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  • Five years after Taliban takeover, life in Afghanistan marred by many struggles

    Why in the News

    Five years have passed since the Taliban entered Kabul on 15 August 2021, ending the United States led military presence and the Islamic Republic that had governed Afghanistan for two decades. The Taliban have converted military victory into durable control of institutions, borders and revenue, without converting it into recognition, economic recovery or rights for women. That gap defines the position every state now has to work around, including India.

    What is a de facto government?

    1. Definition: A de facto government is an authority that exercises effective control over a territory and its population without being formally recognised as its lawful government by other states. Control is a question of fact, recognition a question of law.
    2. What recognition does: Recognising a government endorses its authority to represent the state internationally, while withholding recognition does not deny that the state itself exists.
    3. Why states still transact: Border management, humanitarian delivery and consular work require dealing with whoever controls territory, which produces engagement without recognition.
    4. What non recognition costs the authority: It blocks the state’s seat at international organisations, access to central bank reserves held abroad and formal sovereign borrowing.

    What is the Islamic State-Khorasan Province?

    1. What it is: The Islamic State-Khorasan Province (ISKP) is the regional branch of the Islamic State operating in Afghanistan, Pakistan and parts of Central Asia, formed in 2015.
    2. Its relationship with the Taliban: It rejects the Taliban’s authority as insufficiently doctrinaire and is an armed rival rather than an ally, which is why the Taliban conduct operations against it.

    What has actually changed in Afghanistan’s security situation since 2021?

    1. The war ended: The most immediate change was the end of the war between the Taliban and the then Afghan government.
    2. The withdrawal and the collapse: The United States and NATO completed their military withdrawal in August 2021, and Afghan security forces collapsed soon afterwards.
    3. Consolidation of control: The Taliban control Afghanistan’s major government institutions, security forces and borders, and armed opposition groups have not been able to mount a significant nationwide challenge.
    4. No comparable conflict: There is now no nationwide armed conflict comparable to the fighting that took place before 2021.
    5. What it means on the ground: Roads previously affected by battles and checkpoints are generally more accessible, and the risk of being caught in clashes between the Taliban and government forces has fallen.

    Why has the end of the war not meant the end of violence?

    1. A surviving armed rival: The Islamic State-Khorasan Province remains active and has carried out attacks against civilians, Taliban officials and foreign nationals.
    2. Counter operations: The Taliban have carried out operations against the group, which makes the conflict internal rather than against a foreign force.
    3. Deteriorating relations with Pakistan: The two countries have repeatedly accused each other of allowing militant groups to operate from their territory.
    4. Frequency of border clashes: Clashes along the border have become more frequent since 2021.
    5. A reversal of the earlier relationship: Pakistan had been an important supporter of the Taliban for years, but since 2021 Islamabad’s concerns over militant attacks and border security have increasingly complicated relations with Kabul.

    How far have restrictions on women gone, and what do they cost in the long run?

    1. The initial assurance: When the Taliban took control in 2021 they said they would respect women’s rights under their interpretation of Islamic law.
    2. What followed: Restrictions on women have steadily increased rather than stabilised at the level announced.
    3. Education: Girls remain barred from secondary education and higher education.
    4. Employment and movement: Women have been excluded from many areas of employment and face restrictions on movement and on access to public spaces, affecting almost every aspect of participation in public life.
    5. The pipeline effect: Girls unable to complete school cannot move on to university or professional training, which means fewer women will enter professions such as medicine, teaching, journalism and public administration.

    Why is economic stability not the same as economic recovery?

    1. The pre 2021 base: International aid accounted for a significant part of government spending and economic activity before the takeover.
    2. The shock: The withdrawal of foreign troops and the sudden reduction in aid created a major economic shock, and there were fears that the Afghan economy could collapse.
    3. What the Taliban did instead: The administration increased domestic revenue collection, tried to expand trade with neighbouring countries, invested in infrastructure and attempted to raise economic activity within the country.
    4. The result: Afghanistan has achieved a degree of economic stability since the severe crisis that followed the takeover, but stability is not recovery.
    5. What stability leaves untouched: Poverty remains widespread, unemployment remains a major problem, and humanitarian assistance continues to be important for millions of Afghans.
    6. A new pressure: The country is dealing with the return of large numbers of Afghans from Pakistan and Iran, whose arrival has created additional pressure on housing, employment and public services.

    What do other countries’ positions show about the limits of non-recognition?

    1. The general position: The Taliban regime has not received widespread international recognition, and most countries continue to avoid formally recognising it as Afghanistan’s legitimate government.
    2. The stated grounds: The main concerns are restrictions on women, the absence of an inclusive political system, and questions about terrorism and human rights.
    3. Russia: Russia has formally recognised the Taliban regime, making it the outlier among major powers.
    4. China and the United Arab Emirates: Both have accepted Taliban appointed ambassadors, which is operational acceptance short of formal recognition.
    5. Western governments: Several Western governments have maintained contact with Taliban officials without extending recognition.
    6. The common driver: Countries have increasingly had to deal with the Taliban because they control Afghanistan, which shows that control eventually compels engagement even where it does not compel recognition.

    What explains India’s shift from distance to pragmatic engagement?

    1. The posture: India has followed a cautious but increasingly pragmatic approach towards the Taliban since they returned to power in August 2021.
    2. The line held: New Delhi did not recognise the Taliban regime, and has expanded diplomatic engagement without altering that position.
    3. Return of presence: India reopened its diplomatic mission in Kabul in 2022.
    4. Continuing assistance: India continued providing humanitarian assistance, including food, medicines and other supplies.
    5. The turning point: The engagement became more significant in 2025 with the visit of the Taliban Foreign Minister.
    6. Why Afghanistan matters: Security is one of India’s biggest concerns in relation to Afghanistan, and Pakistan is the other factor shaping the calculation.

    Challenges to India’s Afghanistan policy

    1. Engagement without recognition has no legal footing: Agreements reached with an unrecognised authority cannot be enforced or registered internationally. Eg. India’s diplomatic mission in Kabul, reopened in 2022, operates as a technical mission rather than a full embassy.
    2. Overland access runs through a hostile neighbour: India has no land route to Afghanistan that does not cross Pakistan. Eg. India’s wheat consignments to Afghanistan required specific Pakistani transit permission in 2022 for movement through the Wagah crossing.
    3. Dependence on a sanctioned transit route: The alternative sea and land corridor runs through Iran, which carries its own sanctions exposure. Eg. India’s ten year contract of May 2024 to operate the Shahid Beheshti terminal at Chabahar depends on a project specific sanctions exemption.
    4. Stranded development assets: India built infrastructure whose upkeep now depends on an authority it does not recognise. Eg. The Afghan Parliament building inaugurated in 2015 and the Afghan India Friendship Dam at Salma completed in 2016 both sit under Taliban administration.
    5. Reputational cost of engaging a rights violating authority: Expanded contact runs against India’s own stated positions on women’s rights. Eg. Girls in Afghanistan remain barred from secondary and higher education while diplomatic engagement expands.
    6. Competition from states willing to recognise: Recognition buys influence that engagement alone does not. Eg. Russia formally recognised the Taliban regime, and China and the United Arab Emirates accepted Taliban appointed ambassadors.
    7. Terrorism risk that engagement cannot eliminate: Groups hostile to India retain sanctuary regardless of the state of India Kabul relations. Eg. The Islamic State-Khorasan Province has attacked foreign nationals in Afghanistan, including a Sikh gurdwara in Kabul in June 2022.

    Conclusion

    Five years after the takeover, the Taliban hold Afghanistan’s institutions, borders and security forces, have arrested the economic collapse that was predicted, and face no nationwide armed challenge. They have not obtained recognition, have not converted stability into recovery, and have deepened rather than relaxed the restrictions that keep recognition out of reach. The unresolved question is whether states that must deal with a de facto authority can extract any change in its conduct through engagement alone, since Russia’s recognition and India’s non recognition have so far produced the same behaviour from Kabul.

    “[2013, GS2, 10] The proposed withdrawal of International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) from Afghanistan in 2014 is fraught with major security implications for the countries of the region. Examine in light of the fact that India is faced with a plethora of challenges and needs to safeguard its own strategic interests.”

  • Core industrial sector growth slows to 5.4% in July as fertilizer, steel, iron ore, oil output falls

    Why in the News

    Growth in India’s nine core industrial sectors slowed to 5.4% in July 2026 from 6% in June, according to official data released on 20 August 2026. The headline number is being held up by cement, electricity and a low-base rebound in iron ore and coal, at a time when the input industries feeding manufacturing and the domestic energy producers are contracting.

    What is the Index of Core Industries?

    1. About: The Index of Core Industries (ICI) measures the combined production performance of nine industries that supply inputs and energy to the rest of the economy, and is released monthly by the Ministry of Commerce and Industry.
    2. The nine sectors: Coal, crude oil, natural gas, refinery products, fertilizers, steel, iron ore, cement and electricity.
    3. New series: A new series of the index was released in July 2026 with 2022-23 as the base year, replacing the 2011-12 base year, and July’s reading is the second print of the revamped index.
    4. Break in comparability: Because of the base year change, a historical comparison on the new series is possible only up to June 2025.

    How did each of the nine sectors perform in July 2026?

    1. Cement: Growth hit 13.1% in July, a seven-month high, up from 11.1% growth in July of last year.
    2. Iron ore: Growth slowed to 29.5% in July from 44.5% in June, the biggest shift among the nine sectors.
    3. Electricity: The sector grew 9% in July, slower than the 11.4% recorded in June.
    4. Coal: Growth reached 7.6% in July 2026, an eleven-month high, against a contraction of 12.3% in July last year.
    5. Steel: Growth slowed to 2.9% in July, the lowest in the 14 months for which data exists on the new series, down from 5.6% in June.
    6. Refinery products: The sector grew 2.7% in July, snapping a three-month streak of contractions and delivering its best performance in nine months.
    7. Natural gas: The sector contracted 3.7% in July 2026, part of an unbroken run of contractions across all 14 months for which data exists.
    8. Crude oil: The sector contracted 5.3% in July 2026, also contracting continuously across the same 14 months.
    9. Fertilizers: The sector contracted 8% in July against a contraction of 3.3% in June, having grown 1.9% in July of last year.

    Why does the headline growth rate overstate the underlying recovery?

    1. The fastest growing sector is rebounding off a collapse: Iron ore’s 29.5% growth sits on a base in which the sector contracted 16.4% in June and 7.1% in July of last year.
    2. Coal’s eleven-month high has the same explanation: The 7.6% reading follows a 12.3% contraction in July last year, so the level of output has not necessarily exceeded its earlier peak.
    3. A truncated series hides the longer trend: With comparison possible only back to June 2025, a fourteen-month record is the longest statement the data supports about any sector.
    4. Composite growth masks divergence: July’s 5.4% was still the second-fastest reading in seven months, even as three of the nine sectors were in contraction.

    What explains the contraction in fertilizers and in domestic energy output?

    1. Monsoon transmission into fertilizer demand: The 8% fertilizer contraction is attributed to a deficient and patchy monsoon and the resultant lower levels of sowing, which cut the demand fertilizer plants produce for.
    2. A structural decline in domestic hydrocarbons: Natural gas and crude oil have contracted in every one of the 14 months for which data exists, which is a production trend rather than a monthly disturbance.
    3. Refining recovered while extraction did not: Refinery products returned to growth in July even as the crude oil that feeds refineries kept contracting, which widens the gap filled by imports.
    4. Steel weakness alongside cement strength: Steel growth fell to a fourteen-month low in the same month that cement growth hit a seven-month high, so construction activity is not translating into metal demand.

    “[2015] In the ‘Index of Eight Core Industries’, which one of the following is given the highest weight?

    (a) Coal Production

    (b) Electricity generation

    (c) Fertilizer production

    (d) Steel production

  • Can free public technology break the private coaching industry?

    Why in the News

    The Independence Day address of 15 August 2026 announced that the government will roll out free online coaching for competitive examinations using India’s digital public infrastructure. The announcement raises a question free access alone cannot settle, since the coaching industry sells structure, assessment and test strategy rather than lectures.

    What is the proposed free online coaching network?

    1. About: A publicly funded online coaching service for aspirants of competitive examinations, to be built on India’s existing digital public infrastructure, teachers and talent.
    2. Stated purpose: The stated objective is to save poor and middle-class families thousands of crores of rupees and to let students prepare without leaving their homes.
    3. Trigger for the announcement: The announcement was framed as an outreach to Gen-Z youth, following widespread student protests against the National Eligibility cum Entrance Test (NEET) paper leak.
    4. Design question left open: The current thinking within government is one course per examination, against a proposal for a single layered stack serving many examinations.

    What is SWAYAM?

    1. About: Study Webs of Active Learning for Young Aspiring Minds (SWAYAM) is the government’s massive open online course platform, offering courses from Class 9 to post-graduation free of cost to any learner.

    What is SAATHI?

    1. About: Self Assessment Test and Help for Entrance Exams (SAATHI) is a free preparation platform and application for national entrance examinations, carrying lectures and practice tests for aspirants.

    What is agentic artificial intelligence?

    1. About: Agentic artificial intelligence describes systems that pursue a goal across multiple steps on their own, choosing actions and tools rather than answering a single prompt at a time.
    2. Why it is invoked here: In a learning platform it allows the system to diagnose a student’s weak areas, set the next task and adapt the sequence without a teacher directing each step.

    What is a digital twin in education?

    1. About: A digital twin is a live digital replica of a real system, updated with data from that system so changes can be tested on the replica first.
    2. Why it is invoked here: A digital twin of a course or a classroom lets a student tweak the model and reshape the learning path to individual need.

    Why does coaching dependency persist when schools and colleges exist?

    1. Two different objectives: The school aims to conceptualise learning and focuses on board examinations. Competitive examinations ask whether a student can outperform millions of others under severe time pressure.
    2. A separate skill set: The two are different dimensions and require a separate skill set, which the school curriculum is not designed to build.
    3. Where dependency begins: Students in Classes 9 and 10 are less dependent on coaching. Dependency starts in Classes 11 and 12 as students begin preparing for the Joint Entrance Examination (JEE) and NEET and have to solve complex questions.
    4. The gap in objectives: The board curriculum is not designed to prepare a student for the examinations that follow it, so the objectives of the two systems diverge sharply.

    What does the private coaching industry sell that free lectures do not?

    1. Structure: Coaching classes are structured and deliver on what they promise, which free access to recorded lectures does not reproduce.
    2. Assessment and doubt resolution: The industry provides weekly assessments and doubt-solving forums as part of the same package.
    3. Examination technique: Coaching centres teach rapid problem solving and test strategies, including eliminating wrong options to arrive at the right answer, which directly improves rank.
    4. Price is not always the barrier: Not all coaching courses cost lakhs of rupees. Some tutors offer the same structure through an application for a minimum charge of around Rs 700 to Rs 800.
    5. The human element: Personalised feedback and a competitive peer environment come from teachers who mentor a student emotionally and academically, which an online module alone cannot supply.

    Does free access break coaching dependency or add another video library?

    1. The equity reading: The announcement is a major intervention in education equity and an opportunity to redesign the competitive examination preparation ecosystem, so the probability of success depends less on family income, geography and access to an elite coaching centre.
    2. The dependency reading: Accessibility and affordability are not the main issues. The deeper issue is the dependency of the Indian education system on coaching, and a platform that does not end that dependency becomes another free access platform where videos are uploaded daily.
    3. Why existing platforms fall short: The existing public platforms are traditional in nature and are not designed for a cohort that wants mobile-based delivery, quick content in different formats and room to experiment outside a classroom.
    4. The resource argument: The government has ample funds and the Indian Institutes of Technology (IITs) and the Indian Institutes of Management (IIMs) at its disposal, so it can make coaching free. The entire structure has to be incorporated, not only the lectures.
    5. The proposed middle path: A hybrid mechanism is needed, with skill hubs in schools that students attend physically for periodic mentoring alongside online classes, since the National Education Policy (NEP), 2020 already encourages skill hubs.

    Should the platform be one common stack or one platform per examination?

    1. The common stack case: India has over 100 major national-level examinations, including the Union Public Service Commission examinations, JEE and NEET, which attract millions of aspirants. About 70 to 80 per cent of these examinations have similar requirements for reasoning, language, general awareness and current affairs.
    2. The proposed grid: A national competitive learning and opportunity grid with a layered selection method would let a student adopt only the layers relevant to the examination being attempted.
    3. The dedicated platform case: The common stack model does not work in practice, since the same subject is taught differently for two examinations. Fundamental concepts in physics are the same for NEET and JEE, and the nature of the examination differs enough to require separate classes.
    4. The feasibility verdict: A common grid is a futuristic plan rather than a currently feasible one, so there should be one proper dedicated platform per examination.
    5. The dilution risk: Building coaching for all national examinations at one point risks diluting quality, which is why the scope of the plan has to be settled first.

    How can the last mile be reached?

    1. The double hurdle: Millions of students face two problems at once: the absence of reliable, high-speed Internet and electricity for online coaching, and examination centres located hundreds of kilometres away.
    2. Current coverage: Third generation and fourth generation mobile implementation has already reached tribal areas, so the residual problem is difficult terrain with low penetration and frequent disconnects.
    3. The satellite receiver: A small, compact ground antenna box is installed at a remote examination centre. The antenna connects directly to Low Earth Orbit (LEO) or Geostationary (GEO) satellites instead of relying on local broadband or mobile networks, in the manner of satellite television broadcasting.
    4. The offline base station: The base station receives the question paper from the satellite and stores it locally. It then acts as an offline server to display the paper or transmit it over short range to students.
    5. The digital answer pad: Students write answers with pen and paper placed over a small smart digital pad carrying short-range wireless capability such as near field communication or radio waves. The pad captures the answers as they are written, encrypts the data locally and saves it in real time, so no active Internet connection is needed during the test.
    6. The upload step: Once the examination ends and a satellite link connects, the local base station securely uploads all encrypted answer files back to the central examination authority.
    7. The low-technology alternative: Existing infrastructure can be improved instead, by installing smart boards, supplying all lectures, and having a mentor play the video and work through concepts and activities in front of the students.

    Challenges to the Free Online Coaching Network

    1. Content without structure: A platform that uploads lectures without weekly assessment and doubt resolution reproduces a library rather than a course. Eg. SWAYAM has run since 2017 with large enrolment and course completion rates that remain a small fraction of registrations.
    2. Device and bandwidth exclusion: Online delivery presumes a personal device and continuous data, which the poorest households do not have. Eg. The National Sample Survey round on education found that only about 8 per cent of rural households with members aged 5 to 24 had both a computer and an Internet connection.
    3. Teacher supply: A public platform needs subject teachers trained in examination technique, and the school system already runs short of teachers. Eg. Government schools carry lakhs of sanctioned teaching posts that lie vacant, with single-teacher schools still functioning in several States.
    4. Examination integrity: Moving preparation online does not address the leak risk in the examination itself, which is what triggered the protests. Eg. The NEET undergraduate paper leak of 2024 forced a re-examination and a Supreme Court-monitored review of the National Testing Agency’s processes.
    5. Coaching hubs and student distress: A free platform does not by itself dismantle the residential coaching economy or its pressures. Eg. Kota in Rajasthan recorded a series of student suicides, which led the district administration to mandate counselling and anti-suicide devices in hostels.
    6. Regional language coverage: Competitive examination content in Indian languages is thin, so a national platform in English replicates the existing advantage. Eg. NEET is conducted in 13 languages, and the supply of quality preparation material outside English and Hindi remains limited.
    7. Sustained financing: Platform costs are recurring, covering content refresh, mentors, assessment and bandwidth, and a one-time announcement does not fund them. Eg. Several State-run e-learning portals launched during the pandemic went dormant once the dedicated budget line lapsed.

    Conclusion

    Free public technology can lower the price of preparation, and price is not the mechanism that sustains coaching dependency. That dependency comes from the gap between what schools teach and what competitive examinations test, and from the structure, assessment and test strategy the coaching industry sells alongside its lectures. A public platform reduces dependency only if it reproduces that structure, adds physical mentoring through school skill hubs, and solves the connectivity and distance problem at the last mile. The scope question, one common stack against one platform per examination, remains unsettled and determines whether quality survives scale.

    “[2016] ‘SWAYAM’, an initiative of the Government of India, aims at

    (a) promoting the Self Help Groups in rural areas

    (b) providing financial and technical assistance to young start-up entrepreneurs

    (c) promoting the education and health of adolescent girls

    (d) providing affordable and quality education to the citizens for free

  • Collectors empowered to grant citizenship under CAA

    Why in the News

    The Union Ministry of Home Affairs (MHA) has transferred the processing of pending citizenship applications under the Citizenship Amendment Act, 2019 from centrally staffed Empowered Committees to District Collectors in eight States and Union Territories. The transfer reverses a centralising arrangement built two years earlier specifically to keep State machinery out of the process. It arrives after the political composition of the State that had resisted the law most strongly changed.

    What is the Citizenship Amendment Act, 2019?

    1. What it does: It amends the Citizenship Act, 1955 to create a route to Indian citizenship for members of six communities from three neighbouring countries who entered India before a fixed cut off date.
    2. Who it covers: It applies to Hindu, Sikh, Buddhist, Jain, Parsi and Christian migrants from Pakistan, Afghanistan and Bangladesh who entered India on or before 31 December 2014 without documents or illegally.
    3. How it operates: It inserts Section 6B into the Citizenship Act, 1955, under which such persons may be granted citizenship by registration or naturalisation, and it exempts them from being treated as illegal migrants.
    4. When it became operational: The Act was passed in December 2019, and the Citizenship (Amendment) Rules that made it operational came into effect on 11 March 2024, days before the 2024 General Election.

    What is Section 6B of the Citizenship Act, 1955?

    1. The provision: Section 6B is the enabling clause inserted by the 2019 amendment, under which the Central Government or an authority specified by it may grant a certificate of registration or naturalisation to a person covered by the Act.
    2. What it removes: It provides that proceedings pending against such a person in respect of illegal migration or citizenship stand abated on grant of citizenship, and that the person is deemed a citizen from the date of entry into India.

    What were the Empowered Committees?

    1. Composition: Each Empowered Committee was made up of Central Government officials, drawn from bodies including the Census organisation, the Intelligence Bureau (IB) and the postal department.
    2. Purpose: They were created to receive and clear citizenship applications without routing them through State government machinery, with at least four constituted, two of them at the district level.

    What does the 19 August order change in the processing chain?

    1. The transfer of pending cases: All applications pending before the Empowered Committees and the District Level Committees in the eight jurisdictions stand transferred to the concerned Collector.
    2. The jurisdictions covered: Gujarat, Rajasthan, Punjab, West Bengal, Assam except tribal areas, Tripura except tribal areas, Jammu and Kashmir, and Ladakh.
    3. The instrument used: The Citizenship (Third Amendment) Rules, 2026, notified on 19 August 2026, empower Collectors in these jurisdictions to receive, scrutinise and dispose of applications for registration or naturalisation under Section 6B.
    4. What the Collector must now do: The Collector is required to verify the documents submitted by an applicant and determine whether the applicant meets the eligibility requirements.
    5. The earlier notification is displaced: The order makes the MHA notification of 11 March 2024 implementing the Citizenship Amendment Rules inapplicable to these jurisdictions.
    6. The committee route is spent: The order renders the earlier multi agency committee arrangement redundant in the eight jurisdictions.

    Why was the power centralised in the first place?

    1. State opposition to the law: The Citizenship Amendment Act was strongly opposed by the then Trinamool Congress government in West Bengal.
    2. The design was built to bypass the State: Empowered Committees headed by Central Government officials were constituted specifically to keep the State government out of the processing of applications.
    3. The timing tracked the electoral calendar: The committees were created days before the Assembly polls in West Bengal in April 2026, and the amendment now decentralising the process was notified after the Bharatiya Janata Party came to power in that State.
    4. The first grants preceded the committees: The Home Ministry handed the first set of citizenship certificates to 14 applicants in May 2024.

    Why does a Union List subject still need the States?

    1. The subject is central: Citizenship, naturalisation and aliens fall under the Union List of the Seventh Schedule, so legislative and executive competence rests with the Centre.
    2. The delivery is district level: Receiving applications, verifying documents and issuing certificates are field functions that need offices, staff and records located in the district.
    3. Police verification sits with the State: Police is a State List subject, so verification of an applicant’s antecedents runs through the State police machinery whatever the processing authority.
    4. The State’s role was reduced to logistics: Under the centralised arrangement the State’s contribution was limited to providing office space and police verification of applicants.
    5. The Collector belongs to both systems: A District Collector is an officer of the State administration and simultaneously the Centre’s principal field functionary in the district, which is why the transfer restores State machinery without transferring the subject.

    What are the other major changes the Citizenship Amendment Act, 2019 made?

    1. Shortened naturalisation period: For the covered communities the residence requirement in the qualifying period for naturalisation was reduced from eleven years to five years, a change made to the Third Schedule of the Citizenship Act, 1955.
    2. Exemption from illegal migrant status: Covered persons were exempted from the operation of the Passport (Entry into India) Act, 1920 and the Foreigners Act, 1946, so their entry without documents no longer bars citizenship.
    3. Abatement of pending proceedings: Proceedings pending against a covered person in respect of illegal migration or citizenship abate on grant of citizenship.
    4. Geographic carve outs: The Act does not apply to the tribal areas of Assam, Meghalaya, Mizoram and Tripura covered by the Sixth Schedule, nor to areas under the Inner Line Permit regime in Arunachal Pradesh, Nagaland, Mizoram and Manipur.
    5. Effect on Overseas Citizen of India registration: The Act added a ground for cancellation of Overseas Citizen of India registration where the holder violates any law notified by the Central Government, with an opportunity of being heard.

    Major debates surrounding the Citizenship Amendment Act

    1. Religion as a statutory classification: The Act identifies its beneficiaries by naming six religious communities, which is contested as a classification that fails the reasonable classification test under Article 14.
    2. The defence of the classification: The stated basis is that the three named countries have a State religion and that the six communities are religious minorities there facing persecution, which is offered as an intelligible differentia with a rational nexus.
    3. The excluded groups: Persecuted groups outside the classification, including Ahmadis and Shias in Pakistan, Rohingya from Myanmar and Tamils from Sri Lanka, fall outside the Act’s coverage.
    4. The cut off date and the Assam Accord: The 31 December 2014 cut off for the covered communities sits against the 24 March 1971 cut off fixed for Assam by Section 6A of the Citizenship Act, 1955, inserted after the Assam Accord of 1985 to regularise migrants in that State. The gap between the two dates is the source of the objection in Assam.
    5. Section 6A itself has been upheld: A Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court upheld the validity of Section 6A in 2024, confirming the 1971 cut off for Assam as constitutionally valid.
    6. The link with a national register: The objection that the Act operates as a filter alongside a nationwide citizens register turns on whether the two exercises are read together, since the Act creates a route to citizenship but no obligation to prove it.
    7. The federal objection: Several State legislatures passed resolutions seeking repeal of the Act, and Kerala filed an original suit in the Supreme Court under Article 131, raising the question whether a State can sue over a Union List subject.

    Challenges to implementing the CAA framework

    1. Documentary proof of origin is the binding constraint: An applicant who entered without documents has to establish nationality of the country of origin and the date of entry, which is precisely what the flight left behind. Eg. The Home Ministry issued its first set of certificates to only 14 applicants in May 2024, years after the Act was passed.
    2. Eligibility determination sits with a generalist officer: The Collector must now assess questions of foreign nationality, religious identity and date of entry alongside a full district administration workload. Eg. The function was earlier assigned to committees staffed by Census, Intelligence Bureau and postal officials specifically for that expertise.
    3. Verification depends on a machinery the Centre does not control: Police verification of applicants runs through the State police, a State List subject, so the pace of processing depends on State cooperation. Eg. The centralised committee design was itself adopted because the West Bengal government opposed the law.
    4. Applicants risk exposure by applying: Filing an application is an admission of having entered India without valid documents, which deters applicants where the outcome is uncertain. Eg. The Act exempts covered persons from the Foreigners Act, 1946 only on grant of citizenship, not on filing.
    5. Uniformity across eight jurisdictions is hard to hold: Decentralising to district officers across eight States and Union Territories creates as many decision practices as there are districts. Eg. The 19 August order applies to Gujarat, Rajasthan, Punjab, West Bengal, Assam, Tripura, Jammu and Kashmir and Ladakh, each with a different administrative history on migration.
    6. The carve outs cut through the areas of highest migrant density: Excluding Sixth Schedule areas and Inner Line Permit States removes from coverage several districts where the affected population actually lives. Eg. Tribal areas of Assam and Tripura are expressly excluded from the 19 August transfer as well.
    7. The constitutional challenge remains live: A framework operating while its parent Act is under challenge risks decisions being unsettled later. Eg. More than 200 petitions challenging the Act were filed before the Supreme Court after its enactment.

    Conclusion

    The Citizenship (Third Amendment) Rules, 2026 stand notified with effect from 19 August 2026, and pending applications in the eight named jurisdictions have been transferred to District Collectors, who will now verify documents and determine eligibility. The 11 March 2024 notification no longer applies in those jurisdictions and the Empowered Committee route is spent there. The source names no further date or milestone for the disposal of the transferred applications. The change is administrative in form, and it records that the reason for centralising the process, namely State government opposition, is no longer present in the State it was designed for.

    “[2021] With reference to India, consider the following statements:

    1. There is only one citizenship and one domicile.

    2. A citizen by birth only can become the Head of State.

    3. A foreigner, once granted citizenship, cannot be deprived of it under any circumstances.

    Which of the statements given above is/are correct?

    (a) 1 only

    (b) 2 only

    (c) 1 and 3

    (d) 2 and 3

  • Ganga treaty not in Bihar’s interests, says JD(U) leader

    Why in the News

    The national working president of the Janata Dal (United), who was Bihar’s Minister for Water Resources between 2021 and 2024, has advocated against renewal of the 1996 India Bangladesh Ganga Water Treaty on the ground that renewal would hurt Bihar’s interests. The treaty expires on 31 December and the two sides are yet to hold the last round of talks on its renewal. A federal objection has therefore entered a bilateral negotiation that the Union alone has the power to conclude.

    What is the India Bangladesh Ganga Water Treaty, 1996?

    1. What it is: A bilateral treaty signed on 12 December 1996 for a term of 30 years, governing the sharing of Ganga waters between India and Bangladesh at the Farakka Barrage.
    2. What it covers: It applies only to the dry season, from 1 January to 31 May, when flow at Farakka is lowest and competition between the two uses is sharpest.
    3. How sharing is measured: Availability is measured in ten day periods at Farakka, and shares are calculated separately for each period rather than as an annual total.
    4. How disputes are handled: A Joint Committee observes and records flows at Farakka and at the Hardinge Bridge in Bangladesh, and the treaty provides for review of the arrangement at five yearly intervals or earlier by mutual agreement.

    What is a cusec?

    1. What it means: A cusec is one cubic foot of water flowing per second, the standard unit in which river discharge and canal capacity are stated in South Asia. All the sharing thresholds in the Ganga treaty are expressed in this unit.

    What does the sharing formula actually do at Farakka?

    1. When availability is 70,000 cusecs or less: The flow is divided equally, with India and Bangladesh receiving 50 percent each.
    2. When availability is between 70,000 and 75,000 cusecs: Bangladesh receives 35,000 cusecs and the balance of the flow goes to India.
    3. When availability is 75,000 cusecs or more: India receives 40,000 cusecs and the balance of the flow goes to Bangladesh.
    4. The guarantee clause: Between 1 March and 10 May, India and Bangladesh each receive a guaranteed 35,000 cusecs in alternate blocks of three ten day periods.
    5. The fallback provision: Where the two sides cannot agree at review, India is to release not less than 90 percent of Bangladesh’s share until an understanding is reached.

    Why does Bihar say the treaty has hurt its interests?

    1. The claim made: Thirty years of data under the treaty show that the interests of Bihar have been negatively impacted.
    2. The separation of interests asserted: Diplomatic issues between the two countries must be sorted out, but Bihar’s interests too must be kept in mind while doing so.
    3. The trade off named: The treaty may have checked a few boxes in terms of international messaging, but it has hurt the State’s interests.
    4. The physical mechanism behind the grievance: Maintaining pond level at Farakka raises the water surface upstream, which slows the river and deposits silt in the Ganga bed across Bihar, reducing channel capacity.
    5. The flood consequence: Reduced channel capacity aggravates flooding and drainage congestion in the Bihar districts along the Ganga, including Bhagalpur, Katihar and Munger.
    6. The State’s standing demand: Bihar has for years sought large scale desilting of the Ganga, a national silt management policy, and at one point the decommissioning of the Farakka Barrage.

    Why does the renewal decision sit with the Union alone?

    1. Treaty making power: Article 253 empowers Parliament to make any law for implementing an international treaty or agreement, and the executive power to conclude treaties rests with the Union.
    2. Water as a State subject: Water, including water supplies, irrigation and canals, drainage and embankments, is Entry 17 of the State List, which is why States claim a stake in any water sharing arrangement.
    3. The Union’s own entry: Entry 56 of the Union List gives Parliament power over the regulation and development of inter State rivers and river valleys where declared expedient in the public interest.
    4. Consultation is practice, not obligation: Riparian States are consulted as a matter of convention in transboundary water negotiations, but the Constitution does not require their concurrence.
    5. The precedent of exclusion: West Bengal objected in 2024 to being left out of the committee constituted for the Ganga treaty renewal and the Teesta discussions, which shows the grievance is not confined to Bihar.

    Why is the renewal a test of the wider India Bangladesh relationship?

    1. The deadline: The treaty expires on 31 December, which fixes the outer limit of the negotiation.
    2. The pending step: The two sides are yet to hold the last round of talks on renewal.
    3. The linked file: The Teesta water sharing arrangement has remained unconcluded since 2011, and the Ganga renewal is the only functioning template the two sides have.
    4. The upstream downstream asymmetry: India is the upper riparian on the Ganga, so the treaty is the principal instrument through which Bangladesh secures a predictable dry season flow.
    5. The domestic politics on both sides: A renewal that satisfies Dhaka must also survive objections from Bihar and West Bengal, which makes the negotiation a two level one.

    Challenges to the renewal of the Ganga Water Treaty

    1. No mechanism to compensate an affected upstream State: The treaty allocates water between countries and is silent on internal distribution of costs. Eg. Bihar’s siltation and flood costs from Farakka pondage have no route to redress inside the treaty text.
    2. Declining lean season flow: The volume the formula divides has itself been shrinking, which sharpens the distributional fight. Eg. The guaranteed 35,000 cusecs blocks between 1 March and 10 May become harder to honour when total availability falls below 70,000 cusecs.
    3. Absence of a State role in the negotiating machinery: Riparian States have no formal seat, which produces objection after the fact rather than input before it. Eg. West Bengal objected in 2024 to exclusion from the renewal committee.
    4. Silt management remains unfunded and unassigned: No agency has both the mandate and the budget for basin scale desilting. Eg. Bihar’s demand for a national silt management policy has been pending across successive Union budgets.
    5. Political transition in Dhaka: A renewal negotiated with one government may be reopened by its successor. Eg. Bangladesh has undergone a change of government since the fall of the Awami League administration in 2024, with the Bangladesh Nationalist Party returning to power in February 2026.
    6. Linkage risk with other rivers: Dhaka has consistently sought to tie the Ganga arrangement to progress on the Teesta. Eg. The Teesta sharing draft agreed in 2011 was not signed because of West Bengal’s objection, and remains unresolved.
    7. No basin wide framework with upper riparians: The Ganga basin extends beyond the two signatories, so a bilateral treaty cannot govern total flow. Eg. Nepal controls the headwaters of the Kosi, Gandak and Ghaghara, which contribute a large share of the Ganga’s dry season flow.

    Conclusion

    The India Bangladesh Ganga Water Treaty, 1996 expires on 31 December, the last round of renewal talks has not yet been held, and a party in Bihar’s ruling coalition has now publicly opposed renewal on the ground that thirty years of the arrangement have damaged the State’s interests. The dispute is not about the sharing ratio alone but about whether an upstream State’s siltation and flood costs can be recognised inside an instrument the Union alone concludes. The next milestone is the final round of renewal talks between the two sides before the treaty lapses.

  • In a 5-4 ruling, Supreme Court for tweaking the definition of industry, exempts pending matters

    Why in the News

    A nine-judge Bench of the Supreme Court held on 20 August 2026, by a 5:4 margin, that the expansive 1978 interpretation of the term industry will not govern the Industrial Relations Code, 2020. The ruling preserves that interpretation for disputes already pending under the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 and withdraws it from every case that follows.

    What is the ‘triple test’ laid down in Bangalore Water Supply (1978)?

    1. Origin: A seven-judge Constitution Bench in Bangalore Water Supply and Sewerage Board v. A. Rajappa (1978), authored by Justice V.R. Krishna Iyer, read Section 2(j) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 expansively.
    2. The three conditions: An undertaking qualifies as an industry where there is systematic activity, organised by cooperation between employer and employee, for the production or distribution of goods or services calculated to satisfy human wants and wishes.
    3. What the test ignores: Profit motive is irrelevant to the classification. Purely spiritual or religious activity stays outside the definition.
    4. Reach: The test brought hospitals, educational institutions and municipalities within the fold of industry, exempting only core sovereign activities such as the judiciary, law and order and defence, in order to protect the state’s functional autonomy.

    What is the Industrial Relations Code, 2020?

    1. About: The Industrial Relations Code, 2020 consolidates the law on trade unions, standing orders and the settlement of industrial disputes into a single statute, and came into force in November 2025.
    2. The operative provision: Section 2(p) of the Code carries its own definition of industry, taking over the function that Section 2(j) of the 1947 Act performed for 48 years.

    What did the Supreme Court actually hold on the reach of the 1978 definition?

    1. A clean slate for the new Code: The majority held that industry under Section 2(p) of the Industrial Relations Code, 2020 would not be burdened by the 1978 interpretation of Section 2(j) of the 1947 Act.
    2. No sheet anchor: The Chief Justice of India stated that the 1978 judgment and its conclusion would not act as the sheet anchor or the foundation for any future interpretation of Section 2(p).
    3. A refinement, not a reversal: The majority found that the essential framework of the 1978 interpretation had withstood the test of time, and that some of its constituent elements could have been articulated differently to better reflect the scope and contours of Section 2(j).
    4. Prospective operation: The refined triple test evolved in the opinion of the Chief Justice of India will operate prospectively, and the modified definition will not apply to pending cases.
    5. Pending disputes protected: All matters presently pending before courts, tribunals and labour authorities under the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 are to be adjudicated in accordance with the triple test as laid down in Bangalore Water Supply.
    6. Maintainability settled: The majority held that the reference questioning the correctness of the 1978 ruling was maintainable.
    7. Text still awaited: The fine print of the ruling prescribing the new formulation of the definition has not yet been released.

    Why was the 1978 definition sent to a nine-judge Bench at all?

    1. Docket explosion: Later Benches found that the 1978 definition produced what they called a docket explosion, bringing far more cases to the labour courts.
    2. A failed legislative narrowing: Parliament attempted to narrow the definition through the Industrial Disputes (Amendment) Act, 1982, excluding several organisations from its scope.
    3. The 2005 admission: The Centre told the Court in 2005 that no alternative dispute resolution mechanism existed for employees who would fall outside the amended definition, so the 1978 position continued to hold.
    4. Divergent readings: Subsequent rulings interpreted the 1978 judgment differently, and the case was referred to a nine-judge Bench for reconsideration.

    What three questions did the reference place before the Bench?

    1. Correctness of the test: Whether the test laid down in Bangalore Water Supply remains the correct interpretation of industry, and whether later legislative developments have any bearing on it.
    2. Welfare schemes: Whether welfare schemes run by the government count as an industrial activity.
    3. Sovereign function: What constitutes a sovereign function of the state, and whether such functions fall outside the ambit of labour law altogether.
    4. When framed: The Court identified these three broad questions for consideration in February 2026.

    Why does preserving the 1978 test only for pending cases divide the workforce in two?

    1. Two regimes running side by side: A dispute already filed under the 1947 Act is decided on the wide 1978 definition. An identical dispute arising under the Code is decided on a definition that has not yet been written out.
    2. The Court’s own reason: The majority stated that it did not intend to displace the governing legal position on pending proceedings, since doing so would create artificial discrimination.
    3. What the wide net secured: The 1978 definition enabled workers across a wide range of jobs to obtain legal recourse on wages, working hours, strikes, collective bargaining and protection against arbitrary dismissal.
    4. What the clean slate removes: Workers whose disputes arise after the Code’s commencement lose the settled presumption that their workplace is an industry, and must establish it afresh under Section 2(p).

    What does the dissent argue about the State as an employer?

    1. Reference itself questioned: Justice B.V. Nagarathna found the reference against the 1978 verdict unwarranted and not maintainable, and held that the ruling required no interference or modification.
    2. Identity of the employer is irrelevant: The dissent held that merely because a function is performed by the State, it cannot be exempted from the definition of industry, so the test of who carries out the activity is not relevant.
    3. Nature of the activity governs: Social welfare activities and schemes undertaken by government departments or their instrumentalities can be construed as industrial activities for the purpose of Section 2(j), depending on the nature of the activity and all other relevant factors.
    4. Why it matters now: The dissent held that it was important, now more than ever, to retain the inclusive definition of industry to safeguard workers’ rights.
    5. Split within the majority side: Justice Joymalya Bagchi recorded disagreement with the majority on the reformulation of the triple test, and Justices Dipankar Dutta and Ujjal Bhuyan wrote dissenting opinions.

    What challenges follow from redefining ‘industry’ under the new Code?

    1. Coverage uncertainty until the operative text arrives: The modified formulation was pronounced without the wording that prescribes it being available, so adjudicating authorities have no text to apply. Eg. The hour-long pronouncement on 20 August 2026 ended with the fine print of the new formulation still awaited.
    2. Identical workplaces treated differently by filing date: The cut-off is the date of the proceeding, not the nature of the work, so two workers in the same undertaking can face different definitions. Eg. A dispute in a municipal water supply undertaking filed under the 1947 Act is decided on the triple test, and one arising afterwards is not.
    3. No fallback forum for excluded categories: Narrowing the definition removes workers from the industrial adjudication machinery without putting anything in its place. Eg. The Centre itself told the Court in 2005 that no alternative dispute resolution mechanism existed for employees who would fall outside a narrowed definition.
    4. Threshold effects that discourage firms from growing: The Code applies its stricter obligations only above stated headcounts, which gives firms a reason to stop hiring below the line. Eg. Standing orders now apply at 300 employees and prior approval for layoff, retrenchment and closure applies at 300 workers, both raised from far lower thresholds.
    5. The sovereign function boundary left to case-by-case litigation: The Court has framed the question of what a sovereign function is without settling a workable test for it. Eg. Whether a government-run welfare scheme is an industrial activity was one of the three questions placed before the Bench in February 2026.
    6. A definition built for a standard employment relation: The triple test turns on cooperation between employer and employee, which platform-mediated work does not fit. Eg. Gig and platform workers are addressed through the Code on Social Security, 2020 rather than through the industrial dispute machinery.

    Conclusion

    The Court has separated the past from the future of a single statutory term, keeping Justice Krishna Iyer’s wide definition alive for disputes already in the system and denying it any authority over the Code that now governs Indian industrial relations. The substantive contest has therefore moved from the judiciary to the text of Section 2(p) and to whoever interprets it first. The Industrial Relations Code, 2020 has been in force since November 2025, and the next milestone is the release of the full text of the judgment carrying the refined formulation of the triple test.

    “[2024, GS3, 15] Discuss the merits and demerits of the four ‘Labour Codes’ in the context of labour market reforms in India. What has been the progress so far in this regard?”

  • NTA’s Big Reset: Air-Gapped & Tamper-Resistant

    Why in the News

    A day after the Education Ministry announced an overhaul of the examination system at the National Testing Agency (NTA), a senior agency official set out its operating design: shorter engagement periods for subject experts, information withheld even inside official circles, and question paper work confined to air gapped systems. The design treats paper leakage as an insider access problem rather than a detection problem.

    What does the four tier examination security system involve?

    1. Two distinct levels: The four tier system is operationalised at two levels, the first at the stage of setting question papers and the second at the stage of physical security during the process.
    2. Level one, separation of paper setting functions: Separate sets of people are involved with each key function, namely item writers and those moderating, translating and vetting the items, so no single group sees the paper end to end.
    3. Level two, layered physical screening: Persons coming to the centres are physically frisked, their credentials are established, their electronic devices are verified, and they work only on air gapped systems.
    4. Already field tested: The new system was tested in the recent Council of Scientific and Industrial Research examination and the National Eligibility cum Entrance Test (NEET) re examination, and is being institutionalised now.

    What is an air gapped system?

    1. Definition: An air gapped system is a computer or system completely isolated from unsecured external networks, including the public internet, so data cannot move in or out over a network connection. Isolation means any transfer requires physical access, which is what the frisking and device verification layers are designed to control.

    Why is the National Testing Agency shortening the engagement of subject experts?

    1. The stated reason: A senior agency official said engagement time is being curtailed because the mafia tries to make these people compromised if they are there for a longer duration.
    2. The threat characterised: The official described what the agency faces as a big mafia, framing leakage as organised rather than opportunistic.
    3. Scale of the churn: The Director General had announced the removal of 600 experts and the onboarding of new ones.
    4. The logic of rotation: A shorter tenure limits the window in which an expert can be identified, approached and cultivated by an organised network.

    Why is information being staggered even inside official circles?

    1. Partial disclosure by design: The agency and the Education Ministry are leaning towards a system where full information is not divulged even within official circles.
    2. The operating rule: Plans are confidential and divulged to people only in parts, on a need to know basis, so that no individual holds the complete process map.
    3. The stated intent: The official said the agency is not disclosing everything and is not opening all its cards, including to people within the system.

    How is physical security being tightened around the examination process?

    1. Frisking at entry: Persons coming to the centres are physically frisked before entry.
    2. Credential verification: Credentials of those entering are established rather than assumed from a pass or list.
    3. Device control: Electronic devices carried by such persons are verified.
    4. Isolated computing: Work is confined to air gapped systems, cutting the network route out of the secure area.
    5. Dedicated security force: Premises are being secured by the Central Industrial Security Force (CISF), which specialises in frisking.

    What did the Parliamentary Standing Committee find about the agency’s record?

    1. The report: The Parliamentary Standing Committee on Education, Women, Children, Youth and Sports flagged the agency’s problems in its 371st Report, 2025, submitted to Parliament.
    2. The 2024 record: Of the 14 competitive examinations conducted by the NTA in 2024, at least five faced major issues.
    3. Postponements: Three examinations, namely the University Grants Commission National Eligibility Test (UGC-NET), the Council of Scientific and Industrial Research National Eligibility Test (CSIR-NET) and the National Eligibility cum Entrance Test Postgraduate (NEET-PG), had to be postponed.
    4. Leak and result failure: One examination, the National Eligibility cum Entrance Test Undergraduate (NEET-UG), saw instances of paper leaks, and one, the Common University Entrance Test for undergraduate and postgraduate admission, saw its results postponed.
    5. Question setting errors: In the Joint Entrance Examination (JEE) Main held in January 2025, at least 12 questions had to be withdrawn due to errors noted in the final answer key.
    6. The Committee’s conclusion: Such instances do not inspire the confidence of examinees in the system, and the NTA needs to quickly get its act together so that they do not recur.

    Challenges to the four tier security overhaul

    1. Expert churn trades security for quality: Replacing subject experts frequently reduces the accumulated experience of the item writing pool, which is itself a source of error. e.g. 12 questions withdrawn from JEE Main January 2025 over answer key errors, a failure of question quality rather than of security.
    2. Air gapping does not cover the human carrier: Network isolation stops remote exfiltration but not a person who memorises or physically removes content. e.g. the government’s own submission before the Supreme Court that the system is foolproof but that at some point there is human intervention.
    3. Need to know secrecy weakens internal audit: Compartmentalised plans that even officials do not see in full make independent internal verification of the process harder. e.g. no single officer being able to certify end to end compliance when each holds only a fragment of the plan.
    4. Outsourced links remain the weak node: Printing, transport and centre operations run through contractors outside the agency’s direct control. e.g. arrests following the NEET-UG leak extended beyond the agency’s own staff.
    5. Frisking capacity does not scale to all centres: Deploying a specialised central force is feasible at paper setting and storage nodes but not at thousands of examination centres. e.g. NEET-UG is conducted for over 23 lakh candidates across the country on a single day.
    6. Tested at small scale, deployed at large scale: The system was validated on the CSIR examination and a re examination, both far smaller than a full national cycle. e.g. a re examination involves a fraction of the centres, invigilators and logistics of a first attempt NEET-UG.

    Conclusion

    The overhaul reorganises examination security around compartmentalisation: shorter expert tenures, split paper setting functions, partial information even internally, and isolated computing behind physical screening. It has been tested on the CSIR examination and the NEET re examination and is now being institutionalised across the agency’s calendar. The Parliamentary Standing Committee’s finding that five of 14 examinations in 2024 failed sets the benchmark this design has to beat. The unresolved element is the human intervention the government itself concedes remains in the chain.

    About the National Testing Agency

    1. Mandate: The NTA is an autonomous testing organisation set up in 2017 under the Ministry of Education to conduct entrance examinations for higher education institutions, and it became operational in 2018.
    2. Legal form: It is registered under the Societies Registration Act, 1860 and is headed by a Director General.
    3. Examination portfolio: It conducts NEET-UG, JEE Main, UGC-NET, CSIR-NET, the Common University Entrance Test, the Common Management Admission Test and the Graduate Pharmacy Aptitude Test, among others.
    4. Delivery mode: Its examinations run in both pen and paper and computer based modes, across thousands of centres and multiple sessions.
    5. Scale: Its examinations together cover crores of candidates a year, with NEET-UG alone drawing over 23 lakh candidates in 2026.

    Laws and Rules Governing Examination Security

    1. Public Examinations (Prevention of Unfair Means) Act, 2024: Criminalises leakage of question papers and answer keys, unauthorised access, tampering with computer networks and the conduct of fake examinations, with imprisonment of three to five years and a fine up to ten lakh rupees for individuals.
    2. Service provider liability: A fine up to one crore rupees and debarment from conducting public examinations for four years.
    3. Organised crime: Imprisonment of five to ten years and a fine of not less than one crore rupees, with all offences cognizable, non bailable and non compoundable.
    4. Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023: Supplies the general offences of cheating, criminal conspiracy and forgery used alongside the special law.
    5. Central Industrial Security Force Act, 1968: The statute under which the force securing examination premises is constituted and deployed.
    6. State anti cheating laws: State statutes such as the Rajasthan Public Examination (Prevention of Unfair Means) Act, 2022 govern state recruitment and board examinations, which the central Act does not automatically cover.

    “[2024, GS2, 15 marks] What are the aims and objects of the recently passed and enforced, The Public Examination (Prevention of Unfair Means) Act, 2024? Whether University/State Education Board examinations, too, are covered under the Act?”

  • Supreme Court asks Centre to institutionalise National Testing Agency reforms, cites the Union Public Service Commission as the model

    Why in the News

    The Supreme Court has directed the Union government to file an affidavit within three weeks setting out what it has done to implement the recommendations of the expert committee headed by a former Chairperson of the Indian Space Research Organisation (ISRO) on the National Testing Agency (NTA). The Bench held that reforms must be institutionalised and carried forward by successive officers rather than restarted with each new committee after each failure.

    What is the National Testing Agency (NTA)?

    1. Status: The National Testing Agency (NTA) is an autonomous testing organisation set up in 2017 under the Ministry of Education and registered under the Societies Registration Act, 1860, to conduct entrance examinations for higher education institutions.
    2. Examinations conducted: It conducts the National Eligibility cum Entrance Test Undergraduate (NEET-UG), the Joint Entrance Examination Main, the University Grants Commission National Eligibility Test, and the Common University Entrance Test, among others.
    3. Why it is before the Court: The agency has been under the Supreme Court’s scanner since the NEET-UG 2026 paper leaks, with petitioners describing the failure as recurring and systemic rather than isolated.

    What is a sovereign database?

    1. Meaning: A sovereign database is one whose servers, storage and control remain within the jurisdiction and ownership of the sovereign authority, rather than on infrastructure owned or operated by a third party or located abroad. The Bench asked whether the NTA has one and where question papers are stored.

    Why did the National Testing Agency come under the Supreme Court’s scrutiny?

    1. The trigger event: The 2026 NEET-UG question paper leaks led to cancellation of the examination and left over 23 lakh medical college aspirants stranded.
    2. Criminal process: A Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI) probe was ordered into the leaks and arrests were made.
    3. Political consequence: The leaks led to nationwide protests and a police crackdown on students, and ultimately to the resignation of the then Union Education Minister.
    4. The petitioners’ framing: The Court was hearing petitions by the Federation of All India Medical Association and the United Doctors Front, which characterised the 2026 leak as part of a recurring, systemic and catastrophic failure of the NTA in conducting NEET-UG.

    Why does the Court treat committee hopping as the problem rather than the solution?

    1. The Bench’s central objection: The Court held that it should not be that a committee gives recommendations and a new committee is then formed which removes the old one lock, stock and barrel.
    2. The specific sequence at issue: A seven member committee formed in 2024 under a former ISRO Chairperson recommended structural reforms in the NEET system, and the Centre has since constituted a task force under an Infosys co founder for new technological reforms.
    3. The Court’s fix, not replacement but review: The new task force must review the earlier committee’s recommendations and improve on them where necessary, and the earlier committee’s chairperson could be made part of the new body.
    4. The pattern is older than these two: The Bench pointed out that there were two more committees before the 2024 committee, and that recommendations must not remain on paper but must translate into action.
    5. The Solicitor General’s position: The Union government agreed on the need for a permanent mechanism to introduce reforms and maintain their continuity, and stated that it had already accepted the 2024 committee’s recommendations.

    What does the Court mean by institutional memory in an examination body?

    1. The failure mode named: A set of reforms implemented for one examination is undone in the next when senior NTA officers are shifted out, so continuity depends on individuals rather than on the institution.
    2. The standard set: Reforms must be vibrant, institutionalised and carried on within the NTA by successive officers, and must flow down from one generation of officers to the next.
    3. The comparator used: The Court cited the Union Public Service Commission (UPSC), which has conducted examination after examination without a hitch because it holds institutional memory and institutional expertise.
    4. What the earlier committee already said: The 2024 committee had itself focused on ways to build institutional memory and had identified the problem as systemic rather than logistical.

    What specific institutional gaps did the Bench probe?

    1. Technology capability: The Bench asked how the agency was facing new technological challenges, and whether the necessary infrastructure and software systems were in place.
    2. Data security and storage: It asked about cybersecurity and storage, whether the NTA has a sovereign database, and where question papers are stored.
    3. Physical premises: It asked where the agency’s office is situated and pressed on the need to secure office premises and operational infrastructure.
    4. Manpower: It asked how many officers the body has, how much staff is available, whether the various director and joint director positions had been filled, and how many had taken charge.
    5. Candidate facing systems: It stressed training and preparing personnel for the long term, candidate friendly arrangements and a grievance mechanism, and the strengthening of physical and intellectual capacity.
    6. The government’s response on hiring: The Solicitor General said hiring for scaling up digital infrastructure was under way and that the chief technology officer and chief financial officer had already been selected.

    What has the Centre placed on record?

    1. Earlier affidavit: The Court referred to an affidavit of 4 August filed by the Union government listing several senior appointments to be made to the NTA.
    2. Fresh affidavit directed: The Secretary must file an affidavit within three weeks, containing all details and indicative timelines, on steps taken to implement the 2024 committee’s suggestions as reflected and nuanced by the new task force.
    3. Measures claimed: The Centre’s affidavit described the Public Examinations (Prevention of Unfair Means) Act, 2024 and the constitution of the new task force as landmark measures against future paper leaks.
    4. Mandate of the new task force: It has been constituted to recommend end to end reforms focused on leveraging advanced technology such as artificial intelligence and blockchain to strengthen examination security and integrity.
    5. Limits on redesigning NEET-UG: Any structural change in the design of NEET-UG would be undertaken only in consultation with and with the concurrence of the Union Health Ministry and the National Medical Commission.
    6. Assurance to candidates: The Union government committed to giving candidates adequate advance notice of any change in the mode or design of the examination.
    7. The residual admission: The Solicitor General submitted that the system in place is foolproof but that at some point there is human intervention.

    Challenges to institutionalising reform in the National Testing Agency

    1. Officer rotation defeats continuity: Reforms owned by a posting rather than a post are reversed on transfer, which is precisely the failure the Court described. e.g. reforms implemented for one examination cycle being undone in the next after senior NTA officers were shifted out.
    2. No statutory foundation: The NTA is a registered society rather than a body created by statute, so its powers, tenure protections and accountability are weaker than those of a constitutional or statutory examination body. e.g. the UPSC derives its independence from Article 315 of the Constitution, which the NTA has no equivalent of.
    3. Recommendations without an implementation tracker: Successive committees have produced reports with no published mechanism to show which recommendation was executed and when. e.g. the Court had to direct an affidavit with indicative timelines three weeks out simply to learn the status of the 2024 committee’s recommendations.
    4. The human link in an otherwise sealed chain: Security design can cover technology and logistics but not the conduct of every person with access. e.g. the Solicitor General’s own submission that the system is foolproof but that at some point there is human intervention.
    5. Vendor and outsourcing dependence: Question paper printing, transport and centre operations run through private contractors whose staff sit outside the agency’s disciplinary reach. e.g. arrests following the NEET-UG leak extended beyond the agency’s own personnel.
    6. State level examinations remain outside the frame: The Court’s directions bind the NTA, and state recruitment and board examinations run on separate legal and administrative regimes. e.g. the Jharkhand government’s cancellation of 22 recruitment examinations over alleged irregularities in the same week.

    Conclusion

    The Court has shifted the remedy from constituting committees to building an institution, holding that reforms must survive the officers who introduced them. The immediate stage is a directed affidavit from the Secretary within three weeks, setting out implementation of the 2024 committee’s recommendations as nuanced by the new task force, with indicative timelines. Whether the NTA acquires a sovereign database, filled senior posts, secured premises and a grievance mechanism is the test the Court has set. Committee count is not the measure of reform; institutional memory is.

    [2024, GS2, 15 marks] What are the aims and objects of the recently passed and enforced, The Public Examination (Prevention of Unfair Means) Act, 2024? Whether University/State Education Board examinations, too, are covered under the Act?”

  • Dignity in death: Supreme Court upholds hanging under Article 21

    Why in the News

    The Supreme Court has dismissed a public interest litigation arguing that death by hanging is scientifically unreliable and violates the right to a dignified death under Article 21 of the Constitution. The ruling holds that a method of execution devised in colonial India still satisfies the constitutional promise of dignity, while leaving the question open to a future challenge built on fresh scientific material.

    What is the long drop method of hanging?

    1. The colonial inheritance: Hanging is the prescribed method of executing death sentences in India and derives from British Common Law.
    2. The older short drop method: Historically, hanging was carried out through a short drop, which causes death by asphyxiation.
    3. What the long drop is meant to do: A longer drop is calibrated to snap the second and third cervical vertebrae, the C2 and C3, and with them the spinal cord, rendering the person immediately unconscious.
    4. Why calibration decides the outcome: The drop must be matched to the individual’s weight and height, since a drop that is too short causes prolonged strangulation and one that is too long risks decapitation.
    5. The protocol afterwards: Standard prison protocols require the body to be left hanging for 30 minutes after the trap door opens.

    What is the current status of capital punishment and the right to die with dignity in India?

    1. Executions carried out: 971 executions have taken place in India between 1947 and 2025.
    2. Executions in this century: Only six executions have taken place since 2001, the most recent in 2020, of the four convicts in the Delhi gang rape and murder case.
    3. Sentences imposed: 1,281 convicts were sentenced to death between 2016 and 2025, which is far larger than the number of executions carried out.
    4. The sentencing threshold: The death penalty may be imposed only in the rarest of rare cases, the standard laid down in Bachan Singh v State of Punjab (1980).
    5. The statutory command: Section 393(5) of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita (BNSS), 2023 provides that where a person is sentenced to death, the sentence shall direct that he be hanged by the neck till he is dead.
    6. How old the clause is: The clause has barely changed since it was introduced in the Code of Criminal Procedure in 1861 and has survived multiple amendments.
    7. The recognised right: The Supreme Court in Gian Kaur v State of Punjab (1996) held that the right to life under Article 21 includes the right to live with dignity and consequently to die with dignity.
    8. The limits on that right: The right to die with dignity does not extend to a right to take one’s own life, and its recognised application is to end of life decisions rather than to the manner of a lawful execution.

    Constitutional Provisions Related to Capital Punishment

    1. Article 21: Guarantees that no person shall be deprived of life or personal liberty except according to procedure established by law, and this procedure must be fair, just and reasonable.
    2. Article 14: Requires that the classification of offences and offenders attracting the death penalty be reasonable and non arbitrary.
    3. Article 20(1): Bars the imposition of a penalty greater than that prescribed by the law in force at the time the offence was committed.
    4. Article 22: Provides procedural protections on arrest and detention, including the right to consult and be defended by a legal practitioner.
    5. Article 72: Empowers the President to grant pardon, reprieve, respite or remission of punishment, and to suspend, remit or commute a sentence of death.
    6. Article 161: Empowers the Governor to grant pardon and to commute sentences, though the power to pardon a death sentence rests with the President.
    7. Article 134: Provides an appeal to the Supreme Court in a criminal proceeding where a High Court has reversed an acquittal and imposed a death sentence.
    8. Article 136: Provides for special leave to appeal to the Supreme Court against any judgment or order in any cause or matter.
    9. Article 137: Provides the power of review, under which death row convicts are entitled to an open court hearing of a review petition.
    10. Concurrent List, Entry 1 and Entry 2: Place criminal law and criminal procedure in the Concurrent List, so both Parliament and State legislatures may legislate on them.

    What did the petition argue?

    1. The relief sought: A declaration that the provision prescribing hanging is unconstitutional, on the ground that Article 21 includes a right to die through a dignified procedure.
    2. The characterisation of the method: The method was described as accompanied by intense physical torture and pain, and as inherently unpredictable.
    3. The scientific material relied on: A 1992 study of the remains of 34 people hanged in England between 1882 and 1945.
    4. What the study found: Fractures at C2 and C3 were common, but the hangman’s fracture, assumed to cause near instant death, appeared in only three of the 34 cases, and six died of asphyxiation instead.
    5. The inference drawn: Hanging is therefore neither quick nor controllable in the way the law assumes it to be.
    6. The intervenor’s evidence: The Executive Director of a university death penalty clinic that intervened in the proceedings stated that researchers examining the remains of executed prisoners found that people had not died by an instant breaking of the neck, and that a range of painful and long drawn causes had produced their deaths.

    Why did the Court decline to revisit the 1983 precedent?

    1. The binding precedent: A three judge bench in Deena vs Union of India (1983) had upheld hanging as a constitutional mode of execution.
    2. What Deena examined: That bench considered medical evidence, expert opinion and comparative execution methods before ruling.
    3. What Deena held: Hanging, when properly administered, is a quick and certain method, causes no greater pain than any other known method, and avoids barbarity, torture and degradation.
    4. The legislative hurdle: Parliament chose to retain hanging while enacting the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, which is a recent legislative reaffirmation of the method.
    5. The evidentiary finding: The new scientific material did not displace the basis on which Deena was decided.
    6. The comparative finding: The material did not establish that lethal injection, electrocution, lethal gas or shooting offered any advantage over hanging.
    7. The constitutional conclusion: The existing method continues to satisfy the State’s obligation to carry out a death sentence with decency and decorum and without degradation or brutality.

    What is the Union government’s position?

    1. The claim made: Hanging remains the safest and quickest available method of execution.
    2. The domestic record cited: No botched execution has ever been recorded in India.
    3. The comparative argument: Lethal injection in the United States carries a well documented history of failures.
    4. What this position implies: The burden of demonstrating that an alternative is measurably less painful and more reliable rests on the challenger, not on the State.

    What did the Court leave open?

    1. No permanent closure: The bench stopped short of treating the question as settled forever.
    2. The ground for a future challenge: Constitutional law evolves, and a future challenge may succeed if new scientific, medical or empirical material fundamentally alters the assumptions on which Deena was decided.
    3. The executive route: The Court left it open to the Union government to examine alternative methods of execution should it choose to do so.
    4. What this means in practice: The method now depends on the state of the evidence rather than on the age of the precedent.

    What do other countries’ execution methods show about the search for a humane method?

    1. Hanging’s reach: A 2012 Cornell Law School database identified 60 countries that authorised hanging as a method of execution, concentrated in jurisdictions influenced by British Common Law, including India, Singapore and Japan.
    2. Lethal injection: The primary method in several United States states where the death penalty is allowed and heavily used in China, administering an anaesthetic, then a paralytic, then potassium chloride, and frequently botched where venous access is compromised.
    3. Shooting: Used in China, North Korea, Somalia and parts of West Asia, visually violent and traumatic for executioners, with proponents citing near instantaneous cardiac or neurological destruction.
    4. Beheading: Carried out with a sword in Saudi Arabia, and reliant entirely on the executioner’s precision.
    5. Nitrogen hypoxia: Recently introduced in the United States, using inhalation of pure nitrogen to cause asphyxiation without triggering the hypercapnic alarm response, the panicked sensation of suffocation, and criticised as insufficiently vetted and amounting to human experimentation.
    6. The abolition trend: More than two thirds of the world’s nations, around 113, have ended the death penalty in law or in practice, according to Amnesty International.
    7. The countervailing trend: A 2025 Amnesty International report recorded a 12 percent increase in executions over the previous year, so fewer states execute while those that do execute more.
    8. The 2025 concentration: The countries recording the most executions in 2025 were Iran at 2,159 or more, Saudi Arabia at 356 or more and Yemen at 51 or more, with China’s total running into the thousands and not published.
    9. What the comparison establishes: Every available method carries its own scientific and ethical controversy, which is why no alternative could be shown to be superior to hanging.

    Major debates surrounding capital punishment and the method of execution

    1. Retribution against reform: The claim that the gravest offences require the ultimate sanction stands against the claim that the state’s own conduct must not replicate the violence it punishes.
    2. Deterrence unproven: The deterrent effect of capital punishment has not been empirically established, which weakens the principal utilitarian justification offered for it.
    3. Two rulings in tension: Gian Kaur (1996) recognises a right to die with dignity within Article 21, while Deena (1983) holds that a method causing potential asphyxiation satisfies the same Article, and the present ruling resolves that tension in favour of the earlier precedent.
    4. Judge centric sentencing: The rarest of rare test is applied unevenly across benches, which makes the sentence depend in part on the composition of the court.
    5. Delay as cruelty: Prolonged delay in deciding mercy petitions has been held to be a ground for commutation, which converts the length of the process itself into a constitutional question.
    6. Socio economic profile of death row: A disproportionate share of death row prisoners come from poor and marginalised backgrounds with inadequate legal representation, which raises an equality question under Article 14.
    7. Irreversibility and wrongful conviction: The penalty cannot be corrected after execution, and acquittals in appeal after years on death row demonstrate that error occurs.
    8. The evidence gap the present dispute turns on: No systematic post mortem study of executions in India exists, so both the State’s claim of no botched execution and the petitioner’s claim of prolonged suffering rest on foreign data.
    9. Legislative expansion against judicial restriction: Parliament has extended the death penalty to more offences while the courts have narrowed the circumstances in which it may be imposed.

    Challenges to ensuring a constitutional mode of execution

    1. No Indian evidence base: India has no published forensic study of executions, so the constitutional question is argued on English data from 1882 to 1945. e.g. the 1992 study relied on by the petitioners examined 34 remains from England, not from any Indian prison.
    2. Calibration depends on execution skill: The drop length must be computed for each individual, so the outcome varies with the competence of prison staff. e.g. the official drop tables in use derive from colonial era manuals rather than from contemporary biomechanical evidence.
    3. Every alternative carries its own failure mode: No method has been shown to be reliably painless. e.g. lethal injection executions in the United States have taken over an hour where venous access failed.
    4. Absence of monitoring: No independent medical observation or record of the execution process is published. e.g. prison protocols require the body to hang for 30 minutes without any requirement to record the time or cause of death.
    5. Delay converts the sentence into a separate punishment: Prisoners spend years under sentence while appeals and mercy petitions are pending. e.g. the Supreme Court in Shatrughan Chauhan v Union of India (2014) commuted 15 death sentences on the ground of inordinate delay in deciding mercy petitions.
    6. Unequal access to competent defence: The quality of representation at the sentencing stage decides who receives the sentence. e.g. mitigating circumstances are often not placed on record at all in trial courts, which the Supreme Court addressed in Manoj v State of Madhya Pradesh (2022).
    7. Legislative expansion without sentencing guidance: New offences attract the death penalty without any accompanying sentencing framework. e.g. the death penalty was extended to the rape of a child below twelve years by the amendment to the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act in 2019.

    Conclusion

    The Court has held that hanging under Section 393(5) of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 remains constitutional, on the twin grounds that Deena (1983) has not been displaced and that Parliament reaffirmed the method when it enacted the new Sanhita. The scientific material placed before it was found insufficient to dislodge the assumptions on which the 1983 ruling rests, and no alternative method was shown to be superior. The petition is dismissed, but the question is not closed, since a future challenge may succeed on fresh scientific, medical or empirical material. The Union government has also been left free to examine alternative methods of execution should it choose to do so.

    What is the rarest of rare doctrine?

    1. About: The rarest of rare doctrine is the sentencing standard under which the death penalty may be imposed only where the alternative of life imprisonment is unquestionably foreclosed.
    2. Rationale: It exists because the Constitution permits capital punishment while Article 21 requires that its imposition be exceptional, reasoned and non arbitrary, so life imprisonment is the rule and death the exception.
    3. Where it comes from: Laid down in Bachan Singh v State of Punjab (1980), which upheld the constitutionality of the death penalty by a majority while confining it to the rarest of rare cases.
    4. The named typology it rests on:
      • Aggravating circumstances: Factors relating to the crime, such as extreme brutality, premeditation and the vulnerability of the victim, which weigh in favour of the maximum sentence.
      • Mitigating circumstances: Factors relating to the offender, such as age, mental condition, socio economic background and the probability of reform, which weigh against it.
      • The five categories in Machhi Singh v State of Punjab (1983): Manner of commission, motive, anti social or socially abhorrent nature of the crime, magnitude of the crime, and personality of the victim.
      • The balancing requirement: The court must weigh aggravating against mitigating circumstances and record why life imprisonment is unquestionably foreclosed.

    Laws Governing Capital Punishment in India

    1. Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita (BNSS), 2023: The procedural code governing trial, sentencing, confirmation and execution of the death sentence, which replaced the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973.
    2. Section 393(5): Directs that a person sentenced to death be hanged by the neck till he is dead.
    3. Confirmation requirement: A death sentence passed by a Sessions Court has no effect until it is confirmed by the High Court.
    4. Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita (BNS), 2023: The substantive penal code listing the offences that carry the death penalty, including murder, waging war against the Government of India, and certain aggravated forms of rape.
    5. Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967: Provides the death penalty for a terrorist act resulting in death.
    6. Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985: Provides the death penalty for repeat offences involving specified commercial quantities, made discretionary rather than mandatory after judicial challenge.
    7. Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012: As amended in 2019, provides the death penalty for aggravated penetrative sexual assault on a child.
    8. Criminal Law (Amendment) Act, 2013 and Criminal Law (Amendment) Act, 2018: Extended the death penalty to repeat rape offences and to the rape of a child below twelve years respectively.
    9. Army Act, 1950, Navy Act, 1957 and Air Force Act, 1950: Provide the death penalty for specified offences under military law, where the alternative method of shooting is available.
    10. Prisons Act, 1894 and State prison manuals: Govern the conditions of confinement of death row prisoners and the procedure at the place of execution.

    “[2023, GS2, 15 marks] “The Constitution of India is a living instrument with capabilities of enormous dynamism. It is a constitution made for a progressive society”. Illustrate with special reference to the expanding horizons of the right to life and personal liberty.”

  • Palestine backs India’s bid for non-permanent Security Council seat

    Why in the News

    Palestine has backed India’s bid for a non-permanent UN Security Council seat for 2028-29. The support came during India’s renewed diplomatic engagement with Palestine, including plans for a new India-funded hospital in the West Bank and medical assistance for Gaza.

    Non-Permanent Seat of the UNSC

    • Composition: UNSC has 15 members: 5 permanent members with veto power and 10 non-permanent members.
    • Election: Elected by the UN General Assembly for a 2-year term with a two-thirds majority.
    • Distribution: Seats follow equitable geographical representation; India contests from the Asia-Pacific Group.
    • Rotation: 5 non-permanent seats are elected every year. A retiring member cannot be immediately re-elected.

    Significance of Palestine’s Support for India

    • Palestine supports India’s 2028-29 candidature and has also expressed support for India having a permanent UNSC seat.
    • It views India’s economic and political weight as important for advancing Palestinian interests.
    • Palestine expects India to use its relations with Israel to facilitate the peace process.
    • The endorsement strengthens India’s image as a country capable of engaging both sides of the Israel-Palestine conflict.

    India’s Development Assistance to Palestine

    • West Bank: India is finalising an India-funded hospital.
    • Vocational training: Support for a vocational training centre.
    • Gaza: Discussions on artificial limbs for amputees.
    • Medical equipment: Talks on supplying dialysis machines and other equipment, potentially through Jordan.

    India’s Position on Palestine

    • India has consistently supported:
      • A negotiated two-state solution.
      • An independent Palestine coexisting peacefully with Israel.
      • Development and humanitarian assistance to the Palestinian people.
    • The recent visit to Ramallah marked India’s first high-level visit to the affected region since the October 2023 conflict.

    India’s De-hyphenated Israel-Palestine Policy

    India follows a de-hyphenated approach, treating relations with Israel and Palestine independently.

    • Full diplomatic relations with Israel were established in 1992.
    • India has deepened strategic cooperation with Israel while continuing to support Palestinian statehood.
    • India has continued supporting Palestinian-related resolutions at the UN.
    • This balancing gives India diplomatic credibility and leverage with both sides.

    “[2009] The Security Council of UN consists of 5 permanent members, and the remaining 10 members are elected by the General Assembly for a term of

    (a) 1 year

    (b) 2 years

    (c) 3 years

    (d) 5 years

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