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  • Air quality panel holding talks with Punjab govt. and ISRO over tracking of stubble fires

    Air quality panel holding talks with Punjab govt. and ISRO over tracking of stubble fires

    Why in the News

    The Commission for Air Quality Management in the National Capital Region and Adjoining Areas (CAQM), the statutory body that directs anti-pollution action across Delhi and the States around it, has said it is in talks with Punjab, Haryana and the Indian Space Research Organisation (ISRO) to improve how stubble fires are measured.

    How does satellite fire counting work?

    1. Detection by heat signature: Two satellites passing over India during the day register the thermal signature of an active fire and log it as a fire count.
    2. A fixed overpass window: A polar orbiting satellite crosses a given location at roughly the same local time each day, so it sees only the fires burning at that moment.
    3. A count is not a quantity: The record shows that a field was alight. It does not show how much particulate matter the burning released.

    Why has the reported decline in farm fires come under doubt?

    1. The peak moved by three and a half hours: The Space Applications Centre recorded peak fire activity at about 1.30 p.m. in 2020 and at about 5 p.m. in 2024.
    2. The shift tracks the enforcement window: Farmers face fines for being caught setting fire to their fields, and burning after the daytime satellite passes leaves no entry in the record.
    3. Evidence has accumulated since 2024: Doubt over the Punjab government’s claim of a 90 percent reduction in farm fires since 2021 has been mounting since 2024.
    4. A decline that may be an artefact: A fall produced by unrecorded burning leaves the actual acreage burnt unknown, so the reported improvement cannot be checked.

    Why does the measurement matter for the capital’s winter air?

    1. Farm fires are a spike, not the base load: Over a whole winter farm fires contribute no more than 15 percent of particulate matter pollution. In certain weeks that share rises to almost 44 percent.
    2. The weather closes the escape route: Stalled monsoon withdrawal weakens the westerly winds that flush particulate matter out of the region through October and November.
    3. Several sources load the same air: Vehicles, industry, road dust, agricultural waste and Deepavali crackers add to the load in the same weeks.
    4. Paddy residue has a disposal logic: Stubble left after the paddy harvest is burnt to clear the field for wheat sowing, since burning is the quickest and cheapest method available.
    5. The response is calibrated to the number: The winter air quality response for the Delhi National Capital Region is built on this dataset, so a wrong count misdirects the measures taken.

    Why is a replacement protocol difficult to define?

    1. Burnt area measures land, not emissions: Mapping singed acreage gives a better estimate of how much land was burnt. The CAQM Chairman noted it is still not an accurate measure of the particulate matter emitted.
    2. Ground truthing needs the States: Verification on the ground requires Punjab and Haryana to run field checks against the satellite record, which is what the Commission is negotiating with both.
    3. A first protocol has been sought this year: ISRO has been asked to supply a basic protocol this year so that the estimate improves on fire counts.

    Challenges to stubble fire measurement

    1. A single daytime overpass: One pass at a fixed hour cannot capture a fire lit after it. Eg. The Terra and Aqua satellites carrying the Moderate Resolution Imaging Spectroradiometer (MODIS) cross northwest India around the middle of the day.
      The Fix: Pair the polar orbiting record with geostationary imaging from INSAT-3D and INSAT-3DR, which observe the same area every fifteen minutes, and with night time detections from the Visible Infrared Imaging Radiometer Suite.
    2. Cloud and haze block an optical sensor: Smoke and cloud hide active fires at exactly the point in the season when burning peaks. Eg. Detection weakens during the late October haze episodes that trigger emergency curbs in the capital.
      The Fix: Add radar based burnt area mapping from Sentinel-1, which images through cloud, as an independent cross check on the count.
    3. Penalties fall on the cultivator, not on the residue: Environmental compensation and red entries in land records punish the act of burning without funding an alternative to it. Eg. Punjab has recovered environmental compensation from farmers recorded as burning paddy stubble.
      The Fix: Pay a verified per acre amount for residue actually managed, so the incentive attaches to disposal rather than to concealment.
    4. The window between two crops is too short: Roughly two to three weeks separate the paddy harvest from wheat sowing, which makes burning the only method that fits. Eg. The Punjab Preservation of Subsoil Water Act, 2009 pushes paddy transplanting into late June and shortens the gap at the other end.
      The Fix: Expand shorter duration paddy varieties such as PR-126 and guarantee machinery through custom hiring centres so the window becomes workable.
    5. The airshed is governed in pieces: Punjab, Haryana, Rajasthan, Uttar Pradesh and Delhi each report and act separately on pollution that is common to one airshed. Eg. The Graded Response Action Plan is triggered by the air quality index recorded in Delhi.
      The Fix: Build one airshed level emission inventory on a common reporting standard, so source shares are settled by an agreed method rather than disputed each winter.

    Conclusion

    The argument here is not about whether stubble is burnt but about whether the instrument that counts it still works. A performance claim measured by a tool that a farmer can time his way around cannot settle how much of the capital’s winter air the fields are answerable for. The marker to watch is whether a verification protocol is in place before the burning window opens rather than after it closes.

    Back2Basics: Commission for Air Quality Management

    1. Statutory basis: The Commission was established under the Commission for Air Quality Management in National Capital Region and Adjoining Areas Act, 2021.
    2. Jurisdiction: It covers Delhi and the adjoining areas of Haryana, Punjab, Rajasthan and Uttar Pradesh that affect the capital’s air quality.
    3. Powers: It issues directions binding on State governments and State pollution control boards, and its directions prevail where they conflict with a State board’s.
    4. Enforcement: Non-compliance with its directions is punishable with imprisonment of up to five years or a fine of up to one crore rupees.

    [2020, GS3, 15 marks] What are the key features of the National Clean Air Programme (NCAP) initiated by the Government of India?

  • Govt. to spend Rs 24,000 crore to modernise police force

    Govt. to spend Rs 24,000 crore to modernise police force

    Why in the News

    The Union government has told the Supreme Court that it has begun implementing an umbrella Police Modernisation Mission worth Rs 24,000 crore over the next five years.

    What is the Police Modernisation Mission?

    1. Its form: It is an umbrella scheme, meaning several police modernisation components are funded through a single mission rather than as separate schemes.
    2. Its size and horizon: The outlay is Rs 24,000 crore, to be spent over five years.
    3. Who it covers: It targets the internal security capabilities of both State police forces and the Central Armed Police Forces.
    4. Its stated route: The capability gain is to come through greater use of technology, which is the only delivery mechanism named in the submission.

    Why was the disclosure made in a court proceeding?

    1. The proceeding was begun by the Court itself: The suo motu case was initiated in 2025 after the Court took note of a media report on non functional CCTV cameras at Udaipur police stations.
    2. The Court widened it into a compliance review: It sought compliance reports from the Centre, the States and the Union Territories on the installation and functioning of cameras.
    3. The Bench: The matter is before a Bench of Justices Vikram Nath and Sandeep Mehta, with the Centre represented by an Additional Solicitor-General.
    4. The mission answers the compliance question with an outlay: The Centre’s response to a record of equipment not working is a larger programme to buy equipment, and no separate maintenance or functioning guarantee was placed before the Court.

    What did Paramvir Singh Saini versus Baljit Singh require?

    1. Cameras at specified locations: The 2021 judgment mandated CCTV cameras at key locations in police stations, including lock ups and the rooms of inspectors and sub-inspectors.
    2. Cameras of a specified capability: The directions required night vision and audio recording, so that an interrogation is recorded and not merely observed.
    3. Footage retention: Recordings were to be preserved for a stated minimum period, so that a complaint filed months later can still be tested against the record.
    4. Oversight bodies: State level and district level oversight committees were to be constituted to purchase, maintain and monitor the systems and to review footage.
    5. Notice to the public: Police stations were to display notices telling visitors that the premises are under camera cover and that a complaint of human rights violation may be made.

    Challenges to the Police Modernisation Mission

    1. Modernisation money has historically gone unspent: Releases under police modernisation schemes stall on State matching shares and pending utilisation certificates. Eg. Successive Comptroller and Auditor General audits have flagged underutilisation of police modernisation grants by States.
      The Fix: Release tranches against verified physical milestones, meaning equipment installed and functioning, rather than against expenditure statements.
    2. Central money buys equipment, not reform: Police is a State subject under Entry 2 of the State List, so a central mission can fund hardware without touching recruitment, tenure or accountability. Eg. Directions in Prakash Singh versus Union of India (2006) on fixed tenure and a State Security Commission remain only partly implemented across States.
      The Fix: Condition a share of each State’s mission grant on enactment of the police board and fixed tenure directions.
    3. Technology fails at the point of maintenance: Installed systems stop working for want of annual maintenance contracts, spares and power backup, and the capital grant does not cover them. Eg. Audits have found Crime and Criminal Tracking Network and Systems terminals installed but not in use at a large number of police stations.
      The Fix: Fund a five year maintenance and consumables line inside each equipment sanction, instead of leaving it as a separate State liability.
    4. Manpower shortfall caps what technology can deliver: A camera or a database still needs an officer to operate, review and act on it, and State forces run well below sanctioned strength. Eg. Bureau of Police Research and Development data records an actual police strength close to 150 personnel per lakh population, against the United Nations recommended figure of 222.
      The Fix: Tie mission approval to a State recruitment schedule closing sanctioned vacancies across the same five years.
    5. Surveillance capacity grows faster than the oversight around it: Equipment installed for accountability also expands the force’s own recording and identification capability, with no independent auditor of its use. Eg. Access logs for police station footage are held and reviewed by the same force whose conduct the footage records.
      The Fix: Place footage access logs and retention compliance under an independent State level oversight body publishing an annual report.

    Conclusion

    The mission has moved from announcement to implementation, and it was disclosed in a proceeding about equipment already mandated and not functioning. Buying capability and sustaining it are different problems, and only the first has an outlay attached to it. The next point to watch is the compliance reports the Court has sought from the Centre, the States and the Union Territories, which is where the gap between equipment sanctioned and equipment working becomes visible.

    Back2Basics: Central Armed Police Forces

    1. What they are: Seven armed forces of the Union under the Ministry of Home Affairs, distinct both from the armed forces under the Ministry of Defence and from State police.
    2. The seven forces: Central Reserve Police Force, Border Security Force, Central Industrial Security Force, Indo-Tibetan Border Police, Sashastra Seema Bal, Assam Rifles and the National Security Guard.
    3. How they are used: They are deployed to States on requisition for internal security duty, election duty and disaster response, and guard specified international border sectors.
    4. Command and recruitment: Each is headed by a Director General, with officer recruitment through the Union Public Service Commission and other ranks through the Staff Selection Commission.

    [2023, GS3, 15 marks] What are the internal security challenges being faced by India? Give out the role of Central Intelligence and Investigative Agencies tasked to counter such threats.

  • Rajnath releases new framework for defence diplomacy

    Rajnath releases new framework for defence diplomacy

    Why in the News

    The Defence Minister has released Raksha, a strategic framework setting out India’s road map for defence diplomacy and global defence partnerships over the next ten years.

    Pillars of the Raksha framework

    1. Bilateral and multilateral defence partnerships: Deepening defence relationships with individual states and within groupings is the first stated pillar.
    2. Joint military exercises: The framework provides for expanding the scale and range of joint exercises with partner forces.
    3. Capacity building with friendly countries: Training and capability assistance to partner militaries is treated as a distinct instrument rather than a by-product of exercises.
    4. Indigenous defence exports and maritime security: Promoting exports of indigenously developed systems under Make in India, and strengthening maritime security, complete the set of pillars.

    How does the framework use defence exports as a diplomatic instrument?

    1. The industrial objective is tied to the diplomatic one: Export promotion is placed inside a diplomacy document, so a sale is treated as a partnership rather than as a transaction.
    2. The positioning sought: The framework seeks to establish India as a reliable global defence manufacturing partner.
    3. The route named: International cooperation is to be expanded around indigenously developed defence technologies, rather than around licensed or assembled platforms.

    What does the net security provider role commit India to?

    1. A first responder duty: The framework places India as a net security provider and first responder in the Indian Ocean Region, which requires capacity to act before a partner state formally requests help.
    2. A stated regional commitment: The road map records a commitment to ensuring peace, stability and security across the region.
    3. Maritime security as the operating theatre: The Indian Ocean Region framing makes the maritime domain the principal arena in which the other pillars are exercised.
    4. A decade long planning horizon: A ten year design replaces case by case engagement, which changes what can be promised to a partner and over what period.

    Challenges to India’s defence diplomacy

    1. Exports remain concentrated in low value items: Much of India’s defence export value is components and subsystems supplied to foreign manufacturers rather than complete platforms. Eg. Aerostructures, forgings and subsystems account for a substantial share of the export figure India reports each year.
      The Fix: Set platform level export targets by category in the framework’s review, reported separately from the aggregate value.
    2. Capacity building commitments outrun training capacity: Offering training slots to partner militaries requires physical capacity at Indian institutions, which is finite and allotted well in advance. Eg. Foreign officer vacancies at Indian staff and war colleges are limited and booked years ahead.
      The Fix: Fund dedicated foreign trainee capacity at named institutions inside the framework, rather than from existing service training budgets.
    3. First responder assets are committed elsewhere: The same ships and aircraft carry out relief, escort and patrol tasking in overlapping waters. Eg. Naval units deployed for anti piracy escort in the western Indian Ocean are the units nearest to most regional relief tasks.
      The Fix: Ring fence a standing humanitarian assistance and disaster relief task group with pre positioned stores in the region.
    4. Export promotion collides with partner sensitivities: A sale to one regional state can strain relations with its rival, which turns a commercial decision into a political one. Eg. India’s supply of BrahMos missiles to the Philippines drew objections from China.
      The Fix: Publish a case by case political clearance process for defence exports, so industry can price the risk of refusal before bidding.
    5. A framework document carries no reporting duty: A ten year horizon with no interim review point cannot be tested against performance at any stage before it ends. Eg. The document states pillars without naming an annual reporting mechanism against them.
      The Fix: Fix a mandatory annual report against each pillar, carrying indicators for exercises held, officers trained and export value.

    Conclusion

    Defence diplomacy has been run through individual visits, exercises and agreements decided one at a time. A published decade long framework changes the planning horizon and states the objective, and it does not by itself create an institution to execute it. The marker to watch is whether the framework acquires a named owner and an annual review reporting against each pillar, or remains a statement of direction.

    Back2Basics: Net security provider

    1. What the term means: A state that supplies security to others in its region, rather than only securing itself, through presence, capability and assistance extended to partner states.
    2. How India uses it: The formulation entered Indian strategic vocabulary around 2009 and is applied to the Indian Ocean Region, where India’s navy is the largest resident force.
    3. What it involves in practice: Anti piracy patrols, humanitarian assistance and disaster relief, evacuation of nationals, hydrographic survey support and maritime domain awareness shared with partner states.
    4. The policy vehicles: The Security and Growth for All in the Region (SAGAR) vision, the Indian Ocean Naval Symposium, and coastal radar chains built for partner countries.

    [2025, GS3, 15 marks] Why is maritime security vital to protect India’s sea trade? Discuss maritime and coastal security challenges and the way forward.”

  • India and Belgium ramp up bilateral defence cooperation

    India and Belgium ramp up bilateral defence cooperation

    Why in the News

    India and Belgium have signed three government level defence agreements, ramping up a defence relationship that had carried no framework instrument.

    What was signed at the government level?

    1. A Letter of Intent on Defence Cooperation: Signed by the two defence ministries, it covers training, officer exchanges, research and development, seminars, joint exercises and maritime security.
    2. An industry to industry Memorandum of Understanding (MoU): It links the Belgian Security and Defence Industry association with the Society of Indian Defence Manufacturers.
    3. A law enforcement MoU: The Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI) and the Belgium Federal Police agreed to cooperate on transnational organised crime, cybercrime and related matters.

    Which capability areas does the defence cooperation target?

    1. Maritime and undersea systems: Mine countermeasures, autonomous maritime systems, underwater robotics and sensors are named focus areas.
    2. Critical infrastructure protection: The list extends to protection of ports, pipelines and subsea data cables.
    3. Conventional and emerging systems: Ammunition, radar, electro optical sensors, command and control, and counter drone systems are covered.
    4. The engagement machinery: The two Defence Ministers agreed to expand contact through a defence cooperation dialogue, high level visits, training and capacity building, and acknowledged the need for greater maritime security collaboration in the Indo-Pacific.

    What was announced alongside the signed instruments?

    1. A resident defence presence in Brussels: India announced the appointment of a Defence Attache at its Embassy in Brussels.
    2. A trade and investment channel: A fast trade mechanism was established to handle trade and investment, alongside a commitment to double bilateral trade over the next five years.
    3. A Consular Dialogue: A standing consular channel was established between New Delhi and Brussels.
    4. Private sector agreements: At least ten private defence agreements were sealed during the visit, including production of Belgian military items such as rockets in India.

    Where does the economic relationship currently stand?

    1. Merchandise trade: Bilateral trade stood at $13.01 billion in 2025-26.
    2. Investment: Belgian foreign direct investment into India was about $4.2 billion between April 2000 and December 2025.
    3. The Belgian trade position: The Belgian side described the global situation as turbulent and called for free trade and an end to the unilateral imposition of tariffs.

    What did the two sides agree on regional and global security?

    1. The Pakistan assurance: India raised concerns over Belgian defence technology or expertise reaching Pakistan, and received an assurance that there is no question of such cooperation.
    2. Terrorism: The Belgian side supported India’s campaign against cross border terrorism and condemned the Pahalgam terror attack.
    3. Maritime routes: The joint statement called for the safety and security of maritime routes and for safe and unimpeded maritime shipping, in the context of the conflicts in West Asia and Ukraine.
    4. Conflict resolution: Both sides supported efforts aimed at an early end to the conflicts in Ukraine and West Asia, and backed a just peace in Ukraine consistent with the United Nations Charter.
    5. A shared historical marker: The two leaders paid tribute to the more than 9,000 Indian soldiers who died at Flanders Fields during the First World War.

    Challenges to India Belgium defence cooperation

    1. A Letter of Intent creates no obligation: It records agreed areas of work and binds neither side to a contract, a value or a timeline. Eg. India’s defence industrial roadmaps with European partners have taken years to convert into signed production contracts.
      The Fix: Attach a dated work plan with a named nodal agency on each side, reviewed at every defence cooperation dialogue.
    2. Export clearance does not sit with the federal government alone: Belgian arms export licences are issued at regional government level and operate under the European Union common position on arms exports. Eg. Flanders and Wallonia license equipment produced in their own regions separately.
      The Fix: Negotiate a programme level licence assurance at the time of contract, instead of clearance obtained shipment by shipment.
    3. Joint production usually stops at final assembly: Technology transfer in Indian defence tie ups has historically covered assembly rather than the propellant, seeker or sensor core. Eg. Several ammunition and rocket partnerships have delivered kits assembled in India from imported subsystems.
      The Fix: Write a phased indigenous content schedule into each private agreement, measured at component level rather than by value.
    4. A political assurance is not a contractual clause: An undertaking on third country transfers given in a bilateral meeting is not enforceable in any signed instrument. Eg. The assurance on Pakistan was conveyed through officials rather than recorded as a treaty obligation.
      The Fix: Convert the undertaking into an end use and non transfer clause in every follow on agreement signed under the Letter of Intent.
    5. The trade base is narrow: The exchange is dominated by a single commodity group, so a doubling target rests on a thin sectoral spread. Eg. Antwerp’s diamond trade accounts for the bulk of India Belgium merchandise flows.
      The Fix: Set named non gem sectoral milestones under the fast trade mechanism, so the target is measured outside the diamond trade.

    Conclusion

    A relationship built largely on trade has acquired a defence framework in the space of a single visit. What has been signed is intent, an industry linkage and a police cooperation channel, and the substance now depends on what follows them. Two things are worth watching: whether the private production agreements reach contract, and whether the trade target is pursued in sectors outside the commodity group that currently dominates the exchange.

    Back2Basics: Society of Indian Defence Manufacturers

    1. What it is: The apex industry body representing Indian defence manufacturers, which acts as the single interface between the domestic defence industry and the Ministry of Defence.
    2. Origin: It was set up in 2017, promoted by the Confederation of Indian Industry.
    3. Membership: It spans defence public sector undertakings, large private manufacturers and micro, small and medium enterprises in the defence supply chain.
    4. What it does: It signs cooperation agreements with counterpart industry associations abroad, and represents industry positions on procurement policy and indigenisation.

    [2023, GS2, 15 marks] ‘The expansion and strengthening of NATO and a stronger US-Europe strategic partnership works well in India.’ What is your opinion about this statement? Give reasons and examples to support your answer.

  • US settlement with Meta is a start. India must protect itself

    US settlement with Meta is a start. India must protect itself

    Why in the News

    Meta has agreed to pay up to $17.1 billion to resolve child harm claims brought by a bipartisan coalition of attorneys general across the United States, its territories and the District of Columbia.

    What does the settlement require Meta to do?

    1. The scale and the date: The agreement was reached on 26 August and ranks among the largest consumer protection settlements in internet history.
    2. Default time limits and night restrictions: Users under 18 get default limits on time spent and restrictions on night time use.
    3. Limits on notifications during school hours: The company must curb notifications sent to minors while school is in session.
    4. Age assurance: The settlement requires enhanced measures to establish whether a user is a minor before the account is treated as an adult account.
    5. Independent compliance oversight: Compliance with the safeguards is monitored by an independent party rather than reported by the company itself.

    Why does the penalty carry little punitive weight?

    1. The sum is small against the revenue base: The company generated $201 billion in revenue in 2025, and the settlement is payable over 10 years.
    2. The market read it as a cost, not a shock: The stock rose 5 per cent after the settlement was announced.
    3. The reforms are the substance, not the money: The mandated safety changes go to how Facebook and Instagram are allowed to operate for minors, and they are overdue rather than novel.

    Why has India’s own debate produced no comparable outcome?

    1. The cycle is episodic and self closing: A tragedy occurs, outrage follows, a platform issues a statement, a parliamentary question may be asked, and silence returns.
    2. The harm is not less serious here: The absence of Indian legal action reflects the absence of a process capable of compelling answers, not a smaller problem.
    3. Regulatory attention has been lighter than in the West: Global platforms have operated in India with weaker oversight and lower public awareness than they face in other large markets.

    What did the American case produce that India lacks?

    1. Court compelled discovery: The litigation forced the company to produce internal research, design documents and executive communications about child safety, under oath, in public and subject to cross examination.
    2. The questions India cannot currently ask: What internal research shows about the mental health impact on Indian teenage girls, how the recommendation engine behaves in Hindi, Tamil and Bengali for a fourteen year old at 11 pm, and how many Indian children under 13 are active on platforms that legally prohibit their membership.
    3. The unmeasured scale of abuse material: The scale of child sexual abuse material affecting Indian users and the manner of its reporting are not on any public record. Eg. In the United States alone, 7.5 million such materials were under internal review.
    4. Whether the same design was applied here: If the addictive design features at issue in the American cases were applied to Indian users, those users have been exposed to the same harm with none of the protection.

    What legal tools does India already hold?

    1. The statutory base already exists: The Consumer Protection Act, 2019, the Information Technology (Intermediary Guidelines and Digital Media Ethics Code) Rules, 2021, the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences (POCSO) Act, 2012, the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2015 and the Constitution together cover the conduct alleged.
    2. A regulator level inquiry: The National Commission for Protection of Child Rights (NCPCR), the statutory body for child rights, can open a formal inquiry compelling platforms to produce India specific safety research, algorithm documentation, data on underage users and internal harm research.
    3. Direct recourse for families: Affected families can approach consumer forums and High Courts directly, without waiting for a regulator to act first.
    4. Coordinated State litigation: State governments can file consumer protection and child safety suits in Indian courts, and a single State moving first can trigger a wider set of filings.
    5. The policy standard is already stated: The Safe, Trusted and Accountable framework developed in 2021 was built so that platforms operating at scale bear legal responsibility for the consequences of their design choices.

    Why is new legislation still needed?

    1. Existing law compels disclosure only case by case: Each of the routes above produces documents inside one proceeding, so nothing survives the case that produced it.
    2. A statutory right to algorithmic disclosure: Parliament can create an obligation on platforms to reveal their content moderation policies, recommendation engine parameters and child safety research for Indian users.
    3. A standing recipient rather than a court: The disclosure would run to a designated Indian authority, which turns a litigated exception into a continuing duty.

    Challenges to compelling platform disclosure in India

    1. No child rights regulator holds standing discovery power: A statutory commission can summon information, and it cannot compel sworn production of internal research open to cross examination. Eg. Platform responses to Indian regulators are routinely filed as written submissions rather than as evidence tested in a hearing.
      The Fix: Give the child rights commission discovery powers with a stated penalty for non production, on the model available to a commission of inquiry.
    2. Consumer forums cannot read algorithmic evidence: A district or State consumer commission has no technical assessor able to interpret recommendation engine documentation. Eg. Consumer adjudication in India is built around defective goods and deficient services, not around product design telemetry.
      The Fix: Attach a standing panel of technical assessors to the National Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission for platform cases.
    3. The evidence sits outside Indian process: Internal research and design documents are held on servers abroad and reached through mutual legal assistance. Eg. Mutual legal assistance requests to the United States for platform records routinely take more than a year to return.
      The Fix: Write a production obligation for India specific safety research into intermediary due diligence, so the duty attaches to operating in India rather than to where a server sits.
    4. Safe harbour blunts liability for design: Section 79 of the Information Technology Act, 2000 shields intermediaries for third party content, and design and ranking choices are argued into that shelter. Eg. Platforms have defended recommendation ranking as an automated function rather than as an editorial act.
      The Fix: Separate design and ranking decisions from hosting in the due diligence rules, so safe harbour covers content and not product architecture.

    Conclusion

    Platform accountability in India has been argued at the level of statements and outrage, never at the level of evidence. The material that would establish whether Indian children were exposed to the same design choices sits with the platforms, and no Indian process currently compels its production. Legislation would convert that into a standing duty, and litigation would produce it once. The marker to watch is whether any Indian regulator or State government files an action carrying discovery powers, rather than another request for information.

    Online child safety in India

    1. What the domain covers: It governs how platforms design products for users below 18, across age of access, consent, exposure to content and collection of data.
    2. The regulatory age is higher than the platform age: Indian data protection law treats anyone below 18 as a child, while platforms set their own account creation floor at 13.
    3. States have moved before the Centre: Karnataka announced plans to bar social media for those under 16, and Andhra Pradesh announced restrictions for those under 13.
    4. The evidence base cited officially: Research highlighted in the Economic Survey 2025-26 records that adolescents lack the neurological brakes needed to resist addictive features such as infinite scroll.

    Laws and Rules Governing Online Child Safety

    1. Digital Personal Data Protection Act, 2023: It treats any individual below 18 as a child, requires verifiable parental consent before processing a child’s data, and prohibits behavioural tracking and targeted advertising directed at children.
    2. The Data Protection Board of India adjudicates breaches and imposes penalties under the Act, with appeals lying to the Telecom Disputes Settlement and Appellate Tribunal.
    3. Information Technology Act, 2000: Section 67B criminalises publishing or transmitting material depicting children in sexually explicit acts, and extends to browsing and downloading such material.
    4. Indian Penal Code and Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita provisions on obscenity: They cover sale and circulation of obscene material to a person under 20, and operate alongside the specialised child protection statutes.

    Key Facts about Online Child Safety

    1. Australia set a minimum age of 16 for social media accounts through the Online Safety Amendment (Social Media Minimum Age) Act 2024, enforced from December 2025.
    2. Indonesia became the first Southeast Asian country to enforce a ban for under 16s, in March 2026.
    3. Gaming disorder is classified as a health condition in the World Health Organization’s International Classification of Diseases, Eleventh Revision (ICD-11).
    4. Kerala runs Digital De-Addiction centres, known as D-DAD centres, for children showing signs of compulsive device use.

    Challenges in Online Child Safety

    1. Age verification is easily circumvented: A minimum age holds only where the platform can establish age, and self declared dates of birth cannot be checked. Eg. Children open accounts on platforms barring under 13s using a false year of birth or an adult family member’s account.
      The Fix: Move to privacy preserving age estimation processed on the device, rather than to identity document uploads.
    2. Verification itself creates a new privacy risk: Establishing age through selfies, identity documents or bank details assembles a fresh database of minors’ sensitive data. Eg. Document based age checks require a child to hand a platform the exact identifiers the law is trying to keep from it.
      The Fix: Require age signals to be discarded once the check is complete, with a bar on retaining the underlying document.
    3. A ban pushes use underground: Restriction moves minors to less regulated services and to tools that hide their location. Eg. Teenagers migrate to smaller platforms or route access through virtual private networks.
      The Fix: Replace a binary ban with a graduated model, strict restriction under 13, supervised access from 13 to 15, and full access at 16.
    4. Restriction removes support networks for some children: Online communities are the only peer support available to some minors, and a blanket bar cuts that too. Eg. LGBTQ+, neurodivergent and disabled children frequently depend on such communities.
      The Fix: Exempt verified support, counselling and helpline services from minor account restrictions.

    [2025, GS2, 15 marks] The National Commission for Protection of Child Rights has to address the challenges faced by children in the digital era. Examine the existing policies and suggest measures the Commission can initiate to tackle the issue.”

  • Police camera ‘caught’ murder, rape accused at Jantar Mantar protest

    Police camera ‘caught’ murder, rape accused at Jantar Mantar protest

    Why in the News

    The Delhi Police has told the Supreme Court that its Facial Recognition System (FRS) spotted 2,873 people with criminal antecedents at the main protest site at Jantar Mantar between 20 and 26 July. The submission follows a Supreme Court order quashing every First Information Report (FIR) arising from the exam leak student protests.

    What is the Delhi Police’s Facial Recognition System?

    1. What the software does: It places boxes around faces detected in a camera feed and compares them against images held in police databases.
    2. The threshold for a positive match: A match is treated as positive at an accuracy rate of 80 per cent, a figure the force disclosed in a 2022 reply under the Right to Information (RTI) Act, 2005.
    3. What it searches against: Of the 2,873 flags, 2,402 were attributed to Crime Kundli, the force’s own biometric database, and 471 to criminal records.
    4. What the output is not: A match is not by itself proof of identity, and performance varies with the algorithm, camera angle, lighting, image quality, masks and the database being searched.

    What does the offence-wise breakdown in the affidavit show?

    1. The residual category is the largest by far: 1,884 of the 2,873, close to two thirds, sit under other Indian Penal Code, Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita and special law entries rather than under any named serious offence.
    2. The legal status of those flagged is unstated: The affidavit does not specify whether the people identified were accused, convicts, or merely named in criminal cases.
    3. The database is claimed to hold only serious offenders: The affidavit states that the face and other material of only those accused facing serious offences are in the police record, and not those facing petty offences such as traffic violations.
    4. The geographic concentration: The North district recorded the highest count at 285, followed by Outer at 257, North West at 256, North East at 174, East at 173 and South West at 166. Railways, Crime Branch, IGI Airport, Metro and the Special Cell were among the other units listed.

    What did the record check of 205 flagged individuals find?

    1. The sample examined: The 205 comprised 101 murder accused, 61 rape accused, 6 accused under the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences (POCSO) Act, 2012, and 37 of the 62 listed under attempt to murder.
    2. The finding: At least 25 of them were lodged in the Tihar, Mandoli or Rohini prison complexes at the time the system flagged them, according to police, jail and court records.
    3. The composition of the 25: 17 were accused in murder cases, 4 in rape cases of which 3 were under the POCSO Act, and 4 in attempt to murder cases.
    4. The dates of the flags: Three of the 25 were identified on 24 July, 21 on 25 July and one on 26 July, the final day of the protest.

    Why does the police assurance not settle the question?

    1. Verification is the only safeguard on record: The stated position is that action follows only after field verification establishes that the person was in fact present at the site, and no verification standard, timeline or reporting duty accompanies that assurance.
    2. Verification is still pending at scale: The force has stated that further verification of the identified individuals is pending, which leaves 2,873 names on a list that a court has already permitted the government to act on.
    3. The accuracy threshold is an internal setting, not a legal standard: An 80 per cent match is a configuration choice inside the software, and no statute, rule or judicial direction fixes what confidence level may be relied on before a person is named.
    4. The error is not random noise: People held in custody were placed at a protest site by the system, which points to database and matching failure rather than to a borderline image.

    Challenges to facial recognition in policing

    1. No statutory basis governs deployment: India has no law authorising or limiting police use of facial recognition, so procurement, matching thresholds and retention are set administratively. Eg. The Delhi Police’s 80 per cent threshold became public only through a Right to Information reply, not through a published rule.
      The Fix: Require prior legislative authorisation and a published operating standard for any biometric identification system before it is deployed in a public space.
    2. Accuracy falls sharply for some groups: Error rates in facial recognition are higher for darker skin tones, women and younger faces, so the burden of a false match is not evenly spread. Eg. The United States National Institute of Standards and Technology’s evaluation of commercial algorithms recorded higher false positive rates across demographic groups.
      The Fix: Mandate a published demographic error audit of the deployed algorithm before each operational use, with results filed with the sanctioning authority.
    3. The system was built for one purpose and used for another: A database assembled to trace missing persons or match crime scene images becomes a crowd screening tool without any fresh authorisation. Eg. The Delhi Police’s facial recognition capability was originally acquired for tracing missing children.
      The Fix: Attach a statutory purpose limitation to each biometric database, so any new use requires a separate written sanction that is placed on record.
    4. Surveillance at a protest changes who turns up: Recording and matching faces at an assembly deters lawful participation independently of any action that follows. Eg. Cameras mounted on police vans at the Jantar Mantar site were visible to those attending.
      The Fix: Bar identification of participants at a lawful assembly except on a written order naming a specific cognisable offence under investigation.
    5. There is no route to contest a match: A person flagged by the system is not told, so the error surfaces only if a journalist or a court checks the records. Eg. The 25 custodial mismatches came to light through a newspaper’s record check, not through any internal review.
      The Fix: Require written notice to every individual against whom a biometric match is acted on, with a stated procedure to seek correction of the underlying record.

    Conclusion

    A facial match is being treated as a sufficient basis to proceed against a named list, while the force’s own position is that a match establishes nothing on its own. Both cannot hold at once. Nothing on record fixes what field verification must consist of, who performs it, or who checks that it happened. The point to watch is whether the Court requires the verification outcome for each flagged individual to be filed before any action follows.

    [2024] Under which of the following Articles of the Constitution of India, has the Supreme Court of India placed the Right to Privacy?

    (a) Article 15

    (b) Article 16

    (c) Article 19

    (d) Article 21

  • [4th September 2026] The Hindu OpED: For newborns, the answer is hospital plus home

    [4th September 2026] The Hindu OpED: For newborns, the answer is hospital plus home

    Question (2024, GS2): “In a crucial domain like the public healthcare system, the Indian State should play a vital role to contain the adverse impact of marketisation of the system. Suggest some measures through which the State can enhance the reach of public healthcare at the grassroots level.
    Linkage: The proposed solution to move a portion of newborn care back to the home is a direct attempt to “enhance the reach of public healthcare at the grassroots level”. This question prompts candidates to suggest structural measures to decentralise care, relieving the burden on overloaded urban hospitals.

    Mentor Comment

    Three newborns died in an accidental fire at the government women’s hospital in Amravati, Maharashtra. That episode is placed alongside a list of clustered newborn deaths in government institutions since 2017, running from BRD Medical College in Gorakhpur and a government hospital in Ahmedabad through JK Lon Hospital in Kota, and on to district and medical college hospitals in Shahdol, Bhandara, Bhopal, Ambikapur, Nanded, Jhansi and Budaun. The argument drawn from that list is that these are a recurring pattern produced by the system, not a series of isolated accidents. The tension is that the policy success which moved birth out of the home is what has overloaded the units that receive the sick newborn, and the proposed answer is to move part of newborn care back to the home.

    What is home based newborn care?

    1. Trained community health workers deliver care where the baby is: They identify and manage neonatal infections at home, support breastfeeding and warmth, and manage low birth weight and preterm babies.
    2. It is already a package inside the public system: The Ministry of Health and Family Welfare adopted it in 2011, and roughly 8,00,000 Accredited Social Health Activists (ASHAs) have been trained on modules built from the Gadchiroli experience.
    3. It does not replace intensive care: A baby with severe prematurity, respiratory distress, shock, severe sepsis or serious birth asphyxia needs immediate facility based treatment.

    Why are newborn deaths clustering in government units?

    1. Overcrowding is the first reason: Institutional deliveries rose from 39 percent in 2005-06 to 90 percent in 2023-24 under the National Family Health Survey-6, and the absolute number of institutional deliveries rose from 109 lakh to 194 lakh. Admissions to public Special Newborn Care Units (SNCUs), the secondary level units that treat sick newborns, rose 28 percent in two years, from 11.3 lakh in 2021-22 to 14.45 lakh in 2023-24.
    2. The case mix has become sicker: Government hospitals now receive premature, low birth weight and sick newborns referred from peripheral facilities, alongside the normal deliveries they always handled.
    3. Infrastructure failure is the third reason: The Gorakhpur deaths of August 2017 were attributed by a district level inquiry to oxygen deprivation following an interruption in supply. Fires at Bhandara in January 2021, Bhopal in November 2021 and Jhansi in November 2024 show the electrical and fire risk in units running warmers, incubators and ventilators.
    4. Infection and staffing form the fourth: Inadequate nurse-to-baby ratios, equipment shortages and weak infection prevention practice let hospital acquired infection spread quickly through a crowded unit.

    What is the evidence that care at home works?

    1. A field trial cut neonatal mortality by 62.2 percent: The Society for Education, Action and Research in Community Health (SEARCH) ran the trial in rural Gadchiroli using trained community health workers, and published the result in The Lancet in 1999.
    2. Most small babies were managed without a bed: Between 1996 and 2003, 97 percent of low birth weight and preterm babies in Gadchiroli, including those above 1,800 g and beyond 34 weeks of gestation, were managed at home with a very low case fatality rate, published in the Journal of Perinatology in 2005.
    3. The delivery channel already exists nationally: India does not have to invent a system, so the binding constraint is training, supervision and support of the workers already deployed.

    What is the three part strategy proposed?

    1. Decongest the neonatal units: Strengthen home based care by ASHAs so that appropriate, stable newborns receive care at home rather than occupying a scarce SNCU bed.
    2. Staff and equip the units properly: Adequate numbers of doctors and nurses, appropriate nurse-to-baby ratios, functioning equipment, reliable oxygen and electricity with backup systems, and rigorous infection prevention.
    3. Make the units intrinsically safe: Fire detection and suppression systems, electrical and oxygen system safety measures, emergency evacuation drills and independent safety audits, all made mandatory rather than advisory.

    Challenges to home based newborn care

    1. The worker carrying the package is not an employee: An ASHA is an honorary volunteer paid through task linked incentives, so an expanded clinical role rests on availability that is not contractually owed. Eg. The fixed monthly incentive for routine tasks is Rs 2,000, with the remainder paid activity by activity.
      The Fix: Create a semi-formal cadre under the National Health Mission with a fixed salary component, insurance and pension attached to the newborn care role.
    2. Skill retention needs supervision that is not staffed: A worker trained once and never observed loses the clinical judgement the package depends on. Eg. The Auxiliary Nurse Midwives who supervise ASHAs also carry immunisation, antenatal and reporting duties at the same sub-centre.
      The Fix: Fund a dedicated supervisory post per cluster of workers with a fixed monthly schedule of observed home visits.
    3. Home care fails when referral fails: A baby that deteriorates at home needs transport and a bed within hours, and neither is guaranteed. Eg. A newborn deteriorating at night depends on a district ambulance network reached through the 102 service.
      The Fix: Link every worker to a live bed availability record for her referral unit and a guaranteed transport response window.
    4. The model was proven rural and remains rural: Urban newborns in slum and peri-urban households sit largely outside the package. Eg. Urban worker deployment norms are pitched at one worker per 1,000 to 2,500 slum population, and non-slum urban households fall outside that count.
      The Fix: Extend the package through urban primary health centres with a stated urban deployment norm and a defined household list.

    Conclusion

    Institutional delivery moved birth out of the home and saved both mothers and babies. It did not create the capacity to look after every newborn who arrives with the mother. The next phase has to divide the work, sending the sick newborn to a unit that is staffed and safe and keeping the stable newborn with a trained worker at home. The measure to watch is whether SNCU admissions fall and neonatal mortality keeps falling, since that combination is what separates decongestion from denial of care.

    Newborn and Child Health in India

    1. The mortality position: The Neonatal Mortality Rate stands at about 17 per 1,000 live births, the Infant Mortality Rate at about 25 and the Under-5 Mortality Rate at about 28 per 1,000 live births.
    2. Maternal mortality has fallen alongside it: The Maternal Mortality Ratio is about 80 per lakh live births.
    3. Immunisation coverage is high: Full immunisation coverage reached 93.5 percent under Mission Indradhanush 5.0.
    4. The disease mix has shifted: The share of communicable, maternal and neonatal conditions in India’s total disease burden fell to 33 percent, from 61 percent in 1990.

    Government Initiatives for Newborn and Child Health

    1. Janani Shishu Suraksha Karyakram: Provides free and cashless treatment to sick infants up to one year of age in government institutions, covering drugs, diagnostics and transport.
    2. Rashtriya Bal Swasthya Karyakram: Screens children for the four Ds, meaning defects at birth, deficiencies, diseases and developmental delays, with tertiary care for those identified.
    3. Mission Indradhanush 6.0: Targets 95 percent full immunisation coverage and tracks every pregnant woman and child through the U-WIN portal.
    4. Saksham Anganwadi and Poshan 2.0: Delivers supplementary nutrition aimed at reducing stunting and wasting among children under six.

    Key Facts about Newborn and Child Health

    1. National Newborn Week is observed from 15 to 21 November each year.
    2. The India Newborn Action Plan, 2014 set the goal of a single digit neonatal mortality rate by 2030.

    Challenges in Newborn and Child Health

    1. Specialist posts at the referral tier stay unfilled: A district newborn unit needs a paediatrician on its roster, and the sanctioned post is often vacant. Eg. Rural Community Health Centres carry a shortfall of about 80 percent against sanctioned specialist posts.
      The Fix: Build district paediatric cadres with a rural service obligation tied to postgraduate admission.
    2. Nursing supply is the binding constraint on every unit level standard: A nurse-to-baby ratio cannot be enforced where the nurses do not exist. Eg. India needs an additional 6.5 lakh nurses by 2030 to meet basic World Health Organization staffing norms.
      The Fix: Fund nursing school expansion in the districts with the highest birth volumes rather than in State capitals.
    3. Public health spending sits below its own policy target: Unit upgrades compete with every other demand inside a constrained health budget. Eg. Public health expenditure stands at about 1.9 percent of gross domestic product against the National Health Policy, 2017 target of 2.5 percent.
      The Fix: Ring-fence a newborn care line within National Health Mission allocations so unit safety upgrades are not crowded out.

    Back2Basics

    1. Janani Suraksha Yojana was launched in 2005 under the National Rural Health Mission, now the National Health Mission.
    2. It is a conditional cash transfer paid to promote institutional delivery among poor pregnant women.
      • Its benefits are differentiated between low performing and high performing States, and between rural and urban beneficiaries.
    3. The ASHA is its link worker, escorting the woman to the facility for a performance linked incentive.

  • More than 40 crore Indians are caught in a healthcare gap: panel

    Why in the News

    More than 40 crore Indians, over a quarter of the population, are covered neither by government health insurance nor by private cover, a Parliamentary Standing Committee on Health and Family Welfare has found. Its report, Affordability and Accessibility of Healthcare Facilities in Public and Private Sector, was presented to Parliament last month and carries 368 recommendations. The group it identifies sits above the eligibility line for fully subsidised cover and below the income at which private care is affordable. The committee’s conclusion is that insurance alone cannot close that gap, and that the fix lies in public capacity and in regulation of private prices.

    What is the ‘missing middle’ in health coverage?

    1. It is a group defined by exclusion from both systems: These households are too well off to rely on government subsidies and not financially secure enough to absorb the rising cost of private care.
    2. Its size is over a quarter of the population: More than 40 crore people fall into it, sitting between the poorest, who hold government protection, and the affluent, who can buy private care.
    3. The risk it faces is attrition, not catastrophe: The threat is the slow erosion of household income through medicines, consultations, tests and repeated treatment, rather than a single large hospital bill.

    Where do Indians actually seek care, and at what price?

    1. The private sector delivers most of the care: Over 60 percent of inpatient care and 70 percent of outpatient care is provided by private facilities, so households without financial protection meet private prices directly.
    2. Medicines are the single largest drain: They account for nearly 30 percent of current health expenditure.
    3. Chronic illness converts a cost into a recurring one: For a person with diabetes, hypertension or cardiovascular disease, medicines, consultations and diagnostic tests become a lifelong expense, and the non-communicable disease burden is climbing steadily.
    4. Childbirth shows the gap in one comparison: Average out-of-pocket spending is Rs 37,630 in private facilities against Rs 2,299 in public ones, more than sixteen times higher.

    What does the financing record show?

    1. Public spending sits below the policy’s own target: Government health expenditure is 1.43 percent of gross domestic product (GDP) against the 2.5 percent target set by the National Health Policy, 2017.
    2. Health’s share of the budget is shrinking: It fell from 6.12 percent of total government expenditure in 2021-22 to 4.89 percent in 2022-23, below the 5.02 percent recorded in 2019-20.
    3. The shortfall lands on households: Public capacity that is not built is care that is bought privately, which is what converts a spending decision into an out-of-pocket bill.

    Why does insurance alone not close the gap?

    1. Government cover is targeted at the poorest: Ayushman Bharat Pradhan Mantri Jan Arogya Yojana (PM-JAY) protects vulnerable households against hospitalisation costs, and the missing middle falls outside fully subsidised coverage.
    2. Private cover carries its own filters: A household that buys a policy still faces premiums, exclusions, waiting periods and co-payments.
    3. Both instruments insure the wrong event: Hospitalisation cover does not reach outpatient consultations, diagnostics and medicines, which is where this group’s expenditure actually accumulates.

    What has the committee recommended?

    1. A single regulatory floor for private providers: Nationwide implementation of the Clinical Establishments Act, so registration and minimum standards apply uniformly rather than State by State.
    2. Mandatory quality standards: Facilities would be held to a defined standard of services as a condition of operation rather than as a voluntary accreditation.
    3. Price transparency in private facilities: Rates for procedures, consultations and diagnostics would be published and displayed.
    4. Curbs on retail pharmacy practice: The report flags excessive trade margins and the non-prescription sale of antibiotics, and recommends stronger audits and enforcement.
    5. Stronger public healthcare infrastructure: The committee argued for building public capacity directly rather than relying on insurance to purchase care from private providers.

    Challenges to closing the missing middle

    1. A contributory product for this group has failed to launch before: The design has been proposed repeatedly and never converted into a national scheme with take-up. Eg. A NITI Aayog report in 2021 proposed extending PM-JAY to the missing middle on a contributory basis, and no national product followed it.
      The Fix: Collect the premium through an existing payment channel the household already uses, so enrolment does not depend on a separate voluntary transaction.
    2. The Clinical Establishments Act is not in force everywhere: Health is a State subject, so the central Act applies only where a State has adopted it. Eg. Large States including Karnataka, Tamil Nadu and Maharashtra regulate through their own statutes instead.
      The Fix: Tie a share of National Health Mission funds to adoption of a common minimum standard, whichever statute a State chooses to enforce it under.
    3. Transparency without a ceiling changes little: A published rate does not restrain a price where the patient is in no position to shop. Eg. Ceiling prices set by the National Pharmaceutical Pricing Authority cover scheduled medicines, and non-scheduled formulations sit outside that control.
      The Fix: Extend price capping to the high volume diagnostics and consumables that make up the bulk of a private bill.
    4. Cheap medicine supply is a fraction of the retail network: A generic price ceiling reaches a household only where a generic outlet exists. Eg. Jan Aushadhi Kendras number about 15,000 against roughly nine lakh retail pharmacies.
      The Fix: Mandate prescription by generic name and stock the full essential drug list at every public facility, so the public system itself becomes the cheap outlet.
    5. Human resources, not finance, cap public capacity: Money released for a facility does not produce the specialist who has to staff it. Eg. Rural Community Health Centres run with a shortfall of roughly 80 percent against sanctioned specialist posts.
      The Fix: Create a public health management cadre so clinical posts are not consumed by administrative duty.

    Conclusion

    The committee’s finding is not that coverage is absent. It is that coverage is built around hospitalisation. The expense that erodes household income is recurring and outpatient. Closing that requires a financing instrument that pays for consultations, diagnostics and medicines, and no such instrument operates at scale today. Whether the committee’s recommendations produce one, or produce another set of standards for private providers to display, is what the government’s action taken reply will show.

    Back2Basics

    1. The Clinical Establishments (Registration and Regulation) Act, 2010 provides for the registration and regulation of all clinical establishments, public and private, across recognised systems of medicine.
    2. Health is a State subject, so the Act operates in the Union Territories and in States that adopt it by resolution, and several States regulate under their own laws instead.
    3. It prescribes minimum standards of facilities and services as a condition of registration.
    4. It requires establishments to display their rates and to maintain and report records to the National Council for Clinical Establishments.

    Matching Previous Year Question

    “[2024, GS2, 15 marks] In a crucial domain like the public healthcare system, the Indian State should play a vital role to contain the adverse impact of marketisation of the system. Suggest some measures through which the State can enhance the reach of public healthcare at the grassroots level.”

  • ‘OBC lists were not used for Census as they featured classes, not castes’

    Why in the News

    The Union government has settled the 2027 Census on an open column method of recording caste, under which every caste outside the Presidential Scheduled Caste and Scheduled Tribe lists is written down as the household states it. The Central and State lists of Other Backward Classes (OBCs) were considered as the alternative and rejected, on the recorded ground that the list of OBCs is a list of classes and not a list of castes. The Union Cabinet had approved the inclusion of caste in the Census forms a year after the Opposition campaigned for a caste census, and the need to enumerate the OBC population was that campaign’s main argument. The method now chosen produces no OBC count of its own, which is the point the Leader of the Opposition in the Lok Sabha and the Congress president are contesting. This is the first Census to enumerate caste beyond the Scheduled lists since 1931.

    What is the open column method of caste enumeration?

    1. The household’s own answer is recorded: The enumerator writes the caste name as it is stated, without matching it against a list drawn up in advance.
    2. The Scheduled categories stay list based: Scheduled Caste and Scheduled Tribe communities continue to be enumerated against the corresponding Presidential lists, as has always been done.
    3. Classification is a separate, later step: The raw names collected are grouped into categories after enumeration is complete, rather than at the doorstep.

    Why were the Central and State OBC lists rejected?

    1. Several entries name something other than a caste: The lists carry entries describing occupational groups, settler groups, and a specific class of labourers.
    2. The examples cited are concrete: Officials pointed to “local borns” in the Andaman and Nicobar Islands and tea garden workers in Assam.
    3. Such entries are a minority of the lists: They sit among nearly 3,000 communities classified as OBC across the Central and State lists.
    4. The same community changes category across States: Several communities carried on OBC lists are classified as Scheduled Caste or Scheduled Tribe depending on the State.
    5. The State survey route was assessed on the same test: The problem surfaced when the government examined whether the methodology of State conducted caste surveys, such as those in Bihar and Telangana, could be replicated nationally.

    What is the objection to the open column?

    1. It yields no enumerated list of communities: OBC groups and Opposition leaders want the communities named, listed and counted specifically rather than written in freehand.
    2. The 2011 precedent is the stated worry: The Socio Economic and Caste Census of 2011 threw up over 46 lakh caste names, which critics expect an open column to reproduce.
    3. The government has used that same result before: It cited the 46 lakh names as its reason for not releasing the caste data from that exercise.
    4. The utility of the method is what is questioned: The objection is not that the count will not happen, but that its output will not be usable for policy.

    Does the government’s own record support the reason it gave?

    1. A statutory body concluded the opposite: A 2015 National Commission for Backward Classes document held that a caste can be, and quite often is, a social class in India.
    2. That document treated caste as the workable starting unit: It recorded that caste represents an existing, identifiable social group, and that an exercise can begin there and then extend to other groups, sections and classes.
    3. The choice was made at the top of the system: Officials involved in the methodology recorded that each option carried its own advantages and drawbacks, and that the open column was finalised only after the alternatives were considered at the highest levels.

    Challenges to caste enumeration through an open column

    1. Spelling and synonym variants inflate the count: One community is recorded under several names across districts, dialects and languages, and each variant enters the data as a separate entity. Eg. Bihar’s 2023 caste survey recorded 215 distinct castes because its enumerators worked from a fixed list rather than a blank field.
      The Fix: Publish a standardised State wise caste directory before enumeration and map every write-in entry to it during data processing.
    2. The classification authority is not named in advance: Grouping raw names into Backward Class and other categories is a decision taken after the count by a body the enumeration design does not identify. Eg. An expert group was constituted in 2015 to classify the caste data collected in the 2011 exercise, and that data was never released.
      The Fix: Notify the classifying authority, its composition and its publication timetable before the first form is filled.
    3. Self reported caste responds to incentive: A household may report the name that improves its standing or its eligibility rather than the one it ordinarily uses. Eg. Karnataka’s 2015 socio economic and educational survey drew objections from dominant communities over its recorded counts and stayed unpublished for years.
      The Fix: Verify a sample of write-in entries against household level administrative records before the totals are finalised.
    4. The quality of the answer rests on the enumerator: A caste question asked without a fixed probe sequence produces a sub-caste from one household and a broader cluster name from its neighbour. Eg. Census enumeration is carried out by roughly 30 lakh school teachers and government staff deployed for a few weeks.
      The Fix: Script the caste question with a mandatory probe sequence and test every enumerator on it before deployment.

    Conclusion

    The method of collection is now settled. What is not settled is who converts several lakh written answers into a list of communities, and by what rule. That step, and not the column on the form, is what decides whether the exercise produces a usable Backward Class number at all. It sits outside the methodology the government has announced, and it has no published owner.

    Back2Basics

    1. The Census is conducted under the Census Act, 1948 and the rules framed under it, which make participation compulsory and the individual returns confidential.
    2. It is carried out by the Office of the Registrar General and Census Commissioner of India, which functions under the Ministry of Home Affairs.
    3. It is decennial, and the last completed round was in 2011, the 2021 round having been deferred.
    4. The 2027 round runs in two phases, houselisting followed by population enumeration, with a reference date of 1 March 2027 and 1 October 2026 for snow bound areas.

    “[2023, GS1, 15 marks] Why is caste identity in India both fluid and static?

  • Quality elementary teachers are vital to lives of children, nation-building: top court

    Why in the News

    The Supreme Court has added teacher education institutions and the National Council for Teacher Education (NCTE) as the sixth and seventh duty bearers of the right to free and compulsory elementary education. A Division Bench held that free and compulsory education for children aged six to fourteen has attained the status of an enforceable fundamental right, and that teacher education has not been given the attention it deserves. The ruling came on an appeal against a Delhi High Court order of 13 March 2023, which had held the NCTE’s Public Notice of 22 September 2019 to be arbitrary and illegal. That notice requires every teacher education institution to file an annual Performance Appraisal Report. The contest was over the source of the power: the notice was challenged on the ground that only the Council itself, and not its Executive Committee, could issue and implement it.

    What is the National Council for Teacher Education?

    1. A statutory regulator of the teacher supply chain: It is constituted under the National Council for Teacher Education Act, 1993 to achieve the planned and coordinated development of the teacher education system in the country.
    2. It regulates the institutions that train teachers: A teacher education institution is defined in Section 2(e) of that Act as an institution offering a course or training in teacher education.
    3. It sets the qualifications a teacher must hold: Section 23 of the Right of Children to Free and Compulsory Education Act, 2009 makes it the academic authority for laying down the minimum qualifications for appointment as a teacher.

    Who are the duty bearers of the right to elementary education?

    1. Five were already recognised: Judicial precedent had identified the government, the local authority, the neighbourhood school, the parents or guardians, and the teacher.
    2. Teacher education institutions become the sixth: The institutions defined in Section 2(e) now carry a duty toward the right, rather than only a licensing relationship with their regulator.
    3. The Council becomes the seventh: It is required to ensure that those institutions function effectively and efficiently and conduct their affairs with integrity.
    4. The addition changes what is justiciable: A duty bearer’s failure is actionable, so a lapse in the training of teachers is now capable of being pleaded as a failure of the right itself.

    What did the Court hold on the power to demand appraisal reports?

    1. The Public Notice is legal and valid: The Court upheld the requirement that institutions upload an annual Performance Appraisal Report, and set aside the High Court order that had quashed it.
    2. The Executive Committee acted within jurisdiction: The Court found ample empowerment in both the Council and its Executive Committee to call for the report.
    3. The power is incidental and ancillary: A regulatory measure of this kind flows from the duties and functions of a regulator even without a specific empowerment in the statute.
    4. The regulator is itself appraised: The NCTE undergoes a performance audit by the Comptroller and Auditor General of India (CAG), so requiring the same discipline from institutions it regulates follows from its own position.

    Why does the Court place teacher training at the centre of the right?

    1. No resource ranks higher than a student’s mind and character: The Court held that elementary school teachers carry the most important role in nation-building and are to be treated with respect and care.
    2. The entitlement is only as good as the person delivering it: A right to education delivered by an untrained teacher is formally satisfied and substantively empty, which is why the regulator of training is being read into the right.
    3. Accountability of institutions is the stated purpose: The Court recorded that it is necessary for the Council and its bodies to ensure accountability of educational institutions.

    Challenges to the National Council for Teacher Education

    1. Recognition ran ahead of capacity: Approval was granted to private institutions at a pace that outstripped any ability to verify what they actually taught. Eg. The Justice J.S. Verma Commission on Teacher Education reported in 2012 that a large number of private institutions were commercial rather than academic in character.
      The Fix: Tie continued recognition to a published appraisal score reviewed on a fixed cycle, so approval becomes renewable rather than permanent.
    2. Retrospective validation weakens the standard: Recognition granted after the fact rewards institutions that ran courses without approval. Eg. The National Council for Teacher Education (Amendment) Act, 2019 conferred retrospective recognition and permission on specified institutions.
      The Fix: Bar retrospective recognition outright and require approval to be in place before an academic session opens.
    3. Quality is measured only at the exit, and only by the State: The regulator holds no outcome data on the graduates its recognised institutions produce. Eg. Pass rates in teacher eligibility tests have generally stayed under a fifth of the candidates appearing.
      The Fix: Publish institution wise eligibility test pass rates, so the appraisal report carries an outcome measure rather than a compliance declaration.
    4. Enforcement rests on self reported filings: A report filed by the institution about itself carries no independent verification. Eg. The Council reaches institutions across every State through four regional committees.
      The Fix: Sample audit a fixed share of filed reports each year through State education departments, with recognition suspended on a false filing.

    Conclusion

    The Court has widened the set of actors who owe a duty under the right to elementary education. It has not created the instrument that measures whether that duty is being met. The appraisal report is now the only candidate for that role. Whether it becomes a published, comparable record of what an institution produces, or settles into an annual compliance filing, is what will decide whether the two new duty bearers carry a duty in substance.

    Back2Basics

    1. The Right of Children to Free and Compulsory Education Act, 2009 gives statutory effect to Article 21A, which was inserted by the Constitution (Eighty-sixth Amendment) Act, 2002.
    2. Section 12(1)(c) requires private unaided schools to reserve 25 percent of entry level seats for children from disadvantaged groups and weaker sections.
    3. It bars screening procedures and capitation fees at the point of admission.
    4. It requires a School Management Committee in every government and aided school, with three fourths of its members drawn from parents and guardians.

    “[2018] Consider the following statements:

    1. As per the Right to Education (RTE) Act, to be eligible for appointment as a teacher in a State, a person would be required to possess the minimum qualification laid down by the concerned State Council of Teacher Education.

    2. As per the RTE Act, for teaching primary classes, a candidate is required to pass a Teacher Eligibility Test conducted in accordance with the National Council of Teacher Education guidelines.

    3. In India, more than 90% of teacher education institutions are directly under the State Governments

    Which of the statements given above is/are correct?

    (a) 1 and 2

    (b) 2 only

    (c) 1 and 3

    (d) 3 only

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