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  • Two years later, PM internship revamp draws more youth, but quality gaps persist

    Why in the News

    The Prime Minister’s Internship Scheme (PMIS) promises skill-building internships for 1 crore youth, yet fewer than 10% of the internships companies post are being filled. Ministry of Corporate Affairs data show a revamp has lifted joining, but dropouts say they got field work instead of training.

    What is the PM Internship Scheme, and why was it launched?

    1. What it is: The PMIS places young people not in full-time work or education in a company for a paid internship. It works like an apprenticeship that pays an allowance during training.
    2. Why it was launched: Youth unemployment in the monthly Periodic Labour Force Survey (PLFS), the official jobs survey, has stayed above 15% this year. The scheme aims to make youth employment ready.
    3. Pilot design: The pilot opened in October 2024 in the top 500 companies, for school leavers, Industrial Training Institute (ITI) certificate holders, diploma holders and graduates.
    4. The takeaway: The scheme bets that a short spell inside a real company can turn a jobless young person into an employable worker.

    What did the revamp change?

    1. Wider pool of host firms: The scheme now covers micro, small and medium enterprises (MSMEs) and sunrise sectors, new fast-growing industries, beyond the top 500 companies.
    2. Higher stipend: The monthly allowance nearly doubled, from Rs 5,000 to Rs 9,000, paid largely by the government through Direct Benefit Transfer (DBT) straight into the intern’s bank account.
    3. Easier entry: The age band was relaxed to 18 to 25 years, and the education criteria were eased.
    4. Shorter stints: Internships now last 6 or 9 months instead of a full year. The government adopted this change in March after feedback from the first two rounds.

    Has the revamp drawn more youth?

    1. Joining rate: The joining rate, the share of posted internships that interns actually take up, rose to 9.5% in Round III from 6.1% in Round II.
    2. More joiners: Round III, launched in April, has drawn 67% to 100% more joiners than the earlier rounds.
    3. Completion rate: The completion rate, the share of joiners who finish, slipped to 39.4% in Round II from 42.6% in Round I.

    Why are interns dropping out?

    1. Missing skills training: Dropouts cite little focus on specialised skills or on-the-job training as the main reason for leaving midway.
    2. Field work at petrol pumps: A Round I intern with a public sector oil refiner was sent from pump to pump to push its payment app. With no training, he left after a month.
    3. Loan recovery rounds: A computer hardware diploma holder was made a loan recovery agent in villages by a microfinance firm. He left midway and is still unemployed.
    4. Better results in manufacturing and IT: Interns placed with manufacturing and IT firms fared markedly better. Eg. An engineering graduate got structured training, then a full-time job at the same IT firm.

    Challenges

    1. Low take-up: Most posted internships go unfilled, which leaves the scheme far behind its five-year target.
    2. Unchecked task quality: Nothing stops a host firm using interns as field sales or collection staff instead of trainees.
    3. Slack youth job market: With youth unemployment high, a finished internship does not guarantee a job.

    Way Forward

    1. Training plan before joining: The Ministry of Corporate Affairs should require each host firm to file a learning plan for every role.
    2. Dropout reason codes: Record why each intern leaves on the scheme portal, and flag host firms with high dropout rates.
    3. Placement link: Tie completion to recruitment tests and placement drives, the route that worked for interns in the IT sector.

    Conclusion

    The revamp has fixed the scheme’s reach more than its quality: more youth join, but too few finish with real skills. Completion and placement numbers when Round III closes in December will show whether the shorter, better-paid internships are worth finishing.

    Key numbers

    1. Joining rate, Round I: 6.9% of posted internships (Ministry of Corporate Affairs).
    2. Interns joined: 8,760 (Round I), 7,308 (Round II), 14,620 (Round III, as on 6 August 2026).
    3. Pilot stipend: Rs 4,500 a month by DBT plus Rs 500 from the company’s Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) funds.
    4. Pilot one-time grant: Rs 6,000 for incidentals.
    5. NEET rate: 25% of youth not in employment, education or training, 2025 (PLFS).
    6. Youth outside work and study: about 8.7 crore Indians aged 15 to 29, 2021 (NITI Aayog).

    Matching Previous Year Question

    “[2019] Atal Innovation Mission is set up under the (a) Department of Science and Technology (b) Ministry of Employment (c) NITI Aayog (d) Ministry of Skill Development and Entrepreneurship ANSWER: (c)”

  • How conversion affects reservation

    Why in the News

    Converting to Islam no longer carries a former Backward Class (BC), Most Backward Class (MBC) or Scheduled Caste (SC) status into Tamil Nadu’s BC Muslim quota, because conversion alone does not make a person a member of a notified backward Muslim community. The Supreme Court, in The Secretary to Government v. Sameer Ahamed N. (2026), upheld the Madras High Court‘s invalidation of a 2024 Tamil Nadu Government Order that allowed such a transfer.

    What did the Government Order do, and why did it fail?

    1. What it is: The Government Order (G.O.) let converts to Islam from BC, MBC, Denotified Communities (DNC) and SC classes obtain BC Muslim certificates for the State’s 3.5% quota. It treated reservation like a ticket that travels with its holder.
    2. Why the State issued it: The State argued that a person who had enjoyed reservation should not lose every benefit by converting. The G.O. followed a letter from the Tamil Nadu Backward Classes Commission.
    3. What went wrong: The order grouped these converts without showing any common social trait linking them to the State’s seven notified backward Muslim communities.
    4. The takeaway: Good intent cannot replace evidence, because reservation rests on a group’s demonstrated disadvantage, not a former label.

    What did the courts hold?

    1. No automatic membership: The case began with a Hindu-born convert seeking a Muslim Lebbai certificate. Conversion did not make the convert a member of any notified community: Ansar, Dekkani Muslims, Dubekula, Labbais (including Rowthar and Marakayar), Mapilla, Sheik and Syed.
    2. Former caste is not proof: A former caste classification does not establish membership of a different Muslim community.
    3. Limits of a Jamath: A Jamath, the local Muslim congregation body, may attest a conversion but cannot decide eligibility for a reservation category.
    4. Certificate records status: A community certificate records legal status. It cannot create it. Muslims can still qualify as a backward class on evidence.

    Why are SC status and backward class status decided differently?

    1. SC route: Article 341 empowers the President to specify Scheduled Castes. Under Article 341(2), only Parliament may alter that list by law.
    2. Religion bar: Paragraph 3 of the Constitution (Scheduled Castes) Order, 1950 restricts SC status to Hindus, Sikhs and Buddhists, so conversion to Islam or Christianity ends it.
    3. Backward class route: Articles 15(4) and 16(4) permit special provisions for socially and educationally backward classes (SEBCs), including in public employment.
    4. State lists: Article 342A recognises the States’ power to keep their own SEBC lists, as amended by the Constitution (One Hundred and Fifth Amendment) Act, 2021.
    5. Beyond Hindu caste names: Occupational groups, sects and communities among non-Hindus may qualify as backward classes if constitutional criteria are met.

    What do earlier commissions show about identifying disadvantage?

    1. Mandal Commission: The Second Backward Classes Commission, under B.P. Mandal, scored communities on 11 weighted social, educational and economic indicators, out of a maximum 22, to find combined disadvantage.
    2. Sachar Committee: Its 2006 report documented Muslims’ disadvantage in education, employment and credit, but did not show that converts form a distinct backward class.
    3. Ranganath Misra Commission: The National Commission for Religious and Linguistic Minorities (2007) recommended delinking SC status from religion by deleting Paragraph 3. The Order was not amended.
    4. Balakrishnan Commission: Set up in October 2022 under former Chief Justice of India K.G. Balakrishnan, it examines SC status for converts of historical SC origin.
    5. Separate questions: SC status turns on the 1950 Order and BC status on the State framework, so these exercises cannot substitute for one another.

    Challenges

    1. No data on converts: Neither the State nor its Backward Classes Commission ran an empirical inquiry into converts’ present condition.
    2. Inherited exclusion: A Hindu MBC convert may still face exclusion, and Islam’s doctrinal rejection of caste does not prove it has ended.
    3. SC converts left out: SC converts to Islam lose SC status and cannot automatically enter the BC Muslim quota either.

    Way Forward

    1. Independent study: Tamil Nadu’s Backward Classes Commission should study converts’ education, public employment and social acceptance.
    2. Defined class: Any proposed class must be defined, related to existing lists and shown to meet constitutional criteria.
    3. Disaggregated inquiry: Converts from SC, BC, MBC and DNC backgrounds should be examined separately, not as one group.

    Conclusion

    Reservation follows a group’s demonstrated disadvantage, not an individual’s former label, so conversion cannot carry a quota across religions. Whether converts still face exclusion is now a question for evidence, and the separate SC question awaits a national decision.

    Matching Previous Year Question

    “[2024] Consider the following statements regarding ‘Nari Shakti Vandan Adhiniyam’: 1. Provisions will come into effect from the 18th Lok Sabha. 2. This will be in force for 15 years after becoming an Act. 3. There are provisions for the reservation of seats for Scheduled Castes Women within the quota reserved for the Scheduled Castes. Which of the statements given above are correct? (a) 1, 2 and 3 (b) 1 and 2 only (c) 2 and 3 only* (d) 1 and 3 only ANSWER: (c)”

  • Hill councils to be created in all eight districts of Ladakh

    Why in the News

    Elected hill councils in Ladakh, until now confined to Leh and Kargil, are to be set up in all eight districts of the Union Territory, with smaller councils in place of a uniform 26 seats each. The President has promulgated the Ladakh Autonomous Hill Development Councils (LAHDC) (Amendment) Regulation, 2026. The Kargil Democratic Alliance (KDA) has questioned changes made during ongoing talks on Statehood and the Sixth Schedule.

    What is a hill council, and how was the law changed?

    1. What it is: An LAHDC is an elected district council under the Ladakh Autonomous Hill Development Councils Act, 1997, handling local development and land vested in it. It works much like a zila parishad.
    2. Why it matters in Ladakh: Ladakh became a Union Territory without a legislature in 2019, carved out of the Kashmir division of the erstwhile State of Jammu and Kashmir. It then had only two hill councils.
    3. How the change was made: The amendment is a Presidential regulation under Article 240, which lets the President make laws for certain Union Territories, with the force of an Act of Parliament.
    4. Speed of approval: The Union Cabinet approved the amendments on October 14, and the President promulgated them on October 16. The Lieutenant Governor called it a “historic regulation”.
    5. The takeaway: Ladakh’s local self-government can be redrawn by executive regulation within a week, without a vote in any elected House.

    What does the amended regulation change?

    1. Eight councils: The regulation paves the way for an LAHDC in every district, including the newly created Sankoo district. The Union Territory administration created eight districts this year.
    2. Seat rationalisation: Each council will now have between seven and 24 constituencies, in place of the earlier uniform size.
    3. Nominated members: Four members are to be nominated from ‘women’ and ‘unrepresented communities’, for wider participation in local governance.
    4. Kargil continuity: LAHDC-Kargil, which held elections in 2023, remains in place.

    Why is the timing contested?

    1. Parallel negotiations: The Leh Apex Body (LAB) and the KDA sit on a high-level committee the Centre constituted in 2023 to ensure constitutional safeguards for Ladakh.
    2. The demands on the table: Both bodies seek Statehood and inclusion of Ladakh in the Sixth Schedule, which would give its tribal areas constitutionally protected self-rule.
    3. No consultation: The KDA said substantial changes to the councils’ composition, powers and functioning were made without consulting the people and stakeholders of Ladakh.
    4. Status still undecided: The Centre’s own draft framework asks whether LAHDCs should receive constitutional status or continue under the 1997 Act.

    Challenges

    1. No legislative power: Hill councils plan and execute but cannot make laws on land or customs. Eg. Sixth Schedule councils such as the Bodoland Territorial Council can.
    2. Redesign by regulation: Council size and composition can be altered by executive regulation, without consultation or legislative debate.
    3. Weight of nominees: In a seven-seat council, four nominated members would form over a third of the House.
    4. Thin new districts: The new districts are sparsely populated and lightly staffed, so new councils start without an administrative base.

    Way Forward

    1. Consult through the committee: Route further changes to the councils through the high-level committee with the LAB and the KDA.
    2. Fixed poll calendar: Notify elections to the new councils on a published timeline.
    3. Transferred subjects: List the subjects, staff and funds each council controls in a schedule to the Act.
    4. Nomination criteria: Publish who qualifies as an “unrepresented community” and how nominees are chosen.

    Conclusion

    The amendment multiplies Ladakh’s elected councils without changing the kind of power they hold, and their constitutional status is still being negotiated. The next tests are the election notification for the new councils and whether the talks settle that status before more changes come by regulation.

    Back2Basics: Sixth Schedule of the Constitution

    1. What it provides: Read with Articles 244(2) and 275(1), it provides for administering tribal areas through Autonomous District Councils and Regional Councils.
    2. Where it applies: It covers tribal areas in Assam, Meghalaya, Tripura and Mizoram. Ladakh is not covered.
    3. Law-making powers: The councils can make laws on land, forests other than reserved forests, shifting cultivation, inheritance, marriage and social customs, with the Governor’s assent.
    4. Other powers: They may set up village courts for disputes among Scheduled Tribes and levy specified taxes.

    Matching Previous Year Question

    “[2015] The provisions in Fifth Schedule and Sixth Schedule in the Constitution of India are made in order to (a) protect the interests of Scheduled Tribes (b) determine the boundaries between States (c) determine the powers, authority and responsibilities of Panchayats (d) protect the interests of all border States ANSWER: (a)”

  • Report flags feature to centrally control access on ECINET

    Why in the News

    The law gives each constituency’s Electoral Registration Officer (ERO) authority over the electoral roll, but an audit finds that ECINET, the Election Commission’s unified portal, lets a central switch cut off officers’ access State by State. The audit by civic tech initiative Charchagram follows objections by two Election Commissioners to centralising ECINET and the roll database.

    What is ECINET, and who is meant to control the roll?

    1. What it is: ECINET is the Election Commission of India (ECI)‘s unified digital portal for election officials, launched in January 2026. It works like a single office building whose front door every roll officer must pass through.
    2. The statutory design: The Representation of the People Act, 1950 makes the ERO responsible for preparing and revising the roll. Article 324 gives the ECI superintendence, direction and control over that work.
    3. Enumeration forms: In the Special Intensive Revision (SIR), a fresh house-to-house check of the roll, each voter fills an enumeration form, and officials review these forms on ECINET.
    4. What is at stake: If the portal decides who may see those forms, whoever controls the portal controls what the ERO can do.
    5. The takeaway: Authority written into law can be narrowed by access settings written into code.

    What did the audit find?

    1. State Nodal Officer controls: ECINET has a management area to create, manage and update each State Nodal Officer (SNO), a State’s designated user of the portal, with a built-in disable action on each SNO row.
    2. Disable warning: The disable pop-up says that once an SNO is disabled, “the user will no longer be able to access the application”.
    3. State-wise viewing switch: The code carries the message “View enumeration form details is not enabled for selected State”. Viewing enumeration forms can therefore be switched on or off for each State.
    4. West Bengal-only feature: A separate feature can bar EROs and Assistant EROs (AEROs) only in West Bengal from reviewing enumeration forms and the notice-and-hearing dashboard.
    5. Uncertain timing: It is not clear since when the feature has existed. The report’s author, a data scientist, could locate it from September 28.

    Why does central control over access matter?

    1. Dissent inside the Commission: Election Commissioners Sukhbir Singh Sandhu and Vivek Joshi had objected to the centralisation of ECINET and the electoral roll database.
    2. Statutory safeguard argument: The Congress argues that EROs hold statutory authority over the roll. It says the ECINET system and the ECI’s IT division have overruled that safeguard.
    3. Political allegation: The Congress alleged that the Chief Election Commissioner (CEC) set up ECINET to centralise control at the instance of the Prime Minister and the Union Home Minister.
    4. Capability, not proven use: The audit documents what the code allows. It does not record when, or against whom, the switches have been used.

    Challenges

    1. Code over statute: Access rules built into software can override duties set by law, without any notification or public scrutiny.
    2. Discovery by outsiders: Such controls came to light only through an independent audit of the platform, not through ECI disclosure.
    3. State-specific treatment: A control aimed at one State’s officers alone raises a question of equal treatment. Eg. EROs and AEROs in West Bengal.
    4. Divided Commission: Open disagreement among Commission members over the platform weakens public trust in the ECI as one body.

    Way Forward

    1. Published access policy: The ECI should publish who can disable whose access on ECINET, and on what grounds.
    2. Audit trail: Log every use of the enable and disable switches, with the record open to the ERO concerned.
    3. Independent review: Commission an external governance and security audit of ECINET and place its findings in public.
    4. Full Commission approval: Bring any platform change that limits a statutory officer’s powers before all three members of the Commission.

    Conclusion

    ECINET has become the place where an ERO’s legal authority is either exercised or switched off, and the audit shows the switch sits at the centre. Whether the ECI explains the State-specific control and opens the platform’s access rules to scrutiny will decide whether its own members’ objections are answered.

    Matching Previous Year Question

    “[2026, GS2, 10 marks] Is the right to vote a fundamental right? Discuss the position of the Election Commission of India while undertaking the revision of electoral rolls. Can it also examine the question of citizenship of voters?”

  • Only 0.27% of 4.5 lakh Form 6s have been disposed of so far in Delhi

    Why in the News

    The claims and objections stage of Delhi’s Special Intensive Revision (SIR) is meant to put wrongly dropped voters back on the electoral roll, but only 1,238 of 4.5 lakh Form 6 applications for inclusion have been decided in 42 days. Over the same period, more than 5,800 Form 7 applications seeking deletions have been disposed of, and fewer than ten days remain to file for inclusion.

    What is Form 6, and how is it meant to work?

    1. What it is: Form 6 is the application to add a name to the electoral roll, meant for new voters and now also for those dropped. It is like re-registering at a library after a membership card was cancelled.
    2. Who must file it: Eligible citizens left out of the draft roll, the provisional list open to objection, must file it to enter the final roll, due on December 4.
    3. How it is checked: A Booth Level Officer (BLO), the field official for a polling booth, verifies the applicant in person and reports. The Electoral Registration Officer (ERO) decides on that report.
    4. The new declaration: Voters left out must attach a new declaration that asks for details of the previous SIR.
    5. The takeaway: Form 6 is the only road back onto the roll, so slow disposal keeps eligible voters off it as surely as a deletion does.

    How large is the backlog?

    1. Scale of deletions: The draft roll published on August 31 removed 47.5 lakh names under the ‘absent, shifted, dead and duplicate’ (ASDD) categories.
    2. Applications after the draft: About 2.39 lakh Form 6 applications came after the draft roll, from voters seeking re-inclusion or enrolling for the first time.
    3. Applications before the draft: The remaining 2.12 lakh were filed between June and August, before the draft roll was published.
    4. Constituencies with no disposal: No Form 6 has been decided in 15 of 70 constituencies. These include Burari, which saw Delhi’s highest deletions in absolute numbers.
    5. North district: Over 36,000 applications have been received there, and only 27 have been disposed of.

    Why are deletions moving faster than inclusions?

    1. Same field work for both: BLOs must verify applications for inclusion and objections alike. A Form 7 objection also carries a 15-day notice period, so deletion is not the lighter task.
    2. Notice cases first: The stated reason for the delay is that BLOs are busy with notice cases, the voters asked to prove their existing entries.
    3. Reverification order: The Chief Electoral Officer (CEO) has directed EROs to reverify the ASDD deletions through door-to-door BLO visits, which falls on the same staff.
    4. Counting rule: Disposal counts both accepted and rejected applications, so even the small number decided does not equal names restored.

    What are applicants facing?

    1. Rejection without reasons: An Okhla resident’s online applications for herself and her daughter, who turned 19 this year, were rejected twice. No BLO contacted them and the reason was not explained.
    2. Unreachable officials: Another applicant who shifted within the same area filed on September 18 and was assigned a BLO two days later. The BLO’s number was unreachable, and the BLO’s name was missing from the area’s BLO list.
    3. Declaration confusion: In parts of Delhi, BLOs are telling citizens that previous SIR details are mandatory.

    Challenges

    1. Deadline squeeze: Filing closes on October 30 and disposal is due by November 30, so a voter rejected late may have no chance to reapply.
    2. Overloaded BLOs: The same officers handle notice cases, reverification, inclusions and objections in one fixed window.
    3. Opaque rejections: A rejection with no stated reason leaves the applicant unable to correct the error.
    4. Tilt toward exclusion: Deciding deletions faster than inclusions shifts the final roll against eligible voters.

    Way Forward

    1. Disposal targets: The Delhi CEO should publish weekly, constituency-wise Form 6 disposal targets, starting with the constituencies where none has been decided.
    2. Reasoned orders: EROs should give written reasons for every rejection, with a fresh chance to file after the deadline.
    3. Extra verification staff: Deploy additional field staff only for Form 6 checks, so inclusions do not wait behind notice cases.
    4. Clear declaration rules: The CEO should state publicly what the new declaration requires and accept offline forms.

    Conclusion

    Delhi’s revision is removing names far faster than it is restoring them, and inclusion now depends on field staff already stretched by other duties. Whether disposal catches up before the final roll is published will decide how many eligible voters stay excluded.

    Matching Previous Year Question

    “[2026, GS2, 10 marks] Is the right to vote a fundamental right? Discuss the position of the Election Commission of India while undertaking the revision of electoral rolls. Can it also examine the question of citizenship of voters?”

  • Maharashtra request prompts four changes to poll panel software

    Why in the News

    Decisions on doubtful voter records in the Special Intensive Revision (SIR), a fresh house-to-house check of the whole electoral roll, are moving from fixed controls in ECINet, the Election Commission’s unified digital platform for roll work, back to the judgement of the Electoral Registration Officer (ERO). The Election Commission of India (ECI) has made four changes sought by Maharashtra’s Chief Electoral Officer (CEO), who argued that software was limiting powers the law gives EROs.

    What problem were the four changes meant to fix?

    1. What it is: In the SIR, a voter gets a notice when the record cannot be linked to the previous SIR roll or software flags a mismatch. It is like a bank querying a typo: a question, not a verdict.
    2. Logical discrepancies: Such flags include a mismatch in a parent’s name or an implausible age gap between parent and child. A flag of this kind does not establish that a voter is ineligible.
    3. Why the ERO matters: The Representation of the People Act, 1950 makes the ERO, one for each Assembly constituency, legally responsible for preparing and revising the roll.
    4. What went wrong: ECINet restricted what officers could accept or decide. The CEO’s letter of September 24 argued that these controls cut into the ERO’s legal powers.
    5. The takeaway: A software flag had begun to act like a final decision, and the officer the law trusts with the roll could not easily overrule it.

    What are the four changes?

    1. Home collection of documents: Voters no longer routinely attend hearings at the office of the ERO or Assistant Electoral Registration Officer (AERO). Booth Level Officers (BLOs), the booth-level field staff, collect documents at home and upload them.
    2. Hearings as the exception: A personal hearing is held only in exceptional cases, and preferably online.
    3. Open document list: Voters may now submit documents beyond the 13 categories listed in notices. The BLO App has been updated with an “Any other Documents” option.
    4. ERO decides discrepancies: Earlier, a case the ERO could not settle on a BLO’s report alone went to the District Election Officer (DEO) for verification. Now the ERO or AERO weighs the documents and field verification material directly.
    5. No duplicate extract: The mandatory upload of an “Extract of Last SIR” in every discrepancy case is removed, because the software already compares each record with the previous SIR roll.

    Why do the changes matter?

    1. Vulnerable voters: The CEO argued that the document list was indicative, not exhaustive, meaning examples rather than a closed list, since tribal, homeless and other vulnerable voters may hold none of the listed documents.
    2. Opportunity to prove eligibility: The Maharashtra CEO’s instructions require EROs to give eligible voters the chance to submit documents, so a flag alone does not remove them.
    3. Lighter field workload: Dropping the extract upload reduces the work of BLOs, who also carry out the home visits and field checks.
    4. Concern inside the Commission: The changes follow concerns of Election Commissioners Sukhbir Singh Sandhu and Vivek Joshi, reported in a newspaper investigation, that software controls were restricting officers’ powers.

    Challenges

    1. Software over statute: Controls coded into a platform can narrow powers the law gives EROs, with no public notice of what has been restricted.
    2. Uneven discretion: Wider ERO discretion can produce different outcomes for the same kind of discrepancy in different constituencies.
    3. Digital divide: Online hearings assume a phone and connectivity that the poorest and most mobile voters often lack.
    4. BLO overload: Home collection adds to the duties of BLOs in a revision that runs to fixed deadlines.

    Way Forward

    1. Published platform rules: The ECI should publish every ECINet control that limits an officer’s decision, with the legal provision it implements.
    2. Reasoned orders: EROs should record written reasons for each discrepancy decision, so that discretion can be reviewed on appeal.
    3. Common document criteria: The ECI should issue uniform guidance on accepting documents outside the listed categories.
    4. Offline option: Keep an in-person hearing available on request for voters who cannot use the online route.

    Conclusion

    The four changes return to the ERO a judgement that software had taken over, which is where the law places it. Whether the ECI audits and discloses the controls built into ECINet, instead of correcting them on a State’s request, will decide whether roll decisions stay with accountable officers.

    Matching Previous Year Question

    “[2026, GS2, 10 marks] Is the right to vote a fundamental right? Discuss the position of the Election Commission of India while undertaking the revision of electoral rolls. Can it also examine the question of citizenship of voters?”

  • The ECI’s unfinished lessons

    Why in the News

    The Election Commission of India’s (ECI) Special Intensive Revision (SIR) of electoral rolls has brought mass deletions, suspect deletion requests and questions over polling records. India’s first roll holds a lesson: nearly 28 lakh women were left off it, because they were listed only by their relationship to a man.

    What does an accurate electoral roll require?

    1. Inclusion as much as removal: An accurate roll drops dead, shifted and duplicate entries and keeps every eligible voter. It is like a class register that strikes off leavers and adds every new admission.
    2. The first roll’s lesson: Sukumar Sen, India’s first Chief Election Commissioner (CEC), worked to enrol these women in their own right. By the 1957 elections, about 85% of them had been enrolled.
    3. The takeaway: Correcting a wrongful exclusion matters as much as removing a wrong entry, because a remedy that comes too late results in a lost vote.

    What has the SIR exposed in Bihar and West Bengal?

    1. Bihar’s missing names: About 65 lakh names were missing from the draft roll published in August 2025. The ECI cited deaths, migration and duplicate entries.
    2. Court direction: The Supreme Court directed the ECI to publish the excluded voters with reasons, so voters can challenge errors.
    3. West Bengal’s backlog: More than 27 lakh names were deleted during adjudication, prompting around 22 lakh appeals.
    4. Appeal hurdles: Tribunal judges have flagged problems with the appeals portal and with issuing notices, holding hearings and restoring names.

    How should deletion requests be checked?

    1. Form 7: Form 7 is the application through which an elector can seek the deletion of a name from the roll.
    2. The Aland case: In Aland, Karnataka, 6,018 online applications sought deletions, and the ECI accepted only 24 after verification.
    3. Safeguards worked: The ECI rejected the other 5,994 as incorrect. An inquiry followed and a First Information Report (FIR) was registered.
    4. Who filed them: A concentrated pattern of requests requires the ECI to establish who submitted them and whether identities or documents were misused.

    Why do polling records and appointments shape trust?

    1. Maharashtra turnout: Reported turnout in Maharashtra’s last Assembly election rose from 58.22% in the evening to 66.05% in the final count. The ECI called the first figure provisional, but the jump needs explaining.
    2. Polling records rule: The government amended Rule 93 of the Conduct of Elections Rules, 1961 after a Punjab and Haryana High Court order to release election records. This raises concerns over access to CCTV footage and webcasting.
    3. Selection panel: In Anoop Baranwal v. Union of India (2023), a five-judge Constitution Bench made the Prime Minister, Leader of the Opposition and Chief Justice of India an interim panel to select election commissioners.
    4. Executive majority: Parliament later replaced the Chief Justice with a Union Cabinet Minister, so the government now controls two of the three votes.

    Challenges

    1. Rushed verification: Booth Level Officers (BLOs) face tough targets and tight deadlines, raising the risk of wrongful “shifted” or “dead” markings.
    2. Footage destruction: The ECI’s policy of destroying CCTV and webcasting footage after 45 days limits post-election scrutiny.
    3. Financial dependence: Unlike the Comptroller and Auditor General’s, the ECI’s budget is not charged on the Consolidated Fund of India, meaning released without Parliament’s annual vote, so it needs executive approval.

    Way Forward

    1. Traceable deletions: Every deletion request should leave a verifiable record of the applicant, the supporting evidence and the final decision.
    2. Time-bound appeals: Decide appeals and restore wrongly deleted names before the roll is frozen for polling.
    3. Examinable records: Keep polling records open to independent examination for a fixed period.
    4. Charged expenditure: Make ECI expenses charged on the Consolidated Fund, as the Law Commission’s 255th Report recommended.

    Conclusion

    The SIR shows the ECI can remove names at scale, but its credibility now rests on proving each removal and reversing wrongful ones before a vote is lost. The marker to watch is whether it publishes traceable deletion records and clears pending appeals before the next roll freeze.

    About the Special Intensive Revision (SIR)

    1. How it differs: Unlike the routine annual Summary Revision, an SIR is a time-bound house-to-house check, with BLOs verifying every entry.
    2. Constitutional basis: Article 324 gives the ECI “superintendence, direction and control” over the preparation of electoral rolls.
    3. Statutory basis: Section 21 of the Representation of the People Act, 1950 lets the ECI order a special revision at any time, for reasons recorded in writing.
    4. History: The first intensive revisions ran from 1952 to 1956, building India’s first voter list.

    Matching Previous Year Question

    “[2026, GS2, 10 marks] Is the right to vote a fundamental right? Discuss the position of the Election Commission of India while undertaking the revision of electoral rolls. Can it also examine the question of citizenship of voters?”

  • On right to internet, Court ruling isn’t enough

    Why in the News

    Access to and use of the internet has moved from a service the state often cuts as its first policing tool to a fundamental right under Articles 19 and 21 of the Constitution. The Supreme Court ruling that made this declaration also tightened the rules on child sexual exploitation and abuse material (CSEAM) online. A right declared on paper does not by itself stop internet shutdowns.

    What did the Court order on child abuse material online?

    1. What CSEAM is: CSEAM is any image, video or text depicting or promoting the sexual abuse of children. The Court cited gaps in platforms’ compliance with the Information Technology Rules, which set their duties.
    2. National database: The Court directed the government to build a national database of digital identifiers, codes that let a known abuse file be recognised without viewing it, like a fingerprint record.
    3. “Known origin” takedown: Platforms must remove any upload that matches the database, even without verifying the match themselves. The Court suggested hefty fines for non-compliance.
    4. Propensity test: Intermediaries, the platforms that carry users’ content, must judge material by its propensity to facilitate exploitation, meaning whether it is likely to help abuse children, even when it is not explicit.
    5. The takeaway: Child safety needs more proactive state action, but such a database needs carefully built safeguards against misuse, set in law and institutions, not just the Court’s assurance.

    What does a fundamental right to internet access change?

    1. Two guarantees: Article 19 guarantees the freedom of speech and expression, and Article 21 the right to life and personal liberty. Internet access now sits within both.
    2. Direct remedy: A citizen denied access can move the Supreme Court directly for enforcement, under Article 32, the right to constitutional remedies.
    3. Limits on future laws: Any future law curbing screen time must stay within narrowly defined, constitutionally permissible limits.
    4. Shutdowns as policing: Restricting the internet is often the state’s first policing measure, so the right matters most where it is most often curtailed.

    Why may a declared right still fall short?

    1. Expansion without enforcement: Scholars have long noted that the Court expands Article 21 faster than it steps in to secure the rights under it.
    2. Rights on paper: Citizens are told they have a right to a speedy trial, clean air or safe roads, but cannot meaningfully invoke these in court when the state fails to deliver.
    3. The shutdown test: The right must be applied when shutdowns are imposed unreasonably and disproportionately, with harm out of scale to the threat. The Court must then restrain the state, not defer the question.

    Challenges

    1. Frequent shutdowns: India often leads the world in local internet blackouts ordered to maintain public order. Eg. Repeated shutdowns in Manipur.
    2. Weak earlier safeguards: Anuradha Bhasin v. Union of India (2020) ruled against indefinite shutdowns, yet shutdown orders continue with little review.
    3. Over-removal: Removing database matches without verification can take down lawful content wrongly tagged as abuse material.
    4. Vague standard: A “propensity” test leaves platforms guessing, so the threat of fines pushes them to remove more than the law requires.
    5. Digital divide: A right means little to those without access. Eg. A 25% gender gap in rural mobile internet use.

    Way Forward

    1. Database law: Parliament should set rules on who adds identifiers to the database, how it is audited and how wrongful takedowns are appealed.
    2. Shutdown review: Publish every shutdown order and review it within a fixed time for necessity and proportionality, as the Anuradha Bhasin guidelines require.
    3. Clear guidance: The Ministry of Electronics and Information Technology (MeitY) should define the propensity test with examples so platforms apply it consistently.
    4. User appeals: Give users a quick route to contest the removal of their content.

    Conclusion

    The ruling adds internet access to a growing list of rights the Court has declared but not always secured. Its worth will be tested the next time a State orders a disproportionate shutdown and a citizen asks the Court to lift it.

    Back2Basics: Safe harbour for intermediaries

    1. Meaning: Safe harbour shields an intermediary from legal liability for content its users post, under Section 79 of the Information Technology Act, 2000.
    2. Condition: The shield holds only as long as the platform follows the due diligence duties in the IT Rules, 2021, such as removing unlawful content on a government order.
    3. Larger platforms: Significant social media intermediaries, those with over 50 lakh users, carry extra duties, such as appointing resident compliance officers.

    Matching Previous Year Question

    “[2015, GS2, 12 marks] Does the right to clean environment entail legal regulations on burning crackers during Diwali? Discuss in the light of Article 21 of the Indian Constitution and Judgement(s) of the Apex Court in this regard.”

  • India’s tech sector needs deeper pools of risk capital

    Why in the News

    Seed funding for Indian technology start-ups fell 37% to $698 million in the first nine months of 2026, a second straight year of decline. India now has the world’s largest pool of developers contributing to public and open-source code. Yet the money that turns this talent into Indian-owned products is shrinking.

    What is risk capital, and why does ownership depend on it?

    1. What it is: Risk capital is money put into unproven ideas, accepting that most will fail, for a share of the few that succeed. It is like sowing many seeds knowing few will sprout.
    2. Seed and early stage: Seed funding is a start-up’s first outside money, before the idea is proven. Early-stage funding follows once a company shows traction, meaning early customers or revenue.
    3. Why ownership needs it: Product ownership is created early, when failure rates are high, so someone must back a founder’s belief in an idea before there is proof it works.
    4. The takeaway: If capital dries up just when founders turn ideas into products, India’s path from capability to ownership becomes harder.

    Where does India capture the value of its tech talent?

    1. Jobs and salaries: India clearly captures this layer. The technology industry employs about 5.8 million people, and Global Capability Centres (GCCs), the in-house technology units of multinationals, about 2.36 million.
    2. Profits and enterprise value: Indian IT companies sell services globally and keep margins and enterprise value, a firm’s total worth, in India. Export revenue splits roughly evenly between Indian providers and multinationals.
    3. High-value work: GCCs that once handled support now house product engineering, artificial intelligence (AI), architecture and research and development (R&D), bringing better-paid roles into India.
    4. Products and intellectual property (IP): This layer remains thin. Software products are only about $16.1 billion of India’s $282.6 billion technology industry, as estimated by the National Association of Software and Service Companies (NASSCOM).

    Why is capital becoming more selective, and why does it matter?

    1. Selective investors: Early-stage funding rose 27% to $4.2 billion as seed funding fell, so money is flowing to firms that have already shown traction. Each investor’s choice is rational, yet seed funding as a whole still falls.
    2. Career choice: A skilled engineer can join an Indian IT firm, a global product company, a GCC or a start-up. Only the start-up offers ownership, with far more uncertainty.
    3. Infrastructure is not capital: India has invested in research centres, incubators, public funding programmes and R&D facilities, but these cannot substitute for capital willing to accept early failure.
    4. Disciplined, not indiscriminate: Most early ideas fail, so funding should stay disciplined. The need is for deep pools that back ideas before the evidence is overwhelming.

    Challenges

    1. Two-year seed slump: Seed funding had already fallen 30% in 2025, so the thinning of first money is a trend, not a blip.
    2. Pull of GCCs: High salaries and global work at GCCs draw away engineers most able to found product companies.
    3. Services-heavy industry: India is far stronger in technology services and global delivery than in building and owning globally scaled products.
    4. AI uncertainty: It is unknown whether AI will mean India needs more developers or fewer, which clouds a talent-led strategy.

    Way Forward

    1. Domestic long-term money: Let more pension and insurance savings flow into regulated venture capital funds to deepen domestic risk capital.
    2. Seed-stage focus: Direct public fund-of-funds commitments towards seed-stage funds rather than later rounds that private investors already serve.
    3. Government as first buyer: Let ministries buy from Indian product start-ups, giving them the early customers investors look for.

    Conclusion

    India’s technology story now turns on ownership rather than talent, and ownership depends on capital willing to back ideas before they are proven. Whether seed funding recovers from its slide is the marker to watch.

    Government initiatives for start-up risk capital

    1. Startup India: Launched in 2016 by the Department for Promotion of Industry and Internal Trade (DPIIT), it has helped make India the third-largest start-up ecosystem, with about 1.9 lakh recognised start-ups.
    2. Fund of Funds for Startups: Run by the Small Industries Development Bank of India (SIDBI), it invests in Alternative Investment Funds (AIFs), which back start-ups, rather than in firms directly.
    3. Startup India Seed Fund Scheme: DPIIT’s scheme routes seed money through selected incubators for proof of concept, prototypes and market entry.
    4. Research, Development and Innovation (RDI) Scheme: A Rs 1 lakh crore window, approved in 2025, offering long-tenure, low or nil interest loans and equity for private research.

    Matching Previous Year Question

    “[2025] With reference to investments, consider the following: I. Bonds II. Hedge Funds III. Stocks IV. Venture Capital How many of the above are treated as Alternative Investment Funds? (a) Only one (b) Only two (c) Only three (d) All the four ANSWER: (b)”

  • Harvesting the Sun, and powering the farm

    Why in the News

    India is hosting the seventh AgriVoltaics World Conference at Bharat Mandapam, New Delhi, this week, on the theme ‘Powering the Global South’. Growing crops and solar power on one plot can give small and marginal farmers, about 86% of India’s farmers, a second income without giving up cultivation.

    What is agrivoltaics, and why does it suit Indian farms?

    1. What it is: Agrivoltaics (AgriPV) grows crops and generates solar power on the same land, using structures and spacing suited to farming. It is like a field under a raised roof of solar panels.
    2. Why farmers need it: A good harvest does not always bring a good income, because weather, input costs and market prices can upset a farm household’s budget.
    3. PM-KUSUM link: The Ministry of New and Renewable Energy’s (MNRE) Pradhan Mantri Kisan Urja Suraksha evam Utthaan Mahabhiyan (PM-KUSUM) has already solarised irrigation, meaning irrigation now runs on solar power. Its next phase will create separate space for AgriPV.
    4. The takeaway: One plot can yield food and electricity, so solar expansion need not compete with farming for land.

    What can agrivoltaics offer the farmer?

    1. Electricity income: Power from the panels gives the cultivator an additional source of revenue alongside the crop.
    2. Lower energy costs: Where solar power replaces diesel or purchased electricity, the farm’s running costs fall.
    3. Crop protection: The shade under the panels creates a favourable microclimate, meaning milder local conditions, protecting crops against heat stress, drought, excessive solar radiation and hail.
    4. Rural jobs: Installation, maintenance and farm services create local work, helped by domestic manufacturing and transparent procurement.

    What does a working agrivoltaic plot need?

    1. Shade tolerant crops: Crop choice should favour shade tolerance, morphological plasticity (a plant’s ability to change its form in lower light) and stable yields under intermittent sunlight.
    2. Field management: Planting crops in strips between panel rows, called alley-based planting, keeps yields up when irrigation and nutrients are adequate.
    3. Light threshold: Designs should keep around 70% or more of natural sunlight reaching the crop canopy. Adjustable panels can let in more light during sensitive growth stages.

    What groundwork does India already have?

    1. ICAR-CAZRI, Jodhpur: The Indian Council of Agricultural Research’s (ICAR) Central Arid Zone Research Institute has tested cultivation alongside solar generation and rainwater harvesting.
    2. BAIF, Pune: BAIF’s Rural Innovation Centre is testing different panel configurations across a range of crops.
    3. Centre of Excellence on Agri-Photovoltaics: This 100 kW centre was set up in 2025 at the Indian Agricultural Research Institute (IARI), New Delhi. ICAR and the National Institute of Solar Energy (NISE) run it jointly.
    4. Two years of field data: The Centre’s data will show which crops suit AgriPV, its working limits, and how best to combine fields and panels.
    5. Global South partnership: The International Solar Alliance (ISA), launched by India and France, offers a base for joint field research and training with countries short of land and water.

    Challenges

    1. Farmer trust: Cultivators may sign agreements without understanding the return to expect or who bears each responsibility.
    2. Land rights: Long solar contracts can weaken a farmer’s hold on land, and tenant cultivators and women farmers have little say in projects.
    3. High upfront cost: Raised structures cost more than ground-mounted panels, which modest holdings struggle to finance.
    4. Yield risk: Panels that block too much light cut crop output, turning a second income into a trade-off.

    Way Forward

    1. Joint planning: Agriculture and energy departments should plan together with States, research institutions and local bodies.
    2. Plain contracts: Standard agreements should state the expected return and each party’s duties simply, keeping land ownership with the farmer.
    3. Inclusive design: Give tenant cultivators and women farmers a formal voice in project design and benefit sharing.
    4. Affordable finance: Develop low-cost structures and credit suited to small holdings, not only better solar technology.

    Conclusion

    Agrivoltaics can make farmland yield both food and power, but only if the small farmer trusts the deal and can afford the structure. The marker to watch is whether the conference yields field projects with contracts small farmers understand.

    Solar energy in India

    1. Installed capacity: India crossed 150 GW of installed solar capacity in March 2026.
    2. Farm solar share: 14.10 GW of this comes from KUSUM and off-grid projects, against 110.43 GW from utility-scale plants.
    3. Potential: NISE estimates a solar potential of 748 GW if only 3% of wasteland is used.
    4. Land need: Solar plants occupy at least 5 acres per 1 MW. Eg. Farmers protested against the Dholera Solar Park in Gujarat.

    Matching Previous Year Question

    “[2022, GS3, 15 marks] Do you think India will meet 50 percent of its energy needs from renewable energy by 2030 ? Justify your answer. How will the shift of subsidies from fossil fuels to renewables help achieve the above objective? Explain.”