due to the Doklam Standoff in 2017 and the subsequent COVID-19 pandemic. However, this interlude witnessed discussions at other levels, especially after China raised concerns about a border dispute to Bhutan’s east.
  • A Seven-Year Hiatus Ends: After a prolonged pause in boundary talks lasting seven years, the resumption of discussions signals substantial headway.

3-Step Roadmap

  • Initiating Border Delimitation: The 3-Step roadmap, established through an MoU in 2021 and facilitated by the Joint Technical Team (JTT), aims to delineate the Bhutanese and Chinese territories conclusively. Despite the absence of diplomatic ties, Bhutan and China seek to formalize their border.
  • Steps in the Roadmap:
    1. Agreement on the border “on the table.”
    2. On-ground inspections of the border.
    3. Formal demarcation of the boundary.

India’s Vigilance and Concerns

  • Strained Sino-Indian Relations: In the context of deteriorating relations between India and China since the 2020 Line of Actual Control standoff, any warming of ties between China and one of India’s closest neighbours raises concerns in New Delhi.
  • Doklam: A Critical Focus: India closely observes discussions related to Doklam, where China has proposed a “swap” of areas under Bhutanese control with territories in Jakarlung and Pasamlung, claimed by China. The Doklam trijunction is strategically significant as it is in close proximity to India’s Siliguri corridor, a vital land link connecting northeastern states to the rest of India.
  • China’s Strategic Moves: Since the Doklam standoff in 2017, China has bolstered its presence in the Doklam plateau, constructing underground facilities, new roads, and villages in disputed areas within Bhutan, undermining India’s strategic interests.
  • Diplomatic Tensions: India remains cautious about China’s insistence on establishing full diplomatic relations with Bhutan and opening an embassy in Thimphu. Given India’s challenges with Chinese projects and funding in neighbouring countries like Bangladesh, Nepal, Sri Lanka, and the Maldives, China’s presence in Bhutan raises apprehensions.

Conclusion

  • The Bhutan-China boundary talks represent a significant stride towards resolving longstanding disputes.
  • However, Bhutan’s leadership has emphasized that decisions will be made with due consideration for India’s concerns, maintaining a delicate balance in this Himalayan diplomatic endeavour.

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Foreign Policy Watch: India-China

How the Sikh migration to Canada began?

Note4Students

From UPSC perspective, the following things are important :

Prelims level: NA

Mains level: Sikh Diaspora

canada sikh

Central Idea

  • Canadian PM recently shared evidence with India, alleging the involvement of Indian agents in the killing of pro-Khalistan leader Hardeep Singh Nijjar.
  • This claim triggered a diplomatic stand-off between Canada and India, with India accusing Canada of sheltering Khalistani terrorists and extremists.

Sikh Diaspora in Canada

  • Significant Population: According to the 2021 Canadian census, Sikhs account for 2.1% of Canada’s population, making Canada home to the largest Sikh population outside India.
  • Historical Migration: Sikhs have been migrating to Canada for over a century, primarily driven by their involvement in the British Empire’s armed services.
  • Expansion of the Empire: Wherever the British Empire expanded, Sikhs migrated, including countries in the Far East and East Africa.

Early Years of Sikh Migration

  • Queen Victoria’s Jubilee: Sikh migration to Canada began in 1897 during Queen Victoria’s Diamond Jubilee. Kesur Singh, a Risaldar Major in the British India Army, is considered one of the first Sikh settlers to arrive in Canada that year.
  • Laborers and Sojourners: The first significant wave of Sikh migration to Canada occurred in the early 1900s, with most migrants working as laborers in British Columbia’s logging industry and Ontario’s manufacturing sector.
  • Intent to Remit: Many of the early Sikh immigrants were sojourners, intending to stay for only a few years and remit their savings back to India.

Challenges and Pushback

  • Hostility and Prejudice: Sikh migrants faced hostility from locals who perceived them as job competitors. They also encountered racial and cultural prejudices.
  • Tightened Regulations: Due to mounting public pressure, the Canadian government imposed stringent regulations, such as requiring Asian immigrants to possess a specified sum of money and arrive only via a continuous journey from their country of origin.
  • Komagata Maru Incident: In 1914, the Komagata Maru incident occurred, where a ship carrying 376 South Asian passengers, mostly Sikhs, was detained in Vancouver for two months and then forced to return to Asia. This incident resulted in fatalities.

Turning Point after World War II

  • Relaxing Immigration Policy: After World War II, Canada’s immigration policy shifted for several reasons, including a commitment to the United Nations’ stance against racial discrimination, economic expansion, and a need for laborers.
  • Importance of Human Capital: Canada turned to third-world countries for the import of human capital, leading to a decline in European immigration.
  • Points System: In 1967, Canada introduced the ‘points system,’ focusing on skills as the main criterion for non-dependent relatives’ admission, eliminating racial preferences.

Conclusion

  • The history of Sikh migration to Canada spans over a century, marked by challenges, prejudice, and policy changes.
  • Today, Canada is home to a thriving Sikh community, showcasing the transformative journey from early struggles to a more inclusive and skill-based immigration system.

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Foreign Policy Watch: India-China

Tibetan Democracy Day: A Legacy of Struggle and Resilience

Note4Students

From UPSC perspective, the following things are important :

Prelims level: Tibetan Democracy Day

Mains level: Not Much

tibet

Central Idea

  • Tibetan Democracy Day on September 2 marks the founding of the Tibetan government-in-exile in Dharamshala.
  • It signifies the establishment of Tibetan democracy after forced displacement.

Tibetan Govt in Exile: Historical Genesis

  • In 1960, a year after Tibetans were displaced, the first elected representatives of the Tibetan Parliament-in-exile were sworn in.
  • His Holiness the 14th Dalai Lama’s influence led to the enactment of the Tibetan constitution in 1963, emphasizing democracy.

Role of Central Tibetan Administration (CTA)

  • The CTA, based in Dharamshala, manages over 100,000 Tibetan refugees globally.
  • It is the heart of Tibetan self-governance and resilience.
  • CTA’s Evolution:
  1. The first women representatives were elected in 1963 under the Tibetan constitution.
  2. In 1975, the CTA declared September 2 as the founding day of Tibetan democracy.
  3. The Charter of the Tibetans in exile was adopted in 1991, followed by the Tibetan Supreme Justice Commission in 1992.

CTA’s Functioning

  • The CTA, led by the President (Sikyong), operates through departments: Religion and Culture, Home, Finance, Education, Security, Information and International Relations, and Health.
  • The Tibetan Parliament-in-exile has 45 members representing various aspects of the Tibetan community.

Leadership Transition

  • The Dalai Lama’s shift to semi-retirement led to direct elections of the executive head, Kalön Tripa.
  • In 2011, His Holiness delegated political authority to Sikyong, the President of the CTA.

Bodh Gaya’s Role

  • In 1960, the first elected Tibetan representatives took their oaths in Bodh Gaya, marking the inception of the democratic system.
  • Bodh Gaya played a pivotal role in the early days of Tibetan democracy.

India’s perception of Tibet

  • India respects the Dalai Lama as a spiritual leader but does not officially recognize the CTA as a government.
  • It balances diplomatic considerations while supporting Tibetan refugees.

Global Recognition

  • The US stands as a vocal supporter, with bipartisan backing and specialized coordinators for Tibet.
  • While global recognition is limited, Tibetans value India’s consistent support.

Back2Basics: Tibetan Buddhism

Description
Origin and Development Form of Vajrayana Buddhism; emerged in Tibetan Plateau and Himalayan regions
Tantric Practices Emphasizes rapid spiritual awakening through rituals, visualizations, and energy transformation
Dalai Lama and Panchen Lama Dalai Lama (Tenzin Gyatso) is spiritual leader; Panchen Lama is also significant
Monastic Traditions Strong monastic presence; monks and nuns preserve teachings and meditate
Deity Pantheon Diverse deities representing enlightenment qualities; depicted in mandalas and thangkas
Prayer Flags and Wheels Flags convey prayers; wheels accumulate merit and blessings
Reincarnation and Tulku System Belief in reincarnation; system to identify tulkus (reincarnated lamas)

 

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Foreign Policy Watch: India-China

China’s Use of Stapled Visas and its Implications for India

Note4Students

From UPSC perspective, the following things are important :

Prelims level: Stapled Visa

Mains level: Not Much

stapled visa

Central Idea

  • The issuance of stapled visas by China to Indian nationals from Arunachal Pradesh and Jammu and Kashmir has been a contentious issue between the two countries.

What is Stapled Visa?

  • A Stapled Visa is an unstamped piece of paper attached to the passport, different from a regular visa that is affixed and stamped.
  • China has been issuing stapled visas to Indian nationals from certain regions, notably Arunachal Pradesh and Jammu and Kashmir, which are territories that China disputes with India.
  • By using stapled visas for residents of these regions, China is making a unilateral claim over the disputed territories, suggesting that it considers them as part of its own territory.

China’s Dispute over Indian Territory:

  • Sovereignty Dispute: China disputes India’s sovereignty over Arunachal Pradesh and questions the legal status of the McMahon Line, the boundary agreed upon between Tibet and British India in 1914. This dispute underlies Chinese claims over the Line of Actual Control (LAC) and its repeated border transgressions into Indian Territory.
  • Unilateral Claim: China claims approximately 90,000 sq km of Arunachal Pradesh as its territory, referring to it as “Zangnan” or “South Tibet.” Chinese maps often depict Arunachal Pradesh as part of China.

Use of Stapled Visas:

  • Signaling Intentions: Chinese state media began referring to Arunachal Pradesh as “South Tibet” in 2005. In 2006, China refused to grant a visa to an Indian government official serving in Arunachal Pradesh. Subsequently, China started issuing stapled visas to all Indian citizens from Arunachal Pradesh and Jammu and Kashmir.
  • Timeline of Events: Stapled visas for Jammu and Kashmir residents appeared around 2008-09. Over the years, China repeatedly issued stapled visas to Indian nationals, including sports athletes, weightlifters, and archers, leading to tensions between the two countries.

India’s Response and Stance

  • Protest and Diplomatic Efforts: The Indian government has consistently protested against the issuance of stapled visas and conveyed its stance to China, asserting that there should be no discrimination based on domicile or ethnicity in the visa regime for Indian citizens.
  • Refusal to Accept Stapled Visas: India has refused to accept stapled visas as valid travel documents and cautioned Indian citizens that such visas are not considered valid for travel out of the country.
  • Sovereignty Assertion: India firmly asserts its sovereignty over Arunachal Pradesh and maintains that stapled visas undermine its territorial integrity.

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Foreign Policy Watch: India-China

Why is China limiting exports of raw materials?

Note4Students

From UPSC perspective, the following things are important :

Prelims level: NA

Mains level: Read the attached story

china

Central Idea

  • China’s Ministry of Commerce recently announced export controls on gallium and germanium, citing national security interests.
  • The move has raised concerns due to the crucial role of these raw materials in semiconductor manufacturing and various other industries.

Why read this?

The restrictions imposed by China have prompted responses from other countries, highlighting the geopolitical backdrop of the ongoing ‘global chip war.’

 

Curbs Imposed by China

  • Specific Licensing Requirement: Export operators must acquire a specific license to restrict the export of gallium and germanium.
  • Application Process: Operators need to provide details of importers, end-users, end use, and the original export contract. Exporting without permission will be deemed a violation, leading to administrative penalties and potential criminal charges.

Significance and Concerns

  • Role of Gallium: Gallium is crucial for manufacturing semiconductor wafers, integrated circuits, mobile communications, satellite communications, LEDs, automotives, lighting, and sensor applications.
  • Role of Germanium: Germanium is used in fiber-optic cables, infrared imaging devices, optical devices, and solar cells due to its properties such as heat resistance and energy conversion efficiency.
  • Import Dependency: China dominates 80% of gallium production and 60% of germanium production, causing concerns for countries heavily reliant on imports, such as the European Commission and India.

International Responses

  • United States: The U.S. opposes China’s export controls and plans to consult with partners and allies to address the issue. The focus is on diversifying supply chains and building resilience.
  • European Commission: Expresses concerns about the development, raising doubts regarding its security-related nature.
  • Geopolitical Backdrop: The US, Japan, and the Netherlands have implemented export control measures for national security reasons, targeting advanced computing chips and semiconductor manufacturing capabilities.

China’s Perspective

  • Denial of Targeting Specific Countries: Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson emphasizes that the export measures are not aimed at any particular country and highlights China’s commitment to secure and stable global supply chains.
  • Countermeasures: Some Chinese officials have suggested that the export controls are just the beginning, and China may escalate its countermeasures if restrictions intensify in the future.

Impact on India

  • Short-Term Disruption: India may experience short-term disruptions in its industries due to the disruption of immediate supply chains and increased prices.
  • Long-Term Consequences: The long-term impact on India’s chip-making plans and industries will depend on factors such as alternative supply sources, domestic semiconductor production capabilities, and strategic partnerships like the India-U.S. Initiative on Critical and Emerging Technology (iCET).
  • Opportunity for India: India can explore waste recovery from zinc and alumina production for gallium and germanium, consider alternative substitutes like indium and silicon, and focus on domestic semiconductor production.

Conclusion

  • China’s export controls on gallium and germanium have raised concerns globally due to their critical role in various industries, particularly semiconductor manufacturing.
  • The responses from other countries reflect the geopolitical backdrop of the ongoing ‘chip war.’

 

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Foreign Policy Watch: India-China

China-India Relations: A Path to Cooperation and Global Growth

Note4Students

From UPSC perspective, the following things are important :

Prelims level: NA

Mains level: India- China potential for collaboration and China's inconsistencies in its words and actions

China

Central Idea

  • In a surprising turn of events, Ma Jia, China’s top diplomat to India, recently emphasized the potential for collaboration between China and India to promote global economic recovery and growth. While such statements from Chinese officials during summits are not uncommon, it is crucial to bridge the gap between China’s rhetoric and actions.

Beginning of India-China Relations

  • The two countries have played up their cultural links-such through the importation of Buddhism into China by wandering Chinese monks more than 1,500 years ago.
  • India and China got independence from the British yoke at the almost same time in the late 1940s. India and China established diplomatic relations on 1st April 1950.
  • India was the first non-socialist country to establish relations with the People’s Republic of China and the catchphrase ‘Hindi Chini Bhai Bhai’ became famous.
  • Both countries attended the Asian-African Conference in which 29 countries participated in Bandung, Indonesia and jointly advocated the Bandung Spirit of solidarity, friendship and cooperation

Potential for collaboration to promote global economic recovery and growth

  • Trade and Investment: China and India can enhance trade relations by reducing trade barriers, promoting fair and balanced trade practices, and exploring new areas of economic cooperation. Increased bilateral investments and the establishment of joint ventures can stimulate economic growth and create employment opportunities in both countries.
  • Infrastructure Development: Collaboration in infrastructure projects, such as transportation, energy, and telecommunications, can foster economic growth and connectivity. Joint investments in projects like the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and the International North-South Transport Corridor (INSTC) can create synergies and facilitate regional trade.
  • Technology and Innovation: Joint research and development initiatives, exchange programs for scientists and technologists, and collaboration in emerging sectors like artificial intelligence, renewable energy, and digital technologies can drive innovation and productivity.
  • Manufacturing and Supply Chains: Collaboration in manufacturing and supply chains can enhance the competitiveness of both countries. By leveraging each other’s strengths, such as China’s manufacturing capabilities and India’s skilled workforce, they can create a robust ecosystem for production and supply of goods.
  • Financial Cooperation: Strengthening financial cooperation can facilitate economic recovery and growth. Enhanced cooperation in banking, investment, and capital markets can promote financial stability, facilitate cross-border investments, and support infrastructure financing.
  • Tourism and Cultural Exchanges: Encouraging tourism and cultural exchanges can foster people-to-people connections and deepen mutual understanding. Joint initiatives to promote tourism, exchange programs for students, and cultural festivals can boost bilateral relations and contribute to economic growth in the hospitality and tourism sectors.
  • Sustainable Development: Collaborating on sustainable development initiatives, such as renewable energy, climate change mitigation, and environmental protection, can benefit both countries and contribute to global goals. Joint efforts to address common challenges like air and water pollution can lead to cleaner and greener economies.
  • Regional and Global Cooperation: China and India can work together to address regional and global challenges, such as promoting regional integration, ensuring open and inclusive multilateralism, and strengthening institutions like the BRICS, SCO, and G20

China

Abnormalities in the India-China bilateral relationship

  • Rhetoric vs. Actions: There are inconsistency between the rhetoric of China’s top diplomats, such as Ma Jia, who express a desire for collaboration and growth, and the critical pieces published by state-run media outlets like the Global Times, which constantly criticize India. This discrepancy raises questions about China’s true intentions
  • Lack of Normalcy: India’s Foreign Minister, S Jaishankar, has openly admitted that the ties between India and China are not normal. This acknowledgment points to an abnormality in the relationship, which is likely attributed to the various contentious issues and conflicts between the two nations.
  • Unresolved Border Disputes: The ongoing border disputes, particularly along the Line of Actual Control (LAC), have created a significant abnormality in the relationship. The lack of resolution and recurring incidents of incursions and military standoffs have led to tensions and strained bilateral ties.
  • Strategic Motivations and Power Dynamics: China’s actions are driven by its desire to establish itself as a dominant power in Asia and the world, while potentially seeking to diminish India’s influence. This power dynamic and China’s perceived attempts to “cut India to size” contribute to the abnormality in their bilateral relationship.
  • Lack of Respect and Disenchantment: India’s belief that China’s foreign policy narrative is built on a lack of respect from the West. India expects China to treat rising powers like India with respect and acknowledge its growing significance as an Asian and global power. The perceived lack of respect and increasing disenchantment further strain the bilateral relationship.
  • Aggressive Posturing and Border Tensions: China’s aggressive actions along the borders, including capturing uninhabitable high grounds and pushing India into military alliances with the West, have intensified border tensions. These actions exacerbate the abnormality and pose challenges to the prospect of cooperation.
  • Shift in India’s Perception: The clashes in Galwan and China’s belligerent behavior have led to a shift in India’s perception of China. India’s increasing disenchantment with China’s behavior, particularly in terms of its promises of cooperation, has altered India’s approach and reduced the scope for cooperation in the current equilibrium.
  • Hesitations and Disillusionment: India’s initial enthusiasm for Asian multilateralism and cooperation, as demonstrated by its participation in initiatives like the RCEP negotiations and the AIIB, has been met with hesitations and disillusionment due to China’s behavior. This disenchantment contributes to the abnormality in their relationship.

Three proposed key steps to mend ties and pave the way for cooperation 

  • Psychological Makeover and Pragmatism: If Beijing truly desires to work with India, it should undergo a psychological makeover and inject pragmatism into its South Asia policy. This entails a shift away from dogmas and a recognition of India’s rising power and influence. China needs to treat India with respect and acknowledge it as an indispensable Asian and global power. Adopting a pragmatic approach will help bridge the gap between China’s desire for collaboration and its actions.
  • Good Faith Measures: Accompanying the psychological makeover, the article emphasizes the need for good faith measures. Calming the borders and ceasing to undermine India’s relationships with its neighbors in South Asia are crucial steps. The onus is on China to settle its land border disputes with India and Bhutan, thereby demonstrating a commitment to maintaining peace and stability in the region.
  • Acknowledging India’s Importance: China, which has built a foreign policy narrative based on a lack of respect from the West, should recognize the need to treat rising powers like India with respect. By acknowledging India’s importance and role as a counterweight in the region, China can establish a starting point for future cooperation

China

Conclusion

  • While border tensions may temporarily influence India’s actions, they will not impede its rise as a global player. India is rapidly gravitating towards the West, and the window of opportunity for fruitful collaboration may not remain open indefinitely. By embracing pragmatism and goodwill gestures, China can pave the way for a mutually beneficial partnership that contributes to global recovery and growth.

Must read:

Arunachal Pradesh: China’s Cartographic Deception

 

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Foreign Policy Watch: India-China

Ensuring Stability and Peace on the Line of Actual Control (LAC)

Note4Students

From UPSC perspective, the following things are important :

Prelims level: LAC

Mains level: Tensions on Line of Actual Control (LAC) and need for peace and stability

LAC

Central Idea

  • The Line of Actual Control (LAC) between India and China has been a hotbed of tension and occasional clashes in recent years, posing a significant risk of escalation. Both countries have invested heavily in defensive preparedness and military infrastructure near the LAC. While a permanent solution may not be immediately achievable due to the complexity of the border dispute, short-term and pragmatic steps can be implemented to reduce the chances of conflict and foster peaceful coexistence

Inadequacies in Existing Agreements

  • Lack of Clarity on LAC: The agreements are based on the assumption that both parties have a clear understanding and definition of the LAC. However, in reality, there are significant segments of the border where the exact demarcation is disputed or lacks clarity.
  • Insufficient Mechanisms for Dispute Resolution: The 1993 Agreement called for the creation of joint mechanisms to verify and settle LAC-related disputes. However, it took 19 years for the establishment of the Working Mechanism for Consultation and Coordination on India-China Border Affairs (WMCC) in 2012. While the WMCC meets twice a year, its effectiveness in resolving disputes and preventing escalations on the ground has been limited.
  • Limited Border Personnel Meeting (BPM) Points: The LAC, which stretches for 3,488 kilometers, currently has only four established BPM points. The 2005 Protocol proposed the establishment of a BPM point at Lipulekh, but it has not been implemented.
  • Lack of Progress in Force Reduction and Redeployment: The agreements, such as the 1993 Agreement and the 1996 Agreement, envisioned a mutually agreed reduction and redeployment of forces along the LAC. However, there has been little progress in implementing these provisions. The absence of substantial force reductions contributes to the prevailing tensions and increases the risk of confrontations.

Facts for prelims

States Border with China Important Passes
Jammu and Kashmir 1597 km Khardung La Pass, Chang La Pass, Marsimik La Pass, Saser La Pass
Arunachal Pradesh

 

1126 km

 

Bum La Pass, Kibithu Pass, Tawang
Uttarakhand 345 km Mana Pass, Lipulekh Pass, Niti Pass
Sikkim 220 km Nathu La Pass, Jelep La Pass
Himachal Pradesh 200 km Shipki La Pass, Kaurik Pass

The Need for Effective and Immediate Measures

  • Fragile and Dangerous Situation: As stated by India’s External Affairs Minister, the situation along the LAC in Eastern Ladakh remains fragile and dangerous from a military assessment perspective. The potential for escalation and the risk of conflict are significant.
  • Escalation of Aggression: Following the Galwan crisis, there has been a significant mobilization of Chinese forces into Tibet, accompanied by heightened rhetoric and jingoism from both countries.
  • Complexity of Border Dispute: The border dispute between India and China, encompassing areas such as Arunachal Pradesh and Aksai Chin, is intricate and has deep historical and geopolitical roots. Achieving a permanent solution to the dispute may not be immediately feasible.
  • Uncertainty of War Outcomes: While there might be voices advocating for a more confrontational approach, it is essential to consider the potential outcomes of a full-fledged war. Despite assurances from the government, there is no guarantee that the results of such a conflict would be favorable to either India or China.

Proposed Steps for Peace and Stability

  • Conversion of LAC into a Line of Control (LC): Both India and China should delineate the LAC on maps and on the ground without prejudicing their respective border claims. This transformation would help reduce the urge among forward troops to make incremental advances and could be accomplished through mature dialogue and the use of technology.
  • Treatment of Disputed Areas as No Entry Zones or Joint Patrolling: The disputed areas along the LAC could be designated as no entry zones, preventing either side from establishing a permanent presence. Alternatively, both countries can explore the possibility of allowing mutually agreed-upon patrolling of these areas. Joint patrolling would help maintain the status quo and build confidence between the troops.
  • Strengthening Existing Confidence Building Measures (CBMs): The WMCC, established in 2012, should be empowered with more authority and resources to effectively address LAC-related disputes. Additionally, establishing more BPM points along the LAC would facilitate quicker resolution of local issues and enhance communication and cooperation between the Indian and Chinese troops.

Conclusion

  • The tense situation along the Line of Actual Control calls for immediate action to ensure stability and prevent the outbreak of a major conflict. It is crucial for both nations to prioritize dialogue, cooperation, and a commitment to regional stability in order to safeguard their own interests as well as those of the world, politically and economically.

Also read:

India-China clash: Why China has opened new front?

 

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Foreign Policy Watch: India-China

Shifting US Policy: From Decoupling to De-risking in China Relations

Note4Students

From UPSC perspective, the following things are important :

Prelims level: G7

Mains level: US delinking from China, Implications for India

china

Central Idea

  • The US is transitioning its policy on China from decoupling to de-risking, signalling a new approach.
  • The EU has already adopted a de-risking approach in its China policy, and the G-7 summit also expressed consensus on de-risking.

Understanding the De-risking

  • After establishing diplomatic ties in 1979, the US and China developed a deep economic interdependence, benefiting China’s global engagement.
  • China’s rise challenged US global clout and impacted its domestic industries.
  • The Trump administration initiated a “decoupling” strategy to address the techno-economic challenge from China.
  • The Biden administration continues with a modified approach, shifting from decoupling to de-risking.
  • De-risking focuses on resilient supply chains to ensure the US is not subjected to coercion from other countries.

Rationale behind De-risking

  • Geopolitical Competition: China’s rise as a strategic competitor challenges US global influence, prompting de-risking to reduce vulnerabilities and maintain an advantage.
  • National Security: Concerns about risks like intellectual property theft and cyber threats lead to de-risking to safeguard sensitive technologies and protect national security interests.
  • Resilient Supply Chains: The COVID-19 pandemic exposed vulnerabilities in supply chains, driving the need for de-risking to ensure diversified and resilient networks.
  • Fair Trade Practices: De-risking addresses concerns over China’s trade practices, such as intellectual property infringement and forced technology transfers, aiming for fairer trade by diversifying partners.
  • Alliance Building: De-risking aligns with allies’ interests, promoting collaboration and a united front against China’s rise.

Geopolitical Ramifications

  • De-risking for Stronger Alliances: The US adopts de-risking to strengthen alliances in its rivalry with China, as seen in the G-7 summit declaration.
  • China’s Skepticism: China views de-risking as disguised decoupling, shifting blame for risks to China.
  • Aligning with Decoupling and United Front: De-risking aligns with decoupling by diversifying supply chains, while fostering a united front among allies.
  • Uncertain Effectiveness: The effectiveness of de-risking is uncertain, influenced by China’s response and challenges in diversifying supply chains.
  • Short-Term Indo-Pacific Impact: De-risking may temporarily divert focus from the Indo-Pacific, necessitating a balance with maintaining a robust strategy in the region.

Way forward

  • The de-risking approach should be further developed and coordinated with allies to effectively counter China’s rise.
  • Balancing the benefits of de-risking with the need to maintain a robust Indo-Pacific strategy is crucial.
  • Engaging in strategic dialogues and strengthening alliances can help shape a cohesive approach in addressing China’s influence while minimizing risks.

 

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Foreign Policy Watch: India-China

India-China Border Tensions: An Assessment of the Current Situation and Proactive Steps for India

Note4Students

From UPSC perspective, the following things are important :

Prelims level: Border states, Places in news, Prelims box

Mains level: India- China border conflicts and measures

Border

Central Idea

  • India needs to take proactive measures to address the ongoing border crisis with China in Ladakh, rather than relying on a status quo approach. The government’s silence and euphemistic language on the issue have given the impression of incompetence and inaction, leading to concerns over India’s capability to handle the situation

Brief background on the Ladakh border issue

  • The border dispute dates back to the 1950s and 60s, when China made claims to the region and occupied large parts of it.
  • In 1962, the two countries fought a brief war over the issue, which ended in a Chinese victory and the establishment of a de facto border line known as the Line of Actual Control (LAC).
  • Since then, the two countries have had several standoffs and skirmishes in the region, with tensions escalating in recent years. T
  • he latest border standoff in Ladakh began in May 2020 and continues to remain unresolved.

The Depsang crisis of 2013

  • Depsang Plains of Ladakh: The Depsang crisis of 2013 refers to a tense border standoff between India and China that took place in the Depsang Plains of Ladakh in April-May 2013.
  • Chinese troops set up a camp: The crisis began when Chinese troops set up a camp in the Depsang Plains, which is located about 19 km inside what India considers to be its territory.
  • Strategically important area: The area is strategically important as it overlooks the strategically important Darbuk-Shyok-Daulat Beg Oldie (DSDBO) road that India had built to improve its connectivity to the border areas.
  • Negotiations and agreement over the withdrawal: The situation was resolved after three weeks of negotiations, with the Chinese agreeing to withdraw their troops in exchange for a pledge from India to scale down its military presence in the area.
  • The crisis led to other standoffs: The crisis highlighted the long-standing boundary dispute between India and China, which has led to several other standoffs and skirmishes over the years.

What is the current situation?

  • The current situation at the Ladakh border is that some areas have witnessed disengagement, while two areas, Depsang and Demchok, remain unresolved. Indian soldiers are not allowed to touch 26 of the 65 patrolling points in Ladakh.
  • Diplomatic meetings and talks between corps commanders have not elicited any progress since September last year. Regular meetings between Indian and Chinese Ministers, Foreign and Defence, have not yielded results either.
  • India needs to find a way to transfer the pressure back to China, as Beijing has never compromised unless it has been forced into an uncomfortable spot.

Border

Facts for prelims

States

Border with China

Important Passes

Jammu and Kashmir 1597 km Khardung La Pass, Chang La Pass, Marsimik La Pass, Saser La Pass
Arunachal Pradesh

 

1126 km

 

Bum La Pass, Kibithu Pass, Tawang
Uttarakhand 345 km Mana Pass, Lipulekh Pass, Niti Pass
Sikkim 220 km Nathu La Pass, Jelep La Pass
Himachal Pradesh 200 km Shipki La Pass, Kaurik Pass

Way ahead: Steps to transfer the pressure back to China

  • Bold use of imagination: The political leadership needs to use its imagination boldly to find a way to impose its will upon China.
  • Be proactive: India needs to be proactive in dealing with China, as Beijing has never compromised unless it has been forced into an uncomfortable spot.
  • Tactful action on LAC: Tactical actions on the LAC need to be daring, and the military needs to be used as an instrument to pursue policy ends and try to impose its will upon the adversary.
  • Increase strategic thought: Strategic thought in Delhi needs to be bold and innovative to find a way to wrest the initiative from China.
  • Avoid fear of military escalation: India’s fear of military escalation is holding back progress in the Ladakh border issue, and the government needs to overcome this fear to take proactive steps.
  • Utilize diplomatic channels: India should leverage diplomatic channels and international forums to put pressure on China to resolve the border issue.
  • Strengthen domestic capabilities: India should focus on building domestic capabilities, including military and economic, to match up to China’s strengths and position itself better in negotiations.

Border

Conclusion

  • India needs to take proactive measures to address the ongoing border crisis with China in Ladakh. A status quo approach can no longer be the answer, and India will have to wrest the initiative from China. Failure to do so would be a national failure for India, and the government must show boldness and imagination to resolve the crisis.

Mains Question

Q. India is going through the tough phase over the issues of border with China. In this backdrop discuss what proactive measures that India needs to take considering the current developments situation of the border conflicts?

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India-China: Border Management Mechanism

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Foreign Policy Watch: India-China

SCO and Its Broader Geopolitical Evolution

Note4Students

From UPSC perspective, the following things are important :

Prelims level: SCO and its members

Mains level: SCO challenges and opportunities

SCO

Central Idea

  • The visit of Chinese and Russian defence ministers to attend a ministerial meeting of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) in Delhi has drawn attention to the broader geopolitical evolution of the SCO. While the clamour for membership shows the attractiveness of the forum, its internal contradictions and inability to cope with intra-state and inter-state conflicts among member states are raising questions about its strategic coherence.

All you need to know about SCO

  • Background: After the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, the then security and economic architecture in the Eurasian region dissolved and new structures had to come up. The original Shanghai Five were China, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia and Tajikistan.
  • SCO formation: The SCO was formed in 2001, with Uzbekistan included. It expanded in 2017 to include India and Pakistan. Since its formation, the SCO has focused on regional non-traditional security, with counter-terrorism as a priority.
  • Partner countries: Eight Member States are China, Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, India, and Pakistan. While four observer states are Afghanistan, Belarus, Iran, and Mongolia and six dialogue partners include Armenia, Azerbaijan, Cambodia, Nepal, Sri Lanka, and Turkey.
  • Functionaries of SCO
  1. Executive Branch: The SCO has an executive branch, which is headed by the Secretary-General and is responsible for the day-to-day functioning of the organization.
  2. Council of Heads of State: The highest decision-making body of the SCO is the Council of Heads of State, which meets annually to discuss and decide on important issues.
  3. Council of Heads of Government: The Council of Heads of Government is the second most important decision-making body of the SCO, which meets annually to discuss and decide on economic and trade-related issues.
  4. Regional Anti-Terrorist Structure (RATS): The SCO has RATS, which is responsible for coordinating the efforts of member states in the fight against terrorism, separatism, and extremism.

Facts for prelims

SCO RATS:

  • Regional Anti-Terrorist Structure (RATS) is a permanent organ of the SCO which serves to promote cooperation of member states against the three evils of terrorism, separatism and extremism.
  • It is headquartered in Tashkent.
  • Its head is elected to three-year term.
  • Each member state of SCO sends permanent representative to RATS.

The SCO paradox

  • Shadow over its strategic coherence: Even as the Eurasian forum looks attractive to a growing number of regional states, its internal contradictions are casting a shadow over its strategic coherence.
  • Russia-Ukraine war: Russia’s war in Ukraine is raising questions about Moscow’s capacity to sustain primacy in its backyard.
  • China’s dominance in Asia: China’s rise is increasing the prospects for Beijing’s emergence as the dominant force in inner Asia.

SCO

Membership Clamour and Attractiveness of the SCO

  • Comparison between the long lines for membership at the doors of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation and the SCO:
  • Central European countries towards NATO: Many countries in Central Europe, including Ukraine, want to follow Finland and Sweden into NATO.
  • Several countries queuing up to join SCO: Several important regional states in India’s neighbourhood are queuing up to join the SCO, which now has eight members – China, India, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Pakistan, Russia, Uzbekistan, and Tajikistan.
  • Iran set to join: Iran is set to join the SCO and Afghanistan, Belarus, and Mongolia are observers and would like to follow Tehran.
  • Impressive list of dialogue partners: Then there is the impressive list of current and incipient dialogue partners that includes Azerbaijan, Armenia, Egypt, Qatar, Turkey, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates from the Middle East and Maldives, Nepal, and Sri Lanka from the Subcontinent.
  • SCO is inclusive: Unlike NATO the SCO is inclusive, and its attractiveness underlines the rise of non-Western security institutions.
  • Turkey wants to be part of SCO: Turkey, a long-standing member of NATO, wants to be part of SCO certainly highlights the value of being part of a forum led by Russia and China that today are at loggerheads with the West.

Internal Conflicts and Counter-terrorism Preoccupation

  • Internal conflicts becoming high priority: Counter-terrorism has been the principal preoccupation of the SCO for all these years. The internal conflicts within and between the member states and associates are becoming a higher priority for the SCO.
  • For example: Afghanistan’s internal instabilities have been a major driver for the SCO. However, for all the talk of the SCO becoming the regional security arbiter, it was a direct deal between the US and the Taliban that reshaped the Afghan dynamic.
  • Russia’s Role and Ambitions in Central Asia: Russia’s muscle and Beijing’s money provide a sensible basis for their strategic division of labour in Central Asia to keep the Western powers out of the region. However, if Russia is a protector of the Central Asian regimes, it could also be a potential predator.
  • China’s Growing Regional Influence: China’s growing regional influence will come at Russia’s expense, as China becomes the senior partner in the bilateral relationship with Russia after Ukraine. China’s explicit support of the sovereignty of the Central Asian states is a straw in the wind. Shared borders, growing political salience, and rising regional security profiles promise to make China a force to reckon with in Central Asia in the not-too-distant future.

Significance of SCO for India

  • Central Asia connection: SCO membership provides India with an opportunity to engage with Central Asian nations, Russia, and China, and work towards promoting regional stability, security, and economic cooperation.
  • Security cooperation: SCO focuses on combating terrorism, separatism, and extremism in the region, which is of particular concern to India.
  • Consensus over CBT: India has been a victim of cross-border terrorism for decades. India has been working closely with the RATS to share intelligence and coordinate counter-terrorism operations in the region.
  • Economic push: SCO has set up mechanisms for trade and economic cooperation, including the SCO Business Council, the SCO Interbank Consortium, and the SCO Development Bank.
  • Cultural cooperation: The organization aims to promote cultural exchanges among member states and has set up mechanisms for cooperation in fields such as education, science, and technology

Issues with SCO (Indian context)

  • Pakistan’s presence: India has accused Pakistan of using SCO forums to spread propaganda and misinformation against India.
  • China’s dominance: India has also expressed concerns over China’s dominance in the organization and its attempts to use the platform to push its strategic interests in the region.
  • Limited economic benefits: Despite being a member of the organization for over a decade, India’s trade with other SCO members remains limited and has not been able to tap the full potential of the organization.
  • Limited counter-terrorism cooperation: While the primary objective of the organization is to combat terrorism, India has expressed concerns over the limited counter-terrorism cooperation among member states.
  • Limited influence: Despite being a major power in the region, India’s voice and concerns have not been adequately represented in the organization.

India’s challenging role in the SCO

  • India’s engagement with the SCO all these decades was premised on Russian primacy in the region and Moscow’s support of India’s regional interests.
  • For India, a strong and independent Russia is critical for maintaining the inner Asian balance. However, Delhi is in no position to ensure Moscow’s strategic autonomy from Beijing; that depends on Russian strategic choices.
  • India’s burden in the SCO must now be to protect its own interests amidst a rapidly changing regional power distribution in China’s favour.

Conclusion

  • India, which is chairing the Eurasian regional forum this year, has a range of bilateral problems to discuss with its fellow SCO members. However, its burden in SCO must now be to protect its own interests amidst a rapidly changing regional power distribution in China’s favour. The challenge is particularly demanding as India does not have direct geographic access to the landlocked region.

Mains Question

Q. The clamour for membership is a measure of a forum’s success the increasing clamour for the membership of the SCO is doing well. Discuss and highlight the internal challenges that the SCO is facing.

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Foreign Policy Watch: India-China

Vibrant Villages Program to be integrated with PM Gati Shakti

Note4Students

From UPSC perspective, the following things are important :

Prelims level: Vibrant Village Programme

Mains level: Not Much

The Centre’s Vibrant Villages Programme (VVP) which aims to develop infrastructure and open up villages to tourists along the China border will be integrated with the Gati Shakti Mega Project.

What is Vibrant Villages Programme (VVP)?

  • Under the VVP, the selected villages will be provided with basic facilities like all-weather roads, potable piped water, 24×7 electricity, good mobile and internet connectivity, healthcare, and enhanced livelihood options.
  • The VVP aims to prevent migration of border population, catalyze reverse migration, and keep all villages along the LAC well-populated from the strategic and security point of view.

Villages selected

  • Kibithoo, one of the remotest circle headquarters of Arunachal Pradesh, is the first village to be developed under the VVP.
  • The villages will also serve as the Indian Army’s eyes and ears in these remote areas.
  • 2,967 villages in 19 border districts of Arunachal Pradesh, Sikkim, Uttarakhand, Himachal Pradesh and Ladakh will be developed under the VVP, with 662 villages being developed in the first phase of the project.

Components

  • The VVP programme involves a number of livelihood programmes, including bee-keeping, improving agricultural yields, encouraging handicrafts and local products, and providing market linkages to them.
  • The programme also focuses on promoting high-end tourism and training local people to cater to tourists.
  • Provision of 24×7 power through micro-hydel power plants, solar power panels, and windmills is also a vital component of the programme.

Impact

  • The development of border villages under the VVP will help provide a better livelihood for the locals, improve the quality of life and prevent migration from these remote areas.
  • It will also help in gathering intelligence from the people of border villages and provide the Indian Army with better access to these areas.

Comparison with China’s Model

  • India’s Vibrant Village Programme (VVP) is people-centric and aims to enhance the quality of life of the locals.
  • China’s Xiaokang villages lack proper planning for providing livelihood opportunities, healthcare and education facilities, and proper transportation.
  • Beijing’s aim of keeping civilian residents of these villages as watchful eyes over activities across the LAC and on Indian Army patrols has been negated.
  • Most of the villages now serve as residential quarters and logistical facilities for the PLA.
  • India’s VVP scores over China’s building of new Xiaokang villages as it has a holistic approach to development.

Why merged with Gati Shakti?

  • Gati Shakti brings 16 ministries, including Railways and Roadways, together for integrated planning and coordinated implementation of infrastructure connectivity projects.
  • It allows government departments to break operational silos.
  • By integrating VVP with Gati Shakti, there can be better coordination between various ministries and departments to ensure the smooth implementation of the programme and to avoid any duplication of efforts.

 

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Foreign Policy Watch: India-China

China’s Renaming Exercise Undermines International Law

Note4Students

From UPSC perspective, the following things are important :

Prelims level: NA

Mains level: China's renaming strategy and its implications

Central Idea

  • China’s recent move to rename 11 places in Arunachal Pradesh and standardise those names on the basis of a map is an exercise of the Chinese perspective of international law, which goes against the international law widely adhered to by most members of the United Nations.

Historical Basis of China’s Claims

  • China’s claims over disputed territories, such as the South China Sea, are often based on historical records, maps, and cultural relics.
  • China argues that these territories had been its territory since the Song Dynasty and, therefore, should be considered part of its sovereign territory. However, this approach is not recognized under international law and undermines the basis of the international legal system.

Chinese perspective of international law

  • Jurisdiction rights: The Chinese perspective of international law is based on its strong stress on the principle of sovereignty. According to this view, sovereign states have an inalienable right to exercise jurisdiction over their territories and their people without interference from other states.
  • Historic rights: China combines its vision of sovereignty with the historic right to exercise jurisdiction over those territories or maritime areas as well, which were once ruled by a Chinese dynasty in the mediaeval or ancient era.
  • Undermines international legal system: The historic right approach makes China undermine the basis of the international legal system grounded in the sovereign equality of states and the general rules of international law.

Contravention of international courts and tribunals

  • Contravenes the decisions of international courts and tribunals: China’s attempt to rename 11 disputed locations on historical and administrative bases contravenes the decisions of international courts and tribunals.
  • No convincing proofs: The International Court of Justice (ICJ) considers direct evidence of possession and the actual exercise of sovereignty as more convincing proof of title to a territory than indirect presumption from events in history.
  • Against the principle of uti possidetis juris: China’s renaming exercise goes against the principle of uti possidetis juris, which is the principle that the boundaries of newly independent states should follow those of the previous colonies.
  • Help of cartographic materials: China tries to buttress its territorial and maritime claims with the support of maps, but cartographic materials do not have any legal value by themselves. They constitute extrinsic evidence of varying reliability that might, depending on the circumstances, be used together with other evidence to establish a fact.

What is the principle of uti possidetis juris?

  • The principle of uti possidetis juris is a Latin phrase that means as you possess under law.
  • It is a principle of international law that was developed in the context of decolonization. The principle holds that newly independent states should inherit the territorial boundaries that existed at the time of their independence.
  • The idea is that the territorial integrity of a new state should be protected and that the boundaries of the state should not be subject to change without the consent of the state.
  • The principle of uti possidetis juris is meant to prevent disputes over territorial boundaries that could lead to instability or conflict.

Implications of China’s actions

  • China’s actions in Arunachal Pradesh undermine the international legal system based on the sovereign equality of states and the general rules of international law.
  • China’s historic right approach to sovereignty over territories and maritime areas is a cause for concern for other countries with territorial disputes with China.
  • China’s use of maps to support its territorial and maritime claims is not a legally valid argument and undermines the legal basis for resolving territorial disputes.

Conclusion

  • China’s attempt to rename disputed territories in Arunachal Pradesh goes against established principles of international law and undermines the sovereign equality of states. The use of historical claims and maps to support territorial and maritime claims is not recognized in international law. This renaming exercise is likely to further strain India-China relations and impact regional stability. It is essential to uphold the principles of international law to ensure the independence and stability of new states and prevent challenges to territorial boundaries.

Mains Question

Q. What is the principle of uti possidetis juris? How does China’s attempt to rename territories in Arunachal Pradesh contravene the decisions of international courts and tribunals?

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Foreign Policy Watch: India-China

Russia and China Aim To Build A Post-Western Order

Note4Students

From UPSC perspective, the following things are important :

Prelims level: NA

Mains level: Russia, China and the West

Central Idea

  • Russia and China aim to exploit divisions within the West to transform the global order and build a post-Western order. However, the Indian strategic community should not expect the fault lines within the West to be fatal, as history has shown that such dreams have not come to fruition.

Post-Western Order

  • Building a post-Western order: Russia and China have talked of upending the world order before, with the history of international communism in the 20th century being about building a post-Western order.
  • America’s internal fissures and divisions between the US and Europe: While Moscow and Beijing are convinced that they can put the West on the defensive by pooling their strengths, the success of this strategy rests on the Moscow-Beijing axis successfully leveraging America’s internal fissures and divisions between the US and Europe.

Dividing America from Europe

  • The Moscow and Beijing are hoping to divide America from Europe: Russia’s latest version of its foreign policy doctrine singles out the US as the main instigator, organizer, and executor of the aggressive anti-Russian policy of the collective West.
  • China’s diplomatic Europe strategy: China’s love for Europe’s strategic autonomy is equally passionate. However, it is unlikely that there will be a decisive movement on either issue, but both sides see the diplomatic dance as a valuable exercise.

Sino-European Engagement

  • Europe’s pressure on Russia: Europe wants Xi to put pressure on Putin to end the war in Ukraine, and Beijing would like Europe to distance itself from the US on its China policy.
  • Europe not ready to busy China’s peace initiative: While Europe is not ready to buy China’s peace initiative on Ukraine, it has convinced itself that Xi is the only leader who can nudge Putin towards peace.

India’s Perspective

  • The realists in India are aware of the many differences between the US and Europe, but they are also aware that Western strategic unity has endured since World War II.
  • The Russian and Chinese overreach has cemented broad Western unity rather than separating Europe from the US.

Conclusion

  • While Russia and China aim to exploit divisions within the West to transform the global order, it is unlikely that they will succeed in building a post-Western order. The fault lines within the West are real, but they are by no means fatal.

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Foreign Policy Watch: India-China

Arunachal Pradesh: China’s Cartographic Deception

Note4Students

From UPSC perspective, the following things are important :

Prelims level: NA

Mains level: China's attempts to use cartography as a weapon

Central Idea

  • The Chinese leadership has been using cartographic deception as a weapon to violate the sovereign national boundaries of its neighbours, and India has been a victim of this deception since Independence. The recent rechristening of villages and areas in Arunachal Pradesh is another example of China’s cartographic deception, and India must remain vigilant against such tactics.

Background: India-China relations

  1. Historical context:
  • India has been a victim of China’s deception since its independence.
  • Mao’s Red Army sent messages to Indian Communists promising support in their violent liberation struggle to overthrow the government of Jawaharlal Nehru.
  • In the early 1950s, China started staking claims to large parts of Indian territory.
  1. Cartographic deception used by China:
  • Cartographic deception is integral to the Chinese leadership’s machinations.
  • China has been indulging in cartographic deception by staking claims to large parts of Indian territory.
  • The recent rechristening of villages and areas in Arunachal Pradesh by the Chinese cabinet is another example of that cartographic deception.
  • Despite President Xi Jinping’s claims of standing guard over the world order based on international law, China continues to use cartography as a weapon to violate sovereign national boundaries of its neighbours.

How cartography is used as a weapon?

  • Deliberate manipulation of maps: The term use of cartography as a weapon refers to the deliberate manipulation of maps for political and strategic purposes. This can involve drawing new borders or redefining existing borders, claiming territory that was previously not contested or that belonged to another country, and renaming places to support these claims.
  • Psychological warfare technique: It is often accompanied by historical revisionism, propaganda, and the creation of artificial historical links to justify these claims. This approach can be seen as a form of psychological warfare, intended to create confusion, weaken the opponent’s resolve, and undermine its legitimacy in the eyes of the international community.

Historical background of Arunachal Pradesh

  • No contact with China: Historically, Arunachal Pradesh had no contact with China, and there was never any Chinese presence there.
  • Shimla Agreement: The McMahon Line, which became the international boundary between India and Tibet through the Shimla Agreement between the British and Tibetan governments in 1914, clearly puts Tawang, which fell south of the McMahon Line, out of Tibetan administrative control.
  • Claims over Tawang: Attempts by pro-China historians to claim that parts of Western Arunachal Pradesh like Tawang were under the rule of Lhasa before 1950 are negated by historical records.

Chinese invasion of Arunachal Pradesh in 1962

  • During the Chinese invasion of Arunachal Pradesh in 1962, they were extra-cordial with the locals and made special efforts to convince them about the greater racial affinity between them.
  • However, despite all the deceptive maneuvers during the 49-day-long occupation, the Chinese could not win over the hearts and minds of the people of NEFA.

Conclusion

  • India must remain vigilant against China’s cartographic deception, as it was through a similar deception in 1962 that China annexed territory. India has dismissed the recent rechristening exercise by China, and rightly emphasised that Arunachal Pradesh is, has been, and will always be an integral and inalienable part of India. India must continue to stand firm against China’s attempts to use cartography as a weapon to violate its sovereign national boundaries.

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Foreign Policy Watch: India-China

India-Bhutan Relationship Built On Faith and Mutual trust

Note4Students

From UPSC perspective, the following things are important :

Prelims level: India- Bhutan border and trijunction

Mains level: India- Bhutan relationship

Relationship

Central Idea

  • India-Bhutan’s exemplary relationship has been a key factor in ensuring the stability and security of the region. The recent visit of Bhutan King Jigme Khesar Namgyel Wangchuck to India was focused on enhancing the bilateral relationship between the two countries. However, the unspoken part of the visit was the Bhutan-China boundary talks, which have gained momentum in recent times.

Exemplary India-Bhutan Relationship

  • Special and strategic relationship: India and Bhutan share a special and strategic relationship with a border of over 600 km. The bond has been strengthened since India’s independence, and it has been a buffer between China and India.
  • India is Bhutan’s largest development partner: The relationship is not limited to rhetoric but extends to an institutional and economic framework. India is Bhutan’s largest development partner, and Bhutan is India’s biggest trade partner in the region.
  • Hydroelectricity, a crucial factor: Hydroelectricity has become the biggest revenue earner of Bhutan, and India buys power generated in Bhutan. It makes Bhutan the country with the highest per capita income in South Asia today.
  • Historical and theological relations: Bhutan is a Buddhist theocracy, monarchy, and modern state. The relationship between India and Bhutan is special from a historical, theological, strategic, and economic perspective.

Bhutan-China Boundary Talks

  • Considerable progress but no decision yet: Before the King’s visit to India, Bhutanese Prime Minister Lotay Tshering had said in an interview that Bhutan and China have made considerable progress on demarcating border lines. Bhutan has been having talks with China on the boundary question for years, and there has been no decision yet.
  • There will be adjustment of territory: Bhutan and China are adopting a modern methodology to draw boundary lines on the ground, and there may be some adjustment of territory as a result of that.
  • India’s strategic interests: India’s strategic interests are involved in the boundary talks between Bhutan and China. China has been seeking a toehold in Bhutan for decades. Bhutan is fully conscious of India’s strategic needs.
  • Trijunction: Where Bhutan decides its boundary with China (to the west) is of exceptional relevance to India because that is a trijunction of the three countries.

Relationship

India’s Strategic Interests

  • No compromise on national security: India will not talk about Bhutan-China negotiations publicly; however, when it comes to India’s national security, there will be no compromise.
  • Siliguri corridor: Doklam plateau overlooks the Chumbi Valley, which overlooks the chicken’s neck (Siliguri corridor). India says this not because Bhutan is threatening its cooperation with India on this front, but to send a message to China that we will draw a line here in conformity with our national interest.

Why India needs Bhutan?

  • Strategic location: Bhutan is strategically located between India and China, which makes it an important buffer state for India. Bhutan’s strategic location ensures India’s security and helps in maintaining regional stability.
  • Water resources: Bhutan is the source of several rivers that flow into India, including the Brahmaputra, the Sankosh, and the Manas. India needs access to these rivers for irrigation, hydroelectric power generation, and other purposes. India has helped Bhutan in developing its hydropower potential and has signed several agreements for the purchase of hydropower from Bhutan.
  • Trade and economic ties: India is Bhutan’s largest trading partner, and Bhutan relies heavily on India for its imports and exports. India provides Bhutan with various economic assistance and has helped Bhutan in its development process.
  • Cultural and historical ties: India and Bhutan share a common cultural heritage and have historical ties dating back centuries. India has helped Bhutan preserve its cultural heritage and has supported Bhutan in its efforts to promote tourism.

Why Bhutan needs India?

  • Security: Bhutan does not have a large army, and India provides security assistance to Bhutan. India has helped Bhutan in building its border infrastructure and has helped in the development of the Bhutanese army.
  • Economic ties: India is Bhutan’s largest trading partner, and Bhutan relies heavily on India for its imports and exports. India provides economic assistance to Bhutan, and Indian companies have invested in various sectors in Bhutan.
  • Infrastructure: India has helped Bhutan in building its infrastructure, including roads, airports, and telecommunication networks. India has also helped Bhutan in developing its hydropower potential, and several hydropower projects in Bhutan have been built with Indian assistance.
  • Education and healthcare: India has helped Bhutan in the field of education and healthcare. Many Bhutanese students study in India, and India provides scholarships and grants to Bhutanese students. India has also helped Bhutan in building hospitals and providing medical assistance.
  • Cultural and historical ties: Bhutan and India share a common cultural heritage and have historical ties dating back centuries. India has helped Bhutan in preserving its cultural heritage and has supported Bhutan in its efforts to promote tourism.

Future of India-Bhutan Relations

  • The Bhutan-India relationship has survived because of spiritual underpinnings, geography, economy, and connectivity, all of which strengthen the relationship.
  • India and Bhutan have survived mainly because it was built on mutual trust, which means Bhutan has equally driven the relationship. India should pursue this relationship with trust and complete faith.
  • India must reach out to the new generation in Bhutan, which is being influenced by social media negativity and wrong information about India.

Conclusion

  • The India-Bhutan relationship has been a key factor in ensuring the stability and security of the region. The relationship between the two countries has been built on mutual trust and has been strengthened by an institutional and economic framework. India’s strategic interests are involved in the boundary talks between Bhutan and China. India should pursue the relationship with trust and complete faith and should reach out to the new generation in Bhutan.

Mains Question

Q. Highlight the significance of the India-Bhutan relationship in ensuring regional stability and security? Discuss why India and Bhutan need each other?

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Foreign Policy Watch: India-China

China issues ‘official’ names for some places in Arunachal Pradesh

Note4Students

From UPSC perspective, the following things are important :

Prelims level: McMahon Line

Mains level: LAC disputes

china

Central idea: The Chinese government has announced it would “standardize” the names of 11 places in Arunachal Pradesh.

MEA clarification

  • The Ministry of External Affairs has dismissed the Chinese “invention”.
  • Arunachal Pradesh has always been, and will always be, an integral part of India, said MEA.

Why is China giving names to places that are in India?

  • China claims some 90,000 sq km of Arunachal Pradesh as its territory.
  • It calls the area “Zangnan” in the Chinese language and makes repeated references to “South Tibet”.
  • Chinese maps show Arunachal Pradesh as part of China, and sometimes parenthetically refer to it as “so-called Arunachal Pradesh”.
  • China makes periodic efforts to underline this unilateral claim to Indian territory.
  • Giving Chinese names to places in Arunachal Pradesh is part of that effort.

Earlier unilateral renaming

  • This is the third lot of “standardized” names of places in Arunachal Pradesh that China has announced.
  • Earlier in 2017, it had issued “official” Chinese names for six places spanning the breadth of Arunachal Pradesh

What is China’s argument for claiming these areas?

  • The PRC disputes the legal status of the McMahon Line, the official boundary under the ‘Convention between Great Britain, China, and Tibet’ — of 1914 (Simla Convention).
  • China was represented at the Simla Convention by a plenipotentiary of the Republic of China, which had been declared in 1912 after the Qing dynasty was overthrown.
  • The present communist government came to power only in 1949, when the People’s Republic was proclaimed.
  • The Chinese representative did not consent to the Simla Convention, saying Tibet had no independent authority to enter into international agreements.

What is the McMohan Line?

  • The McMohan Line, named after Henry McMahon, the chief British negotiator at Shimla, was drawn from the eastern border of Bhutan to the Isu Razi pass on the China-Myanmar border.
  • China claims territory to the south of the McMahon Line, lying in Arunachal Pradesh.
  • China also bases its claims on the historical ties that have existed between the monasteries in Tawang and Lhasa.

Intention behind these renamings

  • This renaming is a part of the Chinese strategy to assert its territorial claims over Indian territory.
  • As part of this strategy, China routinely issues statements of outrage whenever an Indian dignitary visits Arunachal Pradesh.
  • Beijing keeps harping on its “consistent” and “clear” position that the Indian possession of Arunachal Pradesh.
  • These claims have been firmly established and recognized by the world, as “illegal”.

Arunachal not all-alone

  • Laying aggressive claims to territories on the basis of alleged historical injustices done to China is a part of Beijing’s foreign policy playbook.
  • The claim on Taiwan is one such example, as are the consistent efforts to change the “facts on the ground” in several disputed islands in the South China Sea.
  • The aggression is at all times backed in overt and covert ways by the use of China’s economic and military muscle.

 


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Foreign Policy Watch: India-China

Taiwan- China: India in the Event of a Cross-Strait Conflict

Note4Students

From UPSC perspective, the following things are important :

Prelims level: NA

Mains level: Taiwan-China conflict and India's role

Conflict

Central Idea

 

  • India needs to proactively consider its military, diplomatic, and economic responses to a potential cross-strait conflict between China and Taiwan.

 

Background

 

  • PLA’s frequent military exercises near Taiwan: The People’s Liberation Army (PLA) is conducting frequent military exercises near Taiwan, increasing the risk of escalation in the Taiwan Strait.
  • Forceful reunification: Some analysts believe that China, under President Xi Jinping, is preparing for a forceful reunification campaign by 2027.

 

Conflict

The impact of a cross-strait conflict between China and Taiwan on India

 

  • Disruption of trade: India’s trade through the South China Sea (SCS) accounts for nearly 55% of its total trade with the Indo-Pacific region. A conflict in the Taiwan Strait could severely disrupt this trade, affecting India’s economy. Additionally, trade with Taiwan, China (India’s second-largest trading partner), East Asia, and some Southeast Asian countries would also be severely impacted.
  • Strategic implications: As a member of the Quad, India would face serious strategic consequences in the event of a cross-strait conflict. New Delhi would be expected to respond in support of its partners, particularly the United States, which may lead to a significant shift in the regional balance of power and India’s international commitments.
  • Escalation along the Line of Actual Control (LAC): India’s involvement in a conflict over Taiwan may prompt China to escalate tensions along the LAC, leading to an increased risk of military confrontation between India and China. This would put additional pressure on India’s military and resources, as it would have to prepare for a potential two-front conflict.
  • Diplomatic challenges: India’s involvement in a conflict over Taiwan would strain its diplomatic relations with China and complicate its foreign policy priorities in the region. New Delhi would have to balance its commitments to its allies and partners with the need to maintain a stable relationship with Beijing.
  • Economic costs: The economic fallout from a cross-strait conflict could be considerable for India, with potential disruptions to supply chains, investment flows, and regional economic integration efforts. This could hinder India’s economic growth and development objectives in the short to medium term.
  • Security concerns: A cross-strait conflict could lead to increased military deployments, escalations, and proxy conflicts in the region, raising security concerns for India. This would necessitate greater vigilance and preparedness from the Indian military and intelligence agencies to address potential threats.
  • Humanitarian consequences: In the event of a large-scale conflict, India may face the challenge of responding to humanitarian crises resulting from displaced populations, refugees, and the disruption of essential services in the region. This could put additional strain on India’s resources and infrastructure.

 

India’s likely responses

 

  • Military response: India could assist partner countries, including the US, by sharing experience and intelligence on dealing with the PLA. It could also offer its mainland for refuelling aircraft and access to its Andaman and Nicobar Island bases.
  • Diplomatic response: India could participate in a United Nations General Assembly resolution condemning Chinese aggression.
  • Economic response: India is unlikely to impose targeted sanctions on China due to the negative trade balance between the two countries.

 

Conflict

India’s proactive measures

 

  • Information sharing: India can establish a secure communication channel with Taiwan to exchange vital intelligence and real-time information on Chinese military movements and strategies. This would help Taiwan to better anticipate potential threats and improve its defensive capabilities.
  • Training Taiwanese armed forces personnel: India can secretly collaborate with Taiwan to train its armed forces personnel in specific operations and tactics. This may include joint exercises and training programs in areas like counterinsurgency, mountain warfare, and special operations, which could enhance Taiwan’s military preparedness.
  • Consultative mechanisms: India can set up consultative mechanisms with Taipei, Tokyo, and Washington to discuss and coordinate their strategic approaches towards deterring a Chinese attack on Taiwan. This collaboration can lead to the development of joint strategies, contingency plans, and a coordinated response in case of a conflict.
  • Strengthening defense ties: India can explore options to strengthen defense ties with Taiwan by providing it with military equipment, technology, and logistical support. This could help Taiwan build a more robust defense system and deter potential Chinese aggression.
  • Economic diversification for Taiwan: India can play a significant role in helping Taiwan diversify its trade and economic dependencies away from China. By increasing bilateral trade, investment, and technological cooperation, India can provide Taiwan with the scale it needs to reduce its overdependence on Beijing.
  • Soft power diplomacy: India can leverage its soft power and cultural ties to build stronger relationships with Taiwan, promoting people-to-people exchanges, educational collaborations, and cultural events. This would not only strengthen the bond between the two countries but also raise awareness and support for Taiwan’s cause on the international stage.
  • Encouraging international support: India can work with its allies and partners in the Quad, as well as other regional and global forums, to build a broader coalition supporting Taiwan’s sovereignty and security. By advocating for Taiwan’s inclusion in international organizations and platforms, India can help raise its global profile and encourage other countries to support Taiwan in the event of a conflict.

 

Conclusion

 

  • While India would face challenges in the event of a cross-strait conflict, it is crucial for New Delhi to plan for the inevitable and proactively consider its military, diplomatic, and economic responses to such a crisis.

Mains Question

Q. There are signs of potential cross-strait conflict between China and Taiwan. In this backdrop discuss its impact on India

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Foreign Policy Watch: India-China

Saudi Arabia set to become SCO member

Note4Students

From UPSC perspective, the following things are important :

Prelims level: SCO

Mains level: Expansion of SCO, Saudi distancing itself from West

saudi-sco

Saudi Arabia’s cabinet decided to join the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, as Riyadh builds a long-term partnership with China despite US security concerns.

What is SCO?

  • The SCO is primarily a geopolitical and security organisation with limited infrastructures to pursue economic integration.
  • The group accounts for about one-third of the world’s land and exports trillions of dollars annually.
  • It is governed by consensus, which limits the scope of major cooperation between its member states.
  • It also functions more as a venue for discussion and engagement where high-level dignitaries from across the region can gather to confer, rather than an alliance like the EU, whose members have a common currency, or NATO.

Its establishment

  • The SCO was founded in June 2001 by the leaders of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, Russia and China.
  • The genesis of the grouping can be traced back to the post-soviet era in 1996 when these countries, termed ‘Shanghai Five’, came together
  • Earlier, it focused on regional security to work on regional security, reduction of border troops, and terrorism.
  • Its particular focus has been on “conflict resolution”, which provided early successes between China and Russia, and then within the Central Asian Republics.

Structure of SCO

  • The organisation has two permanent bodies —
  1. SCO Secretariat based in Beijing and
  2. Executive Committee of the Regional Anti-Terrorist Structure (RATS) based in Tashkent.
  • The SCO Secretary-General and the Director of the Executive Committee of the SCO RATS are appointed by the Council of Heads of State for a term of three years.
  • But the venue of the SCO council meetings shifts between the eight members (including India and Pakistan).

Members of SCO

  • Apart from the above-mentioned countries— Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, Russia and China.
  • India and Pakistan are also members of this organisation, both included in 2017.
  • The SCO also has four observer states — Afghanistan, Belarus , Iran and Mongolia — which may be inducted at a later date.
  • And “Dialogue Partners” —Armenia, Azerbaijan, Cambodia, Nepal, Sri Lanka, Turkey Egypt, Qatar as well as Saudi Arabia.

Main goals

The main goals of the SCO, as adopted in its Charter in St. Petersburg in 2002, is:

  1. Strengthening mutual trust and neighbourliness among the member states;
  2. Promoting their effective cooperation in politics, trade, economy, research and technology and culture, as well as in education, energy, transport, tourism, environmental protection, and other areas;
  3. Making joint efforts to maintain and ensure peace, security and stability in the region; and
  4. Moving towards the establishment of a democratic, fair and rational new international political and economic order.”

Why did Saudi Arabia join SCO?

  • Saudi Arabia could benefit in several ways, such as increased trade and economic cooperation with member states, particularly with China and Russia.
  • It could also gain a stronger voice in regional security issues and access to the SCO’s anti-terrorism framework.
  • Additionally, Saudi Arabia could help the organization expand its influence in the Middle East and increase its strategic weight in global affairs.
  • This is definitely a result of straining its ties with Washington.

 

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Foreign Policy Watch: India-China

The Global Security Initiative (GSI) : China’s Sincere Effort or a Mere Counter-Narrative?

Note4Students

From UPSC perspective, the following things are important :

Prelims level: Global Security Initiative

Mains level: Global Security Initiative, India- china relations

Central Idea

  • The Global Security Initiative (GSI), a China-led framework aiming to restore stability and security in Asia, appears to be more of a counter-narrative to U.S. leadership rather than a genuine attempt to establish a sustainable security order.

What is GSI?

  • The GSI was introduced by Chinese Minister of Foreign Affairs Qin Gang at the Lanting Forum in Beijing.
  • The initiative is based on five pillars: mutual respect, openness and inclusion, multilateralism, mutual benefit, and a holistic approach.

Analysis: China’s track record shows a different picture than what the GSI envisions

  1. Mutual Respect and Adherence to International Law:
  • China’s relations with neighbors like India and Southeast Asian countries demonstrate a lack of respect for their sovereignty and territorial integrity.
  • China’s assertive manoeuvres in the South China Sea, rejection of UNCLOS, and undermining of India’s territorial integrity are at odds with the GSI’s first principle.
  1. Openness and Inclusion:
  • Despite advocating for openness and inclusion, China engages in exclusionary policies in the East and South China Seas, rejecting freedom of navigation and consolidating its sphere of influence.
  1. Multilateralism and Security Cooperation:
  • China’s involvement in multilateral institutions often involves asymmetric power relations, as seen in its dealings with ASEAN members.
  • Its delay in establishing a Code of Conduct for the South China Sea and ongoing militarization in the region undermine this principle.
  1. Mutual Benefit:
  • China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) has the potential to benefit all parties involved. However, its funding of unsustainable projects for countries with low credit ratings creates debt burdens and destabilizes international macroeconomic stability.
  • China’s insistence on a larger share in joint resource exploration with the Philippines is another example of disregarding mutual benefit.
  1. Holistic Approach:
  • China’s rise in a transitioning multipolar international system has led to power competitions with established and rising powers, such as the U.S. and India.
  • Its engagements with these powers indicate a narrowly defined goal for its power interests. Furthermore, China’s involvement in non-traditional security threats, such as the COVID-19 pandemic and arming terror groups, shows a lack of holistic approach.

Conclusion

  • China’s rise in a transitioning multipolar international system has led to power competitions with established and rising powers, and its involvement in non-traditional security threats shows a lack of holistic approach. It’s Global Security Initiative, which is a vision of a future security order, is vastly different from China’s recent track record of external engagement.

Mains Question

Q. What is China’s Global Security Initiative (GSI)? It is said that China’s GSI is vastly different from China’s recent track record of external engagement. Discuss


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Foreign Policy Watch: India-China

India-China: Border Management Mechanism

Note4Students

From UPSC perspective, the following things are important :

Prelims level: NA

Mains level: India-China border issues and management

Central Idea

  • India and China appear to be moving towards a new modus vivendi to maintain peace and tranquillity along their disputed 4,000 kilometre border. They are discussing measures to ease the border situation, including creating no-patrol zones along the Line of Actual Control (LAC) and upgrading the border management mechanism.

Older arrangements and need for new measures

  • Blockades: In 2020, the older arrangements, shaped by the agreements of 1993, 1996, 2005 and 2013, came apart in Ladakh after the Chinese massed troops in Tibet and established blockades at six points on the Line of Actual Control (LAC) to prevent Indian troops from patrolling the border.
  • Clashes: A clash at Galwan in June 2020 led to the deaths of 20 Indian and four Chinese soldiers, the first such losses on the LAC since 1975. The Sino-Indian clash, in December 2022, at Yangtse, north-east of Tawang, suggests that new measures may be needed across the LAC, and not just in Ladakh.

Attempts to Ease the Border Situation

  • Working Mechanism for Consultation and Coordination (WMCC): Important discussions that took place between Indian Ministry of External Affairs and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, China, met in Beijing for the 26th Meeting of the Working WMCC on China-India Border Affairs, on February 22, 2023. This was the first in-person meeting of the WMCC that had held the previous 11 rounds since the 2020 events by video conference.
  • Other Measures: Discussions have taken up the issue of upgrading the border management means to replace the WMCC with a mechanism that will have both military and civilian officers. The no-patrol zones could lead to a package settlement in the two remaining areas of Depsang and Charding Nala.
  • Confidence-building Measures: The entire range of confidence-building measures since 1993 was premised on the belief that both sides largely accepted the lay of the LAC, though they had differences that related to some 18-20 points on it. The 1993 and 1996 agreements specifically spoke about the importance of identifying and resolving these differences.
  • No-patrol zones: The no-patrol zones could be confined to the places where the two sides have overlapping claims. Chinese journalist-scholar Qian Feng suggested that the concept of the zone of actual control could replace the “line of actual control” in some areas that had no obvious geomorphological features or population.

The Idea of Shifting the Goalposts

  • The idea of creating no-patrol zones is an echo of the original proposal by Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai following a similar set of circumstances experienced today.
  • In October 1959, an Indian police party was ambushed at Kongka La leading to the deaths of 10 personnel and the capture of another dozen.
  • Zhou proposed to Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru in a letter of November 7, 1959, that both sides withdraw 20 kilometers from the so-called McMahon Line, as well as the line up to which each side exercises control in the west.

Conclusion

  • Creating no-patrol zones along the LAC could be a possible solution to the border conflict, as well as upgrading the border management mechanism to include both military and civilian officers.

Mains Question

Q. Discuss the recent developments in the India-China border conflict and the measures being taken to maintain peace and tranquillity along the border


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Foreign Policy Watch: India-China

China-India: Facilitating an Asian Century

Note4Students

From UPSC perspective, the following things are important :

Prelims level: NA

Mains level: India-china Trade, development and Bilateral Relations

China

Central idea

  • China’s recent developments in steady growth, people’s well-being, opening up, and win-win cooperation, as well as its willingness to strengthen communication and coordination with India, can provide new opportunities for all countries in the world, especially neighbouring countries. importance of China-India relations and their role in facilitating an Asian Century.

China’s focus areas of development 

  • Modernization: China is currently advancing modernization in all fronts, based on its practices, and a focus on high-quality development.
  • Overall development: The country aims to modernize its huge population, ensuring common prosperity for all, material and cultural-ethical advancement, harmony between humanity and nature, and peaceful development.
  • New opportunities: China’s development will create new opportunities for all countries, especially neighbouring countries.

China

The development of China in recent years

  1. Steady Growth:
  • In 2022, China’s economy grew by 3%, and the country added a total of 12.06 million urban jobs.
  • The country’s GDP increased to 121 trillion yuan (approximately $18 trillion), registering an annual growth rate of 5.2% over the past five years and an annual growth of 6.2% over the past decade, with GDP increasing by nearly 70 trillion yuan.
  • China’s economic strength is steadily reaching new heights.
  1. People’s Well-being:
  • China has historically resolved absolute poverty, with the alleviation of close to 100 million rural residents from poverty.
  • Over 70% of the government’s expenditure went toward ensuring people’s well-being.
  • Basic old age insurance covers 1.05 billion people, an increase of 140 million. Living standards continue to witness new improvements.
  1. Opening Up:
  • In 2022, China’s total volume of trade in goods exceeded 40 trillion yuan, registering an annual growth rate of 8.6%.
  • China’s actual use of foreign capital was up by 8%, and the country remained one of the top destinations for foreign investors.
  • The overall tariff level continues to fall, from 9.8% to 7.4%. China’s doors to the outside world are opening even wider.
  1. Win-Win Cooperation
  • In the period 2013-2021, China’s contribution to global economic growth averaged 38.6%, higher than that of G7 countries combined (25.7%).
  • More than 100 countries have expressed their support, and over 60 countries have joined the Group of Friends of the Global Development Initiative (GDI) since Chinese President, Xi Jinping, proposed it in a speech at the United Nations General Assembly in 2021.

China

China-India Relations

  • Emerged as Representatives: As neighboring and ancient civilizations, China, and India are representatives of developing countries and emerging economies.
  • National rejuvenation: Both countries are currently in the process of national rejuvenation and a crucial period of modernization where challenges need to be overcome and problems need to be solved.
  • Interests than differences: China and India have far more common interests than differences.

China- India Trade

  • China and India are important trading partners, with bilateral trade volume reaching $135.984 billion in 2022.
  • Although there is a trade deficit, India’s import of equipment and materials from China reduces the overall cost of Made-in-India products, benefits Indian downstream industries and consumers, enhances the competitiveness of Indian exports, and in turn facilitates India’s integration into global industrial and supply chains.

China

Facilitating an Asian Century

  • Chinese Foreign Minister recently stated that the development and revitalization of China and India embody a boost to the force of developing countries, which will change the destiny of a third of the world’s population and have a bearing on the future of Asia and beyond.
  • This echoes what India’s External Affairs Minister S. Jaishankar had expressed in 2022 that the Asian Century will happen when China and India come together.

Conclusion

  • China’s development and its relationship with India are important for the region and the world. Both countries are in the process of modernization and face challenges that need to be overcome. China and India are important trading partners, and their cooperation can facilitate an Asian Century and contribute to peace and stability in the region and beyond.

Mains Question

Q. Provide your insights on the role of China and India in shaping the destiny of the developing countries and their impact on the future of Asia and beyond


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Foreign Policy Watch: India-China

What is the McMahon Line?

Note4Students

From UPSC perspective, the following things are important :

Prelims level: McMahon Line

Mains level: Not Much

McMahon

Central idea: Republican and Democrat senators introduced a resolution in US Congress reiterating that the US recognises the McMahon Line as the international boundary between China and India in Arunachal Pradesh.

Significance of such move

  • This resolute confirms US (both ruling and opposition) stand with India at a time when China poses a threat to the Free and Open Indo-Pacific.
  • The resolution reaffirms India’s position that Arunachal Pradesh, which China calls ‘South Tibet’, is an integral part of India.

What is the McMahon Line?

  • The McMahon Line serves as the de facto boundary between China and India in the Eastern Sector and represents the boundary between Arunachal Pradesh and Tibet.
  • China disputes the boundary and claims the state of Arunachal Pradesh as part of the Tibetan Autonomous Region (TAR).

Under what circumstances was the McMahon Line drawn?

  • The McMahon Line was drawn during the Simla Convention of 1914, officially described as the Convention between Great Britain, China, and Tibet.
  • The British led an expedition into Tibet and signed the Convention of Lhasa in 1904, alarmed at the growing Russian influence in the region.
  • China invaded at the same time, taking control of the southeastern Kham region and pushing British officials to advocate extending British jurisdiction into the tribal territory.
  • The convention attempted to settle the question of Tibet’s sovereignty and avoid further territorial disputes in the region.

What happened at the Simla Convention of 1913-14?

  • The Tibetan government in Lhasa was represented by its plenipotentiary Paljor Dorje Shatra, and Britain by Sir Arthur Henry McMahon, foreign secretary of British India at Delhi.
  • The Chinese plenipotentiary was Ivan Chen.
  • The treaty divided the Buddhist region into “Outer Tibet” and “Inner Tibet” and determined the border between China proper and Tibet as well as Tibet and British India.
  • The final convention was only signed by McMahon on behalf of the British government and Shatra on behalf of Lhasa.
  • Ivan Chen did not consent to the convention, arguing that Tibet had no independent authority to enter into international agreements.

How was the border between British India and China decided?

  • The 890-km border from the corner of Bhutan to the Isu Razi Pass on the Burma border was drawn largely along the crest of the Himalayas, following the “highest watershed principle”.
  • However, exceptions were made, such as Tawang, which was included in British India due to its proximity to the Assam Valley.

What has the status of the McMahon line been since 1914?

  • While there were disputes regarding the McMahon line from the beginning, after the communists took power in 1949, they pulled China out of all international agreements.
  • The McMahon line was not mentioned during the Bandung Conference of 1955, which was held in Indonesia and saw Asian and African leaders agree to a common stand against colonialism and the Cold War.
  • However, the Chinese have recently raised the issue of the McMahon line, and in 2017, Beijing officially renamed six places in the Arunachal Pradesh region, including the disputed area of Tawang.

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Foreign Policy Watch: India-China

Australia to buy US nuclear submarines under AUKUS

Note4Students

From UPSC perspective, the following things are important :

Prelims level: AUKUS

Mains level: AUKUS as a response to China

aukus

Australia will buy up to 5 US nuclear-powered submarines and build a new model with US and British technology under the AUKUS.

AUKUS: A Backgrounder

  • This new partnership is known as AUKUS and the major highlight of this arrangement is the sharing of US nuclear submarine technology with Australia.
  • The first major initiative of AUKUS would be to deliver a nuclear-powered submarine fleet for Australia thereby giving it a nuclear heft in the Pacific where China has been particularly aggressive.
  • Apart from this AUKUS will also involve the sharing of cyber capabilities and other undersea technologies.
  • This alliance is considered to be most significant security arrangement between these three nations.

Ripples created by AUKUS

(A) US shift of focus

  • AUKUS is both an acknowledgment of and a concession to the loss of US strategic primacy.
  • It gives justification for the hasty withdrawal from Afghanistan — to be able to better focus on the strategic rivalry and trade competition with China.

(B) Resentment in the EU and France

  • The deal has complicated the relations between France and Australia, and also France and the US. France is upset as it has been kept out of the loop.
  • France has even ordered the recall of its ambassadors to Washington and Canberra.

(C) Chinese offensive reception

  • China, expectedly, has strongly criticised AUKUS and the submarine deal as promoting instability and stoking an arms race.

(D) Confusion among the SE nations

  • The new great power contestation might actually generate much room for the Southeast Asian states to manoeuvre, as they are wooed simultaneously by China, AUKUS, and the Quad.
  • They realise that AUKUS is a challenge to the hallowed notion of “ASEAN centrality”, a totemic rhetorical device which seeks to have others acknowledge its relevance.

Why such an alliance?

(A) Deteriorating China-AU relations

  • Tensions have been high between Australia and an increasingly assertive China, its largest trade partner.
  • Australia banned Chinese telecom giant Huawei in 2108 and its PM called for an investigation into the origins of COVID-19 last year.
  • China retaliated by imposing tariffs on or capping Australian exports.

(B) US act of counterbalancing

  • China has nuclear-powered submarines, as well as submarines that can launch nuclear missiles.
  • The three signatories to the AUKUS deal have made it clear though, that their aim is not to arm the new subs with nuclear weapons.

(C) Bringing Australia at the centrestage of Indo-Pacific

  • In the context of the AUKUS agreement, nuclear-powered submarines will give the Royal Australian Navy the capability to go into the South China Sea.
  • This is primarily because a nuclear-powered submarine gives a navy the capability to reach far out into the ocean and launch attacks.
  • A nuclear-powered submarine offers long distances dives, at a higher speed, without being detected gives a nation the ability to protect its interests far from its shores.

Exactly, How?

  • To go from a diesel-electric fleet to a nuclear fleet is thus a change of strategy, not just of propulsion.
  • It provides a way to project power from the shipping lanes which feed the all-important Malacca Strait to the waters off Taiwan.
  • Add on the capacity to launch much longer-range missiles—a submarine could deliver missiles to China’s mainland while sitting to the east of the Philippines—and the country has a greatly expanded offensive capacity.

AU: Another US Base

  • If Australia’s strategic stance is changed by the deal, so is America’s.
  • Since the Second World War the US has projected power across the region called as an archipelago of empire.
  • There are the island bases from Hawaii in the east to Guam, Okinawa in Japan and, in the Indian Ocean, Diego Garcia, leased from Britain without the consent of its natives.
  • In Australia, America has now, in effect, a beefed-up continent-sized base for its own operations as well as a reinvigorated ally.

Outcomes of AUKUS

(A) Offensive front against China

  • There is no gainsaying the fact that rapid accretion in China’s economic and military capacities, but more particularly its belligerence, has led to a tectonic shift in regional security paradigms.
  • Several countries have been obliged to review their defence preparedness in response to China’s rising military power and its adverse impact on regional stability.

(B) India as a bridge in Anglosphere

  • The transatlantic fissure has also pointed to something inconceivable—that India could emerge as a potential bridge between different parts of the West.
  • Our PM was on the phone with French President Emmanuel Macron reaffirming India’s strong commitment to the Indo-Pacific partnership with France.
  • India’s solidarity with France at a difficult moment is rooted in New Delhi’s conviction that preserving the West’s unity is critical in shaping the strategic future of the Indo-Pacific.

(C) Exposed Chinese double standards

  • China has the world’s fastest-growing fleet of sub-surface combatants.
  • This includes the Type 093 Shang-class nuclear-powered attack submarine (SSN) and the Type 094 nuclear-powered Jin-class ballistic missile submarine (SSBN).
  • Its nuclear submarines are on the prowl in the Indo-Pacific.
  • Yet, China denies Australia and others the sovereign right to decide on their defence requirements.

Implications on QUAD

  • Not superseding: This alliance does not and will not supersede or outrank existing arrangements in the Indo-Pacific region such as the Quad, which the US and Australia form with India and Japan, and ASEAN.
  • Complimentary to QUAD: AUKUS will complement these groups and others.

Opportunities for India

While the Quad and Washington’s Indo-Pacific pivot generate much interest and anxiety, it is easy to forget that the two ideas are, in essence, about India.

  • India’s role has enhanced: Balancing China is the challenge confronting the United States, and Washington has recognized that India is an indispensable part of the answer.
  • Just another alliance: New Delhi has no reason to complain if Australia, Britain, and the United States raise the military capabilities of their coalition. The submarine deal is an undiluted example of strategic defence collaboration.
  • Intimidating China: The introduction of nuclear-powered submarine through AUKUS has a complicating impact on the Chinese maritime calculus. Anything that maintains a balance of power in the region is desirable.
  • Focusing inside on land border: AUKUS also leaves India with a less of a headache in securing its maritime flank from Chinese aggression and New Delhi may focus more fully on the threat emanating from the land border with China.

 

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Foreign Policy Watch: India-China

Chinese hydro-hegemony over Brahmaputra

Note4Students

From UPSC perspective, the following things are important :

Prelims level: Brahmaputra and its tributaries

Mains level: Hydrodiplomacy over Brahmaputra River

brahmaputra

India has planned to build a buffer reservoir in the proposed Arunachal hydropower project to counter China’s proposed 60,000 MW Medog hydropower project on the Brahmaputra River.

Brahmaputra hydrology: A tool of aggression for China

  • China has continued to use the water of river Brahmaputra for its interest and has intentionally created hazardous conditions for downstream states like India and Bangladesh.
  • Concerns over China’s proposed 60,000 MW hydropower in Medog, Tibet are influencing the design of a proposed hydropower project in Arunachal Pradesh’s Upper Siang district.
  • Still only in the planning stage, a ‘pre-feasibility report’ on the 11,000 MW project, or more than five times the size of the largest such projects in India – has been submitted.

What is Medog super-dam Project?

  • China is planning a mega dam in Tibet able to produce triple the electricity generated by the Three Gorges—the world’s largest power station.
  • The structure will span the Brahmaputra River before the waterway leaves the Himalayas and flows into India.
  • It is billed as able to produce 300 billion kilowatts of electricity each year and said to be largest dam in the world once completed.

India’s plan: To build buffer reservoir

  • The design of the proposed project incorporates a buffer storage” of 9 billion cubic metres (or about 9 billion tonnes of water) during monsoonal flow.
  • This could act as a store of water worth a year’s flow that would normally be available from the Brahmaputra or buffer against sudden releases.

Threats posed by Medog Project

Chinese dams can hold large amounts of water, during times of droughts China could stop the flow of the river, jeopardizing the lives of millions of people in Arunachal Pradesh, Assam, and Bangladesh.

  • Reduced flow in the Brahmaputra: The 60,000 MW dam in Medog could reduce the natural flow of water from the Brahmaputra.
  • Triggering artificial floods: Away from India during lean patches, it might be used to trigger “artificial floods” in the Brahmaputra basin.
  • Degradation of the entire basin: Silt carried by the river would get blocked by dams leading to a fall in the quality of soil and eventual reduction in agricultural productivity.
  • Seismic threats: Seismologists consider the Himalayas as most vulnerable to earthquakes and seismic activity.
  • Ecological threats: The cumulative impact of these two megaprojects might aggravate ecological degradation, converting lotic ecosystems into lentic ones.
  • Water security: Damming Brahmaputra would result in water security in an era of unprecedented shifting climate patterns.
  • Catastrophic threat: Any damage to the mega dam, if constructed here, will cause dam breaching and consequent flood havoc in India and Bangladesh.

Why are such issues unaddressed?

  • No treaty on water sharing: We do not have any bilateral or multilateral treaty or any other effective and formal instrument of understanding for collaborative management of the Brahmaputra River.
  • Hostility over borders: Undemarcated borders are at the core of all hostilities between India and China.

India’s dilemma

  • Flood control dichotomy: India’s hydropower projects, while potentially beneficial in controlling flooding from the Brahmaputra in Assam and Arunachal Pradesh.
  • No deterrence to China: This might not necessarily serve as a strategic deterrent to China.
  • Resentment to Bangladesh: A large dam in India may help control floods within India but might open fresh disputes over water sharing with Bangladesh downstream.

Way forward

  • There must be collaborative management of our shared rivers.
  • Hydro-diplomacy should form an important ingredient of Indian foreign policy, especially as India shares river basins with neighbors.

Brahmaputra River

brahmaputra

  • Origin → Chemayungdung Glacier (Kailash Range, Tibet)
  •     In Tibet, known as TSANG – PO
  •     In China, known as YARLUNG ZANBO
  •     Forms grand canyon in Tibet
  •     Turns southward near Namcha – Barwa
  •     Enters Arunachal Pradesh as Dihang River at Sadiya, emerging from the mountains
  •     Joined by Dibang river from the north & Lohit river from the south → Known as Brahamputra
  •     Turns at Dhubri to enter into Bangladesh
  •     After joining Teesta, known as Jamuna in BD
  •     Joins Ganga & Megna → Merges to BOB.
  •     Forms many river island of which Majuli is world 2nd largest one
  •     Major tributaries → Dihang, Lohit, Subansiri, Teesta, Meghna (Barack in Assam), Manas

 

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Foreign Policy Watch: India-China

India-China relations: China Inconsistent in its words and actions

Note4Students

From UPSC perspective, the following things are important :

Prelims level: NA

Mains level: India- china strained relations

India-China

Context

  • India-China relations have been under enormous strain in recent years. The Indian foreign minister, S. Jaishankar, on many occasions has stated that India-China relations are going through an extremely difficult phase. For the two to return to normalcy in the relationship, he added that it will depend on three mutuals: mutual sensitivity, mutual respect and mutual interest.

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India-China

Chinese foreign minister statement

  • Statement by Wang Yi: Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi stated that China is ready to work with India in improving bilateral ties.
  • Statement said China will work with India for steady China-India growth: Speaking at a symposium on the international situation and China’s foreign relations in 2022, Wang reportedly said that both countries “have maintained communication through the diplomatic and military-to-military channels, and both countries are committed to upholding stability in the border areas. We stand ready to work with India in the direction toward steady and sound growth of China-India relations.
  • Statement against the backdrop of Tawang clash: The Chinese foreign minister’s statement comes against the backdrop of the December 9 clash near Tawang in the northeastern Indian state of Arunachal Pradesh, where soldiers on both sides sustained minor injuries.

Strained relationship between India-China

  • No sign of taking a back step: Even though the two sides managed to bring the Tawang situation under control, the reality is that the number of forces on deployment on either side of the border after the Galwan clash two years back shows no sign of being pulled back, a stark reminder of the far-from-normal state of relations between India and China.
  • Despite of commander level talks, no fruitful negotiation on disengagement: Despite 17 rounds of military talks at the army commander level, the two sides have not been able to resolve their differences and accomplish a complete disengagement of their military forces.
  • Statement by India: Following the 17th session of military talks last week, the Indian Ministry of Defense issued a statement that blandly stated that both sides will maintain the security and stability on the ground in the Western Sector and that they agreed to stay in close contact and maintain dialogue through military and diplomatic channels and work out a mutually acceptable resolution of the remaining issues at the earliest.

India-China

Is there any positive change in Chinese strategic thinking?

  • Chinese foreign policy is just the same: It is unclear if Wang’s comment on India-China relations reflects any fundamental change in China’s foreign policy. Clearly, there has been no general softening of China’s attitude.
  • Speech was a part of diplomacy: The minister’s statement on India was part of a long speech taking stock of China’s diplomacy and foreign relations in 2022.
  • Particular focus on United states: In the statement, there was a particular focus on the troubled nature of its ties with the United States, calling out Washington’s erroneous China policy. Wang went on to say that it was U.S. stubbornness in seeing China as its peer competitor and Washington’s “blatant blockade, suppression and provocation against China” that has put the relationship in “serious difficulties.
  • Concerned about Taiwan: The minister noted Taiwan is a red line that must not be crossed in China-US relations. He also made note of U.S. House Speaker Nancy Pelosi’s visit to Taiwan to which the minister said that China has taken firm and resolute measures, which have strongly deterred anti-China elements in the United States and the Taiwan independence forces.
  • Indirect reference to QUAD: The Quad, which comprises the U.S., Japan, India and Australia, also found an indirect mention in Wang’s speech. He stated that China is opposed to “bloc confrontation and zero-sum competition.
  • Aggressive with each of India’s security partner: Each of India’s new security partners among the Quad countries has been subjected to China’s aggressive behavior in military, political and economic terms, which has brought a new depth of strategic purpose to the Quad.

India-China

Way ahead

  • India’s relationship with China has been teetering from bad to worse over the last 32 months since the standoff in Ladakh began, and it seems unlikely to improve unless Beijing’s calculus vis a vis India and the region undergoes a drastic change.
  • On the current status of the ties Indian foreign minister, S. Jaishankar, remarked that “the state of the border will determine the state of the relationship.”
  • While Delhi’s G20 leadership may bring opportunities for engagement with Beijing, what is required first is a clear vision and a grand strategy to deal with the China challenge, instead of reacting to each crisis as it emerges

Conclusion

  • Inconsistencies, both in China’s words and also between words and actions, will likely reduce the willingness of other countries, including India, to take seriously China’s statements about wanting a reset of ties.

Mains question

Q. India-China relations, though occasionally showing signs of peace and cooperation, have often been afflicted by tension and mistrust. China is inconsistent in words and actions. Discuss.

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Foreign Policy Watch: India-China

Latest round of commander-level talks at Line of Actual control (LAC)

Note4Students

From UPSC perspective, the following things are important :

Prelims level: NA

Mains level: India-China Border issues, friction points

talks

Context

  • A week after the clash in Tawang in Arunachal Pradesh, convening of the 17th round of India-China corps commander-level talks at the Chushul-Moldo border meeting point in eastern Ladakh is a positive development. But unfortunately, it does not inspire confidence about Chinese intentions vis a vis the Line of Actual Control.

 Background

  • Disengagement at Gogra Hot springs in last round of talks: The last round of talks was held in July, and in September, the government announced that the two sides had finished disengaging at Gogra Hot Springs, as had been agreed in the 16th round.
  • Beijing reluctant for further rounds of talks: Beijing appeared reluctant to accede to Delhi’s push for another round,
  • No return to the status quo: China signals that there is nothing more to discuss about the situation in eastern Ladakh, and certainly not a return to the status quo that existed before its incursions in April-May 2020.

What is outcome of the latest round of talks and the current status?

  • No mutually acceptable resolution on remaining issues: A joint statement that the two sides agreed to keep talking through military and diplomatic channels toward a mutually acceptable resolution of the remaining issues at the earliest suggests that there was no outcome from this round. It is also not clear if the remaining issues have been agreed upon by both sides.
  • India facing an altered status quo: Apart from the fact that India now faces an altered status quo and that the PLA is rapidly building war-like infrastructure on its side, for India, the remaining issues are the presence of Chinese troops in the Depsang plains, and intrusions in the Demchok area.
  • Tensions seems manageable but situation is unpredictable: The sector-wise compartmentalisation makes the tensions seem manageable, but the reality appears to be that there is no predicting which part of the 3,500 km of the line will flare up suddenly, as it did recently.
  • Situation is very serious: Minister of External Affairs S Jaishankar flagged the seriousness of the situation when he told Parliament that the Indian deployment at the LAC is at its highest level.
  • Despite the advanced surveillance, no clarity on Army’s preparedness: From the short statement by Defence Minister Rajnath Singh, it is unclear how prepared the Army was for the transgression at Tawang, despite the advanced Intelligence Surveillance and Reconnaissance devices that have reportedly been installed in that area.

talks

Why China has opened new front in Tawang?

  • Status quo along the boundary not only limited to the Western Sector: China has traditionally been active in areas close to Ladakh given the significance of the Xinjiang-Tibet region in its domestic narrative. However, with its sights on an ageing Dalai Lama, and the issue of his succession, Beijing will want to bring into focus its claims on Tawang, and the rest of Arunachal Pradesh.
  • Huge investment in infrastructure in eastern sector: China has invested in infrastructure in the Eastern Sector over many years. This includes rail, road, and air connectivity, better telecommunications, as well as improved capacity to station and supply troops and artillery.
  • Centrality of the boundary issue in the India-China relationship: External Affairs Minister S Jaishankar has repeatedly asserted that it is no longer possible to separate the boundary question from the overall relationship and that peace and tranquillity on the LAC is the key to restoring relations. However, China is likely to keep up the pressure on the ground along the LAC, even as they continue to suggest that the two countries look beyond the differences, much like Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi’s comments during his March 2022 visit when he claimed that the two sides need to “inject more positive energy” into the relationship.

talks

Way ahead

  • Delhi should make a push for talks at the diplomatic level even as it ramps up military preparedness.
  • Whatever the facts on the ground and regardless of how the tensions will unfold, the government would be well advised to take the Opposition parties into confidence at the earliest.
  • A wide political consensus is what the country needs when confronted with tensions at the borders and it is the government’s task and responsibility to build it.

Conclusion

  • Delhi should make a push for talks at the diplomatic level even as it ramps up military preparedness. Whatever the facts on the ground and regardless of how the tensions will unfold, the government should take the Opposition parties into confidence at the earliest. A wide political consensus is what the country needs when confronted with tensions at the borders

Mains Question

Q. China has opened new front in the eastern sector. Even after the commander level talks multiple times, frictions between the two continues at LAC. Discuss.

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Foreign Policy Watch: India-China

India-China clash: Why China has opened new front?

Note4Students

From UPSC perspective, the following things are important :

Prelims level: India china border areas

Mains level: Chinese Transgression, India's preparedness and challenges

China

Context

  • There has been yet another transgression by Chinese troops across the Line of Actual Control (LAC) between India and China. That it culminated in violence, that it took place this time in the Eastern Sector of their boundary dispute, or that it should take place in the middle of winter should surprise no one. If there is one lesson that can be drawn from India’s experiences with Chinese transgressions over the last decade or so, it is that the Chinese seem to set the pace on the nature and timing of these transgressions.

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Army’s statement about the clash

  • On December 9, 2022, People’s Liberation Army (PLA) troops contacted the LAC in the Tawang sector, which was contested by own troops in a firm and resolute manner.
  • This face-off led to minor injuries to a few personnel from both sides,” “Both sides immediately disengaged from the area.”

China

Events of Chinese transgressions: Need to understand the nature and timing

  • Depsang in Ladakh, 2013: Chinese troops came across the LAC, pitched tents and refused to move for several weeks until New Delhi threatened to cancel the planned visit of Premier Li Keqiang to India. This might have been a diplomatic victory for the Indian government but it also highlighted the inability of the Indian military to bring an end to the standoff or the unwillingness of the government to let the military take the lead in responding.
  • Chumar in Ladakh, Sept, 2014 in the middle of the Xi Jinping’s first visit to India: Chinese intruded at Chumar, also in Ladakh, in the middle of Chinese President Xi Jinping’s first state visit to India. This was in keeping with a reasonably long tradition of Chinese transgressions during important visits but it was also notable for confronting Indian troops in an area where they enjoyed a degree of military advantage.
  • Doklam in 2017: China provoked India with infrastructure development in a third country in Bhutan’s Doklam territory. This was a case of China trying to browbeat an Indian treaty ally.
  • Transgression across multiple locations in 2020 and Galwan valley clash: The Chinese PLA took advantage of Covid-19 and a lack of Indian military alertness to transgress across multiple locations on the LAC in eastern Ladakh. On June 15, 2020 episode when 20 Indian soldiers were killed and several others were injured in violent clashes with the PLA troops in Ladakh’s Galwan Valley.

Why China has opened new front in Tawang?

  • Status quo along the boundary are no longer going to be limited to the Western Sector: China has traditionally been active in areas close to Ladakh given the significance of the Xinjiang-Tibet region in its domestic narrative. However, with its sights on an ageing Dalai Lama, and the issue of his succession, Beijing will want to bring into focus its claims on Tawang, and the rest of Arunachal Pradesh.
  • Huge investment in infrastructure in eastern sector: China has invested in infrastructure in the Eastern Sector over many years. This includes rail, road, and air connectivity, better telecommunications, as well as improved capacity to station and supply troops and artillery.
  • Centrality of the boundary issue in the India-China relationship: External Affairs Minister S Jaishankar has repeatedly asserted that it is no longer possible to separate the boundary question from the overall relationship and that peace and tranquillity on the LAC is the key to restoring relations. However, China is likely to keep up the pressure on the ground along the LAC, even as they continue to suggest that the two countries look beyond the differences, much like Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi’s comments during his March 2022 visit when he claimed that the two sides need to “inject more positive energy” into the relationship.

China

India’s preparedness and learnings from the incident

  • Indian Army anticipated such kind of transgression in eastern sector: The Indian Army had for long anticipated that the PLA would activate the eastern sector of the LAC, and to that extent, it is evident that steps were taken to beef up military preparedness in the region.
  • Light on what gaps to address: What the incident has effectively achieved though is the lighting up of one more section of the LAC at a time the issues in Ladakh have not yet been settled, from the point of view of India.
  • China appears not want to disengage: After 16 rounds of talks, a disengagement has taken place in eastern Ladakh, but it has not restored the status quo that prevailed in April 2020. China, for its part, appears reluctant to hold any further rounds of talks on the leftover problems in Ladakh, including its play in Depsang and Demchok areas.
  • China is only increasing the economic gap between itself and India: China has only increased the economic gap between itself and India and in the intervening years, not only built up more infrastructure in its border provinces but also tried to integrate these regions much more closely with neighbouring economies such as Pakistan and Nepal through grand projects such as the Belt and Road Initiative and pressuring Thimphu to open formal diplomatic ties with Beijing.

Way ahead

  • India’s relationship with China has been teetering from bad to worse over the last 32 months since the standoff in Ladakh began, and it seems unlikely to improve unless Beijing’s calculus vis a vis India and the region undergoes a drastic change.
  • While Delhi’s G20 leadership may bring opportunities for engagement with Beijing, what is required first is a clear vision and a grand strategy to deal with the China challenge, instead of reacting to each crisis as it emerges.

China

Conclusion

  • With its sights on an ageing Dalai Lama, and the issue of his succession, Beijing will want to bring into focus its claims on Arunachal Pradesh. The border stand-off seems to have been managed for now, but Delhi needs a clear vision, grand strategy to deal with China instead of reacting to each crisis as it emerges.

Mains question

Q. There has been yet another transgression by Chinese troops across the Line of Actual Control (LAC) between India and China. Why China has opened new front in eastern sector? Discuss.

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Foreign Policy Watch: India-China

Indian Army and PLA clash near Arunachal Border

Note4Students

From UPSC perspective, the following things are important :

Prelims level: LAC

Mains level: LAC skirmishes

arunachal-lac

The Indian troops deployed in the area of face-off in Tawang sector gave a befitting response to the Chinese troops and the number of Chinese soldiers injured in the clash is more than the Indian soldiers.

Increased clashes at LAC

  • In January 2021, Indian and Chinese troops were involved in a face-off in a disputed stretch in Nakula area of North Sikkim.
  • In 2017, troops of India and China were engaged in a 73-day stand-off in Doklam tri-junction area which even triggered fears of a war between the two neighbours.

What is LAC- the Line of Actual Control?

  • The LAC is the demarcation that separates Indian-controlled territory from Chinese-controlled territory.
  • India considers the LAC to be 3,488 km long, while the Chinese consider it to be only around 2,000 km.
  • It is divided into three sectors: the eastern sector which spans Arunachal Pradesh and Sikkim, the middle sector in Uttarakhand and Himachal Pradesh, and the western sector in Ladakh.
  • The LAC is only a concept – it is not agreed upon by the two countries, neither delineated on a map nor demarcated on the ground.

When did India accept the LAC?

  • The LAC was discussed during Chinese Premier Li Peng’s 1991 visit to India, where PM P V Narasimha Rao and Li reached an understanding to maintain peace and tranquillity at the LAC.
  • India formally accepted the concept of the LAC when Rao paid a return visit to Beijing in 1993 and the two sides signed the Agreement to Maintain Peace and Tranquillity at the LAC.
  • The reference to the LAC was unqualified to make it clear that it was not referring to the LAC of 1959 or 1962 but to the ‘LAC’ at the time when the agreement was signed.
  • To reconcile the differences about some areas, the two countries agreed that the Joint Working Group on the border issue would take up the task of clarifying the alignment of the LAC.

Issues with LAC

  • India’s claim line is the line seen in the official boundary marked on the maps as released by the Survey of India, including both Aksai Chin and Gilgit-Baltistan.
  • In China’s case, it corresponds mostly to its claim line, but in the eastern sector, it claims entire Arunachal Pradesh as South Tibet.
  • However, the claim lines come into question when a discussion on the final international boundaries takes place, and not when the conversation is about a working border, say the LAC.

Why is LAC so disputed?

  • The delineation of the LAC has also not been done based on the accepted norms of control.
  • This has resulted in the existence of a number of areas of differing perceptions all across the LAC which is the primary cause of conflict.
  • China has changed its documented stance and has been looking for justifications for the conflict escalation.

Worry for India

  • China is developing infrastructure in the Indian-claimed areas.
  • Moreover, it is being developed at an unprecedented pace by China in these areas.
  • These are potential sovereignty markers which will be a restricting factor for future negotiations.

 

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Foreign Policy Watch: India-China

Understanding the principal contradiction, keeping China at the Centre

Note4Students

From UPSC perspective, the following things are important :

Prelims level: NA

Mains level: India's foreign policy

contradiction

Context

  • If principal contradictions must determine strategic priorities, New Delhi should decide what its principal contradiction is. China is contemporary India’s principal strategic contradiction. Every other challenge, be it Pakistan, internal insurgencies, and difficulties in relations with its neighbours, fall in the category of secondary contradictions.

What is principal contradiction?

  • The concept of a principal contradiction is one that poses the most intense challenge to an individual/organisation, and has the power to shape its future choices and consequent outcomes useful method of optimising and prioritising strategic decision-making.

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Principal contradiction with China

  • Straightforward question over the decisions taken by the policymakers: Major decisions in New Delhi’s strategic decision matrix should pass the China test, which amounts to asking and answering a rather straightforward question: “does x or y decision/development/relationship help deal with the China challenge, or not?”
  • China test a tool for policy making: A perspicacious ‘China test’ can help prioritise strategic decision making in the longer run, at least as an analytical tool with potential policy utility.

Elements of ‘China test’

  • From an operational point of view, the ‘China test’ consists of three distinct elements.
  • Assessment of Indian decisions: an assessment of how a certain Indian decision or a specific regional development square with Chinese regional strategy or interests.
  • Assessment if the decisions need Modifications: An assessment of whether India’s decision or a certain regional development would require India to make modifications at the level of secondary contradictions.
  • Assessment if it requires a major policy change: An assessment of whether this would require any major policy changes internally. Let me highlight the utility of the ‘China test’ using a few examples.

contradiction

Analysis of India-U.S. relations applying the China test

  • Relations are more of Interest driven: New Delhi has had a complicated relationship with Washington which is increasingly getting normalised and interests-driven. Despite its withdrawal from the region, Washington is seeking to re-engage southern Asia (Pakistan, South Asia in general, the Indo-Pacific, and perhaps even the Taliban).
  • India’s growing proximity to the U.S: It appears that one of the lessons New Delhi learnt from the standoff with China along the Line of Actual Control in 2020 was that it was perhaps a consequence of India’s growing proximity to the U.S.
  • lack of/lukewarm India-U.S. strategic engagement in the region may help China: Given that Beijing seeks to dominate the region, it is clearly not in its interest to see an American reengagement of the region or growing India-U.S. proximity. If so, the lack of/lukewarm India-U.S. strategic engagement in the region is precisely what would help Beijing’s long-term objectives.

contradiction

Analysis of India-Russia relations applying the China test

  • Relations in the wake of Ukraine war: India-Russia relations in the wake of the Ukraine war are among the most debated bilateral relationships in the world today.
  • Question arises by applying the China test: India-Russia relations in the face of western pressure on India to decouple from Moscow. “Does continuing its relationship with Moscow help New Delhi better deal with the China challenge?”
  • What the U.S. and its allies offer India to condemn Russia: The U.S. and its allies would like India to stop engaging with Moscow and condemn its aggression against Ukraine which India has refused to do so far. In return, there is on offer greater accommodation of Indian interests including perhaps diplomatic and political support against Chinese aggression.
  • The challenge of growing proximity between Moscow and Beijing: There is also the growing proximity between Moscow and Beijing which reduces the robustness of India-Russia relations. So, does the China test require New Delhi to continue to engage with Moscow against all these odds?

contradiction

What could be the consequences If India chooses to accept the US offer and deviate from strong India-Russia ties?

  • Sino-Russian cooperation is likely to strengthen: In the absence of an India-Russia relationship, the extent of Sino-Russian cooperation is likely to strengthen, and India will be cut out of the continental space to its north and west.
  • China may replace India as a Natural beneficiary of energy at discounted price and thereby support to Pakistan: New Delhi continues to get discounted energy, cheaper defence equipment If India decides to break away from Russia, many of these could come to a grinding halt, and the natural beneficiary of such an eventuality will, undoubtedly, be China. This could also push Moscow towards Pakistan with or without some nudging from Beijing.
  • India a trusted partner for Russia: It is also important to note that Moscow is not keen to have China dominate the strategic space around it and has been keen to balance the growing influence of China in Central Asia with partners such as New Delhi. New Delhi’s turn away from Moscow will ensure that China gets a free hand in Central Asia too. In one sense, therefore, the China piece best explains the enigma called India-Russia relations.

What the China test suggests?

  • Avoiding the short-term temptation and look a bigger picture: New Delhi should not give into the short-term temptation of not being on the wrong side of China given its long-term implications. While the fears of such a relationship irking China may not be entirely unjustified, they invariably play into the Chinese strategy of boxing India in the region.
  • Break away from Russia may likely to play in Chinese strategy for Boxing India: If indeed New Delhi was to completely break away from Russia (as India’s U.S. and western partners have asked India to), Such a decision is most likely to play into China’s hands. India-Russia relations are on the wane, there is a strong rationale for New Delhi to continue its relationship with Moscow which is China.
  • China test require India to pacify its relationship with Pakistan: The question to ask here is “does making (relative) peace with Pakistan help India better deal with China?”. For China, the best-case scenario is an India vigorously preoccupied with Pakistan which ensures that India is not focused on the growing threat from China, thereby providing Beijing with the opportunity to displace traditional Indian primacy in South Asia. So, for India, a course-correction on Pakistan, even if it is only post facto, is a strategically sensible one.
  • Focus should on China, more than the Pakistan: What India should actively seek is not a balance of power in South Asia with Pakistan but balancing Chinese power in Southern Asia. Hence, India’s objective in South Asia should be to seek a pacification of conflicts with Pakistan, so that it can focus on China.

Conclusion

  • For New Delhi, the message from the China test is a rather straightforward one that the smart balancing China in Southern Asia and beyond must form a key element in India’s grand strategic planning and decision making.

Mains question

Q. What do you understand by the concept of principal contradiction? Explain it shortly keeping China at the Centre of India’s strategic planning and decision making.

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Foreign Policy Watch: India-China

In news: China Indian Ocean Region Forum

Note4Students

From UPSC perspective, the following things are important :

Prelims level: China Indian Ocean Region Forum, USAID

Mains level: Read the attached story

china

China’s top development aid agency convened the first “China-Indian Ocean Region Forum” in the southwestern Chinese city of Kunming.

What is the China Indian Ocean Region Forum?

  • It is organised by the China International Development Cooperation Agency (CIDCA).
  • It is the latest Chinese initiative focusing on the Indian Ocean Region (IOR).
  • It underlines Beijing’s growing strategic interests in a region where its economic footprint has been deepening.

What is it about?

  • The CIDCA is China’s new development aid agency similar to the United States Agency for International Development (USAID).
  • It aims to-
  1. Strengthen policy coordination,
  2. Deepen development cooperation,
  3. Increase resilience to shocks and disasters, and
  4. Enhance relevant countries’ capacity to obtain economic benefits through use of marine resources such as fisheries, renewable energy, tourism, and shipping in a sustainable way

Which countries have backed the forum?

  • The organisers have said the forum was attended by high-level representatives and senior officials from 19 countries.
  • But at least two of those countries, Australia and Maldives, subsequently released statements rebutting the claim, emphasising that they did not participate officially.

Why such a move by China?

China’s ambitions in the Indian Ocean have been motivated by three factors-

  • Gaining significance of Indo-Pacific: As the new world order unveils around the Indo-Pacific, Beijing aims to challenge other major powers, such as India, and establish its hegemony.
  • Domestic energy security: Beijing needs the Indian Ocean to ensure its energy security and continue fuelling its growth, which defines its foreign policy and international leverage.
  • Hegemony establishment: Establishing new and alternative institutions with IOR countries helps China display its presence and influence from the China Sea to the Indian Ocean, reflecting its status as a significant power.

How is China perceiving its interests?

  1. Political corruption: Beijing has cultivated close and personal relationships with political elites and parties of IOR countries, usually through corruption, party funding, and by turning a blind eye to their human rights abuses and democratic infirmities.
  2. Fractionalization: Friendship with different political parties in Pakistan; bonhomie with the Rajapaksa clan in Sri Lanka, and close relations with Maldives’ Abdulla Yameen are some examples of this widespread phenomenon.
  3. Elite capture: In addition, China has often used the elite capture tactic to ensure a pro-China policy and bag geo-economically and strategically significant projects. This includes concessions on Pakistan’s Gwadar Port and Sri Lanka’s Colombo Port City project.

Where does India stand?

  • India was the lone absentee in the forum ignoring the invitation.
  • China has exposed its intention with the Indian Ocean Region (IOR) countries.
  • New Delhi has viewed China’s recent moves in the region warily, including the recent visit of a Chinese military tracking vessel, the Yuan Wang 5, to Sri Lanka.
  • Moreover, India sees the Indian-Ocean Rim Association (IORA) as an already established platform for the region.

China’s plans for the IOR

  • The forum has underlined China’s stepped-up interest in the IOR, where it is already a major trading partner for most countries and where sea routes lie vital to China’s economic interests.
  • The CIDCA forum is the latest initiative to reflect Beijing’s view that it has a clear stake in the region, and that more such initiatives are likely.

Has China out-powered India in the IOR with this move?

  • The Chinese initiative looks like a kind of delayed response.
  • It can be seen only as a comparison and competitor to India’s SAGAR (Security and Growth for All in the Region), as outlined by PM Modi in Mauritius in 2015.
  • The Indian idea is implemented through the nation’s ‘Neighbourhood First’ policy and such other initiatives as ‘‘Project Mausam’ and ‘Integrated Coastal Surveillance System’ (now shared with Maldives).
  • All of them are confined to the Indian Ocean, where India too belongs legitimately, unlike China.

Conclusion

  • In a way, the new initiative reflects China’s unending greed.
  • It also reflects China’s desire and ambition to measure up to the US in reach and outreach, and through them, geo-economics, geopolitical, and geostrategic comparability.

 

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Foreign Policy Watch: India-China

Understanding the “China’s BRICS” game

Note4Students

From UPSC perspective, the following things are important :

Prelims level: NA

Mains level: China BRICS strategy, Role of India

BRICS

Context

  • At the 14thLeaders’ Meeting of the BRICS, held virtually in June 2022, China dwelt on the issue of expanding the group beyond its five existing members to include more emerging economies. At a time when China-India relations are at a low point, the proposal has raised concerns in New Delhi. As India deliberates its stance on this contentious issue, it is important to understand China’s approach towards BRICS.

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BRICS

All you need to know about BRICS

  • BRICS is an acronym for the grouping of the world’s leading emerging economies, namely Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa.
  • Jim O’Neill, a British economist, coined the term ‘BRIC’ to describe the four emerging economies of Brazil, Russia, India, and China. He made a case for BRIC on the basis of econometric analyses projecting that the four economies would individually and collectively occupy far greater economic space and become among the world’s largest economies.
  • The importance of BRICS is self-evident: It represents 42% of the world’s population, 30% of the land area, 24% of global GDP and 16% of international trade.
  • The five BRICS countries are also members of G-20.

BRICS for China

  • Strategy of multiple engagements: For China, it is the grand strategy that is the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) that threads its many engagements: BRICS, the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO), the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) where it is not directly a member, the Eurasian Economic Union, and the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP).
  • Projecting the connection between BRICS and BRI: BRICS as an entity, has not signed any memorandum of cooperation with the BRI, In Chinese strategic thinking, the BRI and BRICS are deeply connected.
  • Repeated assertion by Xi Jinping: President Xi Jinping himself has harped on this notion in his speeches on multiple occasions, such as the 9th BRICS Business Forum in September 2017 and the 11th BRICS Leaders’ Meeting in November 2019. In his speech he stated that China would cooperate with other multilateral development institutions such as the BRICS New Development Bank to support BRI and jointly formulate guidelines to finance development projects. 

BRICS

China’s Approach towards BRICS: The Link with BRI

  • Policy of Five connectivities: Chinese scholars are of the opinion that the “five connectivities” in policy, infrastructure, trade, finance, and people-to-people constitute the common way forward for both the BRI and BRICS.
  • Economic development strategy: China has been working towards strengthening the interconnection of economic development strategies of different states along the BRI, particularly the BRICS nations, aligning and integrating BRI and BRICS infrastructure projects, ensuring unimpeded trade, pursuing multiple forms of cooperation.
  • China’s Silk Road Economic Belt and EEU: The most significant progress made so far by China in this regard has been the official docking between China’s Silk Road Economic Belt (the land part of the BRI) and the EEU (where Russia is the dominant player) in May 2015.
  • Infrastructure models that China is emphasising: A high-speed railway project from Moscow to Kazan is being constructed under this strategic cooperation, funded by the BRICS New Development Bank. This is the model that China wants to replicate with other BRICS nations as well. In December 2015, South Africa and China signed a memorandum of understanding on jointly promoting the construction of the “Silk Road Economic Belt” and the “21st Century Maritime Silk Road.”

Why China needs BRICS to promote the BRI?

  • To avoid direct conflicts: Chinese policymakers believe that although China is the main proponent of the BRI, it needs to avoid both strategic overdraft and direct conflicts with the pillars of the present international order while implementing the strategy.
  • To use resources effectively: To improve efficiency in the use of funds and other resources, China, it is argued, should shift from individually leading specific projects to constructing and leading various international institutions and exerting itself through institutional norms.
  • Strategic alignment and ambition to lead: President Xi emphasised this as well at the ‘Belt and Road’ International Cooperation Summit Forum in May 2017, saying that the BRI “is not about starting from scratch and reinventing the wheel, but realising strategic alignment and (reaping) complementary advantages (of various existing or new mechanisms).”
  • Dominating the financial mechanism through BRI partnership: Chinese scholars point out that all the BRICS countries have already been made part of the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), one of China’s key financing mechanisms for the BRI. Further, given China’s clear dominance in the New Development Bank (NDB), Contingency Reserve Fund (CRA), the AIIB, as well as Silk Road Fund, it is only imperative for it to use these institutions to incentivise more BRICS countries to participate in the BRI, and to lay the foundation of a global financial system for the Chinese currency (RMB) trade settlement.
  • Creating an acceptable front: China is aware that the BRI has provoked extensive discussion around the world. It has been interpreted differently by different countries and has even drawn suspicion and caution in certain quarters. China is aware that to implement the BRI smoothly, it needs an additional front that is less controversial and more acceptable to the international community at large, and in particular, to developing countries.

BRICS

What are the concerns for India?

  • Promoting priorities in contrast: China prioritises the ‘BRICS + Asia’ cooperation mechanism – ‘BRICS + ASEAN’ on the one hand, and ‘BRICS + Bay of Bengal’ on the other, thereby integrating BRICS more closely with the Southeast Asian countries as well as with the Bangladesh-China-India-Myanmar Economic Corridor (BCIM-EC) and Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi-Sectoral Technical and Economic Cooperation (BIMSTEC) nations.
  • Aligning with BIMSTEC to counter India’s resistance to BRI: The aligning with BIMSTEC is particularly aimed at countering India’s reticence to endorse the BRI, while seeking its cooperation through either coercion (i.e., using other member states of the said groupings as bargaining chips to pressure India to cooperate) or deception (i.e., temporarily ignoring the BRI banner).
  • Using BRICS at its advantage: China wants to use the BRICS platform to establish links and influence policies of these key regional organisations, including the African Union in Africa, the Arab League in West Asia, the SCO in Central Asia, the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) in South Asia, and ASEAN in Southeast Asia.
  • Ambition to formulate the world order in its own way: It wants BRICS, especially the BRICS New Development Bank, to strengthen cooperation with the IMF, the World Bank, and the World Trade Organization. This will enable China, through BRICS, to strengthen its international leadership, play a bigger role in the formulation of international rules, and influence the overall global governance mechanism.

Conclusion

  • As China-US rivalry intensifies and the BRI faces a plethora of challenges, BRICS is increasingly gaining significance for China. Within the grouping, China sees itself as the ‘core’ of BRICS, while India as its weakest link.
  • India needs to accurately grasp the geopolitical shifts taking place within BRICS and deftly navigate the complex dynamics between the member states to safeguard its own interests within the grouping and avoid being drawn passively into China’s Great Game.

Mains Question

Q. China has focused on expanding the BRICS group to achieve its own ambitions. Discuss the significance of BRICS for China and India’s concerns.

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Foreign Policy Watch: India-China

Assertive China, Implication for world and India

Note4Students

From UPSC perspective, the following things are important :

Prelims level: Not much

Mains level: Assertive china and its implications on India and the world

China

Context

  • China’s 20th Party Congress concluded with hardly any surprises, and a predetermined script was implemented without any hitch. Xi Jinping was anointed President for an unprecedented third term, and all six of his acolytes made it to the powerful Politburo Standing Committee.

Why China’s 20th Party Congress is important?

  • Extension of tenure of Xi Jinping: Xi’s ‘core’ status has been further reinforced, and he is now set to eclipse Deng Xiaoping and Jiang Zemin, placing him next only to Mao. Mr. Xi’s Thought on ‘Socialism with Chinese Characteristics for a New Era’ will be the Chinese Communist Party/Communist Party of China (CCP)’s guiding philosophy for the future.
  • Xi’s control over party: It was also evident that Mr. Xi enjoys wide, if not overwhelming, support within the Party elite, enabling him to infuse a renewed sense of purpose alongside tightening of controls over it.
  • High focus on national security: National security would be the key factor dictating all aspects of governance. A common theme that permeated the proceedings was affirmation of the CCP’s historical mission.
  • Emphasized ideological coherence: There was only a single narrative, crafted in a manner that extolled Mr. Xi’s role in revitalization of the CCP, further enhancing his cult status. Unequivocally rejected was an earlier Xi thesis of a ‘Community of Common Destiny’ which has been replaced by the belief that international public opinion was currently anti-China and also included an incitement to overthrow the existing Communist regime. To counter such disruptive philosophies, it had become necessary for the CCP to emphasize ideological coherence and internal discipline.
  • Avoiding the soviet style collapse: This would help to avoid the danger of a ‘Soviet style collapse’ caused by ideological laxity, corruption, divisions within the party and attempts by outsiders to foment unrest.

China

What are the problematic declarations at 20th party congress?

  • Undermining the USA: In the realm of geopolitics, the Congress declared that the objective is to effectively reduce the authority and the power of the United States.
  • Rejecting the Indo-pacific: This was especially true of China’s neighborhood, essentially the Indo-Pacific.
  • Achieving the lost glory: Also, to be eschewed by China were the vague and contradictory goals of the past, made at a time when China sought to make rapid progress in several directions.
  • Theory of victimhood of international conspiracy: Implicit in the proceedings was the belief that China was being deliberately denied access, and the ability, to import certain vital technological items, and in this regard, of being a victim of major international conspiracies. Earlier pragmatism was replaced by concerns about western pressures to derail China’s progress.
  • Possible lifelong tenure to Xi: The Party Congress is indicative of the fact that Mr. Xi is much more than a mere party ‘restorer’, and that he adheres to the belief that the CCP’s role is central to Chinese society and critical to determining China’s role in world affairs.
  • Raising the national strength and international influence: In terms of China’s world view, the Party Congress reiterated that the goal is to make China a modern socialist power by 2035, boost per capita income to middle income levels, and modernise the armed forces. By 2049, the 100th anniversary of the Peoples’ Republic of China, China is determined to lead the world in terms of composite national strength and international influence.

China

What are the implications for the world?

  • Premature takeover of Taiwan: one can expect that notwithstanding the level of rhetoric and assertions that this is a dangerous phase, China is unlikely to take any premature step to take over Taiwan, and thereby risk a wider conflict with the U.S. and the rest of the world at this point. Mr. Xi is far more likely to devote attention to internal matters within China, since unity within the Communist Party remains ephemeral; while dissent has been stamped out for the present, more consolidation would be necessary.
  • Short term conciliation with world: Consequently, one might well see China stepping back from its present confrontational posture with the U.S. and several other countries, and adopting a more conciliatory approach in the near future.
  • Conflicts are likely to happen: There are, of course, certain red lines any attempt at provocation within the ‘First Island Chain’, or encouraging Taiwan to seek independence or break away from China are certain to lead to a conflict, irrespective of how it would adversely affect China’s 2049 plans and objectives.

China

Implications for India

  • Border incursion will rise: In India’s case, further skirmishes between the two countries along the several thousand kilometres of the undefined land border is to be expected.
  • Conflicts in Indian ocean: China is unlikely to embark on an open conflict with it anywhere else in the Indian Ocean region. This could alter, if India were to pursue a more aggressive policy in support of the West’s ‘open seas policy’ in waters in China’s vicinity.
  • Prime target in west vs China battle: India is, however, likely to be a principal target of Chinese wrath in the next few years. As India’s economic fortunes steadily improve even as China’s declines, the perception conflict will become more intense.
  • China’s progress at the cost of India: Moreover, if India is seen as a major recipient of western technology, the kind being denied to China, China would make it a point to use its economic, rather than military muscle, to deter India’s progress. For China to achieve greatness by 2049, subduing India economically, and reducing its image in the eyes of the world would be critically important.

Conclusion

  • China’s middle kingdom complex, unjustified assertion, paranoic claims on borders and seas and wolf warrior diplomacy is against the international rules and order. China has challenged the USA’s hegemony and entire international system without any tangible punishment. India has to choose its options carefully without compromising national security and ambitions.

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Foreign Policy Watch: India-China

What is China’s ‘Wolf Warrior’ Diplomacy?

Note4Students

From UPSC perspective, the following things are important :

Prelims level: Wolf warrior diplomacy

Mains level: Read the attached story

wolf

Chinese President Xi Jinping will get an endorsement for a third term as President. His “wolf warrior” style of diplomacy has particularly attracted attention.

What does Wolf Warrior’ Diplomacy mean?

  • A term that gained popularity, especially after Xi became President, “wolf warrior diplomacy” is a tactic for the Chinese government to extend its ideology beyond China and counter the West and defend itself.
  • It is an unofficial term for the more aggressive and confrontational style of communication that Chinese diplomats have taken to in the last decade.
  • A 2015 Chinese action film, titled ‘Wolf Warrior’, and its sequel have served as the inspiration for the term.
  • The films, with their nationalist themes and dialogues, focus on Chinese fighters who frequently face off against Western mercenaries.

Do you know?

Panchasheel also called the Five Principles of Peaceful Co-existence was signed on 29p April 1954 and since then it has become a guiding principle of India’s bilateral relations with other countries.

Why China resorts to such diplomacy?

The change in strategy has been attributed to many reasons, such as:

  1. Xi’s more authoritarian tendencies as compared to earlier leaders
  2. Deteriorating US-China relations under former US President Donald Trump and
  3. Coronavirus pandemic-related accusations on China, etc.

What does this look like in practice?

  • Some examples can be seen in the form of messaging on social media too, where Chinese officials are quick to counter any allegations by the West and proactively launch attacks.
  • For instance, in 2021 Chinese government spokesperson Lijian Zhao tweeted a digitally morphed photo of an Australian soldier killing a child, claiming the Australian army was killing children in Afghanistan.
  • This led the Australian Prime Minister to announce he would seek an official apology, but China did not budge.
  • But this is not limited to Western countries.

Indian experience

  • The new ‘wolf warrior diplomacy’ confronts head-on any criticism of China in the public sphere.
  • They lecture host governments and don’t always show up when ‘summoned’ by foreign offices.
  • Delhi has been at the receiving end for a while — especially during the recent crises of Doklam and Ladakh.

 

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Foreign Policy Watch: India-China

Private: Taiwan crisis

Note4Students

From UPSC perspective, the following things are important :

Prelims level: Location of Taiwan

Mains level: Sovereign nations, Bilateral ties ,One china policy

Context

  • Taiwan showcases most advanced fighter jet after China drills. Taipei has carried out its own drills to simulate defence against invasion by China, and unveiled the F-16V fighter jet.

What is the issue?

  • As per the PRC, Taiwan’s sovereignty belongs to China, the PRC’s government and supporters believe that the secession of Taiwan should be agreed upon by all 1.3 billion Chinese citizens instead of just the 23 million residents of Taiwan.

Why in news?

  • Chinese stand: Taiwan has been governed independently of China since 1949, but Beijing views the island as part of its territory. Beijing has vowed to eventually “unify” Taiwan with the mainland, using force if necessary.
  • Tensions are rising: Taiwanese President Tsai Ing-wen, whose party platform favours independence, has rebuked Beijing’s efforts to undermine democracy. Beijing has ramped up political and military pressure on Taipei.
  • War situation: Some analysts fear the United States and China could go to war over Taiwan. S. House Speaker Nancy Pelosi’s trip to the island in 2022 heightened tensions between the countries.

Is Taiwan part of China?

  • One china principle: Beijing asserts that there is only “one China” and that Taiwan is part of it. It views the PRC as the only legitimate government of China, an approach it calls the One-China principle, and seeks Taiwan’s eventual “unification” with the mainland.
  • Chinese claim: Beijing claims that Taiwan is bound by an understanding known as the 1992 Consensus, which was reached between representatives of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and the Kuomintang (KMT) party that then ruled Taiwan.

Status of Taiwan as member of UN

  • Taipei protest exclusion: China rejects Taiwan’s participation as a member in UN agencies and other international organizations that limit membership to states. Taipei regularly protests its exclusion; the United States also pushes for Taiwan’s meaningful participation in such organizations.
  • Membership of other groups: Taiwan does, however, hold member status in more than forty organizations, most of them regional, such as the Asian Development Bank and the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation forum, as well as in the World Trade Organization. It holds observer or other status on several other bodies.

Value addition for mains

  • An Introduction to Sovereignty: A Case Study of Taiwan examines the key issue of sovereignty and provides an in-depth look at the unique status of Taiwan among nations of the world.
  • Although Taiwan has control over its internal affairs (domestic sovereignty) and is able to keep outsiders from operating within its borders or influencing internal decisions (Westphalian sovereignty), the island does not have international legal sovereignty, which would confirm its status as an independent country.
  • Despite lacking the advantages of having international legal sovereignty—including the ability to negotiate trade agreements and treaties, among others—Taiwan has evolved into an economic powerhouse and has successfully developed and maintained international relations with many independent countries.

How has China tried to intimidate Taiwan?

  • Coercion tactics: China has employed a variety of coercive tactics short of armed conflict, and it has ramped up these measures since Tsai’s election in 2016. Its objective is to wear down Taiwan and prompt the island’s people to conclude that their best option is unification with the mainland.
  • Military pressure: China has increased the frequency and scale of patrols of PLA bombers, fighter jets, and surveillance aircraft over and around Taiwan. It has also increasingly sailed its warships and aircraft carriers through the Taiwan Strait in shows of force.

What Taiwanese people say?

  • An increasing number of Taiwanese people feel more closely tied to Taiwan than to the mainland. More than 62 percent of the island’s residents regarded themselves as exclusively Taiwanese in 2021.

Opportunity for India

  • Taiwan’s position as a semiconductor superpower opens the door for more intensive strategic-economic cooperation between Delhi and Taipei.
  • Part of the problem is that India’s strategic community continues to view Taiwan as an adjunct to India’s “One-China policy”.

Conclusion

  • As Taiwan becomes the world’s most dangerous flashpoint, the geopolitical consequences for Asia are real. Although Delhi has embraced the Indo-Pacific maritime construct, it is yet to come to terms with Taiwan’s critical role in shaping the strategic future of Asia’s waters.

Mains question

Q.Do you consider Taiwan has become the world’s most dangerous flashpoint, the geopolitical consequences for Asia are real? Critically examine.

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Foreign Policy Watch: India-China

Why the India China Border situation is still risky?

Note4Students

From UPSC perspective, the following things are important :

Prelims level: NA

Mains level: border security

india china borderContext

  • According to the consensus reached in the 16th round of India China Corps Commander Level Meeting, the Indian and Chinese troops in the area of Gogra-Hotsprings (PP-15) have begun to disengage in a coordinated and planned way. With disengagement at PP 15 India China border, forces of the two countries have disengaged at all friction points in the region which included the North and South banks of the Pangong Tso, PP 14, PP 15 and PP 17A.

India china borderWhy the India-China Border situation is still risky?

The tentative conciliatory steps between two nuclear-armed rivals are important; but they also carry risks, especially for India. The risks are as follows:

  • Uneasy peace: Despite the latest round of disengagement, the LAC remains deeply unsettled. Observers have pointed out that the buffer zones produced by the crisis inhibit India’s ability to patrol its own territory.
  • Un-resolve areas: India and China have tacitly agreed to postpone settlement at two other confrontation sites, particularly tactically valuable area known as Depsangand Charding Nala regions.
  • Persisting threat: The reinforcements that each side deployed since 2020 have not returned to garrison. Even if future rounds of talks continue “disengagement and de-escalation,” and reduce those forces, returning to the status quo ante is now impossible.
  • Border infrastructure: Both sides on India China border are racing towards building permanent military infrastructure near the border, to help them surge forces to the border. Unsurprisingly, China seems to have outpaced India in building these roads, helipads, and communications nodes.
  • Possibility of conflict: The increasing capabilities and mobility on both sides of the border means that a crisis can more quickly escalate to a large military stand-off anywhere on the LAC, and possibly even trigger a conflict

india china borderWhat are the Strategic implications?

  • Changing priorities: India has reassigned one of three originally Pakistan-facing Strike Corps to the China front. It has deployed its newest artillery, jets, and drones to the China border.
  • Unattended Indian Ocean: India has not yet improved its capabilities or posture in the Indian Ocean region significantly.
  • Diversion from real threat: With the border crisis, China seems to have successfully fixed India’s gaze to the land border, at the expense of that more consequential competition over the Indian Ocean.
  • Loss of grazing: Ladakh’s elected representatives said the disengagement has caused loss of huge grazing land as it would now be converted into no man’s land.

india china borderSteps taken by India

  • Increasing capability: from cruise missile-equipped fighter jets and U.S.-origin naval helicopters to a brand-new indigenously-built aircraft carrier.
  • Atmanirbhar Bharat: India undertook several structural economic reforms for strengthening domestic capability and reducing the economic parity between two nations. Defence ministry has decided to increase CAB (capital acquisition budget), around 64% of modernization fund around 70000 cr. has been allocated for purchasing from domestic market. Atma Nirbhar Bharat and Make in India mission will also include Defence sector, we can see the local or private companies can also participate in procurement of defence equipment
  • Defence India Start-up Challenge (DISC): Started by the defence ministry and over 1200 MSMEs participated in the fourth edition of the DISC in 2020. The government has prepared a negative list, it include light combat helicopters, artillery guns; these items will not be imported by anyone thus encouraging self-reliant India.
  • The SRIJAN portal: Launched to facilitate the two initiatives, Atmanirbhar Bharat and make in India
  • Sagarmala project: The sagarmala project has been started to revamp port Infrastructure which is a welcome step in modernization.

Conclusion

  • For china Deception is diplomacy. Time and again China tries a deception strategy from its Confucius doctrine to defeat its enemy. From 1962 to 2022 India has made a lot of progress in military and economic sphere but China is way ahead than us. Strategic competition between two Asian giants will continue foreseeable future. So as long as India doesn’t gain domestic capabilities it would be prudent step to undertake strategic balancing.

Mains Question

Q. India has decided to maintain a strategic balance with china rather than being subsidiary to china. Discuss.

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Foreign Policy Watch: India-China

PM Modi to attend SCO meet

Note4Students

From UPSC perspective, the following things are important :

Prelims level: SCO

Mains level: Read the attached story

sco

PM Modi will travel to Samarkand in Uzbekistan to attend the first in-person summit of the SCO (Shanghai Cooperation Organisation) countries since the COVID-19 pandemic.

What is SCO?

  • After the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, the then security and economic architecture in the Eurasian region dissolved and new structures had to come up.
  • The original Shanghai Five were China, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia and Tajikistan.
  • The SCO was formed in 2001, with Uzbekistan included. It expanded in 2017 to include India and Pakistan.
  • Since its formation, the SCO has focused on regional non-traditional security, with counter-terrorism as a priority.
  • The fight against the “three evils” of terrorism, separatism and extremism has become its mantra. Today, areas of cooperation include themes such as economics and culture.

India’s entry to the SCO

  • India and Pakistan both were observer countries.
  • While Central Asian countries and China were not in favor of expansion initially, the main supporter — of India’s entry in particular — was Russia.
  • A widely held view is that Russia’s growing unease about an increasingly powerful China prompted it to push for its expansion.
  • From 2009 onwards, Russia officially supported India’s ambition to join the SCO in 2017.
  • China then asked for its all-weather friend Pakistan’s entry.

Changing the narrative of SCO

Infographic: Shanghai Cooperation Organisation: An Explainer - Times of India

  • There has been discussion in the international arena that the trend of non-alignment is back.
  • NATO is based on Cold War thinking.
  • The logic of NATO is creating new enemies to sustain its own existence.
  • However, SCO is a cooperative organisation based on non-alignment and not targeting a third party.

India and SCO: Present status

  • India will host the SCO summit next year, and Varanasi has been selected as the SCO region’s first “Tourism and Cultural Capital”.
  • India will also be chairing the summit.

 

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Foreign Policy Watch: India-China

India- China disengage at LAC friction points in Ladakh

Note4Students

From UPSC perspective, the following things are important :

Prelims level: LAC

Mains level: India-China border issues

lac

India and China have announced that their Armies have begun to disengage from Patrolling Point-15 in the Gogra-Hot springs area at LAC.

What is LAC- the Line of Actual Control?

  • The LAC is the demarcation that separates Indian-controlled territory from Chinese-controlled territory.
  • India considers the LAC to be 3,488 km long, while the Chinese consider it to be only around 2,000 km.
  • It is divided into three sectors: the eastern sector which spans Arunachal Pradesh and Sikkim, the middle sector in Uttarakhand and Himachal Pradesh, and the western sector in Ladakh.
  • The LAC is only a concept – it is not agreed upon by the two countries, neither delineated on a map nor demarcated on the ground.

What is the disagreement?

  • The alignment of the LAC in the eastern sector is along the 1914 McMahon Line, and there are minor disputes about the positions on the ground as per the principle of the high Himalayan watershed.
  • The major disagreements are in the western sector where the LAC emerged from two letters written by Chinese Prime Minister Zhou Enlai to PM Jawaharlal Nehru in 1959, after he had first mentioned such a ‘line’ in 1956.

When did India accept the LAC?

  • The LAC was discussed during Chinese Premier Li Peng’s 1991 visit to India, where PM P V Narasimha Rao and Li reached an understanding to maintain peace and tranquillity at the LAC.
  • India formally accepted the concept of the LAC when Rao paid a return visit to Beijing in 1993 and the two sides signed the Agreement to Maintain Peace and Tranquillity at the LAC.
  • The reference to the LAC was unqualified to make it clear that it was not referring to the LAC of 1959 or 1962 but to the ‘LAC’ at the time when the agreement was signed.
  • To reconcile the differences about some areas, the two countries agreed that the Joint Working Group on the border issue would take up the task of clarifying the alignment of the LAC.

How was the disengagement carried on?

  • As per the understanding reached earlier on disengagement, a buffer zone is to be created at the friction points.
  • Once troops are withdrawn by both sides, new patrolling norms are to be worked out after complete disengagement and de-escalation.

Why sudden disengagement?

  • The move comes ahead of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) summit in Uzbekistan next week.
  • However, neither side has, so far, confirmed if the two leaders would hold bilateral talks on the sidelines of the summit.
  • The leaders have not spoken to each other since a November 2019 meeting during the BRICS Summit in Brasilia and the beginning of the stand-off in April 2020.

Significance of the disengagement

  • Since the stand-off began in May 2020, the two sides have so far held 16 rounds of talks.
  • Earlier, disengagement was undertaken from both sides of Pangong Tso in February 2021, and from PP-17 in the Gogra-Hot springs area in August, in addition to Galwan in 2020 after the violent clash.
  • The friction points that remain now are Demchok and Depsang, which China has constantly refused to accept, maintaining that they are not a part of the current stand-off.

What was the dispute over LAC?

  • In what was the worst clash between the two countries in over 40 years, the Galwan incident reverberated around the world.
  • The casualties in the clash were the first in the disputed Sino-Indian border since 1975.
  • The Galwan episode led to a rapid build-up of forces on both sides of the Line of Actual Control.
  • This incident is being seen as major punctuation in the bilateral relations between India and China and what does the future hold for both neighbors.

Why did India change its stance on the Line of Actual Control?

  • Indian and Chinese patrols were coming in more frequent contact during the mid-1980s.
  • This was after the government formed a China Study Group in 1976 which revised the patrolling limits, rules of engagement and pattern of Indian presence along the border.

Is the LAC also the claim line for both countries?

  • Not for India. India’s claim line is the line seen in the official boundary marked on the maps as released by the Survey of India, including both Aksai Chin and Gilgit-Baltistan.
  • In China’s case, it corresponds mostly to its claim line, but in the eastern sector, it claims entire Arunachal Pradesh as South Tibet.
  • However, the claim lines come into question when a discussion on the final international boundaries takes place, and not when the conversation is about a working border, say the LAC.

Why are these claim lines controversial in Ladakh?

  • When the Shimla Agreement on the McMahon Line was signed by British India, Aksai Chin in Ladakh province of the princely state of J&K was not part of British India, although it was a part of the British Empire.
  • Thus, the eastern boundary was well defined in 1914 but in the west in Ladakh, it was not.
  • India, in July 1948, had two maps: one had no boundary shown in the western sector, only a partial colour wash; the second one extended the colour wash in yellow to the entire state of J&K, but mentioned “boundary undefined”.

Way forward

  • The impasse in India-China relations CANNOT be overcome by more talks through diplomatic and military channels, and possibly require the intervention of the top leadership of both countries.
  • Therefore, as Dr. Jaishankar put it, the management of the fissures within Asia will require adherence to established laws, norms, and rules.

 

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Foreign Policy Watch: India-China

Importance of Tibetan Democracy Day

Note4Students

From UPSC perspective, the following things are important :

Prelims level: Tibetan Democracy Day

Mains level: India's asylum to Tibetans

A little more than six decades ago, Tibetan Democracy Day was marked with the inauguration of the Tibetan government-in-exile in Dharamshala on September 2.

Tibetan Democracy Day

  • In February 1960, a little less than a year after he crossed over into India, the Fourteenth Dalai Lama outlined in Bodh Gaya, where The Buddha attained Enlightenment, a detailed program of democratic practice for exiled Tibetans.
  • According to the website of the Tibetan Parliament-in-Exile (TPiE), he advised them to set up an elected body with three exiled representatives each from the three provinces, and one each from the four religious schools of Tibetan Buddhism.
  • After elections were held, 13 elected representatives, called ‘Deputies’, were designated as the ‘Commission of Tibetan People’s Deputies’ (CTPD). They took oath on September 2, 1960.
  • Subsequently from 1975 onward, this date began to be formally observed as Tibetan Democracy Day.

Parliament-in-Exile

  • The TPiE is the highest legislative body of the Central Tibetan Administration (CTA).
  • It is described as one of the three pillars of Tibetan democratic governance — the others being the Judiciary and the Kashag, or Executive.
  • The website of the TPiE underlines the Dalai Lama’s commitment to the democratic principle — it quotes the Dalai Lama from the Foreword to the Constitution for Tibet, drafted in 1963:
  • The CTA is based in Dharamsala, Himachal Pradesh.
  • Elections are held every five years to elect Members of the TPiE, and their Sikyong (Prime Minister). The 16th TPiE was elected in 2016.
  • This was the second direct election after the Dalai Lama distanced himself from the political functioning of the TPiE in 2011.

The Government-in-Exile

  • On March 10, 1963, the Dalai Lama promulgated the Constitution of the Tibetan Government-in-Exile (TGiE).
  • From 1991 onwards, TPiE became the legislative organ of the CTA, the Tibetan Supreme Justice Commission became the judicial organ, and the Kashag the executive organ.
  • The TGiE is not recognised officially by any country, including India.
  • However, many countries, including the US, deal directly with the Sikyong and other Tibetan leaders through various forums.
  • The TPiE says its democratically elected character helps it manage Tibetan affairs, and raise the Tibetan issue across the world.
  • The current Sikyong (known as Kalön Tripa until 2012) of the CTA is Lobsang Sangay, who has been the head of the Kashag or Cabinet (first as Kalön Tripa and then as Sikyong) since 2011.

What is India’s official policy towards the CTA?

  • India considers the Dalai Lama as a revered religious leader and an honored guest, but it does not encourage political activities by Tibetans.
  • It does not recognize any separate government of Tibet functioning in India.

 

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Foreign Policy Watch: India-China

Why has the Solomon Islands blocked foreign navy vessels?

Note4Students

From UPSC perspective, the following things are important :

Prelims level: Solomon Islands

Mains level: Chinese expansion in Pacific

After refusing access to US and UK ships to its ports earlier this month, the Solomon Islands has now temporarily halted all naval visits.

Why in news?

  • The country’s move is a departure from the norm and is been seen as an attempt to appease China.
  • This raises concerns about China’s growing influence in the country and the region at large.

Where is the Solomon Islands located?

  • The Solomon Islands is a sovereign country consisting of six major islands and over 900 smaller islands in Oceania, to the east of Papua New Guinea and northwest of Vanuatu.
  • Its capital, Honiara, is located on the largest island, Guadalcanal.
  • It is part of the ethnically Melanesian group of islands in the Pacific and lies between Papua New Guinea and Vanuatu.
  • The country takes its name from the Solomon Islands archipelago, which is a collection of Melanesian islands that also includes the North Solomon Islands (a part of Papua New Guinea).
  • It excludes outlying islands, such as the Santa Cruz Islands and Rennell and Bellona.

Quick recap of its past

  • The islands, which were initially controlled by the British Empire during the colonial era, went through the hands of Germany and Japan.
  • It then went back to the UK after the Americans took over the islands from the Japanese during World War II.
  • The islands became independent in 1978 to become a constitutional monarchy under the British Crown, with a parliamentary system of government.
  • Nevertheless, its inability to manage domestic ethnic conflicts led to close security relations with Australia, which is the traditional first responder to any crisis in the South Pacific.

How did China enter the picture?

  • Earlier this year, the Solomon Islands established a security agreement with China, saying it needed Beijing’s assistance with its domestic security situation.
  • But the announcement had rattled the west, esp. the US, Australia and others in the Indo-Pacific region.
  • The concerns were that the agreement could potentially lead to a Chinese military base on the island nation and a gain in power-projection capabilities.
  • At that time, following intense scrutiny, the Solomon Islands had denied that the agreement would allow China to establish a naval base.
  • The Island insisted that the agreement was only to assist the Solomon Islands with what he called “hard internal threats”.

What is the Solomon Islands’ stance?

  • The government has asked all partner countries with plans to conduct naval visits or patrols to put them on hold until a revised national mechanism is in place.
  • The revised national mechanism applied to all foreign vessels seeking access to the country’s ports.
  • The nation wanted to build up its own naval capacity.
  • It has some unfortunate experiences of foreign naval vessels entering its waters without any diplomatic clearance.

What is behind China’s growing influence in the region?

  • There is no dispute that China has been rapidly increasing its presence and influence in the region for over three decades, particularly in the South Pacific.
  • Certainly Beijing views the Pacific Island region as an important component of its Belt and Road Initiative (BRI).
  • Specifically, it sees the region as a critical air freight hub in its so-called Air Silk Road, which connects Asia with Central and South America.

Concerns of the West

  • The United States and its regional allies, such as Australia and New Zealand, are concerned that the China-Solomon Islands security pact allows Chinese naval vessels to replenish there.
  • That could open the door to a Chinese naval base, which would significantly extend China’s military reach in the South Pacific.”
  • It is likely that this security agreement between China and the Solomon Islands has been driven by, what the CFR calls, Beijing’s “sense of vulnerability” in the region.

What is the rationale for the Solomon Islands’ increasing proximity to China?

  • The Solomon Islands had cultivated strong ties with Taiwan, which ended with the emergence of the current government in Honiara.
  • In 2019, the regime change switched Taiwan for China.
  • This was supposedly after Beijing offered half a billion US dollars in financial aid, roughly five times what Taiwan spent on the islands in the past two decades.
  • It has been alleged by the pro-Taiwan Opposition that the incumbent government has been bribed by China.

Why is China interested in the Solomon Islands?

  • Isolating Taiwan: The Solomon Islands was one among the six Pacific island states which had official bilateral relations with Taiwan.
  • Supporter in UN: The small Pacific island states act as potential vote banks for mobilising support for the great powers in international fora like the United Nations.
  • Larger EEZ: These states have disproportionately large maritime Exclusive Economic Zones when compared to their small sizes.
  • Natural resources: Solomon Islands, in particular, have significant reserves of timber and mineral resources, along with fisheries.
  • Countering US: But more importantly, they are strategically located for China to insert itself between America’s military bases in the Pacific islands and Australia.

What does this mean for the established geopolitical configuration in the region?

  • Diminishing western influence: The Pacific islands, in the post-World War II scenario, were exclusively under the spheres of influence of the Western powers, in particular, the US, UK, France and Australia and New Zealand.
  • Inserting into western hegemony: All of them have territorial possessions in the region, with the three nuclear powers among them having used the region as a nuclear weapons testing ground.
  • Shifting of dependencies: The smaller island nations of the region are heavily dependent on them, especially Australia as it is a resident power.

Damage control by West

  • Australia has reacted with boosted finances, and by extending its current security mission till 2023 when the islands will host the Pacific Games.
  • The US has responded by considering reopening its embassy in Honiara after a long 29-year gap.
  • New Zealand has shed its typical restraint about China and has criticised it for attempting to militarise the Pacific islands.

 

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Foreign Policy Watch: India-China

Places in news: Taiwan Strait

Note4Students

From UPSC perspective, the following things are important :

Prelims level: Taiwan Strait

Mains level: One China Policy

India has for the first time referred to what it called “the militarization of the Taiwan Strait”, marking a rare instance of New Delhi appearing to comment on China’s actions towards Taiwan.

What is the news?

  • Two American warships have recently sailed very close to China through Taiwan Strait.
  • This has intimidated the China which is already fuming due to the visit of Nancy Pelosi.

Taiwan Strait

  • The Taiwan Strait is a 180-kilometer wide strait separating the island of Taiwan and continental China (and Asia of course).
  • The strait is part of the South China Sea and connects to the East China Sea to the north.
  • The narrowest part is 130 km wide.

Issues over Taiwan Strait

  • The Taiwan Strait is itself a subject of an international dispute over its political status.
  • China claims to enjoy sovereignty, sovereign rights and jurisdiction over the Taiwan Strait” and regards the waterway as “internal territorial waters” instead of being international waters.
  • This means that the Chinese government denies any foreign vessel having the freedom of navigation in the strait.
  • This position has drawn strong objections from the western World.

India’s change of stance

  • India has followed a “One China policy” since its recognition of the PRC in 1949, and only maintains trade and cultural relations with Taiwan.
  • India routinely reiterated this policy until 2008 after which it stopped mentioning it in official statements.
  • This is a demand that China usually asks of most countries in official declarations.

Why is India shifting its stance?

  • China often make provocative statements claiming Arunachal Pradesh.
  • It often moves to issue “stapled visas” to Indian citizens in Jammu and Kashmir and Arunachal.

 

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Foreign Policy Watch: India-China

Lessons for India from the Taiwan standoff

Note4Students

From UPSC perspective, the following things are important :

Prelims level: Not much

Mains level: Paper 2- Lessons for India in China-Taiwan crisis

Context

The brief visit by the United States House Speaker, Nancy Pelosi, to Taiwan, against stern warnings issued by China, has the potential to increase the already deteriorating relationship between the U.S. and China. For those of us in India watching the events as they unfold around Taiwan, there are valuable lessons to be learnt.

Background

  • The crisis that began with the visit of Ms. Pelosi to Taipei is still unfolding and there is little clarity today on how it will wind down.
  •  For China, its claims about a rising superpower might ring hollow if it is unable to unify its claimed territories, in particular Taiwan.
  • For the U.S., it is about re-establishing steadily-diminishing American credibility in the eyes of its friends and foes.
  • For Taiwan, it is about standing up to Chinese bullying and making its red lines clear to Beijing.
  • Lessons for India: To be fair, there is growing recognition in New Delhi that it is important to meet the challenge posed by a belligerent China, but there appears to be a lack of clarity on how to meet this challenge.
  • To that extent, the Taiwan crisis offers New Delhi three lessons, at the very least.

Takeaways for India

1] Articulate red lines

  • The most important lesson from the Taiwan standoff for policymakers in New Delhi is the importance of articulating red lines and sovereign positions in an unambiguous manner.
  •  New Delhi needs to unambiguously highlight the threat from China and the sources of such a threat.
  • Any absence of such clarity will be cleverly utilised by Beijing to push Indian limits, as we have already seen.
  • Stop confusing international community: Even worse, ambiguous messaging by India also confuses its friends in the international community.
  • If India does not clearly articulate that China is in illegal occupation of its territory, how can it expect its friends in the international community to support India diplomatically or otherwise?
  • In other words, India’s current policy amounts to poor messaging, and confusing to its own people as well as the larger international community, and is therefore counterproductive.

2] Avoid appeasement

  • Taiwan could have avoided the ongoing confrontation and the economic blockade during Chinese retaliatory military exercises around its territory by avoiding Ms. Pelosi’s visit to Taipei, or perhaps even keeping it low key.
  • Appeasement of China, Taiwan knows, is not the answer to Beijing’s aggression.
  •  India’s policy of meeting/hosting Chinese leaders while the Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA) continue(d) to violate established territorial norms on the LAC is a deeply flawed one.
  • Unilaterally catering to Chinese sensitivities even during the standoffs between the two militaries is a mistake.
  • For instance, the parliamentary delegation visits and legislature-level dialogues between India and Taiwan have not taken place since 2017.
  • Soft-peddling of the Quad was a mistake: During the 2000s, India (as well as Australia) decided to soft-peddle the Quad in the face of strong Chinese objections.
  • It is only in the last two years or so that we have witnessed renewed enthusiasm around the Quad.
  • In retrospect, appeasing Beijing by almost abandoning the Quad was bad strategy.

3] Economic relationship is a two way process

  • Given that the economic relationship is a two-way process and that, as a matter of fact, the trade deficit is in China’s favour, China too has a lot to lose from a damaged trade relationship with India.
  • More so, if the Taiwan example (as well as the India-China standoff in 2020) is anything to go by, trade can continue to take place despite tensions and without India making any compromises vis-à-vis its sovereign claims.
  • India for sure should do business with China, but not on China’s own terms.

Conclusion

The recent crisis offers valuable lessons for India in its dealing with China.

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Foreign Policy Watch: India-China

China’s problem with top US senator visiting Taiwan

Note4Students

From UPSC perspective, the following things are important :

Prelims level: NA

Mains level: US meddling in China-Tawian friction

The Speaker of the House of Representatives, Nancy Pelosi, landed in Taiwan, ignoring Chinese threats and a warning by President Xi Jinping to “not play with fire”.

Why in news?

  • Pelosi’s visit to Taiwan is the highest-level visit by an American official to the island in a quarter century.
  • The senior US politician has been critical of China on multiple fronts over the decades.

US defiance of One China Policy

  • The US has maintained a ‘One China’ policy since the 1970s, under which it recognises Taiwan as a part of China.
  • But it has unofficial ties with Taiwan as well — a strategy that is known as strategic or deliberate ambiguity.
  • Beijing considers Taiwan a part of China, threatens it frequently, and has not ruled out taking the island by military force at any time.

Why does China have a problem with Pelosi visiting Taiwan?

  • For China, the presence of a senior American figure in Taiwan would indicate some kind of US support for Taiwan’s independence.
  • This move severely undermined China’s perception of sovereignty and territorial integrity.

Brief history of China-Taiwan Tensions

  • Taiwan is an island about 160 km off the coast of southeastern China, opposite the Chinese cities of Fuzhou, Quanzhou, and Xiamen.
  • It was administered by the imperial Qing dynasty, but its control passed to the Japanese in 1895.
  • After the defeat of Japan in World War II, the island passed back into Chinese hands.
  • After the communists led by Mao Zedong won the civil war in mainland China, Chiang Kai-shek, the leader of the nationalist Kuomintang party, fled to Taiwan in 1949.
  • Chiang Kai-shek set up the government of the Republic of China on the island, and remained President until 1975.
  • Beijing has never recognised the existence of Taiwan as an independent political entity, arguing that it was always a Chinese province.

Taiwanese stance

  • Taiwan says that the modern Chinese state was only formed after the revolution of 1911.
  • It was not a part of that state or of the People’s Republic of China that was established after the communist revolution.
  • While the political tensions have continued, China and Taiwan have had economic ties.
  • Many migrants from Taiwan work in China, and China has investments in Taiwan.
  • No doubt, cultural ties are indispensable.
  • In recent years, Taiwan’s government has said only the island’s 23 million people have the right to decide their future and that it will defend itself when attacked.
  • Since 2016, Taiwan has elected a party that leans towards independence.

How does the world, and US, view Taiwan?

  • The UN does NOT recognise Taiwan as a separate country; in fact, only 13 countries around the world — mainly in South America, the Caribbean, Oceania, and the Vatican — do.
  • In June, President Biden said that the US would defend Taiwan if it was invaded, but it was clarified soon afterward but America does not support Taiwan’s independence.
  • While the US has no formal ties with Taipei, it remains Taiwan’s most important international backer and arms supplier.

 

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Foreign Policy Watch: India-China

Taiwan between giants

Note4Students

From UPSC perspective, the following things are important :

Prelims level: Not much

Mains level: Paper 2- Taiwan issue

Context

The US House of Representatives Speaker Nancy Pelosi visited Taiwan evoking strong protest from China.

Brief history of China-Taiwan Tensions

  • Taiwan is an island about 160 km off the coast of southeastern China, opposite the Chinese cities of Fuzhou, Quanzhou, and Xiamen.
  • It was administered by the imperial Qing dynasty, but its control passed to the Japanese in 1895.
  • After the defeat of Japan in World War II, the island passed back into Chinese hands.
  • After the communists led by Mao Zedong won the civil war in mainland China, Chiang Kai-shek, the leader of the nationalist Kuomintang party, fled to Taiwan in 1949.
  • Chiang Kai-shek set up the government of the Republic of China on the island, and remained President until 1975.
  • Beijing has never recognised the existence of Taiwan as an independent political entity, arguing that it was always a Chinese province.

The US and One-China Principle

  • With the shifting geopolitics of the Cold War, the PRC and the U.S. were forced to come together in the 1970s to counter the growing influence of the USSR.
  • This led to the US-China rapprochement demonstrated by the historic visit of then US President Richard Nixon to PRC in 1972.
  • The same year, the PRC displaced ROC as the official representative of the Chinese nation at the UN.
  • Diplomatic relations with the PRC became possible only if countries abided by its “One China Principle” — recognizing PRC and not the ROC as China.

Why does China have a problem with Pelosi visiting Taiwan?

  • For China, the presence of a senior American figure in Taiwan would indicate some kind of US support for Taiwan’s independence.
  • This move severely undermined China’s perception of sovereignty and territorial integrity.

China’s reaction

  • Increased military exercises around Taiwa : Military exercises around Taiwan have been expanded, with Chinese aircraft intruding more frequently across the informal median line which defines the zone of operations on each side.
  • Increased naval presence: Chinese naval ships are cruising within the Taiwan Straits and around the island itself.
  • Economic sanctions have been announced, prohibiting imports of a whole range of foodstuffs from Taiwan.
  • One item which will be left out is semi-conductors, a critical import for a range of Chinese high-tech industries.
  • Taiwanese firms like the Taiwan Semi-Conductor Manufacturing Company (TSMC) are world leaders in the most sophisticated brands of chips imported by a large number of countries.
  •  The main target of China’s escalating response will be Taiwan.
  • Taiwan is indeed caught in the crossfire between China and the US and being a proxy in a fight between giants.

Implications for East Asia and South East Asia

  • Forced into making a choice: Just as Taiwan is caught in a crossfire between the US and China, so are the East Asian and South East Asian countries.
  • Prefer US military presence: They feel reassured by the considerable US military presence deployed in the region and tacitly support its Indo-Pacific strategy.
  • Strong economic ties with China: However, their economic and commercial interests are bound ever tighter with the large and growing Chinese economy.
  • This having it both ways strategy is beginning to fray at the edges with the escalating tensions between the US and China.
  • Most do not wish to be forced into making a choice.

What should be India’s approach?

  • Advantageous for India: In one sense, China’s preoccupation with its eastern ocean flank of the Yellow Sea, the Taiwan Strait and the South China Sea is good for India.
  • It diminishes Chinese attention toward the Indian Ocean, India’s primary security theatre.
  • Adhere to One China Policy: Prudence demands that India hew closely to its consistent one China policy even while maintaining and even expanding non-official relations with Taiwan.
  • For the US, Japan and Australia, members of the Quad, Taiwan is a key component of the Indo-Pacific strategy.
  • It is not for India.

Conclusion

One should use the opportunity to expand India’s naval capabilities and maritime profile in this theatre before the Chinese begin to look to our extended neighbourhood with renewed interest and energy.

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Foreign Policy Watch: India-China

Taiwan Crisis

Note4Students

From UPSC perspective, the following things are important :

Prelims level: One-China Principle

Mains level: India-Taiwan Relations

As US House Speaker Nancy Pelosi arrived upsetting China, India was keenly watching the developments, although it has not yet commented on it.

What is the ‘One China’ policy?

  • It is the diplomatic acknowledgment of China’s position that there is only one Chinese government.
  • Taiwan’s government was set up by the Kuomintang, whose party logo is reflected in Taiwan’s flag
  • Initially, many governments including the US recognised Taiwan as they shied away from Communist China.
  • But the diplomatic winds shifted as China and the United States saw a mutual need to develop relations beginning in the 1970s, with the US and other countries cutting ties with Taipei in favour of Beijing.

Why is China obsessed with Taiwan?

  • Taiwan is the largest producer of electronic chips, which are supplied to almost all the industries, from phones to laptops, watches to game consoles, industrial equipment to automotive, and aircraft and fighter jets.
  • TSMC (Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company) is the largest foundry in the world and holds around 65 percent of the global production of chips.
  • Any potential conflict with China would completely disrupt the entire supply chain of TSMC and labor availability, and could cause major shortage of electronic chips.
  • Additionally, China controls five percent of the global production of chips, which could also be affected.
  • This could further impact the already existing supply-demand gap for electronic components.

India- Taiwan Relations

Background

  • India does not have formal diplomatic ties with Taiwan yet, as it follows the One-China policy.
  • However, during then Chinese premier Wen Jiabao’s visit to India in December 2010, India did not mention support for the One-China policy in the joint communique.
  • In 2014, when PM Modi came to power, he invited Taiwan’s Ambassador Chung-Kwang Tien, along with Lobsang Sangay, president of the Central Tibetan Administration to his swearing-in.

Diplomatic ties

  • While following the One-China policy, India has an office in Taipei for diplomatic functions — India-Taipei Association (ITA) is headed by a senior diplomat.
  • Taiwan has the Taipei Economic and Cultural Center (TECC) in New Delhi. Both were established in 1995.
  • Their ties focus on commerce, culture and education.
  • Now in their third decade, these have been deliberately kept low-profile, owing to China’s sensitivities.
  • For example, parliamentary delegation visits and legislature-level dialogues have stopped since 2017, around the time the India-China border standoff happened in Doklam.

The new push

  • Any significant development in India-Taiwan relations runs the risk of meeting with a likely stern reaction from Beijing.
  • This explains India’s steady, albeit slow, outreach to Taiwan.
  • Given that India-China relations are not likely to witness a return to normalcy in the near future, India should consider adopting a bold, comprehensive and long-term approach to engage Taiwan.

 

 

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Foreign Policy Watch: India-China

UN panel tells Hong Kong to repeal National Security Law

Note4Students

From UPSC perspective, the following things are important :

Prelims level: Honkong, Taiwan

Mains level: Honkong, Taiwan issue

Hong Kong’s controversial national security law should be repealed, experts on the UN Human Rights Committee said, amid concerns the legislation is being used to crack down on free speech and dissent in the former British colony.

Why in news?

  • Chinese and Hong Kong officials have repeatedly used the NSL imposed by Beijing in 2020 to restore stability after the city was rocked for months by sometimes violent anti-government and anti-China protests in 2019.
  • The committee, which monitors the implementation of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) by state parties, released its findings on Hong Kong following a periodic review.
  • The Hong Kong Special Administrative Region is a signatory to the ICCPR but China is not.

About Hong Kong

  • A former British Colony and Autonomous Territory: Hong Kong is an autonomous territory, and a former British colony, in south-eastern China.
  • It became a colony of the British Empire at the end of the First Opium War in 1842.
  • Sovereignty over the territory was returned to China in 1997.
  • Special Administrative Region (SAR): As a SAR, Hong Kong maintains governing power and economic systems that are separate from those of mainland China.
  • The 1984 Sino-British Joint Declaration guarantees the Basic Law for 50 years after the transfer of sovereignty.
  • It does not specify how Hong Kong will be governed after 2047.
  • Thus, the central government’s role in determining the territory’s future system of government is the subject of political debate and speculation in Hong kong.

What is this law all about?

  • Hong Kong was always meant to have a security law, but could never pass one because it was so unpopular.
  • So this is about China stepping in to ensure the city has a legal framework to deal with what it sees as serious challenges to its authority.
  • The details of the law’s 66 articles were kept secret until after it was passed. It criminalises any act of:
  1. Secession – breaking away from the country
  2. Subversion – undermining the power or authority of the central government
  3. Terrorism – using violence or intimidation against people
  4. Collusion–  with foreign or external forces

What provisions do fall under the law?

  • The law came into effect at 23:00 local time on 30 June 2020, an hour before the 23rd anniversary of the city’s handover to China from British rule.
  • It gives Beijing power to shape life in Hong Kong it has never had before.
  • Its key provisions include:
  1. Crimes of secession, subversion, terrorism and collusion with foreign forces are punishable by a maximum sentence of life in prison
  2. Damaging public transport facilities can be considered terrorism
  3. Those found guilty will not be allowed to stand for public office
  4. Companies can be fined if convicted under the law
  5. This office can send some cases to be tried in mainland China – but Beijing has said it will only have that power over a “tiny number” of cases
  6. In addition, Hong Kong will have to establish its own national security commission to enforce the laws, with a Beijing-appointed adviser
  7. Hong Kong’s chief executive will have the power to appoint judges to hear national security cases, raising fears about judicial autonomy
  8. Importantly, Beijing will have power over how the law should be interpreted, not any Hong Kong judicial or policy body. If the law conflicts with any Hong Kong law, the Beijing law takes priority
  9. Some trials will be heard behind closed doors.
  10. People suspected of breaking the law can be wire-tapped and put under surveillance
  11. Management of foreign non-governmental organizations and news agencies will be strengthened
  12. The law will also apply to non-permanent residents and people “from outside [Hong Kong]… who are not permanent residents of Hong Kong“.

What has changed in Hong Kong since the law was introduced?

  • Hundreds of protestors, activists and former opposition lawmakers have been arrested since the law came into force.
  • The arrests are an ominous sign that its crackdown on Hong Kong is only going to escalate.
  • Beijing has said the law is needed to bring stability to the city, but critics say it is designed to squash dissent.

Why did China do this?

  • Hong Kong was handed back to China from British control in 1997.
  • But under a unique agreement – a mini-constitution called the Basic Law and a so-called “one country, two systems” principle.
  • They are supposed to protect certain freedoms for Hong Kong: freedom of assembly and speech, an independent judiciary and some democratic rights – freedoms that no other part of mainland China has.
  • Under the same agreement, Hong Kong had to enact its own national security law – this was set out in Article 23 of the Basic Law – but it never happened because of its unpopularity.

How can China do this?

  • Many might ask how China can do this if the city was supposed to have freedoms guaranteed under the handover agreement.
  • The Basic Law says Chinese laws can’t be applied in Hong Kong unless they are listed in a section called Annex III – there are already a few listed there, mostly uncontroversial and around foreign policy.
  • These laws can be introduced by decree – which means they bypass the city’s parliament.
  • Critics say the introduction of the law this way amounts to a breach of the “one country, two systems” principle, which is so important to Hong Kong – but clearly, it is technically possible to do this.

Must read:

[Burning Issue] National Security Law debate in Hong Kong

 

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Foreign Policy Watch: India-China

Understanding the nature of US-Taiwan Relations

Note4Students

From UPSC perspective, the following things are important :

Prelims level: NA

Mains level: Taiwan as a new global flashpoint

The US President made a controversial statement on whether the US will come to the aid of Taiwan militarily in case of an invasion by China.

What is the Taiwan issue?

  • Taiwan is an island territory located off the coast of mainland China, across the Taiwan Strait.
  • After their defeat to the communist forces in the Chinese civil war (1945-1949), the ruling Kuomintang (Nationalist) government of China fled to Taiwan.
  • They transplanted the Republic of China (ROC) government in Taiwan, while the Communist Party of China (CPC) established the People’s Republic of China (PRC) in the mainland.
  • Since then, the PRC considers the island as a renegade province awaiting reunification by peaceful means, if possible.

Game changer: Cold war affiliations

  • Meanwhile, the ROC retained its membership at the United Nations and its permanent seat at the UN Security Council (UNSC).
  • The cross-strait relations became strained as a result of the Cold War, with the PRC allying itself with the Soviet Union (USSR) and ROC with the U.S.
  • This resulted in the two Taiwan Strait crises of the 1950s.

The US and One-China Principle

  • With the shifting geopolitics of the Cold War, the PRC and the U.S. were forced to come together in the 1970s to counter the growing influence of the USSR.
  • This led to the US-China rapprochement demonstrated by the historic visit of then US President Richard Nixon to PRC in 1972.
  • The same year, the PRC displaced ROC as the official representative of the Chinese nation at the UN.
  • Diplomatic relations with the PRC became possible only if countries abided by its “One China Principle” — recognizing PRC and not the ROC as China.

Rise of Taiwan

  • Taiwan transitioned from a single party state to a multi-party democracy.
  • At the same time that China reformed its economic system under Deng Xiaoping, and by the end of the Cold War they became economically entangled.
  • Nevertheless, they continue to compete for international recognition and preparing themselves for the worst possible scenario.

How has the US’s stance on the Taiwan question evolved vis-à-vis China?

  • The very foundation of the US rapprochement as well as its recognition of the PRC is a mutual understanding on the Taiwan question.
  • This has been outlined in three documents — the Shanghai Communique (1972), the Normalisation Communique (1979) and the 1982 Communique.
  • According to the 1972 communique, the US agreed to the ‘one China principle’, with an understanding that it “acknowledges” and “does not challenge” that all Chinese on either side of the Taiwan Strait.
  • It maintained that there is one China and Taiwan is a part of China.
  • However, the US also established unofficial relations with Taiwan through this communique in the name of the people of both the countries.

 Why is the issue significant today?

  • As Taiwan’s democracy flourished, the popular mood drifted towards a new Taiwanese identity and a pro-independence stance on sovereignty.
  • The past decade has seen considerable souring of ties across the Strait, as the Democratic People’s Party (DPP) became the most powerful political force in Taiwan.
  • The DPP government has been catering to the pro-independence constituency in Taiwan and seeks to diversify economic relations away from China.
  • China has always seen Taiwan as a territory with high geopolitical significance.
  • This is due to its central location in the First Island Chain between Japan and the South China Sea, which is seen as the first benchmark or barrier for China’s power projection.

Why is China so obsessed with Taiwan?

  • Taiwan is at China’s geostrategic calculus.
  • Moreover, its reunification will formally bury the remaining ghosts of China’s “century of humiliation”.
  • China under Xi Jinping seems to have lost its patience and currently sees very slim chances of a peaceful reunification.
  • China usually makes aerial transgressions in Taiwan’s Air Defence Identification Zone (ADIZ).
  • Also, this build-up of tensions is happening simultaneously and drawing parallels with the Russo-Ukrainian conflict.

Is US strategy towards Taiwan witnessing a major transformation?

  • The US strategy towards Taiwan in light of the unresolved nature of the cross-Strait relations has been marked by what has been called “strategic ambiguity”.
  • This is under the Taiwan Relations Act (TRA) of 1979.
  • As per the TRA, the US has stated clearly that the establishment of bilateral relations with the PRC rests upon “the expectation that the future of Taiwan will be determined by peaceful means”.
  • It also states the US policy to maintain the capacity to resist any resort to force or other forms of coercion that would jeopardise the security, or the social or economic system, of the people on Taiwan.
  • Hence, there is no clear guarantee here that the US will militarily involve in a situation where China attempts to invade Taiwan, short of supplying “defensive weapons”.

Enjoying the ambiguity

  • The US has for long utilized this strategic ambiguity with its own interpretation of the ‘one China principle to maintain its strategic interests in the Western Pacific.
  • It is in this context that Mr. Biden’s statements have made controversy.

 

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Foreign Policy Watch: India-China

Illegal fishing by China in the Indo-Pacific

Note4Students

From UPSC perspective, the following things are important :

Prelims level: QUAD

Mains level: IIU fishing and related issues

In order to check China’s illegal fishing in the Indo-Pacific region, the Quadrilateral Security Alliance (Quad) has planned to launch a satellite-based surveillance initiative.

What is the news?

  • The leaders of Quad are reported to be getting ready to unveil a maritime surveillance initiative to protect exclusive economic zones in the Indo-Pacific against environmental damage.

How will the proposed maritime surveillance system work?

  • The initiative will use satellite technology to connect existing surveillance centres in India, Singapore and the Pacific.
  • This will help establish a tracking system to combat illegal, unregulated and unprotected (IUU) fishing.
  • The satellite-enabled dragnet will track IUU fishing activities from the Indian Ocean and South-east Asia to the South Pacific.
  • The idea is to monitor illicit fishing vessels that have their AIS (automatic identification system) transponders turned off to evade tracking.
  • The move by the Quad security group is also seen to be aimed at reducing the small Pacific island nations’ growing reliance on China.

Why is illegal fishing seen as such a big threat?

  • The unregulated plunder of global fishing stock poses a grave threat to the livelihood and food security of millions of people.
  • Globally, fish provide about 3.3 billion people with 20% of their average animal protein intake.
  • According to an FAO report, around 60 million people are engaged in the sector of fisheries and aquaculture.
  • While the economic loss from illegal fishing has been difficult to precisely quantify, some estimates peg it around USD 20 billion annually.

Threats posed by IUU Fishing

  • Illegal fishing has now replaced piracy as a global maritime threat.
  • In the Indo-Pacific region, like elsewhere, the collapse of fisheries can destabilise coastal nations.
  • It poses a much bigger security risk, as it can fuel human trafficking, drug crime and terror recruiting.

Why is China in the dock?

  • The 2021 IUU Fishing Index, which maps 152 coastal countries, ranked China as the worst offender.
  • China is considered responsible for 80% to 95% illegal fishing in the region after having overfished its own waters.
  • It, in fact, is known to incentivise illegal fishing with generous subsidies to meet its growing domestic demand.

China and distant-water fishing (DWF)

  • China’s DWF fleet has almost 17,000 vessels and is the largest in the world.
  • Vessel ownership is highly fragmented among many small companies and the fleet includes vessels registered in other jurisdictions.

Issues with Chinese IUU Fishing

  • Chinese are often accused of pillaging ocean wealth with great sophistication and with little regard for maritime boundaries.
  • China also uses them to project strategic influence and to bully fishing vessels from weaker nations.
  • China uses destructive practises such as bottom trawling and forced, bonded and slave labour and trafficked crew, alongside the widespread abuse of migrant crewmembers.

 

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Foreign Policy Watch: India-China

What is China’s Global Security Initiative?

Note4Students

From UPSC perspective, the following things are important :

Prelims level: GSI

Mains level: Chinese counter to Western Indo-Pacific strategy

Chinese President Xi Jinping last week proposed a “Global Security Initiative” to promote security for all in the globe.

What is Global Security Initiative?

  • Conceived as a global public good, the initiative seeks to promote world peace and stability by fostering equity and justice among nations.
  • To do this, Xi defined his proposal in six areas:
  1. Stay committed to the vision of common, comprehensive, cooperative and sustainable security, and work together to maintain world peace and security;
  2. Stay committed to respecting the sovereignty and territorial integrity of all countries, uphold non-interference in internal affairs, and respect the independent choices of development paths and social systems made by people in different countries;
  3. Stay committed to abiding by the purposes and principles of the UN Charter, reject the Cold War mentality, oppose unilateralism, and say no to group politics and bloc confrontation;
  4. Stay committed to taking the legitimate security concerns of all countries seriously, uphold the principle of indivisible security, build a balanced, effective and sustainable security architecture, and oppose the pursuit of one’s own security at the cost of others’ security;
  5. Stay committed to peacefully resolving differences and disputes between countries through dialogue and consultation, support all efforts conducive to the peaceful settlement of crises, reject double standards, and oppose the wanton use of unilateral sanctions and long-arm jurisdiction;
  6. Stay committed to maintaining security in both traditional and non-traditional domains, and work together on regional disputes and global challenges such as terrorism, climate change, cybersecurity, and biosecurity.

It is quite ironic that China has never adhered to any of the above-stated lofty principles and now is preaching them to the world.

Key propositions made by Xi

  • China opposes the wanton use of unilateral sanctions and long-arm jurisdiction, appearing to refer to Western sanctions.
  • He said “some countries” were “eager to engage in exclusive ‘small circles’ and ‘small groups’”, terms Chinese officials have used previously to describe the Quad and the AUKUS (Australia-U.K.-U.S.) security pact.
  • He firmly opposed the use of the ‘Indo-Pacific’ strategy to divide the region and create a ‘new Cold War’, and the use of military alliances to put together an ‘Asian version of NATO’.
  • According to him, China upholds true spirit of multilateralism.

A critical assessment of Xi’s speech

  • The idea of a world-encompassing security mechanism sounds like what China’s ancient emperors might have proposed.
  • Diplomats are under pressure to dissect the meaning but are having a hard time: Xi’s speech contained only abstract Chinese words and idioms.
  • One thing is very clear, China always comes out with an excessively large framework that nobody objects to.
  • The idea is that even if countries don’t agree wholeheartedly, at least they can’t fully oppose it.

Conclusion

  • Chinese criticism of unilateralism, hegemony and double standards is usually aimed at the U.S.
  • Xi envisions a gradually weakening America replaced by a multipolar world in which China is a major player.

 

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Foreign Policy Watch: India-China

Nepal’s dwindling Forex Reserves

Note4Students

From UPSC perspective, the following things are important :

Prelims level: Forex reserves, BoP

Mains level: Economic crisis in India's neighbourhood

In an unusual development, the Nepali PM sacked the head of its central bank accusing him of leaking sensitive information and for failing to perform his duties.

What is the news?

  • Nepal’s forex reserves have plummeted by 18.5% to $9.58 billion in March from $11.75 billion in July 2021.
  • The current forex reserves are not enough to pay the government’s import bills beyond the next seven months or so.
  • Nepal’s central bank recently announced a ban on the import of vehicles and other luxury items, citing liquidity crunch and declining foreign exchange reserves.
  • It is rumoured that the Nepali economy will go into a crisis like Sri Lanka.

Why have Nepal’s forex reserves fallen?

  • Nepal’s forex reserves situation appears healthy as of now as the country, unlike Sri Lanka, is not burdened by external debt.
  • There are, however, concerns that the lower middle-income economy is being battered repeatedly by external factors and that may precipitate a crisis sometime soon.
  • Nepal which is blessed with one of the finest tourism sectors in South Asia, because of the Himalayan mountain range, suffered during the COVID-19 pandemic as global tourist flow fell.
  • This is followed by the global energy crisis caused by Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.
  • This has put extraordinary inflationary pressure on the economy.

How bad is the situation?

  • Nepal’s economy is highly dependent on imports as the country buys a range of merchandise goods apart from fuel.
  • The prevailing weak economic indicators mean that Nepal is spending from its forex reserves faster than it can save.
  • Economists contend that Nepal will soon have double-digit inflation. All economic indicators are declining.
  • The real shortfall in forex reserves is because of the decline in foreign remittances which suffered during the pandemic when the Nepalese workforce abroad suffered job losses.

Can the energy scene in Nepal escalate economic woes?

  • Nepal’s history shows that any uncertainty regarding fuel can trigger serious internal problems as was visible during the 2015-16 blockade when disruption of fuel supply from India.
  • Nepal’s primary supplier of energy is Indian Oil Corporation (IOC).
  • Nepal Oil Corporation (NOC) pays IOC in two installments every month, on the 8th and the 23rd.
  • The NOC has been in crisis for months as high global prices depleted the company’s savings, prompting it to approach the government for a lifeline.
  • The Government of Nepal has agreed to provide NOC the necessary amount to continue supplies from IOC.
  • NOC’s financial status makes it unattractive for banks and as a result the public sector company does not enjoy confidence in the market.

Paradoxical situation

  • The government is in a paradoxical situation: It has to control imports of products from which it earns the highest amount of tax revenue.
  • Luxury items are the country’s major source of revenue.
  • If revenue shrinks, an economic crisis could be imminent.

Impact on elections

  • Nepal will hold local level polls next month which will be followed by general elections towards the end of the year.
  • The election process requires considerable financial allocation and Nepal has received support in the past for elections from international donors like the USAID.
  • These donors help in carrying out pre-election staff training and logistics that are part of any democratic process.
  • But there are uncertainties considering the bleak financial situation.
  • It will require at least 10 billion Nepali rupees for the election process and that will mean diversion of a large amount of resources for the democratic process.

Quick recap: Sri Lankan Crisis

  • Like Nepal, Sri Lanka is a country with a small economy. The Sri Lankan economy is around 1.5 times bigger than Nepal’s.
  • Sri Lanka’s economic crisis was in the making since it suffered a terrorist attack in 2019 which hit its tourism industry, a major contributor to the GDP.
  • Then came the pandemic, which further wiped out tourism incomes. Then there were debt burdens in dollars.
  • The political leadership failed to act to address the looming crisis.
  • The Rajapaksha dynasty made some wrong moves—it cut taxes and started printing money, hugely devaluing the currency.
  • In what looked like a well-intentioned move towards organic farming, the county banned imports of chemical fertilisers. Paddy production failed. The country ran out of money to pay its bills.

Is Nepal really going the way of Sri Lanka?

  • In Nepal, the situation is not as bleak.
  • Nepal’s current forex reserves are enough to pay for imports of goods and services for about seven and a half months.
  • Tourism, one of the major foreign currency earners, was hit hard by the pandemic, but its gradual revival has given a glimmer of hope.
  • Since Nepal’s currency is pegged to the Indian rupee, a massive devaluation shock is unlikely. Tourism is also rebounding, giving a fillip to foreign currency reserves.

Back2Basics: Foreign Exchange Reserves

  • Foreign exchange reserves are important assets held by the central bank in foreign currencies as reserves.
  • They are commonly used to support the exchange rate and set monetary policy.
  • In India’s case, foreign reserves include Gold, Dollars, and the IMF’s quota for Special Drawing Rights.
  • Most of the reserves are usually held in US dollars, given the currency’s importance in the international financial and trading system.
  • Some central banks keep reserves in Euros, British pounds, Japanese yen, or Chinese yuan, in addition to their US dollar reserves.

 

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Foreign Policy Watch: India-China

Centre extends relief to Tibetan Committee by 5 years

Note4Students

From UPSC perspective, the following things are important :

Prelims level: Tibetan Parliament-in-Exile (TPiE)

Mains level: India's asylum to Tibetans

The Union government has extended the scheme to provide ₹40 crore grants-in-aid to the Dalai Lama’s Central Tibetan Relief Committee (CTRC) for another five years, up to fiscal year 2025-26.

Do you think that India’s support for the Tibetan cause is the root cause of all irritants in India-China relations?

What is CTRC?

  • The Dalai Lama’s Central Tibetan Relief Committee (CTRC) was formed and registered as Charitable Society under Indian Societies Registration Act XXI of 1860.
  • It effectively acts as the Relief and Development Wing of Home Department, Central Tibetan Administration.
  • All the CTRC activities are carried out with consent and support from Board of Directors and approval from TPiE (Tibetan Parliament in Exile).

Tibetan Parliament-in-Exile (TPiE)

  • The Tibetan Parliament-in-Exile (TPiE) has its headquarters in Dharamsala, in the Kangra district of Himachal Pradesh.
  • According to the Green Book of the Tibetan government-in-exile, over 1 lakh Tibetans are settled across India.
  • The remaining are settled in United States, Australia, Brazil, Canada, Costa Rica, France, Mexico, Mongolia, Germany, United Kingdom, Switzerland and various other countries.

Working of the TPiE

  • The Speaker and a Deputy Speaker head the Tibetan Parliament-in-exile.
  • It includes two members from each of the four schools of Tibetan Buddhism and the pre-Buddhist Bon religion.
  • Other representatives are from the Tibetan Communities in North America and Europe; and from Australasia and Asia (excluding India, Nepal and Bhutan).
  • Till 2006, it used to be called as Assembly of Tibetan People’s Deputies (ATPDs) with the chairman as its head and a vice-chairman.

Tibetan Constitution

  • The Central Tibetan Administration exists and functions on the basis of the Constitution of the Tibetan government called the ‘The Charter of the Tibetans in Exile’.
  • In 1991, The Constitution Redrafting Committee instituted by the Dalai Lama prepared the Charter for Tibetans in exile. The Dalai Lama approved it on June 28, 1991.
  • In 2001, fundamental changes happened with the amendment of the Charter that facilitated the direct election of the Kalon Tripa by the Tibetans in exile.
  • The Kalon Tripa is called Sikyong or president of the Central Tibetan Administration.

The Kashag (Cabinet)

  • The Kashag (Cabinet) is the Central Tibetan Administration’s highest executive office and comprise seven members.
  • It is headed by the Sikyong (political leader) who is directly elected by the exiled Tibetan population.
  • Sikyong subsequently nominates his seven Kalons (ministers) and seeks the parliament’s approval. The Kashag’s term is for five years.

A backgrounder: Democracy for Tibet

  • The Dalai Lama began democratization soon after he came to India during the 1959 Tibetan National Uprising.
  • He reportedly asked Tibetans in exile to choose their representatives through universal adult suffrage, following which polls were held for electing Tibetan Parliamentarians in 1960.
  • Democracy for the Tibetans, thus, began in exile.
  • The Dalai Lama, however, continued to remain the supreme political leader. On March 14, 2011, he relinquished his political responsibilities, ending a 369-year-old practice.

Is TPiE officially recognized by any country?

  • Not exactly, it is not recognised officially by any country, including India.
  • But, a number of countries including the USA and European nations deal directly with the Sikyong and other Tibetan leaders through various forums.
  • The TPiE claims its democratically-elected character helps it manage Tibetan affairs and raise the Tibetan issue across the world.
  • The incumbent Sikyong, Lobsang Sangay, was among the guests who attended the oath-taking ceremony of our PM in 2014, probably a first.

 

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Foreign Policy Watch: India-China

Delinking Depsang from the ongoing Ladakh border crisis is worrying

Note4Students

From UPSC perspective, the following things are important :

Prelims level: Aksai Chin

Mains level: Paper 2- Border conflict with China

Context

In a recent television interview, the Indian Army Chief, General M.M. Naravane, argued that “out of the five or six friction points (in Ladakh), five have been solved”.

Friction points in Ladakh

  • ‘Friction point’ are the points of Chinese ingress into hitherto India-controlled territory in Ladakh, where this control is exercised by the Army and the Indo-Tibetan Border Police (ITBP) through regular patrols to the claimed areas.
  • These ‘friction points’ are Depsang, Galwan, Hot Springs, Gogra, North bank of Pangong Tso, Kailash Range and Demchok.
  • By asserting that only one of the friction points is remaining to be resolved —  Hot Springs or PP15, Army Chief implicitly ruled out Depsang as an area to be resolved.
  • This attempt to delink the strategically important area of Depsang from the ongoing Ladakh border crisis is worrying.

Significance of Depsang

  • Depsang is an enclave of flat terrain located in an area the Army classifies as Sub-Sector North (SSN), which provides land access to Central Asia through the Karakoram Pass.
  • The Army has always identified Depsang plains as where it finds itself most vulnerable in Ladakh, devising plans to tackle the major Chinese challenge.
  • SSN’s flat terrain of Depsang, Trig Heights and DBO — which provides direct access to Aksai Chin — is suited for mechanised warfare but is located at the end of only one very long and tenuous communication axis for India.
  • China, in turn, has multiple roads that provide easy access to the area.
  • This leaves SSN highly vulnerable to capture by the PLA, with a few thousands of square kilometres from the Karakoram Pass to Burtse, likely to be lost.
  • Nowhere else in Ladakh is the PLA likely to gain so much territory in a single swoop.
  • SSN lies to the east of Siachen, located between the Saltoro ridge on the Pakistani border and the Saser ridge close to the Chinese border.
  • On paper, it is the only place where a physical military collusion can take place between Pakistan and China — and the challenge of a two-front war can become real in the worst-case scenario.
  • If India loses this area, it will be nearly impossible to launch a military operation to wrest back Gilgit-Baltistan from Pakistan.

Dangers of delinking Depsang

  • Invalidation of Indian claims: The biggest danger of delinking Depsang from the current border crisis in Ladakh, however, is of corroborating the Chinese argument, which invalidates the rightful Indian claim over a large swathe of territory. 
  • In sparsely populated areas like Ladakh, with limited forward deployment of troops, the only assertion of territorial claims is by regular patrolling. 
  • By arguing that the blockade at Y-junction predates the current stand-off — a ‘legacy issue’ that goes back years — the Chinese side can affirm that Indian patrols never had access to this area and thus India has no valid claim on the territory.

Conclusion

As was demonstrated by China in the aftermath of the 1962 War, there should be no holding back in painstakingly asserting one’s claims when it comes to safeguarding the territory.

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Foreign Policy Watch: India-China

The Indo-Pacific opportunity

Note4Students

From UPSC perspective, the following things are important :

Prelims level: AUKUS

Mains level: Paper 2- Indo-Pacific challenge

Context

The geopolitics of the Indo-Pacific, which is changing fast. As it moves into 2022, the region will carry the imprint of the past five years, and will have to chart a course through inter-state tensions and crises, using both diplomacy and military preparedness.

What will shape the geopolitics and geoeconomics of the Indo-Pacific?

  • Key players in the region: The region is central to world economy and peace, and nine countries are key players: the US, China, Japan, India, Germany, the UK, Russia, Australia and France.
  • The geopolitics and geo-economics of the Indo-Pacific will be largely shaped by the interplay of relations among these nations.
  • US-China relations: Of paramount importance is the US-China equation.
  • Expect this relationship to be marked by continually adversarial, competitive and cooperative traits.
  • Beijing’s south/east China policy, aggressive postures towards Taiwan, human rights violations in Xinjiang, the subjugation of Hong Kong’s citizenry and assertive economic outreach in the Indo-Pacific — these will weigh heavily on US-China relations.

A significant role of groupings and individual nations

  • In this standoff, the role of new groupings and individual nations is significant.
  • Role of Quad: Foremost are the Quad, a strategic partnership between the US, India, Japan and Australia and the militaristic AUKUS (Australia, UK, US). 
  • India-Australia ties: Meanwhile, India and Australia are on track to deepen ties, not only bilaterally but also with the other two Quad powers.
  • The next Quad summit, probably hosted by Japan, will cement the grouping.
  • EU’s role: The EU’s Indo-Pacific strategy, announced last September, aims at increasing its economic and security profile in, and linkages with, the region.
  • UK’s role: Only by being more strategic and less mercantilist, more candid and assertive with China, and more cooperative with partners such as India, can the EU — and its former member the UK — hope to become vital players in the Indo-Pacific.
  • ASEAN, located in the middle of the Indo-Pacific waters, faces the heat of China’s aggression and the sharpening great power rivalry.
  •  It must enhance its realism and shed its tendency of wishing away problems.

Suggestions for India

  • 1]Strengthen the Quad – especially by ensuring that the grouping fulfils its commitment to deliver at least one billion vaccine doses to Indo-Pacific nations by December 2022.
  • India must protect its established relationship with Russia, and show some resilience in dialogue with Beijing.
  • 2] Enhance relations with ASEAN nations: It must enhance cooperation with key Southeast Asian partners —Indonesia, Vietnam, Philippines and Thailand — while humouring ASEAN as a grouping.
  • 3] Give attention to African and Indian Ocean island states: The eastern and southern planks of Africa and the Indian Ocean island states need continued high policy attention and financial resources.
  • A clear economic and trade agenda to follow the flag in this vital region, is certain to yield long-term dividends.

Consider the question “Indo-Pacific will present India strategic and economic opportunities that India must not miss. However, the region will have to chart a course through inter-state tensions and crises. Comment.”

Conclusion

India has done well by fulfilling its humanitarian duties during the pandemic. Learning how to convert them smartly into economic and strategic opportunities in its periphery is the focused task for the nation in 2022.

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Foreign Policy Watch: India-China

The Chinese challenge

Note4Students

From UPSC perspective, the following things are important :

Prelims level: Not much

Mains level: Paper 2- China challenge

Context

Nearly 20 months after the border crisis began in Ladakh, China has pressed on with aggressive diplomatic and military gestures against India.

Recent anti- India moves by China

  • Beijing recently renamed 15 places in Arunachal Pradesh, following the six it had done in 2017.
  • China justifies the renaming as being done on the basis of its historical, cultural and administrative jurisdiction over the area — these old names existed since ancient times which had been changed by India with its “illegal occupation”.
  • On January 1, 2022, Beijing’s new land border law came into force, which provides the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) with full responsibility to take steps against “invasion, encroachment, infiltration, provocation” and safeguard Chinese territory.

India’s response

  • Delhi has run out of proactive options against Beijing that will force the Chinese leadership to change course on its India policy.
  • The two countries have an increasingly lopsided trade relationship driven by Indian dependency on Chinese manufacturing, a situation further worsened by the Government’s mishandling of the novel coronavirus pandemic.
  • To restore the status quo ante on the LAC as of April 2020, India undertook internal balancing of its military from the Pakistan border to the China border and external rebalancing through a closer partnership with the United States in the Indo-Pacific.
  • Because of the China factor, the U.S. is currently looking away even as India mistreats its minorities and its democracy stands diminished.
  •  India’s difficult diplomatic and military engagement with China is going to leave it more dependent on U.S. support, rendering India more vulnerable to American pressure on ‘shared values’.
  • With a rising China as its neighbour and a more self-centred U.S. – which is uncomfortable with India’s reliable partner, Russia — as its friend, Delhi continues to face difficult choices.

Conclusion

Put under the harsh glare, India has been found wanting in its ability to deal with future challenges. The immediate challenge, however, remains China. It cannot be wished away and must be tackled.

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Foreign Policy Watch: India-China

China’s new land boundary law fits in with its expansionism

Note4Students

From UPSC perspective, the following things are important :

Prelims level: Chumbi Valley

Mains level: Paper 2- What China's new boundary law mean for India?

Context

The latest in the series of aggressive Chinese actions is the use of lawfare through the passing of the “Land Boundary Law” on October 21 which became effective this week.

Background of the Chinese approach

  • The last residue of the Qing dynasty was wiped out in the 1911 revolution when China was established as a republic.
  • The republic was again overthrown in 1949 by the Chinese Communist Party.
  • Three successive Chinese governments in China refused to delineate or demarcate the boundary with either Tibet or India.
  • British archival records, many declassified points to attempts made by Imperial Britain to formally formulate a boundary with China.
  • Yet, all three regimes were united in their refusal to accept a formal limiting of China’s territorial expanse and kept their response ambiguous.
  • Even during the Simla Convention of 1913-14, when the Republic was ascendant in China, there was a vehement refusal to recognise any demarcation of boundaries between Tibet and China.

Strong-arm tactics against India

  • Having operated from a maximalist position to settle its borders with 12 of its 14 neighbours so far, China has attempted to use the same strong-arm tactics with both India and Bhutan.
  • It has offered to forgo its claims in the larger parts of North Bhutan in lieu of gaining a relatively smaller area in West Bhutan.
  • Threat to Siliguri corridor: This seeming magnanimity is calculated to expand into the Chumbi Valley in the South, threatening the narrow and strategic Siliguri corridor in India.
  • In its latest move, China has made a new claim on Sakteng sanctuary in Bhutan which may form a launchpad for future operations against Tawang in Arunachal Pradesh.
  • China has also strengthened its collusion with Pakistan.
  • There is a deliberate attempt by China to physically link with Pakistan in the Northern Areas by removing the Indian wedge of DBO, the doorway to the Karakoram Pass.
  • A Training Mobilisation Order (TMO) issued by Xi Jinping in January 2020 called for “confrontational training” for its troops and officers to assess their preparedness, especially in light of the new reforms undertaken by the PLA.
  • These factors seem to be the tactical beginnings of China’s grand strategy which also saw China flexing in the South China Sea and Taiwan, almost simultaneously.

China making use of lawfare and implications for India

  • The latest in the series of aggressive Chinese actions is the use of lawfare through the passing of the “Land Boundary Law”.
  • Formalises and legalises land Chinese grab: The law formalises and legalises China’s geographic creep towards Tawang, Arunachal Pradesh and parts of eastern Ladakh and creates conditions for using newly-constructed border villages close to the LAC for claiming sovereignty over disputed areas.
  • The import of the law is most critical for India but will affect China’s disputes with other countries too.
  • What China has done, therefore, is convert a territory dispute over borders into a sovereignty dispute which precludes any give or take of territory.
  • China will attempt to settle its Han population in the Tibetan regions, reversing established demographic patterns and at the same time.
  •  Future negotiations over territory, if they occur, will then refer to the Border Defence Cooperation Agreements of 2005 and 2012 which call for border settlements to be done keeping in mind the local population in the border regions.

Way forward

  • A deliberate thought process needs to be evolved to offset our disadvantages as purely military actions may not solve the situation in the long term.

Conclusion

What emerges clearly is that by adopting the Land Boundary Law, in conjunction with its physical actions on the LAC, China has consolidated its position in eastern Ladakh and kept possibilities open in Arunachal Pradesh.

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Foreign Policy Watch: India-China

China’s bridge over Pangong Tso

Note4Students

From UPSC perspective, the following things are important :

Prelims level: Pangong Tso

Mains level: LAC ambiguities

China is building a bridge across the Pangong Tso area connecting the North and South Banks which will significantly reduce the time for moving troops and equipment between the two sides.

About Pangong Tso

  • Pangong Tso or Pangong Lake is an endorheic lake in the Himalayas situated at a height of about 4,350 m.
  • It is 134 km long and extends from India to the Tibetan Autonomous Region, China.
  • Approximately 60% of the length of the lake lies within the Tibetan Autonomous Region.
  • The lake is 5 km wide at its broadest point. All together it covers 604 sq.km.
  • During winter the lake freezes completely, despite being saline water.
  • It is not a part of the Indus river basin area and is geographically a separate landlocked river basin.
  • Earlier, Pangong Tso had an outlet to Shyok River, a tributary of Indus River, but it was closed off due to natural damming.

Tactical significance of the lake

  • It lies in the path of the Chushul approach, one of the main approaches that China can use for an offensive into Indian Territory.
  • During the 1962 war, this was where China launched its main offensive — the Indian Army fought heroically at Rezang La under Maj. Shaitan Singh.
  • Not far away, to the north of the lake, is the Army’s Dhan Singh Thapa post, named after Major Dhan Singh Thapa who was awarded the country’s highest gallantry award, the Param Vir Chakra.
  • Major Thapa and his platoon were manning the Sirijap-1 outpost which was essential for the defense of the Chushul airfield.

Connectivity in the region

  • Over the years, the Chinese have built motorable roads along their banks of the Pangong Tso. This points to the importance accorded by the Chinese to the area.
  • Even during peacetime, the difference in perception over where the LAC lies on the northern bank of the lake makes this contested terrain.
  • In 1999, when the Army unit from the area was moved to Kargil for Operation Vijay, China took the opportunity to build 5 km of a road inside the Indian Territory along the lake’s bank.
  • From one of these roads, Chinese positions physically overlook Indian positions on the northern tip of the Pangong Tso Lake.

What is the importance of the bridge over Pangong Tso?

  • The bridge over Pangong Tso is located around 25 kms ahead of the LAC in Chinese territory and will significantly reduce the time for movement of Chinese army.
  • The Indian Army gained tactical advantage over the PLA on the south bank in end August 2020 by occupying several peaks lying vacant since 1962 gaining a dominating view.
  • This has prompted China to build deep alternate roads behind the friction points away from the line of sight.

How is India responding to developments on the ground?

  • The bridge is well within Chinese territory.
  • The implications of this new bridge will have to be factored in the Indian Army’s operational planning for the future.
  • On its part, over the last few years India has been focusing on infrastructure development in forward areas and improving connectivity to the forward areas.
  • Large-scale construction of roads, bridges and tunnels is underway all along the LAC.

 

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Foreign Policy Watch: India-China

China’s new Border Law and India

Note4Students

From UPSC perspective, the following things are important :

Prelims level: Not much

Mains level: LAC disputes

China’s new law on land borders has come into effect on January 1.

Key takeaways of the Border Law

China passed the law for the “protection and exploitation of the country’s land border areas”.

  • Sacrosanct nature of Borders: Under the law, “the sovereignty and territorial integrity of China are sacred and inviolable”.
  • Border defense: It mandates the state to take measures “to strengthen border defense, support economic and social development as well as opening-up in border areas.
  • Habitation near borders: It seeks to improve public services and infrastructure in such areas, encourage and support people’s life and work there.
  • Consultations with neighbors: The law asks the state to follow the principles of equality, mutual trust, and friendly consultation, handle land border related-affairs with neighboring countries.

Why did China bring it?

Several factors may have led to China’s move.

  • Aggressive actions: The new law is a tool the Chinese government will use if it wants, as its actions have been aggressive even before this law.
  • Maritime assertion: This law reflects Beijing’s renewed concerns over the security of its land border while it confronts a slew of unsettled disputes on its maritime front (in the South China Sea).
  • Land boundary issues: The confrontations on the Sino-Indian borders in recent years may have reminded Beijing about this law.
  • Fear of radicalization: Afghanistan under the Taliban may become a hotbed for terrorism and extremism that could spread to Xinjiang amongst Uyghurs.
  • One-China Policy: China officially (constitutionally) claims mainland China and Taiwan as part of their respective territories. It has similar assertions for Hong Kong.

Does it concern India?

  • No specific mention: Although the law is not meant specifically for India, it is bound to have some impact.
  • May hamper disengagement:  The date for the round meeting is still awaited, amid concerns that the Chinese delegation can use the new law to try to bolster their existing positions.
  • Possible misadventures: The new law provides for the construction of permanent infrastructure close to the border. This has been observed in Arunachal Pradesh.

What impact can it have on India-China relations?

  • Onus on China: The view is still divided. Much depends on China’s actions, regardless of the new law.
  • Unilateral action: The new law might be the latest attempt by China to unilaterally delineate and demarcate territorial boundaries with India and Bhutan.
  • Maintain status-quo: The new law will make China dig its heels in, on the ongoing standoff as well as for the resolution of the larger boundary issue.
  • Permanent demarcation of borders: There is also a possibility that Beijing appears to be signaling a determination to resolve the border disputes on its preferred terms.

Recent mis-adventures

  • China has been building “well-off” border defense villages across the LAC in all sectors, which the new law encourages.
  • President Xi visited a village in Tibet near the border with Arunachal Pradesh followed by renamings.
  • China has constructed a bridge in Eastern Ladakh connecting the North and South Banks of Pangong Tso.

Conclusion

  • The law only “states the obvious” as “every country is in the business of protecting its territorial integrity.
  • The big question is what your territory is, and there we don’t agree with each other.

 

[RSTV Archive] India-China Ties Post-Galwan

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Foreign Policy Watch: India-China

China issues ‘official’ names for 15 places in Arunachal Pradesh

Note4Students

From UPSC perspective, the following things are important :

Prelims level: McMahol Line, Shimla Convention

Mains level: India-China Border Issue

China’s Ministry of Civil Affairs has issued standardized names for 15 places in the Indian State of Arunachal Pradesh, to be used henceforth on official Chinese maps.

MEA clarification

  • The Ministry of External Affairs has dismissed the Chinese “invention”.
  • Arunachal Pradesh has always been, and will always be, an integral part of India, said MEA.

Why is China giving names to places that are in India?

  • China claims some 90,000 sq km of Arunachal Pradesh as its territory.
  • It calls the area “Zangnan” in the Chinese language and makes repeated references to “South Tibet”.
  • Chinese maps show Arunachal Pradesh as part of China, and sometimes parenthetically refer to it as “so-called Arunachal Pradesh”.
  • China makes periodic efforts to underline this unilateral claim to Indian territory.
  • Giving Chinese names to places in Arunachal Pradesh is part of that effort.

Earlier unilateral renamings

  • This is the second lot of “standardized” names of places in Arunachal Pradesh that China has announced.
  • Earlier in 2017, it had issued “official” Chinese names for six places spanning the breadth of Arunachal Pradesh

What is China’s argument for claiming these areas?

  • The PRC disputes the legal status of the McMahon Line, the official boundary under the ‘Convention Between Great Britain, China, and Tibet’ — of 1914 (Simla Convention).
  • China was represented at the Simla Convention by a plenipotentiary of the Republic of China, which had been declared in 1912 after the Qing dynasty was overthrown.
  • The present communist government came to power only in 1949, when the People’s Republic was proclaimed.
  • The Chinese representative did not consent to the Simla Convention, saying Tibet had no independent authority to enter into international agreements.

What is the McMohan Line?

  • The McMohan Line, named after Henry McMahon, the chief British negotiator at Shimla, was drawn from the eastern border of Bhutan to the Isu Razi pass on the China-Myanmar border.
  • China claims territory to the south of the McMahon Line, lying in Arunachal Pradesh.
  • China also bases its claims on the historical ties that have existed between the monasteries in Tawang and Lhasa.

Intention behind these renamings

  • This renaming is a part of the Chinese strategy to assert its territorial claims over Indian territory.
  • As part of this strategy, China routinely issues statements of outrage whenever an Indian dignitary visits Arunachal Pradesh.
  • Beijing keeps harping on its “consistent” and “clear” position that the Indian possession of Arunachal Pradesh.
  • These claims have been firmly established and recognized by the world, as “illegal”.

Arunachal not all-alone

  • Laying aggressive claims to territories on the basis of alleged historical injustices done to China is a part of Beijing’s foreign policy playbook.
  • The claim on Taiwan is one such example, as are the consistent efforts to change the “facts on the ground” in several disputed islands in the South China Sea.
  • The aggression is at all times backed in overt and covert ways by the use of China’s economic and military muscle.

Also read:

[RSTV Archive] India-China Ties Post-Galwan

 

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Foreign Policy Watch: India-China

The ‘diplomatic’ Olympic boycott

Note4Students

From UPSC perspective, the following things are important :

Prelims level: Not much

Mains level: US-China Rivalry

The US Government has decided not send any official representation to the Winter Olympic Games in Beijing announcing what is being called a “diplomatic boycott” of the games.

What is a ‘diplomatic boycott’?

  • A “diplomatic boycott” means no US official will be present at the Winter Olympics in Beijing.
  • This stops short of a complete boycott, which would have meant the non-participation by US athletes.
  • As such, the absence of official representation will not impact the games as much as an athletic boycott would have.

What led to the US boycott?

Ans. Uyghurs Genocide

  • The decision was taken because of China’s gross human rights abuses and atrocities in Xinjiang.
  • This is the latest clash adding to a long list of differences on trade, Taiwan, human rights and the South China Sea.
  • Xinjiang Uyghurs have been sent by Chinese authorities to “re-education” camps, a network of which were constructed beginning in 2016 to house thousands of detainees.
  • Beijing initially denied the existence of the camps, but subsequently claimed the centres were for “vocational training”.

Who else is ‘diplomatically boycotting’ the games?

  • So far, Australia, Canada, and New Zealand have also announced that their officials will not be present at the games.
  • None, however, has said their athletes will not attend, which means the games themselves are unlikely to be impacted.
  • It remains to be seen if the boycott will gain traction beyond US allies and partners.
  • Russian President Vladimir Putin will travel to Beijing for the opening of the Winter Olympics.
  • China has been garnering support from countries in Asia, Africa and Latin America.

How is China reacting to the boycott?

  • Beyond the statements decrying the “politicization” of sports, there is certainly a domestic political undercurrent to the games.
  • China’s media, meanwhile, has been largely playing down the reports of the boycotts, underlining how the authorities are going all-out to ensure the games are conducted without a hurdle.

What will be the impact on US-China relations?

  • Much recently, the US and Chinese Presidents committed to “responsibly” managing their growing competition amid increasing conflicts.
  • Both nations called common-sense guardrails to ensure that competition does not veer into conflict.
  • China emphasized the “need to treat each other as equals” and warned against “drawing ideological lines”, calling on the US “to meet its word of not seeking a ‘new Cold War’”.

 

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Foreign Policy Watch: India-China

Beijing’s aggressive regional policies and its implications

Note4Students

From UPSC perspective, the following things are important :

Prelims level: AUKUS

Mains level: Paper 2- Implications of China's aggressive policies for geopolitics

Context

One of the many consequences of China’s assertive posture in Asia has been the emergence of geopolitical coalitions to limit the prospects for Beijing’s regional dominance.

Two new coalitions forcing China rethink

  • Quad and AUKUS: Two new coalitions that have got a lot of political attention are the Quadrilateral framework involving Australia, India, Japan and the US, and the AUKUS, which brings together Australia, the United Kingdom and the United States.
  • Until recently, China was quite contemptuous of the new political formations.
  • It had compared the Quad to “seafoam” that is here now but gone in a second.
  • China’s dismissive attitude has now yielded place to denunciation.

US’s policy forcing China to rethink

  • Two big factors are behind China’s rethinking.
  • Consensus in the US on Challenging China: One was the surprising emergence of American domestic political consensus on challenging China.
  • Beijing believed that Donald Trump was an exception to the longstanding US policy of deeper economic integration with China and sustained political engagement. But Biden has simply reinforced Trump’s strategy.
  • US making alliances critical element of China policy: Trump thought that alliances are a burden on US taxpayers.
  •  Biden, in contrast, has made alliances a critical element of his China strategy.
  • The idea was to create “situations of strength” vis-a-vis China by rebuilding US alliances and developing new coalitions.
  • In Asia, the Biden administration moved quickly to strengthen the traditional security ties with its allies in northeast Asia — Japan and South Korea.
  • Elevating the Quad to leaders-level: It also elevated the Quad to the leaders-level within weeks after Biden took charge and had a physical summit in Washington six months later.
  • AUKUS: It also announced the AUKUS.
  • Biden travelled to Europe in June this year to revitalise the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation.
  • Summit with Russia: Biden also decided on an early summit with Russian President Vladimir Putin that took place in Geneva at the end of his European tour.
  • Rebalancing relations: Biden’s team believed that the greatest strength of the US was its wide network of allies and partners.
  • And that mobilising them was the key to rebalancing relations with China.

How China is making alliances and partnerships?

  • While China’s economic reach is now global and deep, political and military alliances have not been part of Beijing’s tradition.
  • Relations with Russia at peak: Beijing’s ties with Moscow have never been as close as they are.
  • Relations with N. Korea and Pakistan: China also has strong alliance-like relations with North Korea and Pakistan.
  • But there can be little comparison though between the kind of strengths that American allies bring to the table with those of China’s partners.

Is Asian geopolitical structure turning in China’s favour?

  • Beijing was betting on the proposition that the Asian geopolitical structure was turning, irretrievably, in China’s favour.
  • This is based on a number of propositions.
  • Location of the US: America, located far from Asia, will have trouble overcoming the tyranny of geography in a conflict with China.
  • The economic and military power of China: China’s hard power — both economic and military — relative to the US is growing rapidly and shifting the local balance of power in its favour.
  • Location of China: The proximity of China and Asian regional integration have made Beijing the most important economic partner for the whole region.
  • Beijing believed that few Asian nations would want to spoil their commercial relations with China and align with Washington.
  • Power imbalance: The vast imbalance in military power between Beijing and its neighbours it presumed would dissuade most Asian states from considering armed confrontations with China
  • Breaking up coalition: China counted on the fact that it is easier to break up coalitions than build them.

Implications of China’s aggressive policies

  • Making the US unfriendly prematurely: Chinese policies have driven the US towards an unanticipated internal consensus on containing Beijing.
  • Making a friendly America into an enemy prematurely could go down as one of Xi Jinping’s egregious strategic errors.
  • Driving regional countries towards the US: China’s aggressive regional policies are driving many countries like Australia, India, Japan, the Philippines and Vietnam, towards the US.
  • Neighbouring countries pursuing stronger national military capacities: While the military balance of power in Asia has certainly turned in China’s favour, it has not cowed down its neighbours.
  • Many are pursuing stronger national military capabilities to limit some of the threats from China.
  • Stoked nationalism: China, which never stops to emphasise its own nationalism, appears to have underestimated the depth of similar sentiment in other Asian states.
  • Today, it is driving many of China’s neighbours into the US camp.
  • It is America and not China that today talks about the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Asian nations.

Consider the question “One of the many consequences of China’s assertive posture in Asia has been the emergence of geopolitical coalitions to limit Beijing’s regional dominance. Critically analyse.”

Conclusion

It has been quite fashionable in the West as well as in the East, to proclaim that China’s hegemony is inevitable, American decline is terminal, and Asian coalitions are unsustainable. Those conclusions are premature at best. For Xi Jinping has squandered many of China’s natural geopolitical advantages.

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Foreign Policy Watch: India-China

China’s missile tests could have Sputnik-like effect

Note4Students

From UPSC perspective, the following things are important :

Prelims level: HGV missile

Mains level: Paper 2- HGV test by China and its implications

Context

On October 27 Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff of the US, reacted to China testing its nuclear-capable hypersonic weapons system by drawing an analogy with a Sputnik moment.

How US’s Ballistic Missile Defence led to the recent Sputnik moment

  •  Since the US withdrawal from the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) treaty in 2002, both Russia and China have been wary of Washington’s Ballistic Missile Defence (BMD) programme.
  • It undermines strategic stability: Missile defence is inherently destabilising — it undermines “strategic stability”.
  • A robust BMD would compromise the second strike capability of the adversary by neutralising the surviving incoming missiles in case of a near-decapitating first strike
  • Both Russia and China thus view the US BMD as undermining their deterrence and have sought ways to restore their retaliatory strike capability by investing in new technologies such as Hypersonic Glide Vehicles (HGVs).
  • HGVs can escape the missile defence systems.
  • HGVs fly at lower altitudes than ballistic missiles, which means they could potentially escape early warning systems, aided by the earth’s curvature.

Implications of Chinese test

  • It can set off competition: The Chinese tests have the potential to set off an aggressive competition among the nuclear powers to modernise their nuclear arsenals and add new, potentially destabilising capabilities to their arsenal.
  • Global and regional arms race: In the present era of minimal arms control measures, the Chinese hypersonic missile system test will trigger an intense arms race both at the global and regional levels.
  • With the Chinese test, the US may be forced to expand its hypersonic programme and further modernise its missile defence systems.

What should be the course of action for India

  • China’s nuclear-tipped hypersonic weapon systems, though not particularly India-focused, could nudge New Delhi to adopt two courses of action.
  • Missile program: First, accelerate its hypersonic missiles programme.
  • Develop missile defence system: Second, consider erecting an equally robust missile defence.
  • Chinese advancement in stealth technologies will drive New Delhi to seek similar capabilities but also develop effective countermeasures.
  • This can then set off a regional arms race, a sign that is not particularly encouraging for regional peace.

Consider the question “Examine the implications of recent hypersonic missile test by China for the region and global arms race control efforts? What should be the course of action for India? “

Conclusion

China’s hypersonic missile test may not have come with a Sputnik-like surprise, but it has the potential to set off a post-Sputnik-like arms race that does not augur well for the strategic stability both at the global and regional level.

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Back2Basics: Hypersonic Glide Vehicles (HGVs)

  • A hypersonic missile is a vehicle that achieves a speed five times faster than the speed of sound, crossing Mach 5.
  • These missiles travel at a speed of around 6,115 km per hour, with a combination of technology and manoeuvrability of ballistic missiles and cruise missiles.

Fractional Orbital Bombardment System (FOBS)

  • A Fractional Orbital Bombardment System is a warhead delivery system that uses a low earth orbit towards its target destination.
  • Just before reaching the target, it deorbits through a retrograde engine burn.

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Foreign Policy Watch: India-China

China’s new land border law and Indian concerns

Note4Students

From UPSC perspective, the following things are important :

Prelims level: Not much

Mains level: China's territorial expansionism

China has recently passed a new land law for the “protection and exploitation of the country’s land border areas”.

Land Border Law: Key Takeaways

  • The law states that the sovereignty and territorial integrity of China are sacred and inviolable.
  • It asks the state to take measures to safeguard territorial integrity and land boundaries and guard against and combat any act that undermines these.
  • The state can take measures to strengthen border defence, support economic and social development as well as opening-up in border areas.
  • It seeks to improve public services and infrastructure in such areas, encourage and support people’s life and work there.

Other features

  • In effect, this suggests a push to settle civilians in the border areas.
  • The law also asks the state to follow the principles of equality, mutual trust, and friendly consultation, handle land border related-affairs with neighbouring countries.

China’s land borders

  • China shares its 22,457-km land boundary with 14 countries including India, the third-longest after the borders with Mongolia and Russia.
  • Unlike the Indian border, however, China’s borders with these two countries are not disputed.
  • The only other country with which China has disputed land borders is Bhutan (477 km).

Why is it significant for India?

  • China claims up to 90,000 square kilometres in Arunachal Pradesh in the eastern sector.
  • It has illegally occupied 38,000 square kilometres of Aksai Chin in the western sector of Jammu and Kashmir.
  • While recent tensions in the western sector have been centred on Ladakh, both sides have lately clashed in Uttarakhand as well.

A signal to India

  • The law is not meant specifically for the border with India.
  • However, this could create hurdles in the resolution of the 17-month-long military standoff at LAC.
  • There is also a clear distinction that PLA will do border management but it will make negotiations a little more difficult.

 

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Foreign Policy Watch: India-China

A ‘bubbles of trust’ approach to globalisation

Note4Students

From UPSC perspective, the following things are important :

Prelims level: Emerging Technology Working Group

Mains level: Paper 2- Bubble of trust approach to globalisation

Context

An asymmetric globalisation favouring China allowed Beijing to attain power. It is now using that power to undermine liberal democratic values around the world.

What is Globalization?

Globalization is a process of increasing interdependence, interconnectedness and integration of economies and societies to such an extent that an event in one part of the globe affects people in other parts of the world.

OR

 Globalization is a process of interaction and integration among the people, organizations, and governments of different nations, a process driven by international trade and investment and aided by information technology.

Asymmetric globalisation

  • The Chinese market was never open to foreign companies in the way foreign markets are to Chinese firms.
  • This is particularly true in the information and communications technology sector: foreign media, technology and software companies have always been walled out of Chinese markets.
  • Meanwhile, Chinese firms rode on the globalisation bandwagon to secure significant market shares in open economies.

Global retreat from globalisation and role of Quad

  • We are currently witnessing a global retreat from the free movement of goods, services, capital, people and ideas.
  • But this should not be understood as a reaction to globalisation itself, but of its skewed pattern over the past four decades.
  • The Quad countries – Japan, India, Australia and the U.S. – have an opportunity to change tack and stop seeing engagement with China through the misleading prism of free trade and globalisation.
  • It will be to their advantage to create a new form of economic cooperation consistent with their geopolitical interests.
  • Indeed, without an economic programme, the Quad’s geopolitical and security agenda stand on tenuous foundations.

Economies inside bubbles of trust

  • Policies of self-reliance: The popular backlash against China – exacerbated by the economic disruption of the pandemic – is pushing Quad governments towards policies of self-reliance.
  • But while reorienting and de-risking global supply chains is one thing, pursuing technological sovereignty is inherently self-defeating.
  • Worse still, inward-looking policies often acquire a life of their own and contribute to geopolitical marginalisation.
  • There is a better way.
  • A convergence of values and geopolitical interests means Quad countries are uniquely placed to envelop their economies inside bubbles of trust, starting with the technology sector.
  • The idea of ‘bubbles of trust’ offers a cautious middle path between the extremes of technological sovereignty and laissez-faire globalisation.
  •  Unlike trading blocs, which tend to be insular and exclusive, bubbles tend to expand organically, attracting new partners that share values, interests and economic complementarities.
  • Such expansion will be necessary, as the Quad cannot fulfil its strategic ambitions merely by holding a defensive line against authoritarian power.

Way forward

  • The U.S. is a global leader in intellectual property, Japan in high-value manufacturing, Australia in advanced niches such as quantum computing and cyber security, and India in human capital.
  • This configuration of values, interests and complementary capabilities offers unrivalled opportunities.
  • The Quad’s Critical and Emerging Technology Working Group, announced in March 2021, is well placed to develop the necessary ‘bubbles of trust’ framework, which could be adopted at the next Quad summit.
  • To be successful the Working Group must seek to strengthen geopolitical convergences, increase faith in each member state’s judicial systems, deepen economic ties and boost trust in one another’s citizens.
  • There are fundamental differences between authoritarian and liberal-democratic approaches to the information age.
  • The Quad cannot allow differences of approach on privacy, data governance, platform competition and the digital economy to widen.

Conclusion

This agenda cannot be about substituting China. Rather, the approach would allow Quad countries to manage their dependencies on China while simultaneously developing a new vision for the global economy.

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Foreign Policy Watch: India-China

Bhutan-China Border Agreement

Note4Students

From UPSC perspective, the following things are important :

Prelims level: Not much

Mains level: Bhutan-China Border Agreement

In a step towards resolving their boundary disputes, Bhutan and China signed an agreement on a three-Step roadmap to help speed up talks to “break the deadlock” in negotiations.

Bhutan-China Border Issues

Bhutan shares an over 400-km-long border with China.

  • Doklam: China wants to exchange the valleys to the north of Bhutan with the pasture land to the west (including Doklam), totalling 269 square kilometres.
  • Jakarlung and Pasamlung valleys: located near Tibet to Bhutan’s North, which measure 495 sq. kms.
  • Sakteng Wildlife Sanctuary Project: China claims this area (near to Arunachal Pradesh) in eastern Bhutan as its own.

What is the recent agreement?

  • The roadmap “for Expediting the Bhutan-China Boundary Negotiations”, is expected to progress on the boundary talks process that has been delayed for five years.
  • It was stalled due to the Doklam standoff in 2017, and then by the Covid Pandemic.
  • Although China and Bhutan do not have official diplomatic relations they have engaged in 24 rounds of ministerial-level talks to resolve their border dispute.

Implications for India

The boundary issue between China and Bhutan is special because it not only relates to Bhutan but also has become a negative factor for China-India ties.

  • China control much of the Doklam: Since the 2017 stand-off with India, Beijing has already strengthened its de facto control over much of the Doklam plateau, located strategically along the India-China-Bhutan trijunction.
  • Bhutan supports it: This agreement has been equally endorsed and appreciated by Bhutan and China.
  • Deadlock at LAC talks: Its timing is particularly significant New, given India-China border talks on their 17-month-old standoff at the Line of Actual Control appear to have hit an deadlock.
  • India’s strategic risks: This has big implications for India, since the Doklam swap would have given China access to the strategically sensitive “chicken neck” of the Siliguri corridor.

India’s interest

(a) Doklam

  • The Doklam plateau remains hugely critical for India due to the Siliguri Corridor that lies to the south of Doklam.
  • The corridor, also known as the ‘Chicken’s Neck’, is a 22-km wide major arterial road connecting mainland India with its northeastern states and thus it is a highly sensitive area for China.

(b) Sakteng: the hotspot

  • The Sakteng sanctuary adjoins West Kameng district and Tawang disticts in India’s Arunachal Pradesh state.
  • Its strategic value lies in its proximity to Arunachal Pradesh, where China claims around 90,000 sq km of Indian territory.
  • Tawang, the major bone of contention between India and China in the eastern sector of their border dispute, lies to the northeast of the Sakteng.

Conclusion

  • Bhutan has to balance its ties with India as well as China.
  • We need to explore channels that India can activate with Bhutan when it comes to the highly sensitive matter of settling the boundary dispute between them and China.

 

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Foreign Policy Watch: India-China

Explained: Patrolling Points along LAC

Note4Students

From UPSC perspective, the following things are important :

Prelims level: Patrolling Points along LAC

Mains level: LAC issues

The standoffs between Indian and Chinese troops in Ladakh on the Line of Actual Control (LAC), where initial steps towards disengagement have taken place, are around a number of patrolling points or PPs in Galwan, Hot Springs and Gogra areas.

What exactly are Patrolling Points?

  • PPs are patrolling points identified and marked on the LAC, which are patrolled with a stipulated frequency by the security forces.
  • They serve as a guide to the location of the LAC for the soldiers, acting as indicators of the extent of ‘actual control’ exercised on the territory by India.
  • By regularly patrolling up to these PPs, the Indian side is able to establish and assert its physical claim about the LAC.

Are all the Patrolling Points numbered?

  • Some of the PPs are prominent and identifiable geographical features, such as a pass, or a nala junction where no numerals are given.
  • Only those PPs, where there are no prominent features, are numbered as in the case of PP14 in Galwan Valley.

Are all on the Patrolling Points bang on the LAC?

  • Mostly, yes. Except for the Depsang plains in northern Ladakh, where PP10, PP11, PP11A, PP12 and PP13 – from Raki Nala to Jivan Nala – do not fall on the LAC.
  • These are short of the LAC, on the Indian side.

Are these Patrolling Points not manned?

  • The PPs are not posts and thus not manned.
  • Unlike on the Line of Control (LoC) with Pakistan, the border with China is not physically held by the Army all along.
  • They are just physical markers on the ground, chosen for their location and have no defensive potential or tactical importance for the Army.

If the Patrolling Points are not manned, how is the claim actually asserted?

  • The claim is asserted by the Army or joint Army-ITBP patrols as they show more visible presence in these areas.
  • This is done by physically visiting PPs with a higher frequency, as the deployment has moved closer to the LAC and due to improved infrastructure.
  • As the Chinese may not see when the Indian patrols visit these PPs, they will leave come cigarette packets or food tins with Indian markings behind.
  • That lets the Chinese know that Indian soldiers had visited the place, which indicates that India was in control of these areas.

Who has given these Patrolling Points?

  • These PPs have been identified by the high-powered China Study Group, starting from 1975 when patrolling limits for Indian forces were specified.
  • It is based on the LAC, after the government accepted the concept in 1993, which is also marked on the maps with the Army in the border areas.
  • But the frequency of patrolling to PPs is not specified by the CSG – it is finalised by the Army Headquarters in New Delhi, based on the recommendations made by the Army and ITBP.

What is this frequency?

  • The frequency of reaching various PPs are given in the annual patrolling programme.
  • Based on the terrain, the ground situation and the location of the LAC, the duration for visiting each PP is specified – it can vary from once a month to twice a year.

Major friction area: Hot Springs

  • Hot Springs lies in the Chang Chenmo River valley, close to Kongka La, a pass that marks the Line of Actual Control.
  • India’s Patrolling Point 15, it is not a launchpad for any offensive action though the area did see action before and during the 1962 war.
  • China’s unwillingness to pull back its platoon-sized unit from Hot Springs is a sign of the difficulties that lie in normalising the situation.
  • The PLA has traditionally had a major base east of Kongka La.
  • The pass also marks the border between two of China’s most sensitive provinces — Xinjiang to the north and Tibet to the south.

 

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Foreign Policy Watch: India-China

A ‘Taiwan flashpoint’ in the Indo-Pacific

Note4Students

From UPSC perspective, the following things are important :

Prelims level: Not much

Mains level: Paper 2- Taiwan issue and implications for the Indo-Pacific region

Context

If the rising confrontation between the United States and China erupts into a clash of arms, the likely arena may well be the Taiwan Strait.

Historical background of the Taiwan issue

  • The Guomindang (KMT) forces under Chiang Kai-shek lost the 1945-49 civil war to the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) in 1949. forces under Mao Zedong.
  • Chiang retreated to the island of Taiwan and set up a regime that claimed authority over the whole of China and pledged to recover the mainland eventually.
  • The CCP in turn pledged to reclaim what it regarded as a “renegade” province and achieve the final reunification of China.
  • Role of the U.S.: Taiwan could not be occupied militarily by the newly established People’s Republic of China (PRC) as it became a military ally of the United States during the Korean War of 1950-53.
  • This phase came to an end with the U.S. recognising the PRC as the legitimate government of China in 1979, ending its official relationship with Taiwan and abrogating its mutual defence treaty with the island.
  • Strategic ambiguity policy of the US: Nevertheless, the U.S. has declared that it will “maintain the ability to come to Taiwan’s defence” while not committing itself to do so.
  • This is the policy of “strategic ambiguity”.
  • The PRC has pursued a typical carrot and stick policy to achieve the reunification of Taiwan with the mainland.
  • It has held out the prospect, indeed preference for peaceful reunification, through promising a high degree of autonomy to the island under the “one country two systems”.
  • The “one country two systems” formula first applied to Hong Kong after its reversion to Chinese sovereignty in 1997.

China-Taiwan economic links

  • Taiwan business entities have invested heavily in mainland China and the two economies have become increasingly integrated.
  • Between 1991 and 2020, the stock of Taiwanese capital invested in China reached U.S. $188.5 billion and bilateral trade in 2019 was U.S. $150 billion, about 15% of Taiwan’s GDP.
  • By the same token, China is capable of inflicting acute economic pain on Taiwan through coercive policies if the island is seen to drift towards an independent status.

Prospects for peaceful reunification

  • Taiwan has two major political parties.
  • The KMT, dominated by the descendants of the mainlanders remains committed to a one-China policy.
  • The Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), on the other hand, is more representative of the indigenous population of the island, and favours independence.
  • Faced with aggressive threats from China and lack of international support, the demand for independence has been muted.
  • Ever since the DPP under Tsai Ing-wen won the presidential elections in 2016, China has resorted to a series of hostile actions against the island, which include economic pressures and military threats.
  • One important implication of this development is that prospects for peaceful unification have diminished.
  • Sentiment in Taiwan in favour of independent status has increased.

Role of the US

  • While the U.S. does not support a declaration of independence by Taiwan, it has gradually reversed the policy of avoiding official-level engagements with the Taiwan government
  • The first breach occurred during the Donald Trump presidency.
  • The Joe Biden officials have continued this policy.
  • The Taiwanese representative in Washington was invited to attend the presidential inauguration ceremony (Biden), again a first since 1979.
  • Reports have now emerged that U.S. defence personnel have been, unannounced, training with their Taiwanese counterparts for sometime.

Implications for Quad and India

  • The recent crystallisation of the Quad, of which India is a part, and the announcement of the AUKUS, with Australia being graduated to a power with nuclear-powered submarines, may act as a deterrent against Chinese moves on Taiwan.
  • But they may equally propel China to advance the unification agenda before the balance changes against it in the Indo-Pacific.
  • For these reasons, Taiwan is emerging as a potential trigger point for a clash of arms between the U.S. and China.

Consider the question “What are the implications of Taiwan issue and the US involvement in it for India?”

Conclusion

In pursuing its Indo-Pacific strategy, India would do well to keep these possible scenarios in mind.

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Foreign Policy Watch: India-China

A strategy for India in a world that is adrift

Note4Students

From UPSC perspective, the following things are important :

Prelims level: Not much

Mains level: Distortions in the Global Order

This article discusses new situations prompted by the tectonic shifts in India’s internal and external environment to take another look at India’s path to power in a world between orders.

New global order: No Order

  • Multipolarity: The world is today adrift. We are neither in a bipolar Cold War nor in a multipolar world, though perhaps tending towards a world of several power centres.
  • Lack of cohesion: The lack of a coherent international response to the COVID-19 pandemic is proof of an absence of international order and of the ineffectiveness of multilateral institutions.
  • Climate ignorance: So is the ineffective international response to climate change and other transnational threats.

What are the major shifts in global order?

  • Secular stagnation
  • Retreat from globalisation
  • Regionalisation of trade
  • Shifting balance of power
  • Rise of China and others
  • Structural China-United States strategic rivalry

All above factors have shifted the geopolitical and economic centres of gravity from the Atlantic to Asia.

Major Concerns

  • Chauvinism: Inequality between and within states has bred a narrow nationalism and parochialism.
  • Existential threats: We are entering a new polarised information age, and face ecological crises of the Anthropocene, making climate change an existential threat.

Asia as the nucleus: With focus on China

  • Shift of focus by the US: Over the next decade we expect Asia to remain the cockpit of geopolitical rivalries, and that the US remains the most formidable power, though its relative power is declining.
  • China at the centre: China sees a window of opportunity but acts in a hurry, suggesting that she believes that window may close or is already closing due to push back from the West and others.

China’s expansionism

  • China’s crowded geography constrains her both on land and at sea.
  • Hence it expects her profile and power to continue expanding, particularly in our periphery.
  • The result is likely continued friction, some cooperation, and quasi-adversarial relations between India and China, which others will take advantage of.
  • Overall, we do not expect conventional conflict between the great powers in Asia, though other forms and levels of violence and contention in the international system will rise, with Taiwan a special case.

Opportunities in disguise for India

  • The uncertainty and changing geopolitical environment clearly pose considerable challenges to Indian policy.
  • However, it also throws up certain opportunities, enhancing our strategic options and diplomatic space, if we adjust policies internally and externally, particularly in the subcontinent.

How can India reap the benefits?

  • Enhancing ties with the US: Increasing security congruence with the US could enable growing cooperation in fields significant for India’s transformation: energy, trade, investment, education and health.
  • Climate cooperation: Other areas in which India and the U.S. could increase cooperation are: climate change and energy, tech solutions for renewable energy, and on digital cooperation.
  • Neighbourhood first: Several middle powers like Sri Lanka, Bangladesh, Indonesia in the neighbourhood are now India’s natural partners.
  • Digital space: This time of transition between orders is also when new standards and norms are being developed, particularly in the digital space. India can and must be present at the creation.
  • Maritime cooperation: At sea, the balance is today more favourable to us than before, possibly more so than on the continent. India must bat for the creation of a Maritime Commission in IOR.

Bottlenecks in India’s neighbourhood policy

  • Over securitisation of policy: towards our neighbours has driven trade underground, criminalised our borders.
  • Conducive environment for entry of China: This has enabled the large-scale entry of Chinese goods destroying local industry in the northeast.
  • Lack of self-strengthening: While lessening dependence on China, and seeking external balancing, our primary effort has to concentrate on self-strengthening.
  • Lack of socio-political enterprise: If there is one country which in terms of its size, population, economic potential, scientific and technological capabilities can match or even surpass China, it is India.

Way forward for India

(A) Bringing multipolarity in Asia.

  • The way forward should be based on the core strategic principles in Non-Alignment 2.0 which are still relevant: independent judgement, developing our capacities, and creating an equitable and enabling international order for India’s transformation.
  • Today’s situation makes India’s strategic autonomy all the more essential.

(B) Making an issue-based coalition

  • India must adjust to changing circumstances. We have no choice but to engage with this uncertain and more volatile world.
  • One productive way to do so would be through issue-based coalitions including different actors, depending on who has an interest and capability.

(C) Reviving SAARC

  • India must craft and reinvigorate regional institutions and processes in the neighbourhood, reviving the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) for instance.
  • India could be the primary source of both prosperity and security in the neighbourhood — the subcontinent and the Indian Ocean Region.

Conclusion

  • Economic policy must match political and strategic engagement.
  • Globalisation has been central to India’s growth.
  • A more active regional and international role for India is incompatible with a position on the margins of the global economy.
  • Self-reliance in today’s world and technologies can only be realised as part of the global economy.
  • We should not imitate China’s claims to being a civilisational state and its adoption of victimhood.
  • Instead, we should affirm our own strength and historic national identity.

 

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Foreign Policy Watch: India-China

Hardly the India-China century

Note4Students

From UPSC perspective, the following things are important :

Prelims level: New Development Bank

Mains level: Paper 2- India-China relations

Context

Deng Xiaoping had told then-Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi in 1988 that the 21st century would be “India and China’s century”, the current Chinese leadership has no patience for such pablum. They believe — indeed believe they know — that it is destined to be China’s century alone.

The policy of side-stepping contentious issues and encouraging bilateral economic relations

  • There have always been political tensions, both over each country’s territorial claims over land controlled by the other, and China’s alliance with Pakistan, and India’s hospitality to the Dalai Lama.
  • But neither country had allowed these tensions to overwhelm them:
  • China had declared that the border dispute could be left to “future generations” to resolve.
  • India had endorsed the “One China” policy, refusing to support Tibetan secessionism while limiting official reverence for the Dalai Lama to his status as a spiritual leader.
  • India actions and statements have usually been designed not to provoke, but to relegate the border problem to the back burner while enabling trade relations with China (now worth close to $100 billion) to flourish.
  • India made it clear that it was unwilling to join in any United States-led “containment” of China.
  • From negligible levels till 1991, trade with China had grown to become one of India’s largest trading relationships. 
  • India engages with China diplomatically in the BRICS  as well as conducting annual summits of RIC (Russia-India-China).
  • India is an enthusiastic partner in the Chinese-led Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank and the New Development Bank (NDB).
  • However, it has become increasingly apparent that the policy of side-stepping contentious issues and encouraging bilateral economic relations has played into Chinese hands.

Chinese strategy in Galwan

  • In the Galwan clash, the Chinese troops seem to have been engaged in a tactical move to advance their positions along areas of the LAC that it covets, in order to threaten Indian positions and interdict patrols.
  • They are threatening India’s construction of roads, bridges and similar infrastructure on undisputed Indian territory, a belated effort to mirror similar Chinese efforts near the LAC in Tibet.
  • They have established a fixed presence in these areas well beyond China’s own ‘Claim Line’.
  • The objective seems to be to extend Chinese troop presence to the intersection of the Galwan river and the Shyok river, which would make the Galwan Valley off bounds to India.
  • The Chinese have constructed permanent structures in the area of their intrusion and issued statements claiming that sovereignty over the Galwan valley has “always belonged” to China.
  • Consolidation of LOC: China’s strategy seems to be to consolidate the LAC where it wants it, so that an eventual border settlement — that takes these new realities into account — will be in its favour.
  • Implications for India:  In the meantime, border incidents keep the Indians off-balance and demonstrate to the world that India is not capable of challenging China, let alone offering security to other nations.

India’s options

  • India has reinforced its military assets on the LAC to prevent deeper incursions for now.
  • And hopes to press the Chinese to restore the status quo ante through either diplomatic or military means.
  • Chinese and Indian officials are currently engaged in diplomatic and military-to-military dialogue to ease tensions, but de-escalation has been stalled for months.
  • Economic options: India has responded with largely symbolic acts of economic retaliation.
  • India has also reimposed tighter limits on Chinese investment in projects such as railways, motorways, public-sector construction projects, and telecoms.

Limits to India’s economic retaliation

  • India is far too dependent on China for vital imports — such as pharmaceuticals, and even the active ingredients to make them, automotive parts and microchips that many fear it will harm India if it acted too strongly against China.
  • Imports from China have become indispensable for India’s exports to the rest of the world.
  • Various manufacturing inputs, industrial equipment and components, and even some technological know-how come from China; eliminating them could have a seriously negative effect on India’s economic growth.
  • And there are limits to the effectiveness of any Indian retaliation: trade with China may seem substantial from an Indian perspective, but it only represents 3% of China’s exports.
  • Drastically reducing it would not be enough to deter Beijing or cause it to change its behaviour.

Consider the question “State of India-China relationship hardly indicate the 21st Century being the “India and China’s century”. In light of this, examine the factors responsible for this and suggest the way forward for India.”

Conclusion

This range of considerations seems to leave only two strategic options. Playing second fiddle to an assertive China or aligning itself with a broader international coalition against Chinese ambitions. Since the first is indigestible for any democracy, is China de facto pushing India into doing something it has always resisted — allying with the West?

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Foreign Policy Watch: India-China

Understanding the anxieties behind Chinese aggression towards India

Note4Students

From UPSC perspective, the following things are important :

Prelims level: Quad

Mains level: Paper 2- India-China relations

Context

Chinese President Xi Jinping made a surprise visit to Tibet on July 21, signalling the seriousness with which China continues to take its Himalayan border dispute with India.

Understanding China’s strategic challenges and intensions

  • Demonstration of political confidence through aggression: More than a year after the clash at Galwan Valley, efforts to resolve the border crisis continue to move slowly.
  • The Chinese side has previously failed to complete troop withdrawals and revert to the status quo that the Indian side believed China agreed to.
  • China’s behaviour has been calculated to demonstrate political confidence.
  • Worsening strategic environment for China: Seen from Beijing, the strategic environment for China is beginning to worsen in South and Central Asia.
  • As the US withdraws and the Taliban advances in Afghanistan, China fears the prospect of instability and an emerging haven for terrorism directed against its policies in Xinjiang.
  • Even as China seeks to scale back the debt-laden BRI, such instability may also result in Beijing increasing its already overstretched external commitments — particularly in the security domain.
  • Re-emergence of Quad: China is deeply worried by the re-emergence and strengthening of multilateral opposition to China, and the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (or “Quad”) between the US, Japan, Australia and India.
  • For China, this represents a persistent threat not only economically and in foreign policy, but also militarily along its maritime periphery in the South and East China Seas, as well as the Taiwan Strait.
  • As US multilateral cooperation with its partners has increased, Beijing has come to increasingly see itself as beset by threats on all sides.

China’s 2 possible responses to strategic challenges and its implications for India

  • 1) Wolf warrier diplomacy: So far, the response from China’s new class of “wolf warrior” diplomats to this emerging strategic challenge has been to only grow more assertive in rhetoric and behaviour.
  • China’s domestic politics: Response of wolf warrior diplomats may seem perplexing, given that it has served only to alienate other countries and isolate China further.
  •  China’s domestic politics in the lead up to the 20th Congress will mean that its leaders, diplomats and generals will be displaying maximum nationalistic fervour.
  • Implications for India: This may well mean China taking political and policy decisions, which in a normal season they would not because doing so could compromise Beijing’s longstanding diplomatic and strategic goals, including in dealings with India.
  • 2) Moderate approach to improve strategic position: But if instead of aggressive posture, China decided that it was better domestic politics to improve China’s strategic position in Asia amid its competition with Washington, Beijing’s diplomats may yet adopt a more moderate approach, including with India.
  • Implications for India: If stability can be restored to the China-India strategic relationship, this could provide a window for Asia’s two mega-economies to reopen their markets to each other.

Conclusion

Indeed, the choice China makes between these two alternatives will have implications for India and the rest of the world in their dealing with China.


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Foreign Policy Watch: India-China

Why does China consistently beat India on soft power?

Note4Students

From UPSC perspective, the following things are important :

Prelims level: Not much

Mains level: Paper 2- Soft-power comparison with China

The article compares India with China in terms of soft-power both countries exert based on the measures produced by Lowy Institute in Australia.

What is soft power?

  • Joseph Nye, who gave us the notion of soft power, suggests that it consists of foreign policy, cultural and political influence.
  • Foreign policy influence comes from the legitimacy and morality of one’s dealings with other countries.
  • Cultural influence is based on others’ respect for one’s culture.
  • Political influence is how much others are inspired by one’s political values.
  • Soft power is difficult to measure.

The Lowy Institute in Australia has produced various measures which correspond roughly to foreign policy influence, cultural influence and political influence.

1) India’s foreign policy influence

  • In diplomatic influence, overall, India ranks sixth and China ranks first among 25 Asian powers.
  • On networks, India nearly matches China in the number of regional embassies it has but is considerably behind in the number of embassies worldwide (176 to 126).
  • Multilaterally, India matches China in terms of regional memberships, but, crucially, its contributions to the UN capital budget are completely dwarfed by Chinese contributions (11.7 per cent to 0.8 per cent of the total).
  • In surveys of foreign policy leadership, ambition, and effectiveness, China ranks first or fourth on four measures while India ranks between fourth and sixth in Asia.

2) Cultural influence

  • Lowy’s overall measure of cultural influence ranks India in fourth place and China in second place in Asia.
  •  Cultural influence is then divided into three elements, of which “cultural projection” and “information flows” are the most important.
  • In cultural projection, India scores better on Google searches abroad of its newspapers and its television/radio broadcasts.
  • India also exports more of its “cultural services” defined as “services aimed at satisfying cultural interests or needs”.
  • China does better on several other indicators.
  • For instance, India has only nine brands in the list of the top 500 global brands whereas China lists 73.
  • On the number of UNESCO World Heritage sites, India has 37 while China has 53.
  • Respect for the Indian passport also lags.
  • Chinese citizens can travel visa-free to 74 countries while Indians can only do so to 60.
  • In terms of information flows, in 2016–17, India hosted a mere 24,000 Asian students in tertiary education institutions whereas China hosted 2,25,000.
  • On total tourist arrivals from all over the world, India received 17 million, while China received 63 million.

3) Political influence

  • In 2017 the two were not ranked that far apart in political influence.
  • The governance effectiveness index shows India scoring in the top 43 per cent countries worldwide and ranked 12th and China scoring in the top 32 per cent and ranked 10th.
  • On “political stability and absence of violence/terrorism”, India ranked 21st, and China ranked 15th.

Consider the question “What do you understand by the term soft-power? How would you assess India’s soft-power potential in terms of various parameters?”

Conclusion

Soft-power theorists suggest that the ability to persuade rests on the power of attraction. We in India may think we are more attractive than China. The numbers show otherwise.

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Foreign Policy Watch: India-China

NATO and China

Note4Students

From UPSC perspective, the following things are important :

Prelims level: NATO

Mains level: Rise of China in the global agenda

In a communiqué issued following the June 14 summit of its member-states in Brussels, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), for the first time, explicitly described China as a security risk.

Try answering this question:

Q.NATO has been an ideal vehicle for power-projection around the world by the US. Critically comment.

China as a global threat

  • China has never figured in NATO summit declarations before, except for a minor reference in 2019 to the “opportunities and challenges” it presented.
  • But China’s stated ambitions and assertive behaviour present systemic challenges to the rules-based international order and to areas relevant to NATO security.
  • China has reacted sharply. It has urged NATO to view China’s development rationally, stop exaggerating various forms of China threat theory.
  • The other two threats identified by the NATO communiqué are on predictable lines: Russia and terrorism.

Focus over two nations

  • There is a significant difference, however, between a strategic focus on countering Russia and casting China as a “systemic challenge”.
  • This goes back to NATO’s founding mandate and subsequent history.

What is NATO, btw?

  • NATO, the planet’s largest — and largest-ever — military alliance, was formed in 1949 by 12 Allied powers to counter the massive Soviet armies stationed in Eastern and Central Europe after Second World War.
  • According to Paul-Henri Spaak, the second Secretary-General of NATO, it was, ironically enough, Joseph Stalin who is the true father of NATO.
  • It was Stalin’s overreach — especially with the Berlin blockade of 1948-49 and the orchestrated coup in Czechoslovakia in 1948 — that convinced a diverse set of war-ravaged European nations to come together under an American security blanket.
  • The collective defence principle enshrined in NATO’s Article V states that “an attack against one ally is considered as an attack against all allies”.
  • The formation of NATO, and its Soviet counterpart, the Warsaw Pact, in 1955, inaugurated the Cold War era.

NATO and its relevance now

  • NATO was completely successful in its mission of protecting the “Euro-Atlantic area” from Soviet expansion and preventing war between the two superpowers.
  • When the Soviet Union collapsed in 1991, questions were raised about NATO’s relevance and future.
  • Since the Non-aligned Movement (NAM) became irrelevant when the Communist bloc disappeared, one cannot justify the continuation of a military alliance formed to protect Europe from Communist expansion.

Post-Cold War era mandate of NATO

  • Its bureaucracy succeeded in refashioning NATO for the post-Cold war era.
  • The refashioning rested on a paradigm shift — from collective defence, which implied a known adversary, to collective security, which is open-ended, and might require action against any number of threats.
  • The threat included unknown ones and non-state actors.
  • In other words, the elimination of one threat to Europe — communist Russia — did not necessarily mean that security risks to Europe have vanished.

Why dismantle a beneficial arrangement

  • Another factor in the persistence of NATO is that, like all successful alliances, it has been a mutually beneficial arrangement.
  • For Europe, it was an attractive bargain where, in exchange for a marginal loss in autonomy, it enjoyed absolute security at a cheap price.
  • Not having to spend massively on defence allowed Europe to focus on building powerful economies and invest its surplus in a strong welfare state.
  • NATO also offered the added bonus of keeping Germany down — historically a major factor for peace and stability in the region.

An effective American weapon

  • For the US, NATO has been an ideal vehicle for power projection around the world — in places beyond the Euro-Atlantic area, such as Iraq, Afghanistan and Libya.
  • It views NATO as a tool to ensure the primacy of American interests across the globe.
  • Unsurprisingly, NATO’s post-Cold War role has evolved in tandem with U.S. foreign policy priorities.
  • The NATO doctrine of “enlargement”, which Russia calls “expansion”, is essentially about extending the American military footprint by bringing in new members.
  • That is how NATO’s membership today stands at 30, having added 14 members between 1999 and 2020.

The final truth

  • The Biden administration wants to mobilize NATO member-states behind its larger objective of containing China.
  • NATO’s European member states may view China as an economic rival and adversary, but they are unconvinced by the American line that it is an outright security threat.
  • This line also, in a way, points to the underlying logic behind NATO’s persistence in the post-Soviet world.
  • Unlike the Soviet Union, China offers no alternative vision of society that could make Western capitalism insecure.
  • In fact, its own economy is already deeply integrated into Western markets. China, nonetheless, is perceived as posing a ‘threat’.
  • It remains to be seen how far an ageing Europe would be willing to commit itself to a strategic path that prefers confrontation to collaboration like the US.

Also read:

India & NATO

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Foreign Policy Watch: India-China

The road from Galwan, a year later

Note4Students

From UPSC perspective, the following things are important :

Prelims level: Not much

Mains level: Paper 2- India-China relations after Galwan valley clash

What happened in Galwan?

  • The Indian and Chinese armies are engaged in the standoff in Pangong Tso, Galwan Valley, Demchok and Daulat Beg Oldie in eastern Ladakh.
    • A sizable number of Chinese Army personnel even transgressed into the Indian side of the de-facto border in several areas including Pangong Tso.
    • The actions on the northern bank of Pangong Tso are not just for territorial gains on land, but enhanced domination of the resource-rich lake.
  • The stand-off at Ladakh’s Galwan Valley has escalated in June 2020 due to the infrastructure projects that India has undertaken in the recent years. India is building a strategic road through the Galwan Valley – close to China – connecting the region to an airstrip.
    • China is opposed to any Indian construction in the area. In 1962, a stand-off in the Galwan area was one of the biggest flashpoints of the 1962 war.
  • The border, or Line of Actual Control, is not demarcated, and China and India have differing ideas of where it should be located, leading to regular border “transgressions.” Often these don’t escalate tensions; a serious border standoff like the current one is less frequent, though this is the fourth since 2013.
    • Both countries’ troops have patrolled this region for decades, as the contested 2,200-mile border is a long-standing subject of competing claims and tensions, including a brief war in 1962.
  • Reasons: The violent clash happened when the Chinese side departed from the consensus to respect the LAC and attempted to unilaterally change the status quo.
    • It is part of China’s ‘nibble and negotiate policy’. Their aim is to ensure that India does not build infrastructure along the LAC. It is their way of attaining a political goal with military might, while gaining more territory in the process.

The current situation in Ladakh

  •  With a continued deployment of 50,000-60,000 soldiers, the Indian Army has been able to hold the line to prevent any further ingress by the PLA.
  • There has been no progress in talks after the disengagement at Pangong lake and Kailash range in February.
  • Outside of Ladakh, the Indian Army remains in an alert mode all along the LAC to prevent any Chinese misadventure but the bigger change has been its reorientation of certain forces from Pakistan border towards the China border.
  • The Ladakh crisis has also exposed India’s military weakness to tackle a collusive threat from China and Pakistan.

External balancing

  • To deal with the threat of combined China and Pakistan, the Government opened backchannel talks with Pakistan which led to the reiteration of the ceasefire on the Line of Control.
  • The Ladakh crisis has also led the Government to relook external partnerships, particularly with the United States.
  • The U.S. military officials have earlier spoken of the intelligence and logistics support provided to the Indian forces in Ladakh.
  • The military importance of the Quad remains moot, with India reportedly refusing to do joint naval patrolling with the U.S. in the South China Sea, the two treaty allies of the U.S., Japan and Australia, also refused.

Challenges for India

  • India attempts to counter the growing Chinese influence in the neighbourhood have faltered, exacerbated by the mishandling of the second wave of the novel coronavirus pandemic.
  • With the widening power gap between New Delhi and Beijing, the challenge is as much economic as it is geopolitical.
  • Despite the border crisis and the Indian restrictions on Chinese technology companies, China displaced the U.S. to be India’s biggest trade partner in 2020-21, up to nearly 13% of India’s total trade compared to 10.4% a year ago.
  • For the past few decades, Indian planners operated on the premise that their diplomats will be able to manage the Chinese problem without it developing into a full-blown military crisis.
  • Militarily, Chinese incursions in Ladakh have shown that the idea of deterrence has failed.
  • India has learnt that it can no longer have simultaneous competition and cooperation with China.
  • A new reset in bilateral ties, àla the early 1990s, is difficult because China is now in a different league, competing with the U.S.

Conclusion

The events of the past one year have significantly altered India’s thinking towards China. The relationship is at the crossroads now. The choices made will have a significant impact on the future of global geopolitics.

B2BASICS

Line of Actual Control

  • Demarcation Line: The Line of Actual Control (LAC) is the demarcation that separates Indian-controlled territory from Chinese-controlled territory.
  • LAC is different from the Line of Control (LoC) with Pakistan:
    • The LoC emerged from the 1948 ceasefire line negotiated by the United Nations (UN) after the Kashmir War.
    • It was designated as the LoC in 1972, following the Shimla Agreement between the two countries. It is delineated on a map signed by the Director General of Military Operations (DGMO) of both armies and has the international sanctity of a legal agreement.
    • The LAC, in contrast, is only a concept – it is not agreed upon by the two countries, neither delineated on a map or demarcated on the ground.
  • Length of the LAC: India considers the LAC to be 3,488 km long, while the Chinese consider it to be only around 2,000 km.

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Foreign Policy Watch: India-China

Rare Earth Metals at the heart of China-US rivalry

Note4Students

From UPSC perspective, the following things are important :

Prelims level: Rare earth elements

Mains level: US-China Rivalry

Beijing’s dominance in rare earth minerals, the key to the future of manufacturing, is a cause for concern for the West.

Answer this question from CSP 2011 in the comment box:

Q.What is the difference between a CFL and an LED lamp? 

  1. To produce light, a CFL uses mercury vapor and phosphor while an LED lamp uses semi-conductor material.
    2. The average life span of a CFL is much longer than that of an LED lamp
    3. A CFL is less energy-efficient as compared to an LED lamp.

Which of the statements given above is/are correct?

(a) Only 1

(b) 2 and 3 only

(c) 1 and 3 only

(d) 1, 2 and 3

What are Rare Earth Metals?

  • The rare earth elements (REE) are a set of seventeen metallic elements. These include the fifteen lanthanides on the periodic table plus scandium and yttrium.
  • Rare earth elements are an essential part of many high-tech devices.
  • They have a wide range of applications, especially high-tech consumer products, such as cellular telephones, computer hard drives, electric and hybrid vehicles, and flat-screen monitors and televisions.
  • Significant defense applications include electronic displays, guidance systems, lasers, and radar and sonar systems.
  • Rare earth minerals, with names like neodymium, praseodymium, and dysprosium, are crucial to the manufacture of magnets used in industries of the future, such as wind turbines and electric cars.

Curbing dependence on China

  • At a time of frequent geopolitical friction among those three powers, Washington and Brussels want to avoid this scenario.
  • They are investing in the market for 17 minerals with unique properties that today are largely extracted and refined in China.
  • The expected exponential growth in demand for minerals that are linked to clean energy is putting more pressure on US and Europe to take a closer look.
  • Amid the transition to green energy, in which rare earth minerals are sure to play a role, China’s market dominance is enough to sound an alarm in western capitals.

Why such a move?

  • In 2019, the U.S. imported 80% of its rare earth minerals from China.
  • The EU gets 98% of its supply from China.

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Foreign Policy Watch: India-China

Pushback against China more likely as Quad gains momentum

Note4Students

From UPSC perspective, the following things are important :

Prelims level: Quad

Mains level: Paper 2- Pushback against China

The article discusses the future pushback against China in South Asia and Indo-Pacific as Quad gains more momentum. 

Context

Recently, the Chinese Ambassador to Bangladesh, Li Jiming, warned Dhaka that there will be “substantial damage” in bilateral ties between China and Bangladesh if the latter joins the Quad.

Bangladesh’s reaction

  • Bangladesh Foreign Minister A.K. Abdul Momen promptly and publicly challenged the Chinese envoy’s statement, underlining categorically that Dhaka pursues an independent foreign policy. 
  • That China’s remarks would reverberate far beyond South Asia was expected and perhaps intended.
  • The spokesperson of U.S. State Department remarked, “What we would say is that we respect Bangladesh’s sovereignty and we respect Bangladesh’s right to make foreign policy decisions for itself.”

Implications for South Asia and Info-Pacific

  • With its message to Bangladesh, Beijing was laying down a marker that nations should desist from engaging with the Quad.
  • This episode captures the emerging fault lines in South Asia and the wider Indo-Pacific.
  • For all its attempts to play down the relevance of the Quad, Beijing realises that the grouping, with all its weaknesses, is emerging as a reality and there is little it can do to prevent that.
  • And so, it is agitated about Quad’s future role and its potential success in offering the regional states an alternative to its own strong-arm tactics.

About Quad’s agenda

  • The Quad member states are figuring out a cohesive agenda amongst themselves and there are no plans for an expansion.
  • There is a desire to work with like-minded nations but that can only happen if the four members of the Quad can build a credible platform first.
  • Quad has not asked any country to join and no one has shown an interest.
  • But China wants to ensure that after failing in its initial attempt to prevent the Quad from gaining any traction.
  • Its message is well understood by other states who may harbour any desire of working closely with the Quad members.

Way forward

  • Beijing has failed to prevent nations from the West to the East from coming out with their Indo-Pacific strategies.
  • It has failed to prevent the operationalisation of the Quad, and now it might be worried about other nations in the region thinking of engaging with the Quad more proactively.
  • Even Bangladesh is planning to come out with its own Indo-Pacific strategy and Beijing has now warned Dhaka that a close cooperation with the Quad should not be part of the policy mix.
  •  As the Quad gains more momentum and the churn in the waters of the Indo-Pacific leads to new countervailing coalitions against China, Beijing’s belligerence can only be expected to grow.

Conclusion

Beijing is more likely to demand clear-cut foreign policy choices from its regional interlocutors, as its warning to Bangladesh underscores. But as Dhaka’s robust response makes it clear, states are more likely to push back than become subservient to Chinese largesse.

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Foreign Policy Watch: India-China

The costs of relying on China to become more apparent to India’s neighbours

Note4Students

From UPSC perspective, the following things are important :

Prelims level: Not much

Mains level: Paper 2- China's wolf warrior foreign policy and its implications for India's neighbours

The article explains the implications of China’s assertive foreign policy for India’s neighbours.

Chinese warning to Bangladesh

  • The Chinese ambassador to Bangladesh warned Bangladesh against joining the Quad and added that it will risk “significant damage” to its relationship with Beijing if it warms up to the Quad.
  • This came as a surprise as China was warning Bangladesh against joining a club that has no plans to invite new members, let alone Bangladesh.
  • China always used tough language when it came to issues of its sovereignty and territorial integrity.
  • The aggressive style now covers a much broader range of issues.
  • Beijing is conscious that Bangladesh’s impressive economic performance in recent years as well as its location at the top of the Bay of Bengal littoral lends a new strategic salience to Bangladesh.
  • China notes India’s growing diplomatic investment in developing a strategic partnership with Bangladesh.
  • China is also not blind to the emerging interest in US and Japan to expand cooperation with Dhaka.
  • Bangladesh, which supports China’s Belt and Road Initiative, is open to similar infrastructure cooperation with the US, Japan and India.

China’s wolf worrier diplomacy

  • The new wolf warrior diplomacy confronts head-on any criticism of China in the public sphere.
  • India has been at the receiving end of this policy for a while — especially during the recent crises of Doklam and Ladakh.
  • But India’s South Asian neighbours, all of whom enjoy good relations with China, are only now getting a taste of Beijing’s new diplomatic medicine.
  • Chinese Ambassador’s public remarks about the Quad were about telling Bangladesh to resist any Indo-Pacific temptation.
  • Pre-emption is very much part of Beijing’s strategic culture.

What such assertive diplomacy mean for South Asia

  • Delhi has learnt after long that too much diplomatic interference in the Subcontinent has tended to undermine the pursuit of India’s regional objectives.
  • China, as the world’s newest superpower, probably bets that its substantive leverages — including economic, diplomatic, and military — will limit the costs while deterring smaller nations from crossing the markers that it lays down.
  • South Asian elites have always seethed at India meddling in their internal affairs; they have held up China’s non-interventionist policy as a welcome alternative.
  • The controversy in Bangladesh over China’s remark on joining Quad should help update their past images of Beijing
  • India is now more circumspect than before about interventions in the region.
  • It recognises that avoiding knee-jerk interventions is a sensible policy.
  • Our neighbours have always complained about India’s inefficiency in implementing economic projects and contrasted this with China’s speed and purposefulness.
  • But they are also discovering the flip side of Chinese economic efficiency — the capacity to set and implement terms of cooperation that are not always in favour of the host nation.
  • All the regimes in the region have had access to different sections of the Indian elite and some capacity to shape the discourse on neighbourhood policies.
  • They have no political recourse at all in China’s closed political system.

Consider the question “As Beijing becomes ever more assertive in South Asia, the costs of relying on China are likely to become more apparent to South Asia’s smaller nations. Comment.”

Conclusion

Until now, Chinese support against India seemed free of cost. As Beijing becomes ever more assertive in South Asia, the costs of relying on China are likely to become more apparent.

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Foreign Policy Watch: India-China

Evaluate the Ladakh crisis

Note4Students

From UPSC perspective, the following things are important :

Prelims level: Not much

Mains level: Paper 2- Managing the strategic competition with China

The article highlights the need for a critical assessment of the stand-off with China last year and offers key lessons in managing the strategic competition with China.

Year after stand-off

  • After over a year, the stand-off between Indian and Chinese troops in eastern Ladakh shows no signs of resolution.
  • More broadly, the India-China bilateral relationship has ruptured.
  • Reversing a long-held policy, India will no longer overlook the problematic border dispute for the sake of a potentially lucrative wider relationship.
  • Even if disengagement continues, the relationship will remain vulnerable to destabilising disruptions.
  • Therefore, the Ladakh crisis offers India three key lessons in managing the intensifying strategic competition with China.

Three key lessons

1) Military strategy based on denial are more useful

  •  Military strategies based on denial are more useful than strategies based on punishment.
  •  The Indian military’s standing doctrine calls for deterring adversaries with the threat of massive punitive retaliation for any aggression, capturing enemy territory as bargaining leverage in post-war talks.
  • But this did not deter China from launching unprecedented incursions in May 2020.
  • In contrast, the Indian military’s high-water mark in the crisis was an act of denial — its occupation of the heights on the Kailash Range on its side of the LAC in late August.
  • This action served to deny that key terrain to the Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA), and gave the Indian Army a stronger defensive position.
  • A doctrinal focus on denial will give the Indian military greater capacity to thwart future land grabs across the LAC.
  • Over time, improved denial capabilities may allow India to reduce the resource drain of the increased militarisation of the LAC.

2) Political cost matters more

  • China is more likely to be deterred or coerced with the threat of political costs, rather than material costs.
  • The material burden of the crisis would not disrupt its existing priorities.
  • In contrast, India successfully raised the risks of the crisis for China through its threat of a political rupture, not military punishment.
  • A permanently hostile India or an accidental escalation to conflict were risks that China, having achieved its tactical goals in the crisis, assessed were an unnecessary additional burden.
  • The corollary lesson is that individual powers, even large powers such as India, will probably struggle to shift Beijing’s calculus alone.
  • Against the rising behemoth, only coordinated or collective action is likely to be effective.

3) India should accept more risk on LAC

  • India should consider accepting more risk on the LAC in exchange for long-term leverage and influence in the Indian Ocean Region.
  • From the perspective of long-term strategic competition, the future of the Indian Ocean Region is more consequential and more uncertain than the Himalayan frontier.
  • At the land border, the difficult terrain and more even balance of military force means that each side could only eke out minor, strategically modest gains at best.
  • In contrast, India has traditionally been the dominant power in the Indian Ocean Region and stands to cede significant political influence and security if it fails to answer the rapid expansion of Chinese military power.

Conclusion

As these three lessons show, the future of the strategic competition is not yet written. If India’s leaders honestly and critically evaluate the crisis, it may yet help to actually brace India’s long-term position against China.

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Foreign Policy Watch: India-China

Sanctions on China over Uighurs: Cause & Effect

Note4Students

From UPSC perspective, the following things are important :

Prelims level: Uighurs

Mains level: Uighur's genocide by PRC

In a coordinated move, many countries imposed sanctions on Chinese officials for human rights abuses against Uighurs and other minorities in Xinjiang province.

The Uighurs

  • Xinjiang has a large number of Uighurs, Muslims of Turkic descent.
  • Over the past few decades, more and more Han Chinese has settled in Xinjiang, which saw violent clashes between them and the Uighurs.

The sanctions have come after a meeting between the US and Chinese officials in Alaska last week, in what Washington described as “tough and direct talks”.

This was a “Tu-Tu, Mai-Mai” conservation if you had seen the news!

Sanctions on China

  • The European Union, the US, Britain, and Canada imposed sanctions on Chinese Officials.
  • Australia and New Zealand issued a joint statement welcoming the Western action, adding they were concerned about reports of abuses from Xinjiang.
  • China on the other hand has consistently denied all reports of atrocities against Uighurs, maintaining it is only “deradicalising” elements of its population in the interests of security.

Retaliation by China

  • Those sanctioned by China include five Members of the European Parliament and the Political and Security Committee, the EU’s main foreign policy decision-making body, among others.
  • China also summoned the EU ambassador and the UK ambassador to lodge “solemn protests”.

Why these sanctions are crucial?

  • This is the first time the EU has imposed sanctions on China since an arms embargo after the 1989 Tiananmen Square crackdown. That is still in place.
  • Although the EU sanctions are not very damaging, they show a hardening of stance against its largest trading partner.
  • Also significant is that the Western powers moved together, in what is being seen as a result of the US push to deal with China along with its allies.

Nations that claim to be defenders of the faith or self-proclaimed Caliphates are silent on the persecution of Uighurs! They perceived the abrogation of Art. 370 as a doomsday event! This is height of hypocrisy!

Reasons behind: Crackdown on Uighurs

  • China is accused of putting over a million people in internment camps to “de-Muslimise” them and make them integrate better in the Communist country.
  • Allegations are that these people have been forced to leave behind their occupations, properties and families, to stay at the camps.
  • Survivors, human rights organisations, and governments of other countries have alleged physical, psychological and sexual torture.
  • People can be sent to the camps for showing any signs of “extremism” — sporting beards, fasting during Ramzan, dressing differently from the majority, sending Eid greetings, praying “too often” etc.

The idea of the sacred is quite simply one of the most conservative notions in any culture because it seeks to turn other ideas – uncertainty, progress, change – into crimes.

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Foreign Policy Watch: India-China

Mounting counter challenge to China through Quad

Note4Students

From UPSC perspective, the following things are important :

Prelims level: Not much

Mains level: Paper 2- India's nuanced approach to Quad

The article discusses the outcomes of the recently concluded first Quad Summit in the context of India.

Message to China after Quad summit

  • The first Learders’ Summit of the Quadrilateral Framework was held on March 12.
  • This Summit conveyed a three-pronged message to China:
  • 1) Under the new U.S. President, “America is back” in terms of its desire to play a leading role in other regions.
  • 2) It views China as its primary challenger for that leadership.
  • 3) The Quad partnership is ready to mount a counter-challenge, albeit in “soft-power” terms at present, in order to do so.
  • For both Japan and Australia the outcomes of the summit, both in terms of the “3C’s”working groups established on COVID-19 vaccines, Climate Change and Critical Technology and in terms of this messaging to the “4th C” (China) are very welcome.

4 Outcomes of Quad Summit for India

  • For India the outcomes of the Quad Summit need more nuanced analysis.

1) COVID-19 Vaccine

  • India is not only the world’s largest manufacturer of vaccines (by number of doses produced, it has already exported 58 million doses to nearly 71 countries.
  • It is also manufacturing a billion doses for South East Asia (under the Quad), over and above its current international commitments.
  • India has also planned to vaccinate 300 million people as originally planned by September.
  • All this comes down to total 1.8 billion doses which will require a major ramp up in capacity and funding, and will bear testimony to the power of Quad cooperation, if realised.
  • However, the effort could have been made much easier had India’s Quad partners also announced dropping their opposition to India’s plea at the World Trade Organization.
  • India had filed the plea along with South Africa in October 2020, seeking waiver from certain provisions of the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights for the prevention, containment and treatment of COVID-19.

2) Climate change

  • On climate change, India has welcomed the return of the U.S. to the Paris accord.
  • Mr. Biden has promised to restart the U.S.’s funding of the global Green Climate Fund, which Mr. Trump ended.
  • India still awaits a large part of the $1.4 billion commitment by the U.S. to finance solar technology in 2016.
  • Mr. Biden might also consider joining the International Solar Alliance, which the other Quad members are a part of, but the U.S.

3) Critical technology

  • India will welcome any assistance in reducing its dependence on Chinese telecommunication equipment and in finding new sources of rare-earth minerals.
  • India would oppose Quad partners weighing in on international rule-making on the digital economy, or data localisation.
  • Such a move had led New Delhi to walk out of the Japan-led “Osaka track declaration” at the G-20 in 2019.

4) Dealing with China

  • On this issue, it is still unclear how India can go on the Quad’s intended outcomes.
  • While India shares the deep concerns and the tough messaging set out by the Quad on China, especially after the year-long stand-off at the Line of Actual Control (LAC) and the killings at Galwan that India has faced, it has demurred from any non-bilateral statement on it.
  • India is the only Quad member not a part of the military alliance that binds the other members.
  • India is also the only Quad country with a land boundary with China.
  • And it is the only Quad country which lives in a neighbourhood where China has made deep inroads.
  • Indian officials are still engaged in LAC disengagement talks and have a long way to go to de-escalation or status quo ante.

3 long term impacts on strategic planning

  • The violence at the LAC has also left three long-term impacts on Indian strategic planning:
  • First, the government must now expend more resources, troops, infrastructure funds to the LAC and ensure no recurrence of the People’s Liberation Army April 2020 incursions.
  • Second, India’s most potent territorial threat will not be from either China or Pakistan, but from both i.e. “two-front situation”.
  • Third, that India’s continental threat perception will need to be prioritised against any maritime commitments the Quad may claim, especially further afield in the Pacific Ocean.

Consider the question “The Quad’s ideology of a “diamond of democracies” can only succeed if it does not insist on exclusivity in India’s strategic calculations given that India shares a special place among the Quad members when it comes to its relationship with China. Comment”

Conclusion

Despite last week’s Quad Summit, India’s choices for its Quad strategy will continue to be guided as much by its location on land as it is by its close friendships with fellow democracies.

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Foreign Policy Watch: India-China

A giant leap forward for the Quad

Note4Students

From UPSC perspective, the following things are important :

Prelims level: Not much

Mains level: Paper 3- First Quad summit and its significance

The first-ever Quad summit is an important milestone in the geopolitics of the region. The article highlights its significance.

Significance of the first Quad summit

  • The maiden Quadrilateral Security Dialogue summit of the leaders of Australia, India, Japan and the U.S. on March 12 was a defining moment in Asian geopolitics.
  • That it was a meeting at the highest political level, occasioned a productive dialogue, and concluded with a substantive joint statement is indicative of its immediate significance.
  • If it leads to tangible action and visible cooperation, it will impact the whole region.

Brief background of the Quad

  • The Indian Ocean tsunami of 2004 triggered cooperation among the navies and governments of the Quad powers.
  • They sought to forge diplomatic cooperation on regional issues in 2006-08.
  • But gave up mainly because China objected to it and the hostility to China was not yet a potent enough glue.
  • This began to change in 2017 when Beijing’s behaviour turned hostile, climaxing in multiple challenges in 2020.
  • This time, U.S. President Joe Biden moved swiftly to host a virtual summit, drawing immediate response from the other three leaders.

5 highlights of the summit

  • A more sophisticated approach is being invented, with enhanced emphasis by the U.S. on carrying its allies and strategic partners together.
  •  The summit’s outcome, therefore, merits close attention for at least five reasons.

1) Compromise over vision of Indo-Pacific

  • Past debates over diverse, even differing, visions of the Indo-Pacific are over.
  • The joint statement struck a neat compromise:
  • To please the U.S. and Japan, it refers to a “free and open” Indo-Pacific, but in the very next sentence it offers an elaboration – “free, open, inclusive, healthy, anchored by democratic values, and unconstrained by coercion” – that amply satisfy India and Australia.

2) Alignment of approach towards China

  • The summit leaders have secured an adequate alignment of their approaches towards China.
  • Senior officials gave sufficient hints on this score, reinforced by phrases such as “security challenges” and “the rules-based maritime order in the East and South China Seas” in the joint statement.
  • Instead of unidimensional antagonism, the Quad members have preferred a smart blend of competition, cooperation and confrontation.

3) Quad’s commitment development and well being of the region

  • The Quad has placed a premium on winning the battle for the hearts and minds of people in the Indo-Pacific region.
  • This explains the special initiative to ensure equitable access to COVID-19 vaccines for every person in need in the region from the western Pacific to eastern Africa.

4) Working groups

  • The establishment of three working groups on vaccine partnership; climate change; and critical and emerging technologies and their new standards, innovation and supply chains is a welcome step.
  • All this should get the four national establishments into serious policy coordination and action mode, creating new capacities.
  • The careful choice of themes reflects a deep understanding of the long-term challenge posed by China and has global implications.

5) Quad working together in future

  • The March 12 summit will not be a one-off.
  • The leaders have agreed to meet in-person later this year, possibly at an international event within the region.
  • Foreign ministers will gather at least once a year; other relevant officials, more often.
  • Thus, will grow the habits of the Quad working together for a common vision and with agreed modalities for cooperation.

How ASEAN and China will react

  • The summit has been watched closely by the ASEAN capitals. A few of them may express cautious welcome.
  • Beijing seems rattled but resigned to the Quad’s new momentum.
  • The Chinese see it in negative terms, targeting New Delhi in particular.

Consider the question “With the first-ever summit, the Quad is moving towards a strong coalition. In light of this, examine the challenges India faces as it deepes its engagement in the grouping.” 

Conclusion

The summit and ‘The Spirit of the Quad’ – the inspired title of the joint statement – represented a giant leap forward. Now is the time to back political commitment with a strong mix of resolve, energy, stamina and the fresh ideas of stakeholders and experts outside of government to fulfil the promise of the Quad.

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Foreign Policy Watch: India-China

Quad Summit

Note4Students

From UPSC perspective, the following things are important :

Prelims level: Quad

Mains level: Paper 2- Relevance of the Quad

As India deepens its engagement with the Quad, it must consider several aspects related to such engagement. The article deals with this issue.

Background of India’s engagement with Quad

  • India’s engagement with the Quad goes back to China’s expanding footprint in South Asia and the Indian Ocean Region over the last few years.
  • China’s ambitious Belt and Road Initiative rang alarm bells in India as the projects were viewed as encroachments into India’s strategic space.
  • The U.S.’s focus on the west Pacific due to aggressive Chinese maritime activity gradually pulled India into the ambit of the Indo-Pacific that views the western Pacific and the Indian Ocean as an integrated geopolitical space.
  • Besides the U.S. navy, India expanded its maritime ties with other regional states, the most high-profile of the interactions being the Quad.

Core structural problems with Quad

  • The Quad has a core structural problem as well in that it pivots around the U.S.
  • The Quad riles China as a hostile grouping, but hardly serves the security interests of its members.
  • The U.S. views China’s rise as a threat to the world order it has led since the Second World War.
  • Despite rhetoric relating to the promotion of a ‘rules-based’ world order, the Quad neither shares a strategic vision nor is it animated by a shared agenda.
  • This is obvious not only from its inability to deter China in the west Pacific, but also by its members’ anxiety to maintain close ties with China.

Implications for India

  • By affiliating with the U.S.-led maritime coalition, India ignored the principal areas of its security concerns which is an undemarcated 3,500-km land border with China.
  • From April 2020, Indian and Chinese forces had their latest border face-off in Ladakh, abruptly ending a long period of productive relations.
  • In retrospect, this confrontation appears to be China’s sharp response to the steady shift in India’s regional posture in favour of an alignment with the U.S. and its allies against China.
  • The stand-off at Ladakh has been a bitter experience for India: it has affirmed the limits of India-U.S. security ties, the folly of Indian involvement in the Quad.
  • The stand-off has also underscored need to focus national attention and resources in areas of abiding interest for India — the border, the neighbours and the Indian Ocean.

Lessons for India

  • Ladakh also offers some valuable lessons for India.
  • One, the rebuilding of ties with China will have to be a priority concern.
  • India need to dilute its focus on the Indo-Pacific and the Quad and accept that the borders and the Indian Ocean are where its crucial interests lie.
  • Two, the Ladakh experience has highlighted certain deficiencies at home:
  • It hardly needs reiteration that India’s capacities can only be built by a united people committed to the national cause.
  • Finally, foreign policy cannot be a part-time concern of the national leadership; in terms of priority and attention, it should be on a par with domestic affairs.

Consider the question “Examine the factors that India should consider as it seeks to deepen its engagement in the Quad.”

Conclusion

As the global scenario gets more complex and India’s ambitions increase, a cohesive strategic vision would give substance and drive to India’s pursuit of its interests over the long term.

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Foreign Policy Watch: India-China

China-Taiwan conflict

Note4Students

From UPSC perspective, the following things are important :

Prelims level: Not much

Mains level: Paper 2- India's relations with Taiwan

The article underscores the centrality of Taiwan in the realms of semiconductor production and how that dominant spills over in geopolitics.

Silicon shield of Taiwan

  • Taiwan’s security situation has been worsening amidst mounting economic, political and military pressure from China.
  • Any Chinese attack on Taiwan that disrupts the flow of semiconductors would produce significant challenges not only for the US but also China that relies on semiconductor supplies from Taiwan.
  • That factor appears to be preventing the crisis from boiling over into a full-scale war that could draw the US and Japan into it.
  •  It is Taiwan’s so-called “silicon shield”.

Taiwan’s dominance in semiconductor industry

  • Taiwan is the world’s leading producer of semiconductors and other electronic components.
  • The Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company (TSMC) has more than 55 per cent of the global market share in the production of high-end custom-made chips.
  • Of the two rival companies that have survived, US-based Intel is in trouble and Korea’s Samsung has challenges of its own.
  •  There will be no generation of data without the semiconductors.
  • It might be more accurate to say that “semiconductors are the new oil” and their production is increasingly dominated by Taiwan and the TMSC.

Geopolitics over Taiwan

  • As its economic heft and political salience rose in the 21st century, China has ratcheted up pressure on countries that have diplomatic relations with Taiwan.
  • China has also compelled international organisations to push Taiwan out of their activities, even when Taiwan had much to contribute.
  • Amidst the deterioration of US-China relations in recent years, President Donald Trump was far more supportive of Taiwan than his recent predecessors.
  • The Biden team has also signalled continuity with Trump’s Taiwan policies.
  • All indications are that Washington will continue to seek some technological decoupling and diversification of sensitive supplies away from China.
  • Taiwan will inevitably be the key element in the American quest for resilient supply chains in the digital domain.

Opportunity for India

  • Taiwan’s position as a semiconductor superpower opens the door for more intensive strategic-economic cooperation between Delhi and Taipei.
  • Part of the problem is that India’s strategic community continues to view Taiwan as an adjunct to India’s “One-China policy”.
  • India’s policy oscillates between keeping needless distance with Taipei when ties with Beijing are warm and remembering it when Sino-Indian ties enter a freeze.
  • This changed in the early 1990s, when it began to engage with Taiwan, but the policy remained a restricted one.
  • In the last few years, though, there has been a steady expansion of bilateral engagement.
  • Trade has increased from about $1 billion in 2001 to about $7 billion in 2018.
  • India has made a special effort to woo Taiwanese companies that are moving some of their production away from China.
  • India is yet to tap into the full range of commercial and technological opportunities possibilities with Taiwan.
  • This is particularly true of semiconductor production.

Way forward

  • Delhi must begin to deal with Taiwan as a weighty entity in its own right that offers so much to advance India’s prosperity.
  • Delhi does not have to discard its “One-China policy” to recognise that Taiwan is once again becoming the lightning rod in US-China tensions.

Consider the question “India needs to explore the opportunities in relationship with Taiwan even as it pursues and sticks to its One China policy. Comment.

Conclusion

As Taiwan becomes the world’s most dangerous flashpoint, the geopolitical consequences for Asia are real. Although Delhi has embraced the Indo-Pacific maritime construct, it is yet to come to terms with Taiwan’s critical role in shaping the strategic future of Asia’s waters.

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Foreign Policy Watch: India-China

New disengagement agreement in eastern Ladakh

Note4Students

From UPSC perspective, the following things are important :

Prelims level: Critical passes and valleys along the international borders

Mains level: India-China border tensions

In the first major breakthrough in talks China’s Defence Ministry that PLA and Indian troops on the southern and northern shores of Pangong Tso began synchronized and organized disengagement.

This newscard presents a holistic report on the ground situation of Sino-India border disputes in Ladakh.

Also, try this PYQ from CSP 2020:

Q.Siachen Glacier is situated to the

(a) East of Aksai Chin

(b) East of Leh

(c)North of Gilgit

(d) North of Nubra Valley

New plan in eastern Ladakh

  • As of now, the disengagement process seems restricted to the north and south banks of Pangong Tso.
  • The process has started with the pulling back of certain columns of tanks from the south bank region by both sides.
  • At the moment, there is no pullback of troops from the friction points and the heights they are positioned on.
  • That will happen in a phased and verified manner.

Disengagement from Pangong Tso

  • China will pull its troops on the north bank towards the east of Finger 8.
  • Similarly, India will also position its forces at its permanent base near Finger 3.
  • Similar action will be taken by both the parties in the south bank area as well.
  • Both sides have also agreed that the area between Finger 3 and Finger 8 will become a no-patrolling zone temporarily, till both sides reach an agreement through military and diplomatic discussions to restore patrolling.
  • Further, all the construction done by both sides on the north and south banks of the lake since April 2020 will be removed.

Why is this area important?

  • The north and south banks of Pangong Tso are two of the most significant and sensitive regions when it comes to the current standoff that began in May 2020.
  • What makes the areas around the shores of the lake so sensitive and important is that clashes here marked the beginning of the standoff.
  • It is one of the areas where the Chinese troops had come around 8 km deep west of India’s perception of the Line of Actual Control.
  • China had positioned its troops on the ridgeline connecting Fingers 3 and 4, while according to India the LAC passes through Finger 8.

Take a glimpse of all friction points along Indian borders:

India is at an advantage

  • Further, it is in the south bank of the lake that Indian forces in an action in late August had gained a strategic advantage by occupying certain peaks, outwitting the Chinese.
  • Indian troops had positioned themselves on heights of Magar Hill, Mukhpari, Gurung Hill, Rezang La and Rechin La, which were unoccupied by either side earlier.
  • Since then, the Chinese side had been particularly sensitive as these positions allowed India to not only dominate Spanggur Gap.
  • It is a two-km wide valley that can be used to launch an offensive, as China had done in 1962, they also allow India a direct view of China’s Moldo Garrison.

Why has this taken so long?

  • Since September, China has insisted that India first pull its troops back from the south bank of Pangong Tso, and the Chushul sub-sector.
  • However, India has been demanding that any disengagement process should include the entire region, and troops should go back to their April 2020 positions.
  • However, it seems that for now, both sides have agreed to first disengage from the Pangong Tso area only.

Principles of disengagement

In military and diplomatic discussions with China India expects a solution to the issue on the basis of three principles:

  1. LAC should be accepted and respected by both parties.
  2. Neither party should attempt to change the status quo unilaterally.
  3. All agreements should be fully adhered to by both parties.

Does this mean that the standoff is resolved?

  • There are still some outstanding issues that remain regarding deployment and patrolling on LAC.
  • The Pangong Tso region is just one of the friction areas. There are other friction points, all north of the Pangong Tso, where the troops have been face-to-face since last year.
  • The situation in Depsang Plains continues to be a concern.
  • Both sides agree that complete disengagement under bilateral agreements and protocols should be done as soon as possible.
  • After the talks so far, China is also aware of our resolve to protect the sovereignty of the country.

Need for confidence building

  • Two of the main stumbling blocks in finding a permanent resolution are lack of trust and no clarity on intent.
  • Any permanent resolution will include first, disengagement of troops from the frontlines from all friction points.
  • Then de-escalation will entail sending the troops from the depth areas to their original bases.
  • Both sides have around 50,000 troops in the region, along with additional tanks, artillery and air defence assets.

Conclusion

  • A resolution has to include sending these troops and military equipment where they came from on both sides.
  • But neither side had been willing to take the first step to reduce their troop or military strength, as it does not trust the other side.

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Foreign Policy Watch: India-China

Taking the long view with China

Note4Students

From UPSC perspective, the following things are important :

Prelims level: Not much

Mains level: Paper 2- Foreign policy challenges India faces

The article explains the various choices India faces in the geopolitical landscape shaped by emergence of two Asian giants.

New challenges and hard choices on geopolitical front

  • As it moves to becoming the third largest economy in the world, India needs to have a clear-eyed world view and strategy as it makes hard choices.
  • It needs to reject the developing country regional mindset that has shaped India’s  national aims and foreign policy.
  • We have a “special and privileged strategic partnership” with Russia which provides more than three-quarter of India’s military equipment and a “comprehensive global strategic partnership” with the U.S.
  • India’s relationship with the U.S.-led Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (Quad), where the others are military allies, has rightly been cautious, as U.S. President Joe Biden sees China as a ‘strategic competitor’ rather than a ‘strategic rival’.
  • Realism dictates that India does not need to compromise on its strategic autonomy.
  • India faces two sides of the China conundrum: Defining engagement with its neighbour which is consolidating an expanding BRI while remaining involved with the strategic, security and technological concerns of the U.S.

China’s dominance in financial sphere

  • In the financial sphere, there is the real possibility of the Chinese renminbi becoming a global reserve currency or e-yuan becoming the digital payments currency.
  • China is the world’s largest trading economy.
  • It could soon become the world’s largest economy.
  • China has stitched together an investment agreement with the EU and with most of Asia.
  • Relative attractiveness will determine when the dollar goes the way of the sterling and the guilder.
  • China, facing technological sanctions from the U.S., may well put in the hard work to make this happen soon.

China: Partner, competitor, and economic rival

  • Some form of the EU’s China policy of seeing the emerging superpower as a partner, competitor, and economic rival depending on the policy area in question is going to be the global norm. 
  • This broad perspective is also reflected in India’s participation in both the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation, designed to resist the spread of Western interests, and in the U.S.-led Quad, with its anti-China stance.
  • Within the United Nations, India’s interests have greater congruence with China’s interests rather than the U.S.’s and the EU’s.
  • Sharing the COVID-19 vaccine with other countries distinguishes India, and China, from the rest.

India’s engagement with the U.S.

  • The congruence between India and the U.S. lies in the U.S.’s declared strategic objective of promoting an integrated economic development model in the Indo-Pacific as a credible alternative to the BRI, but with a caveat.
  • Instead of an alternate development model, India should move the Quad towards supplementing the infrastructure push of the BRI in line with other strategic concerns in the region.
  • For example, developing their scientific, technological capacity and digital economy, based on India’s digital stack and financial resources of other Quad members, will resonate with Asia and Africa.

India’s role in global governance

  • Another area where India can play a ‘bridging role’ is global governance.
  • President Xi Jinping’s “community with shared future for mankind”, and Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s “climate justice” and asking how long India will be excluded from the UN Security Council, challenge the frame of the liberal order without providing specific alternatives.
  • With respect to digital data, India has recently expressed that there must be reciprocity in data sharing, and this is the kind of ‘big idea’ for sharing prosperity that will gain traction with other countries.

India’s growing influence

  • India’s recent policies are gaining influence at the expense of China and the West, and both know this trend will accelerate.
  • The steps to a $5 trillion economy, shift to indigenous capital military equipment, and a new Science, Technology and Innovation Policy underline impact, capacity and interests.
  • ASEAN remains keen India re-join its trade pact to balance China.
  • It is being recognised that India’s software development prowess could shape a sustainable post-industrial state different to the U.S. and China model.

Consider the question “Examine how India’s foreing policy priorities and its role in global governance is shaped by China’s rise.”

Conclusion

As in the historical past, Asia is big enough for both Asian giants to have complementary roles, share prosperity and be independent of each other and of the West.

 

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Foreign Policy Watch: India-China

BNO Visas for Hong Kong residents

Note4Students

From UPSC perspective, the following things are important :

Prelims level: BNO visa

Mains level: Hong-Kong/ Taiwan Issue

Hong Kong residents can apply for a new visa offering them an opportunity to become British citizens after Beijing’s imposition of a national security law last year.

What is the news?

  • The move comes as China and Hong Kong have said they will no longer recognise the British National Overseas (BNO) passport as a valid travel document from Sunday, January 31.
  • Britain and China have been arguing for months about what London and Washington say is an attempt to silence dissent in Hong Kong after pro-democracy protests in 2019 and 2020.

What is the British move for citizenship?

  • The scheme, which was first announced last year, allows those with BNO status to live, study and work in Britain for five years and eventually apply for citizenship.
  • BNO is a special status created under British law in 1987that specifically relates to Hong Kong.
  • Britain says it is fulfilling a historic and moral commitment to Hong Kong people after Beijing imposed the security law on the semi-autonomous city.
  • Britain says breaches the terms of agreements under which the colony was handed back to China in 1997.
  • The U.K. government forecasts the new visa could attract more than 300,000 people and their dependants to Britain.

Chinese stance on the move

  • China says the West’s views on its actions over Hong Kong are clouded by misinformation and an imperial handover.
  • Beijing also said that it would no longer be recognising BN(O) passports, saying that the citizenship offer “seriously infringed” on China’s sovereignty.
  • It is unclear, however, how this could deter Hong Kongers from leaving since city residents are usually known to use Hong Kong passports while leaving for another country.

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Foreign Policy Watch: India-China

Foreign Minister suggests way forward for India-China ties

Note4Students

From UPSC perspective, the following things are important :

Prelims level: Not Much

Mains level: Way ahead for India-China relations

External Affairs Minister S. Jaishankar has given useful insight on the future of India-China ties amid heating border tensions and has suggested the best way forward.

Statements made by EAM are major breakthrough in itself. They are the most logical and amply reflect his perfect statesmanship.

We can imbibe such statements in our answers as they hold extraordinary significance like any gospel.

Key takeaways from EAM’s speech

  • 2020 was a year of exceptional stress in a relationship profoundly disturbed by the border crisis.
  • China’s actions last year had not only signaled a disregard of commitments to reduce troop levels” but also “a willingness” to breach the peace and tranquillity on the border.
  • For all the disagreements we had, the fact is the border areas still remained fundamentally peaceful with the last incident of a loss of life in 1975, prior to 2020.
  • Until now, India is yet to receive a credible explanation for the change in China’s stance or reasons for its amassing of troops.
  • Any expectation that can be brushed aside and life can carry on undisturbed despite the situation in the border is simply not realistic.

China’s contentious moves

  • China did a unilateral attempt to redraw the LAC in several areas in eastern Ladakh
  • China’s issuing of stapled visas to Indian citizens from Jammu and Kashmir in 2010
  • Reluctance from China to deal with some of India’s military commands, Beijing had that same year refused to host the Northern Army Commander
  • China’s opposition to India’s membership of the Nuclear Suppliers Group and the U.N. Security Council as a permanent member
  • Blocking of U.N. listings of Pakistani terrorists, and
  • China Pakistan Economic Corridor, a flagship project under China’s Belt and Road Initiative, violating India’s sovereignty

Gone is the past

  • Both sides had “painstakingly” worked to normalize relations after the post-1962 war freeze and the first prime ministerial visit in 1988.
  • For the border areas, he said, both had agreed a complete and practical set of understandings and agreements focused on border management, while negotiations were being conducted on the boundary dispute.
  • The advancement of ties, he said, was predicated on ensuring that peace and tranquillity were not disturbed, and the LAC was both observed and respected by both sides.
  • For this reason, it was explicitly agreed the two countries would refrain from massing troops on their common border, along with a detailed understanding of handling frictions that would arise.

No progress over the years

  • Over the years, he said, there was no sign of progress of arriving at a common understanding of the LAC, while there was increasing construction of border infrastructure, especially in the Chinese side.
  • India had made efforts to reduce the considerable infrastructure gap since 2014, including through greater budgetary commitments and border road building.

Way forward

The External Affairs Minister suggested “three mutuals” and “eight broad propositions” as a way forward for the relationship.

#Three mutuals

Mutual respect, mutual sensitivities and mutual interests are the “determining factors”.

#Major propositions

(1) Adhering to commitment

  • The first proposition was that agreements already reached must be adhered to in their entirety, both in letter and in spirit.

(2) Respect for LAC

  • Both sides also needed to strictly observe and respect the LAC, and any attempt to unilaterally change the status quo was completely unacceptable.

(3) Maintaining peace and tranquillity

  • Peace and tranquillity in border areas was the basis for the development of the relationship in other domains. If that was disturbed, he said, the rest of the relationship would be too.

(4) Broader partnership

  • The fourth proposition was that while both remain committed to a multipolar world, they should recognise that a multipolar Asia was one of its essential constituents.

(5) Reciprocity

  • While each state had its interests, concerns and priorities, sensitivities to them could not be one-sided and relations were reciprocal in nature. As rising powers, neither should ignore the other’s set of aspirations.

(6) Divergences management

  • While both sides had made a common cause on development and economic issues and common membership of plurilateral groups was a meeting point, there were divergences when it came to interests and aspirations.

(7) Civilizational ties

  • The last proposition was that as civilizational states, India and China must always take the long view.

(8) Cooperation and competition

  • Even before the events of 2020, the relationship had reflected a duality of cooperation and competition.

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Foreign Policy Watch: India-China

China builds a new village in Arunachal Pradesh

Note4Students

From UPSC perspective, the following things are important :

Prelims level: McMahon Line

Mains level: India-China border tensions

Satellite images show that China has constructed a new village in Arunachal Pradesh, around 4.5 kilometres inside of the de facto border on the Indian side.

Indian and Chinese soldiers have confronted each other in their deadliest clash in decades in Ladakh last year and the earlier one in Doklam. Now another front has been opened up by China in Arunachal.

This year could face another ugliest standoffs and skirmishes.

Location of the village

  • The village, located on the banks of the River Tsari Chu, lies in the Upper Subansiri district.
  • It is an area that has been long disputed by India and China and has been marked by armed conflict.
  • Sources in the defense ministry have said that Beijing has, for years, maintained an army post on this territory, and the various constructions by the Chinese have not happened suddenly.

Background of the story

  • China’s June 1959 operation known as the Longju incident reportedly accused Indian troops of occupying some places in Tibet and colluding with Tibetan rebels.
  • In August same year, the PLA clashed with the Indian personnel of the 9 Assam Rifles.
  • Two Indian soldiers were killed in action and the issue was finally resolved through diplomatic channels. Both sides withdrew from the area on August 20, 1960.
  • And the Assam Rifles then did not re-occupy the post.
  • In the late 1990s however, China established a company level post 3 kilometers inside the Indian Territory. Since then, the area remains contested to this day.

India and Arunachal

  • Arunachal Pradesh (called South Tibet in China) is a full-fledged state of India.
  • India’s sovereignty over the area is internationally recognized and its residents have not shown any inclination to leave India.
  • The majority of the international maps acknowledge the area to be an Indian Territory.
  • China has some (pre-) historical claims through its ownership of Tibet, but the people and geography primarily favor India.

Back2Basics: Chinese claim over Arunachal Pradesh

  • When the new Peoples Republic of China was formed in February 1912 after the abdication of the Qing emperor, the Tibetans asserted their independence.
  • They forced the Chinese troops based in Lhasa to return to the mainland-via India. A year later, Tibet declared independence from China.
  • In order to ensure that the unrest did not spread to India and assert their boundaries, the ruling British convened a tripartite meeting at Shimla with Tibetan and Chinese delegates to define the border.
  • The meeting gave China suzerainty over most of Tibet, and the boundary defined in this treaty was later known as the McMohan line.

Chinese reluctance

  • The essential dispute is over China’s refusal to acknowledge the McMohan Line as the border between the two nations, and staking claim to large tracts of land as a contiguous part of Tibet.
  • However, it laid claim to the entire state of Arunachal Pradesh.
  • In the 16th century, the most important heritage of the state – Tawang Monastery was built. This is one of the most important sites for Tibetan Buddhists.
  • China never recognized Tibet’s independence nor the 1914 Simla convention.
  • In 1950 China completely took over Tibet. Thus, according to their version, the Tawang region belongs to them.
  • It especially wants to hold on to the monastery as that is a leading center of Tibetan Buddhism in India.

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Foreign Policy Watch: India-China

CPEC- The corridor of uncertainty

Note4Students

From UPSC perspective, the following things are important :

Prelims level: Gilgit-Baltistan Region, CPEC

Mains level: CPEC and India's sovereignty concerns

The China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) has turned five.

What is CPEC?

  • China–Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) is a collection of infrastructure projects that are under construction throughout Pakistan since 2013.
  • It is an extension of the Belt and Road Initiative of China.
  • It intended to upgrade Pakistan’s required infrastructure and strengthen its economy by the construction of modern transportation networks, numerous energy projects, and special economic zones.
  • On 13 November 2016, CPEC became partly operational when Chinese cargo was transported overland to Gwadar Port for onward maritime shipment to Africa and West Asia.

Why in news?

  • The viability of some of the CPEC’s projects, and how they were going to be paid for in a pandemic-hit economy, had come under renewed attention in Pakistan.
  • China had sought additional guarantees before sanctioning a $6 billion loan for the Main Line-1 (ML-1) project, which includes upgrading a 1,872 km rail line from Peshawar to Karachi.
  • This is due to the “weakening financial position of Pakistan” and had “proposed a mix of commercial and concessional loans against Islamabad’s desire to secure the cheapest lending”.

An overrated project

  • The CPEC, to some degree, has been a victim of its own hype.
  • Its economic figure may never materialise as the plan has been “considerably slimmed-down” from the scope that was first imagined.
  • This largely due to the ever-deteriorating financial situation of Pakistan and a visible debt-trap.
  • Pakistan had established a CPEC authority to speed up the execution of several projects that were mired in delays (and to give the military a greater role in the project).

Threats of Baloch insurgency

  • Gwadar, the heartland of CPEC certainly faces serious threats.
  • The city is a prime target for Baloch nationalist insurgents. Hence Pakistan has decided to fence the area.
  • This has sparked a new furore among the local residents.

India’s concerns with CPEC

  • CPEC passes through Pakistan-Occupied Kashmir (Gilgit-Baltistan) which is an Indian territory illicitly occupied by Pakistan.
  • Thus CPEC undermines India’s strategic interests and territorial integrity.
  • More importantly, with CPEC, China will get access to the western Indian Ocean through Gwadar port.
  • This will help China in controlling maritime trade and would affect the freedom of navigation and trade-energy security of India.

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Foreign Policy Watch: India-China

Reading the new US policy on Tibet

Note4Students

From UPSC perspective, the following things are important :

Prelims level: Not Much

Mains level: TIbetan issue and its political recognition

The Tibet Policy and Support Act (TPSA) passed by the US Senate earlier this week, bookends a turbulent year in US-China relations.

Must read:

Tibetan Policy and Support Act (TPSA)

Do you think that India’s support for the Tibetan cause is the root cause of all irritants in India-China relations?

TPSA: A backgrounder

  • The TPSA is an amended version of the Tibet Policy Act of 2002, which came into existence during the Bush Administration.
  • The act once signed into law would make it the official policy of the US Government to oppose any effort by the govt. of the People’s Republic of China to select, educate, and venerate Tibetan Buddhist religious leaders in a manner inconsistent with Tibetan Buddhism.
  • The proposed legislation will empower the US Government to impose sanctions on China who might try to interfere in the process of selecting the next incarnation of the Dalai Lama.

US and China, today

  • US-China relations have become much more difficult over the last two decades, particularly worsening in the Trump Administration.
  • The matters range from the pandemic to trade tariffs and its cross-world coalition-building against Chinese superpower ambitions.
  • Earlier in the year, President Donald Trump signed into law the Hong Kong Autonomy Act.

Fuelled by TPSA

  • Adding much fuel to the issue, the TPSA introduces stronger provisions on Tibet, plus teeth in the form of a threat of sanctions, including travel bans on Chinese officials.

The Dalai Lama

  • Among the most significant amendments is that the TSPA makes it US policy to oppose attempts by Beijing to install its own Dalai Lama in a manner inconsistent with Tibetan Buddhism.
  • The legislation makes reference to the Chinese government’s ‘Measures on the Management of the Reincarnation of Living Buddhas’ in 2007.
  • China had earlier insisted that the reincarnation of living Buddhas including the Dalai Lama must comply with Chinese laws and regulations.

Other provisions of TPSA

  • The TPSA has introduced provisions aimed at protecting the environment of the Tibetan plateau, calling for greater international cooperation and greater involvement by Tibetans.
  • Alleging that China is diverting water resources from Tibet, the TPSA also calls for a regional framework on water security, or use existing frameworks… to facilitate cooperative agreements among all riparian nations.
  • While the 2002 Act said the US should establish a “branch office” in Lhasa, the TSPA ups the ante by changing that to a “consulate”.
  • It recognizes the Central Tibetan Administration, whose Prime Minister Lobsang Sangay takes credit for ensuring that the Senate took up the legislation for a vote.

Chinese response to TPSA

  • China had earlier said the TPSA severely breached international law and basic norms governing international relations, interfered in China’s internal affairs, and sent a wrong message to ‘Tibet independence’ forces”.
  • After the passage of the Bill through the Senate, China said it “resolutely opposes” the “adoption of Bills containing such ill contents on China.

India’s present stance on Tibet

  • If India is pleased with this latest US barb to China, it has not said so openly.
  • India has mostly refrained from playing the Tibet card against China, and like the US, has a one-China policy.
  • It was only this year, in the ongoing Ladakh standoff, that it used Special Forces made up almost entirely of Tibetan exiles to occupy strategic heights in Pangong Tso’s south bank.

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Foreign Policy Watch: India-China

The new League of Nations

Note4Students

From UPSC perspective, the following things are important :

Prelims level: League of Nations

Mains level: Paper 2- Changing global order and opportunities for India

Despite China’s rise, the world will remain committed to multi-polar order. The article highlights the emerging trends in the global order against the backdrop of a pandemic and explains how there could be an opportunity for India.

Changing geopolitical landscape and choices India face

  • As the world is slowly recovering from the disruption caused by the pandemic, there are worrying intimations of other crises looming round the corner.
  • Geopolitics has been transformed and power equations are being altered.
  • There are a new set of winners and losers in the economic changes.
  • Technological advancement will magnify these changes.
  • India will need to make difficult judgements about the world that is taking shape and find its place in a more complex and shifting geopolitical landscape.
  • As the pandemic recedes, the world could draw the right lessons and proceed on a more hopeful trajectory.

Unlearnt lessons: lack of international cooperation

  • Most challenges the world faces are global, like the pandemic.
  • However, international cooperation in either developing an effective vaccine or responding to its health impacts has been minimal.
  • The pre-existing trend towards nationalist urgings, the weakening of international institutions and multilateral processes continues.
  • Even in the distribution of vaccines, we are witnessing a cornering of supplies by a handful of rich nations.

Need for a collaborative solution

  • Global challenges such as climate change, cybersecurity, space security, terrorism, drug trafficking, money laundering and ocean and terrestrial pollution demand collaborative, not competitive solutions.
  • The challenges require some display of statesman-like leadership to mobilise action on a global scale.
  • The nation-state will endure but its conduct will need to be tempered by a spirit of internationalism and a sense of common humanity.

Role of China and Asia

  • The pre-pandemic shift in the centre of gravity of the global economy and political power and influence, from the trans-Atlantic to the trans-Pacific, has been reinforced under the impact of the crisis.
  • East Asian and South-East Asian countries are the first to register the green shoots of recovery.
  • China has been the first large economy to witness a significant rebound in its growth rate.
  • The regional supply chains centred on China have been reinforced rather than disrupted.
  • China will emerge in pole position in the geopolitical sweepstakes commencing in 2021.
  • The power gap with its main rival, the US, will shrink further.

Why should India prefer multi-polar world order

  • As the power gap between India and China is expanding, the threat from China will intensify and demand asymmetrical coping strategies.
  • Despite China emerging a relative gainer from the pandemic the trend towards multi-polarity is here to stay.
  • Neither the US nor China can singly or as a duopoly manage a much more diffused distribution of economic and military capabilities across the globe.
  • This is only possible through multilateral approaches and adherence to the principle of equitable burden-sharing.
  • But a multipolar order can only be stable and keep the peace with a consensus set of norms, managed through empowered institutions of international governance and multilateral processes.
  • India’s instinctive preference has been for a multipolar order as the best assurance of its security and as most conducive to its own social and economic development.
  • India now has the opportunity to make multipolar order as its foreign policy priority as this aligns with the interests of a large majority of middle and emerging powers.
  • This will be an important component of a strategy to meet the China challenge.

The favourable geopolitical moment for India

  • Due to China’s aggressive posture across the board and its unilateral assertions of power, there is a significant push-back even from smaller countries, for example, in South-East Asia and Africa.
  • China’s blatant “weaponisation of economic interdependence” such as action against Australia, has made its economic partners increasingly wary.
  • In this context, India is seen as a potential and credible countervailing power to resist Chinese ambitions.
  • The world wants India to succeed because it is regarded as a benign power wedded to a rule-based order.
  • India can leverage this propitious moment to encourage a significant flow of capital, technology and knowledge to accelerate its own modernisation.

Consider the question “Though it may sound counterintuitive, India which is dealing with pessimism about its economic prospect in the wake of the pandemic, may be located at favourable geopolitical moment” Comment.

Conclusion

India should seize the opportunity and make multi-polar world order a pillar of its foreign policy to counter China threat while trying to leverage the moment to attract the flow of capital, technology and knowledge to accelerate its own modernisation.

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Foreign Policy Watch: India-China

Tibetan Policy and Support Act (TPSA)

Note4Students

From UPSC perspective, the following things are important :

Prelims level: Not Much

Mains level: TIbetan issue

The US and China sparred over Tibet and the South China Sea over the passing of the Tibetan Policy and Support Act (TPSA).

Do you think that India’s support for the Tibetan cause is the root cause of all irritants in India-China relations?

About TPSA

  • The TPSA once signed into law would make it the official policy of the US Government to oppose any effort by the govt. of the People’s Republic of China to select, educate, and venerate Tibetan Buddhist religious leaders in a manner inconsistent with Tibetan Buddhism.
  • The proposed legislation will empower the US Government to impose sanctions on China who might try to interfere in the process of selecting the next incarnation of the Dalai Lama.

Why such a law?

  • Tibetans were concerned over the possibility of the Chinese Government making an attempt to install someone loyal to it as the 15th Dalai Lama after the death of the incumbent.
  • The PRC could use him as a puppet to fizzle out the global campaign against its occupation of Tibet.
  • The incumbent and the 14th Dalai Lama have been living in exile in India ever since his 1959 escape from Tibet, which had been occupied by the Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA) in 1950-51.
  • He has been leading the movement for “genuine autonomy” for Tibet and the Tibetans.

Significance of TPSA

  • The TPSA acknowledged the legitimacy of the Tibetan Parliament in Exile elected by the exiled community as well as the CTA.
  • It seeks to introduce key provisions aimed at protecting the environment and water resources on the Tibetan Plateau.
  • In an aggressive move, the PRC government has forced resettlement of the nomads from grasslands.
  • TPSA recognizes the importance of traditional Tibetan grassland stewardship in mitigating the negative effects of climate change in the region.
  • In addition, it calls for greater international cooperation to monitor the environment on the Tibetan plateau.

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Foreign Policy Watch: India-China

Hazardous ideas for the Himalayas

Note4Students

From UPSC perspective, the following things are important :

Prelims level: Not Much

Mains level: Anthropogenic threats to Himalayas

By planning hydropower projects, India and China are placing the region at great risk.

China’s new hydropower project

  • Recently China announced that it is planning to build a major hydropower project as a part of its 14th Five-Year Plan (2021-25), on the YarlungZanbo River, in Mêdog County in Tibet.
  • The hydropower generation station is expected to provide 300 billion kWh of electricity annually.
  • The Chinese authorities say the project will help the country realize its goal of reaching a carbon emission peak before 2030 and carbon neutrality before 2060.

Misadventures

  • Such ‘super’ dams projects are very unviable as they are being planned in an area that is geologically unstable.
  • There are two hydropower projects being built in Arunachal Pradesh on the tributaries of the Brahmaputra: the 600 MW Kameng project on the Bichom and Tenga Rivers and the 2,000 MW Subansiri Lower Hydroelectricity Project.
  • China has already completed 11 out of 55 projects that are planned for the Tibetan region. In this race, the two countries overestimate their economic potential and grossly underestimate the earthquake vulnerability of the region.
  • High seismic zones coincide with areas of high population concentration in the Himalayan region where landslides and glacial lake outburst floods are common.

Practice Question:‘’Carbon neutrality should not be at the expense of the environment.” Elaborate with proper examples.

Havocs created due to these earthquakes

  • About 15% of the great earthquakes of the 20th century (with a magnitude of more than 8) occurred in the Himalayan region.
  • The northeast Himalayan band has experienced several large earthquakes of magnitude 7 and above in the last 100 years, more than the share from other parts of the Himalayas.
  • The 1950 earthquake just south of the McMahon Line was of 6 magnitudes. It was the largest continental event ever recorded and devastated Tibet and Assam.
  • The earthquake killed thousands, and caused extensive landslides, widespread land level changes and gaping fissures. It resulted in water and mud oozing in the Himalayan ranges and the upper Assam valley.
  • The earthquake was felt over an extensive area comprising parts of India, Tibet, erstwhile East Pakistan and Myanmar.
  • The2015 Gorkha earthquake of magnitude 7.8 in central Nepal resulted in huge losses in the hydropower sector. Nepal lost about 20% of its hydropower capacity consequent to the earthquake.
  • About 30 projects with a capacity of 270 MW, mostly located along the steep river valleys, were damaged.

What are the issues of high concern?

  • The main mechanisms that contributed to the vulnerability of hydropower projects were found to be landslides, which depend on the intensity of seismic ground shaking and slope gradients.
  • Heavy siltation from giant landslides expected in the project sites and headwater region from future earthquakes will severely reduce the water-holding capacity and life expectancy of such dams.
  • Even without earthquakes, the steep slopes made of soft rocks are bound to slide due to deforestation and road-building. These activities will get intensified as part of the dam-building initiatives.
  • Desilting of dams is not an economically viable proposition and is technologically challenging.

A transnational asset under threat

  • The Himalayan range is a transnational mountain chain and is the chief driver of the Asian climate.
  • It is a source for numerous Asian river systems and glaciers which are now under the threat of degradation and retreat due to global warming; these river systems provide water for billions of people.
  • The ongoing low-level military confrontations between these two countries have led to demands for further infrastructural development on both sides, including all-weather roads, much to the peril of regional biodiversity and the livelihoods of the indigenous population.
  • The Himalayas have seen the highest rate of deforestation and land-use changes.

Way Forward

  • There is a need for India and China to sit together to deliberate on the consequences of such misadventures in an area where massive earthquakes are bound to take place.
  • The upper Himalayas should be converted into a nature reserve by an international agreement.
  • The possibility of a Himalayan River Commission involving all the headwater and downstream countries needs to be explored.
  • There is a need to understand that – ‘’Carbon neutrality should not be at the expense of the environment’’.

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Foreign Policy Watch: India-China

Private: China plans for first downstream dam on Brahmaputra

Note4Students

From UPSC perspective, the following things are important :

Prelims level: Brahmaputra river system

Mains level: Chinese assertions in Arunachal region

Chinese hydropower company is set to construct the first downstream dam on the lower reaches of the Brahmaputra river, or Yarlung Zangbo as it is known in Tibet.

Yarlung Zangbo Hydropower Project

  • China will implement the hydropower exploitation in the downstream of the Yarlung Zangbo River” as part of the new Five-Year Plan (2021-2025).
  • China in 2015 operationalised its first hydropower project at Zangmu in Tibet, while three other dams at Dagu, Jiexu and Jiacha are being developed, all on the upper and middle reaches of the river.

Potential of the great bend

  • The “Great Bend” of the Brahmaputra and at the Yarlung Zangbo Grand Canyon in Medogcounty, where the river falls spectacularly over a 2,000 metre-drop and turns sharply to flow across the border into Arunachal Pradesh.
  • If built, it could provide 300 billion kWh of clean, renewable and zero-carbon electricity annually.
  • The project will play a significant role in realising China’s goal of reaching a carbon emissions peak before 2030 and carbon neutrality in 2060.

Concerns for India

  • Indian officials have said the dams are not likely to impact the quantity of the Brahmaputra’s flows in India greatly.
  • This is because they are only storing water for power generation and the Brahmaputra is not entirely dependent on upstream flows with an estimated 35% of its basin is in India.
  • However, India has expressed concerns to China over the four dams on the upper and middle reaches.

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Foreign Policy Watch: India-China

Elections for the Tibetan Parliament-in-Exile (TPiE)

Note4Students

From UPSC perspective, the following things are important :

Prelims level: Comparison of TIbetan constitutional scheme with India

Mains level: TIbetan refugees issue

Over 1.3 lakh Tibetans living in exile and settled across India and other parts of the globe shall be electing their next Parliament-in-Exile, called Central Tibetan Administration, and it’s head in May 2021.

Do you think that India’s support for the Tibetan cause is the root cause of all irritants in India-China relations?

Electing the exiled Government

  • The Tibetan Parliament-in-Exile (TPiE) has its headquarters in Dharamsala, in the Kangra district of Himachal Pradesh.
  • According to the Green Book of the Tibetan government-in-exile, over 1 lakh Tibetans are settled across India.
  • The remaining are settled in United States, Australia, Brazil, Canada, Costa Rica, France, Mexico, Mongolia, Germany, United Kingdom, Switzerland and various other countries.

Here is how the Tibetan elections will be held:

Tibetan Parliament-in-Exile (TPiE)

  • The Speaker and a Deputy Speaker head the Tibetan Parliament-in-exile.
  • The 16th TPiE had 45 members – 10 representatives from each of the traditional provinces of Tibetan – U-Tsang, Dhotoe and Dhomey.
  • It includes two members from each of the four schools of Tibetan Buddhism and the pre-Buddhist Bon religion.
  • Other representatives are from the Tibetan Communities in North America and Europe; and from Australasia and Asia (excluding India, Nepal and Bhutan).
  • Till 2006, it used to be called as Assembly of Tibetan People’s Deputies (ATPDs) with the chairman as its head and a vice-chairman.

Tibetan Constitution

  • The Central Tibetan Administration exists and functions on the basis of the Constitution of the Tibetan government called the ‘The Charter of the Tibetans in Exile’.
  • In 1991, The Constitution Redrafting Committee instituted by the Dalai Lama prepared the Charter for Tibetans in exile. The Dalai Lama approved it on June 28, 1991.
  • In 2001, fundamental changes happened with the amendment of the Charter that facilitated the direct election of the Kalon Tripa by the Tibetans in exile.
  • The Kalon Tripa is called Sikyong or president of the Central Tibetan Administration.

The Kashag (Cabinet)

  • The Kashag (Cabinet) is the Central Tibetan Administration’s highest executive office and comprise seven members.
  • It is headed by the Sikyong (political leader) who is directly elected by the exiled Tibetan population.
  • Sikyong subsequently nominates his seven Kalons (ministers) and seeks the parliament’s approval. The Kashag’s term is for five years.

A backgrounder: Democracy for Tibet

  • The Dalai Lama began democratization soon after he came to India during the 1959 Tibetan National Uprising.
  • He reportedly asked Tibetans in exile to choose their representatives through universal adult suffrage, following which polls were held for electing Tibetan Parliamentarians in 1960.
  • Democracy for the Tibetans, thus, began in exile.
  • The Dalai Lama, however, continued to remain the supreme political leader. On March 14, 2011, he relinquished his political responsibilities, ending a 369-year-old practice.

Is TPiE officially recognised by any country?

  • Not exactly, it is not recognised officially by any country, including India.
  • But, a number of countries including the USA and European nations deal directly with the Sikyong and other Tibetan leaders through various forums.
  • The TPiE claims its democratically-elected character helps it manage Tibetan affairs and raise the Tibetan issue across the world.
  • The incumbent Sikyong, Lobsang Sangay, was among the guests who attended the oath-taking ceremony of our PM in 2014, probably a first.

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Foreign Policy Watch: India-China

China’s use of ‘Microwave Weapons’

Note4Students

From UPSC perspective, the following things are important :

Prelims level: Microwave weapons

Mains level: Not Much

The Indian Army has rejected a report in the British daily newspaper which claimed that the Chinese army had used “microwave weapons” to drive Indian soldiers away from their positions in eastern Ladakh.

The use of non-lethal weapons for violence and mob control is a contested issue. Can you suggest some alternatives to it apart from the use of water cannon and teargas?

What are “Microwave Weapons”?

  • Microwave weapons are supposed to be a type of direct energy weapons, which aim highly focused energy in the form of sonic, laser, or microwaves, at a target.
  • It uses a focussed beam of high-frequency electromagnetic radiation to heat the water in a human target’s skin, causing pain and discomfort.
  • In a microwave oven, an electron tube called a magnetron produces electromagnetic waves (microwaves) that bounce around the metal interior of the appliance, and are absorbed by the food.
  • The microwaves agitate the water molecules in the food, and their vibration produces heat that cooks the food.
  • Food with high water content cooks faster in a microwave often than drier foods.

Which countries have these “microwave weapons”?

  • A number of countries are thought to have developed these weapons to target both humans and electronic systems.
  • According to a report, China had first put on display its “microwave weapon”, called Poly WB-1, at an air show in 2014.
  • The United States has also developed a prototype microwave-style weapon, which it calls the “Active Denial System”.

How dangerous are these weapons?

  • Concerns have been raised on whether they can damage the eyes, or have a carcinogenic impact in the long term.
  • It is not clear yet how China intends to use such a weapon, and whether it can kill or cause lasting damage to human targets.

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Foreign Policy Watch: India-China

Four lessons for the Quad from Asia’s history and geopolitics

Note4Students

From UPSC perspective, the following things are important :

Prelims level: The Quad

Mains level: Paper 2- Fourth factors the Quad must consider about Asia

The article highlights the 4 issues related to the history and geopolitics of Asian that the Quad members should pay attention to while formulating the future course of action. 

The 4 factors

If the Quad is to prosper as a geopolitical construct, it would do well to heed four lessons drawn from the long arc of Asia’s history and geopolitics.

1) Lack of existence of Indo-Pacific system

  • There has never been Indo-Pacific system ever since the rise of the port-based kingdoms of Indochina in the first half of the second millennium.
  •  There were two Asian systems — an Indian Ocean system and an East Asian system — with intricate sub-regional balances.
  • The effort by a U.S. to artificially manufacture to combine the Indo and the Pacific into a unitary system is unlikely to succeed.

2) Lack of peaceful existence dominated by any power

  • The Indo-Pacific region possesses no prior experience of long period of peace, prosperity and stability engineered from its maritime fringes.
  • Rather, dynamic long cycles of Chinese influence radiating outwards have alternated with sharp periods of turmoil.
  • The of ASEAN-centred multilateralism is more in tune with regional tradition and historical circumstance.
  • For their part, the Indo-Pacific’s ‘flanking powers’, India and Japan, have never balanced Chinese power throughout their illustrious histories.

3) India must use its leverage judiciously

  •  The sea lines of communication constitute the important links connecting Indian Ocean to the Western Pacific.
  • It is also a valuable arena of leverage vis-à-vis Chinese shipping and resource flows.
  • This leverage must be wielded judiciously on India’s terms, not on the Quad’s terms.
  • The Quad, after all, has little to offer materially with regard to New Delhi’s continental two-front dilemma.
  • However, ceding this chokepoint leverage will invite overwhelming Chinese pressure against the full range of India’s South Asian interests — to which the other Quad members possess neither will nor desire to answer.

4) Check on China’s India Ocean Ambitions

  •  The Quad has a valuable role to play as a check on China’s Indian Ocean ambitions.
  • India must develop ingrained habits of interoperable cooperation with its Quad partners.
  • This interoperable cooperation could pre-emptively dissuade China from mounting a naval challenge in its backyard.

Conclusion

The Quad must consider these factors while formulating the future course of action.

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Foreign Policy Watch: India-China

Confusion on what the Quad is and its future

Note4Students

From UPSC perspective, the following things are important :

Prelims level: Quad countries

Mains level: Paper 2- Non-alignment and Quad

The article analyses the basics of India’s foreign policy and its implications for the Quad.

Context

  • There is confusion on what the Quad is and its future in India’s international relations.
  • Sustaining that confusion is the proposition that India is abandoning non-alignment in favour of a military alliance with the US in order to counter the China threat.

4 Question on Quad’s future and India’s role

1) What is the nature of alliance?

  • Alliances involve written commitments to come to the defence of the other against a third party.
  • Working of alliance varies according to the distribution of power within the members of an alliance and the changing nature of the external threat.
  • Alliances come in multiple shapes and forms — they could be bilateral or multilateral, formal or informal and for the long-term or near term.
  • Alliances feature in India’s ancient strategic wisdom and contemporary domestic politics in India.
  • Yet, when it comes to India’s foreign policy, alliances are seen as a taboo.
  • Part of the problem is that India’s image of alliances is frozen in the moment when India became independent.
  • After the Second World War, a newly independent India did not want to be tied down by alliances of the Cold War.
  • That notion is seen as central to Indian worldview.

2) Does India forge alliances?

  • Contrary to conventional wisdom, India has experimented with alliances of different kinds.
  • During the First World War, some nationalists aligned with Imperial Germany to set up the first Indian government-in-exile in Kabul.
  • In the Second World War, Subhas Chandra Bose joined forces with Imperial Japan to set up a provisional government.
  • Policy of non-alignment among the great powers also did not rule out alliances in a different context.
  • For example, when Bhutan, Nepal and Sikkim turned to Delhi for protection amidst Maoist China’s advance into Tibet during 1949-50, Nehru signed security treaties with them.
  • India turned to the US for military support to cope with the Chinese aggression in 1962.
  • Indira Gandhi signed a security cooperation agreement with the Soviet Union in 1971 to cope with the crisis in East Pakistan.
  • Then, as now, there was much anxiety in Delhi about India abandoning non-alignment.
  • India does do alliances but the question is when, under what conditions and on what terms.

3)  Is the US offering India an alliance against China?

  • The current political discourse in Washington is hostile to alliance-making.
  • President Donald Trump does not miss an opportunity to trash US alliances.
  • In any case, formal commitments do not always translate into reality during times of war.
  • Even within the long-standing US military alliances with Japan and the Philippines, there is much legal quibbling over what exactly is the US’s obligation against, say, Chinese aggression.
  • In case of the Quad, it is quite clear that Washington is not offering a military alliance, nor is Delhi asking for one.
  • Because it knows India has to fight its own wars.
  • Both countries, however, are interested in building issue-based coalitions in pursuit of shared interests.

4) Instrumental nature of alliance

  • Agreements for security cooperation are made in a specific context and against a particular threat.
  • When those circumstances change, security treaties are not worth the paper they are written.
  • Consider India’s security treaties with Nepal, Bangladesh and Russia.
  • The 1950 Treaty was designed to protect Nepal against the Chinese threat.
  • Now, Nepali communists have long argued that the Treaty is a symbol of Indian hegemony.
  • India’s 1972 security treaty with Bangladesh did not survive the 1975 assassination of the nation’s founder, Mujibur Rahman.
  • India’s own enthusiasm for the 1971 treaty with Moscow waned within a decade.
  • Today Beijing is Moscow’s strongest international partner, a reality that has a bearing on India’s strategic partnership with Russia.

What India can learn from China about alliances

  • Mao aligned with the Soviet Union after in 1949 and fought the Korean War against the US during 1950-53.
  • He broke from Russia in the early 1960s and moved closer to the US in the 1970s.
  • Mao, who denounced US alliances in Asia, was happy to justify them if they were directed at Russia.
  • He also welcomed Washington’s alliance with Tokyo as a useful means to prevent the return of Japanese nationalism and militarism.
  • Having benefited from the partnership with the US, China is trying to push America out of Asia and establish its own regional primacy.
  • Delhi could learn from Beijing in not letting the theological debates about alliances cloud its judgements about the extraordinary economic and security challenges India confronts today.

Conclusion

The infructuous obsession with non-alignment diverts Delhi’s policy attention away from the urgent task of rapidly expanding India’s national capabilities in partnership with like-minded partners.

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Foreign Policy Watch: India-China

India needs a China plan

Note4Students

From UPSC perspective, the following things are important :

Prelims level: Not much

Mains level: Paper 2- India-China relations

The article discusses the issue of dealing with China in the aftermath of clashes on the border.

Understanding the importance of Tibet

  • Tibet is the roof of the world, with vast mineral and natural resources.
  • The mighty rivers that emanate from its expansive glaciers — such as the Brahmaputra, the Yangtse, the Yellow river, the Mekong, the Salween and the Indus — together with thousands of their tributaries have nurtured civilisations in peripheral countries for centuries.
  • The Kailash Mansarovar is centered in this region.
  • In an act of naked aggression, China occupied Tibet in 1959.
  • A buffer was eliminated, and the de facto boundary of China became contiguous to that of India.
  • That boundary was deliberately left undemarcated to enable further expansion.

Understanding China’s stand

  • China has land borders with 14 neighbours covering an estimated 22,100 kilometres.
  • Post-independence, and as its economic status increased, so did its military muscle.
  • China embarked on claims based on perceived imbalances of treaties forced on countries when they were weak.
  • Some of these have since been resolved after bloody clashes such as with Russia and Vietnam, while others have been resolved using a combination of lucrative offers.
  • Russia accepted half of China’s claim, Kazakhstan was given lucrative economic deals, Kyrgyzstan retained 70% of the land, ceding just 30%, and so on.

Way forward

  • The road ahead will have to be evolved and based on a study of the manner in which China has negotiated its boundary disputes with 12 of its neighbours.
  • Under the prevailing circumstances, it has become imperative to form a group of experts.
  • This group will plan and prepare, short-, medium- and long-term goals to achieve them within a suggested time frame.

 Conclusion

Let us play down the rhetoric and adopt a pragmatic approach. It can no longer be a part-time issue to be addressed only when a crisis occurs. The crisis is upon us now.

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Foreign Policy Watch: India-China

Our larger China picture

Note4Students

From UPSC perspective, the following things are important :

Prelims level: Not much

Mains level: Paper 2- India-China relations

Context

  • After the skirmish at the border, Beijing started to concentrate troops, armoured vehicles and munitions opposite our posts in Aksai China at Galwan.

2 interpretations of China’s move

  • First believes that the Chinese exercise was a territorial snatch in Aksai Chin, which they believe is entirely theirs.
  • The move was accompanied by a “lesson” to the Indians on aggressive Indian behaviour in not conceding Aksai Chin.
  • The second school of thought in India believes that territory has nothing to do with it.
  • They believe that, due to growing economic power, Beijing will lay down the rules of world governance.

How it matters for India

  • India contest China’s entire southern border, refuse to join the Belt and Road initiative, create an anti-China maritime coalition, compete with them for influence in South East Asia and Africa.
  • India is also unsupportive of their crackdown on Taiwan, Hong Kong and Xinjiang and move ever closer to the United States.
  • When China assumes hegemonic power after 2030, India is going to get a nasty surprise.
  • Secularism, democracy and the rights of man will play no part in Chinese foreign policy.
  • China will overturn every international, financial, trade, diplomatic, arms control and nuclear agreement that the world has put together in seven decades.

Way forward

  • We in India need to conduct a large and vociferous debate on Chinese intentions.
  • If the Chinese intention is to “teach us a lesson” we need a new national strategy, combining diplomatic and military means.
  •  If our national goal is to concentrate on the creation of wealth and growing GDP, let us proclaim it, tighten our belt, look down and avoid conflict.

Conclusion

What China wants is Indian acceptance of Beijing’s benign superiority, and that is a purely Chinese trait, not to be confused with the known rules of international diplomacy. Talking from a position of inferiority will not lead to an equitable solution. But first, a national debate.

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Foreign Policy Watch: India-China

Neither war nor peace between India and China

Note4Students

From UPSC perspective, the following things are important :

Prelims level: Not much

Mains level: Paper 2- India-China relations

The article analyses the challenges in the India-China border dispute and the recent events of Chinese aggression.

Trust deficit

  • The recent Chinese actions have set back trust between the two countries by decades.
  • Trust made sense when both sides could assume that the other side either did not have the capacity or would not rapidly deploy troops in strategic positions at the border.
  • With the building of infrastructure on both sides, this trust was bound to break.
  • Even after temporary disengagement, both sides will now have distrust about the deployment of the other side.
  • An infrastructure-thick environment will require a permanent presence and closer deployments.

Challenges

  •  At the level of the army, India seems to have consistently misread the PLA’s intentions.
  •  The closer the armies get, the greater the risks.
  • There is a political logic that does not bode well. There is still speculation on why the Chinese are taking an aggressive posture.
  • The very fact that we are not sure of Chinese motives means it is hard to know their endgame.

Chinese fears

  • At a basic level, they will want to secure their interests in CPEC.
  • Tibet issue has also been a sensitive issue for China.
  •  Chinese interest in Nepal is less to encircle India. It is to ensure Nepal is not used as a staging ground of resistance in Tibet.

Tibet issues in India-China relations

  • On Tibet issue India is in an awkward situation.
  • Due to the presence of the Dalai Lama in India, China will see it as a potential threat to its cultural hegemony in Tibet.
  • Ladakh and Tawang are also important pieces in that cultural consolidation.
  • The Sino-India peaceful relations were premised on keeping the Tibet issue in check.
  • But just as we are not sure of Chinese motives, they may not be sure of our motives either.

New paradigm in India’s foreign policy

  • India growing power means it needs a new paradigm of foreign policy.
  • This policy will supposedly safeguard India’s interests more assertively.
  • If diplomatically not well managed, this change also causes great uncertainty in the international system.
  • India’s Pakistan policy is premised entirely on keeping them guessing on what we might do, including possible military options and altering the territorial status quo.
  • Our domestic ideological articulation of India’s position ranges from reclaiming PoK to Aksai Chin.
  • We cannot abandon Tibetans.
  • This underscores a narrative of uncertainty over our intentions.

Conclusion

Our own trumpeted departure from the past, without either the diplomatic preparation, domestic political discipline, and full anticipation of military eventualities, does not make it easy for others to understand our endgame.

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Foreign Policy Watch: India-China

Chushul Valley and its Significance

Note4Students

From UPSC perspective, the following things are important :

Prelims level: Chushul Valley

Mains level: India-China border skirmishes

The Chushul sub-sector has come into focus in the standoff between the Indian and PLA troops.

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What is the Chushul Valley?

  • The Chushul sub-sector lies south of Pangong Tso in eastern Ladakh.
  • It comprises high, broken mountains and heights of Thatung, Black Top, Helmet Top, Gurung Hill, and Magger Hill besides passes such as Rezang La and Reqin La, the Spanggur Gap, and the Chushul valley.
  • Situated at a height of over 13,000 feet close to the LAC, the Chushul Valley has a vital airstrip that played an important role even during the 1962 War with China.

What is its strategic importance to India?

  • Chushul is one among the five Border Personnel Meeting points between the Indian Army and the People’s Liberation Army of China.
  • It enjoys tremendous strategic and tactical importance because of its location and terrain, which make it a centre for logistics deployment.
  • This sector has plains that are a couple of km wide, where mechanized forces, including tanks, can be deployed. Its airstrip and connectivity by road to Leh add to its operational advantages.
  • Indian troops have now secured the ridgeline in this sub-sector that allows them to dominate the Chushul bowl on the Indian side, and Moldo sector on the Chinese side.
  • They also have a clear sight of the almost 2-km-wide Spanggur gap, which the Chinese used in the past to launch attacks on this sector in the 1962 War.

How is Chushul important to China?

  • Simply put, Chushul is the gateway to Leh. If China enters the Chushul, it can launch its operations for Leh.
  • After the initial attacks, including on the Galwan valley by the Chinese in October 1962, the PLA troops prepared to attack Chushul airfield and the valley to get direct access to Leh.
  • However, just before the attacks were launched, the area was reinforced by the 114 Brigade in November 1962, which also had under its command two troops of armour and some artillery.

What are the challenges in this area?

  • An immediate challenge is of a flare-up as troops of the two countries are deployed within a distance of 800 to 1,000 metres of each other at Black Top and Reqin La.
  • Logistics also pose a major challenge. There is a need to carry water and food to the top which soldiers cannot do.
  • The harsh winter that lasts for eight months of the year poses a big challenge.
  • It is very difficult to dig in and make shelters on the ridgeline. The temperature falls to minus 30 degrees Celsius, and there are frequent snowstorms.

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Foreign Policy Watch: India-China

Non-War Military Tactics used by China

Note4Students

From UPSC perspective, the following things are important :

Prelims level: NA

Mains level: India-China Relations

An annual report from the U.S. Department of Defense describes Chinese leaders’ use of tactics short of armed conflict to further the country’s objectives, citing border conflicts with India and Bhutan among the examples.

Try this question:

Q. What are Non-War Military Activities (NWMA)? Discuss how China is using NWMA as a tool for its overtly ambitious expansionist policy.

Various non-war military tactics

The report describes Non-War Military Activities (NWMA) as one of two kinds of military operations (the other is war) used by the PLA. NWMA can be conducted internationally or domestically and encompass activities in multiple domains.

(1) Provoking armed conflict

  • China calibrates its coercive activities to fall below the threshold of provoking conflict with the United States, its allies and partners, or others in the Indo-Pacific region.
  • It can notably include operations in which the PLA uses coercive threats and/or violence below the level of armed conflict against states and other actors to safeguard its expansionism.
  • These tactics are particularly evident in China’s pursuit of its territorial and maritime claims in the South and East China Seas as well as along its border with India and Bhutan.

(2) Neo-imperialist tools

  • China also employs non-military tools coercively, including economic tools during periods of political tensions with countries that China accuses of harming its national interests.
  • The Belt and Road Initiative is leading to a greater overseas military presence for China in the guise to protect its economic interests.

(3) Multilateralism as a strategic messaging tool

  • The report says that China uses multilateral forums and international organisations to generate new opportunities to expand its influence, strengthen its political influence.
  • It promotes strategic messaging that portrays China as a responsible global actor, advances its development interests, and limit outside interference in and criticism of its initiatives.
  • The Brazil Russia India China South Africa (BRICS) grouping and Shanghai Cooperation Organization are among those cited as examples of this alleged phenomenon.

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Foreign Policy Watch: India-China

India needs an internationalism that is rooted in realism

Note4Students

From UPSC perspective, the following things are important :

Prelims level: Not much

Mains level: Paper 2- Evolution of India's approach to Asian regionalism and internationalism

The article analyses India’s approach towards regional integration in Asian unity and internationalism and its consequences.

Clash between internationalism and nationalism

  • Three current developments reveal the clash between grandiose internationalism and the intractable nationalism.
  • 1) India pulled out of the military exercise of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation, which was to herald a new era of Eurasian unity.
  • Sharpening contradictions between India and China comes in the way of uniting such a large geopolitical space.
  • 2) Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s claim to leadership of the Muslim world that has run into resistance from a large section of the Arab rulers.
  • 3) The tension between the globalism of the US foreign policy establishment and Donald Trump’s “America First” nationalism.

Internationalism and threats to it

  • Western liberalism has had more power than anyone else to promote internationalism.
  • But the liberal internationalist effort at constructing supra-national institutions now faces big setbacks.
  • The greatest resistance to the liberal internationalist vision has not come within the US.
  • Trump channelled the American resentments against the globalist excesses of the Wall Street, Washington and the Silicon Valley.

India’s nationalism

  • Indian nationalism was inevitably influenced by liberal internationalism, socialism, communism, pan-Islamism, pan-Asianism and Third-Worldism to name a few.
  • Both the Asian Relations Conference (Delhi 1947) and the Afro-Asian Conference (Bandung 1955) showed up the deep differences among the Asian elites.
  • India then turned its back on Asianism to claim the leadership of the broader Non-Aligned Movement.
  • After the Cold War, India re-embraced Asianism in the 1990s when it unveiled the Look East Policy.
  • India also joined the Asian regional institutions led by the Association of South-East Asian Nations.

RCEP joining issue

  • Few could have anticipated that Delhi would walk out of one of the most consequential agreements negotiated by the ASEAN — the RCEP — that sought Asia-wide economic integration.
  • Delhi believed that the contradiction between India’s domestic commercial interests and a China-led Asian economic regionalism was irreconcilable.

India’s approach toward Asian regionalism

  • Eurasian regionalism led by Moscow and Beijing is also facing tensions and there is deepening conflict between Indian and Chinese interests.
  • India’s diplomatic finesse on the SCO has become increasingly unsustainable after Chinese aggression in eastern Ladakh.
  • India underestimated the economic and political consequences of China’s rapid rise while seeking economic regionalism in East Asia and the multi-polar world with Russia and China.
  • India took a benign view of Chinese power and has been shocked to discover otherwise in 1962 and in 2020.

Conclusion

India today needs more internationalism, than less, in dealing with the Chinese power. But it must be an internationalism that is rooted in realism and tethered to India’s economic and national security priorities.

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Foreign Policy Watch: India-China

Leveraging its market to force China to settle border issue

Note4Students

From UPSC perspective, the following things are important :

Prelims level: Not much

Mains level: Paper 2- India-China relations

The article charts out the plan to leverage the potential and the present size of the India markets to settle the boundary dispute with China.

Boycott of Chinese goods: view and counterview

  • After Galwan incident, there have been calls for the boycott of Chinese goods.
  • Counter views have been expressed that the Indian economy is so dependent on China that the costs would be disproportionately higher for India.
  • Our dependence can be reduced substantially if there is a national will and resolve to do so.

Need for mutually acceptable boundary agreement

  • China may not be willing to go back substantially from the areas they have occupied.
  • Agreeing on maintaining peace and tranquillity or clarification of the LAC has left space for the Chinese to create border incidents which have now led to casualties.
  • So India needs to get China to seriously negotiate a mutually acceptable boundary agreement.

India could use its market as leverage

  • Size of Indian market: The size of the Indian market and its potential in the coming years provides India considerable leverage.
  • But to use this leverage, Indians, individual consumers as well as firms, have to accept that there would be a period of adjustment in which they would have to pay higher prices.
  • The Chinese have a competitive advantage and are integral to global supply chains.
  • But whatever they sell is, and can be, made elsewhere in the world.
  • Indian can produce everything imported by China: Most of what we import from China was, is and can be made in India itself.
  • With volumes and economies of scale, the cost of production in India would decline as it did in China.

Steps need to be taken to use market as leverage

  • Focus on those imports from China which have been increasing: The initial focus should be on items which are still being made in India and where imports from China have been increasing.
  • Depriciate Rupees: If the RBI let the currency depreciate in real terms it would be equivalent to an increase in import duties of about 10 per cent.
  • China-specific safeguard duties and use of non-tariff trade barriers should be used in segments like electrical appliances to let Indian producers expand production and increase market share.
  • Government Finances for expansion: The government should also facilitate the flow of finances for expansion and provide technical support for testing, improving quality and lowering costs of production.
  • Look for other players: In critical areas such as Active Pharmaceutical Ingredients, we need a vigorous approach to procure from elsewhere and have early production in India.
  • The government could provide support for environmental compliance to bring down costs of production.This would create demand for domestic goods and services.
  • There are strategic sectors where we should reduce vulnerability: Like scrutiny of -Chinese FDI, Chinese 5G participation etc.
  • Assured government procurement: In critical areas like solar panel and grid storage batteries private investment for manufacturing in India would be triggered by assured government procurement.

Consider the question “Size and potential of India market could be leverage by India to settle the issues it has with its neighbour. What India needs to achieve this is a strategy and its implementation. Comment.”

Conclusion

A sustained and graded economic response to the recent Chinese conduct on the border is needed. We should signal India’s firm resolve and willingness to bear the cost. China could choose to settle the border amicably and have full access to our market. We could then work together to make this the Asian century.

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Foreign Policy Watch: India-China

Seeking equilibrium with China

Note4Students

From UPSC perspective, the following things are important :

Prelims level: Not much

Mains level: Paper 2- India-China relations

The article analyses the India’s efforts to establish strategic equilibrium with assertive China and how that idea clashes with China’s desire to form an Asian order with itself at the top.

Strategic equilibrium

  •  External Affairs Minister S Jaishankar articulated that India is seeking strategic equilibrium with an increasingly aggressive China.
  • It is hoped that with China’s growing differences with the U.S. China would pay attention to India’s sensitivities.
  • In achieving equilibrium with China, India has bravely been confronting a face-off in the Himalayas for the past several months.
  • India has been building issue-based alliances with the US and Asian majors like Japan, Korea, Vietnam and Indonesia, and Australia.
  • It has taken initiatives in the direction of economic de-coupling with China in the name of “atmanirbharata”.

Hierarchical Asian order with China at top

  • China is not interested in equilibrium with any of its Asian neighbours, least of all with India.
  • China’s efforts are clearly to build a hierarchical Asian order, with itself at the top.
  • It is acutely conscious of India’s economic strength, military modernisation and overall capabilities.
  • It knows that India is also far behind on these counts.
  • China is ruthlessly resisting India’s access to global governance bodies, such as the UNSC and NSG.
  • To keep India tied at that level, China is objecting to India’s growing strategic proximity to the US. I
  • It is encircling India strategically and economically through its strategic and economic corridors — BCIM (Bangladesh, China, India and Myanmar), CPEC and the Trans-Himalayan Connectivity Network.
  • It is raising issues like Kashmir at the UN and establishing footprints in the Indian Ocean.

What should India do

1. Adjust with China, at least tactically.

  • Such an adjustment could be based on mutual give and take.
  • For India, our first priority could be the resolution of the border dispute.
  • Secondly, since China has offered to mediate between India and Pakistan, it should be asked to prevail over Pakistan to resolve the Kashmir issue.
  • In return for these “takes” India could offer access to Chinese commercial cargos to sea, through the Nathula pass.
  • India could also join China’s BRI on mutually acceptable terms.
  • India may also show its willingness, at least tactically, to join CPEC as both Pakistan and China have asked for, provided, India is allowed to undertake projects in PoK and Balochistan.

2.India should revisit its Tibet policy, which is a core irritant for China.

Consider the question “China seeking to establish an Asian order with itself at the top comes in the way of India establishing strategic equilibrium with China. Comment.”

Conclusion

It is possible that this “give” and “take” may not be acceptable to China. Even if it does not work out as planned, India would have made a bold diplomatic initiative and a huge tactical move towards thinking through out-of-the-box solutions and displaying that it can undertake risks to pursue its long-term national interests.

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Foreign Policy Watch: India-China

What India should consider about the proposition to isolate China

Note4Students

From UPSC perspective, the following things are important :

Prelims level: Not much

Mains level: Paper 2- India-China relations

The economic grip China exerts on the world protects it from the threat of isolation. This article examines this issue and its implications for India.

Worsening U.S.-China ties and implications for other countries

  • After years of cooperating with one another, the U.S. and China are currently at the stage of confrontation.
  • Both are seeking allies to join their camps.
  • This places several countries in Asia, in a difficult position as most of them, loathe to take sides.
  • The U.S. may not necessarily be the first choice for many countries of Asia and the Asia-Pacific region.
  • In the case of China, it is clearly more feared than loved.

China’s aggression

  •  Beijing’s virtual takeover of Hong Kong has only confirmed what had long been known about China’s intentions.
  • In March-April this year, China further stepped up its aggressive actions, renaming almost 80 geographical features in the region as an index of Chinese sovereignty.
  •  Taiwan, Japan, Vietnam, Indonesia and South Korea have all complained about China’s menacing postures in their vicinity.

How countries are resisting China

  • Hardly any country in Asia is willing to openly confront China, and side with the U.S.
  • East Asian countries explain that China was always known to be over-protective of the South China Sea.
  • And China consider South China Sea a natural shield against possible hostile intervention by outside forces inimical to it.
  • No U.S. assurance and Chinese aggression has been enough to make countries in the region openly side with the U.S. and against China.

China’s economic grip and lessons for India

  • Despite a series of diktats from Washington to restrict economic and other relations, China remains unfazed.
  • China seems confident that its stranglehold on the global economy ensures that it does not face any real challenge.
  • It would be wise for India to recognise this.
  • It is equally necessary to realise how fickle some of these countries can be when it comes to economic issues.
  •  At a recent meeting in Washington Australia (a member of the Quad) made it clear that China is important for Australia.
  • Likewise, the U.K.’s Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, recently stated in its Parliament, that the U.K. wants a positive relationship with China.
  • It is evident that few nations across the world are willing to risk China’s ire because of strong economic ties.

India’s relations with neighbouring countries: concerns

  • India’s relations with Nepal, meanwhile, have hit a roadblock over the Kalapani area.
  • In Sri Lanka, the return of the Rajapaksas to power after the recent elections does not augur too well for India-Sri Lanka relations.
  • The strain in India-Bangladesh relations is a real cause for concern since it can provide a beachhead against Chinese activities in the region.

Growing Chinese presence in India’s sphere of influence

  •  In July, the Chinese Foreign Minister organised a virtual meeting of the Foreign Ministers of Nepal, Afghanistan and Pakistan.
  • In this meeting, China proposed economic corridor plan with Nepal, styled as the Trans-Himalayan Multi-Dimensional Connectivity Network.
  • China has also made headway in Iran to an extent, again at India’s expense.

Conclusion

Geo-balancing is not happening to China’s disadvantage. This lesson must be well understood when India plan its future strategy.

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Foreign Policy Watch: India-China

What are Confucius Institutes, and why are they under the scanner in India?

Note4Students

From UPSC perspective, the following things are important :

Prelims level: Confucius Institutes

Mains level: India-China diplomatic spat since border skirmishes

  • The Ministry of Education (previously HRD) had sent a letter to several institutions seeking information about the activities of their Confucius Institutes (CIs) and Chinese language training centres.
  • This has brought the spotlight to China’s CI programme, a key pillar of Beijing’s global soft power effort, and raised questions about the future of India-China cooperation in the education space.

Try this question for mains:

Q.“It cannot be business as usual with China after the border clash.” Critically comment.

What are the Confucius Institutes (CI)?

  • Starting with a CI in Seoul in 2004, China’s National Office for Teaching Chinese as a Foreign Language (NOCFL) known as Hanban establishes CI.
  • China has established 550 CIs and 1,172 Confucius Classrooms (CCs) housed in foreign institutions, in 162 countries.
  • As the Hanban explains on its website, following the experience of the British Council, Alliance Française and Germany’s Goethe-Institut, China began “establishing non-profit public institutions which aim to promote Chinese language and culture in foreign countries”.

What is the presence of CIs in India?

  • India is reviewing the presence of CIs in seven universities, in addition to 54 MoUs on inter-school cooperation involving China, which is not connected to the CI programme.

How have CIs been viewed around the world?

  • The CI arrangement has generated debate in the West, where some universities have closed the institutes amid concern over the influence of the Chinese government and it’s funding on host institutions.
  • Closures of some CIs have been reported in the United States, Denmark, the Netherlands, Belgium, France and Sweden.
  • While the closures in the West have made news, these cases still represent a minority. Faced with this backlash, China is now rebranding the programme.
  • Most of the 550 CIs and more than 1,000 CCs around the world are still active, with a presence spanning Africa, Central Asia, Latin America, and across Asia.

What does it mean for India-China relations?

  • CIs and CCs had already been in India for more than 10 years.
  • Even prior to the border skirmishes, Indian authorities had viewed the CI arrangement somewhat warily.
  • Along with the new move to review CIs, Mandarin has been dropped from the list of foreign languages that can be taught in schools in the new National Education Policy.

Not a perfect move

  • Recent moves by India shows that it cannot be business as usual with China after the border clash.
  • However, India’s long-term objectives are not clear.
  • De-emphasizing learning Mandarin is neither likely to impact China’s stance on the border nor help India in developing the expertise and resources it needs in dealing with China.

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Foreign Policy Watch: India-China

Russia-India-China: A triangle that is still relevant

Note4Students

From UPSC perspective, the following things are important :

Prelims level: SCO

Mains level: Paper 2-India's relations with Russia and China

RIC engagement started on the promising note but the geopolitical changes over the last two decades have set the three countries on diverging paths. It is against this backdrop, the article articulates why RIC is still relevant.

Background of RIC

  • The RIC dialogue commenced in the early 2000s.
  • At that time the three countries were positioning themselves for a transition from a unipolar to a multipolar world order.
  •  It was not an anti-U.S. construct though.
  • The initial years of the RIC dialogue coincided with an upswing in India’s relations with Russia and China.
  • The 2003 decision to bring a political approach to India-China boundary dispute and to develop other cooperation, encouraged a multi-sectoral surge in relations.
  • An agreement in 2005, identifying political parameters applicable in an eventual border settlement, implicitly recognised India’s interests in Arunachal Pradesh.

Growing India-U.S. relations

  • During the same period in which RIC dialogues took place, India’s relations with the U.S. surged.
  • This involved trade and investment, a landmark civil nuclear deal and a burgeoning defence relationship.
  • This rising relations with the U.S. met India’s objective of diversifying military acquisitions away from a near-total dependence on Russia.
  • The U.S. saw value in partnering with a democratic India in Asia as China was rapidly emerging as a challenger.

How India-U.S. relations affected RIC

  • China went back on the 2005 agreement.
  • It launched the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor and worked to undermine India’s influence in its neighbourhood.
  • And expanded its military and economic presence in the Indian Ocean.
  • As U.S.-Russia relations imploded in 2014 after the annexation/accession of Crimea.
  • Russia’s pushback against the U.S. included cultivating the Taliban in Afghanistan and enlisting Pakistan’s support for it.
  • The western campaign to isolate Russia drove it into a much closer embrace of China.

Thus, the RIC claim of overlapping or similar approaches to key international issues, sounds hollow today. But it is still holds significance.

Why RIC is still significant for India

1) SCO

  • Central Asia is strategically located, bordering our turbulent neighbourhood.
  •  Pakistan’s membership of SCO and the potential admission of Iran and Afghanistan heighten the significance of the SCO for India.
  • It is important for India to shape the Russia-China dynamics in this region, to the extent possible.
  • The Central Asian countries have signalled they would welcome such a dilution of the Russia-China duopoly.
  • The ongoing India-Iran-Russia is an important initiative for achieving an effective Indian presence in Central Asia, alongside Russia and China.

2) Significant bilateral relations

  • India’s defence and energy pillars of partnership with Russia remain strong.
  • Access to Russia’s abundant natural resources can enhance our materials security.
  • With China too, while the recent developments should accelerate our efforts to bridge the bilateral asymmetries, disengagement is not an option.

3) The Indo-Pacific issue

  • For India, it is a geographic space of economic and security importance, in which a cooperative order should prevent the dominance of any external power.
  • China sees our Indo-Pacific initiatives as part of a U.S.-led policy of containing China.
  • Russia’s Foreign Ministry sees the Indo-Pacific as an American ploy to draw India and Japan into a military alliance against China and Russia.
  • India should focus on economic links with the Russian Far East and the activation of a Chennai-Vladivostok maritime corridor.
  • This may help persuade Russia that its interests in the Pacific are compatible with our interest in diluting Chinese dominance in the Indo-Pacific.

4) Strategic autonomy of India

  • The current India-China stand-off has intensified calls for India to fast-track partnership with the U.S.
  • National security cannot be fully outsourced.
  • India’s quest for autonomy of action is based on its geographical realities, historical legacies and global ambitions.

Consider the question “The changing geopolitical landscape should not dampen the importance of India’s engagement in the RIC (Russia-India-China) triangle. Comment.” 

Conclusion

India should continue its engagement in the RIC while keeping and protecting its interests.

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Foreign Policy Watch: India-China

Exploring options to tackle China

Note4Students

From UPSC perspective, the following things are important :

Prelims level: Not much.

Mains level: Paper 2- Options in dealing with China

There are several options which India could explore in dealing with China with less cost but significant effectiveness. Diplomacy is one of them. What are the other options? Read the article to know…

Context

  • China’s aggression and Galwan valley incident dismantles the Border Agreements of 1993, 1996, 2005 and 2013.
  • Understanding China’s objectives become critical in this situation.

Analysing China’s objectives

  • Humbling India in the eyes of Asia and the world was all important for China.
  • Despite China’s territorial aggression, it would be a mistake to think that China is preparing for a conflict over territory.
  • China is well aware that it cannot be certain whether it will emerge a victor from an all-out conflict with India.
  •  China cannot afford to jeopardise its future for the present.
  • China has been intent on transforming the Asian region in its own image, and, simultaneously, seeking to become a continental and a maritime power.

What are the options to deal with China

  • India may well find non-military tools not only more cost-effective but also less risky.
  • 1)  Exploiting the current widespread opposition to China, India must try to create international opinion in its support regarding border violations.
  • 2) Cultivation of foreign leaders with a view to draw their specific attention to China’s aggressive policies and designs is the second option.
  • India’s involvement with the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) should prove invaluable in this respect.
  • 3) India must also overhaul its ‘messaging’ capacity.
  • It should make greater use of technology to send across its message and ideas in its vicinity and across the globe, highlighting its peaceful intentions in stark contrast to China’s aggressive policies and tactics.
  • 4)  India must pay particular attention to relations with countries in its neighbourhood, such as Nepal and Bangladesh, and allies such as Iran and Vietnam.
  • Relationship with these countries seems to have frayed at the edges, with India being more intent on strengthening relations with the West.
  • Smaller countries of Asia, which constantly face China’s aggressive interference in their internal affairs, have not received much support from India, and this needs India’s attention.
  • 5) India’s true strength is its unity in diversity. A truly united and resilient India is the best antidote to China’s attempts to humble India.
  • China has never been able to properly understand, the strength India seems to derive from its spiritual, religious and cultural attributes, which are a part of its civilisational heritage.
  • 6) India would do well to take pole position in propagating ‘Himalayan Buddhism’ which China has been seeking to subvert to achieve its ends.

Consider the question “To counter the challenges manifested by China through recent events India needs to explore along with other options the subtler tools of power available to it. Examine the other tools available with India.”

Conclusion

Military no doubt project the country’s power but there are other options with less cost and significant benefits. India should focus on these options as well while dealing with China.

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Foreign Policy Watch: India-China

Changing dynamics in China-Pakistan collusion against India

Note4Students

From UPSC perspective, the following things are important :

Prelims level: Not much

Mains level: Paper 2- China-Pakistan collusion in Jammu and Kashmir

India has always been aware of the China-Pak collusion and their mutual support to each others’ actions. But the underlying basis has been changing now. It is no longer Pakistan seeking Chinese support in J&K as much as it is the other way around.

Preparedness for a two-front war

  • The debate regarding India’s capability to fight a war in which there is full collusion between China and Pakistan has generally remained inconclusive.
  • Most detractors of the belief regarding China’s military-operational support to Pakistan, have leaned on the argument that China will adopt a policy to suit its interests.
  • Both in 1965 and 1971, China made some promises to Pakistan but chose to stay away.
  • Of course, that was during the Cold War — a completely different international strategic environment.

China-Pakistan collection action in Kashmir

  • Pakistan increased its proxy campaign in J&K almost in sync with two China-related trends.
  • First, enhanced PLA assertiveness in Eastern Ladakh.
  • Second, the announcement of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI).
  • A progressively altering Chinese attitude towards the Kashmir issue started to take shape as early as 2008-09, with issuing stapled visas to Indians residing in J&K and denial of a visa to the Northern Army Commander were signs of it.
  • This support was also witnessed on issues like the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG), Pakistan’s involvement in global terrorism and the abrogation of Article 370.

Pincer approach in Ladakh

  • It is no longer Pakistan seeking Chinese support for its adventurism as much as it is the other way around.
  • The mutuality of interests has increased and military coordination has become a larger part of the overall strategy.
  • China may force further escalation this season depending upon how the world responds to its expansionism.
  • China could also adopt a posture which prepares it, along with Pakistan, towards a future “pincer approach” in Ladakh.
  • Along with Ladakh — Arunachal, Sikkim and the Central Sector are very part of the expanded collusive strategy.
  • But it is Ladakh where the effect is intended most and it is there that the pincer approach may prove more challenging for India.

Suggestions for India

  • Assuming that confrontation with the Sino-Pak combine is inevitable now or later, one of the ways for India to offset this is to project sufficient capability.
  • The diplomatic and military domains have to play this out effectively.
  • India cannot be seen to be alone or militarily weak.
  • It has tremendous support internationally which must translate into a higher level of strategic support.
  • Militarily, Pakistan should never be able to perceive that it will be allowed to fight as per choice and conceived strategy.
  • China’s success or failure in such adventurism will set the course of its future strategy against its multiple adversaries.
  • That is the psyche which India must exploit to prevent escalation and win this and impending standoffs without fighting.
  • This needs a rapid and all-out national effort with the highest priority accorded to it, including budgeting.

Conclusion

India cannot afford to focus only on the northern borders. A firm and full strategy to deal with Pakistan in all contingencies has now become imperative.

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Foreign Policy Watch: India-China

Concerns over Australia in the Malabar Exercise

Note4Students

From UPSC perspective, the following things are important :

Prelims level: Quad

Mains level: Paper 2- Australia's joining in Malabar naval exercise and issues with it

While the idea of inviting Australia to join Malabar is being explored, we must not forget the concerns with it. This article examines such concerns.

Context

  • India’s Ministry of Defence discussed the issue of adding Australia to the trilateral Malabar naval exercise.
  • If materialised, it will be the first time since 2007 that all members of Quad-India, U.S., Japan and Australia will participate in a joint military drill.

Possible consequences of the move

  • The Chinese leadership sees the maritime Quadrilateral as an Asian-NATO that seeks only to contain China’s rise.
  •  India’s intention to involve Australia in the Malabar drill could only be construed as a move directed against Beijing.

India’s perspective

  • Following the stand-off in Ladakh, many Indian analysts believe the time is right for India to shed its traditional defensiveness in the maritime domain.
  • The realists advocate an alliance with the U.S., Japan and Australia to counter Chinese moves in the Indian Ocean.

Concerns

1) Contrary message to China

  • While India and China are negotiating a truce, Australia’s participation in the Malabar exercise sends contrary signals to Beijing.
  • If China responded aggressively in the Eastern Indian Ocean, it could needlessly open up a new front in the India-China conflict.

2) Only modest gains for India

  • U.S. and its Pacific partners want to form a maritime coalition to implement a ‘rules-based order’ in the Indo-Pacific littorals.
  • India’s priority is to acquire strategic capabilities to counter a Chinese naval presence in the Indian Ocean.
  •  Indian Navy is yet to develop the undersea capability to deter Chinese submarines in the eastern Indian Ocean.
  • With U.S. defence companies hesitant to share proprietary technology the gains for India, in exchange for signing up the ‘military-quad’, are modest.
  • Without strategic technology transfers, Indian Navy’s deterrence potential in the Indian Ocean Region (IOR) will not improve much.

3) Operational issue: India will be drawn into power dynamics of the Asia-Pacific

  • With the strategic contest between the U.S. and China, there is every possibility that the military-Quad will be used to draw India into the security dynamics of the Asia-Pacific.
  • The U.S. would expect its Indo-Pacific partners, including India, to assist the U.S. Navy in its South China Sea endeavour.
  •  The U.S. and Japanese navies have little spare capacity for sustained surveillance and deterrence operations in the IOR.
  • Australia is an exception and is ready and able to partner India in securing the Eastern Indian Ocean.

4) Timing

  • A balancing coalition must come together at a time when the nature and magnitude of the threat are wholly manifest.
  • But, despite a growing presence in the Indian Ocean, the Chines Navy is yet to physically threaten Indian interests at sea.
  • So, the onus of the first move to precipitate a crisis in the Eastern Indian Ocean lies with the Indian Navy.

Conclusion

Upgrading the trilateral Malabar to a quadrilateral, without acquiring the requisite combat and deterrence capability, could yield gains for India in the short term, but would prove ineffective in the long run.

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Foreign Policy Watch: India-China

Broader strategic challenge of dealing with China

Note4Students

From UPSC perspective, the following things are important :

Prelims level: Not much

Mains level: Paper 2- India-China tension and India's response

  • Identifying the nature of the threat posed by China is important to formulate a response. This article discusses the plan of action on the diplomatic, strategic and economic front to deal with Chinese aggression.

Economic angle of China’s expansionism

  • The Chinese growth model needed to find subservient emerging markets.
  • In these markets, China can park huge debts and make investments to keep feeding China’s high growth rates.
  • Friendly foreign debt-investment markets were needed to compensate for over-investment at home.
  • The Belt and Road Initiative was rolled out as a meeting point for China’s geo-strategic and geo-economic interests.
  • China has expanded its global footprint by signing on about 100 countries to the BRI.
  • China has made aggressive moves on most of its non-submissive neighbours in the South China Sea.
  • China has also made moves against its traditional rivals like Japan and Taiwan to independent-minded nations like South Korea and Australia.
  • China sees itself as a global power whose time has come.

India needs to play clearer role

  • Rise of China is shaking up global alignments and shaping new world order.
  • The Trump administration is increasingly being criticised for not providing global leadership.
  • India could afford to be largely non-aligned during the 20th century Cold War.
  • Our size and economic momentum necessitate that we play a clearer role in the Cold War’s 21st-century sequel.
  • India’s foreign policy has lacked a clear vision about China.
  • India has been deepening our strategic relationship with the US but without wanting to alarm China.

India’s relation with neighbours

  • India’s relations with other neighbouring nations have also become a cause of concern.
  • Pakistan has practically become a minion state for the Chinese – the $62-billion CPEC is a case in the point.
  • Nepal is no longer on our list of all-weather friends.
  • Chinese influence is growing in Sri Lanka and Bangladesh — both signatories to the BRI.
  • And just last week, Beijing, sent another appallingly stern message to our loyal friend, Bhutan, by making ridiculous territorial claims.

What should be India’s plan of action

  • Dealing with China will require conviction and exercising a range of military, diplomatic and economic options.
  • One forum we need to build on and provide leadership to is the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue.
  •  India should now propose the expansion of the Quad’s scope with a possible exploration of a collective defence architecture like NATO.
  • The membership of the Quad should be expanded to include Vietnam, South Korea, New Zealand, and Malaysia.
  • On the economic front, India must welcome the US proposal to expand G7 to include India, Russia, Australia and South Korea without China as a member.
  • Next area of focus should be strengthening ties with our neighbourhood.
  • Effort must be made to regain the relationship with Russia.

Conclusion

China must be made to choose: Is it willing to push the equally proud, equally numerous, equally historical and glorious civilisation to the south in this long-term direction for a few square kilometres of territory and a round of chest-thumping?

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Foreign Policy Watch: India-China

Patrolling Points along LAC

Note4Students

From UPSC perspective, the following things are important :

Prelims level: Patrolling points, Galwan River

Mains level: India-China border skirmishes and its de-escalation

The standoffs between Indian and Chinese troops in Ladakh on the Line of Actual Control (LAC), where initial steps towards disengagement have taken place, are around a number of patrolling points or PPs in Galwan, Hot Springs and Gogra areas.

Do you know?

The Galwan River flows from the Aksai Chin region occupied by China in the UT of Ladakh.  It originates in the area of Samzungling on the eastern side of the Karakoram Range and flows west to join the Shyok River.  It is one of the upstream tributaries of the Indus River.

What exactly are Patrolling Points?

  • PPs are patrolling points identified and marked on the LAC, which are patrolled with a stipulated frequency by the security forces.
  • They serve as a guide to the location of the LAC for the soldiers, acting as indicators of the extent of ‘actual control’ exercised on the territory by India.
  • By regularly patrolling up to these PPs, the Indian side is able to establish and assert its physical claim about the LAC.

Are all the Patrolling Points numbered?

  • Some of the PPs are prominent and identifiable geographical features, such as a pass, or a nala junction where no numerals are given.
  • Only those PPs, where there are no prominent features, are numbered as in the case of PP14 in Galwan Valley.

Do all Patrolling Points fall on the LAC?

  • Mostly, yes. Except for the Depsang plains in northern Ladakh, where PP10, PP11, PP11A, PP12 and PP13 – from Raki Nala to Jivan Nala – do not fall on the LAC.
  • These are short of the LAC, on the Indian side.

Are these Patrolling Points not manned?

  • The PPs are not posts and thus not manned. Unlike on the Line of Control (LoC) with Pakistan, the border with China is not physically held by the Army all along.
  • They are just physical markers on the ground, chosen for their location and have no defensive potential or tactical importance for the Army.

How is the claim asserted on LAC?

  • The claim is asserted by the Army or joint Army-ITBP patrols as they show more visible presence in these areas.
  • This is done by physically visiting PPs with a higher frequency, as the deployment has moved closer to the LAC and due to improved infrastructure.
  • As the Chinese may not see when the Indian patrols visit these PPs, they will leave come cigarette packets or food tins with Indian markings behind.
  • That lets the Chinese know that Indian soldiers had visited the place, which indicates that India was in control of these areas.

Who has given these Patrolling Points?

  • These PPs have been identified by the high-powered China Study Group, starting from 1975 when patrolling limits for Indian forces were specified.
  • It is based on the LAC after the government accepted the concept in 1993, which is also marked on the maps with the Army in the border areas.
  • But the frequency of patrolling to PPs is not specified by the CSG – it is finalised by the Army Headquarters in New Delhi, based on the recommendations made by the Army and ITBP.

PP under dispute

  • PPs 10 to 13 in Depsang sector, PP14 in Galwan, PP15 in Hot Spring, and PP17 and PP17A in Gogra are currently being disputed by both sides, where the standoffs have taken place in the past nine weeks.

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Foreign Policy Watch: India-China

De-escalation begins on LAC

Note4Students

From UPSC perspective, the following things are important :

Prelims level: Galwan valley, Shyok River

Mains level: India-China border skirmishes and its de-escalation

Three weeks after the worst military clashes in decades, India and China have begun the process of disengagement at contentious locations along the Line of Actual Control (LAC).

Must read:

[Burning Issue] India-China Skirmish in Ladakh

China is moving back

  • In the Galwan Valley, Chinese troops have shifted 2 kilometres from the site violent clashes while some tents had been removed by the PLA in the Finger 4 area of Pangong Tso.
  • India’s claim is till Finger 8 as per the alignment of the LAC.
  • Some rearward movement of vehicles was seen at the general area of Galwan, Hotsprings and Gogra.
  • Without giving the specific distances moved, the source said the pullback at each location would be confirmed after verification.

Lessons learnt

  • The lesson for us in Doklam is that disengagement is not enough in order to declare an end to tensions at the LAC.
  • It is necessary that we define endpoints up to where the troops must withdraw to and no understanding should be reached without the restoration of status quo ante.
  • Endpoint variances reflect the potential for future troubles along the LAC.

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Foreign Policy Watch: India-China

Sakteng Wildlife Sanctuary

Note4Students

From UPSC perspective, the following things are important :

Prelims level: Sakteng Wildlife Sanctuary

Mains level: China's territorial expansion plans

In a bid to further its territorial ambitions, China has recently claimed the Sakteng wildlife sanctuary in Eastern Bhutan as its own territory.

Practice question for mains:

Q.What are the various fronts of Chinese imperial expansionism across the South Asian Region?

About the Sakteng WLS

  • Sakteng is a wildlife sanctuary located mostly in Trashigang District and just crossing the border into Samdrup Jongkhar District, Bhutan.
  • It is one of the country’s protected areas.
  • It is listed as a tentative site in Bhutan’s Tentative List for UNESCO inclusion.

Certain unresolved issues

  • The boundary between China and Bhutan has never been delimited.
  • There have been disputes over the eastern, central and western sectors for a long time.
  • China last month attempted to stop funding for the Sakteng sanctuary from the U.N. Development Programme’s Global Environment Facility (GEF) on the grounds that it was “disputed” territory.

Reasons for the dispute

  • According to written records, there has been no mention of Eastern Bhutan, or Trashigang Dzongkhag (district), where Sakteng is based as per boundary negotiations held between the two countries between 1984 and 2016.
  • The negotiations have not been held since the Doklam standoff between Indian and Chinese troops in 2017.
  • Bhutan has always maintained a discreet silence on its boundary negotiations with China, and it does not have any formal diplomatic relations with Beijing.

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Foreign Policy Watch: India-China

Indo-Pacific region

Note4Students

From UPSC perspective, the following things are important :

Prelims level: The East China Sea, the Bohai Sea, the Yellow Sea, the South China Sea

Mains level: Paper 2-India's Indo-Pacific vision and China's BRI

As India tries to diffuse the tension along the disputed northern border with China, it must focus on the other potential fronts that China could open. India Ocean could be the next one. This article examines the centrality of the Indian Ocean for China and their approach to the region.

India’s Indo-Pacific vision

  • This vision is based on our historical associations with this region.
  • This vision also acknowledges the importance of the Indian Ocean in building prosperity in this century.
  • So, the key points of this vision are thus-
  • 1) Inclusiveness, openness and ASEAN centrality and unity.
  • 2) India does not see the Indo-Pacific Region as a strategy or as a club of limited members.
  • 3) It is not directed against any country.

China should have equal access

  • China is not a littoral state in the Indian Ocean.
  • Historically, Chinese naval activity was limited to the East China Sea, the Bohai Sea, the Yellow Sea, and the South China Sea.
  •  In today’s context, China is the second-largest economy and the world’s largest trading nation.
  • The sea-lanes of communication in the Indian Ocean are vital to her economy and security.
  • Under international law, China should have equal access to the Indian ocean.

China’s “Malacca Dilemma”

  • China thinks that others would block the Malacca Straits to “contain” the Chinese.
  • So, China has strategized to dominate not just the Malacca Straits, but the ocean beyond it.
  • The PLA Navy (PLAN) made its first operational deployment in the Gulf of Aden in 2008.
  • In 2009 China planned for overseas base or facility.
  • In 2010 a China State Oceanic Administration report alluded to plans to build aircraft carriers.

BRI: Overcoming the deficiencies China face in India Ocean

  • The US hegemony and India’s regional influence in the Indian Ocean are thought of as a challenge to China.
  • So, China focused on 3 inherent deficiencies that they wanted to overcome.
  • (a) China is not a littoral state.
  • (b) Its passage through key maritime straits could be easily blocked.
  • (c) The possibility of US-India cooperation against China.
  • How to overcome these deficiencies?
  • (1) carefully selecting sites to build ports — Djibouti, Gwadar, Hambantota, Sittwe and Seychelles.
  • (2) By conducting activities in a low-key manner to “reduce the military colour as much as possible”.
  • (3) By not unnerving India and America by cooperating at first, then slowly penetrating into the Indian Ocean, beginning with detailed maritime surveys, ocean mapping, HADR, port construction and so on.

 China acting on the plans

  • The PLA’s new base in Djibouti is the prototype for more “logistics” facilities to come.
  • More port construction projects like Gwadar and Hambantota, are being offered to vulnerable countries.
  • These projects are commercially unviable but have military possibilities,
  • Chinese “civilian” vessels routinely conduct surveys in the EEZ of littoral states.
  • In January 2020 the PLA Navy conducted tripartite naval exercises with Russia and Iran in the Arabian Sea.
  • They have the largest warship building programme in the world.

Consider the question “What constitutes India’s Indo-Pacific vision? Elaborate on the factors that explain China’s reluctance to subscribe to this vision.”

Conclusion

The idea of Indo-Pacific might potentially derail the carefully crafted Chinese plan. So, they now wish to cause alarm by raising fears about Great Power “strategic collision” caused by the so-called American-led “containment” strategy. It is important to look past their propaganda.

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Foreign Policy Watch: India-China

Ladakh and its Geo-strategic Importance

Note4Students

From UPSC perspective, the following things are important :

Prelims level: Ladakh and its topography

Mains level: India-China border skirmishes and their impacts on bilateral relations

With the long-standing border standoff with China, Ladakh, a rugged, high-altitude region that is generally far removed from the lives and imagination of most Indians, has become part of our daily conversations and worries.

Let’s have a look at a short primer on the region, its history, and some of the places where Indian soldiers are locked in conflict with the Chinese army. Try remembering its geographical features.

Ladakh through the History

  • Lying between the Kunlun mountain range in the north and Himalayas to the south, Ladakh was originally inhabited by people of Indo-Aryan and Tibetan descent.
  • Historically the region included the valleys of Baltistan, Indus, and Nubra, besides Zanskar, Lahaul and Spiti, Aksai Chin, Ngari and Rudok.
  • Located at the crossroads of important trade routes since ancient times, Ladakh has always enjoyed great geostrategic importance.
  • At the beginning of the first century AD, Ladakh was part of the Kushan Empire. Till the 15th century, it was part of Tibet and was ruled by dynasties of local Lamas.
  • Later it changed hands multiple times, alternating between the kingdoms of Kashmir and Zhangzhung.
  • In 1834, Gen Zorawar Singh, a general of Raja Gulab Singh who ruled Jammu as part of the Sikh empire, extended the boundaries of Maharaja Ranjit Singh’s kingdom to Ladakh.

Partition, Pakistan and Chinese occupations

Immediately after India’s Partition, tribal raiders (the disguised Pakistani Army) attacked Ladakh. They captured Kargil and were heading for Leh when they were confronted by the Indian Army, who got back Kargil.

  • Although India has always considered Aksai Chin to be part of Jammu and Kashmir, in the 1950s the Chinese built a highway, called western highway or NH219, connecting Tibet with Xinjiang through this region.
  • It was always more easily accessible to the Chinese than to the Indians, who were across the Karakoram.
  • India learnt of this road in 1957, and it was one of the causes of the 1962 India-China war, after which China strengthened its control over this region.
  • China today claims Aksai Chin to be part of Hotan County of its Xinjiang province.
  • Pakistan ceded the Shaksgam Valley, which was part of the Baltistan region north of the Karakoram, to China following a Sino-Pakistani agreement signed on March 2, 1963.

Ladakh through the Chinese eyes

  • China’s forays into the region began after the 1949 Communist Revolution, when Chairman Mao Zedong, a veteran of guerrilla warfare, began consolidating China’s periphery as part of his expansionist designs.
  • The PLA occupied Tibet in 1951 and then began to eye Ladakh.
  • The reason was that the road connecting Kashgar in Xinjiang to Lhasa in Tibet had to pass through Aksai Chin, which was held by Indians but was seldom patrolled by them.

Galwan Valley in the limelight

  • The Tibetan revolt of 1959 and the Dalai Lama’s flight to India saw China further strengthening its military presence in Ladakh to ensure the security of NH 219.
  • India reacted with its ‘forward policy’ as part of which it began setting up Army posts in the region to prevent Chinese expansion.
  • This resulted in the initial clash between the Indian and Chinese forces in the Kongka Pass area in 1959.
  • Later, Galwan Valley became the scene of action when the Indian Army established a post to cut off the Chinese post in the Samjunjling area, marking the beginning of the 1962 war.

Pangong Tso: The contested lake

  • In the latest face-off, Indian troops first spied the Chinese on the banks of Pangong Tso.
  • This lake, which is one-third in India and two-thirds in China, is of great tactical significance to the Chinese who have built infrastructure along both its sides to ensure the speedy build-up of troops.
  • Chinese incursions in this region aim at shifting the LAC westward so that they are able to occupy important heights both on the north and the south of the lake, which will enable them to dominate the Chushul Bowl.
  • The narrow Chushul valley, which lies on the road to Leh with Pangong Tso to its north, was an important target for the Chinese even during the 1962 war. It was here that the Battle of Chushul was fought.

Strategic SSN: To the far north

  • The area spanning Galwan, Depsang plateau, and Daulat Beg Oldie (DBO), is called Sub-Sector North (SSN).
  • This enclave that lies to the east of the Siachen glacier is of immense significance given its proximity to the Karakoram Pass, close to China’s western highway or NH 219 going to Aksai Chin.
  • It’s the SSN that provides land access to Central Asia through the Karakoram Pass.
  • Domination of this area is also crucial for the protection of the Siachen glacier, lying between the Saltoro ridge on the Pakistani side and the Saser ridge close to the Chinese claim line.
  • The Galwan heights overlook the all-weather Durbuk-Shyok-Daulat Beg Oldie (DSDBO) Road, which connects Leh to DBO at the base of the Karakoram Pass that separates China’s Xinjiang Region from Ladakh.
  • Domination over these heights allows China to easily interdict this road.

Why is China stubborn on Galwan?

  • Occupation of Galwan will neutralize the tactical advantage India gained by building the all-weather Durbuk-DBO road over the last two decades.
  • Last year, the Border Road Organisation (BRO) made this rugged terrain even more accessible by completing the 430-metre-long bridge across the Shyok River.
  • With this, the Darbuk route to DBO became available round the year, and the travel time of troops to the SSN was halved.
  • It was this bridge, coupled with the ongoing work on a link road to LAC in this area, prompted the PLA to enter Galwan.

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Foreign Policy Watch: India-China

Resistance to China is going to be definitive moment for India

Note4Students

From UPSC perspective, the following things are important :

Prelims level: Not much

Mains level: Paper 2- India-China standoff

How India overcomes the challenge posed by China would have far-reaching effects. Role of Russia and the U.S. is important for India. This article discusses these factors and the significance of the outcome of the conflict started at Galwan. 

Two takes on India’s China policy

  • Following Galwan encounter, there are two views about the future of India’s China policy.
  • Some say that structural constraints would limit dramatic changes in policy once the heat of the moment dissipates.
  • While others say that the Galwan clash comes amidst the deepening crisis in bilateral relations over the last decade.
  • Stalled boundary talks, a widening trade deficit, the clash of national interests in the region, and Chinese opposition to India’s global aspirations have together strained Sino-Indian relations.
  • Galwan is the last straw, the argument goes, that broke the camel’s back.

So, what will be the outcome

  •  The relationship is likely to depend on how the current military confrontation in Ladakh is resolved.
  • If it ends with a quick return to the status quo that prevailed in April, inertia is likely to limit radical policy departures.
  • If the Ladakh crisis ends in a setback for India, the pressure on Delhi to radically reorient its China policy will mount.

What if the standoff continues?

  • In that case strengthening India’s military and political hand against China is the immediate objective of Delhi’s post-Galwan diplomacy.
  • The long term steps suggested include the construction of a military alliance with the US and other Western partner.
  • As as well as economic decoupling and diversification.
  • Short term steps are about being able to stare down the Chinese in the current military confrontation and hold its ground.

Role of Russia

  • Three decades after the collapse of the Soviet Union, India’s dependence on Russian arms remains substantive.
  • Rajnath Singh’s visit to Moscow amidst the crisis with China underlines the weight of the past in India’s security policy.
  • India is also pressing other major defence suppliers, including France and Israel, to accelerate deliveries on contracted defence equipment.
  • There have been reports from Russia, that China is pressing Moscow not to sell the new fighter aircraft to India.
  • Russia and China are strong strategic partners today.
  • While the past suggests India has a special claim to Russian affections, there is a Sino-Russian strategic cohabitation today in opposition to America
  • How Russia responds to India’s request will have a major bearing on the future evolution of Delhi’s ties with Moscow.

Role of the U.S.

  • Unlike Russia’s public stance of neutrality between India and China, Washington has come out in favour of Delhi.
  • There was vocal public support of the US defence and foreign policy establishment against Chinese aggression at Galwan.
  •  Media reports from Delhi say the US is already supplying valuable real-time military intelligence of value to the Indian armed forces.
  • Washington is apparently willing to do more but is letting Delhi decide the pace and intensity of that cooperation.

Challenges in the U.S. cooperation

  • The uncertain political moment in the US amidst the general election scheduled for early November can’t be underestimated.
  • A change of guard in Washington will certainly slow things down as the new administration settles down and reviews its priorities.
  • America’s stakes in China are far higher than Russia’s.
  • Profound economic interdependence of the U.S. and China is a significant political constraint on the US’s options.
  • On deeper military cooperation with Washington, Delhi would want to move with care rather than rush into it as it did in 1962.

How will outcomes of the crisis matter for India

  • If Delhi comes out of this crisis wounded, its troubles at home and the world will mount significantly.
  • A weakened India will find recasting its China policy even harder.
  • But victorious India will find its international political stock rising and its options on China expanding.
  •  Successful Indian resistance to China’s expansionism would be a definitive moment in the geopolitical evolution of Asia.
  • The stakes for India and the world, then, are far higher today than in 1962.

Consider the question “Examine the issues that introduce friction in India-China relations. Also, elaborate on the scope of India’s alliance with the U.S to counter the challenges posed by China.”

Conclusion

Outcomes of the resistance will have a profound impact on India’s standing and India’s destiny.

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Foreign Policy Watch: India-China

Making sense of moves of China

Note4Students

From UPSC perspective, the following things are important :

Prelims level: Galwan valley

Mains level: Paper 2- India-China relations, role of intelligence, limits of summit diplomacy

The role played by intelligence and emphasis on Summit diplomacy in relation with China are the two issues discussed in this article. So, what went wrong in Galwan incident from the intelligence point of view? And what are the perils of Summit diplomacy? Read to know...

Galwan-New and fractious phase

  • What occurred in the Galwan heights on June 15, must not be viewed as an aberration.
  • It would be more judicious to view it as signifying a new and fractious phase in China-India relations.
  • Even if the situation reverts to what existed in mid-April India-China relations appear set to witness a “new and different normal”.
  • China’s reaction has been consistent — India must move out of Galwan.
  • This is something that India cannot ignore any longer.
  • Galwan incident cannot be viewed as a mere replay of what took place in Depsang (2013), Chumar (2014) and Doklam (2017).
  • This is a new and different situation and India must not shrink from addressing the core issue that relations between India and China are in a perilous state.

Close and careful analysis of China’s claim is necessary

  • China’s assertion of its claim to the whole of the Galwan Valley needs close and careful analysis for following reasons-
  • 1) Point 14 gives China a virtual stranglehold over the newly completed, and strategically significant, Darbuk-Shyok-Daulat Beg Oldie Road, which leads on to the Karakoram Pass.
  • 2) The strategic implications for India of China’s insistence on keeping the whole of the Galwan Valley are serious as it fundamentally changes the status quo.
  • 3) By laying claim to the Galwan Valley, China has reopened some of the issues left over from the 1962 conflict.
  • And this demonstrates that it is willing to embark on a new confrontation.

LAC and claim line of China

  • Ambiguity has existed regarding the Line of Actual Control (LAC) in this sector.
  • The Chinese “claim line” is that of November 1959.
  • For India the LAC is that of September 1962.
  • In recent years, both sides had refrained from reopening the issue, but China has never given up its claims.
  • By its unilateral declaration now, China is seeking to settle the matter in its favour. India needs to measure up to this challenge.

Importance of Aksai Chin

  • The importance of Aksai Chin for China has greatly increased of late, as it provides direct connectivity between two of the most troubled regions of China, viz., Xinjiang and Tibet.
  • This does not seem to have been adequately factored in our calculations.
  • While Indian policymakers saw the reclassification of Ladakh as purely an internal matter.
  • They overlooked the fact that for China’s military planners it posited a threat to China’s peace and tranquillity.

Intelligence capabilities

  • Admittedly, the timing and nature of China’s actions should have aroused keen interest in intelligence circles about China’s strategic calculations.
  • The Chinese build-up in the Galwan Valley, Pangong Tso and Hotsprings-Gogra did not require any great intelligence effort, since there was little attempt at concealment by the Chinese.
  • India also possesses high-quality imagery intelligence (IMINT) and signals intelligence (SIGINT) capabilities.
  • These capabilities are distributed between the National Technical Research Organisation, the Directorate of Signals Intelligence of the Ministry of Defence and other agencies.
  • Which made it possible to track Chinese movement.
  • Where intelligence can be faulted is with regard to inadequate appreciation of what the build-up meant, and what it portended for India.
  • This is indicative of a weakness in interpretation and analysis of the intelligence available.
  • And also of inability to provide a coherent assessment of China’s real intentions.
  • Intelligence assessment of China’s intentions, clearly fell short of what was required.
  • While India’s technological capabilities for intelligence collection have vastly increased in recent years, the capacity for interpretation and analysis has not kept pace with this.
  • Advances in technology, specially Artificial Intelligence have, across the world, greatly augmented efforts at intelligence analysis.

Who has the responsibility of intelligence assessment and analysis

  • The principal responsibility for intelligence assessment and analysis concerning China, rests with the National Security Council Secretariat (NSCS) and India’s external intelligence agency, the Research and Analysis Wing (R&AW).
  • To a lesser extent, it remains with the Defence Intelligence Agency.
  • The decision of the NSCS to dismantle the Joint Intelligence Committee has contributed to a weakening of the intelligence assessment system.
  • In the case of the R&AW, lack of domain expertise, and an inadequacy of China specialists might also have been a contributory factor.

Adverse impact of certain policy measures

  •  The preference given recently to Summit diplomacy over traditional foreign policy making structures proved to be a severe handicap.
  • Summit diplomacy cannot be a substitute for carefully structured foreign office policy making.
  • Currently, India’s Summit diplomacy has tended to marginalise the External Affairs Ministry with regard to policy making, and we are probably paying a price for it.
  • As it is, the Ministry of External Affairs’s (MEA) stock of China experts seems to be dwindling.
  • And MEA’s general tilt towards the U.S. in most matters, has resulted in an imbalance in the way the MEA perceives problems and situations.

Conclusion

Along with the other factors, India should also focus on intelligence analysis and interpretation and make sure there are enough China experts in the MEA.

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Foreign Policy Watch: India-China

Will banning Chinese imports hurt India’s exports?

Note4Students

From UPSC perspective, the following things are important :

Prelims level: Not Much

Mains level: India-China trade relations

  • Following the recent clashes with Chinese troops in Ladakh, there has been a growing clamour in the country to boycott goods from the neighbouring country.
  • However, the development has caused an alarm among various industry bodies that are concerned about the adverse impact in the event of a blanket ban on exports in several sectors.

Practice question for mains:

Q.“Curbing Chinese imports to India will do more harm than any good”. Analyse.

How dependent is India on Chinese imports?

China accounts for a sizable portion of India’s top imports, especially where intermediate products or components and raw materials are concerned.  Electronics: The neighbouring country also accounts for 45 per cent of India’s total electronics imports.

  • A third of machinery and almost two-fifths of organic chemicals that India purchases from the world come from China.
  • Automotive parts and fertilizers are other items where China’s share in India’s import is more than 25 per cent.
  • Several of these products are used by Indian manufacturers in the production of finished goods, thus thoroughly integrating China in India’s manufacturing supply chain.
  • For instance India sources close to 90 per cent of certain mobile phone parts from China.

India’s export to China

  • Even as an export market, China is a major partner for India. At $15.5 billion, it is the third-largest destination for Indian shipments.
  • At the same time, India only accounts for a little over two per cent of China’s total exports, according to the Federation of Indian Export Organisation (FIEO).

How could a blanket ban on Chinese imports hit India’s exports?

  • Across sectors from pharmaceuticals to telecommunications and automobiles, industry associations have been speaking up against a complete boycott of Chinese imports.
  • A “blanket ban” may not be feasible because of India’s dependence on the country for crucial raw materials.
  • Banning the imports of raw materials from China without which products over here cannot be manufactured will make things difficult.
  • If China takes any retaliatory measures, it would impact India more negatively.

Most crucial: The Pharma sector could be worst hit

  • For instance, of the nearly $3.6 billion worth of ingredients that Indian drug-makers import to manufacture several essential medicines, China catered to around 68 per cent.
  • India is considered one of the largest pharma industries in the world and accounts for a considerable portion of imports of finished formulations by other large economies like the US.
  • While pharma consignments from China have unofficially been stopped at ports in India, and are expected to be cleared after thorough checks,
  • A ban could create shortages of medicines both for India’s domestic and export markets.

Are there any alternatives in this situation?

  • The decision to boycott non-essential products made in China can be left to the individuals.
  • However, trade-related measures like raising duties on cheaper raw materials imported from China would be better than an outright embargo.
  • This would still allow access to crucial ingredients in the short-term while India looks to build self-reliance or maybe switch to alternate trade partners.
  • It would be better to maybe raise duties on cheaper raw materials instead of going in for a blanket ban.

Alternatives to Chinese imports

  • Countries like the US, Vietnam, Japan, Mexico and certain European countries could be tapped as alternate import sources for some critical electronic, vehicular and pharmaceutical components as well.
  • It is likely that the costs of the raw materials from these alternate sources will be higher and may get passed on to consumers if the manufacturers cannot absorb them.
  • India will need to look into the totality of its trade with China and Hong Kong and implement certain short- to long-term plans to reduce its dependence on them, according to FIEO.

Way forward

  • The government’s “Atmanirbhar” focus is expected to help ministries handhold industries where self-reliance needs to be built.
  • Some measures, like the decision to push bulk drug parks in India, have to be executed.
  • While an increase in tariff can be one way to achieve import substitution, the more effective strategy would be to provide an ecosystem that addresses the cost disability of Indian manufacturing leading to such imports.

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Foreign Policy Watch: India-China

Why China is being aggressive along the LAC

Note4Students

From UPSC perspective, the following things are important :

Prelims level: Not much

Mains level: Paper 2- India-China relations

Despite India’s careful approach which involved not upsetting China’s domestic and geopolitical sensitivities, Galwan happened. What explains the Chinese aggression? There could be many factors. This article delves into these factors. 

Not upsetting China

  • The India government has been very careful not to upset China’s domestic and geopolitical sensitivities.
  • Barring occasional joint statements issued with leaders from the U.S. and Asia-Pacific countries, reasserting India’s commitment to “freedom of navigation”  India has stayed away from criticising China on controversial topics,
  • On issues such as “de-radicalisation” camps in Xinjiang, crackdown on protests in Hong Kong, or disputes with Taiwan India India didn’t criticise China.

Yet China chose to increase tensions along the LAC. Why?

1. China wants to reorient global order

  • Unlike the Soviet Union of the 1940s China is not an ideological state that intends to export communism to other countries.
  • When it was rising, China had adopted different tactical positions — “hide your capacity and bide your time”, “peaceful rise” or “peaceful development”.
  • That era is over.
  • Under President Xi Jinping, the Chinese think they have arrived.
  • With the global economy in the doldrums, globalisation in a crisis and the U.S. under an isolationist President hostile towards China Beijing believes the global order is at a breaking point.
  • It is fighting back through what game theorists call “salami tactics” — where a dominant power attempts to establish its hegemony piece by piece.
  • India is one slice in this salami slice strategy.

2. India: An ally-in-progress of the US

  • It sees India as an ally-in-progress of the U.S.
  •  So, China actions are a result of the strategic loss [India] that has already happened.
  • If India is what many in the West call the “counterweight” to China’s rise, Beijing’s definite message is that it is not deterred by the counterweight.
  • This is a message not just to India, but to a host of China’s rivals that are teaming up and eager to recruit India to the club.

Factors that could explain China’s move

Global factors

  • Europe has been devastated by the virus.
  • The U.S. is battling in an election year the COVID-19 outbreak.
  • It is also battling the deepest economic meltdown since the Great Depression.
  • Its global leadership is unravelling fast.

Regional and local factors

  • The Indian economy was in trouble even before COVID-19 struck the country, slowing down its rise.
  • Social upheaval over the Citizenship (Amendment) Act (CAA), 2019, and the National Register of Citizens had weakened the Indian polity.
  • India’s traditional clout in its neighbourhood was slipping.
  • Tensions with Pakistan have been high keeping the troops occupied in the border areas.
  • Nepal raised boundary issues with India.
  • Sri Lanka is diversifying its foreign policy.and China is making deep inroads into that region.
  • Bangladesh was deeply miffed with the CAA.
  • Even in Afghanistan, where Pakistan, China, Russia and the U.S. are involved in the transition process, India is out.
  •  A confluence of all these factors, which point to a decline in the country’s smart power, allowed China to make aggressive moves on the LAC.

Consider the question “At the time when relations reached a nadir with China, India needs to focus on its neighbourhood and mend win back the friendly neighbours. Comment”

Conclusion

What India needs is a national security strategy that’s decoupled from the compulsions of domestic politics and anchored in neighbourhood realism. It should stand up to China’s bullying on the border now, with a long-term focus on enhancing capacities and winning back its friendly neighbours. There are no quick fixes this time.

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Foreign Policy Watch: India-China

India will have to manage its conflict on its own

Note4Students

From UPSC perspective, the following things are important :

Prelims level: Not much.

Mains level: Paper 2- India-China relations

The Galwan incident marked the new low in the India-China relations. Following it, there have been talks of a closer alliance with the U.S. This article analyses the utility, potential and the limitations of this approach.

Exploring the strategic options

  • As the border stand-off with China deepens, India will have to think of all possible strategic options that gives it leverage.
  • One of the options is new arrangements with other powers.
  • This is the right moment to mobilise international opinion on China.
  • But can this be translated into concerted global action to exert real pressure on China?

Things India should consider while forming alliance with the US

  • International relations are formed in the context of a country’s development paradigm.
  • India’s primary aim should be to preserve the maximum space for its development model, if it can actually formulate one.
  • India is not unique in this respect.
  •  The question for India is not just whether the US has a stake in India’s development, which it might.
  • But it is, rather, to ask whether India’s development needs will fit into the emerging US development paradigm.
  • Will the very same political economy forces that create a disengagement with China also come in the way of a closer relationship with India?
  • Some sections of American big business might favour India.
  • But the underlying political economy dynamics in the US are less favourable.
  • Will the US give India the room it needs on trade, intellectual property, regulation, agriculture, labour mobility, the very areas where freedom is vital for India’s economy?
  • Will a US hell-bent on bringing manufacturing jobs back to the US, easily gel with an “atma nirbhar” Bharat?
  • To see what is at stake, we just need to look how the development paradigm is driving tensions on trade, taxation and regulatory issues between the US and EU.

Why India avoided alignment with the US in the past

  •  But the drivers of this have often been legitimate differences over development, including climate change.
  • It has also been that, at various points, that alignment was against India’s other strategic commitments.
  • India was wise to stay out of the war in Iraq, it was wise not to upset Russia.
  • It is wise not to throw its weight behind the US’s Iran policy.
  • There is more maturity in the US to understand India’s position.

Global reluctance in collective action against China

  • It is an odd moment in global affairs, where there is recognition of a common challenge emanating from China.
  • But there is no global appetite to take concerted action.
  • An interesting example might be the global response to the BRI.
  • Many countries are struggling to meet their BRI debt obligations.
  • But it is difficult to see the rest of the international community helping all these countries to wean their regimes away from dependence on Chinese finance.
  • Similarly, there are now great concerns over frontier areas of conflict like cyber security and space.
  • It is difficult to imagine concerted global action to create rules in these area, partly because Great Powers like the US and Russia will always want to maintain their exceptionalism.

Limitations of global alliance and public opinion in solving local conflicts

  • 1) The international community has not been very effective in neutralising
  •  exercised by some powers.
  • This is the tactic Pakistan has used.
  • 2) Don’t count on the fact that the world will support an Indian escalation beyond a point.
  • The efforts of the international community, in the final analysis, will be to try and throw cold water on the conflict.
  • No one has a serious stake in the fate of the terrain India and China are disputing.
  • At the end of the day, India has to manage China and Pakistan largely on its own.

Conclusion

Even as we deal with the military situation on the border, the test of India’s resolve will be its ability to return to some first principle thinking about its own power.

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Foreign Policy Watch: India-China

Three pronged strategy to deal with China

Note4Students

From UPSC perspective, the following things are important :

Prelims level: Not much.

Mains level: Paper 2- India-China border dispute

The LAC has been exploited by China as leverage against India. And failure on our part to understand long-term strategic aims and objective of China makes the problem hard to solve. This article suggests a three-pronged approach to deal with China.

Incomprehension of aims and objectives

  •  There is incomprehension among our decision-makers of the long-term strategic aims and objectives that underpin China’s belligerent conduct.
  • We have not devoted adequate intellectual capital, intelligence resources and political attention to acquisition of a clear insight into China and its motivations.
  • Even when intelligence is available, analysis and dissemination have fallen short.

What China’s Defence White Papers suggest

  • These thematic public documents articulate China’s national security aims, objectives and vital interests and also address the “ends-ways-means” issues related to its armed forces.
  • The 11 DWPs issued so far are a model of clarity and vision, and provide many clues to current developments.
  • No Indian government since Independence has deemed it necessary to issue a defence white paper, order a defence review or publish a national security strategy.
  • Had we done so, it may have prepared us for the unexpected and brought order and alacrity to our crisis-response.

China uses LAC as strategic leverage

  • In order to show India its place, China had administered it a “lesson” in 1962.
  • And it may, perhaps, be contemplating another one in 2020, with the objective of preventing the rise of a peer competitor.
  • For China, the line of actual control or LAC, representing an unsettled border, provides strategic leverage.
  • Leverage it can use to keep India on tenterhooks about its next move while repeatedly exposing the latter’s vulnerabilities.

1993 Agreement didn’t benefit India

  • Our diplomats derive considerable satisfaction from the 1993 Border Peace & Tranquility Agreement.
  • This agreement, according to former foreign secretary, Shivshankar Menon, “…effectively delinked settlement of the boundary from the rest of the relationship”.
  • But by failing to use available leverage for 27 years, and not insisting on bilateral exchange of LAC maps, we have created a ticking time-bomb, with the trigger in China’s hands.
  • While “disengagement” may soon take place between troops in contact, it is most unlikely that the PLA will pull back or vacate any occupied position in Ladakh or elsewhere.
  • In which case, India needs to consider a three-pronged strategy.

What should be India’s three-pronged strategy?

1. Reinforce at ground level

  • At the ground-level, we need to visibly reinforce our positions, and move forward to the LAC all along.
  • We should enhance the operational-tempo of the three services as a measure of deterrence.
  • Indian warships should show heightened presence at the Indian Ocean choke-points.
  • Cyber emergency response teams country-wide should remain on high alert.
  • We should build-up stocks of weapons, ammunition and spares.
  • The Ministry of Defence should seize this opportunity to urgently launch some long-term “atma-nirbharta” schemes in defence-production.

2. At strategic level: Modus vivendi

  • At the strategic level, the government should consider sustained process of engagement with China at the highest politico-diplomatic echelons.
  • The negotiations should seek multi-dimensional Sino-Indian modus-vivendi; encompassing the full gamut of bilateral issues like trade, territorial disputes, border-management and security.
  • Simultaneously, at the grand-strategic level, India should initiate a dialogue for the formation of an “Indo-Pacific Concord for Peace and Tranquility”.
  • This Concord should involve inviting four members of the Quad as well as Vietnam, Indonesia, Philippines and Malaysia.

3. Political pragmatism

  • As a nation, we need to be pragmatic enough to realise that neither conquest nor re-conquest of territory is possible in the 21st century.
  • Parliament should, now, resolve to ask the government, “to establish stable, viable and peaceful national boundaries”.

Consider the question “With changing relations with China, India needs to overhaul its strategy on the ground, strategic and political levels in dealing with China”

Conclusion

This three-pronged approach while comprehending the Chines objectives and goals can help India in dealing successfully with the challenge posed by China.

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Foreign Policy Watch: India-China

Future of relations with China

Note4Students

From UPSC perspective, the following things are important :

Prelims level: Galwan river, Shyok River

Mains level: Paper 2- India-China relations

This article calibrates the changes our future engagement with China will experience following the Galwan incident. The first casualty has been the trust between the two countries. And next could be strategic communications between the two countries. So, India’s response to the incident should be based on these changes.

What explains China’s aggression

  • Hubris, internal insecurities in China, the COVID-19 pandemic and the complex and confused external environment explains it.
  • Challenge posed by India from the ideological, strategic and economic points of view can be the other factor.

Violation of many agreements

  • China’s recent military actions in Ladakh clearly violate the signed agreements of 1993, 1996, 2005, etc on maintaining peace and tranquillity along the LAC.
  • These actions are in violation also of other signed agreements, including at the highest level.
  • It also contradict positions taken by Xi himself at the informal Wuhan and Chennai summits in 2018 and 2019.
  • In 2003, two countries signed a Declaration on Principles for Relations and Constructive Cooperation between our two countries.
  • The third principle states: “The two countries are not a threat to each other. Neither side shall use or threaten to use force against the other.”
  •  This was more than reiterated in the agreement signed in April 2005 on the Political Parameters and Guiding Principles for settlement of the India China boundary question.
  • . Article 1 states, inter alia: “Neither side shall use or threaten to use force against the other by any means.”

Doklam and informal summits

  • .A qualitative change though occurred in Chinese perceptions after the Doklam face-off.
  • That necessitated the first informal summit at Wuhan in April 2018.
  • One important outcome of that summit was the agreement to continue to meet at the highest level and to enhance trust and strengthen strategic communication.
  • The second informal summit took place between Xi and Narendra Modi in Chennai in October 2019.
  • It was in the aftermath of the revocation of Article 370 by India and China’s unnecessary and unsuccessful attempt to raise the issue in the UN Security Council.
  • By then, many other developments — both internal and external — had added pressure on China.
  • At Chennai, the Chinese undoubtedly drew some red lines.

Which red lines does China feel India has crossed

  • One fundamental red line is China’s long-held and strategic interest in parts of Jammu and Kashmir.
  • Jammu and Kashmir border Xinjiang and Tibet and allow connectivity between the two.
  • It is wrongly argued that it is Pakistan that is the issue in J&K.
  • China is as big an issue but has quietly hidden behind Pakistan’s cover.
  • That is no longer feasible as democratic India becomes economically and otherwise stronger.

Future of Special Representative process

  • The Special Representatives process to address the boundary question seems stalemated and its usefulness needs review.
  • The 2005 agreement contains the necessary parameters for a boundary settlement but there is obviously not adequate common ground.
  • Some positivity can, however, be brought in if the LAC clarification process is revived and completed in a time-bound manner.
  • But this is easier said than done in the prevailing circumstances.
  • Patrolling procedures will need to be revised, preferably by mutual agreement.

Unsustainable economic partnership

  • The current nature of the economic partnership between India and China is not sustainable.
  • India’s annual trade deficit with China in recent years virtually finances a CPEC a year!
  • China has still not fulfilled all its commitments to India on joining the WTO in 2001.

What should be our trade policy

  • Indian business and industry must stop taking the easy option.
  • Some costs will no doubt go up but there can be environmental advantages of switching to other sources of technology and equipment.
  • There is more than one available source of financial investments in Indian ventures.

What will be the nature of bilateral dialogue

  • Bilateral dialogue mechanisms will continue their desultory course.
  • On issues of interest to India such as terrorism, we get no support from China.
  • Cooperation on river waters has not evolved.
  • On the global agenda, on issues such as climate change, dialogue and cooperation will continue in multilateral fora depending on mutual interest.

What should be the nature of governments response

  • The response to China’s recent actions in Ladakh must be an all-of-government one, indeed an all-India one.
  • It should be covering all sectors including heightened security and be coordinated, consistent.
  • This is not a question of nationalism or patriotism but of self-esteem and self-respect.

Consider the question “What should be the basis of India’s evolving policy response to China’s new approach to the border dispute?”

Conclusion

Bilateral relations between India and China cannot progress unless there is peace on the borders and China recognises that India too has non-negotiable core concerns, aspirations and interests.

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Foreign Policy Watch: India-China

Faults in our China policy

Note4Students

From UPSC perspective, the following things are important :

Prelims level: Not much

Mains level: Paper 2- India-China realtions

This article tracks the faultline in India’s China policy that makes it an enduring tragedy. China never bought into India’s narratives of Asian unity and untied Asian front against the West. Instead, China cultivated its relations with the West and leveraged that for furthering its interests.

Enduring tragedy: India’s China policy

  • That tragedy is rooted in persistent political fantasies.
  • Refusal to learn from past mistakes.
  • And the belief that the US and the West are at the source of India’s problems with China.
  • The problem predates independence.
  • Each generation has been reluctant to discard the illusions that India’s China policy has nurtured over the last century.

Historical background

  •  Tagore went to China in 1924 with the ambition of developing a shared Asian spiritual civilisation.
  • He was accused by Chines of diverting Chins’s attention away from the imperatives of modernisation and, yes, westernisation.
  •  Jawaharlal Nehru approached China as a modernist and nationalist.
  • He met a delegation of Chinese nationalists at Brussels in 1927.
  • There he issued a ringing statement on defeating western imperialism and shaping a new Asian and global order.
  •  But in Second World War, Congress was unwilling to join hands with China in defeating Japanese imperialism.
  • Indian and Chinese nationalists could not come together for they were fighting different imperial powers.

Relations after independence

  • As India’s first PM, Nehru campaigned against the western attempt to isolate China.
  • Afro-Asian conference in Bandung, Indonesia in 1955 was attended by both.
  • Within five years war broke out in 1962.
  • Atal Bihari Vajpayee travelled to China in February 1979 to re-engage Beijing.
  • Before he could head home, Beijing had launched a war against a fellow communist regime in Vietnam.
  • That was an end of hope for Asian solidarity.
  • Rajiv Gandhi in 1988 sought to normalise relations with China while continuing to negotiate on the boundary dispute.

Other issues: Trade entanglement

  • Amid border dispute, other issues have taken a life of their own.
  • For example, the massive annual trade deficits.
  • India’s hope that economic cooperation will improve mutual trust will help resolve other issues was also dashed.
  • India’s massive trade deficit with China is now a little over half of its total trade deficit.
  • India is finding it hard to disentangle the deep economic dependence on imports from China.

Story of political cooperation: From unipolar to bipolar world

  • As the Cold War ended, India began political cooperation with China on global issues.
  • It was hoped that such cooperation will provide the basis for better bilateral relations.
  • It could not have been more wrong.
  • P V Narasimha Rao and his successors joined China and Russia in promoting a “multipolar world” [remember the US dominance].
  • Delhi is now struggling to cope with the emergence of a “unipolar Asia” — with Beijing as its dominant centre.
  • China’s rapid rise has also paved the way for the potential emergence of a “bipolar world” dominated by Washington and Beijing.

Engagement with West

  • China never worked with Indian on the ideas of building coalitions against the West.
  • While India never stopped arguing with the West, China developed a sustained engagement with the US, Europe and Japan.
  • Mao broke with Communist Russia to join forces with the US in the early 1970s.
  • Deng Xiaoping promoted massive economic cooperation with the US to transform China and lay the foundations for its rise.

Will staying away from West lead to good relations with China

  • China has leveraged the deep relationship with the West to elevate itself in the international system.
  • Delhi continues to think that staying away from America is the answer for good relations with Beijing.
  • Beijing sees the world through the lens of power.
  • Delhi tends to resist that realist prism.
  • India has consistently misread China’s interests and ambitions.
  • The longer India takes to shed that strategic lassitude, the greater will be its China trouble.

Facts that India needs to come to terms with

  • India must also recognise that China, like the great powers before it, wants to redeem its territorial claims.
  • China also has the ambition to bend the neighbourhood to its will, reshape the global order to suit its interests.
  • China has not hidden these goals and interests, but India has refused to see what is in plain sight.

Consider the question “Acknowledging Beijing’s rise, scale of challenge it presents, are first steps in crafting a new China policy” Comment.

Conclusion

Acknowledging China’s dramatic rise and recognising the scale of the challenge it presents is essential for Delhi in crafting a new China policy.

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Foreign Policy Watch: India-China

What is lacking in our China policy

Note4Students

From UPSC perspective, the following things are important :

Prelims level: Not much

Mains level: Paper 2- India-China relations and border dispute

While formulating our response to China’s aggressive policies in Ladakh, we should first understand their objectives. This article explains these objective and suggests the steps to deal with China’s policies.

Statements on Aksai Chin and Pakistan

  • Statements over Aksai Chin and Pakistan-occupied Kashmir (PoK) by India have painted the image of India as a revanchist power in utter disregard of the country’s capabilities.
  • These statements also gave the impression that India precludes any attempt at changing the status quo on either front.
  • Though these statements were justifiable in terms of India’s legal rights to these territories, were ill-timed.

How these statements were perceived by China

  • They were made when Beijing was feeling alarmed at the Indian government’s decision to separate Ladakh from Jammu and Kashmir.
  • The move augmented its perception that it was a prelude to India’s attempt to change the status quo in Aksai Chin.
  • India’s assertion of its claims on PoK that in China’s perception threatened the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor project.

China’s 4 strategic objectives

1. India and China are not equals

  • China wants India to understand that it is not in the same league as China.
  • China resorts to periodic assaults across the Line of Actual Control (LAC) if India tries to assume a position of equality.

2. Keep India away from interfering in Indo-Pacific

  • China wants India not to actively oppose Chinese designs to dominate the Indo-Pacific region.
  • Also, China wants Indias to refrain from aligning with the U.S. and its allies — Japan and Australia, in particular — in an attempt to contain China.

3. Keeping India preoccupied with problems

  • China’s strategy also includes keeping India preoccupied with problems in its immediate neighbourhood.
  • So with these problems, India cannot act as an alternative pole of power to China in the broader Asian region.

4. Supporting Pakistan to neutralise India

  • As part of the last objective, China supports  Pakistan economically and militarily, including the sharing of nuclear weapons designs.
  • China uses Pakistan to neutralise India’s conventional power superiority vis-à-vis that country.

An understanding of these objectives is essential to fashioning a realistic Indian response to China’s aggressive policies in Ladakh and elsewhere along the LAC.

But, what about Pakistan?

  • Pakistan is at best an irritant for India. (so, focus on China)
  • Pakistan can be managed with the use of diplomatic tools, international opprobrium, and superior military force.
  • In fact, the Pakistani challenge to India has become magnified because of its nexus with China.

What India should do?

  • India’s main strategic goal should be the adoption of carefully calculated policies that neutralise China’s diplomatic and military clout in the Asia-Pacific region.
  • While doing so, India should not appear as a surrogate for other powers.
  • And India should also ensure that in making alliances it in not sacrificing the autonomy of decision-making in foreign policy. 

Consider the question “Understanding of China’s objective is essential to formulate a realistic response to its aggressive policies in Ladakh.” Comment.

Conclusion

Understanding the greater threat posed by China vis-a-vis Pakistan should be the basis of India’s policy towards China.

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Foreign Policy Watch: India-China

Why China trade ban is bad idea

Note4Students

From UPSC perspective, the following things are important :

Prelims level: Not Much

Mains level: India-China trade relations

After the Galwan Valley skirmish, the popular idea resonating in Indian streets is that Indians should boycott Chinese goods and thus “teach China a lesson”.

Practice question for mains:

Q. India’s quest for self-reliance is still a distant dream. Critically comment in light of the popular sentiment against the Chinese imports in India.

There are several reasons why the #Boycott_China is an ill-advised move:

A. Trade deficits are not necessarily bad

  • Trade deficits/surpluses are just accounting exercises and having a trade deficit against a country doesn’t make the domestic economy weaker or worse off.
  • Example: If one looks at the top 25 countries with whom India trades, it has a trade surplus with the US, the UK and the Netherlands. But this does not make Indian economy better than them.

What does this deficit indicate?

  • Both Indian consumers and Chinese producers are gainer through trading.
  • One gets the market other cheap price. Thus, both are better off than what they would have been without trade.

So, having a trade deficit is good?

  • Of course, running persistent trade deficits across all countries raises two main issues.
  • One, availability of foreign exchange reserves to “buy” the imports.
  • Today, India has more than $500 billion of forex — good enough to cover imports for 12 months.
  • Two, lack of domestic capacity to produce in the most efficient manner.

B. Will hurt the Indian poor the most

  • This is because poor are more price-sensitive.
  • For instance, if Chinese TVs were replaced by either costlier Indian TVs or less efficient ones, unlike poor, richer Indians may buy the costlier option.
  • Similarly, the Chinese products that are in India are already paid for. By banning their sale or avoiding them, Indians will be hurting fellow Indian retailers.
  • Again, this would hit poorest retailers more due to inability to cope with the unexpected losses.

C. Will punish Indian producers and exporters

  • Several businesses in India import intermediate goods and raw materials, which, in turn, are used to create final goods — both for the domestic Indian market as well as the global market (as Indian exports).
  • An overwhelming proportion of Chinese imports are in the form of intermediate goods such as electrical machinery, nuclear reactors, fertilizers, optical and photographic measuring equipment organic chemicals etc.
  • Such imports are used to produce final goods which are then either sold in India or exported.
  • A blanket ban on Chinese imports will hurt all these businesses at a time when they are already struggling to survive, apart from hitting India’s ability to produce finished goods.

D. Will barely hurt China

  • While China accounts for 5% of India’s exports and 14% of India’s imports — in US$ value terms — India’s imports from China are just 3% of China’s total exports.
  • More importantly, China’s imports from India are less than 1% of its total imports.
  • The point is that if India and China stop trading then — on the face of it — China would lose only 3% of its exports and less than 1% of its imports.
  • However, India will lose 5% of its exports and 14% of its imports.

Issues

  • On the whole, it is much easier for China to replace India than for India to replace China.
  • Ban can also seize Chinese funding to many Indian businesses (the start-ups with billion-dollar valuations).
  • In short term, replacing Chinese products with Japan or Germany, will only increase our total trade deficit.
  • If on the other hand, we decide to use Indian products, that too would cost us more — albeit just internally.

E. India will lose policy credibility

  • It has also been suggested that India should renege on existing contracts with China.
  • This can be detrimental for India’s effort to attract foreign investment.
  • As one of the first things an investor — especially foreign — tracks is the policy credibility and certainty.
  • If policies can be changed overnight or if the government itself reneges on contracts, investor will either not invest or demand higher returns for the increased risk.

F. Raising tariffs is mutually assured destruction

  • Many argue that India should just slap higher import duties on Chinese goods or apply prohibitive tariffs on final goods.
  • By doing this, firstly India would be violating rules of the World Trade Organization.
  • Secondly, it would make China and many others to reciprocate in the same way.

Equating border dispute with trade is no panacea

  • The first thing to understand is that turning a border dispute into a trade war is unlikely to solve the border dispute.
  • Worse, given India and China’s position in both global trade as well as relative to each other, this trade war will hurt India far more than China.
  • Thirdly, these measures will be most poorly timed since the Indian economy is already at its weakest point ever — facing a sharp GDP contraction.

Way forward

  • In long term, under the banner of self reliance, India must develop its domestic capabilities and acquire a higher share of global trade by raising its competitiveness.
  • But no country is completely self-sufficient and that is why trade is such a fantastic idea.
  • It allows countries to specialize in what they can do most efficiently and export that good while importing whatever some other country does more efficiently.
  • Need of hour is well thought and balanced approach.

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Foreign Policy Watch: India-China

Postscript to a tragedy at Galwan

Note4Students

From UPSC perspective, the following things are important :

Prelims level: Galwan valley.

Mains level: Paper 2- India-China relations

The article suggests the approach that India should adopt in its policy toward China. Long term view of the situation is crucial. But some short term steps is also necessary.

Prelude to 1962 War

  • Revolt in Tibet and granting asylum to the Dalai Lama in March 1959 can be seen as start of tensions in relations.
  •  In October 1959, there was a face-off between Indian and Chinese troops at Kongka La.
  • With the conflict in 1962,  there was very little room for a reasoned, negotiated settlement on the boundary question between the two countries.

2020 is not same as 1959 for both India and China

  • Both nations have grown immensely in strength and stature on the world stage – even military wise.
  • Their relations have substance and a diversity of content in a manner absent in the 1950s – like the economic relations.
  • Hence, there is a need to not blame each other and find solutions instead of descent towards a full-blown conflict with China.

Weighing the options carefully

  • India at present is struggling at multiple fronts:
  • 1) COVID-19 crisis demands the full attention of the government.
  • 2) Economy is stagnant and needs recovery.
  • 3) Tensions on other fronts – Pakistan persist and Nepal dispute in the Lipulekh/Kalapani area.
  • Thus, the call by warmongers should be evaluated, that too critically.

Evolving comprehensive China policy

  • Strong political direction, mature deliberation and coherence are keys to handling the situation.
  • Army’s role can involve tactical adjustments and manoeuvres to deter the Chinese.
  • But comprehensive China strategy should be left to those tasked with national security policy.
  • Chinese transgressions in Sikkim and Ladakh can provide learning lessons for our future strategy.
  • A complete strategy would involve military, diplomatic and political levels.

Future plan of action – Defence

  • India should take the initiative on a timely and early clarification of the LAC.
  • Identify areas of conflict and mark such areas as demilitarized by both sides through joint agreement.
  • At the same time, India must stand resolute and firm in the defence of territory in all four sectors of the border.
  • Contacts between the two militaries — joint exercises and exchanges of visits of senior Commanders — should be scaled down for short term future.
  • Diplomatic channels must continue to be open and should not be restricted in any way as they are essential in the current situation.
  • A border settlement is part of long term strategy.

Future of business, trade and investment between two countries

  • Indian businesses in China and Chinese business operations in India can expect tougher future.
  • The scenario on trade and investments could encounter similar obstacles.
  • Areas of on national security, as in the cyber field and in telecommunications (5G) should take necessary reduction in import of Chinese items.

 India should strengthen alliances

  • The events in Galwan Valley should be a wake-up call to re invent it’s South and easAsia policy.
  • This is an opportunity for India to align its interests much more strongly with the U.S. as a principal strategic partner.
  • India should also infuse more energy into its relations with Japan, Australia, and the ASEAN.
  • The time has also come for India to reconsider its stand on joining the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership.
  • To disengage from economic involvement with China, and build the capacities and capabilities it needs in manufacturing, and in supply chains networks closer home, India has to think in the long terms.

Consider the question “The context of changing relations with China has forced India to reconsider the depth of its engagement with other countries. In light of this examine the changes India’s foreign policy adopt in dealing with other countries.”

Conclusion

Galwan incident is a wake up call for us. In every aspect, engagement with China needs a re look. And that also includes an increased level of engagement in South Asian neighborhood.

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Foreign Policy Watch: India-China

Why Ladakh matters to India and China?

Note4Students

From UPSC perspective, the following things are important :

Prelims level: Ladakh and its topography

Mains level: India-China border disputes

This article from IE discusses this cold, dry, high altitude territory with its extremely scarce vegetation that makes it a point of disagreement between India and China.

Practice question for mains:

Q. India’s boundary disputes with its neighbourhood are the legacy of its colonial past. Analyse.

Ladakh: The Cold Desert of India

  • Ladakh is the highest plateau in India with much of it being over 3,000 m.
  • It extends from the Himalayan to the Kunlun Ranges and includes the upper Indus River valley.
  • The importance of Ladakh is rooted in complicated historical processes that led to the territory becoming part of the state of J&K, and China’s interest in it post the occupation of Tibet in 1950.

Beginning of the Chinese claim

  • In July 1958, an official monthly magazine in China published a map of the country that would in the next few months become a bone of contention between India and its East Asian neighbour.
  • The map in question showed large parts of the North-East Frontier Agency (NEFA) and the Himalayan territory of Ladakh as part of China.
  • Soon after ‘China pictorial’ came out with the new Chinese map, the leaders of both countries began writing to each other frequently regarding Ladakh.
  • The exchange of letters between Jawaharlal Nehru and his Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai was followed by the Sino-Indian war of 1962.
  • The war also led to the formation of the loosely demarcated Line of Actual Control (LAC) running through Ladakh.

The Integration of Ladakh into India

  • Historically and culturally the state was intrinsically linked to neighbouring Tibet.
  • Language and religion linked Ladakh and Tibet; politically too, they shared a common history.
  • Ladakh was part of the Tibetan empire which broke up after the assassination of King Langdarma in 742 CE.
  • Up until the Dogra invasion of 1834, Ladakh was an independent Himalayan state, much the same way as Bhutan and Sikkim.
  • As the Sikhs acquired Kashmir in 1819, Emperor Ranjit Singh turned his ambition towards Ladakh.
  • But it was Gulab Singh, the Dogra feudatory of the Sikhs in Jammu, who went ahead with the task of integrating Ladakh into Jammu and Kashmir.

British interests in Ladakh

  • The British East India Company, which was by now steadily establishing itself in India, had lacked interest in Ladakh initially.
  • However, it did show enthusiasm for the Dogra invasion of the area, with the hope that as a consequence, a large portion of Tibetan trade would be diverted to its holdings.
  • The state of J&K was essentially a British creation, formed as a buffer zone where they could meet the Russians.

The Sino-Sikh War

  • In May 1841, Tibet under the Qing dynasty of China invaded Ladakh with the hope of adding it to the imperial Chinese dominions, leading to the Sino-Sikh war.
  • However, the Sino-Tibetan army was defeated, and the Treaty of Chushul was signed that agreed on no further transgressions or interference in the other country’s frontiers.
  • After the first Anglo-Sikh war of 1845-46, the state of J&K, including Ladakh, was taken out of the Sikh empire and brought under British suzerainty.

Chinese interest in Ladakh after the occupation of Tibet in 1950

  • The annexation of Tibet by China in 1950 sparked a newfound interest in Ladakh, and particularly so after the 1959 Tibetan uprising that erupted in Lhasa with Dalai Lama’s political asylum in India.
  • In attempting to crush the Tibetan revolt while at the same time denying its existence, the Chinese have used methods which have brought China and India into sharp conflict.
  • To begin with, the road that the Chinese built across Ladakh in 1956-57 was important for the maintenance of their control over Tibet.
  • The building of the road through Ladakh upset Nehru’s government. The diplomatic negotiations failed, and the war of 1962 followed.

Why conflict has flared up again?

  • There are two layers to this. First, up to 2013, India’s infrastructural development in that area was minimal.
  • From 2013, India started pushing for infrastructure projects there and by 2015; it became a major defence priority.
  • The second layer is the August 5, 2019 decision (to remove the special status of J&K and downgrade the state into two Union Territories).
  • From the Chinese point of view, they would have assumed that if India makes Ladakh a Union Territory, they would be reasserting its control over the entire state.
  • Moreover, it is also important to note that over time, Xinjiang which is part of Aksai Chin, has become very important to China for their internal reasons.

The dispute

  • The British legacy of the map of the territory continued to remain the ground upon which India laid its claim on the area.
  • India insisted that the border was, for the most part, recognised and assured by treaty and tradition; the Chinese argued it had never really been delimited.
  • The claims of both governments rested in part on the legacy of imperialism; British imperialism (for India), and Chinese imperialism (over Tibet) for China.

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Foreign Policy Watch: India-China

History, the standoff, and policy worth rereading

Note4Students

From UPSC perspective, the following things are important :

Prelims level: Treaties with Nepal and Bhutan.

Mains level: Paper 2- India-China relations

In the changing circumstances, there is a need for recalibration of foreign policy when dealing with China. This article draws on a policy approach adopted by Nehru and suggests 4 areas to focus on while devising the foreign policy.

India must pay attention to “five fingers”

  • The deadly clashes at Galwan and the ongoing standoff between India and China on the ridges or “fingers” around the Pangong Tso are a metaphor for the wider conflict between the two countries.
  • The metaphor refers to all the areas that Chinese strategy refers to as the “five fingers of the Tibetan palm”.
  • According to the construct, attributed to Mao and cited in the 1950s by Chinese officials, Xizang (Tibet) was China’s right palm, and it was its responsibility to “liberate” the fingers.
  • Fiver fingers are defined as Ladakh, Nepal, Sikkim, Bhutan, and the North East Frontier Agency (NEFA, or Arunachal Pradesh).
  • Sixty years ago, India began to set about ensuring that quite the reverse ensued, and all five fingers were more closely attached to India, not China.
  • As the government of India grapples with its next steps at the Line of Actual Control (LAC), it must cast a similarly grand strategy, to renew its compact with each of those areas today.

Chines propaganda before 1962 War

  • In the 1950s, even after India and China signed the Panchsheel agreement in 1954.
  • And before the 1962 China-India war, the Nehru government had begun to worry about some of China’s proclamations.
  • Especially after the flight of the Dalai Lama to India in 1959, China began to demand “self-determination in Kashmir”, wrote former Foreign Secretary T.N. Kaul in his memoirs.
  •  More importantly, school textbooks there began to depict the “five fingers” as a part of China.

India’s three-pronged foreign policy form past

  •  India’s defeat in the 1962 war has been studied in great detail, what is perhaps not so well understood is the three-pronged foreign policy New Delhi set into motion at the time, that provided an effective counter to Mao’s five finger policy over the course of the century.

Following are the 3 elements that also formed the part of past policy, with the addition of Jammu and Kashmir status change.

1. Focus on border infrastructure and governance

  • The first was a push for building border infrastructure and governance.
  • In the mid-1950s the government piloted a project to build the Indian Frontier Administrative Services (IFAS) for overseeing NEFA (Arunachal Pradesh) and other areas along the India-China frontier.
  • The Foreign secretary was the Chair of the IFAS selection board.
  • And many who enlisted in the cadre overlapped between the Indian Foreign Service, the Indian Administrative Service and the Indian Police Service, and rotated between postings in the most remote tribal areas and embassies in the region.
  • A special desk was created in the Ministry of External Affairs for officers who would tour all the regions from NEFA to Ladakh in order to make suggestions for the rapid development of these areas.
  • While India’s border infrastructure is only now catching up with the infrastructure China built in the course of the next few decades, its base was made during the brief period the IFAS existed, before it was wound up in 1968.
  • An idea before its time, the IFAS’s role has since been transferred to the Indian Army and the Border Roads Organisation (BRO).

Idea worth revisiting: IFAS

  • IFAS is an idea worth revisiting, especially as areas along the frontier continue to complain of neglect and a lack of focus from the Centre.
  • In 2019, the Chief Ministers of Arunachal Pradesh and Mizoram called for the resurrection of the IFAS.

2. Outreach and treaties

  • The second prong were a series of treaties that were signed around that time with neighbours such as Nepal and Bhutan.
  •  And the consolidation of control, militarily and administratively, of other territories that acceded to India, including Ladakh as a part of Jammu and Kashmir (1947), and NEFA (1951).
  • In 1950, India signed a treaty with Sikkim that made it a “protectorate”.
  • By 1975 the Indira Gandhi Government had annexed Sikkim and made it the 22nd State of India.
  • Each of these treaties built unique relationships with New Delhi, tying countries such as Nepal and Bhutan in ways that were seen as a “win-win” for both sides at the time.

Treaties outliving their utility

  • Over time, the treaties have outlived their utility.
  • And the benefits of unique ties with Nepal and Bhutan, including open borders and ease of movement, jobs and education for their youth as well as India’s influential support on the world stage, have waned in public memory.

What explains difference in Nepal and Bhutan for India

  • One of the reasons that China has been able to make inroads into Nepal and not with Bhutan, is that the government renegotiated its 1949 Treaty of Perpetual Peace and Friendship with Bhutan.
  • The India-Bhutan 1949 Treaty was replaced with the India-Bhutan Friendship Treaty in 2007.
  • 2007 treaty dropped an article that had committed Bhutan “to beguided” by India on its external affairs policy.
  • This has held India and Bhutan ties in good stead thus far, even during the Doklam stand-off between India and China in 2017 in the face of severe pressure from China.
  • However, despite years of requests from Kathmandu, New Delhi has dragged its feet on reviewing its 1950 Treaty of Peace and Friendship between the Government of India and the Government of Nepal.
  • and on accepting a report the Eminent Persons’ Group (EPG) on Nepal-India relations has produced that recommends a new treaty.
  • New treaties may not, in themselves reduce India’s security threat from China in its neighbourhood.
  • But they create space for a more mutually responsive diplomacy that is necessary to nurture special relationships.

3. Tibet strategy: India must chart a more prominent role

  • For the third prong, India’s policy towards the “palm” or Tibet, itself should be looked at more closely as well.
  • While New Delhi’s decision to shelter the Dalai Lama and lakhs of his followers since 1959 is a policy that is lauded.
  • But it does not change the need for New Delhi to look into the future of its relationship, both with the Tibetan refugee community in India, which has lived here in limbo for decades, as well as with its future leadership.
  • At present, the Dalai Lama has the loyalty of Tibetans worldwide, but in the future, the question over who will take up the political leadership of the community looms large.
  • The Karmapa Lama, who lived in India after his flight from China in 2000, and was groomed as a possible political successor, has now taken the citizenship of another country and lives mostly in the United States.
  • Meanwhile, China will, without doubt, try to force its own choice on the community as well.
  • Given that it is home to so many Tibetans, India must chart a more prominent role in this discourse.

4. Introspection of reorganisation in Jammu and Kashmir

  • Finally, it is necessary to introspect on how India’s own reorganisation of Jammu and Kashmir in August 2019 has changed the security matrix and threat parameters for India, and its neighbours.
  • While Pakistan’s extreme reaction to the move was expected, China’s reaction was perhaps not studied enough.
  • Beijing issued a statement decrying the impact on Jammu and Kashmir, and another one specifically on Ladakh.
  • In the statement, China called it an attempt to “undermine China’s territorial sovereignty by unilaterally changing its domestic law”.
  • And warned that the move was “unacceptable and will not come into force”.

Consider the question “India’s relations with China has always had to factor in the border dispute. But the incidents in recent necessitated a relook at the foreign policy towards China.” In light of this, examine the factors that must form the basis of foreign policy.

Conclusion

The impact of the new map of Jammu and Kashmir on ties with Nepal as well, is no coincidence. There is proof enough that now more than ever, as the government readies its hand on dealing with China, it must not lose sight of every finger in play.

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Foreign Policy Watch: India-China

Multilateralism post COVID-19

Note4Students

From UPSC perspective, the following things are important :

Prelims level: WIPO, UNIDO

Mains level: Paper 2-Multilateralism in the post-Covid world

What is the future of multilateralism? This is the question we have come across many times recently. Given the chaos that we are witnessing in the global order, multilateral seems to be headed for either collapse or capture by China. But, the author of this article suggests that it would be a mistake to consider the choice as binary. Between the collapse and the capture, there are many stakeholders working for its sustenance. So, multilateralism will endure.

International institutions performing below par

  • The COVID-19 outbreak has placed all international institutions under a magnifying glass.
  • By any measure, most have performed below par.
  • Such is the caution espoused that multilateralism today seems to have reverted to its version 0.1.
  • The General Assembly now passes resolutions through no-objection procedure.
  • The Security Council has been found wanting in no small measure.
  • The 75th session’s ‘leaders week’ runs the risk of being reduced to a video playback session.

Pursuit of change by threatening to leave

  • It is true that functioning of multilateral institutions requires reform.
  • They need to adapt to new realities.
  • However, the pursuit of change by threatening to leave multilateral institutions is a phenomenon we witnessed only during the period of the League of Nations.
  • One state followed another in bidding goodbye, until the League’s final demise.

Why post Second World War institutions survived departures

  • The post Second World War multilateral institutions have survived such departures.
  • The United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) in Paris and the Human Rights Council in Geneva have survived the departure of the U.S.
  • The United Nations Industrial Development Organization (UNIDO) in Vienna continues despite the withdrawal of the U.S. and many others.
  • The World Health Organization (WHO), notwithstanding its visible shortcomings, will survive U.S. threats.
  • The reasons are simple.
  • Multilateral organisations serve desperately felt global needs of the vast membership.
  • The pandemic has reinforced the desire for greater global cooperation amongst most states.

So, will the current multi-lateral order survive China’s onslaught?

  •  It is true that Chinese nationals head four multilateral organisations.
  • It is also true that Chinese nationals have failed in campaigns to head UNESCO and the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO).
  • Despite contributing nearly 10% of the UN’s budget, Chinese nationals are not exactly over-represented in terms of staff positions.
  • China has certainly risen up the multilateral pantheon and is able to better promote its interests.
  • It has warded off attacks against it in multilateral fora, at times with the aid of the heads of these organisations.
  • However, it is yet to display an ability to set the multilateral agenda and dominate the discourse on an array of issues, in the manner that the U.S. once indispensably did.
  • China’s flagship venture, the Belt and Road Initiative, remains only on the fringes of multilateral fora.
  • Neither in monetary terms nor in substantive inputs are there portents of a ‘Chinese takeover’.
  • Amidst this, multilateral bodies are populated by a plethora of small and middle states quietly working to restore equilibrium, when the balance tends to shift.
  • The capture of the existing multilateral order by a new hegemon is antithetical to the ethos of multilateralism.
  • Multilateralism thrives on the notion of the Lilliputians tying up Gulliver — old or new.

Evolving multilateralism is not a choice between collapse and capture

  • Between collapse and capture, there are other pathways.
  • Multilateral architecture places a premium on structures over functions, processes over substance.
  • It slows down the change of any sort.
  • The same processes that have stalled change in the past will militate against a takeover in the future.
  • Does that mean that multilateralism will meander meaninglessly?
  • It will meander, but perhaps not meaninglessly.
  • The ‘pluri-laterals’ and the emerging ‘mini-laterals’ each have their place in terms of international agenda-setting, but global norm-setting requires inclusivity that they lack.

Opportunity for India

  • Being able to shape the discourse at an incipient stage is a good perch to be on.
  • Issue-specific ‘coalitions of the willing’ are catalysts.
  • As a growing power, India needs to avail of such avenues.
  • However, by themselves, these will not do justice to the depth and variety of India’s interests and our stakes in global cooperation.
  • Also, they are not holistic solutions in ensuring global acceptance of norms.

Understanding the essence of multilateralism

  • Responses of states during the COVID-19 crisis point to more emphasis on sovereign decision making than before.
  • The imprimatur for acting on behalf of the global community is not going to be available easily.
  • On myriad issues, from sustainable development to the environment, from climate change to pandemics and cyberspace to outer space, the demands for ‘nothing about us without us’ are likely to increase.
  • Since stakeholders perceive that their stakes have risen, they will call for enhanced engagement.
  • Convening such stakeholders in pursuit of global goals is the essence of multilateralism.

Consider the question “In the world afflicted by Covid, multilateralism seems to be headed for collapse or capture by a hegemon. Critically examine.”

Conclusion

We need to patiently promote reforms while building partnerships to avail opportunities which may arise for more fundamental change. We need to bide our time without hiding our intent.

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Foreign Policy Watch: India-China

India-China Border Dispute: A Conflict that has been in the making for years

Note4Students

From UPSC perspective, the following things are important :

Prelims level: Nathu La and Cho La

Mains level: Paper 2- India-China border dispute

This article chronicles the border dispute between the two countries. It began in 1914 and ever after more than a hundred years it still continues. But the latest clash was the deadliest after 1967. Let’s go through past incidents over the border issue.

1914: A border China never agreed to

  • The conflict stretches back to at least 1914.
  • In 2014 representatives from Britain, the Republic of China and Tibet gathered in Simla to negotiate a treaty that would determine the status of Tibet and effectively settle the borders between China and British India.
  • The Chinese, unhappy at proposed terms that would have allowed Tibet to be autonomous and remain under Chinese control, refused to sign the deal.
  • But Britain and Tibet signed a treaty establishing what would be called the McMahon Line, named after a British colonial official, Henry McMahon, who proposed the border.
  • India maintains that the McMahon Line, a 550-mile frontier that extends through the Himalayas, is the official legal border between China and India.
  • But China has never accepted it.

1962: India-China War and origin of LAC

  •  Tensions rose throughout the 1950s.
  • The Chinese insisted that Tibet was never independent and could not have signed a treaty creating an international border.
  • There were several failed attempts at peaceful negotiation.
  • China sought to control critical roadways near its western frontier in Xinjiang.
  • India and its Western allies saw any attempts at Chinese incursion as part of a wider plot to export Maoist-style Communism across the region.
  • By 1962, war had broken out.
  • Chinese troops crossed the McMahon Line and took up positions deep in Indian territory, capturing mountain passes and towns.
  • By November China declared a cease-fire, unofficially redrawing the border near where Chinese troops had conquered territory.
  • It was the so-called Line of Actual Control.

1967: In Sikkim, India pushes China back

  • Tensions came to a head again in 1967 along two mountain passes, Nathu La and Cho La, that connected Sikkim — then a kingdom and a protectorate of India — and China’s Tibet Autonomous Region.
  • A scuffle broke out when Indian troops began laying barbed wire along what they recognized as the border.
  • The scuffles soon escalated when a Chinese military unit began firing artillery shells at the Indians.
  • In the ensuing conflict, more than 150 Indians and 340 Chinese were killed.
  • The clashes in September and October 1967 in those passes would later be considered the second all-out war between China and India.
  • But India prevailed, destroying Chinese fortifications in Nathu La and pushing them farther back into their territory near Cho La.
  • The change in positions, however, meant that China and India each had different and conflicting ideas about the location of the Line of Actual Control.
  • The fighting was the last time that troops on either side would be killed. — until the skirmishes in the Galwan Valley on Tuesday.

1987: A crisis averted

  • In 1987, the Indian military was conducting a training operation to see how fast it could move troops to the border.
  • The large number of troops and material arriving next to Chinese outposts surprised Chinese commanders — who responded by advancing toward what they considered the Line of Actual Control.
  • Realizing the potential to inadvertently start a war, both India and China de-escalated, and a crisis was averted.

2013: Stand-off at Daulat Beg Oldi

  • After decades of patrolling the border, a Chinese platoon pitched a camp near Daulat Beg Oldi in April 2013.
  • The Indians soon followed, setting up their own base fewer than 1,000 feet away.
  • The camps were later fortified by troops and heavy equipment.
  • By May, the sides had agreed to dismantle both encampments, but disputes about the location of the Line of Actual Control persisted.

2017: Doklam Stand-off

  • In June 2017, the Chinese set to work building a road in the Doklam Plateau, an area of the Himalayas controlled not by India, but by its ally Bhutan.
  • Indian troops carrying weapons and operating bulldozers confronted the Chinese with the intention of destroying the road.
  • A standoff ensued, soldiers threw rocks at each other, and troops from both sides suffered injuries.
  • In August, the countries agreed to withdraw from the area, and China stopped construction on the road.

2020: Ladakh stand-off

  • In May, melees broke out several times.
  • In one clash at the glacial lake Pangong Tso, Indian troops were badly injured and had to be evacuated by helicopter.
  • China bolstered its forces with dump trucks, excavators, troop carriers, artillery and armored vehicles, Indian experts said.
  • What was clear was that it was the most serious series of clashes between the two sides since 2017 — and a harbinger of the deadly confrontation to come.

Consider the question “Examine the elements that make the border dispute between India and China difficult to resolve.”

Conclusion

Border dispute in two giants could easily escalate into a full-blown war. India has to recalibrate the policy approach after the recent clash and take steps that would prepare it for such an eventuality.

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Foreign Policy Watch: India-China

What lies behind China’s assertion in Ladakh

Note4Students

From UPSC perspective, the following things are important :

Prelims level: Shaksgam valley

Mains level: Paper 2- India-China border dispute

The latest stand-off in Ladakh triggered a debate over the reasons for Chinese actions. While many attribute it to India’s decision to change the constitutional status of J&K, the author of this article points to the widening power differential. So, what are the implications of it? Read the article to know…

What is argument from China’s side over growing Chinese assertiveness

  •  India’s decision to change the constitutional status of J&K is cited as the reason for Chinesé growing assertiveness in the Ladakh.
  • The Chinese arguments proffered on various occasions since last August have been summarised by Wang Shida, a Chinese scholar in Beijing.
  • Wang argues that India’s move last August has forced China into the Kashmir dispute.
  • The move stimulated China and Pakistan to take counter-actions on the Kashmir issue, and dramatically increased the difficulty in resolving the border issue between China and India.

And what is India’s stand over this explanation

  • Official Delhi rejects the argument that India’s action has “posed a challenge to the sovereignty of China and Pakistan”.
  • It points out that the constitutional changes altered the nature of the relationship between Delhi and Kashmir within the Indian Union, and that it has no impact on the current territorial disposition with China and Pakistan.
  • The government’s renewed claim over Pakistan-Occupied Kashmir and China-occupied Aksai Chin is simply a restatement of long-standing Indian positions.

China: Part of Kashmir dispute or not?

  • It might be baffling to hear the argument that Delhi has “forced” Beijing into the Kashmir dispute with Pakistan.
  • China is very much part of the Kashmir dispute.
  • After all, China occupies large parts of Kashmir, including Aksai Chin and parts of Ladakh and sits on the Shaksgam valley ceded to Beijing by Pakistan in 1963.
  • It is important to note a nuance in China’s articulation.
  • The competing claims of Delhi and Islamabad over Kashmir are rooted in their shared understanding that there was a princely state of Jammu and Kashmir in undivided India.
  • For Beijing, the territories it claims have never been part of J&K but belonged to Tibet and Xinjiang.

Pakistan agreeing to China’s claim

  • That Pakistan has largely swallowed the Chinese argument is reflected in the 1963 agreement on the boundary between “China’s Sinkiang and the contiguous areas the defence of which is under the actual control of Pakistan”.
  • Not entirely surprising, since Pakistan’s primary focus is on getting the Indian-controlled areas of Kashmir rather than claim all the original lands of J&K.

China’s changing approach to the Kashmir question

  • While its claim to be outside the dispute has been consistent, China’s approach to the Kashmir question has seen considerable variation over the last seven decades and more.
  • Some recent research has delved into Nationalist China’s active efforts to draw the Hunza region of the Gilgit district into a union with China during 1947-48.
  • The Mir of Hunza, Jamal Khan, opened negotiations with officials of Xinjiang, but in the end, opted to accede to Pakistan.
  • Communist China did not abandon the efforts of the Nationalist government and continued to show Hunza as part of its territory until the early 1960s.
  • In the 1950s, at the height of the “Bhai-Bhai” phase, China avoided taking a position on the Kashmir question.
  • After the 1962 war, China’s position aligned with Pakistan’s as Beijing called for “self-determination” in Kashmir.
  • After the Maoist era came to a close and Deng Xiaoping took charge in the late 1980s, China began to moderate its Kashmir position and find a better balance in its bilateral relations with India and Pakistan.
  • In the mid-1990s, in a significant setback to Islamabad, Beijing urged both India and Pakistan to put aside the Kashmir issue and focus on developmental cooperation.
  • But China’s position on the boundary dispute in general and the Kashmir question in particular tended to harden against India since the late 2000s.
  • That’s when Beijing became more conscious of the widening power differential with all its neighbours, including India.

So, what explains China’s latest move?

  •  The ground reality has not been altered by India’s constitutional changes.
  • It is being changed by the PLA’s growing military capabilities and the political will to use them.
  • India’s constitutional changes might, in the end, look like a minor defensive move amid China’s continuing gains in Kashmir across the India-Pakistan divide.
  • Although Beijing has let Pakistan keep Hunza for now, it has not really given up its claims on the region under the 1963 agreement.
  • The CPEC, which enters Pakistan through Hunza, has laid the foundation for ever-larger Chinese economic influence in Gilgit-Baltistan.

What is the implication of this in the future?

  • China’s ability to nibble away at the LAC in Ladakh will only grow as the military balance continues to shift in the PLA’s favour.
  • While India’s significant current military deployment to counter Chinese mobilisation may yet help persuade Beijing to step back, there is no escaping the longer-term trend.
  • If Delhi can’t redress the growing military imbalance and as Islamabad becomes even more dependent on Beijing, China will loom larger than ever on the entire Kashmir region.
  • That is the real message from the new Chinese affirmation that it is now part of the Kashmir question.

Consider the question “Rather than Indian’s action in its internal matters, it’s China’s widening power differential with India that explains the Chinese assertive actions on the disputed border locations. Comment.

Conclusion

In raking up the issue at the UNSC, raising economic presence in the Northern Areas and probing India’s military and political vulnerabilities, China is highlighting its new salience for Kashmir. This is part of China’s growing geopolitical impact all across the Great Himalayas. And India must prepare itself to face this changing reality.

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Foreign Policy Watch: India-China

Private: Why South China Sea matters to India

What happens in the South China Sea has bearing on India. So far, the U.S. played a major role in the prosperity and security of the Indo-Pacific, but after the Covid, it may be forced to reconsider its stand over the region. So, what is at stake for India? And what are the options available with ASEAN countries and Indian in such a situation? Read to know…

Dilemma the Indo-Pacific countries faces

  •  As the two most consequential powers of the world, the United States and China which are engaged in a fundamental transformation of their relationship rest of the countries in the region face a dilemma.
  • Almost nobody any longer thinks that China will conform to the US worldview, or that China’s rise from hereon will be unchallenged.
  • The Singapore Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong’s essay in the latest issue of Foreign Affairs cogently spells out this dilemma.

How the U.S. contributed to the region’s prosperity

  • The Indo-Pacific has prospered under American hegemony for the previous 40 years not just because of their huge investments.
  • U.S. invested $328.8 billion in the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) alone and a further $107 billion in China.
  • However, it’s not the investment but also because of the security blanket that it provides.
  • China might have replaced the US as the primary engine of growth in the last decade, but it has come with a cost — the assertion of Chinese power.
  • The benign American military presence has afforded countries the opportunity to pursue economic prosperity without substantial increases in their own defence expenditures or having to look over their shoulders.
  • No group of nations has benefitted more from the presence of the US than the ASEAN.

How Chinese military posture is different from the U.S.

  • Chinese military postures, on the other hand, give cause for concern ever since they unilaterally put forward the Nine-Dash Line in 2009 to declare the South China Sea as territorial waters.
  • Their territorial claim itself is tenuous, neither treaty-based nor legally sound.
  • They act in ways that are neither benign nor helpful for long-term peace and stability.
  • In the first half of 2020 alone, Chinese naval or militia forces have rammed a Vietnamese fishing boat, “buzzed” a Philippines naval vessel and harassed a Malaysian oil drilling operation, all within their respective EEZs.
  • Since 2015, they have built a runway and underground storage facilities on the Subi Reef and Thitu Island as well as radar sites and missile shelters on Fiery Cross Reef and Mischief Reef.
  • They conducted ballistic missile tests in the South China Sea in June 2019 and continue to enhance naval patrols to enforce area denial for others.

Fundamental choices the region faces

  • Going forward, the US and China face fundamental choices.
  • But then, so do the rest of us living in the Indo-Pacific.
  • America’s role in the preservation of the region’s peace and security should not be taken for granted.
  • As COVID imposes crushing costs on all economies, the US may also be weighing its options.
  • Finding justification for Chinese actions in the South China Sea, even as countries in the region help themselves to Chinese economic opportunities while sheltering under the US security blanket, is also fraught with risk.
  • Accommodation may have worked thus far but regional prosperity has come at a mounting cost in geo-strategic terms.
  • The South China Sea is effectively militarised. In the post-COVID age, enjoying the best of both worlds may no longer be an option.

But, ASEAN won’t change the course suddenly

  • Nobody should expect that ASEAN will suddenly reverse course when faced with possibly heightened Sino-US competition.
  • China is a major power that will continue to receive the respect of ASEAN and, for that matter, many others in the Indo-Pacific, especially in a post-COVID world where they are struggling to revive their economies.
  • ASEAN overtook the European Union to become China’s largest trading partner in the first quarter of 2020, and China is the third-largest investor ($150 billion) in ASEAN.
  • The South East Asians are skilled at finding the wiggle room to accommodate competing hegemons while advancing their interests.
  • This does not, however, mean that they are not concerned over Chinese behaviour in the South China Sea.
  • They need others to help them in managing the situation.

Validation of the US military presence and collective efforts of stakeholders

  • A robust US military presence is one guarantee.
  • A stronger validation by the littoral states of the South China Sea helps the US Administration in justifying their presence to the American tax-payer.
  • Others who have stakes in the region also need to collectively encourage an increasingly powerful China to pursue strategic interests in a legitimate way, and on the basis of respect for international law, in the South China Sea.
  • The real choice is not between China and America — it is between keeping the global commons open for all or surrendering the right to choose one’s partners for the foreseeable future.

What is at stake for India?

  • How the South China Sea situation plays out will be critical for our security and well-being.
  • India must consider the following factors while calibrating its approach.
  • 1) The South China Sea is not China’s sea but a global common.
  • 2) It has been an important sea-lane of communication since the very beginning, and passage has been unimpeded over the centuries.
  • 3) Indians have sailed these waters for well over 1,500 years — there is ample historical and archaeological proof of a continuous Indian trading presence from Kedah in Malaysia to Quanzhou in China.
  • 4) Nearly $200 billion of our trade passes through the South China Sea and thousands of our citizens study, work and invest in ASEAN, China, Japan and the Republic of Korea.
  • 5)  We have stakes in the peace and security of this region in common with others who reside there, and freedom of navigation, as well as other normal activities with friendly countries, are essential for our economic well-being. In short, the South China Sea is our business.
  • We have historical rights established by practice and tradition to traverse the South China Sea without impediment.
  • We have mutually contributed to each other’s prosperity for two thousand years.
  • We continue to do so.
  • The proposition that nations that have plied these waters in the centuries past for trade and other peaceful purposes are somehow outsiders who should not be permitted to engage in legitimate activity in the South China Sea, or have a voice without China’s say, should be firmly resisted.

India’s Stand

  • India has maintained that it is not a party to the SCS dispute and its presence in the SCS is not to contain China but for its own economic interests, especially that of its energy security needs.
  • However, China’s increasing ability to decide and expand its role in the South China Sea has compelled India to reevaluate its approach on the issue.
  • As a key element of the Act East Policy, India has started internationalizing disputes in the Indo-Pacific region to psychological pressure on irritants (the recent mentions of South China Sea dispute in bilateral statements between India-USA and India-France is a testimony to the fact).
  • Further, India is aggressively using the soft tool of Buddhist legacy to reclaim the unique historical leverage to make a strong bond with the Southeast Asian region.
  • India has also deployed its navy with Vietnam in the South China Sea for protection of sea lanes of communication (SLOC), denying China any space for assertion.
  • Also, India is part of Quad initiative (India, US, Japan, Australia) and lynchpin of Indo-Pacific narrative. These initiatives are viewed as a containment strategy by China.

India needs to be responsive to ASEAN

  • India needs to be responsive to ASEAN’s expectations.
  • While strategic partnerships and high-level engagements are important, ASEAN expects longer-lasting buy-ins by India in their future.
  • They have taken the initiative time and again to involve India in Indo-Pacific affairs.
  • It is not as if our current level of trade or investment with ASEAN makes a compelling argument for them to automatically involve us.
  • They have deliberately taken a longer-term view.
  • A restructuring of global trade is unlikely to happen any time soon in the post-COVID context.
  • Regional arrangements will become even more important for our economic recovery and rejuvenation.
  • If we intend to heed the clarion call of “Think Global Act Local”, India has to be part of the global supply chains in the world’s leading growth region for the next half-century.
  • It is worth paying heed to the words from Singapore’s prime minister, who writes that something significant is lost in an RCEP without India.
  • And urges us to recognise that the value of such agreements goes beyond the economic gains they generate.
  • Singapore is playing the long game. Are we willing to do so, even if it imposes some costs in the short-term?

Consider the question “The South China Sea has been witnessing growing militarisation day by day. And how the South China Sea situation plays out will be critical for our security and well-being. In light of this, examine the basis on which India should contest China’s unilateral claims in the area and scope of engagement with the ASEAN countries in this regard.”

Conclusion

Indian is a stakeholder in the South China Sea. What happens there have implications for us. In such a scenario, India must form a partnership with other players in the region and should attempt to make China follow international laws and global order.

B2BASICS

Significance of South China Sea

  • Geo-Strategic Location
    • The geographic location of the SCS is strategically important. As it links the Indian Ocean to the Pacific and is a critical shipping channel
    • According to the United Nations Conference on Trade And Development (UNCTAD), one-third of the global shipping passes through it, carrying trillions of trade.
    • Roughly two thirds of South Korea’s energy supplies, nearly 60% of Japan’s and Taiwan’s energy supplies, and 80% of China’s crude oil imports come through the South China Sea.
  • Rich Energy Reserves
    • SCS is believed to have huge oil and gas reserves beneath its seabed.
    • According to the World Bank, the South China Sea holds proven oil reserves of at least seven billion barrels and an estimated 900 trillion cubic feet of natural gas.
  • Choke Point
    • The Strait of Malacca connects Indian Ocean to the South China Sea and is 900 km in length and is also a prominent trade route between East Asia and West Asia-Europe.
    • The Strait of Malacca is a choke point, it is always in interest of great powers to control such a strategic location. Thus, due to the presence of this choke point, SCS assumes much importance for China and other regional countries.
    • In context of naval diplomacy, it is a geopolitical term used to signify an international strait whose control could potentially affect commercial transit.

  • Fishery Resources
    • Fishing in the South China Sea is a big business.
    • According to some estimates up to 10 % of the world’s ocean-caught fish come from the region. However the fish stocks in the area are depleted and regional countries are using fishing bans as a means of asserting their sovereignty claims.

South China Dispute

Encroaching EEZ of Other Countries

In 1947, China took control of some islets in the South China Sea occupied by Japan in World War–II. Since 1953, China has been claiming almost the entire South China Sea, reflected in a map created with a 9-dash line to show them as a part of China.

  • In 2016, the Philippines had filed an arbitration case in the Permanent Court of Arbitration, seeking to strike down China’s expansive territorial claims in the South China Sea.
    • The tribunal issued a decision finding that there is no legal basis to claim “historic rights” to islands in the South China Sea and the 9-dash line is inconsistent with Convention on the Law of the Sea.
    • However, China refused to abide by the judgement.
  • China has asserted a maritime claim (based on historic rights) to a large part of the South China Sea that is not consistent with international law.
    • The SCS has more than a dozen overlapping EEZ in accordance with the 1982 Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS- an international treaty that sets out important maritime rules).
    • As per UNCLOS, countries in their EEZ can explore oil, mineral resources, living and non-living natural resources including resources under the sea, seabed and subsoil.

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Foreign Policy Watch: India-China

A case for quiet diplomacy to resolve standoff

Note4Students

From UPSC perspective, the following things are important :

Prelims level: Depsang Plains

Mains level: Paper 2- India-China relations

Apart from the recent one, there had been several stand-offs between India and China over the border issue. The use of quiet diplomacy to diffuse the situation underlies all these stand-offs. However, politicisation of stand-off could make the situation difficult to resolve. This article explains the use of quiet diplomacy and problems posed by the politicisation of the stand-offs.

Process to diffuse tension began but not at all points

  •  Both sides have agreed on a broad plan to defuse four of the five points of discord.
  • The situation at the fifth, Pangong Lake remains uncertain as also in Galwan valley and north Sikkim.
  • At Pangong Tso, the Chinese have entrenched their positions with tents and remain on India’s side of the LAC.
  • There is a major point of difference which will not be easy to resolve.

Let’s look into the strategy used by India in the past to resolve stand-offs

  • The pattern of resolution of past stand-offs underlines the key role played by quiet diplomacy in unlocking complicated stand-off situations.
  • Both the United Progressive Alliance (UPA) and National Democratic Alliance (NDA) governments have followed an approach that has coupled quiet diplomacy with a strong military posture, while at the same time allowing the adversary a way out.
  • This has been the broad strategy in dealing with challenges from China across the LAC.
  • And this strategy has generally worked.

Let’s look into three specific incidents

1) 2013-Depsang plains

  • In 2013, when Chinese troops pitched tents on India’s side of the LAC on the Depsang plains, similar to Pangong Tso.
  • The UPA government was under fire, both for being weak on China and for its reticence.
  • While the government was being publicly attacked for doing nothing, it had privately conveyed to China that if the stand-off didn’t end, an upcoming visit by Premier Li Keqiang would be off.
  • If that demand had been made public at the time, China would have only dug in its heels, even if the government may have won the headlines of the day.

2) Chumar stand-off

  • The government adopted a similar strategy during the 2014 stand-off at Chumar, which coincided with President Xi Jinping’s visit to India.
  • Mr. Xi’s visit went ahead, while India quietly but forcefully stopped the Chinese road-building and deployed 2,500 soldiers, outnumbering the People’s Liberation Army (PLA).
  • The PLA withdrew.
  • Both sides disengaged and followed a moratorium into patrolling into contested areas, which was observed for many months thereafter.

Ultimately, in both cases, the objective was achieved. China, faced with firm resistance, was prevented from changing the status quo.

3) Doklam stand-off in 2017

  • In 2017, the government came under particularly intense fire because it stayed studiously silent through a 72-day stand-off at Doklam.
  • Indian troops crossed over into Bhutan to stop a Chinese road construction on territory India sees as Bhutanese but China claims.
  • By extending the road, India argued, China was unilaterally altering the India-Bhutan-China trijunction.
  • Beijing demanded an unconditional withdrawal.
  • When both finally disengaged, neither divulged the terms.
  • It would later emerge that the deal struck involved India withdrawing first.
  • China then stopped construction, and the status quo at the face-off site was restored.

Stand-off politics in the country

  • Politics over border stand-offs is not new.
  •  The Opposition and the media are certainly right to hold the government to account.
  • Indeed, neither the Opposition nor the media would be doing its job if they weren’t.
  • The tensions on the LAC are neither the first nor likely to be the last.
  • With every incident, they are, however, getting increasingly politicised in an environment where there is a 24/7 demand on social media for information — and unprecedented capacity for disinformation.
  • Rather than wish away this reality — and adopt a stand that it is above questioning — the government needs to come to terms with it. 

Dealing with the politicisation of stand-offs

  •  First, it needs to keep the Opposition informed, which it is clear it hasn’t.
  • Second, it needs to proactively engage with the media, even if that may be through low-key engagement as was the case on June 9, that does not escalate into a public war of words.
  • At the same time, expectations of having a public debate about the intricacies of every border stand-off — or for the Prime Minister to weigh in even while negotiations are ongoing — need to be tempered.
  • This will only risk inflaming tensions, and reduce the wiggle room for both sides to find an off-ramp.
  • The broader objective shouldn’t get lost in political debates.
  • That objective is to ensure India’s security interests remain protected — and that the status quo on India’s borders isn’t changed by force.

Consider the question “Border issue between India and China has several times resulted in the stand-off between the two countries but the use of quiet diplomacy helped defuse the tension. But the politicisation of such issue could complicate the situation in the future. Comment.

Conclusion

  • Past incidents have shown that quiet diplomacy, coupled with strong military resolve that deters any Chinese misadventures, has been more effective than public sabre-rattling, even if we may be inhabiting a media environment that misconstrues loudness as strength, and silence as weakness.

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Foreign Policy Watch: India-China

Sikkim-Tibet Convention of 1890 and its significance

Note4Students

From UPSC perspective, the following things are important :

Prelims level: Sikkim-Tibet Convention of 1890

Mains level: India-China border skirmishes

The skirmishes between Indian and Chinese troops at Naku La in Sikkim that is considered settled may be Beijing’s way of attempting a new claim. Defence experts highlighted the historical Sikkim-Tibet Convention of 1890 as proof of India’s ownership of the territory.

Practice question for mains:

Q. China’s actions on dormant areas mask a hidden agenda of broader assertiveness in the entire Asia-Pacific. Comment.

China creates a new flashpoint

  • Referring to a major scuffle that took place at Naku La in May, it was unusual for Chinese troops to open up a part of the LAC that has not been in contention before.

Sikkim-Tibet Convention of 1890

  • Of the entire 3,488km Sino-Indian border, the only section on which both countries agree that there is no dispute is the 220km Sikkim-Tibet section of the boundary.
  • This is because under the Anglo-Chinese Convention of 1890, the Sikkim-Tibet border was agreed upon and in 1895 it was jointly demarcated on the ground.
  • Not only that but the new government of People’s Republic of China, which took power in 1949, confirmed this position in a formal note to the government of India on 26 December 1959.

Chinese claims

  • Prior to Sikkim’s merger with India in 1975, the Chinese side accepted the Watershed based alignment of the International Border (IB).
  • The Sikkim – Tibet boundary has long formally been delimited and there is neither any discrepancy between the maps nor any dispute in practice.
  • The Chinese reiterate that, as per para (1) of the Convention of 1890, the tri-junction is at Mount Gipmochi.

India’s stance

  • The geographic alignment of the features was so prominent that it could easily be identified and recognized.
  • Even analysing the available Google images of the past, the location of Naku La could be discerned by anyone as the watershed parting line in the area was very prominent. “
  • There exist no ambiguity with respect to the location of the pass, since geographic realities cannot be altered.

How Sikkim came into the picture?

  • Earlier, Sikkim came into the limelight in 1965 during the India-Pakistan conflict, when the Chinese suddenly and without any provocation sent a strongly-worded threat.
  • Then PM Lal Bahadur Shastri neatly sidestepped the issue by stating that if the bunkers were on the Chinese side they were well within their rights to demolish them.
  • The point that the Chinese were trying to make was not military, but political, for they wanted to bolster the Pakistani spirit, which by then was rapidly losing steam.
  • As India stood firm with the backing of USSR and the US, nothing emerged from Chinese threats on the Sikkim-Tibet border.

Series of activity since then

  • In 1967, the Chinese again activated the Sikkim-Tibet border and on 11 September, suddenly opened fire on an Indian patrol party near Nathu La pass. The main point was that India did not lose any position, nor did it yield any ground.
  • The next important episode was in 2003. When PM Vajpayee conceded during his visit to China in 2003 that “the Tibet Autonomous Region (TAR) was a part of the PRC” with the expectation that China would recognize Sikkim as a part of India.
  • This did not materialize then but in the joint statement issued by premier Wen Jiabao and prime minister Manmohan Singh on 11 April 2005.
  • In part 13, the Chinese recognized “Sikkim State of the Republic of India”. Wen even handed over an official map of the People’s Republic of China to Singh, showing Sikkim as a part of India.

Nothing new about the skirmishes over Sikkim

  • History would thus indicate that the present stand-off between India and China over the Sikkim-Tibet boundary is nothing new.
  • The latest episode after a road construction party entered Doklam area, despite Bhutanese attempts to dissuade them.

Ignoring usual behaviour

  • The clearly orchestrated actions on an otherwise dormant area mask a hidden agenda.
  • The Chinese push at several points along the LAC and also the ongoing aggression in the South China Sea and Taiwan Straits are testimony to this.
  • The timeline of initiating this incident indicates a high level of pre-planning, possibly at senior levels of the PLA as well as the Chinese government.

Way forward

  • There is no question of India bending to Chinese “demands”, for like in 1967, it must stand its ground firmly.
  • That would be a sufficient lesson for the Chinese that the Indian Army is no pushover and this is perhaps the only way to deal with China that likes to flaunt its economic and military prowess.

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Foreign Policy Watch: India-China

Strategic importance of Daulat Beg Oldie, Ladakh

Note4Students

From UPSC perspective, the following things are important :

Prelims level: Shyok river, Nubra Valley, Sassar la pass

Mains level: Read the attached story

In the reporting on the LAC stand-off, the Darbuk-Shyok-Daulat Beg Oldie (DSDBO) road has often appeared in news.

Practice questions for mains:

Q. Discuss how India’s all-weather border infrastructure has created new festering points for the Sino-Indian border skirmished.

Daulat Beg Oldie

  • DBO is the northernmost corner of Indian Territory in Ladakh, in the area better known in Army parlance as Sub-Sector North.
  • DBO has the world’s highest airstrip, originally built during the 1962 war but abandoned until 2008 when the Indian Air Force (IAF) revived it as one of its many Advanced Landing Grounds (ALGs) along the LAC.

The DSDBO Road

  • DSDBO is an all-weather 255-km long road 255-km long built by India over nearly 20 years.
  • Running almost parallel to the LAC, the DSDBO road, meandering through elevations ranging between 13,000 ft and 16,000 ft, took India’s Border Roads Organisation (BRO) almost two decades to construct.
  • Its strategic importance is that it connects Leh to DBO, virtually at the base of the Karakoram Pass that separates China’s Xinjiang Autonomous Region from Ladakh.

A trigger for PLA incursions

  • Of the possible triggers cited for the PLA targeting of Indian Territory along the LAC in eastern Ladakh, the construction of DSDBO all-weather road is possibly the most consequential.
  • The Chinese build-up along the Galwan River valley region overlooks and hence poses a direct threat to the DSDBO road.

Significance of DSDBO Road

  • The DSDBO highway provides the Indian military access to the section of the Tibet-Xinjaing highway that passes through Aksai Chin.
  • The road runs almost parallel to the LAC at Aksai Chin, the eastern ear of erstwhile Jammu and Kashmir state that China occupied in the 1950s, leading to the 1962 war in which India came off worse.
  • The DSDBO’s emergence seemingly panicked China, evidenced by the 2013 intrusion by the PLA into the nearby Depsang Plains, lasting nearly three weeks.
  • DBO itself is less than 10 km west of the LAC at Aksai Chin. A military outpost was created in DBO in reaction to China’s occupation of Aksai Chin.
  • It is at present manned by a combination of the Army’s Ladakh Scouts and the paramilitary Indo-Tibetan Border Police (ITBP).

Other strategic considerations

  • To the west of DBO is the region where China abuts Pakistan in the Gilgit-Baltistan area, once a part of the erstwhile Kashmir principality.
  • This is also the critical region where China is currently constructing the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) in Pakistan-Occupied Kashmir (PoK), to which India has objected.
  • As well, this is the region where Pakistan ceded over 5,180 sq km of PoK to China in 1963 under a Sino-Pakistan Boundary Agreement, contested by India.

Also read:

https://www.civilsdaily.com/burning-issue-india-china-skirmish-in-ladakh/

 

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Foreign Policy Watch: India-China

LAC row: China reaches accord with India

Note4Students

From UPSC perspective, the following things are important :

Prelims level: NA

Mains level: India-China border skirmishes and their impacts on bilateral relations

China said that it had “reached an agreement” with India on the ongoing tensions along the Line of Actual Control (LAC), a day after India announced troops from both sides had begun a “partial disengagement” from some of the stand-off points.

Practice question for mains:

Q. “Early settlement of the boundary question serves the fundamental interests of both countries”. Discuss in light of the ongoing border skirmishes between India and China.

Read the complete story here:

https://www.civilsdaily.com/burning-issue-india-china-skirmish-in-ladakh/

Troops moving back

  • Partial deinduction has happened from some points in Galwan and Hot Springs areas.
  • Chinese side removed some of the tents and some troops and vehicles have been moved back, and the Indian side to has reciprocated.
  • At some points in the Galwan Valley, Chinese troops have moved back 2-3 km. However, there is no change in the ground situation at Pangong Tso.

De-escalation begins

  • India and China held Major general-level talks to discuss further de-escalation at several standoff points in Eastern Ladakh including Patrolling Point (PP) 14, following a broad accord reached on Saturday in talks held at the Corps Commander-level.
  • As per the agreement, a series of ground-level talks would be held over the next 10 days, with four other points of conflict identified at PP15, PP17, Chushul and the north bank of Pangong Lake.
  • The Chinese Foreign Ministry said both sides had agreed to handle the situation “properly” and “in line with the agreement” to ease the situation.
  • However, it did not provide specific details on some of the stand-off points, such as Pangong Lake, where Chinese troops are still present on India’s side of the LAC.

No final solution yet

  • At present, the two sides are taking actions in line with the agreement to ameliorate the border situation.
  • Government officials said a partial disengagement had happened at some points in the Galwan area and at Hot Springs, but there was no change at Pangong Lake.
  • Chinese state-run media has revealed that the ongoing dispute will not escalate into a conflict.
  • But it added due to the complexity of the situation, the military stand-off could continue for a little longer.

Way forward

  • The military-level talks showed that both sides do not want to escalate tensions further.
  • It showed that China and India remain determined to peacefully resolve border issues.
  • However, the ongoing stand-off is not likely to end immediately, as concrete issues must still be resolved.

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Foreign Policy Watch: India-China

Pay attention to their objectives in dealing with China and Pakistan

Note4Students

From UPSC perspective, the following things are important :

Prelims level: Article 370

Mains level: Paper 2- China-Pakistans overlapping interests in Kashmir and diverging objectives.

While their interests overlap, Pakistan and China diverge when it comes to their objective in Kashmir. Both want to keep the pressure on India to avoid it from changing the status quo. Extending this line of argument, the author in this article suggest that India should separate the policy response to China from Pakistan, as they differ in their objectives.

Coordinated efforts to corner India?

  • Latest news on the Ladakh front suggests that Chinese and Indian forces have begun to disengage in select areas.
  • But this does not detract from the reality that in the past few weeks Beijing and Islamabad are making coordinated efforts to challenge India’s presence in the Kashmir-Ladakh region.
  • There is stepped-up activity on Pakistan’s part to infiltrate terrorists into the Valley.
  • China has undertaken provocative measures on the Ladakh front to assert control over disputed areas around the Line of Actual Control (LAC).

Let’s see how Pakistan and China’s interests overlap

  • In Pakistan’s case the intensification in its terrorist activities is related in part to the dilution of Article 370. 
  • Dilution of Article 370 helps India de-link Ladakh from the Kashmir problem.
  • For China, the division of Ladakh from Jammu and Kashmir allows India a freer hand in contesting China’s claims in the region.
  • Increasing road-building activity on India’s part close to the LAC augments this perception.
  • In addition, Ladakh borders China’s most restive provinces of Xinjiang and Tibet.
  • Ladakh is also contiguous to Pakistan-occupied Kashmir (PoK), Gilgit and Baltistan, where the Chinese have invested hugely under the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) project.
  • External Affairs Minister S. Jaishankar’s remark last year that India expects to have “physical jurisdiction over (POK) one day” has alarmed Beijing which sees any such Indian move as threatening the CPEC project.
  • These factors demonstrate the overlapping interests that Beijing and Islamabad have regarding India in this region.

The above factors explain why Pakistan and China would want India to be so preoccupied with taking defensive measures in Kashmir and Ladakh as to have little time and energy left to attempt to alter the status quo in POK or in Aksai Chin.

But there are major differences in Pakistani and Chinese objectives regarding India

  • These differences are related to their divergent perceptions of their disputes and their different force equations with India.
  • For China, Ladakh is primarily a territorial dispute with strategic ramifications.
  • China also believes it is superior to the Indian militarily and, therefore, can afford to push India around within limits as it has been attempting to do in the recent confrontation.
  • For Pakistan, its territorial claim on Kashmir is based on an immutable ideological conviction that it is the unfinished business of partition and as a Muslim-majority state is destined to become a part of Pakistan.
  • Islamabad also realises that it is the weaker power in conventional terms and therefore has to use unconventional means, primarily terrorist infiltration, to achieve its objective of changing the status quo in Kashmir.
  • China is a satiated power in Ladakh having occupied Aksai Chin and wants to keep up the pressure on New Delhi to prevent the latter from trying to change the situation on the ground.

Way forward-Pay attention to objectives while negotiating

  • China’s primary concern with regard to Kashmir is to prevent any Indian move from threatening the CPEC project.
  • It does not challenge the status quo in Kashmir.
  • Pakistan, on the other hand, is committed to changing the status quo in Kashmir at all cost.
  • It has been trying to do so since Partition not only through clandestine infiltration but also by engaging in conventional warfare.
  • Therefore, while it is possible to negotiate the territorial dispute with China on a give-and-take basis.
  • Doing the same is not possible in the case of Pakistan which considers Kashmir a zero-sum game.
  • India should, therefore, distinguish the different objectives on the part of Beijing and Islamabad and tailor its responses accordingly without conflating the two threats to its security.

Consider the question “Policy response of India in dealing with Pakistan and China should consider differences in their objectives in relation to Kashmir. And clubbing them together just because of their tactical overlap should be avoided. Elaborate.”

Conclusion

Lumping the twin threats posed by Pakistan and China together because of a tactical overlap between them makes it difficult to choose policy options rationally. So, the policy response must understand the difference in their objectives and avoid clubbing them together.

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Foreign Policy Watch: India-China

India-China border crisis: It is not about the U.S.

Note4Students

From UPSC perspective, the following things are important :

Prelims level: Nine dash line, Natuna Islands

Mains level: Paper 2- India-China relations

India’s growing closeness to the U.S. could be the reason for China’s aggression along India’s border. This is the explanation we often come across. But is it really the case?. This article probes the same question. Example of China’s dispute with Indonesia and Philippine help us analyse the U.S. angle to Indo-China border dispute. So, what is the conclusion?

An easy explanation to India-China border crisis

  • Why has China precipitated a fresh military crisis with India in eastern Ladakh?
  • Among the many explanations making the rounds in Delhi, there is always the easy and attractive one — it’s all about America.
  • Delhi has incurred Beijing’s wrath by moving closer to Washington, goes the argument.
  • India’s renewed enthusiasm for the US-led Quad, it is said, is encouraging China to teach a lesson to Delhi.

But does this explanation applies to the other countries as well? Look at Indonesia

  • No!
  • This theory does not hold up in relation to other countries having problems with China.
  • Let us turn to the South China Sea, where China is on a bold and ambitious drive to expand its control over the disputed waters.
  • Let us start with gathering tensions over the territorial dispute between Beijing and Jakarta.
  • Over the last year and more, Jakarta is coping with a Chinese challenge in its waters off its Natuna Islands.
  • The Natuna are nearly 1,500 km from the Chinese mainland.
  • The Natuna themselves lie outside Beijing’s nine-dash line that claims nearly 80 per cent of the South China Sea.
  • The dispute is over the exclusive economic zone that the islands confer on Indonesia.
  • China says it has historic rights to these waters and has been dispatching its fishing fleet into these waters.

Maybe China sees a problem with Jakarta-Washington relations: Let’s analyse

  • Jakarta did not support the US approach to the Indo-Pacific.
  • and went to great lengths to develop a concept of its own and get it endorsed by the ASEAN.
  • Indonesia is not a member of the much-maligned Quad.
  • Its foreign policy is wedded to non-alignment.
  • And as the host of the historic Bandung Conference in 1955, Indonesia is a founding member and champion of Non-aligned Movement.

Now, let’s consider second example: Philippines

  • The story of the Philippines — one of the oldest military allies of the US in Asia — nicely complements the non-aligned Indonesia’s troubles with China.
  • When he came to power in 2016, President Rodrigo Duterte decided to distance the Philippines from the US and embraced China.
  • He had a hope of finding a reasonable settlement to the substantive maritime territorial dispute with Beijing.
  • In February this year, Manila announced the decision to terminate the agreement that lets American troops operate in the Philippines.
  • But last week, the Philippines “suspended” the decision to terminate military cooperation with the US.
  • The reason: The PLA’s relentless military pressure on the South China Sea islands claimed by Manila and including them in a new Chinese administrative district.

So, what the two examples suggest?

  • Neither Jakarta that is scrupulously non-aligned nor Manila that was ready to break its alliance with the US has been spared from Beijing’s current muscular approach to China’s territorial disputes.
  • China has long-standing claims, right or wrong, on the territories of its neighbours.
  • The other is the dramatic shift in the regional power balance in favour of China.
  • Unlike in the past, China now has the military power to make good its claims and alter the territorial status quo, if only in bits and pieces.
  • This is what China is doing in the South China Sea.
  • And the situation may not be any different in Ladakh.

Consider the question “The shift in the regional power balance and not the growing Indo-U.S. relations explains the assertive nature of China in India-China border issues. Elaborate.”

Conclusion

The real challenge for Delhi in managing its expansive territorial dispute with Beijing, then, is to redress the growing power imbalance with China. The rest is detail.

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Foreign Policy Watch: India-China

Inter-Parliamentary Alliance on China (IPAC)

Note4Students

From UPSC perspective, the following things are important :

Prelims level: IPAC

Mains level: Global move to curb Chinese overambitions

Senior lawmakers from eight democracies including the US have united to counter Communist China. They have launched the Inter-Parliamentary Alliance on China (IPAC).

Points to ponder:

The world is growing conscious against China after its coronavirus adventure. IPAC is the first step towards the institutionalization of the Anti-China consciousness!

What should be India’s stance here?

IPAC

  • IPAC is a new cross-parliamentary alliance to help counter what the threat posed by China’s growing influence on global trade, security and human rights.
  • The participating nations include the US, Germany, UK, Japan, Australia, Canada, Sweden, Norway, as well as members of the European parliament.
  • It is an international cross-party group of legislators working towards reform on how democratic countries approach China.
  • Comprised of legislators from eight democracies it will be led by a group of co-chairs who are senior politicians drawn from a representative cross-section of the world’s major political parties.
  • The group aims to “construct appropriate and coordinated responses, and to help craft a proactive and strategic approach on issues related to China.”

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Foreign Policy Watch: India-China

The China conundrum

Note4Students

From UPSC perspective, the following things are important :

Prelims level: BPTA 1993

Mains level: Paper 2- India-China relations

India-China border issue and the latest standoff in Ladakh has forced India to consider the lasting solution to the problem. This article explains China’s anti-India strategy. And options available with India in the face of aggression are also considered.

LAC: the reason for frequent face-offs

  • The debate has persisted whether it was China’s National Highway 219 cutting across Aksai Chin or Nehru’s “forward policy” which constituted the actual reason for the Sino-Indian border-conflict of 1962.
  • After declaring a unilateral ceasefire on November 20, troops of the Peoples Liberation Army (PLA) withdrew 20 kms behind what China described as the “line of actual control” (LAC).
  • The LAC generally conformed to the British-negotiated McMahon Line.
  • In the west, the Chinese stuck to their 1959 claim-line in Ladakh, retaining physical control of the 14,700 sq km Aksai Chin.
  • The 1962 ceasefire line became the de facto Sino-Indian border.
  • But in a bizarre reality, both sides visualised their own version of the LAC, but neither marked it on the ground; nor were maps exchanged.
  • This has inevitably led to frequent face-offs.

So, what were the steps taken the resolve the border issue after 1962?

  • Post-conflict, it is customary for belligerents to undertake early negotiations, in order to establish stable peace and eliminate the casus belli.
  • Strangely, in the Sino-Indian context, it took 25 years and a serious military confrontation in 1987 to trigger a dialogue.
  • The dialogue led the two countries to sign the first-ever Sino-Indian Border Peace and Tranquility Agreement (BPTA) in 1993.
  • Indian diplomats claim that this has helped maintain “mutual and equal security”, while the bilateral relationship has progressed in other spheres.
  • And yet, the failure to negotiate a boundary settlement after 22 meetings of special representatives of the two countries cannot be seen as anything but a failure of statesmanship and diplomacy.

Now, let’s analyse China’s anti-India strategy and how LAC and Pakistan problem fits into it

  • China’s post-civil war leadership had conceived an early vision of the country’s future.
  • Ambitious and realist in scope, this strategy visualised China attaining, in the fullness of time, great-power status and acquiring a nuclear-arsenal.
  • Since the vision saw no room for an Asian rival, neutralising India became a priority.
  • It was for this specific purpose, that Pakistan was enlisted in 1963 as a partner.
  • In China’s anti-India strategy, Pakistan has played an invaluable role by sustaining a “hot” border and holding out the threat of a two-front war.
  • In China’s grand-strategy, an undefined LAC has become a vital instrumentality to embarrass and keep India off-balance through periodic transgressions.
  • These pre-meditated “land-grabs”, blunt messages of intimidation and dominance, also constitute a political “pressure-point” for New Delhi.

Possibility of escalation into shooting war

  • While Indian troops have, so far, shown courage and restraint in these ridiculous brawls with the PLA.
  • But there is no guarantee that in a future melee, a punch on the nose will not invite a bullet in response.
  • In such circumstances, rapid escalation into a “shooting-war” cannot be ruled out.
  • Thereafter, should either side face a major military set-back, resort to nuclear “first-use” would pose a serious temptation.

What are the options available with India?

  • For reasons of national security as well as self-respect, India cannot continue to remain in a “reactive mode” to Chinese provocations and it is time to respond in kind.
  • Since India’s choices vis-à-vis China are circumscribed by the asymmetry in comprehensive national power, resort must be sought in realpolitik.
  • According to theorist Kenneth Waltz, just as nature abhors a vacuum, international politics abhors an imbalance of power, and when faced with hegemonic threats, states must seek security in one of three options: 1) Increase their own strength, 2) ally with others to restore power-balance, 3) as a last resort, jump on the hegemon’s bandwagon.

India’s decision-makers can start by posing this question to the military: “For how long do you have the wherewithal to sustain a combat against two adversaries simultaneously?” Depending on the response, they can consider the following 2 options.

1. Alliance with the USA

  • Nehru, when faced with an aggressive China in 1962, asked support from the USA.
  •  Indira Gandhi in the run-up to the 1971 war with Pakistan asked support from the USSR.
  • Both had no qualms of jettisoning the shibboleth of “non-alignment” and seeking support from the USA and USSR respectively.
  • Today, India has greater freedom of action and many options to restore the balance of power vis-à-vis China.
  • Xi Jinping has opened multiple fronts — apart from the COVID-19 controversy — across the South China Sea, South East Asia, Hong Kong, Taiwan and South Asia.
  • Donald Trump is burning his bridges with China.
  • In the world of realpolitik, self-interest trumps all and India must find friends where it can.
  • Given China’s vulnerabilities in the Indian Ocean and the real possibility of America losing its strategic foothold in Diego Garcia, India has a great deal to offer as a friend, partner or even an ally; with or without the Quad.

2. Accommodation with China

  •  If ideological or other reasons preclude the building of a power-balancing alliance, coming to an honourable accommodation with China remains a pragmatic option.
  • Zhou Enlai’s proposal of 1960 — repeated by Deng Xiaoping in 1982 — is worth re-examining in the harsh light of reality.
  • The price of finding a modus vivendi [an arrangement or agreement allowing conflicting parties to coexist peacefully]for the Sino-Indian border dispute may be worth paying if it neutralises two adversaries at one stroke and buys lasting peace.

Consider the question “In the harsh light of reality and faced with aggression from its neighbour, India has to ally with other powers to restore the balance of power. Examine.”

Conclusion

Neither option will be easy to “sell”. However, India cannot afford to continue with the current situation for long and must choose one of the options to end the to find the solution.

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Foreign Policy Watch: India-China

A chill in US-China relations and India as a collateral damage

Note4Students

From UPSC perspective, the following things are important :

Prelims level: Not much.

Mains level: Paper 2- U.S.-China tensions and impact on India

Even before the covid pandemic we could sense the rising tension between the U.S. and China. However, pandemic proved to be the tipping point. This article explains the role the U.S. played in China’s rise. And its recent acceptance under Donald Trump of not so peaceful rise of China.

Let’s look into recent announcements on China by the US President

  •  On May 29, the Trump administration said it would revoke Hong Kong’s special trade status under U.S. law.
  • It passed an order limiting the entry of certain Chinese graduate students and researchers who may have ties to the People’s Liberation Army.
  • The U.S. President has also ordered financial regulators to closely examine Chinese firms listed in U.S. stock markets.
  • And warned those that do not comply with U.S. laws could be delisted.

So, what all these measures indicate?

  • These announcements are a clear indication that the competition between the U.S. and China is likely to sharpen in the post-COVID world.

U.S. is complicit in China’s rise, but how?

  •  After the Chinese communists seized power, the Americans hoped to cohabit with Mao Zedong in a world under U.S. hegemony.
  • The Chinese allowed them to believe this and extracted their price.
  • U.S. President Richard Nixon gave China the international acceptability it craved in return for being admitted to Mao’s presence in 1972.
  • President Jimmy Carter terminated diplomatic relations with Taiwan in order to normalise relations with China in 1978.
  • President George H.W. Bush washed away the sins of Tiananmen in 1989 for ephemeral geopolitical gain.
  • And Bill Clinton, who as a presidential candidate had criticised Bush for indulging the Chinese, proceeded as President to usher the country into the World Trade Organization at the expense of American business.
  • All American administrations since the 1960s have been complicit in China’s rise in the unrealised hope that it will become a ‘responsible stakeholder’ under Pax Americana.

China is creating its own universe

  • The collapse of the Soviet Union reinforced the view that the U.S. wants to keep its order and change China’s system.
  • This strengthened China’s resolve to resist by creating its own parallel universe.
  • China is building an alternate trading system: the Belt and Road Initiative.
  • A multilateral banking system under its control-Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, New Development Bank.
  • Its own global positioning system BeiDou.
  • Digital payment platforms like WeChat Pay and Alipay.
  • A world-class digital network-Huawei 5G.
  • Cutting-edge technological processes in sunrise industries.
  • And a modern military force.
  • It is doing this under the noses of the Americans and some of it with the financial and technological resources of the West.

U.S. accepting the uneasy fact that China’s rise has not been peaceful

  • It is only under Mr. Trump that the Americans are finally acknowledging the uneasy fact that the Chinese are not graven in their image.
  • He has called China out on trade practices.
  • He has called China out on 5G.
  • It was Mr. Trump’s 2017 National Security Strategy document that, perhaps for the first time, clubbed China along with Russia as a challenge to American power, influence and interests.
  • His recent China-specific restrictions on trade and legal migration are, possibly, only the beginning of a serious re-adjustment.

Decoupling of the economies and new cold war

  • A full-spectrum debate on China is now raging across the U.S.
  • Former White House Chief of Staff Steve Bannon declared that the U.S. is already at war with China.
  • Others like diplomat Richard Haass and former president of the World Bank, Robert Zoellick, warn that a new Cold War will be a mistake.
  • Scholar Julian Gewirtz, in his brilliant essay, ‘The Chinese Reassessment of Interdependence’, talks about a similar process underway in Beijing.
  • Both sides are acutely aware how closely their economies are tied together: from farm to factory, the U.S. is heavily dependent on supply chains in China and the Chinese have been unable to break free of the dollar.
  • If Mr. Trump’s wish is to disentangle China’s supply chains, Mr. Xi is equally determined to escape from the U.S. ‘chokehold’ on technology.
  • To what extent the de-coupling is possible is yet to be determined.
  • But one thing is inevitable, India will become part of the collateral damage.

Hong Kong: Sign of U.S. China rivalry entering in ideological domain

  • Will Hong Kong become a game-changer in the post-COVID world?
  • China’s decision to enact the new national security law for Hong Kong has been condemned in unison by the U.S. and its Western allies as an assault on human freedoms.

Why is this significant?

  • The points of divergence, even dispute, between them have so far been in the material realm.
  • With Hong Kong, the U.S.-China rivalry may, possibly, be entering the ideological domain.
  • For some time now there are reports about Chinese interference in the internal affairs of democracies.
  • Countries in the West have tackled this individually, always mindful of not jeopardising their trade with China.
  • Hong Kong may be different.
  • It is not only a bastion for Western capitalism in the East, but more importantly the torch-bearer of Western democratic ideals.
  • Think of it as a sort of Statue of Liberty; it holds aloft the torch of freedom and democracy for all those who pass through Hong Kong en route to China.
  • This is an assault on beliefs, so to speak.

Issue of China’s role in Covid-19 pandemic

  • These is growing demands that China should come clean on its errors of omission in the early days of COVID-19.
  • In the months ahead, more information may become public, from sources inside China itself, about the shortcomings of the regime.
  • That will further fuel a debate on the superiority of the Chinese Model as an alternative to democracy.

Will this form the ideological underpinning for the birth of a new Cold War?

  • That will depend on who wins in Washington in November.
  • It will also depend on whether profit will again trump politics in Europe.
  • Moreover, how skilfully the Wolf Warriors of China can manipulate global public opinion will also make the be an important factor.

Consider the question-“Various recent measures by the U.S. on China and the debate on the role of China in Covid-19 makes it clear that the next Cold War is all but imminent. And India has to be careful to avoid being collateral damage in that war. Comment.”

Conclusion

The lines are beginning to be drawn between the Americans on the one side and China on the other. A binary choice is likely to test to the limit India’s capacity to maintain strategic and decisional autonomy.

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Foreign Policy Watch: India-China

Dilemma for Delhi in Ladakh standoff

Note4Students

From UPSC perspective, the following things are important :

Prelims level: India-China trade

Mains level: Paper 2- India-China border issue

Though the rest of the world is preoccupied with Covid pandemic, China is busy in raising tension over border issues with its neighbour-India. What explains such actions by China? And timing selected by China has also puzzled many. India, on its part, faces a dilemma. This article dissects the various issues related to the standoff and explains the options available with India to deal with the Chinese intimidation.

Why the latest transgression by PLA is unprecedented?

  • There are around 400 transgressions/faceoffs each year on an average along the LAC.
  • But the recent spate of territorial transgressions by the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) is unprecedented in its scope and manner.
  • Even as independent accounts point out that Chinese troops are yet to withdraw from the transgressed territories and restore status quo ante.
  • Those territories are traditionally considered by both sides to be on the Indian side of the LAC.
  • Chinese officials have gone ahead and stated that the “Situation in China-India border is overall stable & controllable”.

What this move by China signals?

  • The Indian government is left with two basic choices: 1) accept territorial loss as a fait accompli or 2)  force or negotiate a reversal to status quo ante, unless of course the PLA unilaterally withdraws.
  • Either way, China’s growing territorial aggression on the LAC signals the end of Beijing’s peaceful rise and its traditional desire to maintain regional status quo with India.
  • China under its President, Xi Jinping, unequivocally seeks to demonstrate that it is the preponderant power in the region. 

Let’s analyse the aggression

  • While the timing could be explained by the global political distraction caused by COVID-19.
  • And also the international pressure on China (including by India) to come clean on the origins of the novel coronavirus could have played the role.
  • But the proximate causes could be several. Consider the following-

1. Statement by India on Aksai Chin

  • For one, New Delhi’s terse statements about Aksai Chin following the Jammu and Kashmir reorganisation in August last year had not gone down well with Beijing.
  • While not many in India believe that New Delhi was serious about getting back Aksai Chin from Chinese control, Beijing may have viewed it as India upping the ante.
  • More pertinently, in a clear departure from the past, New Delhi has been carrying out the construction of infrastructural projects along the LAC — a long overdue activity — which is something that seems to have made China uneasy.

2. Broader context of long-term geopolitical world view

  • The Chinese angle to the J&K conundrum deserves more attention here.
  • The aggression must also be viewed in the broader context of a long-term geopolitical world view China has for the region. Consider the following in this regard-
  • 1) China’s China–Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) connectivity to Pakistan through the Karakoram and New Delhi’s criticism of it.
  • 2) The reported presence of PLA troops in Pakistan Occupied Kashmir (PoK).
  • 3) India’s new-found activism on Aksai Chin.
  • 4) The PLA’s incursions into areas in eastern Ladakh.

3. Strategic goals

  • It is equally important to appreciate the larger Chinese strategic calculations behind its recent spate of aggressions.
  • Having given up its traditional slogan of ‘peaceful rise’, China, under Mr. Xi, is beginning to assert itself as the next superpower.
  • Over the years, Beijing has perhaps realised that India is not keen on toeing the Chinese line in the region.
  • So this is Beijing sending a message to New Delhi to fall in line.
  • A message that will not go unnoticed in the smaller capitals around China — from Colombo to Kathmandu to Hanoi.

4. Political message

  • Given that China is currently engaged in what many analysts are describing as a new cold war with the United States, in the middle of a crackdown in Hong Kong along with fighting COVID-19 at home, one would not have expected the Chinese leadership to open another front.
  • And yet, by opening a limited military front with India on the LAC, China is signalling the U.S. that it can handle pressure.
  •  And telling India that it has the political and military wherewithal to put pressure on New Delhi notwithstanding its other preoccupations.

Why limited scope confrontation is cost-effective and preferred option by China?

  • China’s limited scope military expeditions on the long-contested border is cost effective for the PLA.
  • This is because the ever-growing conventional military superiority that it enjoys with India.
  • Moreover, because limited fights or smaller land grabs may not provoke an all-out confrontation or nuclear use.
  • The side with conventional superiority and more border infrastructure would likely carry the day.

India’s China dilemma

  • Picking a direct fight with India which might lead to an undesirable military escalation with India does not suit Beijing’s interests.
  • But carrying out minor military expeditions with the objective of inflicting small-scale military defeats on India is precisely what would suit the Chinese political and military leadership.
  • They are cost effective, less escalatory, and the message gets conveyed.
  • More so, India’s military response would depend a great deal on how far the regime in New Delhi is willing to acknowledge such territorial losses due to domestic political constraints.
  • If New Delhi acknowledges loss of territory, it would have to regain it, but doing so vis-à-vis a conventionally superior power would not be easy.
  • Put differently, growing conventional imbalance and domestic political calculations could prompt New Delhi to overlook minor territorial losses on the LAC.
  • But let us be clear: the more New Delhi overlooks them, the more Beijing would be tempted to repeat them.
  • These considerations lie at the heart of India’s China dilemma.

How India could respond?

  • Yet, there are limits to China’s LAC adventurism.
  • 1) There are several places along the several thousand kilometre long LAC where the PLA is militarily weak, the Indian Army has the upper hand.
  • And, therefore, a tit-for-tat military campaign could be undertaken by New Delhi.
  • 2)  While China enjoys continental superiority over India, maritime domain is China’s weak spot, in particular Beijing’s commercial and energy interest to which the maritime space is crucial.
  • 3) Finally, and most importantly, would Beijing want to seriously damage the close to $100 billion trade with India with its military adventurism on the LAC?

Way forward

  • In any case, for India, the age of pussyfooting around Chinese intimidation strategies is over.
  • The time has come to checkmate Beijing’s military aggression even as we maintain a robust economic relationship with our eastern neighbour.
  • It is also a reminder for us to get more serious about finalising a border agreement with China.
  • The bigger the power differential between India and China, the more concessions Beijing would demand from New Delhi to settle the dispute.

Consider the question-“There have been growing instances of PLA aggression on India-China border. Examine the multiple objectives China’s actions seek to achieve. What are the options available with India to deal with situation?

Conclusion

There is little doubt that China is our neighbour and that we have to live next to the larger and more powerful China. However, India should not accept Beijing’s attempts at land grabs, or military intimidation. That China is a rising superpower located next door to us is a reality, but how we deal with that reality is a choice we must make as a nation.

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Foreign Policy Watch: India-China

Private: National Security Law debate in Hong Kong

Hong Kong is burning again. Last year it was Fugitive Offenders Amendment bill, now it’s National Security Law. This anthem bill criminalises insulting China’s national anthem. No, this is not like the same dictum given to us by Supreme Court to stand up in multiplexes. But people actually fear that this law will take away Hong Kong’s basic freedoms.

Context

Chinese lawmakers have approved a proposal for sweeping new national security legislation in Hong Kong, which democracy advocates say will curb essential freedoms in the city.

About Hong Kong

  • A former British Colony and Autonomous Territory: Hong Kong is an autonomous territory, and a former British colony, in southeastern China.
  • It became a colony of the British Empire at the end of the First Opium War in 1842.
  • Sovereignty over the territory was returned to China in 1997.
  • Special Administrative Region (SAR): As a SAR, Hong Kong maintains governing power and economic systems that are separate from those of mainland China.
  • The 1984 Sino-British Joint Declaration guarantees the Basic Law for 50 years after the transfer of sovereignty.
  • It does not specify how Hong Kong will be governed after 2047.
  • Thus, the central government’s role in determining the territory’s future system of government is the subject of political debate and speculation in Hong kong.

The ‘Basic Law’

  • One country, two systems: Hong Kong is a Special Administrative Region (SAR) of China.
  • It has observed a “one country, two systems” policy since Britain returned sovereignty to China on July 1, 1997, which has allowed it retain certain freedoms, the rest of China does not have.
  • Basic Law: It is governed by a mini-constitution called the Basic Law – constitutional document is a product of the 1984 Sino-British Joint Declaration.
  • Under this, China promised to honour Hong Kong’s liberal policies, the system of governance, an independent judiciary, and individual freedoms for a period of 50 years from 1997.

Why is Hong Kong fuming?

  • The handover agreement gave Hong kong special freedoms of press, speech, and assembly for at least 50 years.
  • These freedoms stand in stark contrast to China’s strict censorship and Jinping’s tight grip on power, which have seen dissidents jailed and interrogated in secret prisons.
  • This is why protesters here are desperate to protect their freedoms — because they fear Hong Kong to become just another Chinese city under Xi’s rule.

China vs. Basic Law

  • Mini-constitution: Hong Kong’s mini-constitution, the Basic Law, says that ultimately both the leader and the Legislative Council should be elected in a more democratic way – but there’s been disagreement over what this should look like.
  • China dominated system: The Chinese government said in 2014 it would allow voters to choose their leaders from a list approved by a pro-Beijing committee, but critics called this a “sham democracy” and it was voted down in Hong Kong’s legislature.
  • Issue: The new proposal is also controversial because it is expected to circumvent Hong Kong’s own law-making processes – leading to accusations that Beijing is undermining Hong Kong’s autonomy.

Why Hong Kong matters for China?

  • Legitimacy to PLA: The handover of Hong Kong by Great Britain was a major achievement of the CCP and had helped boost the party’s legitimacy.
  • Extending nationalism: The handover strengthened nationalism debates within Chinese society and was perceived as righting the wrongs of the century of humiliation.
  • Since 1978, the basic tenet of the CCP has been reform and liberalisation of the economic sphere and command and control of the political sphere.
  • Political reform (So-called): Today, after more than 40 years of reform, mainland China is yet to witness any breakthrough in political reform.
  • Beijing expects other countries to acknowledge that there exists only one China.

The National Security Law

  • Under Article 23 of the Basic Law, Hong Kong has to enact a national security law “to prohibit any act of treason, secession, sedition, and subversion against the Chinese government.”
  • When the Hong Kong government first tried to enact the law in 2003, the issue became a rallying point for the city-wide protests which occurred that year.
  • Since then, the government has steered clear of introducing the legislation again.

Unrest in Hong Kong

  • Banning Sedition: The new law would ban seditious activities that target mainland Chinese rule, as well as punish external interference in Hong Kong affairs.
  • Many expect a revival of the protests that rocked the city last year.
  • China, on the other hand, has sought support and understanding of India and other countries for its controversial decision as a precautionary measure.

Rise of Taiwanese aspirations and Domino Effect

  • The upsurge in Hong Kong’s pro-democracy movement is more closely linked to the developments in Taiwan than is commonly acknowledged.
  • The Taiwanese election results have given hope to the pro-democracy supporters in Hong Kong.
  • However, to imagine that Beijing will stop interfering in the territory’s domestic sociopolitical space is perhaps over-optimistic.
  • National unity and the “One China Principle” are core issues of the Chinese communist party (CCP).
  • Hong Kong, however, is already seen as a part of China under the “one country, two systems” formula.

implications of the Security Law across the globe

China’s authoritarianism stands exposed in Hong Kong and its assertiveness seriously damages its soft power. The developments in Hong Kong, therefore, have global consequences for Beijing’s search of power and legitimacy.

On Hong Kong

  • Hong Kong is a global financial hub – so a hit to its economy affects business worldwide as well.
  • Experts warn that if the unrest continues, international companies could look to pull out of Hong Kong and relocate their branches elsewhere.
  • The stock market would likely crash, followed by the housing market. A mass exodus could follow, and other countries could see migrants’ incoming from Hong Kong.
  • Many Hong Kongers hold foreign passports, a legacy of 1997, and it is easy for them to move overseas.
  • On a more abstract level, some people have framed the unrest as a tug-of-war between Chinese authoritarianism and the Western ideals of freedom and democracy.

India’s concerns

  • India and Hong Kong have signed a double taxation avoidance agreement (DTAA).
  • It gives protection against double taxation to over 1,500 Indian companies and businesses that have a presence in Hong Kong.
  • Hong Kong is similarly host to a large number of Indian companies and professionals in banking, IT and shipping.
  • India was Hong Kong’s third-largest export market (after China and the US) in 2017 and Hong Kong was India’s third-largest export market (after the US and the UAE).
  • Hong Kong has a very well established Indian diaspora and has much wealth and business influence within the territory.

India and Chinese diplomatic take(Informal take)

  • Possibly due to its leadership’s idolization of communism, India for long-neglected the basic principle of reciprocity in its relationship with China.
  • India has consistently upheld the “One China” policy. It was one of the first countries to recognise Tibet as a part of China.
  • Today, India is a democracy and only has to deal with the Kashmir issue.
  • But China is facing resistance movements in Tibet, Xinjiang and Southern Mongolia. Hong Kong and Taiwan, too, remain a concern for Beijing.
  • This makes Delhi’s One-China policy lopsided in terms of diplomacy.
  • China expects India to remain silent on 60 per cent of the contested area under China’s territorial control, and also Hong Kong and Taiwan, while China refuses to stand with India only on Kashmir.

Way forward

  • China and India should never let their differences shadow the overall bilateral ties and must enhance mutual trust.
  • India’s firm military and diplomatic posturing for the ongoing border dispute has made it clear to Beijing that India is in for the long haul.
  • Given its own problems at home and the focus on Hong Kong over the coming days, de-escalation on its borders with India suits China well.

Conclusion

China under Xi’s leadership is one of the most assertive and aggressive powers the world has encountered in a long time. Hong Kong’s protest has been continuing for a long time now. Not just Hong Kongers but even India feels the heat of Dragon’s assertiveness on borders. No one knows the result yet but it is going to be long fight that is for sure.

 

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Foreign Policy Watch: India-China

Depsang Plain near LAC

Note4Students

From UPSC perspective, the following things are important :

Prelims level: Depsang Plain and its location

Mains level: India-China border skirmishes and their impacts on bilateral relations

Reports of a heavy Chinese presence at Depsang, an area at a crucial dip (called the Bulge) on the Line of Actual Control (LAC) have increased the recent tensions between Indian and Chinese troops.

For the Depsang Plain, a prelim based question is hardly possible. However one must know all the fronts of border disputes from mains perspective.

Depsang Plain

  • The “Depsang Plain” is one of the few places in the Western Sector where light armour (vehicles) would have ease of manoeuvre, so any Chinese buildup there is a cause for concern.
  • India controls the western portion of the plains as part of Ladakh, whereas the eastern portion is part of the Aksai Chin region, which is controlled by China and claimed by India.
  • The buildup invokes memories of both the 1962 war, when Chinese troops had occupied all of the Depsang plains.
  • More recently in April 2013, the PLA crossed the LAC and pitched tents on the Indian side for three weeks, before they agreed to pull out.

Also read:

[Burning Issue] India-China Skirmish in Ladakh

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Foreign Policy Watch: India-China

A phantom called the Line of Actual Control with China

Note4Students

From UPSC perspective, the following things are important :

Prelims level: Ladakh Region, Pangong Lake.

Mains level: Paper 2- Border issue between India and China

Yet again, India and China are engaged in a standoff on the border. But why the issues persist even after four agreements with a view to solve the boundary problem? This article explains the problem in wording of the agreement. And also explains the lack of intent from China’s part.

Four agreements: vision of progress or strategic illusion?

  •  At the heart of India’s and China’s continued inability to make meaningful progress on the boundary issue are four agreements.
  • Those agreements were signed in September 1993, November 1996, April 2005 and October 2013 — between the two countries.
  • Ironically, India and China keep referring to these agreements as the bedrock of the vision of progress on the boundary question.
  • Unfortunately, these are deeply flawed agreements.
  • And also make the quest for settlement of the boundary question at best a strategic illusion and at worst a cynical diplomatic parlour trick.

Let’s look into LAC provision in 1993 and 1996 agreements

  • According to the 1993 agreement, “pending an ultimate solution”, “the two sides shall strictly respect and observe the LAC between the two sides No activities of either side shall overstep the LAC”.
  • Further, both the 1993 and the 1996 agreement—on confidence-building measures in the military field along the LAC— say they “will reduce or limit their respective military forces within mutually agreed geographical zones along the LAC.”
  • This was to apply to major categories of armaments and cover various other aspects as well, including air intrusions “within ten kilometres along the LAC”.

Okay, but where is the LAC?

  • The specification of this phantom LAC as the starting point and the central focus has made several key stipulations and articles of the four agreements effectively inoperable for more than a quarter of a century.
  • In fact, many of the articles have no bearing on the ground reality.
  • Article XII of the 1996 agreement, for instance, says, “This agreement is subject to ratification and shall enter into force on the date of exchange of instruments of ratification.”
  • It is not clear if and when that happened.
  • Nowhere in the 1993 agreement is there the provision to recognise the existing lines of deployment of the respective armies, as they were in 1993.
  • The agreement does not reflect any attempt to have each side recognise the other’s line of deployment of troops at the time it was signed.
  • That would have been the logical starting point.
  • If both armies are to respect the LAC, where is the line?
  • The ambiguity over the LAC has brought a prolonged sense of unease and uncertainty and thus exponentially contributed to the military build-up in those areas.
  • The absence of a definition of this line allows ever new and surreptitious advances on the ground.

What could have been done?

  • Had the 1993 agreement begun the exercise with the phrase “pending an ultimate solution, each side shall strictly respect and observe the line of existing control/deployment” instead of the “LAC”, it would have been more possible to keep the peace.
  • In such a case there would have been two existing lines of control on the map — one for the physical deployment of the Chinese troops and the other for the physical deployment of the Indian troops.
  • This would have rendered the areas between the two lines no man’s land, and would have ensured that the two armies were frozen in their positions.

The issue of two LAC in the eastern and western sector

  • The LAC is two hypothetical lines in the following two sectors-
  • 1) In the eastern sector, where the Chinese have not accepted the loosely defined McMahon line which follows the principle of watershed.
  • 2) The western sector, which is witnessing another episodic stand-off.
  • The first is what Indian troops consider the extent to which they can dominate through patrols, which is well beyond the point where they are actually deployed and present.
  • The second is what the Chinese think they effectively control, which is well south of the line they were positioned at in 1993.

Why map exchange didn’t happen for the western sector?

  • It is in this theatre of the militarily absurd that we should look at the outcome of the attempted exchange of maps in the western sector.
  • It is the sector where this round of confrontation continues between India and China.
  • This came after the exchange of maps in the middle sector.
  • In the middle sector, divergences were the least, i.e., the existing line and the Chinese and Indian idea of the LAC were more or less the same (in 2002).
  • The Foreign Secretary India and the head of the Chinese delegation, met in New Delhi in 2003 for sharing the map of the western sector.
  • It had been agreed that both sides would exchange maps to an agreed scale on each side’s perceptions of the location of the LAC in the western sector.
  • The idea was to superimpose the maps to see where the perceptions converged and, crucially, where they diverged.
  • Due to the contentious nature of the sector, it would provide a starting point, not the end point, to discuss how to reconcile divergences presumed to be significant, given Chinese military behaviour on the ground there.
  • Each side handed over its map to the other.
  • But, head of the Chinese delegation gave it a long, hard look, and wordlessly returned it.
  • They provided no reason for their action.
  • The meeting effectively ended there.

Consider the question “Examine the reasons for the persistent nature of the India-China border issue.”

Conclusion

By disregarding the map, China is not bound in any way by New Delhi’s perception of the LAC, and therefore does not have to limit liberty of action. This was evident then and is especially evident now. Because the nature of the terrain, deployment, and infrastructure and connectivity asymmetries in the border areas continue to be so starkly in China’s favour that it is clear that the Chinese are in no hurry to settle the boundary question. They see that the cost to India in keeping this question open suits them more than settling the issue.

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Foreign Policy Watch: India-China

THAAD defence system

Note4Students

From UPSC perspective, the following things are important :

Prelims level: THAAD defence system

Mains level: THAAD and its features to define geopolitics

China has issued a statement reiterating its long-standing objections to the presence of the US THAAD missile defence system in South Korea.

Try this question from CSP 2018:

Q. What is “Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD)”, sometimes seen in the news?

(a) An Israeli radar system

(b) India’s indigenous anti-missile programme

(c) An American anti-missile system

(d) A defence collaboration between Japan and South Korea

What is THAAD?

  • THAAD is an acronym for Terminal High Altitude Area Defense, a transportable, ground-based missile defence system.
  • It is coupled with space-based and ground-based surveillance stations, which transfer data about the incoming missile and informs the THAAD interceptor missile of the threat type classification.
  • THAAD is alarmed about incoming missiles by space-based satellites with infrared sensors.
  • This anti-ballistic missile defence system has been designed and manufactured by the US company Lockheed Martin. South Korea is not the only country with the THAAD missile defence system.
  • It has been previously deployed in the UAE, Guam, Israel and Romania.

The South Korea-China controversy over THAAD

  • In South Korea, the THAAD missile defence system is operated by the US army stationed in the country.
  • The US had previously announced that the deployment of this missile defence system was a countermeasure against potential attacks by North Korea, particularly after the country had engaged in testing ballistic missiles.
  • In 2017, matters escalated in the Korean Peninsula after North Korea test-fired a few missiles in the direction of US bases in Japan.
  • Following this incident, the US amended its plans and moved the systems to its army base in Osan, South Korea while the final deployment site was being prepared.
  • These moves by the US and by extension, South Korea, particularly angered China.

China’s reservations against THAAD

  • China’s opposition has little to do with the missiles itself and is more about the system’s inbuilt advanced radar systems that could track China’s actions.
  • The controversy also has much to do with the geopolitics and complex conflicts in East Asia, with the US having a presence in the region particularly through its many military bases in Japan and South Korea.
  • According to some observers of East Asia, China believes the US exerts influence over South Korea and Japan and may interfere with Beijing’s long-term military, diplomatic and economic interests in the region.
  • The US and South Korea have consistently maintained that these missiles are only to counter potential threats by North Korea.
  • South Korea also issued a statement saying the number of missiles had not increased but had only been replaced with newer versions.

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Foreign Policy Watch: India-China

China and the Rhineland moment in Hong Kong

Note4Students

From UPSC perspective, the following things are important :

Prelims level: G-7 countries, TPP

Mains level: Paper 2- US-China relations and implications for India

While the world is busy battling pandemic, China has embarked upon completing its pet project: stripping Hong Kong off its special status. This article explains the significance of China’s actions. And the options the U.S. could explore as a response to China’s move.

Tipping points in History

  • In 1911 Germany sparked an international crisis when it sent a gunboat into the Moroccan port of Agadir.
  • Winston Churchill wrote in his history of the First World War, “all the alarm bells throughout Europe began immediately to quiver.”
  • In 1936 Germany provoked another crisis when it marched troops into the Rhineland, in flagrant breach of its treaty obligations.
  • In 1946, the Soviet Union made it obvious it had no intention of honoring democratic principles in Central Europe, and Churchill was left to warn that “an iron curtain has descended across the Continent.”

Analogies: Not perfect, but not inapt, either.

  • Analogies between these past episodes and China’s decision this week to draft a new national security law on Hong Kong aren’t perfect.
  • First, Hong Kong is a Chinese port, not a faraway foreign one.
  • Second, Hong Kong’s people have ferociously resisted Beijing’s efforts to impose control, unlike the Rhineland Germans who welcomed Berlin’s.
  • And lastly, the curtailment of freedom that awaits Hong Kong is nothing like the totalitarian tyranny that Joseph Stalin imposed on Warsaw, Budapest and other cities.
  • But the analogies aren’t inapt, either.
  • Beijing has spent the better part of 20 years subverting its promises to preserve Hong Kong’s democratic institutions.
  • Now it is moving to quash what remains of the city’s civic freedoms through a forthcoming law that allows the government to punish speech as subversion and protest as sedition.
  • The concept of “one country, two systems,” was supposed to last at least until 2047 under the terms of the 1984 Sino-British Joint Declaration.
  • Now China’s rulers have been openly violating that treaty, much as Germany openly violated the treaties of Locarno and Versailles.

Rethink of the U.S. strategic approach to China

  • US administration has undertaken a sober rethink of it’s strategic approach to China.
  • The outlines of which are described in a new inter-agency document quietly released by the White House last week.
  • Gone from this new vision are the platitudes about encouraging China’s “peaceful rise” as a “responsible stakeholder” in a “rules-based order.”
  • Instead, Beijing is described, accurately, as a habitual and aggressive violator of that order.
  • It also describes China as a domestic tyrant, international bully and economic bandit that systematically robs companies of their intellectual property, countries of their sovereign authorities, and its own people of their natural rights.
  • A critic might note that this description of China’s behavior sounds a lot like Trump’s.
  • Sort of, except that the comparison trivializes the scale of China’s abuses and neglects the breadth and longevity of its challenge.

Why Now and what is the US response?

  • Beijing almost certainly chose this moment to strike because it calculated that a world straining under the weight of a pandemic and a depression lacked the will and attention to react.
  • On Friday, Trump said he would strip Hong Kong of its privileged commercial and legal ties to the U.S.
  • Issue with the move: That punishes the people of Hong Kong at least as much as it does their rulers in Beijing.

What’s a better course for the U.S.? A few ideas:

  • Sanction Chinese officials engaged in human-rights abuses in Hong Kong under the Global Magnitsky Act.
  • Upgrade relations with Taiwan and increase arms sales, including top-shelf weapons’ systems such as the F-35 and the Navy’s future frigate.
  • Re-enter the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP)agreement as a counter to China’s economic influence.
  • Publicly press all G-7 countries to stop doing business with telecom-giant Huawei as a meaningful response to the Hong Kong law.
  • Give every Hong Kong person an opportunity to easily obtain a U.S. residency card, even a passport.

Conclusion

If all this and more were announced now, it might persuade Beijing to pull back from the brink. In the meantime, think of this as  Rhineland moment with China — and remember what happened the last time the free world looked aggression in the eye, and blinked

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Foreign Policy Watch: India-China

India-China confrontation: Not a standalone event

Note4Students

From UPSC perspective, the following things are important :

Prelims level: Hong Kong, Taiwan location in the map

Mains level: Paper 2- India-China relation and tension over border dispute

The recent India-China standoff in Ladakh points to a larger picture of the Chinese agenda of regional dominance. The US-China tension has proved to be the backdrop against which the Ladakh standoff is playing out. This article suggests that this standoff is not a standalone event. It could well be a trigger for domino effect.

What the intensification of tension between India-China suggests?

1) China is feeling threatened

  • An authoritarian regime whose legitimacy rests primarily on its economic performance is faced with a situation where growth is expected to plummet.
  • It is a sign that Beijing is increasingly feeling beleaguered.
  • In response, it has embarked on a strategy of brinkmanship with several goals in mind.
  • External adventurism, when cloaked in the garb of ultra-nationalism, can shore up a regime’s legitimacy at home.

2) It could be a move to divert the attention of the world

  • Simultaneously, it can act as a diversionary measure to escape international criticism for Beijing’s attempt to cover up the spread of the coronavirus.
  • Many countries hold China responsible for the huge cost in human lives and suffering as well as the unprecedented economic distress.
  • In the face of such criticism, the Chinese regime is increasingly using jingoistic jargon to build up domestic support.
  • President Xi Jinping’s recent speech to the PLA is an outstanding example of this strategy.
  • He exhorted the Chinese armed forces to “prepare for war” in order to “resolutely safeguard national sovereignty” and “the overall strategic stability of the country”.
  • This is a sign that the Communist Party of China (CPC) feels increasingly threatened both domestically and externally.

Let’s look at the deterioration of the US-China relations

  • China’s relations with the U.S. have been going downhill almost since the beginning of the Donald Trump presidency.
  • Washington has periodically imposed economic sanctions on China and Beijing has retaliated in kind.
  • Trade talks have faltered because of growing protectionist sentiments in the U.S. and Chinese inability to adequately respond to them.
  • The chipping away at Hong Kong’s autonomous status by Beijing and the suppression of the pro-democracy movement in Hong Kong has led to severe criticism by the U.S. administration and in the Congress.
  • Differences over the issue of Taiwan have added to tensions, with China viewing the U.S. as the primary impediment preventing Taiwan’s integration.
  • The Trump administration has significantly increased support to Taiwan with arms sales that have added to China’s concern.

U.S.-China rivalry in South-China Sea

  • Above all, the U.S.-China rivalry in the South China Sea acts as the potential flashpoint that may well lead to a shooting war.
  • So far, it has been careful that these moves do not trigger a serious confrontation with the U.S.
  • Washington has a strong interest in preventing China from asserting control over the South China Sea as maintaining free access to this waterway is important to it for economic reasons.
  • It also has defence treaty obligations to the Philippines, which has vigorously contested Chinese territorial claims.
  • Further, China’s control of the South China Sea would be a major step toward replacing the U.S. as the foremost power in the Indo-Pacific region.

India-China relation questions have been the leitmotif in the UPSC papers. Just the theme of the question changes. Consider 2017 question “China is using its economic relations and positive trade surplus as a tool to develop potential military power status in Asia. In light of this statement, discuss its impact on India as her neighbour.”

Conclusion

Increased Chinese adventurism could result in an escalation of U.S.-China confrontation in the South China Sea. If that happens, the India-China face-off in Ladakh could become part of a much larger “great game”, with the U.S. trying to preserve the status quo and China attempting to change it to further its objective of regional dominance at the U.S.’s expense. The current India-China crisis should, therefore, be seen in its proper context and not as an isolated event.

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Foreign Policy Watch: India-China

Analysing three-pronged strategy of China in Ladakh

Note4Students

From UPSC perspective, the following things are important :

Prelims level: Various location mentioned in the article.

Mains level: Paper 2- Implications of dispute for India China relation

The article gives an in-depth analysis of the current border dispute between India and China in Ladakh. But the present dispute follows the pattern. China has been encroaching and gaining control over the disputed territory since the 1980s. And this dispute also fits into that pattern.

China acting strategically in Ladakh

  • While India has pursued its core national interests in J&K, China’s response was strategic — a shift that may have a lasting imprint on geopolitics.
  • We have been harping on the “differing perception” theory of the LAC for decades.
  • But in reality China has been gaining control over a massive “disputed territory” in Eastern Ladakh since the 1980s.

Major Chinese encroachment events

  • The Chinese first made encroachments into the 45-km long Skakjung pastureland in Demchok-Kuyul sector.
  • This resulted in local Changpas of Chushul, Tsaga, Nidar, Nyoma, Mud, Dungti, Kuyul, Loma villages gradually losing their winter grazing.
  • Ladakh’s earlier border lay at Kegu Naro — a day-long march from Dumchele.
  • Starting from the loss of Nagtsang in 1984, followed by Nakung (1991) and Lungma-Serding (1992), the last bit of Skakjung was lost in 2008.
  • The PLA followed the nomadic Rebo routes for patrolling in contrast to Indian authorities restricting Rebo movements that led to the massive shrinking of pastureland and border defence.
  • By the 2000s, the PLA’s focus shifted to desolate, inhospitable Chip Chap which remains inaccessible until end-March.
  • After mid-May, water streams impede vehicles moving across Shyok, Galwan, and Chang-Chenmo rivers leaving only a month and a half for effective patrolling by the Indian side.
  • No human beings inhabit here, a 1962 war site, an entry point into Ladakh for the Uyghurs and Tibetans.
  • Local Ladakhi personnel manned the posts here, but patrolling in the 972 sq km Trig Height area has been lax.
  • Easier accessibility allowed the PLA to intrude into Chip Chap with impunity during July-August — its regulars usually spent a few hours before crossing back.
  • But, during the 21-day Depsang stand-off in 2013, when Burtse became a flashpoint, the PLA set up remote camps 18-19 km inside Indian territory.
  • Chinese soldiers virtually prevented Indian troops from getting access to Rakinala near Daulat Beg-Olde (DBO) where the IAF reactivated the world’s highest landing strips in 2008.
2008 Daulat Beg Oldi Stand-off
  • This plus the reopening of Fukche and Nyoma airbases perhaps provoked the PLA’s intrusion in Depsang.

So, what is the current stand-off about?

  • Despite topographical challenges, the BRO has lately fast-tracked the 260 km long Shayok-DBO road construction.
  • That road construction probably triggered the PLA intrusion in early May sparking the current Galwan stand-off.
  • Towards the south at Pangong Tso, forces had physical scuffles over area-denial for patrolling at Sirijap on May 5-6 and on May 11.
  • The situation remains tense at Sirijap’s cliff spurs and also at the Tso, where troops are chasing each other in high-speed patrol boats.
  • Clearly, intrusions are part of China’s never-ending effort to push Indian troops westward of the Indus and Shyok rivers and reach the 1960 claimed line.

Details of the disputed border in Ladakh

  • Out of the 857 sq km long border in Ladakh only 368 sq km is the International Border, and the rest of the 489 sq km is the LAC.
  • The two traditional disputed points included Trig Heights and Demchok.
  • At eight points, the two sides have differing perceptions.
  • But lately, China has raised two fresh dispute points at Pangong Tso 83 sq km and at Chumur where it claims 80 sq km.
  • The old dispute sites were at the end point of Pangong Tso and at Chushul — the 1962 battle-site.

Three-pronged strategy

  • 1) The Sirijap range on the northern bank of the lake remains most contested, from which several cliff spurs jut out — the “finger series” 1 to 8.
  • India’s LAC claim line is at Finger-8, but the actual position is only up to Finger-4.
  • The Chinese are asserting further west to claim 83 sq km here.
  • The PLA has built a 4.5 km long road to prevent patrolling by Indian troops.
  • The PLA’s road network from here extends to Huangyangtan base located near National Highway G219.
  • 2) Further south in Demchok, China claims some 150 sq km.
  • The PLA has built massive infrastructure on its side, moved armoured troops into Charding Nalla since 2009.
  • Tibetan nomads pitch tents on Hemis Monastery’s land throughout 2018-2019.
  • 3)In Chumur, China claims 80 sq km and probably wants a straight border from PT-4925 to PT-5318 to bring Tible Mane (stupa) area under its control.
  • For India, holding of Chumur is critical for the safety of the Manali-Leh route.
  • PLA demanded removal of India’s fortified positions in Burtse (2013) and Demchok and Chumur (2014) for its retreat.

What could be the implications for India?

  • Overall, the pattern shows the PLA’s desperate design to snatch the lake at Lukung through a three-pronged strategy of attacking from Sirijap in the north, Chuchul in the south and through the lake water from middle.
  • This is the key chokepoint from where the Chinese can cut off Indian access to the entire flank of Chip Chap plains, Aksai Chin in the east and Shayok Valley to the north.
  •  Which means that Indian control is pushed to the west of the Shyok river and south of the Indus river, forcing India to accept both rivers as natural boundaries.
  • And once China gets control of the southern side of the Karakoram it can easily approach Siachen Glacier from the Depsang corridor.
  • And meet at Tashkurgan junction from where the CPEC crosses into Gilgit-Baltistan.
  • That would be disastrous for Indian defence, leaving the strategic Nubra vulnerable, possibly impacting even India’s hold over Siachen.
  • China’s access to Changla-pass through Lukung and Tangtse would threaten the entire Indus Valley.
  • It is quite possible that China is eyeing the waters of the Shyok, Galwan and Chang-Chenmo rivers, to divert them to the arid Aksai Chin and its Ali region.

Consider the question “What could be the strategic and security implications of China’s claim in Pangong Tso region for India?”

Conclusion

India should resist the Chinese design which could have disastrous consequences for India’s defence and strategic interests. This should involve diplomatic channels rather than skirmishes on the borders.

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Foreign Policy Watch: India-China

Private: India-China Skirmish in Ladakh

“Hindi Chini bhai bhai” – The tale of these brothers is filled with so much action and drama that it can give Bollywood writers a run for money. See, border issues is never easy to resolve, never has been and never will be. Pangong Tso or Doklam – All point to Troubled LAC and an aggressive neighbour, which is a tough combination for India. Let’s dive into this article to learn about the border skirmishes.

Current Incidents

On May 5, around 250 Indian and Chinese army personnel clashed with iron rods, sticks, and even resorted to stone-pelting in the Pangong Tso lake area of Ladakh, in which soldiers on both sides sustained injuries. In a separate incident, nearly 150 Indian and Chinese military personnel were engaged in a face-off near Naku La Pass in the Sikkim sector on May 9. At least 10 soldiers from both sides sustained injuries.

After Chinese accusation of Indian Army’s border transgressions and strong Indian pushback, Ladakh has become a new festering point for the Sino-Indian relations.

A deeper look into reasons of present tensions

  • The stand-off in Galwan valley, according to reports, was triggered by China moving in troops and equipment to stop construction activity by India.
  • Delhi claims that it was well within India’s side of the LAC. The LAC was thought to be settled in this area which has not seen many incidents in the past, but China now appears to think otherwise.
  • The northern bank of Pangong lake has, however, been a point of contention where there are differing perceptions of the LAC.
  • The Sikkim incident is unexpected as the contours of the LAC are broadly agreed to in this sector.
  • Unofficial reason: The broader context for the tensions appears to be a changing dynamic along the LAC, as India plans to catch-up in improving infrastructure there.

Some old bruises in border relations

  • India and China do not have a well-defined border, and troop face-offs are common along its 3,500 km Line of Actual Control (LAC), though not a bullet has been fired for four decades.
  • After the 1962 Sino-Indian war, one of the longest standoffs between the Indian and Chinese armies happened at Sumdorongchu (near the Bhutan tri-junction) in 1986, when the troops had an eye-to-eye stalemate.
  • In 2017, at Doklam, near the same Bhutan tri-junction, the troops of India and China were engaged in a 73-day stand-off, triggering fears of a war between the two nuclear-armed neighbours.

The Gandhi-Deng bargain

    • A year after a military skirmish between India and China in the Sumdorong Chu Valley in Arunachal Pradesh, then PM Rajiv Gandhi visited his counterpart Deng Xiaoping in Beijing to mend ties.
    • The two leaders agreed to establish a forward-looking relationship but border dispute were temporarily set aside.
    • The reason for this pragmatism was rooted in economic and strategic factors: Both China and India needed a stable external environment to promote domestic economic development.
    • China was already a decade into the dramatic economic reforms that Deng had initiated, while Gandhi’s India had also embarked on a similar path.
    • The Gandhi-Deng bargain paved the way for a number of border management agreements (including the 1993 and 1996 agreements related to confidence-building measures.

Then, Why do face-offs occur so frequently?

  • Basic: Face-off and stand-off situations occur along the LAC in areas where India and China have overlapping claim lines. The LAC has never been demarcated.
  • The boundary in the Sikkim sector is broadly agreed but has not been delineated.
  • Face-offs occur when patrols encounter each other in the contested zones between overlapping claim lines.
  • Protocols agreed to in 2005 and 2013 detail rules of engagement to prevent such incidents, but have not always been adhered to.

What are the various sectors on the India-China border?

  • The border can be broadly divided into three sectors—Western, Middle and Eastern.
  • The Western sector, which includes Ladakh, is governed by the Johnson Line, making Aksai Chin (controlled by China) in Jammu and Kashmir contested territory for India.
  • The Middle sector, consisting of Uttarakhand and Himachal, is relatively tranquil. Even map exchanges between the two countries have taken place, based on a broad understanding of borders.
  • In the Eastern Sector (where Indian controls territory based on the MacMahon Line), China claims Arunachal Pradesh as part of southern Tibet, while India contests it.
  • The MacMahon Line was drawn at the tripartite 1913-14 Simla Convention attended by British India, Tibet and China; the problem: Tibet is involved and China is not a signatory to this pact.

LAC: Why no solution yet?

  • It’s not like nothing has been done!
  • Maps have been exchanged in the Middle Sector, but the exercise fell through in the Western Sector where divergence is the greatest.
  • China has rejected this exercise, viewing it as adding another complication to the on-going boundary negotiations.
  • India’s argument is rather than agree on one LAC, the exercise could help both sides understand the claims of the other, paving the way to regulate activities in contested areas until a final settlement of the boundary dispute.

Also, Chinese transgressions are frequent: Dragon’s aggressiveness

  • A higher number indicates that the Chinese soldiers are coming to the Indian side more often, and their movements are being observed and recorded by the Indian soldiers.
  • This can be seen as an indicator of increased Chinese assertiveness.
  • Since 73-day Doklam standoff on Sikkim-Bhutan border in 2017 there had been no major standoff.
  • PM Modi and President Xi met in Wuhan, following the Doklam crisis, and passed some instructions.

Wuhan Coziness turned sour

  • Modi and Xi had met for their first informal summit at Wuhan in April 2018, where the two leaders had issued strategic guidance to their respective militaries.
  • These guidelines aimed to strengthen communication in order to build trust and mutual understanding and enhance predictability and effectiveness in the management of border affairs.
  • They had also directed their militaries to earnestly implement various confidence-building measures agreed upon between the two sides, including the principle of mutual and equal security.
  • But the latest border issues show hollowness of such talks.

International forces in this bilateral ties

  • In addition to the border dispute, some of the core issues in the Sino-Indian rivalry include Tibet (the presence of the Dalai Lama, the Tibetan government-in-exile), the burgeoning China-Pakistan partnership, and the two countries’ overlapping spheres of influence in Asia.
  • These issues have become more salient in the context of the two countries’ simultaneous but asymmetric rising power.
  • In addition to accruing power domestically, India is also building strong strategic partnerships with China’s other rivals, especially the US and Japan.
  • Meanwhile, a rising China has stabilized its northern borders with Russia and is working to undermine the US primacy in the East Asian maritime (particularly the South China Sea).
  • This basically leaves only one border issue with a rival unresolved: namely, the Sino-Indian border.
  • It is hardly surprising that it is exerting periodic pressure on India along this front—a trend that is only likely to escalate.

India should not fear. Why?

To be sure, China’s regional aggression is COVID-proof. From Japan to Malaysia, Vietnam, Philippines and Taiwan, everyone has had to push back against Beijing’s marauding missions.

1) India can retaliate

  • India, while still under-resourced, is no longer a pushover, having emerged stronger and wiser from the Depsang incident of 2013, when Chinese troops pitched tents to establish their control over the area.
  • India and China are both nuclear-armed countries with strong militaries.
  • India has been building a road along the Galwan River to Daulat Beg Oldie that would improve India’s access to the Karakoram Highway, as well as 61 border roads with a total length of 3,346 km across the Himalayan frontier.
  • The Indian Air Force’s capabilities have improved as well.

2) China is wooing its people

  • Presently, China is in the midst of its annual “2 Sessions” of the CPCC (Chinese People’s Political Consultative Process) and NPC (National People’s Congress), where the ruling sentiment is how China is being bold and tough.
  • Hong Kong was an example of that sentiment. It is likely the India moves may be related. No softening or reasonableness can be expected from China until the NPC ends.
  • China is, as usual, changing the ground realities to influence a future boundary agreement.

The ground realities before we think settlement

  • India sees China as occupying 38,000 sq km in Aksai Chin. In the east, China claims as much as 90,000 sq km, extending all across Arunachal Pradesh.
  • A swap was hinted at by China in 1960 and in the early 1980s, which would have essentially formalized the status quo.
  • Both sides have now ruled out the status quo as a settlement, agreeing to meaningful and mutual adjustments.
  • At the same time, the most realistic solution will involve only minor adjustments along the LAC, considering neither side will be willing to part with territory already held.

Way forward

  • India and China should grasp the current situation as an opportunity to revive the stalled process of clarifying the LAC.
  • Clarifying the LAC may even provide a fresh impetus to the stalled boundary talks between the Special Representatives.
  • Beyond the posturing, both sides know a final settlement will ultimately have to use the LAC as a basis, with only minor adjustments. Only a settlement will end the shadow boxing on the LAC.
  • With both countries in the midst of an unprecedented global pandemic, the time to push for a settlement to a distracting, protracted dispute is now.

Conclusion

The issue is basically the fundamental difference in how both sides view the boundary question. India insists that its relations with China won’t improve until the border dispute is resolved. But China differs here. In some sense, Beijing appears to view an unsettled border as holding some leverage with India, one of the many pressure points it could use to keep India off-guard.

But for now, India should resist the Chinese design which could have disastrous consequences for India’s defence and strategic interests. Lastly, Diplomatic channels is always a better option than skirmishes on the borders.

 

 

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Foreign Policy Watch: India-China

Importance of the Pangong Tso Lake

Note4Students

From UPSC perspective, the following things are important :

Prelims level: Pangong Tso Lake

Mains level: India-China border skirmishes and their impacts on bilateral relations

(Note: No higher resolution is available for the image)

The recent incidents at the Pangong Tso lake area between Indian and Chinese soldiers on the LAC involve a picturesque lake, mountains, helicopters, fighter jets, boats, eyeball-to-eyeball confrontation, fisticuffs and injuries.

Apart from the geo-physical significance of the Pangong Tso for prelims, other general information should be necessarily known to aspirants, particularly for Personality Tests.

The Pangong Tso Lake

  • Pangong Tso Lake in eastern Ladakh has often been in the news, most famously during the Doklam standoff, when a video of the scuffle between Indian and Chinese soldiers.
  • In the Ladakhi language, Pangong means extensive concavity, and Tso is a lake in Tibetan.
  • Pangong Tso is a long narrow, deep, endorheic (landlocked) lake situated at a height of more than 14,000 ft in the Ladakh Himalayas.
  • The western end of Tso lies 54 km to the southeast of Leh. The 135 km-long lake sprawls over 604 sq km in the shape of a boomerang and is 6 km wide at its broadest point.
  • The brackish water lake freezes over in winter and becomes ideal for ice skating and polo.
  • The legendary 19th century Dogra general Zorawar Singh is said to have trained his soldiers and horses on the frozen Pangong lake before invading Tibet.

Tactical significance of the lake

  • By itself, the lake does not have major tactical significance.
  • But it lies in the path of the Chushul approach, one of the main approaches that China can use for an offensive into Indian Territory.
  • Indian assessments show that a major Chinese offensive if it comes, will flow across both the north and south of the lake.
  • During the 1962 war, this was where China launched its main offensive — the Indian Army fought heroically at Rezang La, the mountain pass on the southeastern approach to Chushul valley, where the Ahir Company of 13 Kumaon led by Maj. Shaitan Singh made its last stand.
  • Not far away, to the north of the lake, is the Army’s Dhan Singh Thapa post, named after Major Dhan Singh Thapa who was awarded the country’s highest gallantry award, the Param Vir Chakra.
  • Major Thapa and his platoon were manning Sirijap-1 outpost which was essential for the defence of Chushul airfield.

Connectivity in the region

  • Over the years, the Chinese have built motorable roads along their banks of the Pangong Tso.
  • At the People’s Liberation Army’s Huangyangtan base at Minningzhen, southwest of Yinchuan, the capital of China’s Ningxia Hui Autonomous Region, stands a massive to-scale model of this disputed area in Aksai Chin.
  • It points to the importance accorded by the Chinese to the area.
  • Even during peacetime, the difference in perception over where the LAC lies on the northern bank of the lake makes this contested terrain.
  • In 1999, when the Army unit from the area was moved to Kargil for Operation Vijay, China took the opportunity to build 5 km of a road inside Indian Territory along the lake’s bank.
  • From one of these roads, Chinese positions physically overlook Indian positions on the northern tip of the Pangong Tso Lake.

Fingers in the lake

  • The barren mountains on the lake’s northern bank, called the Chang Chenmo, jut forward in major spurs, which the Army calls “fingers”.
  • India claims that the LAC is coterminous with Finger 8, but it physically controls area only up to Finger 4.
  • Chinese border posts are at Finger 8, while it believes that the LAC passes through Finger 2.
  • Around six years ago, the Chinese had attempted a permanent construction at Finger 4 which was demolished after Indians strongly objected to it.
  • Chinese use light vehicles on the road to patrol up to Finger 2, which has a turning point for their vehicles.
  • If they are confronted and stopped by an Indian patrol in between, asking them to return, it leads to confusion, as the vehicles can’t turn back.
  • The Chinese have now stopped the Indian soldiers moving beyond Finger 2. This is an eyeball-to-eyeball situation which is still developing.

Confrontation on the water

  • On the water, the Chinese had a major advantage until a few years ago — their superior boats could literally run circles around the Indian boats.
  • But India purchased better Tampa boats some eight years ago, leading to a quicker and more aggressive response.
  • Although there are well-established drills for disengagement of patrol boats of both sides, the confrontations on the waters have led to tense situations in the past few years.
  • The Chinese have moved in more boats — called the LX series — in the lake after the tensions which rose in the area from last month.
  • The drill for the boats is agreed upon by the two sides, as per the Standard Operating Procedure.

Out of bounds for tourists

  • Indian tourists are only allowed up to Spangmik village, around 7 km into the lake. This is where a famous movie climax was shot.
  • In fact, tourists were not allowed at all at Pangong Tso until 1999, and even today, you need to obtain an Inner Line Permit from the office of the Deputy Commissioner at Leh.

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Foreign Policy Watch: India-China

How China is seeking more control on Hong Kong?

Note4Students

From UPSC perspective, the following things are important :

Prelims level: Not Much

Mains level: Secessionist tendencies across the world and their handling

China has started pushing for an “improvement” in the Basic Law — the mini-constitution that defines ties between Hong Kong and Beijing — signalling a fundamental change in the way the highly autonomous city-state is run. The Chinese parliament is debating a controversial national security law for Hong Kong.

Practice question for mains:

Q. Democracy and authoritarianism cannot co-exist in the same country. Comment in context to the situation generated in Taiwan. How is the situation different from the withdrawl of special category status of Jammu and Kashmir.

Chinese authoritarian grip on Hong Kong

Hong Kong’s ‘Basic Law’

  • Hong Kong is a Special Administrative Region (SAR) of China.
  • It has observed a “one country, two systems” policy since Britain returned sovereignty to China on July 1, 1997, which has allowed it certain freedoms, the rest of China does not have.
  • It is governed by a mini-constitution called the Basic Law — which affirms the principle of “one country, two systems”.
  • The constitutional document is a product of the 1984 Sino-British Joint Declaration.
  • Under this, China promised to honour Hong Kong’s liberal policies, the system of governance, an independent judiciary, and individual freedoms for a period of 50 years from 1997.

Uproar in Hong Kong

  • China accuses that the Hong Kong SAR has not acted out its constitutional duty for national security in line with China’s Constitution and the Basic Law.
  • Since the handover, Hong Kong residents have time and again taken to the streets to protect their Basic Law freedoms, with the first major pro-democracy protest taking place in 2003.
  • In 2014, over one lakh city residents took part in the ‘Umbrella Revolution’ to protest against China’s denial of democratic reforms.

Impact of the 2019 protests

  • The largest protests since the 1997 handover took place last year in 2019 when for months tens of thousands of Hong Kongers agitated against a proposed extradition law.
  • The protest continued with pro-democracy marches even after the legislation was withdrawn.
  • These protests were seen as an affront by mainland China, which under President Xi Jinping has increasingly adopted a more hardline approach to foreign policy and internal security issues in recent years.

Rise of Taiwanese aspirations

  • The Hong Kong unrest is also believed to have left its mark on Taiwan, another prickly issue for Beijing which considers the island state as its own.
  • In this year’s presidential election, Taiwanese voters brought to power the Democratic Progressive Party, which openly opposes joining China.

The National Security Law

  • Under Article 23 of the Basic Law, Hong Kong has to enact a national security law “to prohibit any act of treason, secession, sedition, and subversion against the Chinese government.
  • When the Hong Kong government first tried to enact the law in 2003, the issue became a rallying point for the city-wide protests which occurred that year.
  • Since then, the government has steered clear of introducing the legislation again.
  • Beijing could now make the law applicable to Hong Kong by another route — by inserting the legislation in Annex III of the Basic Law.
  • The Chinese parliament is expected to vote on a resolution that will make way for the new law, which could be promulgated in Hong Kong.

What could happen if such a law takes effect?

  • The new law would ban seditious activities that target mainland Chinese rule, as well as punish external interference in Hong Kong affairs.
  • Many expect a revival of the protests that rocked the city last year.
  • China, on the other hand, has sought support and understanding of India and other countries for its controversial decision as a precautionary measure.

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Foreign Policy Watch: India-China

Rising incidences of Chinese Transgressions

Note4Students

From UPSC perspective, the following things are important :

Prelims level: Not Much

Mains level: India-China border disputes

As tensions remain high between Indian and Chinese soldiers, the number of recorded Chinese transgressions across the disputed India-China border surged by 75 per cent in Ladakh in 2019, and the Chinese forays into Indian Territory in the first four months of the current year have also witnessed an increase compared to the same period last year.

Chinese Transgression:

    • The border between India and China is not fully demarcated and the Line of Actual Control (LAC) is neither clarified nor confirmed by the two countries.
    • This leads to different perceptions of the LAC for the two sides while soldiers from either side try to patrol the area.
    • Observation Methods: Use of surveillance equipment, face-offs by patrols, reliable indications by locals, or evidence left by the Chinese in the form of wrappers, biscuit packets etc. in an unmanned area.
    • Official data shows that 80% of Chinese transgressions across the LAC since 2015 have taken place in four locations of which three are in eastern Ladakh in the western sector.
      • These areas of eastern Ladakh are Pangong Tso, Trig Heights and Burtse.
      • The fourth area is the Dichu Area/Madan Ridge area (Arunachal Pradesh) of the Eastern sector.
  •  Implications of Increased Number of Transgressions:

    • It is an indicator of increased Chinese assertiveness.
    • Even if there are no major incidents, it should not be taken lightly.
    • So far, there has been no major standoff between the two sides after the 73-day Doklam standoff on Sikkim-Bhutan border in 2017.

Concerns

  • India is worried about the tensions at Naku La in Sikkim and at Galwan river and Pangong Tso in Ladakh.
  • The increased transgressions lead to more tensions between both countries which are already struggling to contain the Covid-19 pandemic.
  • Nepal’s recent behaviour on the Mansarovar Link Road raising the border map issue also raises Indian concerns.
  • The constant accusations on each other also cause tensions and disrupt the peace on borders.
    • Recently, Chinese media accused India of building defence facilities in the Galwan Valley region of the contested Aksai Chin area.
  • India and China are both nuclear-armed countries with strong militaries and the constant border conflicts are not a desirable thing.

Way Forward

  • In the Wuhan and Mahabalipuram summits, both China and India had reaffirmed that they will make efforts to ensure peace and tranquility in the border areas.
  • On 1st April, 2020 India and China completed their 70 years of diplomatic relations.
  • Both countries have resolved border issues peacefully in the past four decades which gives the hope that the tensions will subside soon.
  • Establishment of peace between the two big powers of such an important geopolitical region is essential for their own growth and development as well as for maintenance of global peace.

Practice question for mains:

Q. Clear demarcation of the national borders is the need of the hour. Discuss.

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Foreign Policy Watch: India-China

Tracking Chinese diplomacy

Note4Students

From UPSC perspective, the following things are important :

Prelims level: Afro-Asian conference.

Mains level: Paper 2- Rise of China and changes in diplomacy.

We are no stranger to the assertive nature of China in geopolitics. But had it always been the same? This article captures the transformation of the nature of Chinese diplomacy. Two personalities that had a profound impact on the nature of the diplomacy of that country are Zhou Enlai and Deng Xiaoping. Each of them imparted special characteristic to diplomacy. Now, that all seems lost from present China. Read the article to know about the contribution of two personalities and trends in Chinese diplomacy now.

Zhou Enlai: Preference for Persuasion and compromise

“All diplomacy is a continuation of war by other means.” – Zhou Enlai

  • If Mao Zedong represented the crude face of Chinese communism, then Zhou was the epitome of its refinement.
  • Zhou preferred to seduce his opponents through word and gesture in the pursuit of national self-interest.
  • Force was used rarely, and only when all other means of persuasion failed.
  • So, amid Korean War in 1950, when the U.S. Army crossed into North Korea, Zhou Enlai delivered message against crossing 38th Parallel through Indian Ambassador, instead publicly declaring this.
  • He chose to give diplomacy a chance.

Role in First Indochina War

  • In 1954, the Chinese made their entry onto the world stage in Geneva.
  • The Vietnamese were winning against the French in the First Indochina War.
  • And the Americans were preparing to intervene fearing that another “domino” would fall to communism.
  • China’s self-interest lay in ending this war while denying the U.S. a foothold in its backyard.
  • Zhou’s strategy was to undermine western unity.
  • His watchwords were persuasion and compromise.
  • He even gave “face” to the French who had just lost to the Vietnamese in the battle of Dien Bien Phu, by travelling the “extra mile” to meet Prime Minister of France to secure the peace.

Low profile at Afro-Asian Conference in Bandung

  • In 1955, at the Afro-Asian Conference in Bandung, Zhou used the same tactics to pursue another objective: Developing relations with leaders of the Afro-Asian countries.
  • He deliberately kept a low profile, allowing Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru and Indonesian President Sukarno to take the lead.
  • His tactic, he reported to Mao, was “not to be involved in provocative or disruptive debate”.
  • His guidance to his team was to “strive to expand the united front of the world peace force.
  • He also instructed the team to create conditions for establishing diplomatic work or diplomatic relations between China and a number of Afro-Asian countries.

So, how Zhou shaped China’s foreign policy?

  • Zhou’s style of diplomacy came to define Chinese foreign policy over the next half-century.
  • The strategy was consistent: avoid isolation, build solidarity with non-aligned countries, divide the West.
  • The tactics were called ‘united front’ — isolate the main threat by building unity with all other forces.
  • Under Zhou, diplomats of calibre kept handled the task of diplomacy with skill and held firm even in storms like the Cultural Revolution.
  • When the tide rose, these diplomatic fishermen gathered the fish — expanding China’s global presence and gaining international acceptability.
  • When it ebbed, they saw to it that the ship remained firmly moored.
  • They navigated the Cold War, playing the Soviets against the Americans.
  • To relieve pressure, Zhou opened border talks with the Soviets and channels to the U.S.
  • Public animosity did not deter him from turning on the full extent of his diplomatic skills on either Alexei Kosygin or Henry Kissinger.
  • In February 1972, he persuaded U.S. President Richard Nixon to abandon Taiwan.
  • It was a staggering act of diplomacy.

Deng Xiaoping: hide our capacities and bide our time

“Observe calmly; secure our position; cope with affairs calmly; hide our capacities and bide our time; be good at maintaining a low profile; and never claim leadership.”

  • In the 1980s, Deng Xiaoping took up the reins.
  • Deng supplemented Zhou’s strategy with a “24-Character Strategy” of his own(the above quote).

Character of Chinese diplomacy in Deng Xiaoping’s time

  • “24-Character Strategy” became the ‘mantra’ of Chinese diplomacy.
  • Chinese diplomats measured their words and kept their dignity.
  • They projected power but rarely used more words than needed.
  • They were masters of their brief because Zhou had taught them that the real advantage in negotiations was to know more than the other side.
  • They flattered acquaintances, calling them “old friends”.
  • They built relationships by making it a point to engage the less friendly interlocutors with greater courtesies than friends.
  • Behind closed doors, they were tireless in reducing opposition through negotiation.
  • And skillfully in putting the onus of responsibility for failure on the other party.
  • And occasionally, they would hold out a veiled threat with a look of concern rather like an uncle anxious to save you from embarrassment.
  • But they rarely offended.

Tumultuous period of 1980s and 1990s and entry into WTO

  • The 1980s and 1990s were the peak for Chinese diplomacy.
  • The U.S. President George Bush and Russian leader Mikhail Gorbachev visited China.
  • They normalised relations, settled borders and won hearts and minds through general financial help.
  • So effective was Chinese diplomacy that the Americans even broke their own sanctions imposed after the 1989 ‘Tiananmen Incident’, within a matter of four weeks.
  • A decade later, the U.S. and the European Union bought into Chinese assurances that it would soon transition to a market economy.
  • And helped steer China into the World Trade Organization.

After Deng Xiaoping: Arrogance and threats in diplomacy

  • Deng died in 1997. China prospered just as Deng had imagined.
  • It began to occupy centre stage in world diplomacy, but the basics of Chines diplomacy started changing
  • A new generation of diplomats, with knowledge of the English language and a careerist mindset, has started to destroy the foundations set down by Zhou and Deng.
  • Arrogance has replaced humility.
  • Persuasion is quickly abandoned in favour of the stick when countries take actions contrary to Chinese wishes.
  • The Chinese pursue unilateralism instead of compromise in the South China Sea.
  • In place of ‘united front’ tactics, they are bent on creating irritations simultaneously with multiple China neighbouring countries.
  • Avenging the ‘Century of Humiliation’ that endured in the hands of western imperial powers from roughly 1839-1840 to 1949 is on their mind now.
  • To avenge that they adopt a one-size-fits-all approach.
  • But they forget that much of the world has done nothing to China and, indeed, shares a similar historical experience.
  • Statements of fact or reasoned opinion are seen by them as insult or humiliation.
  • Foreign governments are educated about their responsibilities in managing the media and the narrative, even as the Chinese manipulate the same media to serve their purposes.
  • They expect to receive gratitude for everything they do, including handling COVID-19, as if it was only done with the foreigner in mind.
  • The veneer of humility has thinned.
  • The reserves of goodwill are fast depleting. The ship seems to be adrift at sea.

Questions related to China has been a recurrent theme in the UPSC papers. Consider the question asked in 2017  “China is using its economic relations and positive trade surplus as a tool to develop potential military power status in Asia. In light of this statement discuss its impact on India and her neighbours.”

Conclusion

In the post-pandemic world, India and the rest of the world will have to reckon the role played by China in the pandemic. In such a changing scenario India will do well to take note of the changing trends of Chinese diplomacy.


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Foreign Policy Watch: India-China

Are the U.S. and China entering a new Cold War?

Note4Students

From UPSC perspective, the following things are important :

Prelims level: Not Much

Mains level: Geopolitics after the Cold War era

Relations between the U.S. and China plunged to a new low in recent weeks. Ties between the two countries had started deteriorating well before the COVID-19 pandemic.

Practice question for mains:

Q. How will economic nationalism take a lead in the post-COVID-19 Asia? Discuss in context to the rising tensions between the US and China.

Heading for a new Cold War

  • The US President has recently threatened to “cut off the whole relationship” with China over the COVID-19 pandemic, which originated in Wuhan.
  • Earlier this month, the U.S. imposed visa restrictions on the Chinese journalists working in the country, limiting their work period to 90 days.
  • Last week, Trump extended for one more year a ban on U.S. companies from using telecom equipment made by “companies positing national security risks” (Huawei and ZTE row).

A new national policy

  • The rising tensions between the two superpowers have prompted many experts to warn of a new Cold War.
  • A chorus of American voices now argues that confronting China should become the organizing principle of U.S. foreign policy, akin to the Cold War against the Soviet Union.
  • Hawks in the Trump administration openly push for a more aggressive approach towards Beijing.
  • In 2017, the US’s National Security Strategy called China as “a revisionist power” seeking “to erode American security and prosperity” and “shape a world antithetical to U.S. values and interests”.

Why is the US confronting China?

  • Competition rules the relationship, and flexibility and mature handling are in short supply on both sides.
  • Uncertainty prevails, whether it on the question of resolving trade problems, or on the maritime front in the East and South China Seas, on technology, or on mutual mud-slinging on COVID-19-related issues.
  • Record high temperatures have been recorded in Sino-U.S. relations in recent years and the pandemic is no exception to this.
  • COVID-19 appears to have aggravated the crisis, pushing both countries, already reeling under trade, technology and maritime disputes, to take a more hostile position towards each other.

How has China responded?

  • China has frequently urged the United States to abandon its Cold-War mentality and zero-sum game mindset.
  • It has sometimes through the state-run media, hit back, calling Trump’s comments “lunacy” and Mike Pompeo, the U.S. Secretary of State, an “evil politician”.

A reminder of the ‘Novikov telegram’

  • In early April, China’s Ministry of State Security sent an internal report to the country’s top leaders, stating that hostility in the wake of the coronavirus outbreak could tip relations with the U.S. into a confrontation.
  • Intelligence community sees the report as China’s version of the ‘Novikov Telegram’, referring to a report Nikolai Novikov, the Soviet Ambassador in Washington, sent to Moscow in September 1946.
  • Laying out his analysis of the U.S. conduct, the report, sent to Russia said that the U.S. is determined on world domination and suggested the Soviet Union create a buffer in Eastern Europe.
  • Novikov telegram was a response to the “Long Telegram”, the 8,000-word report sent by George Kennan, an official at the U.S. Embassy in Moscow, to Washington.
  • It said that the Soviet Union was heavily armed and determined to spread communism, and peaceful coexistence was impossible.
  • Historians often trace the origins of the Cold War to these telegrams.

Nationalist overdrive in US

  • The current crisis in relations clearly shows that tensions will not go away. This situation is unlikely to ease until the U.S. Presidential election.
  • Post-election, temperatures could decrease, but a deep-rooted antipathy towards China has gripped the popular and political imagination in the U.S.
  • In China, the leadership and public opinion are both on a nationalist overdrive and the Trump administration is seen as the prime antagonist.

Relevance with the Cold War

  • There are similarities between the current crisis and the Cold War.
  • The political elites of both China and the U.S., like the Soviet Union and the U.S. back then, see each other as their main rivals.
  • We can also see this antagonism moving from the political elite to the popular perception — the targeting of ethnic Chinese professionals and others in the U.S. and of American individuals or entities in China is a case in point.

Conclusion

  • We don’t see the kind of proxy conflicts between the U.S. and China which we did during the Cold War.
  • The world is also not bipolar any more. There are third parties such as the EU, Russia, India and Japan.
  • These parties increasingly have a choice whether or not to align with either power as they see fit and on a case by case basis.
  • This leads to a very different kind of international order than during the Cold War.

Challenges ahead

  • The Cold War was out and out ideological between the communist and capitalist blocs.
  • For China, a country ruled by a communist party where the primary goal of all state apparatus is preserving the regime in power, it’s always been ideological.
  • The U.S. has started realizing this angle about China now. The Republican Party has ideological worldviews, too.
  • If Trump gets re-elected, the ideological underpinnings of the U.S.-China rivalry could get further solidified.

Back2Basics: Cold War

  • During World War II, the United States and the Soviet Union fought together as allies against the Axis powers.
  • However, the relationship between the two nations was a tense one.
  • Americans had long been wary of Soviet Communism and concerned about Russian leader Joseph Stalin’s tyrannical rule of his own country.
  • For their part, the Soviets resented the Americans’ decades-long refusal to treat the USSR as a legitimate part of the international community as well as their delayed entry into World War II, which resulted in the deaths of tens of millions of Russians.
  • After the war ended, these grievances ripened into an overwhelming sense of mutual distrust and enmity.

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Foreign Policy Watch: India-China

Mapping: Pangong Tso Lake

Helicopters of the Chinese Army came close to the border during the face-off with the Indian Army near Pangong Tso Lake in Eastern Ladakh last week.

Keep a watch on some facts related to the Pangong Tso Lake like nearby rivers, passes, Ramsar status etc.

Aircraft restricted near LAC

  • As per existing agreements between India and China, operation of fighter aircraft and armed helicopters is restricted to a distance from the LAC.
  • According to the Agreement on Maintenance of Peace and Tranquility along the LAC in India-China Border Area’ of 1996 combat aircraft (to include fighter, bomber, reconnaissance, military trainer, armed helicopter and other armed aircraft) shall not fly within 10 km of the LAC.

Pangong Tso Lake

  • Pangong Tso or Pangong Lake is an endorheic lake in the Himalayas situated at a height of about 4,350 m.
  • It is 134 km long and extends from India to the Tibetan Autonomous Region, China.
  • Approximately 60% of the length of the lake lies within the Tibetan Autonomous Region.
  • The lake is 5 km wide at its broadest point. All together it covers 604 sq.km.
  • During winter the lake freezes completely, despite being saline water.
  • It is not a part of the Indus river basin area and geographically a separate landlocked river basin.
  • Formerly, Pangong Tso had an outlet to Shyok River, a tributary of Indus River, but it was closed off due to natural damming.
  • The lake is in the process of being identified under the Ramsar Convention as a wetland of international importance.
  • This will be the first trans-boundary wetland in South Asia under the convention.

Back2Basics: India-China Border Dispute

The India-China borders disputes exist between three regions:

1) J&K region

  • The Aksai Chin sector which originally was a part of the state of Jammu and Kashmir is claimed by China as part of its autonomous Xinjiang region.
  • After the 1962 war, it is administered by China. It is the second-largest Indo-China border area covering over 38000 sq. km. However, it is uninhabited land.
  • While India claims the entire Aksai Chin territory as well as the Shaksgam valley (Indian Territory gifted to China by Pakistan), China contests Indian control over Daulat Beg Oldi (a tehsil in Leh south of Aksai China-it is believed to host the world’s highest airstrip).

2) Sikkim region

  • China has recognised India’s sovereignty over Sikkim and had initiated the trade at Nathu La pass.
  • However, this is the region where the Doklam standoff took place.

3) Arunachal Pradesh Region

  • The Arunachal Pradesh border that China still claims to be its own territory is the largest disputed area, covering around 90000 sq. km.
  • It was formally called North-East Frontier Agency.
  • During the 1962 war, the People’s Liberation Army occupied it but they announced a unilateral ceasefire and withdrew respecting the international boundary (Mcmahon Line).
  • However, it has continued to assert its claim over the territory.

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Foreign Policy Watch: India-China

Seven trends in the geopolitics of the world

Note4Students

From UPSC perspective, the following things are important :

Prelims level: G-7, G-20, BRI etc.

Mains level: Paper 2- Recent changes in the global order that were hastened by the pandemic.

The article examines 7 trends that have been emerging in the global order for quite some time now. The corona crisis has only accentuated these trends. So, what are these trends? read to know more.

1. The rise of Asia

  • The first trend which became clear in the aftermath of the 2008 global financial crisis is the rise of Asia.
  • Economic historians pointed to its inevitability, recalling that till the 18th century, Asia accounted for half the global GDP.
  • The Industrial Revolution accompanied by European naval expansion and colonialism contributed to the rise of the West, and now the balance is being restored.
  • The 2008 financial crisis showed the resilience of Asian economies.
  • And even today, economic forecasts indicate that out of the G-20 countries, only China and India are likely to register economic growth during 2020.
  • Asian countries have also demonstrated greater agility in tackling the pandemic compared to the United States and Europe.
  • This is not limited to China but a number of other Asian states have shown greater responsiveness and more effective state capacity.
  • Consequently, Asian economies will recover faster than those in the West.

2. Decline of the US

  • The second trend is the retreat of the U.S.after a century of being in the forefront of shaping the global order.
  • The U.S. played a decisive role in shaping the world, from the World Wars to the leadership of the western world during the Cold War, molding global responses to threats posed by terrorism or proliferation or climate change.
  • But recent examples show that interventions in Afghanistan and Iraq have become quagmires that have sapped domestic political will and resources.
  • President Donald Trump called for “America first” and during the current crisis, the U.S.’s efforts at cornering supplies of scarce medical equipment and medicines and acquiring biotech companies engaged in research and development in allied states, shows that this may mean “America alone”.
  • Moreover, even as countries were losing trust in the U.S.’s leadership, its mishandling at the home of the pandemic indicates that countries are also losing trust in the U.S.’s competence.

3. Weakening unity of the EU

  • A third trend is the European Union’s continuing preoccupation with internal challenges.
  • This internal disruption is generated three factors: 1) EU’s expansion of membership to include East European states 2) Impact of the financial crisis among the Eurozone members 3) Ongoing Brexit negotiations.
  • Threat perceptions vary between old Europe and new Europe making it increasingly difficult to reach agreement on political matters e.g. relations with Russia and China.
  • Rising populism has given greater voice to Euro-sceptics and permitted some EU members to espouse the virtues of “illiberal democracy”.
  • Adding to this is the North-South divide within the Eurozone.
  • This divide was seen when austerity measures were imposed on Greece, Italy, Spain and Portugal a decade ago by the European Central Bank.
  • These austerity measures were persuaded by the fiscally conservative Austria, Germany and the Netherlands.
  • The EU lacked solidarity when Italy was battling the pandemic alone.
  • Further damage was done when Italy was denied medical equipment by its EU neighbours who introduced export controls.
  • Schengen visa or free-border movement has already become a victim to the pandemic.
  • The EU will need considerable soul searching to rediscover the limits of free movement of goods, services, capital and people, the underlying theme of the European experiment of shared sovereignty.

4. Rise of China

  • China’s growing economic role has been visible since it joined the World Trade Organization in 2001.
  • Its more assertive posture has taken shape under President Xi Jinping’s leadership with the call that a rejuvenated China is now ready to assume global responsibilities.
  • In recent years, the U.S.-China relationship moved from cooperation to competition; and now with trade and technology wars, it is moving steadily to confrontation.
  • A partial economic de-coupling had begun and will gather greater momentum.
  • The Belt and Road Initiative involves investing trillions of dollars in infrastructure building as a kind of pre-emptive move against any U.S. attempts at containment.
  • Even if Mr Xi’s leadership comes under questioning, it may soften some aggressive policy edges but the confrontational rivalry with the U.S. will remain.

5. Failure of multinational institutions

  • With COVID-19, international and multilateral bodies are nowhere on the scene.
  • The World Health Organisation (WHO) was the natural candidate to lead global efforts against the health crisis but it has become a victim of politics.
  • The UN Security Council (UNSC), the G-7 and the G-20 are paralysed when the world faces the worst recession since 1929.
  • The reality is that these institutions were always subjected to big power politics.
  • During the Cold War, U.S.-Soviet rivalry blocked the UNSC on many sensitive issues and now with major power rivalry returning, finds itself paralysed again.
  • Agencies such as WHO have lost autonomy over the decades as their regular budgets shrank.
  • Budget constraints forced them to increasingly rely on voluntary contributions sourced largely from western countries and foundations.
  • The absence of a multilateral response today highlights the long-felt need for reform of these bodies but this cannot happen without collective global leadership.

6. The oil prices

  • The two trends were changing energy markets: 1)Growing interest in renewables and green technologies on account of climate change concerns. 2) The U.S. emerging as a major energy producer.
  • Now, a looming economic recession and depressed oil prices will exacerbate internal tensions in West Asian countries which are solely dependent on oil revenues.

7. Stability of West Asia

  • Long-standing rivalries in the region have often led to local conflicts but can now create political instability in countries where regime structures are fragile.

Consider the question “The Corona crisis contributed to speeding the failure of a global order which had been faltering before the pandemic afflicted the world. Examine the trends that have been accentuated by the pandemic.”

Conclusion

The vaccine may end the corona crisis when it comes, but the unfolding trends in the geopolitics have been altering the world even before the corona crisis and continue to do so after a pandemic is over.

 

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Foreign Policy Watch: India-China

Opportunity for India in changing global order

Note4Students

From UPSC perspective, the following things are important :

Prelims level: Not much.

Mains level: Paper 2- Changing global order presents opportunities for India.

The world is going through a transition phase. We are experiencing the rise of new powers and the decline of the old. India has to navigate its path through this changing order keeping its interests in mind. The double opportunity in current scenario for India is explained in the article. To know more about it, continue reading.

The changing global stage

  • The world today is fragmenting and slowing down economically.
  • Asia-Pacific is the new economic and political centre of the world with the rise of China, India and other powers — Indonesia, South Korea, Iran, Vietnam.
  • Rapid shifts in the balance of power in the region have led to arms races and the US’s “America First” attitude has led to rising uncertainty.
  • China-U.S. strategic contention is growing, uninhibited so far by their economic co-dependence.
  • As China seeks primacy in a world so far dominated by the U.S., the world faces a destabilising power transition which may or may not be completed.

What should India’s response be to the new situation?

Alliance with the US?

  • Many experts advocate that India should enter into an alliance with the U.S in the wake of rising China.
  • But India is much greater and more resilient than these people think.
  • Also, the aim of foreign and security policies of India has been the pursuit of strategic autonomy for India.
  • Thus, in the present situation, India should retain the above initiative and not get entangled in others’ quarrels. (i.e. the US-China quarrel)
  • Also, India should focus on pursuing its own national interest in this disorganized and uncertain world by creative diplomacy and flexibility.
  • An alliance seems to be exactly the wrong answer.

China challenge

  • One way to handle China could be to see whether the two countries can evolve a new modus vivendi.
  • This new modus vivendi shall replace the one that was formalised in the 1988 Rajiv Gandhi visit.
  • The old framework is no longer working and the signs of stress in the relationship are everywhere.
  • The more India rises, the more it must expect Chinese opposition.
  • So, India will have to work with other powers to ensure that its interests are protected in the neighbourhood, the region and the world.
  • The complexity of India-China relations suggests there is a scope for new modus vivendi.
  • This would require a high-level strategic dialogue between the two sides about their core interests, red lines, differences and areas of convergence.

What India can do to keep the region multi-polar?

  • As U.S. is withdrawing from the world, it will no longer be the upholder of international, economic and political order.
  • There is uncertainty over how the US will choose to deal with China.
  • India must work with other powers to ensure that this region stays multi-polar and that China behaves responsibly.

Double opportunity for India

  • 1. Opportunity in the US-China contention
  • US-China contention will continue in future. Hence, both China and the U.S. will look to put other conflicts (eg: conflicts with India on trade or border issue) and tensions on the back burner.
  • This effect is already perceptible in the Wuhan meeting between China’s President Xi Jinping and Mr. Modi in early 2018.
  • And the apparent truce and dialing back of rhetoric by both India and China.
  • 2. Opportunity to Change national security Structures
  • Today, India is more dependent on the outside world than ever before.
  • It relies on the world for energy, technology, essential goods like fertilizer and coal, commodities, access to markets, and capital.
  • Adding the new security agenda and the contested global commons in outer and cyberspace and the high seas to India’s traditional state-centred security concerns gives India a sense of insecurity.
  • So, India needs to adapt to the changes and avoid imitating China.

Consider the question-“The global order is experiencing geopolitical churn, new powers are rising and older are staring at the decline. In such a scenario, examine the opportunities India can explore in the context of the US-China contention”.

Conclusion

India risks missing the bus to becoming a developed country if it continues business and politics as usual. The most important improvement that India needs to make concerns its national security structures and their work — introducing flexibility into India’s thinking and India’s structures. For change is the only certainty in life.

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Foreign Policy Watch: India-China

Study on China dams brings the Brahmaputra into focus

Note4Students

From UPSC perspective, the following things are important :

Prelims level: Mekon River

Mains level: India-China Relations

A new study highlighting the impact of China’s dams on the Mekong River has raised fresh questions on whether dams being built on other rivers that originate in China, such as the Brahmaputra, may similarly impact countries downstream.

Make a note of:

1) Tributaries of R. Brahmaputra

2) Countries swept by R. Mekong

3) Mekong-Ganga Cooperation (reminds us seeing R. Mekong)

China’s dams on the Mekong River

  • The Mekong flows from China to Myanmar, Laos, Thailand, Cambodia and Vietnam.
  • The Mekong River Commission, which comprises Cambodia, Laos, Thailand, and Vietnam, has said more scientific evidence was needed to establish whether dams caused a 2019 drought.
  • While China’s southwestern Yunnan province which usually has above-average rainfall, there was “severe lack of water in the lower Mekong.

Mekong dams raise some questions

  • The Mekong study was not conclusive on the question of how China’s dams had affected the quantity of flows.
  • To state that the basin had less water because of activities in China alone is misleading, mainly because that only considers the water flowing into the lower basin at one station in Thailand.
  • The study did not consider other dams and water-use along the course of the river.
  • The lower basin isn’t entirely dependent on flows from China but also receives water from tributaries in all four countries, which the study did not account for.

Concerns for India

  • India does not have a water-sharing agreement with China, but both sides share hydrological data.
  • India has long expressed concerns over dam-building on the Brahmaptura.
  • In 2015, China operationalised its first hydropower project at Zangmu, while three other dams at Dagu, Jiexu and Jiacha are being developed.
  • India need to raise the issue of river waters in the Brahmaputra with China, as that appears to be the only methodology to ensure what happened on Mekong does not happen on Brahmaputra.

A management problem

  • The dams are not likely to impact the quantity of the Brahmaputra’s flows because they are only storing water for power generation.
  • Moreover, the Brahmaputra is not entirely dependent on upstream flows and an estimated 35% of its basin is in India.
  • However, India concerns more about activity in China affecting quality, ecological balance, and flood management.

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Foreign Policy Watch: India-China

Global recovery after the Covid-19

Note4Students

From UPSC perspective, the following things are important :

Prelims level: Not much.

Mains level: Paper 2- Various geopolitical factors that influence the recovery of the world in post-pandemic period/How India could play a crucial role in forming the global coalition for faster recovery?

This article discusses the various factors with geopolitical significance. These factors would shape the post-pandemic recovery on a global scale. Though these factors have been touched upon in the previous op-eds, they are dealt with in detail here.

Post-pandemic strategic environment for the recovery

  • It’s the post-pandemic strategic environment that will dictate how soon the world recovers from this unexpected shock.
  • It must start with the international geopolitical angle, with many assumptions.
  • With some clarity in this domain, we can prepare ourselves better for the recovery phase of a near post-war situation.
  • Shortly, even as the world continues to reel under the pandemic threat, there will be more endeavours on enhancing human security through better strategic management of the world.
  • So, what will all that be about? It could be a major conference.
  • Major conference with agenda for revival: The situation is similar to the elusive efforts towards the creation of new world order after the end of the Cold War in 1989.
  • Will the world consider a major conference with the agenda being a revival after the coronavirus?
  • The 2015 Paris Summit of the United Nations, which was convened to save the world from the rapid impact of climate change, could not muster a consensus.
  • Will a potential 2020 “pandemic conference” succeed in getting big powers to jettison their geopolitical ambition?

China’s role has significance for India. The UPSC asks questions touching the economic or security aspect of China for India. So, the role played by China in the post-pandemic world is important from Mains perspective. Take note of the issues discussed below.

The US-China rivalry

  • The US-China rivalry will remain the core issue, with several other regions and nations aligning with the one who can bring them short to medium-term advantages.
  • Contingent upon how badly the US is finally affected, its current confused leadership is unlikely to inspire and its efforts at internal stabilisation may compromise US power.
  • A major turn in political fortunes in the US and its bumbling on pandemic management could throw open opportunities for others to exploit.
  • The US will perceive itself far more insecure than it was even after 9/11.

Accusations over China’s role in the pandemic

  • There is likely to be a huge effort to slander China — accusing it of being the originator of the scourge — and isolate it economically and politically.
  • The allegations on the use of biological warfare are the ones which will cause turbulence in relationships.
  • Ironically, China is also in a unique position to help the world bounce back.
  • Against the backdrop of these accusations regarding culpability, we need to be ready for changes in the norms of international cooperation and behaviour.
  • Cold war situation: A cold war of sorts could well be on the cards for some time, hampering a full recovery.
  • It will be brutal in the cyber world — fake news on social media will prevent international cooperation in crucial fields such as scientific research, patents.
  • And this could perhaps even slow down the ability to prevent the next pandemic.

The crucial role of the US

  • Subject to the US’s economic capability after the pandemic, the ability to find a consensus to put on hold defence spending for the sake of human security will be the key.
  • But the trust deficit between nations will probably hamper this to a great extent.
  • The key anchor of globalisation — the US-China trade relationship — will change even more.
  • China cannot be replaced by the US as a major industrial producer (even for the US market).
  • Other countries or blocs — ASEAN, Bangladesh and India — will all chip in but that will still not be enough.
  • Nor can any country buy as much grain from the US as China does.
  • So, an economic relationship will continue but will be politically fractured as both parties search for alternatives, which don’t exist on a scale that both of them need.

The growing influence of China

  • China’s recovery is likely to be the fastest.
  • Its ambitious Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) may now go uncontested by the US-led efforts to create alternatives.
  • The Chinese ability to influence politics among smaller nations in Asia and Africa could bring it strategic advantages.
  • But this influence is unlikely to be enough to replace America unless the recession-hit US remains defensively oriented.
  • Potential for conflict: Knowing the US propensity to bounce back, China’s efforts will have to remain energetic and that is where the potential for conflict is likely to rise.
  • Of course, it is not as if the US would abandon its interests for an era of only-inward economic healing.
  • Its eye on the future will remain firmly in place.

The decline in the credibility of the UN

  • Role of WHO: The UN has lost credibility with the World Health Organisation taking the worst hit any UN agency has suffered in years.
  • Its future is contingent upon how it manages the geopolitical fallout of the pandemic.
  • The sooner it can get the world leaders on board, the better.

Instability in Iran and Afghanistan

  • The collapse of the economy: Iran has been hit badly and with the US unrelenting on sanctions, its economy could collapse with frightening results as far the Middle East is concerned.
  • The threat for peace in the region: A big nation in instability mode with internal turbulence and leadership challenges could spread greater threats of an undefined kind.
  • The US may abandon Afghanistan with less commitment towards keeping its economy sustainable.
  • Possibility of IS revival: It could be a sure recipe for internal instability, which could see the Islamic State emerge a major player.
  • Russian advantage: Everything in the Middle East points towards Russian advantage and domination.

Opportunities for India

  • India without recession: Economically hit but probably one of the few nations without a recession, India’s strong central leadership could be a big advantage.
  • International cooperation: Prime Minister Narendra Modi would need to use all his influence to cobble together international cooperation to pull the world from the abyss it could sink into.
  • His credibility is already higher than most international leaders and could spell a leadership role for India not in conflict with China but in cooperation with it.
  • It is India’s established multilateral foreign policy that could eventually come to the assistance of the world.

Conclusion

Successful and swift recovery of the world hinges on international cooperation among the nation. This provides India with an opportunity to stitch together international cooperation in dealing with the aftermath of the crisis.

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Foreign Policy Watch: India-China

The new multilateralism

Note4Students

From UPSC perspective, the following things are important :

Prelims level: WHO's role.

Mains level: Paper 2- How BRICS with India and China as its members poses challenges in its success?

Context

As the major global institutions — from the WHO to the WTO — are experiencing unprecedented turmoil India needs to be pragmatic and fleet-footed.

Reorientation of India’s multilateral strategy

  • As many international institutions, including the World Health Organisation and the United Nations Security Council, come under great stress in the corona crisis, Delhi’s multilateral strategy is going through a rapid reorientation.
  • Realists in Delhi recognise that India’s engagement with the UN is not about the pursuit of some higher ideological calling, but the navigation of hardball geopolitics.

China’s growing influence and implications for India

  • China’s role on Kashmir question: China repeatedly pressed the UN to discuss the Kashmir question after Delhi changed the constitutional status of the region last August.
  • China avoiding discussion on Covid crisis: But through last month, as the rotating chair of the UNSC, China blocked any discussion of the Covid crisis.
  • Beijing insisted that the crisis was not a matter of international peace and security that the UNSC ought to bother itself with.
  • A mere internal administrative change in Kashmir, Beijing continues to insist, is a grave threat to international peace and security.
  • With its veto power, Beijing can simply prevent the UNSC from doing anything against China.

Why the credibility of the UN and WHO bureaucracy is under cloud?

  • Secretary-General Antonio Guterres, jumped quickly into the Indo-Pak arguments over Kashmir, and raised concerns over India’s Citizenship Amendment Act and the National Register of Citizens.
  • Guterres went on an extended visit to Pakistan in February and made an ostentatious public offer to mediate between Delhi and Islamabad on Kashmir.
  • But when it comes to China’s role in the spread of the coronavirus, Guterres can’t seem to find the words.
  • The situation at the WHO is a lot worse.
  • The Director-General of WHO, Tedros Adhanom Ghebreyesus warns against the dangers of “politicising” the Covid crisis.
  • Many in Europe and the US think that is exactly what Tedros has done at the WHO in the last few months.
  • Breakdown of the multilateral system: What we are witnessing is the breakdown of the multilateral system that emerged from the ashes of the Second World War amidst the deepening contestation between the world’s foremost powers — the US and China.

NEW MULTILATERALISM adopted by India

  • India’s new multilateralism — as a pragmatic response to external change — involves downplaying some past associations and strengthening new partnerships.
  • Take, for example, two innovations India has made since the end of the Cold War.
  • One was the BRICS forum with Brazil, Russia, China and South Africa and the other was the so-called Quad — a coalition of democracies with Australia, Japan and the US.
  • Actions of BRICS members with respect to India: As India reorders its multilateral priorities amid the corona crisis, the BRICS forum is losing some of its salience and the Quad is gaining traction.
  • Preventing discussion on COVID crisis: Two of India’s partners in BRICS — Russia and South Africa — had reportedly backed the efforts of a third, China, to prevent a discussion of the COVID crisis in the UNSC.
  • If Delhi were sitting in the UNSC right now as a non-permanent member, it would have had every interest in pressing for a discussion of the COVID crisis that has severely damaged India’s economic and social prospects.
  • Meanwhile, India is in regular consultations on managing the corona crisis with the “Quad Plus” grouping that draws in South Korea, Vietnam and New Zealand.
  • Neither the BRICS nor the Quad square with the conventional narrative on India’s multilateralism that was dominated in the past by the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) and the G-77.
  • As circumstances change, India is finding new international partners to secure its interests.

Context which gave rise to BRICS

  • It started out as a triangular coalition with Russia and China in the mid-1990s.
  • India’s interest in the RIC was borne out of fear of the unipolar moment and Russia’s relentless efforts to draw it into a “strategic triangle” that would resist “American hegemony”.
  • In the early 1990s, Delhi was rather wary of the Bill Clinton Administration’s plans to relieve India of its nuclear and missile programmes.
  • What made matters worse was the Clinton Administration’s formulation that “Kashmir is the world’s most dangerous nuclear flashpoint”.
  • This was not just a description; it was accompanied by a prescription for Delhi: Resolve the Kashmir question by sitting down with Pakistan and the Hurriyat.
  • If Delhi needs any help, Washington will be happy to chip in.
  • Balancing the US pressure: Going into a political tent with Russia and China seemed a sensible bet to ward off American pressures on the nuclear and Kashmir questions.

Two decades after BRICS-Changes in circumstances

  • Two decades later, we are in a very different place.
  • Take the same two issues — Kashmir and the nuclear programme — that drove India into the BRICS.
  • China’s role on Kashmir issue: It is Beijing that wants the UNSC to take up the Kashmir question, and it is Paris and Washington that are preventing it.
  • NSG membership blocked by China: China has also resolutely blocked India’s effort to become a full member of the global nuclear order by joining the Nuclear Suppliers Group.
  • On the nuclear front too, it was France and the US that helped India break the nuclear blockade.
  • Shielding of Pakistan by China: China shields Pakistan from international pressures to end cross-border terrorism.
  • And it is India’s partners in the West and the Muslim world that are helping Delhi cope better with violent extremism.

India’s engagement with Europe

  • India has also discovered the new possibilities for engaging Europe in the multilateral arena.
  • Europe as an important partner: If India’s definition of multilateralism — Afro-Asian solidarity — immediately after Independence was defined in opposition to colonial Europe, Delhi now sees Europe as a valuable partner in rearranging the global order.
  • India has joined the “alliance for multilateralism” initiated by Germany and supported by its European partners.

Conclusion

India needs all the pragmatism it can muster to pursue its interests in a world where all the major global institutions — from the WHO to the WTO — are experiencing unprecedented turmoil and are heading towards an inevitable restructuring.

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Foreign Policy Watch: India-China

The art of China’s legalpolitic

Note4Students

From UPSC perspective, the following things are important :

Prelims level: IHR- International Health Regulations.

Mains level: Paper 2- India needs to make international law a keystone of its diplomacy.

Context

A resolution has been moved in the US Senate calling on the international community to inquire into the origins of the virus in China’s Wuhan province. Delhi could learn a trick or two from Beijing on how to make international law the keystone of India’s diplomacy, especially in the multilateral domain.

Fixing responsibility for the outbreak on China

  • Compensation demand: Lawyers and activists have begun to sue China in US courts demanding compensation. Politicians are not far behind.
  • The U.S. Senate resolution: A resolution has been moved in the US Senate calling on the international community to inquire into the origins of the virus in China’s Wuhan province, quantify the damage inflicted on the rest of the world, and design a mechanism of reparations from Beijing.
  • Basis of the demand for compensation: The case for China’s culpability is based on the principles of state responsibility and Beijing’s alleged failure to respect the obligation, under the 2005 International Health Regulations (IHR), to notify the world on the outbreak of the epidemic.
  • Is the basis valid? Many international jurists dismiss these claims by citing the principles of sovereign state immunity, the lack of precedent in holding states to account for the spread of infectious disease beyond their borders and the absence of provisions for reparations under the IHR.

The interplay between legality, moralpolitik and geopolitics

  • Gulliver and Lilliputs of the world: On the face of it, China is too much of a Gulliver to be tied down by legal Lilliputs.
  • The Legalpolitik: Before we dismiss international law as not real law, “legalpolitik” can put some real pressure on big nations and contribute to the power play among them.
  • Role of public opinion: As public opinion began to intrude into diplomacy over the last two centuries, legality and moralpolitik have become an integral part of geopolitics.

Difficulty in proving the case against China

  • The cost of a pandemic: Most world leaders know, whether they say it aloud or not, the international costs of the pandemic could have been far lesser if China had acknowledged the spread of the virus from Wuhan early on and informed other countries.
  • It is one thing to know but entirely another to prove it under the law.
  • The pursuit of claims is a waste of time: Most governments believe the pursuit of claims against Beijing is a waste of time.
  • Political heft of China: If Beijing can make the World Health Organisation toe its line and prevent the rest of the world, including US President Donald Trump, from describing COVID-19 as the “China Virus”, it is unlikely to be impressed by a few legal impresarios from the West.
  • Precedence of defying the law: After all, China had dismissed the unanimous verdict of the International Court of Justice in 2016 on Beijing’s territorial claims over the South China Sea.
  • Beijing did not even bother to appear in the case filed by the Philippines.
  • China had simply declared that the ICJ has no jurisdiction in the matter.

The relation between power and law in international relations

  • Power prevails: That power tends to prevail over law is certainly truer in international relations than domestic politics.
  • Law in the domestic domain: In the domestic domain, the state as the highest authority compels citizens to abide by the law, with force if necessary.
  • Law in the international arena: In the international arena, no single actor has a monopoly over the instruments of force.
  • We have multiple sovereigns but no “world government” that can compel deviant states to conform to rules.

Role of the UNSC

  • In theory, the members of the UN Security Council can authorise coercion — in the form of economic sanctions or military force.
  • This, in turn, involves building a consensus among major powers, including the five permanent members of the UNSC who wield a veto.
  • In reality, then, the UNSC can’t act against one of the five permanent members.
  • Beijing, which was so eager to get the UNSC to discuss the situation in Jammu and Kashmir since last August, has simply blocked all suggestions for a discussion on the corona crisis in recent days.

Are laws meaningless in the global arena?

  • Legal narratives have the weight of their own: While outcomes in international conflicts tend to be defined by power, the international discourse on any conflict today is framed in legal terms.
  • Whether it is a conversation between a state and its citizen or among governments or in a country’s outreach to the global society, legal narratives have a weight all of their own.
  • Delhi, for example, has struggled in recent days to counter the global interpretation of its domestic actions.
  • Importance of legal argument: Winning the legal argument, China has learnt from the history of great power relations, is very much part of great power jousting.
  • The negative lessons are from the Soviet Union that dismissed the Western legal arguments during the Cold War as based on the logic of capital and empire.
  • That did not convert many beyond the choir.
  • The positive lessons are from Great Britain and the United States.
  • The enduring Anglo-Saxon hegemony is rooted not just in economic and military power. It has always been underwritten by a powerful legal tradition that shapes the global narrative on most issues.
  • China developing own narrative: As it mounts a massive propaganda offensive against the US on the corona crisis, China’s state lawyers have filed a case in the Wuhan Intermediate People’s Court last week accusing various US government agencies of covering up the origin of the coronavirus.
  • China’s own narrative: It is no longer about China defending against a powerful international narrative; it is developing one of its own.

Conclusions

  • 1. Make international law keystone of diplomacy: India has been at the receiving end of China’s legalpolitik — most recently on the quest for the membership of the Nuclear Suppliers Group and the constitutional changes in Kashmir.
  • Delhi could learn a trick or two from Beijing on how to make international law the keystone of India’s diplomacy, especially in the multilateral domain.
  • 2. Reinvest in the geo-legal arts: If China could emulate US and Britain on leveraging legalpolitik for strategic ends, India should not find it too hard to reinvest in the geo-legal arts that Delhi inherited from the Anglo-Saxons but seems to have lost along the way.

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Foreign Policy Watch: India-China

China and WHO a new story

Note4Students

From UPSC perspective, the following things are important :

Prelims level: Not much.

Mains level: Paper 2- China's growing influence at UN agencies and how it matters for Indian and the world.

Context

The WHO leadership, especially its Director-General, has been accused of serving China’s interests rather than preparing the world against the spread of the virus.

What is the basis of accusations?

  • The first basis for these charges is the WHO’s endorsement of the Chinese claim in mid-January that there was no evidence of human-to-human transmission of the virus.
  • Second, consistent support for Beijing’s handling of the crisis.
  • Third, WHO’s criticism of other nations for imposing travel restrictions to and from China.
  • Critics also believe the WHO lulled the world into complacence by delaying the decision on calling it a global emergency.

The new geopolitics of multilateralism

  • Whatever the merits of the above arguments, they point to the new geopolitics of multilateralism,
  • It also disproves the assumptions in both the West and India on China’s role in the UN.
  • It also underlines Beijing’s success in the leveraging of international organisations for its national advantage.
  • Nations working together against the trans-national threat: On the face of it, the sentiment that nations must work together against common trans-national threats is an eminently sensible one. But it does not easily translate into concrete actions.
  • Example of failure to act against a common threat: Take climate change. Attempts at developing collective solutions to the problem over the last three decades have foundered.
  • Most leaders agree on the problem and the solutions but are not willing to accept the framework — either the domestic or international — for distributing the costs associated with the solutions.
  • The US-China rivalry angle to the coronavirus outbreak: The problem of the cost-benefit distribution is compounded by great power rivalries. The coronavirus has shown up at a moment of deepening tensions between the US and China.
  • The grave collective challenge that the virus constitutes has only sharpened the conflict.
  • The blame game between the two: The US blames Beijing for letting this virus become a global monster and Beijing is doing all it can to deny that the virus came out of China.

How the relationship between China and WHO has transformed over the years?

  • WHO’s actions in the past: Nearly two decades ago, during the SARS crisis, WHO was at the front and centre of pressing China to come clean on the unfolding pandemic.
  • In 2003, it had issued the organisation’s first travel advisory ever on travel to and from the epicentre of the pandemic in southern China.
  • As the SARS crisis escalated, Beijing’s traditional arguments about the centrality of state sovereignty yielded place to a new policy of working with the WHO and taking proactive steps to reassure neighbours in South East Asia.
  • Reasons for change in WHO’s stance: Some attribute the turnaround in the relationship between Beijing and WHO to China’s growing financial contributions.
  • China’s efforts to expand clout: Observers of the UN point to something more fundamental — a conscious and consequential Chinese effort to expand its clout in the multilateral system.
  • China, which was admitted to the UN system in the 1970s, was focused on finding its way in the 1980s, cautiously raised its profile in the 1990s, took on some political initiatives at the turn of the millennium and seized the leadership in the last few years.

How India and the West are reacting to China’s rise?

  • Unprepared to deal with China’s rise at UN: Neither the West nor India have been prepared to deal with the impact of China’s rise on the UN system.
  • The US and its allies bet that China will be a “responsible stakeholder”. Put another way, they hoped that China will play by the rules set by the West.
  • China’s ambitions: China, of course, wants to set its own rules. Only the political innocents will be shocked by China’s natural ambition.
  • India’s past alignment with China: India, which considered US dominance over the international institutions in the 1990s as a major threat, chose to align with China in promoting a “multipolar world”.
  • Delhi convinced itself that despite differences over the boundary, Pakistan and other issues, there is huge room for cooperation with China.
  • Replacing the US as the dominant force: To their chagrin, the West and India are being compelled to respond to a very different environment at the UN. China wants to replace America as the dominant force in the UN.
  • The US is now fighting back. Last month, Washington went all out to defeat the Chinese candidate for the leadership of an obscure UN agency called the World Intellectual Property Organisation.

Implications of China’s rise for India

  • Chinese hegemony vs. American primacy: Delhi discovered that Chinese global hegemony could be a lot more problematic than American primacy.
  • After all, it is China that complicates India’s plans for membership of the Nuclear Suppliers Group, protects Pakistan against international pressures on cross-border terrorism, and relentlessly pushes the UN Security Council to take up the Kashmir question.
  • India now turns to the US and its allies to pursue some of its interests in the UN.
  • Multilateralism not an end in itself: Political ironies apart, if there is one lesson that India could learn from China’s experience with WHO and the UN, it is that multilateralism is not an end in itself for major powers.
  • It is an important means to secure one’s national interest and shape the international environment.
  • As a nation battered by the Cultural Revolution, China used international cooperation and global institutions to rebuild itself in the last decades of the 20th century.
  • Ready to reorder global governance: Having developed its economy and advanced its scientific and technological base, China is now ready to reorder global governance and become a rule-maker.
  • The effects are visible in the arena of global health.
  • China’s expanding global engagement with the WHO, its substantive international health assistance programmes, and an impressive domestic health technology sector are poised to boost China’s ambition to build a “Global Silk Road for Health’.

Conclusion

On its part, Delhi needs to intensify the recalibration of India’s multilateralism, rewrite its diplomatic lexicon at the UN, and build new political coalitions that will simultaneously contribute to India’s internal modernisation and enhance its international influence. The corona crisis is a good moment to start writing a new script for India’s own health diplomacy.

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Foreign Policy Watch: India-China

Fighting COVID-19 together for a shared future

Note4Students

From UPSC perspective, the following things are important :

Prelims level: Not much.

Mains level: Paper 2- International cooperation on dealing with the epidemic.

Context

The Chinese government has mobilised the whole nation with confidence, unity, a science-based approach and targeted response.

Aspects that were focused by China to deal with COVID-19

  • Formulated timely strategies for epidemic prevention and control.
  • Strengthened a unified command and response in Wuhan and Hubei.
  • Coordinated the prevention and control work in other regions.
  • Strengthened scientific research, emergency medical and daily necessity supplies.
  • Effectively maintained social stability.
  • Strengthened public education.
  • Actively engaged in international cooperation.

Mutual support between India and China

  • China and India have maintained close communication and cooperation on epidemic prevention and control. In a letter to President Xi, India’s Prime Minister has expressed support for China.
  • China appreciates the medical supplies provided by India and have helped facilitate the safe return of Indian nationals in Hubei.
  • The global footprint of COVID-19: China has been closely following the global footprint of COVID-19.

Cooperation on a global level for disease control:

  • Chines govt. will stay in close communication with WHO.
  • Share its epidemic control experience with other countries.
  • Seek closer international cooperation on medicine and vaccine development.
  • Provide assistance to the best of its capabilities to countries and regions that are affected by the spread of the virus in keeping with its role as a responsible major
  • The Chinese reach-out: China has provided various kinds of assistance including testing reagents, remote assistance and medical supplies to countries with a severe outbreak.
  • Sharing of experience and protocol for treatment: China have shared diagnosis and treatment experience and protocols with many countries including India.
    • China is ready to maintain communication with India, share experience in a timely manner, render assistance and make joint efforts to overcome the epidemic.

Impact and recovery of China

  • Robust economy: The impact on the Chinese economy will be short-lived and generally manageable. China has a resilient economy with robust domestic demand and a strong industrial base. We will definitely sustain the good momentum of economic and social development and meet the goal of achieving moderate prosperity in our society and eradicating extreme poverty in China.
  • Strengthen coordination and communication: China will also strengthen coordination and communication with economic and trading partners and give priority to the resumption of production and supply of leading enterprises and key sectors that have a major impact on the stability of global supply chains.
    • The fundamentals of China’s economy will remain strong in the long run, and China will remain an important engine for global economic growth.

Conclusion

The history of civilisation is also one of a history of fighting diseases and a great journey of ceaseless global integration. To prevail over a disease that threatens all, unity and cooperation is the most powerful weapon.

 

 

 

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Foreign Policy Watch: India-China

The missing piece in India’s defence jigsaw puzzle

Note4Students

From UPSC perspective, the following things are important :

Prelims level: Not much.

Mains level: Paper 2- Understanding the implications of China's rise for the security of India.

Context

The country needs a clearly articulated white paper on its defence needs which sets out its strategic concerns.

India’s defence deals in the pipeline

  • The first lot of Rafale fighter jets are expected shortly.
  • The final deal on the 200 Kamov Ka-226 light utility helicopters from Russia is in advanced stages and expected to be signed soon.
  • In October 2018, India and Russia had signed a $5.4-billion mega-deal for the S-400 Triumf Air Defence System.
  • Under contemplation today are yet another set of high-value U.S. defence deals, including additional purchases of P-8I Maritime Reconnaissance Aircraft and Apache Attack Helicopters.
  • NASAMS-II: Speculation is rife that India and the U.S. would sign a deal for the National Advanced Surface to Air Missile System (NASAMS-II).
    • Which is intended as part of a multi-layered missile shield to protect Delhi.
  • The U.S. side is also hoping for two more mega defence deals, worth $3.5-billion to be signed for 24 MH-60 Romeo Multi-Mission Helicopters for the Navy and an additional six AH-64E Apache Attack Helicopters for the Army.

Need for the white paper

  • Given India’s rising global profile, and with two major adversaries on its borders, India needs to be fully prepared.
  • A missing piece: What is lacking in the defence jigsaw puzzle is a well-considered and clearly articulated white paper on India’s defence needs.
    • The white paper would deal with?
    • It sets out its strategic concerns.
    • How it is positioning itself to meet these challenges.
    • The putative costs of meeting the country’s defence needs.
  • Explain the Pakistan threat: In the case of Pakistan, the threat motif is, no doubt, obvious.
  • India’s political and defence establishment are on record that India can easily defeat Pakistan, even if a “weaker” Pakistan possesses “nuclear teeth”.
    • What is needed? A great deal of effort is called for to-
    • Explain to the public, the true nature of the threat posed by Pakistan.
    • And why India is so confident of beating back the Pakistani challenge.
  • Explaining the China threat: Meeting the military, strategic and economic challenge from China is an entirely different matter.
    • Understanding the nature of the threat: China is not Pakistan.
    • While China and Pakistan may have established an axis to keep India in check, explaining the nature of the threat posed by China to India is a complex task that needs to be undertaken with care and caution.

The China threat

  • Is China an existential threat for India?: There are many experts who express doubts as to whether China intends today to pursue its 19th Century agenda, or revert to its belief in ‘Tian Xia’.
    • Undoubtedly China aims to be a great power and an assertive one at that.
    • India’s defence planners should, however, carefully assess whether there are degrees of “assertiveness” in China’s behavioural patterns.
    • There is little doubt that regarding its claim to areas falling within the ‘nine-dash lines’ (the first island chain), China is unwilling to make compromises.
    • Whether this applies to other regions of Asia and the Indo-Pacific, calls for an in-depth study.
  • The analysis is needed: It would be premature for India without undertaking such an analysis, to adhere to a common perception that China is intent on enforcing a Sino-centric world order in which India and other countries would necessarily have to play a secondary role.
  • What after analysis? If after undertaking such an “analysis”, it appears that China does not pose a direct threat to India’s existence, strategic and military planners need to come up with a different set of alternatives.
  • Western influence over thinking about China: In recent years, much of India’s strategic thinking regarding China’s aggressive behaviour has been coloured by that of the U.S. and the West.
    • Though it is a proven fact that China has not used lethal military force abroad since the 1980s.
  • Concerns over BRI: China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) does convey an impression that China seeks to put itself at the centre of the world.
    • The speed with which many of the steps to progress the BRI are being taken again conveys an impression that China is intent on shrinking the physical and psychological distance between Europe and East Asia.
    • No intention of confrontation: This does not, however, necessarily mean that China is preparing to confront individual countries in Asia, such as India, which do not subscribe to the BRI.

What would the white paper explain?

  • Answer to whether China is a threat to India? A defence white paper would provide a more definitive answer to such issues.
    • A detailed exercise to assess whether China is indeed a threat, rather than a challenge, to India should prove invaluable.
    • It is possible that a detailed study may indicate that China understands that there are limits to its strength and capabilities.
  • China’s weaknesses: Several instances of late have shown the frailties in China’s policies –Hong Kong, Taiwan, and even Xinjiang are instances that indicate that China has its own Achilles heel.
    • Consequently, China may not be ready, for quite some time at least, to seek a direct confrontation with India.
  • Conflict or furthering the influence? A defence white paper may also indicate that rather than a “conflict-prone” role, China is more intent on an “influence-peddling” one.
    • This is important from India’s point of view.
    • Converting economic heft into strategic influence: Already there is one school of thought that believes that Beijing is better at converting its economic heft into strategic influence, rather than employing force beyond certain prescribed areas.
  • Coming to understanding over the respective sphere of influence: If the above view is espoused by a defence white paper then, despite the vexed border dispute between India and China, the two countries could try and arrive at a subliminal understanding about respective spheres of influence.
    • What is India’s major concern? Today, one of India’s major concerns is that China is attempting to intrude into its sphere of influence in South Asia, and the first and second concentric circles of India’s interest areas, such as Afghanistan and parts of West Asia.
    • The peaceful co-existence: The defence white paper might well provide a strategic paradigm, in which India and China agree to peacefully co-exist in many areas, leaving aside conflict zones of critical importance to either, thus ensuring a more durable peace between them.
  • Is geo-economics is the primary arena of competition: One other outcome that the defence white paper could attempt is: whether China views geo-economics as the primary arena of competition today.
    • Avenue for cooperation: China has invested heavily in artificial intelligence, robotics and biotechnology, and perhaps, India needs to recognise that rather than blacklisting Chinese technology Tech firms, (which could prove counter-productive) there exist avenues for cooperation, paving the way for better state-to-state relations.

Conclusion

The defence white paper needs to underscore that a country’s domestic politics are an important pointer to a stable foreign policy. There could be different schools of thoughts within a nation, but equilibrium needs to be maintained if it is not to adversely impact a nation’s foreign policy imperatives. An impression that the country is facing internal strains could encourage an adversary, to exploit our weaknesses. This is a critical point that the defence white paper needs to lay stress on.

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Foreign Policy Watch: India-China

The battle in Beijing

Note4Students

From UPSC perspective, the following things are important :

Prelims level: Not much

Mains level: Paper 2- Coronavirus threat and its implications for India and the rest of the world.

Context

The coronavirus epidemic poses a challenge to China’s place in global affairs, its political leadership.

The possible implications of coronavirus crisis

  • The Chines leadership might not be able to escape the blame: If the epidemic turns into a pandemic, as some analysts bet, China’s all-powerful leader Xi Jinping might not be able to escape the blame.
    • And will likely come under considerable political pressure.
  • It could also turn into a systemic threat: Some also speculate that the backlash against the government’s mishandling of the crisis could turn into a systemic threat against the dominance of the Chinese Communist Party.
  • Speculations as perennial hope among China’s critics: Sceptics, however, dismiss above speculation as merely reflecting the perennial hope among Beijing’s harshest critics who can’t wait to see a China without the CCP.
    • Realist’s stand: Realists point to the massive mobilisation of state power by President Xi in limiting the spread of the virus.

Handling of the crisis by China

  • Initial faltering response: To be sure, there were major failures in the initial faltering response to the crisis.
    • Cover-up attempts from the lower level: The attempts at the lower levels to cover-up or underplays the crisis and the inadequate appreciation at the higher levels of the potential consequences are common to all large bureaucracies. The party-state in China is not an exception.
  • Praise for handling the crisis: China’s handling of the crisis had drawn much respect, grudging or otherwise, from the international community.
    • Whether it is the lockdown of Hubei province and its capital Wuhan, from where the virus began to spread.
    • Or in deploying thousands of doctors and health workers in the province and building massive hospitals for treating the infected.
  • Possibility of some political impact: Yet, there is no question that a crisis of this magnitude -will have some political impact.
    • The party-state is certainly having some difficulty in containing the public outrage against the initial failures.
  • Efforts to shield top leadership from blame: The CCP, however, is bound to shield the supreme leader from any damaging criticism and in fact, celebrate a triumph in containing the spread through a determined effort.
    • Responsibility will be affixed on provincial officials in Hubei and a purge of some kind may have already begun.

Addressing the economic consequences of the crisis

  • International dimension: Nearly two decades after the SARS epidemic -China is now a much larger economy and its interdependence with the world has only deepened.
    • This interdependence, in turn, lends a strong international dimension to China’s crisis.
  • Optimist’s hope of future uptick: Optimists hope that a sharp drop in economic activity in the current quarter will be followed by a steep uptick in growth in the next when the virus is contained and normalcy returns.
  • Pessimist’s fear of economic disruption: Pessimists suggest that the economic disruption — in terms of the impact on internal and external trade and the breakdown of the global supply chains- could have lasting effects.
    • Reinforcing the disruption: Some suspect that the disruption could reinforce the slowdown driven by a number of other internal and external factors including the trade war with the US.

China’s response to the rest of the world

  • Channelling of resentment against the West: Some in the West hope that a prolonged economic crisis might turn the people against the CCP. For now, though, Beijing is channelling the resentment against the West.
  • Terming evacuation as an over-reaction: Beijing has criticised the advisories from various countries against travel to China and the cancellation of flights as over-reaction.
    • Lukewarm response to evacuation efforts: China has also been lukewarm to efforts of various countries to evacuate their citizens from Wuhan and Hubei.
    • India evacuated students: India has managed to convince Beijing to let India airlift its students from Wuhan.
    • Pakistan has declared that it will not evacuate its students as a gesture of political solidarity with China in a time of crisis.
    • South Asian neighbour’s response: Many of India’s other South Asian neighbours are torn between the reluctance to offend Chinese sentiment and the mounting domestic pressures to bring students back.
    • Cooperation with the US: While being critical of the US travel restrictions against China, Beijing has certainly been open to cooperation with the US in dealing with the crisis.
  • India’s offer to help other countries in evacuation: The external affairs minister Subrahmanyam Jaishankar said last week that India has been willing to bring back students from all the neighbouring countries.
    • Balancing between Delhi and Beijing: The logic of balancing between Delhi and Beijing has prevented most of the smaller neighbours from requesting Indian assistance.
    • The Maldives has been the only exception.
  • The response of the East and Southeast Asia: Beyond South Asia, many countries in East and Southeast Asia have been hesitant to be seen as rushing to cut themselves from China.
    • What is making these countries hesitant: Deep economic interdependence and massive flows of Chinese tourists led to much dithering among the East Asian countries in their early responses to the crisis.

Conclusion

India must explore all potential cooperative engagement with Beijing as well as its other international partners on pandemics-an important but the under-addressed challenge for national, regional and international security.

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Foreign Policy Watch: India-China

Ethnic Unity Law in Tibet

Note4Students

From UPSC perspective, the following things are important :

Prelims level: Not Much

Mains level: India-China Relations in context of Tibet

The People’s Congress of Tibet passed a law that makes ethnic unity in the region mandatory, reflecting the significant role that the autonomous Himalayan region plays in its economic and social development.

About the Law

  • The law makes it clear that Tibet has been an inalienable part of China since ancient times.
  • It states that it is the common responsibility of the people of all ethnic groups to safeguard national reunification and take a clear stand against separatism.

Ethnic Unity in China

  • This is not the first time that the phrase ethnic unity has been mentioned by China.
  • In October 2019 the Communist Party of China published a guideline for enhancing ethnic unity.
  • It stressed on efforts to improve the governance of ethnic affairs, guaranteeing the legal rights and interests of citizens of ethnic groups.
  • It called for cracking down on “criminal acts” that sabotage ethnic unity or cause ethnic separation.
  • Before this, in 2016, China began a campaign in the autonomous territory of Xinjiang to promote ethnic unity and called for people to respect the cultures of the minorities who call the region home.

Why such Law?

  • There are more than 40 ethnic minorities in the region, which account for 95 per cent of Tibet’s population of over three million.
  • Like Tibet, Xinjiang is another region of China that houses multiple ethnic minorities.
  • A similar legislation was passed there four years ago and in recent times, China has faced criticism for detaining at least a million Uighur and other Muslims, along with some ethnic Kazakhs and Uzbeks.
  • China has began “re-education camps” in Xinjiang, a region that has been claimed by China since 1949.
  • China has denied these allegations and maintains that the facilities where the detainees are housed are vocational training centers.

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Foreign Policy Watch: India-China

[op-ed snap] The world from Raisina.

Note4Students

From UPSC perspective, the following things are important :

Prelims level: Not much.

Mains level: Paper 2- India's foreign relation with 'Middle Power' countries-Prospects and opportunities.

Context:

As the world is moving from an era of predictability to an era of unpredictability led by the US and China, a new Middle Power coalition is the need of an hour.

The “Rising India” narrative and challenges

  • The narrative was scripted over the two post-Cold War decades, 1991 to 2011.
  • Narrative of plural secular democracy: It was based on the improving performance of the economy and India’s political ability to deal with many longstanding diplomatic challenges within a paradigm of realism.
  • Three successive prime ministers – scripted the narrative of India rising as a plural, secular democracy, as opposed to China’s rise within an authoritarian system.
  • Opening of new vistas: India’s improving economic performance had opened up new vistas for cooperation with major powers and neighbours.
  • New challenges to the narrative: Now the economy’s subdued performance and domestic political issues have created new challenges for Indian foreign policy.
    • The new approach to relations with India adopted by both President Donald Trump and President Xi Jinping has created a more challenging external environment.

Relations with the US

  • New demands from the US: Each time New Delhi has tried to meet a US demand, Washington DC has come up with new demands.
  • US-China dispute resolution and effects for India: Any resolution of US differences with China, can only reduce whatever little bargaining clout India has.
  • Complaint at WTO: The US has, in fact, actively lodged complaints against India at the World Trade Organisation.
  • Geopolitical effects for India:  On the geopolitical side, US intervention in West Asia has always imposed an additional economic burden on India.

Relations with China

  • Consistent policy: There has been continuity and consistency in India-China policy over the past two decades, with some ups and downs.
  • Effects of power difference with China: As the bilateral power differential widens, China has little incentive or compulsion to be accommodative of Indian concerns, much less the interests
    • China never fails to remind India of the growing power differential between the two.
  • Building strength to deal with China: In dealing with China, India will have to, paraphrasing Deng Xiaoping, “build its strength and bide its time.

Russia’s focus

  • It will remain focused on Eurasian geopolitics.
  • It will also be concerned with the geo-economics of energy.
  • Implications for India: Both these factors define Russia’s relations with China, and increasingly, with Pakistan, posing a challenge for India.

 

Way forward in the relations with Pakistan

  • The government’s Pakistan policy has run its course.
    • It yielded some short-term results thanks to Pakistan’s efforts not to get “black-listed” by the Financial Action Task Force (FATF).
    • But the rest of the world is doing business with Pakistan, lending billions in aid.
  • The global community may increasingly accept future pleas from Pakistan that terror attacks in India are home-grown.
  • related to the situation in Kashmir or concerns about the welfare of Muslims, unless incontrovertible evidence to the contrary is offered.
  • The need for a new Pakistan policy: Backchannel talks should be resumed and visas should be given liberally to Pakistani intellectuals, media and entertainers to improve cross-border perceptions as a first step towards improving relations.

The Middle Powers and opportunities for India

  • What are the middle powers?  It is a mix of developed and developing economies, some friends of the US and other friends of China.
    • It is an amorphous group but can emerge into a grouping of the like-minded in a world of uncertainty capable of taming both the US and China.
    • A new Middle Powers coalition may be the need of the year.
  • Which countries can be part of it?  Germany, France, Japan, Australia, Brazil, Indonesia, Vietnam and perhaps South Korea. One could include Russia, Nigeria and South Africa also in this group.
  • Stakes involved but no influence: Like India, these countries have a stake in what the US and China do, but little influence over either.
  • What India can do? These countries which constitute the part of the Middle Powers should engage the attention of India’s external affairs minister.

Disruptive policies not an option

  • Adoption of disruptive approach: There is a view among some policy analysts that India too can adopt a “disruptive” approach as a clever tactic in foreign affairs.
    • Disruption is not an end in itself. It has to be a means to an end.
    • Powerful nations can afford disruption as tactics.
  • Unchanged strategic elements: The strategic elements defining Indian foreign policy in the post-Cold War era have not changed.
  • Not an option: India cannot risk such tactics without measuring the risk they pose to strategy.

Conclusion

With the changing geopolitical atmosphere particularly with respect to the US and Chiana, India needs to adopt a suitable approach to its foreign policy especially involving the Middle Powers.

 

 

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Foreign Policy Watch: India-China

[op-ed snap] A multilateral alternative, by Asia

Note4Students

From UPSC perspective, the following things are important :

Prelims level: Not much.

Mains level: Paper 2-Relations with China and the U.S.

Context

After the gap of 200 years, Asian economies are once again larger than the rest of the world combined.

The Asian Century

  • Providing an alternative order: With the rise of India and China, Asia is providing a multilateral alternative to the world base on values.
  • Asian Century corresponds to the re-emergence of the two countries, leveraging the size and technological competence
  • Civilizational values: Both countries have civilisational values that are different from the west.
  • Peaceful existence: In the case of India and China balance of power is a western construct and both lived in peace across the ages.
  • The rise of China on the global landscape: In 2013, after attaining 15% of global wealth, announced the multilateral Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). In 2014, launched the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, challenging the global governance paradigm.
  • India in 2015, established the International Solar Alliance, laying out a distinct global sustainable development framework.
  • Current multilateralism and its problems: The U.S. has recognised the ‘Asian Century’ bypassing multilateralism and recognised Indo-Pacific construct.
  • The U.S. withdrawal from the Paris Agreement and the inclusion of intellectual property rights into the trade regime point to the colonial origin of the present order.

 

New Framework- Country-specific to global value chain

  • Changing competition: Competition is moving from country-specific to fragmented competition based on global value chains.
  • Imposing the U.S. determined national security standards has led to only a handful of countries agreeing to ban Huawei for 5G technology.
  • The U.S. imposed sanctions on Iran that have affected India’s interests.
  • A different approach of China: It is based on “common interests” as different from the agreed goals of a negotiated treaty. BRI is an example of this.
  • It optimise not maximise the financial returns with countries remaining out of it.
  • The BRI offers the benefit of integration and connectivity with European markets to the member countries.

Potential of BRI

  • It acts as a strategic framework: It provides a strategic framework for new global institution building.
  • Its scope is as wide as multilateral treaties.
  • Internationalizing the Renminbi: With state-owned enterprises in the infrastructure sector in the sector in BRI and backing from national banks is internationalising the Renminbi.
  • Developing blockchain bases infrastructure: As a leader in digital transactions, China is developing blockchain-based infrastructure in BRI countries. Thus reducing the dependence on the dollar.

The shared interest of India and China

  • RCEP: China and the rest of the countries are eager that India joins the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP), which is poised to become the largest trading block.
  • Security and border dispute: With the U.S. pivot to Asia, China is eager to resolve the dispute with India to avoid constraints.
  • Huawei: India has rejected American opposition to Huawei taking part in 5G trials, India allowed all applicants to participate.

    The emergence of new values

  • The emergence of the new order should not be seen through a western prism.
  • The triumvirate: India, the U.S., and China are intertwined with each other. China was the largest supplier of the goods to the U.S. in 2018 and it has been India’s major trading partner.
  • They take part in limited sectoral cooperation on a regional basis.
  • Both the U.S. and China have a regular high-level discussions on strategic issues with India.

    Area of future differences

  • In Asia, differences will center on overlapping priorities.
  • Security-The U.S.’s effort to maintain hegemony.
  • Economy-China’s emphasis on connectivity, markets, and growth.
  • An equitable and sustainable development-India-led framework of digital infrastructure designed as a public good.

   Conclusion

With the rise of India and China in Asia and the presence of the U.S. with them is going to make the new order centered around Asia a new reality in the near future.

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Introduction

  • On 1 April, 1950, India became the first non-socialist bloc country to establish diplomatic relations with the People’s Republic of China. Prime Minister Nehru visited China in October 1954. While, the India-  China border conflict in 1962 was a serious setback to ties; Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi’s landmark visit in 1988 began a phase of improvement in bilateral relations.
  • In 1993, the signing of an Agreement on the  Maintenance of Peace and Tranquility along the Line of Actual Control (LAC) on the India-China Border Areas during Prime Minister Narasimha Rao’s visit reflected the growing stability and substance in bilateral ties.
  • India-China relations, though occasionally showing signs of peace and cooperation, have often been afflicted by tension and mistrust. With the potential to make big contributions to regional peace and development, these two Asian powers have, by design or accident, themselves been the sources of regional tension and insecurity to some extent.
  • Besides their internal dynamics, the interplay of interests and moves of their neigbours, and several external powers would have significant bearing on the equation and relations between them.

Areas of Conflict

(a) Tibet & Dalai Lama.

  • This led to the first ever war between these two nations. China is very sensitive about the territorial sovereignty and having Dalai Lama run a shadow government in India has historically been a major irritator for them.  
  • India’s support for the Dharamasala regime is a huge issue for China, but not even headline-worthy for India.

(b)Two border disputes  

Two border disputes
source
  • One in a region called Aksai Chin and another in a region called Arunachal Pradesh. Both nations claim both regions although China controls the former and India the latter.
  • In both these places the geography favors the current arrangement. With both nations nuclear armed, it is inconceivable for any solution other than formalizing the status quo.  
  • When Prime Minister Narendra Modi visited China in May 2015, one of his objectives was to persuade the Chinese leadership to restart discussions on the clarification of the Line of Actual Control (LAC) through the exchange of maps.  
  • The rationale for India’s demand was that, pending a final settlement of the border question, LAC
  • clarification would help ease border tensions. But the Chinese leadership was not enthusiastic about India’s proposal. Instead, China called for a comprehensive ‘code of conduct’ for the forces deployed along the border.
  • Here, it is useful to remember that both LAC clarification and Confidence Building Measures (CBMs) are part of the agreed principles in the 2005 agreement.  This mismatch in desired outcomes was the main obstacle in the recent border talks, and it showed once again India and China’s contrasting approaches to border negotiations at large.  
  • India’s reluctance to consider a ‘code of conduct’ suggests that it entertains reservations about agreeing to restrictions on its plans for infrastructure development in the border region.
  •  Perhaps, this reluctance is because of two inferences. One, that the Chinese proposal is aimed at limiting India’s military and infrastructure modernisation, and thereby enabling China to preserve its military advantage in Tibet. And two, accepting the Chinese proposal could potentially curtail the ability to effectively patrol and intercept PLA movements in territory claimed by India.  
  • The Indian position on the Sino-Pakistan understanding on Chinese activities in PoK has been consistent.
  • There are often debates in India-mostly episodic and lacking vigour-about Sino-Pakistan relations.

(c)  Domination of Indian Ocean

Domination of Indian Ocean
source
  • China has been accused of pursuing strategic maneuvers on a well-thought out route encircling India in the Indian Ocean.  Beijing has been reaching out to India’s neighbors on the premise of development and trade, allegedly recreating the Silk Route.
  • From Nepal in the south east to Myanmar, Bangladesh to Sri Lanka in the south and Pakistan in the west, China plans to choke India diplomatically.  There are diplomatic visits, courtesy calls, exchange of gifts and promises between Mr. Modi and the heads of all of the surrounding countries, to not just counter the Chinese influence but also strengthen the Indian presence.

Water issue:

  • The dispute between India and china is mainly regarding the Brahmaputra River flowing through the two countries the search for water resources in China and India has persistently been a source of tension between the two countries.
  •  Chinese efforts to divert the water resources of the Brahmaputra River away from India will worsen a situation that has remained tense since the 1962 Indo-China war.
  •  The melting glaciers in the Himalayas as a result of accelerating global climate change will have a dramatic effect on this river’s water supply. This will increase water scarcity as well as the likelihood of floods, impact agrarian livelihoods and strain the fragile equilibrium between the two Asian giants.

Pakistan factor:  

  • The longtime friendship between China and Pakistan, rooted in a time when both countries were deeply mistrustful of India, has long made New Delhi nervous.  The relationship has mainly gone one way, with China providing economic assistance and political backing to Pakistan.
  •  Islamabad is also anxious for an alliance it can use to balance the growing economic and political clout of India.  But Pakistan also offers China a gateway to South Asia, Iran and the Arabian Sea, one of the economic beltways that President Xi Jinping has sought to build through the region. Earlier this year, during a visit to Islamabad, Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi said China and Pakistan have an “all-weather friendship.”

South China Sea issue and India:

  • China opposes India’s oil exploration in the SCS (which has been undertaken at Vietnam’s request) by calling the area of exploration a ‘disputed’ area and asserting ‘Chinese sovereignty’ over the SCS in the ‘historical’ context.  
  • It has been continuously expressing its reservation in this regard in the last few years, and sometimes quite belligerently at that. India has taken note of the Chinese reservation and has carefully gone ahead in signing a few agreements with Vietnam for oil exploration in the SCS.
  • These exploration fields are very much within the maritime space under the actual control of Vietnam.  But at the same time, China casually shrugs off the issue of India’s ‘sovereignty’ over POK in the ‘historical’ context.
  • China is currently engaged on a variety of investment projects and infrastructural building activities in Gilgit-Baltistan, and these will be expanded under the CPEC project.  
  • China further explains that the Sino-Pak understanding to implement CPEC through POK is based on a range of bilateral agreements and understandings, including their 1963 Border Agreement.

Trade deficit:

  •  India faces trade imbalance heavily in favour of China. India has a trade deficit with China of nearly $50 billion, its largest with any country. Singapore, with a population about 240 times smaller than India, sells twice as many goods to China each year.

Reasons for the deficit:

  • China imports raw material from India e.g. iron ore and exports the finished goods as it has got core competency in manufacturing sector and provides huge energy subsidies.
  • Importing finished goods obviously cost more. India also imports power equipments, consumer electronics and telecommunications gear from china. China is dumping manufactured products in India.
  • On the other hand India does not have a large access to Chinese market and with Indian rupee declining while renminbi gaining centre stage the trade deficit is becoming huge.

Maritime Silk Route project: Impact on India:  

  • Beijing’s plan for a maritime infrastructure corridor in the broader Indo-Pacific region, first proposed by President Xi Jinping’s during his trip to Southeast Asia in October 2013, has attracted attention because of its potential to establish a Chinese foothold in the Indian Ocean. Needless to say, China’s outreach to India – inviting it to join the project – has generated much analytical curiosity.  
  • The first thing of interest about the MSR is that it was initially mooted as an ASEAN-centered project.∙ The intention then was to enhance connectivity and cultural links in China’s strategic backyard-the South China Sea.  
  • Beijing later expanded the scope of the project to include the Indian Ocean, but in reaching out to∙ Colombo and New Delhi, it found a willing partner only in the former. India has been ambivalent about the MSR and is yet to make up its mind on joining the project.  The problem with the MSR, essentially, is the ‘opaque’ nature of its proposal.
  • Outwardly, the project is∙ about the development of massive maritime infrastructure and connectivity in the Indian Ocean and the Western Pacific. Beijing has been careful to project the MSR as an exclusively commercial venture, trying hard to dispel any impressions of it being a cover for maritime military bases.
  • Surprisingly, however, China has released no details about the project, and this makes many countries doubt Beijing’s strategic intentions. The lack of specifics not only makes it hard to decipher the MSR’s real purpose, it gives credence to∙ suspicions of geopolitical game play by China. Indeed, for a project being touted as a critical enabler of regional sea-connectivity, Chinese planners would have spent much time and effort developing the fineprint.
  • The lack of firm plans, proposals and timelines then does lead to a suspicion that there may be something about the MSR that Beijing is hesitant to reveal quickly.  The MSR’s essential∙ rationale is the leveraging of Chinese soft-power.
  • The aim apparently is to shore-up China’s image as a benevolent state. Beijing’s would also conceivably use the project’s commercial investments to establish its legitimate interests in the Indian Ocean. And while China can be expected to do everything in its power to force region states to join the project – including offering economic aid to potential partners – the bottom-line for it will be to make an offer to India that is hard to refuse.
  • For India, it is instructive that the sales pitch of shared economic gains does not conceal the MSR’s real purpose: ensuring the security of sea lines of communications (SLOCs) in the Indian and Pacific oceans. Since African resources are China’s focus right now, the project could well be a surrogate for a giant Chinese SLOC running all the way from the East African coast, to the Southern coast of China – created, maintained and controlled by Beijing.
  • In its ultimate form, therefore, the MSR could end up setting up Chinese logistical hubs in the Indian Ocean, linking up already existing string of pearls.  India’s appreciation of the MSR must be based on an objective appraisal of these new realities. Even assuming the project delivers on its economic promise, it could well turn out to be detrimental to India’s geopolitical interests in the IOR.
  • As Beijing becomes more involved in building infrastructure in the Indian Ocean, it will play a larger part∙ in the security and governance of the IOR, which could pose a challenge to India’s stature as a ‘security provider’ in the region and also adversely affecting New Delhi’s strategic purchase in its primary area of interest.

China’s Reluctance to Support India’s membership of international bodies

  • China has continuously blocked India’s entry in UNSC. Recently China has blocked India’s entry in NSG. Chinese diplomats say Beijing wants NSG entry to be norm-based — in other words, whatever rules govern Indian entry should apply to others too.
  • Norm-based entry would, presumably, help Pakistan gain entry, something many in the NSG are certain to resist because of the country’s record as a proliferator of nuclear-weapons technology to Iran, Libya and North Korea.

Areas of Cooperation

  • Despite their rivalries, the two countries have played up their cultural links-such as the importation of Buddhism into China by wandering Chinese monks more than 1,500 years ago-and have found ample room for economic cooperation.
  • Both are members of the BRICS grouping of emerging economies, which is now establishing a formal lending arm, the New Development Bank, to be based in China’s financial hub of Shanghai and to be headed by a senior Indian banker.  
  • India also was a founding member of the China-backed Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, which plans to be formally established by year’s end and seeks to emulate institutions such as the World Bank and International Monetary Fund.  

Educational areas:

India and China signed Education Exchange Programme (EEP) in 2006, which is an umbrella agreement for educational cooperation between the two countries. Under this agreement, government scholarships are awarded to 25 students, by both sides, in recognized institutions of higher learning in each other’s country. The 25 scholarships awarded by India are offered by Indian Council for Cultural Relations (ICCR).

Trade cooperation:

India China export & import data
source
  • Two countries have shown tremendous economic growth. Change in the dynamics of the global economy has provided the opportunity to both countries to cooperate on wider scale.  China and India are the major trading partners in the region. During the last decade, bilateral trade has increased notably. In 2014, the trade between China and India exceeded over $65 billion mark.
  • According to the Trade Map figures, in 2013, China accounted for 11.1 percent of India’s imports, while 4.1 percent of India exports were destined for China. Chinese exports to India are mainly comprised of electric and electronic equipment, organic chemical, fertilizers and furniture. On the other side, China’s imports from India chiefly consist of cotton, pearls, precious stones, copper ores, slag and ash.  
  • Bilateral trade has expanded substantially in recent years. Nevertheless, the balance of trade still remains in China’s favor.
  • Following table summarizes the latest trends in trade between China and India. Source: China India Trade and Investment Center  Though, compared to the past, the economic cooperation between the two countries has accelerated.
  • However, there are still enormous opportunities that have not been exploited in such fields as manufacturing, construction, electricity, gas and water industries, infrastructure (such as, roads, buildings, transportation, storage and communication), hotels and tourism, financial institutions, agriculture, healthcare, education and the various training sectors.  China and India have synergies in many areas.
  • China has wide experience and expertise in the field of construction industry. Due to its international recognition, Chinese firms have been successful in creating infrastructure base for many countries.
  • India could utilize Chinese expertise in the development of its high speed railway network, metro lines and other infrastructure facilities.  While the sides are seeking to expand bilateral trade to $100 billion this year, China exports far more than it imports, something Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi hopes to alter with increased market access for Indian goods and services.

Areas of Competition in Africa:

  • The rapid economic growth experienced by China and India has resulted in an increase in competition for∙ global resources and investment opportunities. Unsurprisingly, the abundance of natural resources in Africa has made the continent a hotspot for Chinese and Indian economic activity.  
  • This growing Sino-Indian involvement has been economically beneficial and has resulted in widespread∙ investment and development, with African leaders welcoming the competition.  Africa is now the latest front in an increasingly global competition between India and China for new markets,∙ agricultural land and access to natural resources.  
  • While Western media and politicians have reacted with varying degrees of alarm over the surge of Chinese∙ trade and investment in Africa, Indian companies have been quietly building their presence on the continent.  
  • As China drives deeper into what many Indians consider their sphere of influence in South Asia, Africa offers∙ an ideal opportunity for Indian firms to challenge China’s growing influence in the region.  For many Indians, particularly in certain political circles and on the blogosphere, competition with China is∙ presented in a classical real politik paradigm.
  • The headlines misleadingly frame the issue in terms of win/loss or even as a “race” between the two∙ countries. Although it may be compelling, even somewhat entertaining, to draw on 19th century colonial cliches (e.g. the Scramble for Africa or the Great Game) it is entirely misleading as both the Indians and Chinese are employing radically different strategies in Africa than earlier European powers.
  • Ironically, the enhanced competition among Chinese and Indian companies will most directly affect∙ European and American firms who are rapidly being shut out of Africa’s emerging markets.  While China’s aggressive economic approach has caused it to achieve more influence in Africa than any∙ other country, its dominance is slowly being impeded by India’s growing involvement in the region.
  • India has focussed on emphasising its cultural and historical ties to enhance the development of its trade relations with resource-rich countries like Zimbabwe, Ethiopia and Sudan.  
  • The success of India’s soft power strategy has been evident in countries like Sudan, where Indian∙ corporations have attained near complete control of the local oil and natural gas industry.  The same trend is occurring in Zimbabwe where China’s dominance in the energy and resource sectors is∙ being challenged by private and state-owned Indian enterprises.  

The US$ 4 billion takeover of Zimbabwean steelmaker Zicosteel, by India’s Essar Group, was hailed by the∙ Zimbabwean Government as the largest foreign direct investment deal in Zimbabwe in recent decades.  Competition for the takeover was intense, as various Chinese corporations challenged the Essar Group’s bid.∙  

The incident has been viewed by some as a reflection of the intense rivalry developing between China and∙ India, and while China continues to dominate African markets, the success of India’s economic strategies has raised uncertainty towards China’s future economic dominance in the region.

Competition in foreign policy

China and India are still strategic rivals despite their increased economic cooperation.∙  

  • Alongside the U.S., Japan, and Australia, India is also seen as one of the major actors that have an interest in offsetting China’s dominance over Asia.  That India and China came to be known as fellow members of the BRICS does not suffice by itself to reverse∙ the two giants’ inherent tendency towards taking sides with rival groupings which are once again beginning to overwhelm Asia’s strategic environment.  
  • Moreover, New Delhi set its permanent membership on the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) as a primary national goal in the name of being recognized as a great power on a global scale. In contrast, China pioneers the opposition bloc which stands firmly against any attempts to reform the UNSC because such would mean including not only India but Japan and several other countries in the Council as well.  
  • The two countries’ strategic interests in South Asia are also mutually exclusive. 
  • China maintains intimate ties with Pakistan, with high-level defense cooperation at the core thereof, a reality that deeply disturbs India as might be expected.  On the other hand, Beijing feels extremely uncomfortable with India’s hosting of the Tibetan opposition.
  • China even fears that India might still be supportive of Tibet’s independence. Likewise, there is a heated rivalry between Beijing and New Delhi for influence over Bangladesh, Myanmar,Sri Lanka, and Nepal.
  • New Delhi shapes its foreign policy in tandem with the West, backing Myanmar’s opening to the rest of the world as well as its related democratization project.
  • However, Beijing believes one of the essential motivations behind such a policy is to detach Myanmar from China’s larger zone of influence.

PM Modi’s visit to China in 2015  

  • The visit was rich in symbolism and substance and it opened up a new chapter in India-China relations. For the first time, Chinese President Xi Jinping travelled outside Beijing to receive a foreign leader, in Xi’an in his home province of Shaanxi.
  • President Xi also accompanied Prime Minister to the Big Wild Goose Pagoda and organized a grand welcome∙ ceremony at the Xi’an city wall.  
  • There were 24 agreements signed on the government-to-government side, 26 MoUs on the business-tobusiness  side and two joint statements, including one on climate change.
  • The fact that India and China could come up with over 50 outcome documents in just eight months reveals the huge potential that exists between our two countries, as well as the efforts that we have made to elevate our partnership.  
  • They included such diverse fields as space cooperation, earthquake engineering, ocean sciences, mining,railways, skill development, education, culture, Yoga, tourism and many more.
  •  Prime Minister interacted with 21 CEOs of leading Chinese companies and over 40 prominent Indian CEOs attended the Business Forum along with their counterparts from China.
  • The 26 business understandings worth over US$ 22 billion signed at the Forum covered such varied sectors as industrial parks, renewable energy, thermal energy, telecommunication, steel, capital goods, IT and media.  
  • There was, moreover, an action-oriented accord on broad-basing the bilateral partnership, as could be seen from the range of agreements signed and in the establishment of new dialogue mechanisms, such as the one between the DRC and the NITI Aayog and the Think Tanks’ Forum, besides a bilateral consultative mechanism on WTO negotiations.  
  • Three new institutions were launched in partnership, the Centre for Gandhian and Indian Studies in Shanghai, Yoga College in Kunming, and National Institute for Skill Development and Entrepreneurship in Ahmedabad.  Both sides decided to establish new Consulates in each other’s country, in Chengdu and Chennai and to∙ expand our interactions at the sub-national level.
  • Two agreements signed-one on cooperation between the Indian Ministry of External Affairs and the∙ International Department of the Central Committee of the CPC and another on the establishment of a State/Provincial Leaders’ Forum-reflect this understanding.  
  • A number of sister-city and sister-state relations agreements between: Karnataka and Sichuan, Chennai and∙ Chongqing, Hyderabad and Qingdao, Aurangabad and Dunhuang were also signed.  Prime Minister also announced the extension of the e-visa facility to Chinese nationals wishing to travel to India.

Other Important issues

(a)ONE BELT

OBOR
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ONE BELT, ONE ROAD (OBOR)

The One Belt, One Road (OBOR) initiative is part of China’s major policy framework to boost domestic development and foreign diplomacy. China also wants to ‘reconstruct’ the world order to fulfill its interests and become a dominant world power.

About OBOR

The “belt and road” have two components—the Silk Road Economic Belt (SREB) that would be established along the Eurasian land corridor from the Pacific coast to the Baltic Sea, and the 21st century Maritime Silk Road (MSR).

  • The “belt and road” run through the continents of Asia, Europe and Africa, connecting the vibrant East Asia economic circle at one end and developed European economic circle at the other.
  • The SREB focuses on bringing together China, Central Asia, Russia and Europe (the Baltic); linking China with the Persian Gulf and the Mediterranean Sea through Central Asia and West Asia; and connecting China with Southeast Asia, South Asia and the Indian Ocean.
  • On land, the initiative will focus on jointly building a new Eurasian Land Bridge and developing China- Mongolia-Russia, China-Central Asia-West Asia and China-Indochina Peninsula economic corridors.
  • The 21st-Century MSR, in turn is designed to go from China’s coast to Europe through the South China Sea and the Indian Ocean in one route, and from China’s coast through the South China Sea to the South Pacific in the other.
  •  To implement the concept, the Chinese have stressed on joint consultation and joint building. China sees this as the most effective model that can be used to safeguard mutual benefits.

What China expects from OBOR?

  • Address security threats
  • Achieve long-term economic benefits
  • Reduce America’s threat to trade lifelines

Analysis

  • Analysts point out that the ‘One Belt One Road’ initiative, backed by a solid financial institutional network, once implemented, is expected to accelerate the shift of geo-economic power away from the United States, towards Eurasia.
  • More than 4.4 billion people, or 63 per cent of the global population countries, are expected to benefit from China’s game-changing plans.
  • Analysts say that the “belt and road” initiative could shift the center of geo-economic power towards Eurasia, and undermine the “Asia Pivot” of the United States and its allies.
  • Chinese President Xi Jinping is hopeful that the mega-trade volumes among the Silk Road economies would touch $ 2.5 trillion over the next 10 years.

Pros of India joining OBOR  

The technical know-how the project will bring back could be used to develop or iron out issues facing∙ technical bottlenecks.  

The OBOR initiative could be icing on the cake for India’s flagship programs like Digital India.

The “Information Silk Route” has the telecom connectivity between the countries through fiber, trunk line and under-sea cables.  

This will expand the bandwidth capabilities for India significantly, without which offering e-Governance and∙ delivering public services in an efficient manner will remain a pipe dream and a good marketing campaign.  India will have excellent connectivity of various transport modes, and a great facilitator to Make In India∙ initiative if India joins such global infrastructure project.

India’s strategy to counter OBOR

India is not part of OBOR. India reaffirmed its opposition of One-Belt-One-Road initiative of China, with Foreign Secretary stating that New Delhi will join multilateral connectivity initiatives in Asia, only if they were pursued through a consultative process.

  • India has indicated that it sees China’s OBOR as a “national Chinese initiative”.
  • The defence establishment is concerned that the project might not be altogether benevolent and that these corridors in future could be used for military mobilisation.
  • There are concerns in India about being part of a “hegemonic project” that would ensure China led development in the Indian Ocean region.
  • The main point of contention for India is the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor or CPEC, which is also part of OBOR.
  • For New Delhi, OBOR may be a potential economic opportunity but it also threatens India’s interests.

India’s strategy to counter OBOR

  • India recently proposed the ‘Cotton Route’ (seen by many as its answer to the Silk Route) to strengthen economic ties between countries in the Indian Ocean rim.
  • It has also launched Project Mausam and Spice Route apparently in response to China’s Belt and Road initiative.
  • The ‘Mausam’ project envisages the re-establishment of India’s ancient maritime routes with its traditional trade partners along the Indian Ocean.
  • The ‘Spice Route of India’, visualises the India-centered linkup of historic sea routes in Asia, Europe and Africa.
  • Many people in India perceive the Mausam Project and the Spice Route as rivals to the Maritime SilkRoad.

(b)SOUTH CHINA SEA (SCS) DISPUTE

The three million square kilometers South China Sea is the maritime heart of Southeast Asia but also a disputable property. Maritime boundaries in the South China Sea are particularly problematic because they involve six separate claimants in a mostly enclosed body of water with a large number of disputed land features.

The South China Sea is ringed by Brunei, China, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Taiwan, and Vietnam, and dotted with hundreds of small islands, shoals and reefs, many of them occupied by the disputants.

The fundamental issue in the South China Sea is one of territorial sovereignty, that is, which state has sovereignty over the islands and their adjacent waters.

UNCLOS has no provisions on how to determine sovereignty over offshore islands. As there is no treaty that governs the issue of sovereignty, states have to look for guidance to the rules of customary international law on the acquisition and loss of territory.

Main Disputes:

The Spratly Islands are located in the central part of the South China Sea, north of the island of Borneo (which comprises Brunei Darussalam and the east Malaysian States of Sarawak and Sabah), east of Vietnam, west of the Philippines, and south of the Chinese island of Hainan.

The Spratly Islands are claimed in their entirety by China, Taiwan, and Vietnam, while some islands and other features are claimed by Malaysia and the Philippines. The Spratly Islands consist of more than 140 islets, rocks, reefs, shoals and sandbanks (some totally or occasionally submerged while others are always dry) spread over an area of more than 410,000 square kilometres.

The Paracel Islands are located in the northern part of the South China Sea, approximately equidistant from the coastlines of Vietnam and China (Hainan). They are claimed by China, Taiwan and Vietnam. China forcibly ejected South Vietnamese troops from the Paracels in 1974, and they are now occupied exclusively by China.

China denies the existence of a dispute over these islands, but they are a continual source of tension between China and Vietnam. The Paracels consist of about thirty five islets, shoals, sandbanks and reefs with approximately 15,000 km² of ocean surface.

Woody Island, the largest island in the Paracels, which is about the same land area as all of the Spratly Islands combined. Woody Island is the location of Sansha City, a prefecture-level city established by China in June 2012 as its administrative centre for its claims in the South China Sea.

Scarborough Reef is located in the northern part of the South China Sea between the Philippines and the Paracels, and is claimed by China, the Philippines and Taiwan. Scarborough Reef is located about 130 miles from the Philippine island of Luzon. Most of the reef is either completely submerged or above water at low tide, but it contains several small rocks which are above water at high tide. It has been a major source of tension between China and the Philippines since the Philippines attempted arrest of Chinese fishermen in June 2012.

The Pratas Islands are located just over 200 miles southwest of Hong Kong. They are occupied by Taiwan, and are also claimed by China.

Macclesfield Bank, a large sunken reef that is completely submerged at low tide, is located between Scarborough Reef and the Paracels. It is claimed by China and Taiwan.

Resources as a Driver of Competition

Many analysts feel that resource competition has become one of the key drivers of territorial disputes and tension, particularly in the South China Sea and East China Sea.

The South China Sea, for example, is a major source of fish resources for each of the nations that borders it, and the largest source of fish for China, the Philippines and Vietnam. The over-fishing in coastal waters has led to depletion of resources thus competition has led fishing boats to work towards offshore.

Many energy industry observers believe that the sea also has substantial reserves of oil and natural gas. The rising energy demand in countries has encouraged more offshore energy development in their economic planning.

New technologies are making complicated offshore oil and gas development more feasible, and high energy prices are contributing to the desire to control these resources.

Energy Resources

Because much of the South China Sea has never been fully explored, accurate assessments of exploitable oil and gas reserves do not exist. A report by the Department of Energy’s Energy Information Administration (EIA) in 2008 cited some of the most optimistic estimates-Chinese assessments that it could have reserves totaling 213 billion barrels of oil and 900 trillion cubic feet of natural gas. Many analysts argue, however, that because much of the northern part of the South China Sea is deep, energy resources may not be exploitable on this scale.

In May 2012, the state-owned China National Overseas Oil Corp (CNOOC) unveiled a deep-water drilling rig that could extend its ability to exploit resources into waters deeper than its current capabilities allow. Still, industry analysts believe that international energy companies have considerably more technical ability to develop resources in difficult offshore settings-and thus, much of the sea will likely go undeveloped as long as the disputes continue.

Offshore energy development is based on assertion of sovereignty over parts of the sea, and because such assertions are still widely overlapping, there are increasing chances for conflict. For example, China warned international oil companies in 2006 that they should not work in regions with unsettled territorial disputes where Vietnam was seeking development partners.

In 2012, a Chinese state oil company, the Chinese National Overseas Oil Corp. (CNOOC) offered tenders for offshore oil and gas exploration within Vietnam’s EEZ, overlapping with areas Vietnam had already tendered and, in some cases, in which companies were already exploring and drilling. This action prompted angry reactions in Vietnam, which deemed the moves illegal.

Such disputes have created uncertainties that constrain offshore resource exploration and development, which requires long-term periods of stability.

There are, however, some examples of exploration and development that have taken place in disputed areas. China, the Philippines, and Vietnam have each undertaken oil-and-gas exploration in disputed parts of the South China Sea, and the Philippines and Vietnam have offered exploration and development contracts to international oil-andgas firms, including American companies.

Fishery Resources

Fishing presents another potential source of conflict. The South China Sea is the largest source of fish, an important foodstock, in each of the claimant countries.

The fishing industries of each of the disputants include large numbers of vessels which travel increasingly farther from their home coasts due to overfishing in coastal waters, bringing them into disputed waters. This has led to frequent incidents of harassment of vessels, confiscation of catches and equipment, and sometimes imprisonment of fishermen.

A 2012 dispute between the Philippines and China at Scarborough Shoal, an outcropping of rocks within the Philippines’ EEZ and China’s nine-dash line, began when Philippine coast guard officials boarded Chinese fishing vessels and confiscated illegally obtained shark and coral. Some analysts point to joint management of fisheries as a potential path towards lowering tensions and fostering functional cooperation among disputants.

Attempts for Resolution

  • Currently, states in Southeast Asia are utilizing four different strategies to try to solve the issue.
  • First, states are pushing for bilateral solutions in incremental stages. Beijing has repeatedly stated a preference for this method, but regional states widely regard it as an attempt to freeze resource development, while doing little to actually resolve the various claims. On the other hand, Vietnam and China recently used bilateral diplomacy to reduce tensions.
  • Second, attempts are being made to resolve the issue at the multilateral level, that is utilizing ASEAN. So far it is difficult to achieve much, as only four of ASEAN’s 10 member states are involved in the South China Sea issue, and China has been able to detach the other six members at various times from positions taken by Vietnam, Malaysia, Brunei and the Philippines.
  • Third, fostering closer ties to the US also remains an option, as Washington is still the predominant power in the region. The Philippines and Vietnam in particular have sought strategic reassurance through new or renewed security agreements with the US; and Washington – concerned that China covets such a strategic sea line of communication – has responded warmly.
  • And fourth, Southeast Asian nations are involving non-regional states in the issue. Vietnam’s agreement with India on drilling in contested waters falls into this strategy, and follows a general campaign by Hanoi to engage external states and oil firms – such as Chevron, Exxon Mobil, BP and Zarubezhneft as a form of pressure on Beijing. But these strategies are not making the slightest difference, and serve only to exacerbate tensions.

 

India and South China Dispute

India has a strong interest in keeping sea lanes open in the South China Sea. The South China Sea is not only a strategic maritime link between the Pacific and the Indian Oceans, but also a vital gateway for shipping in East Asia.

Almost, 55% of India’s trade with the Asia Pacific transits through the South China Sea. Apart from helping secure energy supplies for countries like Japan and Korea, India has the unique distinction of shipping oil from Sakhalin to Mangalore through sea routes of the region. Therefore, it is vital for India to have access to the region.

If China continues to assert dominance over these waters, it will be difficult for India to continue with its activities through this channel.

But China’s hard line on the South China Sea has affected India too. New Delhi was a bit taken aback after Beijing denounced plans by an Indian Company to develop oil fields in the region.

The Chinese objection was to ONGC Videsh’s (OVL) venture for off-shore oil exploration in water’s belonging to Vietnam (not recognized by China), Beijing urged India to refrain from entering into deals with Vietnamese firms exploring oil and gas in the disputed South China Sea over which China enjoys ‘indisputable’ sovereignty.

India however, in recent years, has been seen as a credible counterweight to China. Southeast Asian countries, wary of continued Chinese aggression in the South China Sea, have encouraged joint maritime exercises with India.

In February 2010, the Indian Navy concluded its Milan series of maritime exercises in the Andaman and Nicobar Islands and almost all ASEAN countries participated in Milan exercise.

India, which has helped Malaysia in building up its Coast Guard in the past, must consider assisting other ASEAN countries. India has a strong Navy with technological credibility that can be leveraged by ASEAN. Collaboration on missile technology, radar systems, defence component systems and supporting hardware are again areas where ASEAN countries can work in partnership with India. China, naturally, does not welcome the ASEAN move to interact militarily with India.

India has also shown keenness to sell Brahmos missiles to friendly countries including the neighboring Southeast Asian countries. Most of the ASEAN countries have been engaged in a defense modernization programme and would like to obtain assistance in weapons up-gradation and systems integration.

Like India, most of the Southeast Asian countries also rely on Russia for their defence procurements. India with its long experience in using Russian products and developed the technological capabilities for low cost servicing could be a potential ally for ASEAN in this field. Assisting ASEAN will also improve India’s relations with the Southeast Asian countries bilaterally and multilaterally and it will also boost India’s morale in balancing China in the IOR.

India’s Interests in the SCS

India has a strong interest in keeping sea lanes open in the SCS.

  • The SCS is not only a strategic maritime link between the Pacific and the Indian Oceans, but also a vital gateway for shipping in East Asia. Almost, 55% of India’s trade with the Asia Pacific transits through the SCS.
  • Apart from helping secure energy supplies for countries like Japan and Korea, India has the unique distinction of shipping oil from Sakhalin to Mangalore through sea routes of the region. Therefore, it is vital for India to have access to the region. If China continues to assert dominance over these waters, it will be difficult for India to continue with its activities through this channel.
  • Presence of India in SCS is not only Counter balance China in South East Asia but it will put pressure on China in South Asia too.
  • Presence in South China Sea will help India to have effective control over Malacca strait.
  • SCS is crucial in India’s Look East Policy-2.
South china sea dispute
source

Recent Ruling of the Tribunal

The Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA) in The Hague, Netherlands, has ruled that China’s claims of historical rights over South China Sea (SCS) has no legal basis. The case was brought to the court in 2013 by the Philippines, centring on the Scarborough Shoal, but Beijing chose to boycott the proceedings.

What did the arbitration panel rule?

  • The court at The Hague ruled that China’s claims to the waters within the so-called “nine-dash line”, with wide-ranging economic interests, was in breach of the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS).
  • The court slammed China for damaging parts of the ecosystem in the Spratly islands- a contested archipelago– on account of overfishing and development of artificial islands.
  • The Court also said that China violated the Philippines’ sovereign rights. It said China has caused “severe harm to the coral reef environment” by building artificial islands.

What is the ‘nine-dash’ line?

The ‘nine-dash line’ stretches hundreds of kilometers south and east of its southerly Hainan Island, covering the strategic Paracel and Spratly island chains. China buttresses its claims by citing 2,000 years of history when the two island chains were regarded as its integral parts.

 

Chinese response to ruling of PCA

  • China rejected an international ruling on the South China Sea as “null and void” and devoid of any “binding force”.
  • China is contemplating to establish a military Air Defence Identification Zone (ADIZ) in the South China Sea (SCS). The imposition of an ADIZ would require overflying planes to first notify China.
  • Many Chinese experts stressed that the entire episode was a cover to enforce the US’ “Pivot of Asia” or Rebalance strategy, aimed at the containment of China.

India’s response

India has made it clear that it recognised that the tribunal had been set up within the jurisdiction of the UN’s Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) that must be given the “utmost respect”.

Comment

Despite gloomy predictions about the inevitability of competition between China and India, cooperation between Asia‘s two emerging powers is possible. It, will however, require a much more concerted effort to bridge the gap in socio-cultural understanding that existed between them, there remains a fundamental lack of appreciation on the part of each country of the underlying cultural and societal norms that define the other norms that influence each country‘s perception of its own national interest.

It is argued that greater appreciation of these elements is critical if China and India are to successfully address issues such as the ongoing border dispute and the mounting trade imbalance.

In present and future scenarios, strategic and diplomatic relations between China and India are fraught with complication, tensions and misgivings on both sides upon the historical legacies of relations between the two countries. Much of the mistrust and misgivings emanate from the legacy of the 1962 war between the two countries.

The following five decades have seen generation of Indians growing up with an inherent wariness of China and anything Chinese. The public popular imagination in India was fuelled by the often repeated stories of the great betrayal by the supposed ally nation.

In recent decades after India gained its independence from Britain in 1947, there was a lot of popular hope for a strong and mutually beneficial partnership between the two nations. This was reflected in the popular phrase that was chanted by Indian children in the 1950s: Hindi-Chini bhai-bhai, the general atmosphere of bonhomie and Friendship was such that most Indians could not imagine the advent of Chinese military aggression on their relative unguarded northeast.

 

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