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  • Egg, chicken, milk prices: Why they remain high

    Why in the News

    Gross value added from India’s livestock sector was about 34% of that from crops in 2013-14, and the ratio touched 57% in 2023-24, the last year for which official data is available. The value of milk, eggs, meat and other animal products from Indian farms is steadily approaching that of foodgrains, oilseeds, sugarcane, cotton, vegetables, fruits and spices. That progress is being undermined by spiralling feed ingredient costs. The tension is that the same grain the animal economy runs on is also the feedstock the fuel blending programme is turning to, and the government cannot protect both at once.

    Components of livestock feed

    1. Energy comes from maize: Broiler chicken feed is 55-65% maize by weight, egg laying bird feed is 50-60% maize, and cattle feed 15-20%.
    2. Protein comes from oilseed cakes and meals: Broiler formulations carry 25-30% soyabean meal and layer feed 18-20%. Oilseed cakes and meals make up 40-50% by weight of compound cattle feed.
    3. The balance is micro ingredients: Animals also need minerals such as calcium and phosphorus, vitamins, dietary fibre, fat and synthetic amino acids such as methionine and lysine.

    How far have feed ingredient prices risen?

    1. Maize at Erode: The average price at the Alangeyam market in Tamil Nadu’s Erode district rose from Rs 2,537 per quintal in August 2025 to Rs 2,759 in August 2026, and stands at Rs 2,810 now.
    2. Soyabean meal at Indore: Prices of 50% protein soyabean meal on the National Commodity and Derivatives Exchange rose from Rs 38,186 per tonne in August 2025 to Rs 58,156 in August 2026. They have fallen to Rs 50,000 this month, against a September 2025 average of Rs 35,327.
    3. The peak and the switch: Soyabean meal has come off a peak of Rs 63,000 to Rs 64,000 per tonne, and maize began hardening just as it eased.
    4. The other protein meals: Groundnut and rapeseed oilcakes trade at Rs 38,000 and Rs 33,100 per tonne against September 2025 averages of Rs 24,188 and Rs 24,479, with cottonseed extraction at Rs 35,500 against Rs 30,500 and rice bran extraction at Rs 20,500 against Rs 13,669, on Solvent Extractors’ Association of India data.

    Why did egg prices climb this year?

    1. The current level: Egg prices in Delhi are at Rs 600 per 100 pieces on the indicative poultry farm-gate rates set by the National Egg Co-ordination Committee (NECC), and retail prices rule at Rs 7-9 per egg depending on whether the purchase is a 30 piece crate, a dozen or a smaller lot.
    2. The July spike: NECC suggested prices scaled Rs 725-730 per 100 eggs in July, and the month’s average of Rs 670.5 was 38.7% higher than a year earlier.
    3. Weather cut supply: The NECC’s stated explanation is that an extended summer and delayed monsoon rains linked to El Nino caused water shortages, heat stress and rising bird mortality, alongside a July spike in maize and soyabean meal prices.
    4. Demand is seasonal: Egg demand and prices generally rise after Diwali through winter and the spring season, and fall with rising temperature and humidity. The real dip runs through Shravan, Pitru Paksha, Navratri, Diwali and Chhath Puja, when many Hindu households avoid eggs.

    Why does feed cost decide the producer’s margin?

    1. Feed dominates the egg cost: Layer feed prices have climbed from Rs 24-26 to Rs 30-32 per kg over the last four months, and feed constitutes 65-70% of a farmer’s egg production cost.
    2. Broiler margins have narrowed: Broiler feed prices have surged from Rs 40 to Rs 46 per kg over the same four months, and total broiler production cost is now roughly Rs 110 per kg.
    3. The price has fallen back towards cost: Farmgate broiler prices crossed Rs 150 per kg of live weight across north India in late June and early July, and have settled at Rs 115-120 per kg after Shravan.
    4. The bird takes time to pay back: Farmers raise day old chicks of 35-45 gm to slaughter ready weight of 2-2.5 kg over 35-42 days. Layer hens begin laying at 18-20 weeks, continue until 70-72 weeks, and lay 250-300 eggs a year.

    Why is the supply outlook uneven between maize and soyabean?

    1. Soyabean looks comfortable: Farmers sowed almost the same area under soyabean this kharif season as last year, and the crop due for harvest in October and November is reported normal to good with no major insect pest or disease incidence.
    2. Imports have padded the stocks: Some large poultry companies with captive feed manufacturing facilities have contracted soyabean imports estimated at 0.9 million tonnes in 2025-26, improving carryover stocks for the new marketing year.
    3. Maize is the worry: Kharif maize acreage is down 4.1% on government data and the yield outlook is weak, on the assessment of CLFMA of India, the compound livestock feed manufacturers’ body. El Nino could also hurt the rabi maize crop.
    4. The output projection has turned: The US Department of Agriculture projects India’s maize production in 2026-27 at 50 million tonnes, a sharp decline from the record 55.1 million tonnes of 2025-26, which was itself a substantial jump over 43.4 million tonnes the year before.

    How does ethanol policy tighten the feed squeeze?

    1. Sugar feedstock is being closed off: With sugar prices rising, the Centre is expected to bar mills from using cane juice or B-heavy molasses, the intermediate molasses stream that still carries high sucrose, for manufacturing ethanol in the crushing year beginning October.
    2. The load shifts to grain: Grain based distilleries carry the blending programme when cane feedstock is restricted, and maize is the grain they draw on.
    3. Diversion itself may be reviewed: If maize prices keep rising into livestock feed costs and consumer prices for milk, eggs and meat, the diversion of the feed grain to ethanol production could itself come up for review.
    4. The blending target is the casualty: Meeting the existing 20% ethanol blending in petrol (E20) would become difficult in 2026-27.

    Challenges to India’s livestock feed supply

    1. Maize productivity is low: India’s average maize yield sits well below the world average, so additional demand has to be met by planting more area rather than by raising output per hectare. Eg. Single cross hybrid seed coverage remains limited across the rainfed kharif maize belts of Rajasthan and Madhya Pradesh.
      The Fix: Drive seed replacement with single cross hybrids in the rainfed kharif districts and expand irrigated rabi maize, which yields far more per hectare.
    2. Protein meal supply carries no import ceiling: India does not permit routine imports of genetically modified soyabean meal, so domestic meal prices have no external cap when they run up. Eg. The Centre allowed a one time import of 1.2 million tonnes of de-oiled genetically modified soyameal in 2021 after poultry feed costs spiked.
      The Fix: Notify a standing tariff rate quota for de-oiled soyameal that opens automatically once domestic prices cross a declared trigger.
    3. Dairy runs on a fodder deficit: Cattle and buffalo rations depend on crop residue and grazing land that is shrinking, which pushes more of the ration onto purchased compound feed. Eg. Fodder crops occupy roughly 4% of India’s gross cropped area and that share has not expanded in decades.
      The Fix: Bring fodder crops into seed subsidy and assured procurement in the major milk shed districts, so a farmer growing fodder is not worse off than one growing grain.
    4. Poultry carries weather risk without cover: Commercial layer and broiler units sit outside the livestock insurance cover that large ruminants receive, so mortality in a heat wave is borne entirely by the farmer. Eg. The livestock insurance component of central animal husbandry schemes covers cattle, buffalo, sheep, goat and pig, and not commercial poultry.
      The Fix: Extend livestock insurance to commercial poultry units with a temperature triggered payout, so relief does not wait on a mortality survey.

    Conclusion

    Feed, not disease and not demand, is what now sets the price of an egg, a kilogram of chicken and a litre of milk. The animal economy has grown faster than the grain and oilmeal base that feeds it, so a single bad grain year passes straight through to the consumer. The decision point is the feedstock order for the coming crushing year, which settles how much grain the fuel programme takes before the feed industry gets to it. The marker to watch is whether the government caps grain diversion to protect feed supply, or holds the blending target and lets feed prices clear the market.

    Back2Basics

    1. What the NECC is: A body of poultry farmers formed in 1982 to co-ordinate egg marketing and stabilise prices for producers.
    2. What it does: It declares daily suggested farm-gate egg prices for each of its producing and consuming centres, which the trade uses as the reference rate.
    3. Its standing: The prices are indicative and carry no statutory force, and the body is a producers’ association rather than a regulator.

    Matching Previous Year Question

    “[2015, GS3, 12.5 marks] Livestock rearing has a big potential for providing non-farm employment and income in rural areas. Discuss suggesting suitable measures to promote this sector in India.”

  • Ex-officials flag concerns over Census data quality, potential NPR, NRC link

    Why in the News

    Two administrative decisions on Census 2027 have drawn objections from former Census officials. The Registrar General and Census Commissioner of India (RG&CCI) notified 40 questions for the Population Enumeration phase on 14 August 2026, several of which mirror the rehearsal form of the National Population Register (NPR) used in 2019. The RG&CCI then advanced the Population Enumeration phase in the poll bound States of Uttar Pradesh, Punjab, Uttarakhand and Goa on 5 September, while deferring it in violence hit Manipur. The objection is that the two decisions together degrade data quality and revive a link between the Census, the NPR and a National Register of Citizens (NRC). Section 15 of the Census Act, 1948 bars that use, and the 1951 Census is the precedent showing it happened anyway.

    What is the National Population Register?

    1. A register of residents: The NPR records persons residing in a local area, and it is generated under the Citizenship Act, with its data intended to be published.
    2. Its current scale: It was first created in 2011, updated in 2015, and already holds a family wise database of 119 crore residents.
    3. Its stalled status: It was to be updated alongside the first phase of the now scrapped Census 2021 and has been held back after opposition from political parties and civil society groups.

    What has changed in the Census 2027 design?

    1. The question set has grown: 40 questions were notified on 14 August 2026 for the Population Enumeration phase.
    2. The new fields are identity fields: They include particulars of a person’s parents including their names, religion, place of birth, Aadhaar, mobile phone number, voter identity and driving licence details.
    3. The resemblance is to a different exercise: Those additions mirror the questions asked in the 2019 rehearsal form of the NPR rather than anything in the previous Census schedule.
    4. The sequence has been reordered: Population Enumeration has been advanced in four poll bound States and deferred in Manipur, breaking the simultaneity a national headcount normally runs on.

    Why do former officials say the data quality will suffer?

    1. Migrants fall between two counts: Counting four States ahead of the rest of the country could lead to under enumeration of migrant workers, particularly those from Uttar Pradesh, since a person counted nowhere at the time of enumeration is not counted at all.
    2. Some questions serve no statistical purpose: Details relating to identity documents and vaccination history are already held in administrative databases, and it is not clear what statistical purpose their collection in a Census would serve.
    3. The link remains speculative rather than stated: A former Deputy Registrar General of India has stressed that any link between the Census and population registration activities remains speculative, while noting that the information now sought resembles NPR data.

    What separates the two exercises in law?

    1. The confidentiality bar: Section 15 of the Census Act, 1948 provides that records of the Census are not open to inspection nor admissible in evidence, and Census data can be used only for statistical purposes.
    2. Different statutes, different outputs: The NPR is generated under citizenship law and its data is meant to be published, which is the opposite disclosure rule from the one governing the Census.
    3. The 2019 practice went the other way: The update of the NRC in Assam in 2019 was not based on NPR data and required a separate data collection exercise of its own.

    What does the 1951 precedent actually show?

    1. The register was copied from the Census: The NRC was prepared across the country in 1951 by transcribing important Census data from the Census slips, using the same symbols and abbreviations.
    2. The two records were reconciled against each other: Missing NRC entries were copied from Census slips and missing Census slips were recreated from NRC entries under a special reconciliation exercise.
    3. It was designed as an administrative tool: The 1951 Census report for Assam, Manipur and Tripura records the register as a Census and administrative instrument rather than a citizenship verification exercise, intended to be maintained permanently and updated by village officials.
    4. It was never completed nationally: A countrywide NRC was never published for unspecified reasons, except in undivided Assam, which then also included Manipur and Tripura.

    Challenges to Census 2027

    1. A staggered count breaks comparability: Population figures collected at different reference moments cannot be compared across States without adjustment, and every downstream allocation rests on that comparison. Eg. Advancing enumeration in Uttar Pradesh, Punjab, Uttarakhand and Goa places four States on a different reference point from the rest of the country.
      The Fix: Publish the reference date used for each State alongside the provisional totals, and state the adjustment method before the figures enter any allocation formula.
    2. Identity questions depress response quality: Asking for document numbers in a count that promises confidentiality invites non response and misreporting from precisely the groups most likely to be undercounted. Eg. The 2019 NPR rehearsal form, which the new questions resemble, drew organised opposition on exactly this ground.
      The Fix: Make the identity document fields optional and record the non response rate for each, so the degradation is measured rather than hidden inside the totals.
    3. Confidentiality is asserted but not enforceable by the respondent: Section 15 bars inspection and evidentiary use of Census records, and offers the person counted no remedy where the bar is crossed. Eg. The 1951 register was built by copying Census slips despite the same statutory bar being in force.
      The Fix: Provide a statutory penalty for onward transfer of individual Census records to any other register, enforceable on complaint rather than only at the department’s discretion.
    4. Enumeration timing collides with the electoral calendar: Running a household level count in poll bound States places enumerators and electoral officials in the same households in the same season, which invites conflation of two separate exercises. Eg. Uttarakhand is simultaneously running a Special Intensive Revision of electoral rolls with a final roll due in October.
      The Fix: Separate the enumeration window from the notified election period by a fixed statutory interval, on the model of the silence period in electoral law.

    Conclusion

    The objection is not that a register is being built, but that the instrument being used promises confidentiality and the instrument it resembles promises publication. That precedent shows the two can be merged in practice with the statutory bar formally intact, and nothing in the present design forecloses that. The concrete markers to watch are whether the identity document fields survive to the final schedule, and whether the four advanced States are enumerated against a stated reference date the rest of the country can be compared to.

    Matching Previous Year Question

    “[2009] Consider the following statements : 1. Between Census 1951 and Census 2001, the density of the population of India has increased more than three times. 2. Between Census 1951 and Census 2001, the annual growth rate (exponential) of the population of India has doubled. Which of the statements given abova is/are correct ? (a) 1 only (b) 2 only (c) Both 1 and 2 (d) Neither 1 nor 2 ANSWER: (d)”

  • Double deflation debate over GDP methodology is no ‘great battle’

    Why in the News

    The Vice Chairman of NITI Aayog, the government’s economic think tank, has said there is no winner in the ongoing dispute over the use of double deflation in India’s new gross domestic product (GDP) series, and that the methodology is neither impractical nor particularly difficult to implement. The statement answers concerns raised a week earlier by a former Finance Secretary and a former Chief Statistician over the method used to double deflate GDP under the new series. The tension is that the methodology being questioned is the same one that produces growth rates lower than the series it replaced, which is why the Vice Chairman asked why the scrutiny is arriving only now.

    What is double deflation?

    1. The method: Double deflation removes the effects of inflation at both the producer and the consumer expenditure stages when arriving at the real GDP of an economy.
    2. What it requires in practice: The inputs a producer buys have to be separated from the outputs the producer sells, and each set is deflated by its own price index.
    3. Where it stands internationally: The method is widely used across national statistical systems.

    What has changed in India’s GDP series?

    1. The new base year carries the new method: The Ministry of Statistics and Programme Implementation (MoSPI), the nodal ministry for official statistics, introduced double deflation in the GDP series with 2023-24 as the base year.
    2. The earlier series did not use it: Double deflation was not part of India’s 2011-12 GDP series.
    3. The output looks different: GDP growth rates in the new series, based on 2023-24 prices, are lower than those under the earlier series with 2011-12 as the base year.

    How is the dispute framed?

    1. The government think tank’s position: Deflating the price effects at the producer and the consumer expenditure stages of GDP is not a great battle, and double deflation is not a methodological impossibility.
    2. The practical claim: All that is required is to separate the inputs from the outputs, the method can of course be improved like anything else, and it is a good time to start.
    3. The timing objection: The Vice Chairman asked why the methodology had not come under similar scrutiny when the earlier series was in use, and why the concerns are being raised only now.
    4. What the critics raised: A former Finance Secretary and a former Chief Statistician had, a week earlier, questioned the methodology used to double deflate GDP under the new series.

    Challenges to measuring real GDP under double deflation

    1. India lacks a full producer side price index: Deflating inputs correctly requires a producer price index, and the wholesale price index that stands in for it covers goods alone. Eg. Services account for over half of gross value added but have no wholesale price index representation.
      The Fix: Complete and release a producer price index covering services, as recommended by the working group set up to design one.
    2. Informal output is estimated rather than measured: A large share of value added comes from unincorporated enterprises whose input costs are inferred from survey benchmarks rather than observed. Eg. The unincorporated sector enterprise survey is conducted at multi year intervals, so intervening years are interpolated.
      The Fix: Move the unincorporated enterprise survey to an annual cycle so input cost ratios are updated each year rather than carried forward.
    3. The method amplifies error in volatile quarters: Subtracting one deflated series from another magnifies any mismatch between the two price indices used. Eg. A sharp swing in crude prices moves input costs long before it moves output prices in refining and petrochemicals.
      The Fix: Publish the input and output deflators alongside the headline estimate so the source of any swing is visible to users.
    4. A base year change breaks comparability: Growth rates computed on a new base and a new method cannot be read directly against the old series. Eg. The shift to the 2011-12 series produced a comparable dispute over back series estimates.
      The Fix: Release a full back series on the new base and method, so the change in level is separated from the change in growth.

    Conclusion

    The dispute is about measurement, not about performance, and both sides accept that removing inflation twice is the internationally accepted way to compute real output. What is unresolved is whether the price data India collects can support the method at the level of detail it demands. That is a question about the statistical system’s inputs rather than about the arithmetic applied to them. The marker to watch is whether the producer price index that the method depends on is released alongside the new series.

    Matching Previous Year Question

    “[2021, GS3, 10.0 marks] Explain the difference between computing methodology of India’s Gross Domestic Product(GDP) before the year 2015 and after the year 2015.”

  • BJD stages protest over Mines and Minerals Amendment Act

    Why in the News

    The Biju Janata Dal has demanded constitutional intervention to reverse the Mines and Minerals (Development and Regulation) Amendment Act, 2026, marching to the Lok Bhavan in Bhubaneswar and submitting a memorandum addressed to the President through the Governor. The demand answers the Supreme Court’s judgment in Mineral Area Development Authority v. Steel Authority of India (2024). That judgment recognised the power of State governments to impose taxes and levies on mines and mineral bearing lands. It also dealt with recovery of such dues for the period beginning 1 April 2005, which the party values at more than Rs 1 lakh crore in arrears for Odisha alone. The contest is between Parliament’s power to limit State taxation in the name of mineral development and a State’s claim on the revenue from minerals it owns.

    What has the party actually asked for?

    1. Reversal, not amendment: The memorandum seeks constitutional intervention for the reversal of the 2026 amendment rather than a modification of its terms.
    2. The route chosen: The petition was addressed to the President and routed through the Governor, placing the objection outside the legislative process the amendment has already cleared.
    3. The stated test: Any legislative measure that substantially curtails the rights and financial interests of a State in relation to mines and mineral bearing lands deserves careful constitutional and legal examination.

    What is at stake for Odisha’s revenue?

    1. The arrears claim: The State was estimated to become entitled to more than Rs 1 lakh crore towards arrears of mining related taxes and levies following the 2024 judgment.
    2. The recurring claim: A further approximately Rs 12,000 crore of additional annual revenue was estimated to follow from the recognised taxing power.
    3. Why the base is large: Odisha’s reserves of iron ore, coal, bauxite, chromite and other minerals have historically been a major source of revenue for the State government, so a change in the taxing head moves a large absolute sum.

    How does the amendment reverse the judgment’s effect?

    1. The provision used: A new Section 9D bars a State from imposing any tax, cess or other levy on mineral rights or mineral bearing lands, whether measured by quantity, value or royalty, except in accordance with conditions the Central Government prescribes.
    2. The constitutional hook: Entry 50 of the State List gives States the power to tax mineral rights subject to any limitations imposed by Parliament by law relating to mineral development, and this is the first exercise of that limitation.
    3. The stated justification: Some States had stacked around fourteen separate charges, with land taxes reaching 20 per cent, on the ground that blocks were being made commercially unviable.
    4. The disputed edge: The judgment recognised a separate State power to tax lands under Entry 49 of the State List, which Entry 50’s limitation clause does not reach, and that gap is what a challenge would target.

    Challenges to the Mines and Minerals (Development and Regulation) Amendment Act, 2026

    1. A statutory limit on a constitutional head: Curbing a State land tax through a central mining statute rather than a constitutional amendment leaves the reversal open to challenge on the ground that Parliament used a power it does not hold over Entry 49. Eg. Odisha and Jharkhand have both said they will test the amendment in the Supreme Court.
      The Fix: Settle the boundary between Entry 49 and Entry 50 by a reference under Article 143 before assessments under the new section are raised, rather than after a decade of recovery litigation.
    2. A recognised entitlement is extinguished after it accrued: The 2024 judgment allowed recovery from 1 April 2005, so States had already booked receivables that the amendment removes prospectively and retrospectively at once. Eg. Odisha’s estimated arrears rest entirely on that recovery window.
      The Fix: Protect dues that accrued before the amendment’s commencement by an express saving clause, so the limitation operates only on future levies.
    3. Mineral revenue is concentrated in a few States: A uniform national bar falls almost entirely on the small group of mineral bearing States, which cannot substitute the lost head from any other source. Eg. Odisha, Jharkhand and Chhattisgarh carry the bulk of India’s iron ore, coal and bauxite output and therefore the bulk of the foregone levy.
      The Fix: Compensate the affected States from a share of central mining receipts for a fixed transition period, on the model used for the Goods and Services Tax transition.
    4. Input cost stability is bought with fiscal centralisation: Capping State levies stabilises costs for steel, aluminium, cement and power at the price of removing a State’s only mineral specific tax head. Eg. The uneven and rising input cost that followed the 2024 judgment is the stated reason for the amendment.
      The Fix: Prescribe a ceiling rate for State levies under Section 9D rather than a bar, so cost predictability is achieved without extinguishing the head.

    Conclusion

    The dispute has moved from the courtroom to the constitutional offices and is heading back to the courtroom. A State whose taxing power was recognised by a judgment has been overridden by an ordinary central statute, and the party in opposition in that State has taken the objection to the President rather than to Parliament, where the amendment has already passed. What to watch is whether the mineral bearing States file the challenge they have threatened, and whether it is framed on Entry 49 rather than Entry 50.

    Back2Basics: The Mines and Minerals (Development and Regulation) Act, 1957

    1. Scope: It is the parent law for every mineral except petroleum and natural gas, and it sets who may explore, who may mine and what they pay.
    2. Ownership and leasing: The State government owns the mineral in its territory and signs every lease, even for a block the Centre has auctioned.
    3. Auction as the only route: The MMDR Amendment Act, 2015 made competitive auction the sole route to a mineral concession, replacing discretionary first come first served allocation.
    4. The 2023 shift: For 24 critical and strategic minerals the Centre took over the auction itself, moving the auctioning authority upward while leaving State ownership untouched.

    Matching Previous Year Question

    “[2025] Consider the following statements: I. India has joined the Minerals Security Partnership as a member. II. India is a resource-rich country in all the 30 critical minerals that it has identified. III. The Parliament in 2023 has amended the Mines and Minerals (Development and Regulation) Act, 1957 empowering the Central Government to exclusively auction mining lease and composite license for certain critical minerals. Which of the statements given above are correct? (a) I and II only (b) II and III only (c) I and III only (d) I, II and III ANSWER: (c)”

  • India’s listing bonanza: IPO window opens wide as OFS turns exit route

    Why in the News

    The initial public offering (IPO) process in India has become an exit mechanism for existing shareholders rather than a route for companies to raise growth capital. The offer for sale (OFS) component was nearly 1.5 times the fresh capital raised in FY26, according to National Stock Exchange data. Forthcoming issues, including the National Stock Exchange’s own estimated Rs 30,000 crore offering, are entirely OFS. The tension is that a window designed to widen public ownership and fund new investment is now converting private holdings into public ones without adding capital to the companies being listed.

    What is an offer for sale?

    1. The instrument: An OFS is a sale of shares already held by promoters or early investors, conducted through the stock exchange rather than by the company issuing new shares.
    2. Where the money goes: The proceeds reach the selling shareholder, so the listed company’s own capital base does not change.
    3. The Indian variation: When an unlisted firm lists, an OFS can be included in the IPO prospectus, also called a Red Herring Prospectus (the offer document filed before the issue price is fixed), so it enters through the primary market window while behaving like a secondary market transaction.

    How large has the OFS share of India’s primary market become?

    1. It now exceeds fresh capital: OFS was nearly 1.5 times the fresh capital raised in FY26, according to National Stock Exchange data.
    2. It dominates issue proceeds: OFS accounted for about 59 per cent of IPO proceeds in FY26, according to KPMG India data. Listings backed by private equity rose sharply.
    3. The pattern is five years old: Indian companies mopped up Rs 5.4 lakh crore through public issues during 2021-25, of which Rs 3.37 lakh crore came entirely from OFS, according to Prime Database.
    4. The pipeline is large: As many as 245 companies have filed their draft Red Herring Prospectus with the Securities and Exchange Board of India (SEBI), according to an Equirus Capital report.

    Why was the OFS route created, and what was it originally meant to do?

    1. A compliance mechanism, not an exit route: SEBI formally introduced OFS in 2012 as a dedicated exchange based mechanism for promoters of listed companies to sell shares transparently.
    2. The stated purpose: It was meant to help promoters reduce their holdings and comply with minimum public shareholding norms, which require a listed company to keep a fixed proportion of its equity with public shareholders.
    3. The government adopted it for disinvestment: The Centre used OFS to dilute its holding in central public sector enterprises to reach the shareholding threshold and beyond it, in ONGC, Hindustan Copper, NMDC, Oil India, NTPC, Rashtriya Chemicals and Fertilisers, NALCO and the Steel Authority of India.
    4. Large public issues carried it too: Life Insurance Corporation of India, General Insurance Corporation, Coal India, Indian Railway Finance Corporation and New India Assurance each saw a sizeable OFS share in their public offer.

    Which of the forthcoming issues are entirely exits?

    1. The exchange’s own listing: The National Stock Exchange, cleared by SEBI for its estimated Rs 30,000 crore IPO, will go entirely through OFS.
    2. An asset manager followed the same route: SBI Funds Management’s public offering of more than Rs 9,800 crore was entirely through OFS.
    3. Three more public sector issues are proposed on the same basis: Indian Gas Exchange, Mahanadi Coalfields and Asset Reconstruction Company India are taking a proposed 100 per cent OFS route.
    4. The private sector uses it to unlock value: In the Hyundai India listing the parent company did not dilute to fund the subsidiary’s expansion, and sold shares to Indian investors instead, in one of India’s largest IPOs.

    Why is the window open now?

    1. Subscription demand has more than doubled: Average IPO subscriptions rose to 59.1 times in July and August from 24.5 times in April to June, according to NovaaOne Investment Banking.
    2. Listing gains have widened: Average listing gains climbed to 19.5 per cent from 5.7 per cent over the same comparison.
    3. Deferred issues have returned: Companies that stayed on the fringes during volatile markets are now seeking to capitalise on improving sentiment.
    4. The pipeline spans consumer facing sectors: The private sector queue covers quick commerce, logistics, housing finance, dairy, financial services and education infrastructure, with a sizeable proportion of OFS embedded in the issues.

    What does the contrast with other large markets show about the Indian structure?

    1. The comparison is structural rather than detailed: The United States, China, the United Kingdom, Japan and parts of Europe have historically had large secondary equity markets, but their structures differ from India’s IPO plus OFS model.
    2. Sequence is the difference: In the United States and Europe, secondary sales usually happen after a company is already public, so the market has already achieved price discovery before existing holders sell.

    Challenges to the offer for sale route

    1. Pricing is set by the party leaving: A selling shareholder fixes the price of its own exit and carries no continuing obligation to the company’s performance after listing. Eg. Paytm listed in November 2021 and traded far below its issue price within a year.
      The Fix: Extend a lock in on significant selling shareholders beyond the existing anchor investor period, so a portion of the exit is priced after the market has tested the company.
    2. Disclosure is built around the issuer, not the seller: An offer document centres on the company’s stated use of proceeds, which carries little information where the fresh issue is small. Eg. An issue that is entirely OFS has no use of proceeds section of substance at all.
      The Fix: Require a separate disclosure of each large selling shareholder’s holding period and acquisition cost on the cover of the offer document.
    3. Retail investors absorb the price discovery risk: Listing gains draw first time investors into issues priced off valuations set in private funding rounds. Eg. SEBI studies have found that a majority of retail allottees sell within a week of listing.
      The Fix: Publish an issue level dashboard showing the fresh issue share and the pre-issue acquisition cost, so a subscriber can see what is being funded.
    4. Public sector divestment becomes procyclical: Stake sales are timed to buoyant markets rather than to a stated ownership policy, so the exchequer sells most when sentiment is strongest. Eg. Coal India’s stake sales have clustered in periods of strong index performance.
      The Fix: Publish a rolling multi year divestment calendar with target holdings per company, so the sale schedule is not set by market mood.

    Conclusion

    India’s primary market is functioning as a liquidity platform, and capital formation has become only one part of what it does. That is not a defect in itself, since an exit route is what persuades early investors to fund unlisted firms in the first place. The unresolved question is whether a subscriber can tell which of the two an issue is doing, because the offer document is built to describe a company raising money and most issues are no longer doing that. The marker to watch is whether SEBI requires the fresh issue share to be disclosed on the face of the prospectus.

    Matching Previous Year Question

    “[2023] Consider the following markets : 1. Government Bond Market 2. Call Money Market 3. Treasury Bill Market 4. Stock Market How many of the above are included in capital markets? (a) Only one (b) Only two (c) Only three (d) All four ANSWER: (b)”

  • Withdraw stand on Gram Sabha consent, rights group urges Ministry

    Why in the News

    The Tribal Affairs Ministry has held in an office memorandum that there is “no provision” under the Scheduled Tribes and Other Traditional Forest Dwellers (Recognition of Forest Rights) Act, 2006 to seek the consent of Gram Sabhas for diverting forest land to non-forest purposes. The Campaign for Survival and Dignity (CSD), a national platform of Adivasi and forest dweller organisations, has demanded immediate withdrawal of the memorandum. The position was arrived at during the Ministry’s discussion with the Power Ministry on the requirement of 100% Gram Sabha consent, which has been described as a “critical bottleneck” delaying large government projects. The contest is over what the consent requirement actually is. Treated as a statutory right it cannot be set aside by an executive communication, and treated as an administrative practice it can.

    What does the Forest Rights Act, 2006 give the Gram Sabha?

    1. It recognises rights: Section 3 recognises individual rights over forest land under occupation and community rights over minor forest produce, grazing, water bodies and traditional use.
    2. The Gram Sabha starts the process: Section 6 makes the Gram Sabha the authority that initiates determination of the nature and extent of individual and community forest rights.
    3. It carries powers over the forest itself: Section 5 empowers the Gram Sabha to protect wildlife, forest and biodiversity and to stop any activity that harms the community forest resource.
    4. Consent attaches to diversion: An Environment Ministry circular of 3 August 2009 requires written Gram Sabha consent, together with a certificate that rights recognition is complete, before forest land is diverted under the Forest (Conservation) Act, 1980.

    What did the Ministry hold, and what produced it?

    1. The memorandum’s claim: The office memorandum of 31 August states there is no provision in the Act requiring Gram Sabha consent for diversion of forest land to non-forest use.
    2. It came out of an inter-ministerial discussion: The Tribal Affairs Ministry is in discussions with the Power Ministry on the 100% consent requirement, which the discussions treat as a critical bottleneck holding up large government projects.

    On what grounds is the memorandum contested?

    1. Called factually and legally untenable: The CSD said the position “smacks of dereliction of duty” and that the error could have been avoided by reading the text of the law.
    2. It cuts against the Ministry’s own record: A former Union Environment Minister said the stance runs contrary to the Ministry’s own directives, communications, guidelines and the set procedure under law as it stands.
    3. It sits against the Niyamgiri ruling: In Orissa Mining Corporation v. Ministry of Environment and Forests (2013), the Supreme Court referred the question of community and religious claims to the Gram Sabhas of Rayagada and Kalahandi districts. All twelve Gram Sabhas consulted rejected bauxite mining in the Niyamgiri hills.
    4. A motive is alleged: The CSD alleged the Ministry took the position to appease the interests of project developers, contractors and large corporations.

    Challenges to Gram Sabha consent under the Forest Rights Act

    1. Consent presumes recognition is finished: Where community forest resource rights have not been recognised, there is no recorded rights holder whose consent can be sought, and the diversion proceeds on that silence. Eg. Gadchiroli district in Maharashtra carries widespread community forest resource titles, and recognition remains thin across most other States.
      The Fix: Complete community forest resource mapping and titling for a block before any diversion proposal for that block is admitted for processing.
    2. Consent can be manufactured: Resolutions are recorded without quorum, or with an agenda drafted by the project proponent and read out at the meeting. Eg. Gram Sabha consent resolutions for the Parsa coal block in Chhattisgarh’s Hasdeo Arand were alleged to be forged and were placed under official inquiry.
      The Fix: Video record every consent Gram Sabha and publish the attendance roll and the resolution in the local language before the clearance file moves.
    3. Clearance stages have been decoupled from consent: The Forest (Conservation) Rules, 2022 allow the Centre to grant in principle approval before the State certifies that forest rights settlement is complete. Eg. The Rules were challenged before the Supreme Court by retired civil servants and forest rights groups on precisely this ground.
      The Fix: Restore the consent certificate as a condition precedent to the first stage approval rather than an obligation the State discharges afterwards.

    Conclusion

    The memorandum stands, and only the Ministry that issued it can withdraw it. What is in dispute is not a policy preference but a reading of a statute, which means the answer is available to any court asked the question. The immediate marker is whether the Tribal Affairs Ministry withdraws or reissues its communication to the Power Ministry. The larger one is whether consent survives as a condition of forest diversion or is converted into a clearance stage that the executive can waive when a project is large enough.

    Matching Previous Year Question

    “[2013] Under the Scheduled Tribes and Other Traditional Forest Dwellers (Recognition of Forest Rights) Act, 2006, who shall be the authority to initiate the process for determining the nature and extent of individual or community forest rights or both? (a) State Forest Department (b) Distrit Collector/Deputy Commissioner (c) Tahsildar/Block Develoment Officer/Mandal Revenue Officer (d) Gram Sabha ANSWER: (d)”

  • Dangerous phase

    Why in the News

    United States forces have struck five Iranian oil tankers in Gulf waters, citing Iranian attacks on U.S. warships in the region. Iran has answered with a ballistic missile attack on the Muwaffaq Salti U.S. air base in Jordan, and has promised a stronger response to every further U.S. strike. It has also declared a new restricted zone in the Strait of Hormuz, warning commercial ships against crossing it under American naval escort. The U.S. had until recently used intense military strikes and economic strangulation as separate tools, and is now applying both at once. The pressure has produced escalation instead of concessions, and the conflict has widened to Jordan, Saudi Arabia and the Red Sea.

    What has changed in the U.S. approach to Iran?

    1. Two instruments applied together: Military strikes and economic strangulation were used separately in the recent past to force Iran to surrender. They are now being used simultaneously as maximum pressure on Tehran.
    2. The blockade has closed the revenue line: The U.S. naval blockade has largely prevented Iran from exporting its oil.
    3. Escorted convoys have blunted the chokepoint: American naval escort for a limited number of ships out of the Strait of Hormuz has reduced the effect of Iran’s chokehold on global energy prices.

    Why has maximum pressure not produced concessions?

    1. Iran escalated rather than conceded: Iran attacked American warships outside the Persian Gulf in the knowledge that a stronger U.S. military response would follow.
    2. A reading of American domestic politics: Iran sees a window in the weeks before the U.S. midterm elections. The U.S. President remains politically weak at home.
    3. Strike capability has been rebuilt: The missile attack on U.S. bases in Jordan indicates capabilities that the U.S. President had claimed were destroyed.

    How far has the conflict spread beyond Iran and the U.S.?

    1. Saudi Arabia has been drawn in: Yemen’s Houthis, closely aligned with Tehran, launched an attack on Saudi Arabia and wounded dozens. Riyadh has vowed a response.
    2. A second maritime front: The Houthis control northern Yemen and parts of its Red Sea coast, and have enforced a naval blockade of Saudi Arabia’s western ports.
    3. A ground offensive inside Yemen: The Houthis have launched an offensive against the forces of Yemen’s Saudi-backed government in Taiz and Mocha.
    4. Two waterways at risk at once: The Strait of Hormuz and the Red Sea, the trade channel between Europe and Asia, are both flashpoints. The conflict now runs horizontally from Tehran to Jordan and from Riyadh to Bab-el-Mandeb.

    Challenges to a maximum pressure strategy

    1. Coercion without an exit ramp invites escalation: A campaign that offers no negotiated off-ramp leaves the target with escalation as its only remaining lever. Eg. The U.S. left the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), the 2015 nuclear agreement, in 2018 and reimposed sanctions, and Iran began exceeding the agreement’s enrichment limits from 2019.
      The Fix: Attach a stated and verifiable de-escalation offer to each coercive step, so compliance carries a defined and reversible reward.
    2. Energy prices transmit the conflict to uninvolved economies: A threat to a shipping chokepoint raises freight, war-risk insurance and crude costs for states with no part in the dispute. Eg. Attacks on shipping in the Red Sea from late 2023 pushed carriers to route around the Cape of Good Hope, adding roughly two weeks to Asia to Europe voyages.
      The Fix: Hold deeper strategic petroleum reserves and pre-contract alternative routings, so a closure is absorbed over months rather than priced within days.
    3. Aligned armed groups let the target strike elsewhere: Sanctions imposed on a state do not reach the armed groups that act with it. Eg. The September 2019 attack on Saudi Aramco’s Abqaiq and Khurais facilities halted about half of Saudi crude output for a period.
      The Fix: Combine weapons transfer interdiction with a regional maritime security arrangement that includes the Gulf states, rather than an escort force drawn only from Western navies.
    4. Inspection access closes before the fighting does: Coercion removes the monitoring that would verify any later agreement. Eg. Iran stopped implementing the Additional Protocol, its expanded inspection arrangement with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), in February 2021.
      The Fix: Ring-fence safeguards access from the coercive track, so inspections continue whatever the state of the political negotiation.

    Conclusion

    Neither side is placed to step back. Washington has committed to military and economic coercion at the same time and has no concession to show for it. Tehran has answered each strike with a wider one and gains from escalating during a period of unsettled American politics. The marker to watch is whether the new restricted zone is enforced against an escorted convoy, since that is the point at which a shipping war becomes a general one.

    Back2Basics: Strait of Hormuz

    1. Location: A narrow sea passage between Iran to the north and Oman and the United Arab Emirates to the south, linking the Persian Gulf with the Gulf of Oman and the Arabian Sea.
    2. Dimensions: Roughly 33 km wide at its narrowest point, with the designated shipping lanes about 3 km wide in each direction.
    3. Traffic: Close to a fifth of global petroleum liquids consumption moves through it, along with most of Qatar’s seaborne liquefied natural gas.
    4. Bypass routes: Saudi Arabia’s East-West pipeline to the Red Sea and the United Arab Emirates’ Habshan to Fujairah pipeline are the only routes that move Gulf crude to open sea without crossing the strait.

    Matching Previous Year Question

    “[2026] Ships from which of the following countries have to cross the Strait of Hormuz to reach out to the Indian Ocean? 1. Bahrain 2. Syria 3. Qatar 4. Egypt (a) 1 and 2 (b) 1 and 3 (c) 2 and 3 (d) 3 and 4 ANSWER: (b)”

  • Pollution from open waste burning triples in cities during winter: study

    Why in the News

    Open waste burning across Indian cities rises sharply in winter, with the average incidence, the quantity of waste burned and the associated emissions as much as three times higher than in summer. The finding comes from a working paper by the World Resources Institute (WRI) India, built on field surveys carried out between 2019 and 2026 in 11 polluted Indian cities whose names have not been disclosed. The burning is not a major source of citywide particulate pollution, contributing under 1% of total PM2.5 and PM10 emissions in the cities assessed. The contest is over what the finding measures. Read as an air quality number the share is small, and read as a service delivery number it is evidence that municipal waste collection is failing in the poorest wards of the smallest cities.

    Why does the burning rise in winter?

    1. The seasonal multiple: Incidence, quantity burned and emissions run up to three times higher in winter than in summer across every category of city examined.
    2. The weather compounds it: The post monsoon period brings falling temperatures and stagnant atmospheric conditions, which make it harder for pollutants to disperse.

    How does the burden differ across city tiers?

    1. Tier 3 cities burn most often: They recorded the highest winter incidence, at an average of 49.6 incidents per square kilometre per day.
    2. Tier 2 cities burn the most waste: Cities with populations between 500,000 and five million recorded the highest quantities of waste burned, at 46 incidents per square kilometre per day.
    3. Tier 1 cities trail: The largest cities recorded 39.4 incidents per square kilometre per day.

    Why does a share under 1% still matter?

    1. The citywide share is small: Open burning contributed less than 1% of total citywide PM2.5 and PM10 emissions in the cities assessed.
    2. The exposure is close range: Burning happens near homes, streets and waste dumps, so it raises short term exposure to toxic smoke for the people living beside it.

    What does the income gradient reveal?

    1. Poorer areas burn more: Lower income neighbourhoods recorded substantially more burning than higher income areas within the same cities.
    2. The single highest reading: Nearly 84 incidents per square kilometre per day were recorded in the poorer areas of Tier 2 cities during winter, the highest figure in the study.
    3. What the researchers read into it: The pattern points to disparities in waste collection and other municipal services between neighbourhoods, rather than to differences in household behaviour alone.

    Challenges to municipal solid waste collection

    1. Segregation at source stays low: The Solid Waste Management Rules, 2016 require households to hand over segregated wet, dry and domestic hazardous waste, and mixed waste continues to reach collection points. Eg. Indore’s ward level segregated door to door collection is cited as an exception rather than the norm across Indian cities.
      The Fix: Tie Swachh Bharat Mission grant releases to third party audited segregation rates at ward level rather than to citywide self reported figures.
    2. Collection routes stop at the settlement edge: Informal settlements and peri urban wards often sit outside the contracted collection route, so waste there has no lawful disposal path. Eg. Peri urban wards added to municipal limits after boundary expansion frequently retain no collection contract for years.
      The Fix: Use burning incidence mapped per square kilometre to identify uncollected pockets and extend contracted routes to them.
    3. Processing capacity lags behind collection: Waste that is collected still lands on legacy dumpsites because sorting and processing plants are missing or underused. Eg. Delhi’s Ghazipur, Bhalswa and Okhla legacy dumps continue to receive fresh waste, with bio-mining running alongside.
      The Fix: Release bio-mining funds against verified reduction in dump height and volume rather than against tonnage cleared on paper.
    4. Enforcement against burning is nominal: Open burning of waste is prohibited and carries a spot fine under the 2016 Rules, and prosecution is rare because the offence is momentary and unwitnessed. Eg. The Graded Response Action Plan bars open burning across Delhi and the National Capital Region every winter, and incidents persist through the season.
      The Fix: Make the ward sanitation officer accountable for a measured incidence figure in the ward, so enforcement is judged on the count rather than on fines issued.

    Conclusion

    The paper converts open waste burning from an air quality footnote into a measurable test of municipal performance. The unit it uses is a count of incidents in a defined area, which a city can track ward by ward and compare across seasons. That makes the finding usable in a way a citywide emission share is not. The marker to watch is whether city clean air action plans adopt burning incidence as a service delivery indicator before the coming winter, or continue to treat it as a source with a negligible share.

    Back2Basics

    1. World Resources Institute: A global research organisation founded in 1982 and headquartered in Washington DC, working on climate, energy, food, forests, water and cities.
    2. WRI India: An independent research charity registered in India, which works with State governments and urban local bodies on air quality, mobility, energy and urban development.
    3. What a working paper is: A pre-publication research document circulated for comment, which has not been through peer review.

    Matching Previous Year Question

    “[2026, GS3, 15.0 marks] What are the challenges to solid waste management in India? Discuss the governmental policy framework on solid waste management. Discuss the success/failure cases of Delhi and Indore cities highlighting the salient feature of their solid waste management initiatives.”

  • Uttarakhand voter-deletion puzzle: Why 4 plains districts account for 85% of Form-7s

    Why in the News

    Four plains districts of Uttarakhand account for more than 85 per cent of the 1,30,382 Form 7 deletion applications filed during the claims and objections period of the Special Intensive Revision (SIR) of electoral rolls. Udham Singh Nagar filed 43,878, Haridwar 29,369, Dehradun 19,402 and Nainital 18,301, against 382 in Rudraprayag. The concentration is read two ways: the ruling party attributes it to migration and border movement, the Opposition to the minority and Scheduled Caste composition of those districts. The Election Commission of India (ECI) has meanwhile disposed of only a third of the applications and has pushed the claims and objections deadline back by nineteen days.

    What is the Special Intensive Revision of electoral rolls?

    1. A rebuild rather than an update: The roll is drawn afresh instead of being amended, so an existing elector is placed on a draft roll and re-established on it before the final roll is notified.
    2. The claims and objections window: A fixed period after the draft roll opens the roll to applications for inclusion, correction and deletion, and is the only stage at which an entry can be contested.
    3. The deletion form: Form 7 is the application seeking removal of a name, filed either by the elector concerned or by any other elector objecting to that entry.

    Where is the deletion demand concentrated?

    1. The four plains districts: Udham Singh Nagar, Haridwar, Dehradun and Nainital together account for over 85 per cent of the 1,30,382 Form 7 applications filed in the State.
    2. The hill districts barely register: Pauri Garhwal recorded 5,424 applications, Pithoragarh 3,044, Almora 2,999, Uttarkashi 2,109, Champawat 1,723, Chamoli 1,702 and Tehri Garhwal 1,431.
    3. The floor of the distribution: Bagheshwar recorded 618 applications and Rudraprayag 382, against Udham Singh Nagar’s 43,878.

    Why do the two sides read the same numbers differently?

    1. The migration explanation: Uttarakhand’s Minister for Minority Affairs attributed the concentration to the four districts being the State’s largest and most mobile urban centres, where people move while retaining electoral records at their previous locations.
    2. The targeting allegation: The Congress said it does not oppose the revision itself but objects to the manner of deletion, alleging that the affected seats are those with larger Muslim, minority, poor, Scheduled Caste and Scheduled Tribe populations.
    3. The rejection of a communal reading: The State minister rejected the suggestion that any minority was being targeted, resting the pattern on cross border movement of people alone.
    4. The Commission declines to interpret: The ECI’s stated position is that the figures record only applications received, and that district totals can vary with how actively individuals examined the roll.

    Can the machinery dispose of what has been filed?

    1. The disposal shortfall: Of the 1,30,382 applications received between 14 July and 13 August, only 44,132 had been disposed of as of 7 September, leaving 86,250 under process.
    2. Pendency follows the same map: Udham Singh Nagar has 34,903 applications under process, Haridwar 17,554, Nainital 11,498 and Dehradun 11,262.
    3. The schedule has moved: The claims and objections deadline has been extended from 9 September to 28 September, with the final electoral roll now due on 3 October.

    Challenges to the Special Intensive Revision

    1. Deletion volume outruns adjudication capacity: Each Form 7 requires an inquiry and a hearing before a name is struck, and a single electoral registration officer cannot run tens of thousands of them inside a notified window. Eg. Udham Singh Nagar carries 34,903 undisposed applications against a district electoral machinery sized for routine annual revision.
      The Fix: Publish a per district disposal rate through the window, so a shortfall is visible in time for the schedule to be corrected rather than after the final roll is notified.
    2. A rebuilt roll shifts the burden onto the elector: A revision that does not carry the previous roll forward requires every elector to act, which falls hardest on those least able to track a draft publication. Eg. Circular migrant workers absent from their registered address through the claims window have no practical way to contest a deletion entry.
      The Fix: Require a documented delivery of individual notice to the registered address before any deletion is confirmed, rather than treating draft roll publication as sufficient notice.
    3. Bulk objections are not distinguished from individual ones: The form makes no distinction between an elector correcting their own record and a third party objecting to another elector’s entry, so the two are counted and processed alike. Eg. The State’s own figures report only totals received, with no breakdown of who filed them.
      The Fix: Record and publish the filer category on every Form 7, so a concentration of third party objections is identifiable in the data itself.
    4. No published reason code for a deletion: A name removed as a duplicate, a name removed on death and a name removed as a non resident are all recorded as a deletion, so the roll’s shrinkage cannot be audited. Eg. The Uttarakhand figures allow no test of the migration explanation against the targeting allegation, which is why both survive the same dataset.
      The Fix: Attach a mandatory statutory reason code to every deletion order and publish the code wise totals alongside the final roll.

    Conclusion

    The Uttarakhand figures do not settle the dispute they have started. The same distribution supports a migration reading and a targeting reading, and the Commission has declined to choose between them because the data records applications rather than outcomes. The test now sits in the disposal record: 86,250 applications have to be decided before 28 September, and the final roll is due on 3 October.

    Matching Previous Year Question

    “[2026, GS2, 10.0 marks] Is the right to vote a fundamental right? Discuss the position of the Election Commission of India while undertaking the revision of electoral rolls. Can it also examine the question of citizenship of voters?”

  • Govt. not in favour of treating English as ‘native’ language

    Why in the News

    The Union government has told the Supreme Court that it “has an issue” with treating English as an indigenous language. It has assured the court that it will move quickly on consultations to grant the current Class 6 batch a one-time reprieve from the mandatory third-language paper in the Central Board of Secondary Education (CBSE) Class 10 examination. The court had earlier asked the CBSE to consider that relief. The petitioners want English moved out of the indigenous category into the “non-native” or foreign language category, and the Centre has reserved its submissions on that question. The court has also issued notice on petitions filed by minority schools on the three-language scheme. The dispute is about classification rather than count, because what counts as an indigenous language decides how many Indian languages a student must carry.

    What is the three-language formula under the National Education Policy, 2020?

    1. What it requires: The National Education Policy, 2020 continues the three-language formula in school education. At least two of the three languages taught must be native to India.
    2. Why classification decides the burden: A language treated as indigenous can fill one of the two mandatory Indian-language slots. English placed outside that category cannot, so a student carries an additional Indian language alongside it.
    3. Choice rests with States and students: The policy states that no language will be imposed on any State. The three languages are chosen by States, regions and students themselves.

    What has the Centre now told the Supreme Court?

    1. The petitioners’ ask: Counsel for the petitioners sought an order shifting English into the “non-native” or foreign language category.
    2. The Centre’s objection: The Centre said it “has an issue” with that, and asked to make its submissions before any order is passed.
    3. The assurance on the reprieve: The Centre told a Bench headed by the Chief Justice of India that a meeting with the officials concerned would be arranged within a day or two to decide on the one-time reprieve for Class 6 students.

    Why does the current Class 6 batch sit at the centre of the case?

    1. One batch faces full implementation: Under the CBSE guidelines, students in Classes 7 to 9 were exempted from the third-language requirement. The current Class 6 batch was slated for full implementation of the scheme.
    2. The examination date: Full implementation carries a mandatory Class 10 Board examination in the third language by 2031.
    3. The court’s earlier direction: At an earlier hearing the court asked the CBSE to consider relieving Class 6 students of writing the third-language examination in Class 10.
    4. The Bench on sequencing: A judge on the Bench said time is needed for students and for infrastructure to reach parity across education boards. Starting with the mother tongue, then an indigenous language, then another indigenous or foreign language works only where it begins in a lower class.

    What else is now before the court?

    1. The minority schools’ challenge: The court issued notice to the government on petitions filed by minority schools on the implementation of the three-language scheme.
    2. The English question is undecided: No order was passed on shifting English out of the indigenous category, because the Centre asked to be heard on it first.
    3. Timeline pressure from the petitioners: Counsel for the petitioners said parents were anxious and urged the court against further adjournments. The hearing stands adjourned to 17 September.

    Challenges to the three-language formula

    1. Political resistance where the formula reads as imposition: A centrally set language requirement collides with State language policy. Eg. Tamil Nadu has followed a two-language policy of Tamil and English since 1968, after the anti-Hindi agitations of 1965, and has refused the three-language formula since.
      The Fix: Make the third language a State-notified choice, and tie central funding to teacher recruitment for whichever language a State selects rather than to adoption of the formula itself.
    2. Teacher availability limits real choice: A school cannot offer a language for which no trained teacher is posted. Eg. UDISE+ returns record over one lakh single-teacher schools in the country.
      The Fix: Sanction language-specific posts and permit a shared language teacher across a cluster of schools before the subject becomes examinable.
    3. Foundational reading is the prior constraint: A third language added at the middle stage assumes reading fluency that many students do not have. Eg. The ASER 2024 survey found under half of Class 5 students in rural India able to read a Class 2 level text.
      The Fix: Sequence the third language behind a measured foundational literacy benchmark in the mother tongue, rather than behind a fixed grade.
    4. Minority institutions’ autonomy is engaged: Article 30(1) gives minorities the right to establish and administer educational institutions of their choice, and a prescribed set of languages touches that right. Eg. In T.M.A. Pai Foundation v. State of Karnataka (2002), an eleven-judge Constitution Bench held that regulation of such institutions is permissible for standards and not for control of administration.
      The Fix: Frame the language requirement as an attainment standard rather than as a prescribed language set, so minority institutions retain the choice of which languages meet it.

    Conclusion

    The case turns on a classification question rather than on the number of languages taught. Whether English is treated as indigenous decides whether a student carries two Indian languages or three. The Centre has reserved its position on that and has offered relief only to one batch of students. What remains unresolved is what happens to every batch that follows it.

    Matching Previous Year Question

    “[2020, GS2, 15.0 marks] National Education Policy 2020 is in conformity with the Sustainable Development Goal-4 (2030). It intends to restructure and reorient education system in India. Critically examine the statement.”

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