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  • ‘UN Convention on the Law of the Sea is still the constitution of oceans’

    ‘UN Convention on the Law of the Sea is still the constitution of oceans’

    Why in the News

    The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) remains the governing framework for the world’s oceans, in the assessment of Tommy Koh. He presided over the Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea, and led more than 150 nations to adopt the Convention in 1982. He is among this year’s Ramon Magsaysay award winners. He puts the number of parties at 172 and treats that as near universal. The United States has never ratified the Convention and still regards it as the authoritative law of the sea. Iran is not a party either, and the regime of transit passage binds it as customary international law. The Convention’s authority is therefore being tested in the Strait of Hormuz against a state that never accepted the treaty.

    What is UNCLOS?

    1. What it is: A comprehensive treaty setting the legal order for the world’s oceans, adopted in 1982 after nine years of negotiation and in force since 1994.
    2. What it allocates: It fixes the maritime zones a coastal state may claim and the rights it holds in each, running outward from the territorial sea to the exclusive economic zone, the continental shelf and the high seas.
    3. What it does with the deep seabed: Part XI treats the deep seabed and its minerals as the “common heritage of mankind”, to be administered for all states rather than claimed by any one of them.
    4. Why it is described as a constitution: It settles jurisdiction, resource rights and dispute settlement in one instrument, so later ocean agreements are negotiated inside its framework rather than beside it.

    Why has the United States never ratified UNCLOS?

    1. The objection was to the seabed regime, not to the law of the sea: The Reagan Administration rejected Part XI as incompatible with free enterprise and private property norms.
    2. It reversed an earlier American position: The stance taken during the Carter Administration was changed under President Reagan, and the demands that followed were rejected by the developing countries.
    3. The 1994 repair did not change the outcome: A separate agreement in 1994 revised the Part XI arrangements to meet those objections, and ratification still did not follow.
    4. Non ratification is not confined to one objector: Iran and a number of other states have also stayed outside the Convention.

    What binds a state that is not a party?

    1. The count itself does the work: With 172 parties, the Convention’s rules describe general state practice rather than the internal arrangements of a treaty club.
    2. Custom reaches the non party: Transit passage through international straits has passed into customary international law, so it binds Iran although Iran never joined the Convention.
    3. The dispute is political rather than legal: There was no trouble in the Strait of Hormuz before the war, so the priority is ending the war rather than rewriting the law that governs the strait.
    4. A fourth conference answers the wrong question: Reopening the Convention to bring the remaining states in would put a settled architecture back on the negotiating table, and near universal participation already exists without it.

    Where does the Convention not reach?

    1. Dark fleet enforcement is happening outside it: States are designating vessels as a “dark fleet” and taking punitive material action against them, including on the high seas.
    2. The forum named for that problem is the IMO: The International Maritime Organization, rather than a law of the sea conference, is where the practice should be addressed.
    3. Boundary disputes are read as application, not failure: Exclusive economic zone and seabed contests in the South China Sea and over Indian Ocean boundaries are treated as arguments inside the Convention’s architecture rather than as evidence that the architecture has stopped working.

    Conclusion

    A treaty honoured by states that never signed it is strong in one sense and weak in another. Its rules describe how states actually behave, which is precisely what turns them into custom. It carries no way of compelling a state that decides to behave differently, because the states outside it are the ones its dispute settlement machinery cannot reach. That gap is where a closed strait sits, and no further round of accessions would close it.

    Back2Basics: International Maritime Organization

    1. What it is: The United Nations specialised agency responsible for the safety and security of shipping and for preventing marine pollution by ships.
    2. When it was established: It was created by a convention adopted in 1948, began functioning in 1959, and is headquartered in London.
    3. What it produces: Its principal instruments are the International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS) and the International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships (MARPOL).
    4. How it enforces: It sets standards that flag states then apply to ships registered with them, so it regulates through member state implementation rather than by direct enforcement at sea.

    [2022] With reference to the United Nations Convention on the Law of Sea, consider the following statements :

    1. A coastal state has the right to establish the breadth of its territorial sea up to a limit not exceeding 12 nautical miles, measured from baseline determined in accordance with the convention.

    2. Ships of all states, whether coastal or land-locked, enjoy the right of innocent passage through the territorial sea.

    3. The Exclusive Economic Zone shall not extend beyond 200 nautical miles from the baseline from which the breadth of the territorial sea is measured.

    Which of the statements given above are correct ?

    (a) 1 and 2 only

    (b) 2 and 3 only

    (c) 1 and 3 only

    (d) 1, 2 and 3

  • Focus on the children, not the platform

    Focus on the children, not the platform

    Why in the News

    Meta has settled a $171 billion case with several United States States over allegations about the effect of its apps on children’s mental health. The settlement requires daily usage limits and “nighttime blocks” for teenagers. It requires “enhanced age assurance measures” (checks intended to establish a user’s age before access is granted) to keep children off the apps. It also requires the depersonalisation of feeds, so a child is served random content rather than content matched to that child’s interests. The outcome is being read as a step towards holding platforms accountable. That framing places the platform at the centre of the problem rather than the child, and the two framings do not produce the same policy.

    Why does a platform centric approach to child safety misfire?

    1. The measures are difficult to enforce: An age gate assumes a child will not defeat it, while children are sophisticated and motivated users of technology who find ways around such checks.
    2. It ignores what children need to be safe online: Poorly designed recommendation systems expose children to harmful content, and stripping personalisation replaces that risk with irrelevant or inappropriate material. It also makes it harder for educational and support services to reach the children who need them.
    3. Online spaces are the only support some children have: Children experiencing neglect or abuse, LGBTQIA+ children and socially isolated children use platforms to find information, companionship or help. A child’s participation is not confined to one service, so a platform that becomes too restrictive simply loses them to platforms with weaker protections.
    4. The offline environment is what pushes children online: In India screens fill a vacuum rather than displacing abundant offline opportunities, because many children have no access to safe public spaces or affordable recreational facilities.

    What would a child centred approach ask for instead?

    1. Equip the child, as is done in the physical world: Children are taught what not to share, how to respond to unsolicited contact, how to recognise manipulation, when to block or report someone, and when to seek help.
    2. Treat digital literacy as the instrument, not the afterthought: Digital literacy and sensitisation are what change a child’s behaviour at the moment a technical control fails, and they receive far less policy attention than platform obligations.
    3. Address the whole ecology of childhood: Responsibility sits across platforms, parents, schools, communities, public spaces and children themselves, so a measure aimed at one of the six leaves the other five untouched.

    Why does the harder answer receive less policy attention?

    1. A platform obligation is visible and countable: A regulator can order a control, verify that it shipped, and record compliance, none of which a curriculum or a public playground delivers on the same timescale.
    2. India’s move so far is a recommendation, not a mandate: The 2026 Economic Survey called for a digital wellness curriculum in schools, and whether it is implemented widely and appropriately is untested.
    3. The effective lever sits outside the regulator’s reach: Digital literacy runs through school systems and recreational space runs through municipalities, while enforcement powers sit with technology and data protection regulators.
    4. The argument does not absolve platforms: Platform responsibility survives intact, and the contest is over which lever produces a safer child rather than over whether platforms owe anything at all.

    Conclusion

    Child online safety is presently measured by the number of controls a service ships. The better measure is what a child is able to do when a control fails, and the settlement model produces no information about that at all. The capability side of the problem belongs to schools, parents and municipalities. The enforcement side belongs to a technology regulator, and nobody owns the gap between the two.

    Child Online Safety in India

    1. What the field covers: The rules governing children’s access to online services, the data those services may collect about a child, and the content they may direct at one.
    2. How India regulates it: Through due diligence obligations on intermediaries under technology law and consent rules under data protection law, rather than through a single children’s online safety statute.
    3. Who counts as a child: Indian data protection law treats every person below 18 as a child, a higher threshold than the 13 year line used in United States children’s privacy law.

    Laws and Rules Governing Child Online Safety

    1. Information Technology Act, 2000, amended in 2008: The parent statute for offences committed through a computer resource, carrying Section 66D on cheating by impersonation and Section 69 on interception.
    2. Section 67B separately punishes publishing or transmitting material depicting children in sexually explicit acts.
    3. Information Technology (Intermediary Guidelines and Digital Media Ethics Code) Rules, 2021, amended in 2023: Impose due diligence, grievance redressal and content takedown obligations on intermediaries.
    4. Digital Personal Data Protection Act, 2023, with the Digital Personal Data Protection Rules, 2025: Govern consent, data fiduciary duties, breach notification and the Data Protection Board of India.
    5. Section 9 requires verifiable parental consent before a child’s personal data is processed, and bars tracking, behavioural monitoring and advertising targeted at children.
    6. Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012: Defines and punishes sexual offences against persons below 18, covers offences committed using electronic material, and makes reporting mandatory.

    [2024, GS3, 10 marks] Describe the context and salient features of the Digital Personal Data Protection Act, 2023.

  • Missing: boundary walls, bathrooms, blackboards

    Why in the News

    Government schools across Bihar, Rajasthan, Uttar Pradesh and Madhya Pradesh are running without boundary walls, functional wash rooms, sufficient classrooms or electricity. Children in several of them sit on verandas, under trees, or in a single room shared with storage almirahs and meal utensils. A citizen audit campaign called ‘School thik karo’, run by the Cockroach Janta Party (CJP) since 15 August, asks residents to download a checklist, audit their local school and post the findings, covering drinking water, boundary walls, wash rooms and midday meals. These schools have sanctioned buildings, sanctioned teaching posts and an annual maintenance head in the budget. What is absent is the capacity to convert those into a room a child can sit in. State attention has meanwhile moved to a small tier of flagship institutions.

    What did the four State ground reports find?

    1. Bihar, schools operating without a facility of any kind: Three schools in Muzaffarpur and Vaishali districts run without a boundary wall, a wash room or storage for midday meal supplies.
    2. A primary school of 119 students, established in 1982, has plaster falling from the corridor its two classrooms open onto. Its six teachers use neighbours’ bathrooms and the children go in the open.
    3. A middle school of 283 students has two rooms, so Class 8 sits on the veranda and Classes 1 and 2 sit under a tree behind the kitchen.
    4. A primary school in Vaishali has no building of its own. It runs 91 students across Classes 1 to 5 in a single room of a community centre, alongside department almirahs and meal utensils.
    5. Rajasthan, the approach to the school is itself the barrier: In Unchki village of Deeg district there is no public road to the school, so students walk through a graveyard and a muddy path to reach it.
    6. Corridors serve as classrooms in three schools of the district, and one teacher takes Classes 4 and 5 together for want of rooms or electricity.
    7. None of the three has functional wash rooms, so children walk home in the middle of the school day and return.
    8. The district falls within the National Capital Region and lies 165 km from Delhi.
    9. Uttar Pradesh, the cost of a dirty wash room: A cab driver in Lucknow is moving his 11 year old daughter out of a government primary school after a prolonged urinary tract infection that the family attributes to the school’s wash room.
    10. The transfer costs an additional Rs 4,000 a month, which the household is meeting by cutting other spending.
    11. Drinking water at the school arrives intermittently and the wash room’s water supply is often dysfunctional, so students fetch water from nearby houses.
    12. Madhya Pradesh, buildings condemned and services withdrawn: A middle school in Hirapur village of Sehore district runs eight classes in three rooms, after the primary block on the same premises was abandoned six months ago.
    13. Its 22 students sit on mats without benches, in rooms with dim lighting, broken almirahs, fans that do not work and rainwater seeping through the roof.
    14. One of the two student wash rooms is functional, so girls and boys use the same toilet.
    15. The self help group contracted to cook the midday meal stopped three months ago, and the school in charge is buying ration himself while awaiting reimbursement.
    16. A second school 20 km away, of 104 students, has had its electricity connection cut because water leaking through the ceiling was reaching the wiring.

    Where does the teaching itself break down?

    1. Attendance runs at roughly half the roll: Teachers at the three Rajasthan schools say 50 to 60 percent of enrolled students come on a given day, and they attribute part of that absence to the infrastructure.
    2. Posted teachers are absent or shared: At one Rajasthan school neither of the two teachers came on the day of the visit, and a teacher posted elsewhere visits only after finishing his own school day.
    3. Senior classes go unstaffed: At the Madhya Pradesh school of 104 students, all three teachers for Classes 6 to 8 were on leave and the principal was away at a training exercise, leaving two primary teachers in charge.
    4. The commute eats the school day: One headmaster travels 15 km each way and a teacher 40 km daily by motorcycle to reach schools in rural Bihar.
    5. Staff are under orders not to speak: Teachers in the Rajasthan schools said their supervisors had instructed them not to speak to the media, so their complaints surface only anonymously.

    Why do repairs not happen even when schools ask for them?

    1. The annual grant cannot fund a repair: One Madhya Pradesh school receives Rs 25,000 a year for miscellaneous works, which is spent on hiring a worker once a month to clean the wash rooms.
    2. Proposals go unanswered for years: That school has sent annual repair proposals for five years without a response, over the same period its building has been in poor condition.
    3. The panchayat fills the gap the department leaves: Its floor, boundary wall and gate were built by the village panchayat after a school alumnus became its head.
    4. Budget is the stated reason given to schools: Rajasthan teachers say district authorities answer requests for more classrooms by citing the absence of budget, while the District Magistrate’s position is that complaints are acted on quickly and vacancies filled regularly.
    5. Attention has moved to a flagship tier: A State School Education Department official says the focus in Madhya Pradesh has been on Sandipani Schools, earlier called CM Rise, and Excellence schools, so small rural schools have struggled for basic infrastructure.

    Who stays in these schools, and who leaves?

    1. The exit has a price: A private school near the Rajasthan cluster costs about Rs 18,000 a year, which a grandparent says rules out sending all his grandchildren to one.
    2. Enrolment collapses where an alternative exists: The Madhya Pradesh middle school runs eight classes for fewer children than a single functioning class would hold, and the school in charge says dominant communities in the village send their children to private schools.
    3. Those who remain are the poorest: Most of the students left at that school are from marginalised communities, and its neglect tracks who is left in it.
    4. Residents read the neglect as targeted: Locals around the Rajasthan schools allege that their requests are ignored because they live in predominantly Muslim areas.
    5. The reason parents give is not academic: The Lucknow parent cites a peaceful atmosphere in which a child can concentrate, not examination results, as what the private school offers.

    Conclusion

    A school counts as functioning in the record when it has a building, a sanctioned staff strength and a maintenance head in the budget. None of those three states whether a child can sit in a lit room, use a toilet, or eat a cooked meal that day. The forward move is to make the release of school funds conditional on periodic physical verification of those conditions, rather than on the return the school files about itself. Until that link exists, the audit is being done by residents with a downloaded checklist while departmental records show nothing wrong.

    Back2Basics: Sandipani Schools, earlier CM Rise Schools

    1. What they are: A Madhya Pradesh government programme creating a tier of well resourced composite schools, running from the pre primary stage to Class 12 on a single campus.
    2. What they provide: Selected schools receive upgraded buildings, laboratories, libraries, digital classrooms and transport for students drawn from surrounding villages.
    3. How they differ from an ordinary school: They are a small, high investment tier rather than a universal upgrade, so a district holds a handful of them alongside its regular government schools.
    4. Why the name changed: The schools were launched as CM Rise Schools and were later renamed Sandipani Vidyalaya.

    [2022, GS2, 15 marks] The Right of Children to Free and Compulsory Education Act, 2009 remains inadequate in promoting incentive-based system for children’s education without generating awareness about the importance of schooling. Analyse.”

  • Play leading role in skilling push: Govt tells industry

    Play leading role in skilling push: Govt tells industry

    Why in the News

    The Ministry of Skill Development and Entrepreneurship has asked industry to take the leading role in the Pradhan Mantri Skilling and Employability Transformation through Upgraded ITIs (PM-SETU) scheme. The scheme’s own design already places industry there. Industry partners take a controlling 51 percent stake in the Section 8 companies (not for profit companies registered under the Companies Act, 2013, which cannot pay dividends to their members) that will manage clusters of Industrial Training Institutes (ITIs). The Centre and the States put up the bulk of the money. Industry’s 17 percent share qualifies as Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) spending. Control over curriculum, technology and delivery therefore passes to a partner whose own contribution comes out of a statutory obligation rather than commercial risk capital.

    What is PM-SETU?

    1. What it is: A central scheme carrying an outlay of Rs 60,000 crore to upgrade government Industrial Training Institutes.
    2. What it funds: Upgraded laboratories, new machines and revised trade curricula at the institutes it covers.
    3. What it is measured on: Employability, since the stated purpose is the quality and relevance of vocational training rather than the number of training seats created.

    What does the ownership structure change?

    1. Industry holds control of the managing entity: Industry partners take a controlling 51 percent stake in the Section 8 companies that will manage ITI clusters.
    2. The state pays and industry decides: The Centre and the States provide the bulk of the funding, against an industry contribution of 17 percent.
    3. The industry share is a statutory obligation, not risk capital: That 17 percent is eligible under Corporate Social Responsibility, so the controlling partner can meet it from money the Companies Act, 2013 already requires it to spend.
    4. What moves into the partner’s hands: Curriculum design, technology adoption and the running of skill development pass to the industry partner.

    Why is industry being asked to lead?

    1. The demand side gets to write the syllabus: Placing curriculum and technology decisions with employers is meant to keep trade training aligned to the machines and processes actually in use.
    2. The immediate driver is the energy and manufacturing transition: The appeal was addressed to the power and utilities industry, whose workforce requirements are changing as generation and grid technology change.
    3. A working cluster is being held up as the model: ArcelorMittal’s leadership of the Vizag cluster has been cited as the benchmark for what the arrangement should produce.
    4. Institute workshops lag the shop floor: ITIs have long trained on equipment that industry has already replaced, which is the specific gap upgraded labs and employer set curricula are meant to close.

    Challenges to PM-SETU

    1. Most trades have no anchor employer: A cluster needs a large firm willing to hold a controlling stake and carry the management burden, which exists in steel or power and not across most trades an ITI teaches. Eg. Plumbing, welding and electrical work are served largely by contractors and micro enterprises, with no single firm able to lead a cluster.
      The Fix: Allow a sector skill council or an industry association to hold the controlling stake in trades where no single anchor firm exists.
    2. Corporate Social Responsibility money contracts in a downturn: A partner funding its share from CSR can redirect that spending in a year when its own hiring slows. Eg. The obligation is calculated at two percent of average net profits of the preceding three financial years, so it falls exactly when industrial demand falls.
      The Fix: Fix the industry contribution as a multi year commitment inside the cluster agreement, so a cluster’s operating budget does not track one partner’s profits.
    3. Control is granted without an outcome obligation: A controlling stake gives industry decision rights over publicly funded assets with no placement or wage commitment attached to those rights. Eg. The National Apprenticeship Promotion Scheme has repeatedly recorded engagement below its sanctioned targets, since participation carried no binding hiring commitment.
      The Fix: Tie renewal of a cluster’s management contract to verified placement and wage outcomes for its trainees.
    4. Clusters will form where industry already is: The model reproduces the existing gap between industrialised and lagging States, because the anchor employer is the precondition. Eg. Institutes in the north eastern States operate with far thinner employer presence than those in Tamil Nadu, Gujarat or Maharashtra.
      The Fix: Reserve a share of central funding for clusters in districts with no large anchor employer, with a public sector undertaking as the lead partner.
    5. The trained worker is a poachable asset: A Section 8 company cannot distribute surplus, so a firm’s only return is the workers it hires, and a competitor can hire them instead. Eg. A firm that trains a welder who then joins a rival bears the full cost and gets none of the benefit, which is the standard problem in employer funded training.
      The Fix: Publish cluster wise trainee supply data so participating firms recruit from a pool they collectively financed rather than each underwriting a rival’s hiring.

    Conclusion

    The scheme moves the state from provider of vocational training to financier of it. That works where a large employer wants the workers and is willing to run the institution, and the scheme has not said who takes charge in the trades where neither condition holds. The marker to watch is the first set of cluster agreements, and specifically whether any hiring or wage commitment is attached to the controlling stake.

    Back2Basics: Industrial Training Institutes

    1. What they are: Post school institutions offering trade level vocational training in engineering and non engineering trades, entered after Class 8, 10 or 12 depending on the trade.
    2. Who runs them: Government institutes are run by State governments alongside a large private sector, with standards set by the Directorate General of Training under the Ministry of Skill Development and Entrepreneurship.
    3. What a trainee gets: Trainees sit the All India Trade Test and are awarded the National Trade Certificate.
    4. Where they sit in the system: They form the country’s oldest and largest formal vocational training network, run under the Craftsmen Training Scheme since 1950.

    [2023, GS2, 15 marks] Skill development programs have succeed in increasing human resources supply to various sectors. In the context of the statement analyze the linkages between education, skill and employment.

  • Centre’s rationale for not using OBC lists for caste enumeration is flawed, say associations

    Centre’s rationale for not using OBC lists for caste enumeration is flawed, say associations

    Why in the News

    Associations representing Other Backward Classes (OBC) have rejected the Union government’s stated reason for not using the Central and State OBC lists in the caste enumeration component of the 2027 Census. The government’s position is that those lists record classes rather than castes, so caste names cannot be drawn and codified from them. Castes other than the Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes will instead be recorded through an open column, in which the enumerator writes down what the respondent states. The associations argue that a government which recognises these communities as OBCs for reservation cannot disregard their caste identities when it collects population data. What is contested is whether an enumeration run without a pre-coded caste frame can produce a usable OBC population figure at all.

    How would the two methods of enumeration differ?

    1. The open column method: Castes other than the Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes are recorded as stated by the respondent, without a pre-coded list of caste names for the enumerator to select from.
    2. The list based alternative: Caste names would have been drawn from the Central and State OBC lists and codified in advance, so responses map onto a fixed set of entries.
    3. Where the lists already exist: The Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes are enumerated against notified lists, which is the precedent the associations point to.

    What is the government’s reason, and how do the associations answer it?

    1. The stated rationale: The OBC lists identify backward classes rather than castes, so caste names cannot be lifted from them for enumeration.
    2. The associations’ core objection: The All India OBC Students’ Association (AIOBCSA) calls the class and caste distinction artificial, arguing that a government recognising these communities as OBCs for reservation and other affirmative action cannot then disregard their caste identities when collecting population data.
    3. Fix the lists rather than drop them: The associations say that if the existing lists are inadequate or carry inconsistencies for enumeration, the government should use experts to draw and rationalise the caste names from them, not “drop them altogether”.
    4. Administrative records already do both: The AIOBCSA points out that certificates and official records routinely identify communities by their specific social and caste identities, and that even Economically Weaker Section certificates identify the beneficiary through prescribed social or category criteria. Administrative classification and social identity therefore coexist in practice.
    5. A charge of bad faith: The OBC Public Representatives Forum said the justification adds to the perception that the government agreed to enumerate castes with no real intention of doing it properly.

    Why do the associations link this to the EWS estimate?

    1. The estimate behind EWS: When the Economically Weaker Section (EWS) quota was introduced, the government worked with an estimate that the population outside the Scheduled Castes, Scheduled Tribes and OBCs was about 35 to 40 percent.
    2. What a rigorous count would do to it: The Backwards Classes Intellectual Forum argues that a scientific enumeration of OBC populations would show that estimate to be an overestimation.
    3. The alleged motive: The same body argues that the refusal to codify existing caste names and count caste group populations, as is done for Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes, is intended to cover up the basis on which EWS reservation was justified.

    Why has the OBC count been the core of the caste Census demand?

    1. The figure has never been counted: The OBC population across the country has only ever been estimated in India, based on the caste Census data of 1931.
    2. The demand was built on that gap: Enumerating the OBC population has historically been the principal argument driving the demand for a caste Census.
    3. The method is what is now questioned: Senior Opposition leaders have questioned the utility of the open column methodology for enumerating every caste other than the Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes.

    Challenges to caste enumeration through an open column

    1. Free text responses multiply into unusable entries: A column with no pre-coded frame collects spellings, surnames, sub castes and clan names as separate answers, and classifying them afterwards becomes a second exercise larger than the count. Eg. The Socio Economic and Caste Census, 2011 returned roughly 46 lakh distinct caste and related entries, and its caste data was never released.
      The Fix: Publish a codified caste directory built from the Central and State lists and State commission reports before enumeration, and let the open column carry only the entries that directory does not hold.
    2. No single classification governs across States: Central and State OBC lists differ, so the same caste name can carry backward class status in one State and not in another or at the Centre. Eg. Jats were added to the Central OBC list in 2014 and the inclusion was set aside by the Supreme Court in Ram Singh versus Union of India (2015), while several States continue to list them.
      The Fix: Record the State of enumeration against each caste entry, so the count can be read against the list actually applicable to that respondent.
    3. Data collected without a publication commitment invites contest: A count whose tables and methodology are not released cannot settle any claim, and every group then disputes its own number. Eg. Bihar’s caste survey of 2023 was challenged in court, and several communities publicly disputed the figures recorded for them.
      The Fix: Fix a statutory deadline for publishing the caste tables together with the methodology note.
    4. Self declaration can be strategic: Where recognition carries reservation benefits, the answer given to an enumerator responds to the benefit rather than to the record. Eg. Sections of the Maratha community in Maharashtra have pressed for recognition as Kunbi in official records in order to access OBC reservation.
      The Fix: Cross check declared entries against existing caste certificate records at the tabulation stage rather than at the point of enumeration.

    Conclusion

    The same administration recognises these communities by caste for the purpose of reservation and declines to name them by caste for the purpose of counting. That is the contradiction the associations have put on the record, and no procedural reason offered so far reconciles the two positions. The decision also determines whether the coming enumeration produces a number that can be used in policy or one that has to be reclassified before anyone can read it. What to watch is whether a codified caste directory is issued to enumerators before fieldwork begins.

    Back2Basics: Economically Weaker Section reservation

    1. What it is: A 10 percent reservation in government jobs and educational institutions for economically weaker sections outside the Scheduled Castes, Scheduled Tribes and Other Backward Classes.
    2. Its constitutional basis: It was introduced by the Constitution (One Hundred and Third Amendment) Act, 2019, inserting Articles 15(6) and 16(6).
    3. How eligibility is set: Eligibility rests on income and asset criteria notified by the government, not on social or educational backwardness.
    4. Its judicial status: The Supreme Court upheld the amendment in Janhit Abhiyan versus Union of India (2022) by a majority of three to two.

    [2022, GS2, 10 marks] Discuss the role of the National Commission for Backward Classes in the wake of its transformation from a statutory body to a constitutional body.

  • Govt has deferred Census in Manipur amid calls for NRC to be carried out

    Govt has deferred Census in Manipur amid calls for NRC to be carried out

    Why in the News

    The Union government has decided to defer the 2027 Census in Manipur. The decision followed a meeting of the Union Home Minister with the Governor and the Chief Minister of Manipur, and the State government said it came out of discussions on the demand that the Census be held only after a National Register of Citizens (NRC), a register of persons verified as Indian citizens, is implemented in the State. Meitei and Naga organisations want citizenship settled before any population figure is recorded. Kuki-Zo organisations want the reverse order, arguing that the Census is the credible data source against which citizenship allegations should be tested. The count is contested because the same figures will eventually decide how Assembly seats are shared between the valley and the hills.

    Why is the Census being opposed?

    1. Citizenship and demographic change: Meitei civil society groups in the valley and Naga communities in the hill districts allege that migration from Myanmar and elsewhere has altered Manipur’s demographic composition. They want an exercise distinguishing Indian citizens from illegal immigrants before population figures are recorded.
    2. Displacement from the ethnic conflict: Thousands remain displaced more than three years after the violence that began in May 2023. Meitei groups say a count taken while people live away from their homes would record the consequences of displacement rather than the underlying population pattern.
    3. Political representation: Census figures will eventually govern delimitation, and Manipur has had no fresh delimitation implemented since the 1970s.

    How old is the NRC demand?

    1. It predates the current conflict: The demand existed before the May 2023 violence, and the influx from Myanmar and the conflict later gave it a sharper political and security dimension.
    2. A joint memorandum in 2022: In June 2022 the Coordinating Committee on Manipur Integrity (COCOMI), representing Meitei civil society, and the United Naga Council (UNC) jointly demanded an NRC and a State Population Commission.
    3. The Assembly endorsed it twice: The Manipur Assembly adopted a resolution seeking both on 5 August 2022, and reaffirmed it on 1 March 2024.
    4. The growth figures the resolution cited: The resolution recorded population growth of 153.3 percent between 1971 and 2001 and 250.9 percent between 2001 and 2011 in the hill districts, against 94.8 percent and 125.4 percent respectively in the valley. Those figures do not by themselves establish illegal immigration.
    5. An institution was created: The State government constituted the Manipur State Population Commission in February 2023.

    What did the Myanmar crisis add?

    1. Displacement across the border: Fighting in Myanmar’s Chin State and adjoining areas after the 2021 military coup drove thousands across the border into India.
    2. Ethnic links on both sides of the border: Many of those arriving belonged to Chin and related communities with ethnic and familial ties to the Kuki-Zomi population in Manipur.
    3. The State government’s framing: The Manipur government linked the influx to new settlements, poppy cultivation, encroachment and demographic change.
    4. The counter position: Kuki organisations disputed that framing, arguing that legitimate Indian citizens were being conflated with recent arrivals from Myanmar.
    5. A border policy change: The Centre scrapped the Free Movement Regime with Myanmar in February 2024, citing security and demographic concerns.

    What are the Meitei and Naga groups demanding now?

    1. A fixed sequence: The UNC stated on 18 August, “NRC first: No Census, No Delimitation Before Implementation of NRC in Manipur.”
    2. An old base year: It demanded an NRC with 1951 as the base year, followed by the Census and then delimitation.
    3. The demand cuts across party lines: The State Congress president, himself a former Chief Minister, supported the demand for an NRC before the Census on 19 and 20 August, placing the two main parties broadly on the same side.

    Why do the Kuki-Zo groups oppose it?

    1. A national exercise, not a State one: The Kuki-Zo Council called an NRC before the Census “premature and unjustified”, stating on 23 August that there is no provision for a community or a State government to unilaterally initiate a separate NRC in one State.
    2. Allegations should be tested against data: It argued that the demand rests on unsubstantiated allegations about the Kuki-Zo community, and that such claims should be tested against credible demographic data. The Census is the appropriate source of that data.
    3. It supports delimitation on verified data: The Council has backed delimitation once verified demographic figures exist.
    4. The documentary cut off is the underlying fear: Kuki, Zomi and Chin communities straddle the India-Myanmar border, so a register built on an old documentary cut off could raise doubts about people who have lived in Manipur for generations.

    Why does delimitation matter so much here?

    1. The present seat split: Manipur has 60 Assembly seats, 40 in the valley and 20 in the hills.
    2. The demographic map behind it: The State’s 16 districts divide broadly into hills, where Nagas and Kuki-Zomis predominate, and the valley, where Meiteis are in the majority.
    3. The map is more than fifty years old: The present political map goes back to the 1973 delimitation, which was based on the 1971 Census.
    4. Manipur was left out of the last exercise: A national delimitation based on the 2001 Census ran between 2002 and 2008, and Manipur, Assam, Arunachal Pradesh and Nagaland were excluded after the Centre deferred it in 2008, citing security concerns and challenges to the credibility of the 2001 Census data in the region.
    5. The disputed 2001 figures: In nine hill subdivisions the increase between 1991 and 2001 was over 40 percent, and in four it exceeded 100 percent.
    6. What the valley’s political class fears: A new Census followed by delimitation could move the 40:20 distribution to something closer to 35:25 or 30:30.

    Can an NRC be held only in Manipur, and what else is the Centre weighing?

    1. The usual national sequence is stalled: A nationwide NRC is supposed to follow an update of the National Population Register (NPR), a register of usual residents, and the government has not notified the NPR to be taken up with the 2027 Census.
    2. No legal bar on a State specific exercise: Section 14A of the Citizenship Act, 1955 vests the power to compulsorily register citizens and maintain the National Register of Indian Citizens in the Centre. No statutory requirement makes simultaneous nationwide deployment necessary.
    3. The decision is political rather than legal: The Centre could in principle notify the exercise for a particular State or border region, and the recorded position is that this is a political call.
    4. An alternative route already exists: A High-Level Committee on Demographic Change, announced in May this year, is examining demographic change arising from illegal immigration and other abnormal causes, and will recommend policy, legislative and administrative measures. Its findings could form the basis of a policy specific to Manipur.

    Challenges to holding the Census in Manipur

    1. Displacement distorts where people are counted: An enumeration records a person where they are living on the reference date, so a district hosting relief camps absorbs the population of the district people fled. Eg. Displaced Kashmiri Pandit families have been counted in Jammu and Delhi rather than in their home districts across successive Censuses.
      The Fix: Record a home district field for persons enumerated in relief camps, so displacement is visible in the data instead of silently altering district totals.
    2. A register built on an old base year excludes documented residents: Citizenship registration turns on producing legacy documents, which the poorest and the most mobile are least able to hold. Eg. Assam’s updated register, worked against a 1971 cut off, left 19,06,657 persons out of the final list published in August 2019, and the appeals process has still not concluded.
      The Fix: Publish the documentary standard and a binding appeal timeline before enumeration begins, so exclusion is contestable within a fixed period.
    3. A deferred count leaves the State on stale data: Allocations for welfare programmes are pegged to Census population, so a State that is skipped keeps running on figures more than a decade old. Eg. Coverage under the National Food Security Act, 2013 is still fixed against the 2011 Census population.
      The Fix: Notify an alternative statutory data source, such as updated ration and electoral rolls, for allocations in the deferred State until enumeration is held.
    4. The credibility of the count is itself contested in the region: A count that any side believes is inflated cannot settle the question it is being deferred to answer. Eg. Nagaland recorded decadal growth of about 64 percent in the 2001 Census and a fall of about 0.6 percent in 2011, and the earlier count was widely described within the State as inflated.
      The Fix: Publish subdivision level growth anomalies alongside post enumeration survey results, so a disputed count is audited rather than defended.

    Conclusion

    Deferring the count postpones the dispute without resolving either question behind it. The two demands cannot be met on the same timetable, since one side wants citizenship settled before people are counted and the other wants the count to test the citizenship allegations. A deferral also leaves the State without the current population data that its own programmes and its own representation ultimately rest on. What to watch is whether the Centre fixes a date for enumeration in the State or lets the deferral run open ended.

    Back2Basics: National Register of Indian Citizens

    1. What it is: A register of persons verified as citizens of India, maintained by the Centre.
    2. Its statutory basis: Section 14A of the Citizenship Act, 1955 empowers the Centre to compulsorily register every citizen and to issue national identity cards.
    3. How it is meant to be built: The rules contemplate verification of the particulars collected in the National Population Register to sort residents into citizens and doubtful cases.
    4. Where it has been done: The only State level exercise so far was in Assam, carried out under Supreme Court supervision, with the final list published in 2019.

    “[2009] Consider the following statements :

    1. Between Census 1951 and Census 2001, the density of the population of India has increased more than three times.

    2. Between Census 1951 and Census 2001, the annual growth rate (exponential) of the population of India has doubled.

    Which of the statements given abova is/are correct ?

    (a) 1 only

    (b) 2 only

    (c) Both 1 and 2

    (d) Neither 1 nor 2

  • Ladakh clears new ‘nautor land’ regularisation rules, paves way for grant of proprietary rights

    Why in the News

    The Lieutenant Governor of Ladakh has approved the Ladakh Autonomous Hill Development Councils (Nautor Regularisation) Rules, 2026. The Rules create a one time mechanism to grant proprietary rights over nautor land to the people already occupying it, across all seven districts of the Union Territory. Eligibility is pegged to possession taken before 27 October 2020, the date on which the Jammu and Kashmir Tenancy Act, 1980 was repealed. The power to allot the land is vested in the elected Hill Councils rather than in the Union Territory administration. The stated aim is to balance the interests of genuine occupants against the protection of public and Council land from encroachment, which is the line the Rules must now hold in a territory where more than 60,000 acres sit in this single revenue category.

    What is nautor land?

    1. The category: Nautor land is barren land or wasteland owned by the government.
    2. How it came to be occupied: Such land was historically allotted to individuals for cultivation or other productive use.
    3. The scale in Ladakh: More than 60,000 acres in Ladakh is presently recorded in revenue records as nautor holdings.
    4. The gap the Rules address: Occupants held and worked the land without proprietary title over it.

    What do the 2026 Rules provide?

    1. A proprietary grant with a ceiling: Proprietary rights may be granted over up to 10 acres of eligible nautor land to the occupant.
    2. A leasehold route above the ceiling: Nautor land beyond the 10 acre limit may be allotted on a leasehold basis.
    3. A single cut off date: Regularisation is available only for land occupied before 27 October 2020, and any possession taken after that date is ineligible.
    4. Uniform application: The framework applies to occupants across all seven districts of Ladakh.
    5. A one time exercise: The mechanism is available once, and does not create a standing route to regularise later occupation.

    Where do the Hill Councils get the power to allot this land?

    1. Transfer of land to the Council: Under Section 42 of the Ladakh Autonomous Hill Development Councils Act, 1997, land within a district stands transferred to the Council.
    2. Executive power over allotment: Clause (i) of Section 23 of the same Act vests executive powers in the Council in relation to the allotment, use and occupation of land vested in it.
    3. What this changes in practice: Title over former government wasteland is granted by an elected district body rather than by the Union Territory revenue administration.

    What changes for an occupant once title is granted?

    1. Legal certainty over possession: A recorded proprietary right replaces occupation that rested on an old allotment or on long use.
    2. The land becomes a financial asset: Titled land can be pledged, so an occupant can use it to avail bank loans.
    3. Two grades of right, not one: An occupant above the ceiling receives a lease rather than ownership, so the holding remains Council land.
    4. A boundary against fresh claims: The cut off is what separates a genuine holder from a claim raised after the repeal of the tenancy law.

    Challenges to the nautor regularisation framework

    1. Proving possession before a cut off date: Regularisation turns on documentary proof of occupation before a date five years past, in a territory where much land is recorded simply as government wasteland. Eg. Under the Scheduled Tribes and Other Traditional Forest Dwellers (Recognition of Forest Rights) Act, 2006, individual claims were rejected in large numbers across hill States for want of documentary proof of occupation before the statutory cut off.
      The Fix: Allow the Hill Council to accept community verified evidence of possession, including village records and dated satellite imagery of cultivation, in place of a title deed.
    2. Common grazing land can be enclosed as private holdings: High altitude pasture carries no individual title and is recorded in the same wasteland category the Rules open up. Eg. The Changpa herders of Changthang, who rear the goats that supply pashmina, depend on open rangeland held by no individual.
      The Fix: Exclude recorded grazing land and migratory routes from eligibility, and settle common pasture rights in the name of the village before individual titles issue.
    3. Cultivation expands where water does not: Bringing more barren land under the plough in a cold desert raises demand on streams that already run short at sowing time. Eg. Ice stupas were developed in Ladakh to store winter water precisely because glacier fed channels do not deliver water when spring sowing begins.
      The Fix: Condition regularisation of land held for cultivation on a water availability assessment by the district administration.
    4. A safeguard made by rule can be unmade by rule: The eligibility limits and the cut off sit in subordinate rules, so the same executive authority can revise them later. Eg. Ladakh’s demand for constitutional safeguards on land and employment has been under discussion with the Ministry of Home Affairs since 2023.
      The Fix: Carry the ceiling, the cut off and the exclusion of common land into primary legislation, so the terms of allotment are not alterable by executive rule making.

    Conclusion

    The Rules are approved and the allotment power now rests with the Hill Councils in every district of Ladakh. Notification settles the framework but not its outcome, since the exercise runs on claims that must be verified holding by holding. The markers to watch are the district level verification process the Councils adopt, and whether common pasture is fenced off from the exercise before individual titles begin to issue.

    Back2Basics: Ladakh Autonomous Hill Development Councils

    1. What they are: Elected district councils exercising devolved powers over local development and land use in Ladakh.
    2. Their statutory basis: They function under the Ladakh Autonomous Hill Development Councils Act, 1997.
    3. Where they exist: The Leh Council was constituted in 1995 and the Kargil Council in 2003.
    4. Their composition: Each Council has 30 members, of whom 26 are directly elected and four are nominated, with a term of five years.

    [2023, GS3, 10 marks] State the objectives and measures of land reforms in India. Discuss how land ceiling policy on landholding can be considered as an effective reform under economic criteria”

  • CJP cases scrapped: Supreme Court’s much-debated powers under Article 142

    Why in the News

    The Supreme Court has used Article 142 of the Constitution to quash first information reports filed across several States against participants in the nationwide examination protests led by the Cockroach Janta Party (CJP). The order gives legal force to an assurance the Union government had already given to CJP members. A negotiated settlement between the Centre and a protest group therefore takes effect as a judicial decree. Article 142 allows the Court to pass any decree or order necessary for doing “complete justice” in a matter pending before it, and it neither defines that phrase nor states when the power may be used. The Court has itself held that this power may fill a gap in a statute but may not override a statutory scheme. What is contested is whether quashing thousands of pending cases in a single order, without examining any of them on its own facts, fills such a gap or replaces one.

    What is Article 142?

    1. The text of the power: Article 142 lets the Supreme Court pass such decree or order as is necessary for doing complete justice in any cause or matter pending before it.
    2. What the provision leaves open: It does not define “complete justice” and it does not specify the circumstances in which the power may be used.
    3. Its statutory ancestor: The provision traces to Section 210 of the Government of India Act, 1935, and behind that to the colonial practice of deciding disputes on “justice, equity and good conscience” where the written law was silent.

    How did a power this wide enter the Constitution without debate?

    1. Adopted as Draft Article 118: The provision appeared in the Draft Constitution as Article 118 and was adopted by the Constituent Assembly on 27 May 1949 without a debate.
    2. Two amendments were dropped: Two amendments to it were moved and then withdrawn.
    3. The nearest the Assembly came to discussing it: During an earlier debate on a related Article granting the court special leave to hear appeals, the member Krishna Chandra Sharma compared the proposed powers to the Privy Council’s own power to step in wherever justice demanded, appeal or no appeal.
    4. The scope was left to the Court: The content of the Court’s widest power was worked out case by case over the following seven decades rather than settled at the drafting stage.

    How has the Court used this power?

    1. The Bhopal gas tragedy settlement: Article 142 was used to secure a payout of 470 million dollars from Union Carbide and to quash the criminal cases against the company.
    2. The Ayodhya title dispute: The power was used to settle the dispute on a “preponderance of probability” and to direct that five acres of land be given to the Muslim side.
    3. A convict’s release: The Court ordered the release of A G Perarivalan, a convict in the Rajiv Gandhi assassination case.
    4. Routine civil use: The provision is also used to grant divorce where a marriage has irretrievably broken down, and in public interest litigation.
    5. The measured scale of its use: An empirical study by researchers at the Indian Institute of Management, Ahmedabad examined every case between 1950 and 2023 citing “Article 142” or “complete justice”, and found 1,579 references and 791 direct invocations, mostly in civil matters.

    Has the Court fenced its own power?

    1. Consistency with law and rights: In Prem Chand Garg versus State of Uttar Pradesh (1962) the Court held that orders under Article 142 must still be consistent with fundamental rights and with the law.
    2. Supplement, not supplant: In Supreme Court Bar Association versus Union of India (1998) the Court held that Article 142 can supplement a statute by filling a gap the law leaves open. The same ruling held that it cannot supplant a statute or override an existing statutory scheme.
    3. The limits are not self enforcing: The Court has often disregarded its own caution, and no institution outside the Court can hold it to these two rulings.
    4. Discretion multiplies across benches: The effect of an undefined discretion is magnified in a court of 38 judges sitting mostly in benches of two.

    How does the CJP order test that limit?

    1. The ordinary statutory route: A first information report is examined on its own facts before being quashed under Section 528 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023, with the court asking whether an offence is made out or whether the case is plainly malicious.
    2. What the order did instead: Thousands of first information reports across several States were clubbed together and quashed without that scrutiny, as part of a negotiated settlement.
    3. The statutory scheme is displaced, not supplemented: The order substitutes the Court’s view of how the law ought to operate for the procedure the statute lays down for quashing.
    4. The Court also decides who is excluded: The same discretion under Article 142 determines which protesters are left out of the relief.
    5. The scholarly objection: Legal scholar Gautam Bhatia argues that criminal law provisions cannot be overridden through a blanket judicial decree.

    Why had Article 142 already drawn criticism?

    1. The Tamil Nadu Bills order: The Court used the same provision last year to deem long withheld Bills of the Tamil Nadu legislature as assented to.
    2. The response from the Vice President: The Vice President described that use of the power as a “nuclear missile” against democratic institutions.
    3. A former law officer’s warning: A former Attorney General of India wrote in 2017 that the provision had done “tremendous good” for deprived sections of society, and that it was time to build in checks and balances.
    4. A proposal to restrict who may invoke it: After the Sabarimala judgment the same former Attorney General described Article 142 as a “Kamdhenu from which unlimited powers flowed”, and proposed that only Constitution Benches of five judges be allowed to invoke it, so that its use does not turn on the reading of a single smaller Bench.

    Challenges to Article 142

    1. No stated standard for “complete justice”: The Constitution attaches no test to the power, so its width is settled afresh in each case by the Bench exercising it. Eg. In Delhi Development Authority versus Skipper Construction Company (1996) the power was used to reach the personal assets of persons who were not parties to the proceeding before the Court.
      The Fix: Require every order made under the provision to record on the face of the order the specific statutory gap it is filling and the limits of the relief granted.
    2. Bench strength does not scale with the consequence: No minimum Bench is prescribed, so an order altering an outcome for an entire class can issue from a small Bench. Eg. A three judge Bench in 2024 set aside the declared result of the Chandigarh mayoral election and declared the defeated candidate elected.
      The Fix: Maintain a published, reasoned compilation of orders made under the provision, so a body of standards accumulates instead of scattered discretion.
    3. The relief creates no right for the next litigant: An order for complete justice is granted on the facts of one case, so a similarly placed person cannot claim the same relief from a lower court. Eg. Divorce on the ground of irretrievable breakdown, allowed in Shilpa Sailesh versus Varun Sreenivasan (2023), is available only from the Supreme Court, since that ground does not exist in the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955.
      The Fix: Where the power is repeatedly used to fill the same statutory gap, refer that gap to the Union government with a reasoned recommendation to amend the statute.
    4. Only the same court can correct such an order: An order issues from the highest court, so the sole remedy is a review or a curative petition before that court. Eg. The curative petition route created in Rupa Ashok Hurra versus Ashok Hurra (2002) is itself a judge made remedy and succeeds in very few cases.
      The Fix: List every order that departs from a statutory scheme for a compliance hearing before the same Bench, so an order that misfires is corrected on the record.

    Conclusion

    The Court’s limits on its own widest power are self imposed, and nothing outside the Court enforces them. The unresolved question is whether a power designed to fill silences in the law may be used to set aside a procedure the law expressly provides, on terms agreed between a litigant and the government. What to watch is whether the Court itself frames a standard for when the power may be exercised, because no other institution can.

    Back2Basics: Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023

    1. What it is: The statute governing criminal procedure in India, covering investigation, arrest, trial and the powers of criminal courts.
    2. What it replaced: It came into force on 1 July 2024 in place of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973.
    3. Its companion statutes: It was enacted alongside the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 and the Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023.
    4. The quashing power it carries: Section 528 preserves the inherent powers of a High Court, which include quashing proceedings to prevent abuse of the process of a court.

    [2019, GS2, 10 marks] Do you think that constitution of India does not accept principle of strict separation of powers rather it is based on the principle of ‘checks and balance’? Explain.”

  • Courtroom dramas, clipped and shared

    Why in the News

    The Supreme Court has barred the use and circulation of audio and video clips of judicial proceedings on social media and other digital platforms without prior permission from court registrars.

    What does the interim order leave unsettled?

    1. The stated reason: A Bench led by the Chief Justice of India said “isolated excerpts” risked “trivialising” the administration of justice.
    2. The carve out: The Court later clarified that “recognised news outlets” may continue reporting on proceedings, but may not “utilise” audio or video clips.
    3. The undefined term: The Court did not define “recognised news outlets”, which leaves independent journalists unable to tell whether they are covered.
    4. Who has been added to the case: High Courts and social media intermediaries, including Meta, LinkedIn and X Corp, have been brought into the proceedings while the Court considers a broader protocol.

    How was live streaming established as a right?

    1. The barrier that prompted the petition: Interns were allowed inside Supreme Court courtrooms only on certain days to prevent overcrowding, and litigants travelling from remote parts of the country often could not enter the courtroom hearing their own case.
    2. The ruling: In September 2018 the petition in Swapnil Tripathi v. Supreme Court of India culminated in a ruling recognising live streaming as part of the right to access justice under Article 21 of the Constitution.
    3. The reasoning: The public’s right to know how justice is administered is integral to a functioning democracy, on the principle that sunlight is the best disinfectant.
    4. The direction to High Courts: The Court urged High Courts to introduce live streaming gradually while framing rules to govern its use.
    5. The safeguards built in from the start: Matrimonial cases, sexual assault cases and proceedings involving children and juveniles were excluded from live streaming.

    How far has live streaming actually spread?

    1. The Supreme Court’s start: The Court began live streaming proceedings before its Constitution Benches in 2022. These Benches comprise five or more judges deciding substantial questions concerning the interpretation of the Constitution.
    2. The limit on coverage: The Court has 17 functioning courtrooms and largely streams only Constitution Bench hearings, which sit intermittently.
    3. The audience: The Court’s official YouTube channel has amassed over 2.67 lakh subscribers.
    4. A rare exception: A video of the suo motu hearing in the R.G. Kar rape and murder case, uploaded in September 2024, has been viewed nearly 48,000 times, and is one of the few instances of a rape case streamed on the channel.
    5. The High Courts: Live streaming was operational in 11 High Courts as of March 2026, per a statement to the Lok Sabha. Gujarat, Karnataka and Calcutta stream daily from a majority of their courtrooms.
    6. The first mover: The Gujarat High Court became the first to formally go live on YouTube in July 2021, and its channel now has nearly 1.97 lakh subscribers.

    Where does unauthorised courtroom footage actually come from?

    1. Virtual hearing access: The Supreme Court and the High Courts allow lawyers and litigants to join hearings virtually through platforms such as Cisco Webex, with links often published in the daily cause lists.
    2. How the links spread: Links are shared indiscriminately beyond litigants and lawyers, so anyone logged in can record the proceeding.
    3. Why the exclusion list does not hold: A High Court can pause streaming for a sensitive case while the virtual hearing continues, so footage from sexual offence, matrimonial and child custody matters has reached social media.
    4. The rule that already covers this: The Supreme Court e-Committee’s Model Rules of 2021 prohibit unauthorised dissemination of courtroom footage and its use for commercial, promotional or advertising purposes.

    Why is a permission regime contested?

    1. The shift it marks: Requiring an ordinary citizen to seek a registrar’s permission to share a proceeding that is already being live streamed converts open access into a permission regime.
    2. The procedural gap: There is no stated method for seeking permission, no ground on which it is to be granted or refused, and no recourse where it is refused.
    3. Who the exemption favours: An exemption confined to “recognised news outlets” advantages established media organisations over citizen journalists and smaller newsrooms.
    4. The inconsistency: A written account of a courtroom exchange remains permitted while a video clip faithfully reproducing the same exchange does not.
    5. The alternative safeguard proposed: Expanding live streaming and archiving on authorised platforms would let a complete official record expose a manipulated clip, which a circulation ban does not.
    6. Where a line is accepted: Artificially generated or doctored video should be prohibited, and faithful reporting permitted whatever the medium.

    What does the case for reporting oral remarks rest on?

    1. What an oral remark is: Judges use oral observations to test arguments, and a prima facie view expressed at the outset can change as arguments unfold. Such remarks do not necessarily reflect the reasoning recorded in the final order.
    2. Why they are still reported: Oral observations offer insight into judicial thinking and hold a mirror to the institution, which is the ground on which they are treated as reportable despite carrying no binding value.
    3. The precedent: Chief Election Commissioner vs M.R. Vijayabhaskar (2021) protected the reporting of oral remarks. The Supreme Court there stressed the role of public scrutiny in ensuring institutional accountability.
    4. The cost feared on the Bench: The prospect of being quoted out of context could make judges more circumspect and less willing to engage freely with counsel, and the litigant bears the consequence.
    5. The risk predates the medium: Oral remarks were misquoted in print long before social media, which locates the problem in reporting quality rather than in the format.
    6. What that implies for reporting: Court proceedings are technical, so an accurate account depends on journalists trained to follow what is happening.

    What has clipping already exposed about judicial conduct?

    1. The Karnataka episode: In September 2024 videos of a Karnataka High Court judge circulated online. He was seen referring to a Muslim dominated locality in west Bengaluru as “Pakistan” in one video, and making a sexist remark to a woman lawyer in another.
    2. The response to it: A Supreme Court Bench took suo motu cognisance within days and cautioned judges against “casual observations” reflecting communal bias or misogyny. The judge apologised and the proceedings were closed.
    3. A more recent instance: A reported reference to “cockroaches” by the Chief Justice of India during a hearing on fake law degrees drew widespread criticism and gave rise to the Cockroach Janta Party, which went on to lead protests against examination paper leaks. The remark was later said to have been misquoted.
    4. What draws an audience: Matrimonial and custody cases attract the most attention, with controversial matters drawing over one lakh views.
    5. The effect on the Bar: Lawyers use a judge’s remark to build a social media following, and a client who can watch the hearing is less willing to accept an unnecessary adjournment.

    How have the Bar and legal media responded?

    1. The Bar Council circular: In July 2026 the Bar Council of India prohibited reels and promotional content from court premises.
    2. The enforcement machinery it created: State Bar Councils were directed to designate social media ethics nodal officers to handle complaints. Lawyers were directed to submit a signed undertaking on professional social media conduct at the time of enrolment.
    3. The change in legal media: A legal news portal has largely shifted to explanatory videos without courtroom footage since the interim order, having earlier limited its edits to trimming pauses and removing litigants’ personal details.
    4. The editorial line already being drawn: Heated exchanges between the Bench and the Bar were withheld where, viewed in isolation, they could misrepresent what actually happened in court.

    What should a permanent protocol take into account?

    1. How news is consumed: People aged 18 to 24 citing social media as their main source of news rose from 21 per cent in 2015 to 39 per cent in 2025, overtaking news websites and apps, per a March 2026 Reuters Institute report.
    2. The nature of that consumption: Young audiences are increasingly “social first”, with much of their news reaching them incidentally rather than through a deliberate search.
    3. What that means for a video bar: Permitting an oral exchange to be reported in print while restricting its circulation as video sits at odds with how that audience actually receives news.
    4. The process objection: An institutional reform of this kind should involve all High Courts and other stakeholders rather than proceed as a unilateral decision.

    Challenges to regulating the circulation of courtroom footage

    1. A registrar is not a speech regulator: Prior permission to publish places a restriction on speech in the hands of an administrative officer, while Article 19(2) permits restriction only on stated grounds and by a law that is clear. Eg. In Shreya Singhal v. Union of India (2015) the Supreme Court struck down Section 66A of the Information Technology Act, 2000 for vagueness about what speech it punished.
      The Fix: Specify the classes of proceeding from which clips may not be circulated at all, so the restriction operates by defined category rather than by case by case permission.
    2. Enforcement begins only after publication: A clip that has circulated cannot be recalled, and removal depends on intermediaries acting on a notice. Eg. Blocking and takedown under Section 69A of the Information Technology Act, 2000 and the Information Technology Rules, 2021 operate after the content is already public.
      The Fix: Route the registry’s removal requests through the intermediary grievance officer channel with a fixed response time, and record each outcome on the case file.
    3. There is no authoritative record to check a disputed clip against: Most hearings are neither streamed nor archived, so a viewer cannot compare an excerpt with the full proceeding it came from. Eg. Transcripts of Supreme Court hearings were introduced only as a pilot for Constitution Bench matters in 2023.
      The Fix: Publish an official transcript and full recording for every streamed hearing, and treat that record as the reference against which a disputed clip is judged.
    4. Contempt is an uncertain remedy: Action against a distorted clip would rest on criminal contempt, which is discretionary and slow, and using it against reportage carries its own cost to free speech. Eg. The Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 makes fair and accurate reporting of proceedings a defence, so a distortion case turns entirely on interpretation.
      The Fix: Handle distortion through a fast correction and right of reply mechanism at the registry, and reserve contempt for deliberate fabrication.
    5. An exclusion list does not protect identity: A case outside the excluded categories can still identify a vulnerable party, since names, addresses and medical details are read out in open court. Eg. Bail and quashing matters routinely disclose a complainant’s identity in offences whose reporting is otherwise restricted by law.
      The Fix: Mask party identifiers in the streamed audio and in the published record, as judgments in sexual offence cases already do.

    Conclusion

    The order changes the default rather than the rules on any single case. The Court has not yet drawn the line between publishers who may use footage and those who may not, and the reach of the restriction turns entirely on where that line falls. The case returns to the Bench on 18 September, with the High Courts and the platforms now on record. The test of whatever protocol emerges is whether it separates a distorted clip from a faithful one, or merely separates one publisher from another.

    Back2Basics: The Supreme Court e-Committee

    1. What it is: A body of the Supreme Court that oversees the computerisation of the Indian judiciary.
    2. When it was set up: It was constituted in 2004 to advise on a national policy for information and communication technology in the courts.
    3. What it runs: It steers the eCourts Mission Mode Project, covering case information systems, electronic filing and virtual hearing infrastructure across district courts and High Courts.
    4. What it issues: It frames model rules on court technology for adoption by individual High Courts, which are free to modify them.

    [2014, GS2, 12 marks] What do you understand by the concept “freedom of speech and expression”? Does it cover hate speech also? Why do the films in India stand on a slightly different plane from other forms of expression? Discuss.

  • SC pushes for raising retirement age in district judiciary as backlog tops 5 cr

    SC pushes for raising retirement age in district judiciary as backlog tops 5 cr

    Why in the News

    The Supreme Court has directed States to raise the retirement age of judicial officers in the district judiciary from 60 to 62 years. A three judge Bench headed by the Chief Justice of India passed the order on 1 September, and the text was published on Friday. The Court recorded that 5.18 crore cases lie pending in district courts across the country. It described stopping the attrition of experienced judicial talent as the “crying need of the hour”, warning that access to justice would otherwise remain “a mere chimera” because of unfilled posts. Only seven States have agreed so far. The rest have resisted on the ground of financial burden, which the Court has held to be arithmetically misconceived.

    What has the Court directed, and to whom?

    1. The seven States that agreed: Chhattisgarh, Karnataka, Madhya Pradesh, Maharashtra, Sikkim, Tamil Nadu and West Bengal have agreed to enhance the retirement age of their judicial officers.
    2. The deadline for them: These State governments have been directed to amend their service rules within two months.
    3. The condition attached: The High Court concerned will enhance superannuation to 62 years for an officer on attaining 60, subject to an assessment of that officer’s suitability.
    4. The States and Union Territories yet to agree: Andhra Pradesh, Arunachal Pradesh, Assam, Bihar, Goa, Gujarat, Haryana, Himachal Pradesh, Jharkhand, Keralam, Manipur, Meghalaya, Mizoram, Nagaland, Odisha, Punjab, Rajasthan, Telangana, Tripura, Uttarakhand, Uttar Pradesh, the National Capital Territory of Delhi, Jammu and Kashmir and Puducherry have responded with a direct refusal or have taken no position at all.
    5. The deadline for them: They have been directed to take a decision on enhancement to 62 years within two weeks.

    Why does the Court treat attrition rather than recruitment as the binding constraint?

    1. Recruitment has not filled the cadre: Most recruitment drives undertaken in the various States have not produced optimum recruitment or filled the sanctioned cadre strength.
    2. The gap is universal: A yawning gap between sanctioned strength and working strength persists across the board.
    3. Recruitment is slow by design: Selecting independent and competent judicial officers is an arduous task, so a post is not refilled at the speed at which it falls vacant.
    4. What that leaves as the available lever: Retaining an officer already in service is the only step that adds working strength without waiting for a recruitment cycle.

    Why does the Court reject the financial burden objection?

    1. What the States fear: States cite the cost of paying the maximum salary in the pay scale for a further two or five years, and a higher outlay on retiral benefits.
    2. The parity fear: States also apprehend that employees in other State services would demand the same extension for themselves.
    3. Why the Court calls that misconceived: Judicial officers render a specialised service, so an extension confined to them does not found a claim by other cadres.
    4. The 1992 precedent quoted: The alleged burden on the State exchequer is negligible against the enormous advantage the administration of justice and society at large derive from a higher retirement age.
    5. The double spend: A State that retains retirement at 60 pays post retiral dues to the officer who has left and salary to the officer newly appointed, in the same period.
    6. What continuation does to that cost: Allowing an experienced officer to serve to 62 postpones the post retiral outlay rather than adding to it.

    What safeguard have the High Courts proposed?

    1. Why most High Courts agreed: Most State High Courts consented to the enhancement because they are face to face with the crisis in the dispensation of justice.
    2. The rider: Some High Courts, including Madras, have recommended a thorough assessment of judicial work as a condition precedent to continuation in service.
    3. What the rider is for: Only competent officers of proven integrity would be permitted to continue in the cadre.
    4. The Court’s view of it: The suggestion preserves experienced officers while removing what the Court called the “clog of deadwood” that blocks the entrance of young blood into the system.

    Challenges to raising the retirement age in the district judiciary

    1. The sanctioned strength is itself inadequate: Extending tenure fills posts within an existing cadre, and the cadre was fixed against a judge to population ratio far below what has been recommended for India. Eg. The Law Commission’s 120th report of 1987 recommended 50 judges per million population, against a sanctioned figure that has stayed close to 21.
      The Fix: Revise sanctioned cadre strength against a stated case load norm, and attach a dedicated State budget line to the additional posts.
    2. A suitability assessment can become an informal removal power: Continuation to 62 will turn on a High Court’s assessment, which inserts a discretionary stage into a service that otherwise holds tenure until superannuation. Eg. Compulsory retirement of judicial officers on the administrative side has repeatedly been challenged before the Supreme Court.
      The Fix: Publish the assessment criteria in advance and require a written reasoned order with an internal review, so a refusal to extend can be tested.
    3. Court infrastructure does not expand with tenure: A retained officer needs a courtroom, support staff and record space, and district court infrastructure is funded through a centrally sponsored scheme that depends on State matching contributions. Eg. The Centrally Sponsored Scheme for Development of Infrastructure Facilities for the Judiciary has run since 1993-94 with persistent shortfalls in court halls and residential units.
      The Fix: Link the release of infrastructure funds to the number of judicial officers actually working in a district rather than to sanctioned posts.
    4. The promotion chain below is frozen: Officers waiting for elevation to the District Judge cadre and for High Court appointment from the service quota face a two year delay in every vacancy. Eg. Appointments to High Courts from the district judiciary already move slowly through the collegium process.
      The Fix: Expand the number of posts in the higher judicial service in step with the extension, so the vacancy chain continues to move.
    5. Pendency has drivers that bench strength does not reach: Adjournments, failure of service of summons and the volume of government litigation extend case life independently of how many judges sit. Eg. Government departments and their agencies remain the largest single class of litigant before Indian courts.
      The Fix: Enforce the three adjournment limit already written into Order XVII of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, and screen government appeals before they are filed.

    Conclusion

    The Court has converted a suggestion into a directed timeline, and the decision now sits with State governments rather than with the judiciary. Its reasoning treats the age of superannuation as the one lever that can be pulled without waiting for a recruitment cycle to conclude. The case is listed again on 1 October, by which time the States that have not responded are required to have taken a position.

    Back2Basics: The District Judiciary under the Constitution

    1. Article 233: The Governor appoints district judges in consultation with the High Court exercising jurisdiction in that State.
    2. Article 234: Persons other than district judges are appointed to the State judicial service by the Governor, under rules made after consulting the State Public Service Commission and the High Court.
    3. Article 235: Control over district courts and subordinate courts, including posting, promotion and leave of judicial officers, vests in the High Court.
    4. Why a State government must act: Conditions of service, including the age of superannuation, are fixed by rules the State government frames, so a High Court’s consent by itself does not change a retirement age.

    [2017, GS2, 10 marks] Critically examine the Supreme Court’s judgement on ‘National Judicial Appointments Commission Act, 2014’ with reference to appointment of judges of higher judiciary in India.

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