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  • PLI Scheme for Bulk Drugs and Resilient Pharmaceutical Supply Chain

    PLI Scheme for Bulk Drugs and Resilient Pharmaceutical Supply Chain

    Why in the News?

    • The Production Linked Incentive (PLI) Scheme for Bulk Drugs is supporting domestic manufacturing of Key Starting Materials (KSMs), Drug Intermediates (DIs) and Active Pharmaceutical Ingredients (APIs).
    • Five greenfield projects have commissioned facilities for critical pharmaceutical inputs, reducing import dependence and strengthening supply-chain resilience.

    Key Highlights

    • Five greenfield projects commissioned under the Bulk Drugs PLI Scheme.
    • Focus areas include:
      • Antibiotic ingredients
      • Cardiovascular medicine APIs
      • Paracetamol starting materials
    • Supports import substitution, domestic value addition, employment generation and backward integration.

    Penicillin G – Andhra Pradesh

    • Company: Lyfius Pharma Pvt. Ltd., subsidiary of Aurobindo Pharma Ltd.
    • Location: Kakinada SEZ, Andhra Pradesh.
    • Investment: ₹2,270.05 crore
    • Capacity: 15,000 MT/year
    • Direct jobs: 2,353
    • Domestic value addition: More than 90%
    • Penicillin G is a fermentation-based KSM.
    • Used to produce 6-APA, which is used in antibiotics such as amoxicillin and ampicillin.
    • Domestic Penicillin G manufacturing restored after about three decades.

    Clavulanic Acid – Himachal Pradesh

    • Company: Kinvan Private Limited, DPB Group.
    • Location: Nalagarh, Himachal Pradesh.
    • Investment: ₹504.68 crore
    • Capacity: 400 MT/year
    • Direct jobs: 465
    • India’s first fermentation-based manufacturing facility for Potassium Clavulanate.
    • Clavulanic Acid is a β-lactamase inhibitor.
    • Combined with penicillin-group antibiotics such as amoxicillin to improve effectiveness against resistant bacteria.

    Sulfadiazine, Telmisartan and Olmesartan – Andhra Pradesh

    • Company: Andhra Organics Limited (AOL), subsidiary of Virchow Laboratories Ltd.
    • Location: Pydibhimavaram, Srikakulam district, Andhra Pradesh.
    • Investment: ₹151.47 crore
    • Direct employment: 221
    • Manufacturing technology developed in-house.
    • Sulfadiazine imports declined by about 73% compared with the FY 2019-20 baseline since domestic supplies began in 2022.
    • Telmisartan and Olmesartan are APIs used in medicines for hypertension.

    Para Amino Phenol – Gujarat

    • Company: Meghmani LLP.
    • Location: Dahej, Gujarat.
    • Investment: ₹60.46 crore
    • Capacity: 13,500 MT/year
    • PAP is a critical starting material for Paracetamol.
    • Facility provides domestic capacity for a material that was earlier largely imported.
    • Supports backward integration in Paracetamol manufacturing.
    • Cumulative production: ₹687 crore.

    Atorvastatin API – Punjab

    • Company: Centrient Pharmaceuticals India Pvt. Ltd.
    • Location: Nawanshahr, Punjab.
    • Investment: ₹161.13 crore
    • Capacity: 206 MT/year
    • Domestic value addition: More than 80%
    • Atorvastatin is a widely prescribed cardiovascular medicine used to lower cholesterol and reduce cardiovascular risk.
    • Cumulative production: ₹432 crore.

    Prelims Quick Revision

    • PLI Bulk Drugs Scheme supports domestic production of KSMs, DIs and APIs.
    • Penicillin G: Kakinada, Andhra Pradesh; 15,000 MT/year.
    • Potassium Clavulanate: Nalagarh, Himachal Pradesh; 400 MT/year.
    • PAP: Dahej, Gujarat; 13,500 MT/year; starting material for Paracetamol.
    • Atorvastatin API: Nawanshahr, Punjab; 206 MT/year.
    • Sulfadiazine imports: declined by about 73% against the FY 2019-20 baseline.
    • Penicillin G is a fermentation-based KSM and is used to produce 6-APA.
    • Clavulanic Acid is a β-lactamase inhibitor used with penicillin-group antibiotics.

    UPSC Prelims Trap

    • API vs KSM: API is the active pharmaceutical ingredient in a medicine, whereas KSM is a starting input used in pharmaceutical manufacturing.
    • PAP vs Paracetamol: PAP is a starting material for Paracetamol, not Paracetamol itself.
    • Clavulanic Acid: It is a β-lactamase inhibitor, not a penicillin-group antibiotic.
    • Penicillin G: It is a fermentation-based KSM and is used in producing intermediates such as 6-APA.
  • Pandit Deendayal Upadhyaya Ji – Jayanti

    Pandit Deendayal Upadhyaya Ji – Jayanti

    Why in the News?

    • Prime Minister Narendra Modi paid tributes to Pandit Deendayal Upadhyaya on his Jayanti on 25 September 2026.
    • The PM highlighted his vision of Antyodaya and the upliftment of the marginalized as a foundation of nation-building.

    Key Highlights

    • Date: 25 September 2026
    • Person: Pandit Deendayal Upadhyaya
    • Core idea: Antyodaya – upliftment of the person standing in the last line of society.
    • Nation-building: Social welfare and upliftment of marginalized sections were highlighted as central to nation-building.
    • PM urged citizens to imbibe his ideals and fulfil their social and national responsibilities.
    • Sanskrit Subhashitam emphasised:
      • Continuous effort and perseverance lead to success.
      • Dedicated action, courage and resolve are important for innovation.
      • Success and innovation were presented as outcomes of sustained effort rather than luck.

    Antyodaya

    • Means focusing on the upliftment of the person at the last end of society.
    • In the article, it is presented as a central idea associated with Pandit Deendayal Upadhyaya.
    • Linked with social welfare and inclusive nation-building.

    Sanskrit Subhashitam

    • “यथा यथा प्रयत्नः स्याद्भवेदाशु फलं तथा।”
    • Emphasises that greater effort and perseverance can lead to quicker achievement of results.
    • The article connects the idea with innovation, stressing continuous effort and dedicated action.

    Prelims Quick Revision

    • 25 September – Jayanti of Pandit Deendayal Upadhyaya.
    • Antyodaya – upliftment of the person at the last line of society.
    • Deendayal Upadhyaya’s vision was associated with nation-building through upliftment of marginalized sections.
    • The PM highlighted social and national responsibility.
    • Sanskrit Subhashitam emphasised effort, perseverance and dedicated action.
    • The article links continuous effort with both success and innovation.
    • The message contrasts dedicated action and courage with reliance on luck.

    UPSC Prelims Trap

    • Antyodaya should not be confused with a specific scheme in this article; it is presented as a vision/ideology associated with Deendayal Upadhyaya.
    • The article does not provide details of any specific government scheme under Antyodaya.
    • The Sanskrit Subhashitam emphasises effort and perseverance, not merely luck, as drivers of success.
    • 25 September is the date highlighted for Pandit Deendayal Upadhyaya’s Jayanti.

  • IIT-Delhi researchers build homegrown graphics chip for low-cost devices

    Why in the News

    Researchers at the Indian Institute of Technology Delhi (IIT Delhi) have built a programmable micro graphics processing unit (GPU) designed in India. The team describes it as the first working, demonstrable indigenously designed micro GPU from a university in India. All GPUs in use in the country are currently imported. The processor is built for graphics and display work rather than for high end artificial intelligence computing, and it runs on a Spartan 7 Field Programmable Gate Array (FPGA) board rather than as a standalone silicon chip. What has been closed is the design gap, and the manufacturing gap is a separate one.

    What is a micro GPU on a Field Programmable Gate Array?

    1. What a graphics processing unit does: A GPU is a processor built for rendering graphics and driving displays, as distinct from a general purpose processor or from the accelerators used for artificial intelligence workloads.
    2. What a Field Programmable Gate Array is: An FPGA is reconfigurable hardware on which a processor design is implemented and run, rather than a chip manufactured for that one design.
    3. How the design is written: The hardware is described in Register Transfer Language (RTL), a hardware description notation, and that description is then implemented on the FPGA platform.
    4. What a fabricated chip would be: An Application Specific Integrated Circuit (ASIC) is the same processor design manufactured as a dedicated silicon chip. Moving from an FPGA demonstration to an ASIC is a manufacturing step, not a design step.

    What has the team actually built?

    1. A programmable architecture, not a fixed function block: The team developed a programmable graphics processor architecture capable of graphics rendering, described in Register Transfer Language and implemented on the FPGA platform.
    2. The claim being made: Researchers from the Department of Electrical Engineering state that, to the best of their knowledge, this is the first working, demonstrable indigenously designed micro GPU from a university in India.
    3. The current form of the system: It runs on a Spartan 7 FPGA board rather than as a standalone silicon chip.
    4. The stated objective: The stated aim was a compact but genuinely programmable graphics processing architecture suitable for FPGA implementation and future ASIC realisation.

    Where would such a processor be used?

    1. Industrial and interface displays: Industrial control displays and low cost human machine interfaces are the primary target.
    2. Mobility and navigation: Uses named include e rickshaw dashboard navigators and inland water navigation terminals for small fishing boats.
    3. Education and reading: Educational devices and e book readers are a further target, alongside other affordable embedded visualisation systems.
    4. The form the design takes: The architecture is offered as a scalable, reusable graphics processor design rather than as a finished product, so it can be dropped into different embedded systems.

    Why target low cost embedded uses rather than artificial intelligence computing?

    1. The import position: All GPUs used in India are currently imported, so a domestic design of any class changes a total dependence.
    2. The deliberate scope: The processor is designed for graphics and display applications rather than high end artificial intelligence computing, which is where global GPU competition and cost are concentrated.
    3. The stated purpose: The researchers state that indigenous hardware systems of this kind can support affordable digital access platforms and contribute towards bridging the digital divide.

    What remains between the demonstration and a chip?

    1. Two possible paths: The design can be implemented on programmable hardware such as FPGAs, or converted into an Application Specific Integrated Circuit.
    2. What conversion involves: An ASIC would mean manufacturing the processor design as a dedicated silicon chip. The current work remains at the FPGA demonstration stage.
    3. The next architectural step: The team is exploring an eight to 16 core vector style graphics processor architecture, along with an optimised compiler and a graphics software toolchain.
    4. The fabrication milestone: The longer term plan includes a proof of concept using a 65 nanometre ASIC process.

    Conclusion

    India now holds a graphics processor design it did not hold before. It does not yet hold a graphics processor. The step that would change that is fabrication, and the team’s own roadmap places a silicon proof of concept in the longer term rather than the near one. What to watch is whether the design attracts a foundry commitment, since a demonstration that stays on a reconfigurable board displaces no import.

    Matching Previous Year Question

    “[2026] Which of the following statements about DHRUV64 is/are correct? 1. It is the third chip fabricated under the DIR-V Programme to enable creation of microprocessors for India. 2. It is India’s first homegrown 1.0 GHz, 64-bit dual-core microprocessor. (a) 1 only (b) 2 only (c) Both 1 and 2 (d) Neither 1 nor 2 Answer: (c)”

  • Zones of worry

    Why in the News

    The seventh draft notification for an Ecologically Sensitive Area (ESA) in the Kerala stretch of the Western Ghats proposes to bring 9,993.7 sq km across 131 villages under the regime. The Kerala government will reiterate a counter position confining the area to 8,590.69 sq km across 98 villages, excluding human habitations and agricultural land. The first draft, based on the report of the High Level Working Group, covered 123 revenue villages and was never finalised, and six further drafts have followed without settling the dispute. The window for filing objections to the seventh draft closed on 25 September. The disagreement is no longer about whether the Ghats need protection. It is about whether an ecologically sensitive line is drawn around ecology or around land use.

    What does the Ecologically Sensitive Area regime restrict?

    1. Purpose of the designation: Those framing the proposals state that the notification is intended to regulate activities that can damage fragile ecosystems, rather than to remove human presence from the landscape.
    2. What the draft prohibits: Mining, quarrying and sand mining are barred in the notified areas.
    3. What the draft leaves untouched: There are no restrictions on the repair, extension or renovation of existing residential houses, or on changes in ownership of land.
    4. The basis of the classification: The zonation rests on ecological sensitivity, the approach proposed by the Western Ghats Ecology Expert Panel.

    How far apart are the Centre’s draft and Kerala’s counter position?

    1. The area proposed: The seventh draft, issued on 27 July, covers 9,993.7 sq km across 131 villages in Kerala.
    2. The forest and non forest split: Of that area, 9,107 sq km is forest and 886.7 sq km is non forest.
    3. The State’s figure: Kerala will press for 8,590.69 sq km across 98 villages, with the ecologically sensitive areas confined to forests and leased forest plantations.
    4. The principle behind the State’s figure: Kerala argues that inhabited and cultivated landscapes should not be treated in the same manner as forests and other ecologically fragile areas. The demand reflects a position held by successive State governments across the political divide.

    Why do high range residents read the notification as a threat to their land?

    1. Origin of the settlements: The Grow More Food campaign of the erstwhile Travancore administration in the early 1940s encouraged migration into the high ranges. Families moved in to farm, and habitations turned large stretches of the mountains into agricultural landscapes.
    2. Damage done by uncertainty rather than by rules: After 2013 people began cutting down trees for fear they would not be able to use their land later. Farmlands were abandoned and land prices fell.
    3. Effects already visible: The Melukavu panchayat president in Kottayam says the issue has affected access to loans and land transactions, and has told on the marriage prospects of young people in the region.
    4. The ecological rationale questioned: The president of the Rubber Producers’ Society at Edamaruku in Kottayam points out that the nearest forests lie about 30 km to the north and about 50 km to the south of the village proposed for inclusion.
    5. The jurisdictional fear: The chairperson of the Kerala Independent Farmers Association argues that inclusion takes a holding out of the jurisdiction of the State Revenue department and places it with the Central regime, so residents would have to seek Central clearance for almost every activity. The proposal in that reading creates two categories of residents, those inside the ESAs and those outside.

    How did the Gadgil report and the Kasturirangan review set the terms of the dispute?

    1. The original proposal: The Western Ghats Ecology Expert Panel, chaired by Madhav Gadgil, proposed a comprehensive zonation of the Ghats based on ecological sensitivity.
    2. How it was received in the high ranges: The report generated fears that agriculture and development would be restricted, and that existing settlements could eventually face displacement.
    3. The review that followed: The Centre appointed a High Level Working Group chaired by K. Kasturirangan to review the Gadgil recommendations. Environmentalists hold that the group watered down the restrictions.
    4. The first draft and the stalemate after it: The first draft notification, based on the High Level Working Group report, proposed 123 revenue villages in Kerala, mainly in Idukki and Wayanad. Protests prevented a final notification and six more drafts followed.
    5. The State’s own committee: A committee appointed by the State government under Oommen V. Oommen recommended excluding inhabited areas, plantations and agricultural lands through physical verification and field surveys. It also proposed re fixing the ecologically sensitive areas using cadastral maps, which are plot level land records, approved by the Kerala State Biodiversity Board.

    What have conservationists and the panel’s own members said in reply?

    1. The fears called propaganda: The president of the Wayanad Prakruthi Samrakshana Samiti says apprehensions of restrictions on building houses and digging wells are baseless political propaganda pushed by vested interest groups.
    2. Existing law already protects forests: The same view holds that a host of laws, including the Forest Act and the Wild Life (Protection) Act, 1972, already protect forests, so classifying forest areas as ESAs adds nothing.
    3. What the Gadgil report asked for: A member of the panel states that the report recommended a shift to organic farming and never opposed farming. It opposed the pollution of water resources through chemical pesticides, called for non polluting industries, and placed no restrictions on local infrastructure development.
    4. Who was to decide: The panel’s approach was to give local communities a decisive role in determining how development should proceed in ecologically sensitive landscapes, in place of a blanket ban on local activity.
    5. The latest draft already concedes ground: The chairman of the State appointed committee notes that the current draft has excluded farmlands and plantations from the ESAs, which leaves the objection directed at fragile rocky land the high range communities do not own.

    How has the dispute reshaped mobilisation and politics in the high ranges?

    1. Idukki as the epicentre: Fifty one villages in Idukki figure in the latest draft, and all the grama sabhas there have passed resolutions urging the Union and State governments to exclude their villages from the regime.
    2. An organised church led agitation: The Idukki Diocese of the Syro Malabar Church has been at the forefront of the anti ESA agitation since 2013, and the High Range Samrakshana Samiti under its patronage has organised protests across the high ranges. The Church’s position is that human habitations and farmlands must be fully excluded.
    3. The electoral consequence: In the 2014 Lok Sabha election the Samiti’s legal adviser, standing as an Independent backed by the Left Democratic Front (LDF), won the Idukki seat, long considered a Congress citadel.
    4. The heritage listing drawn in: The State vice president of the All India Kisan Sabha, the farmers’ wing of the Communist Party of India, has demanded that the Western Ghats be removed from UNESCO World Heritage Site status, which requires more stringent conservation. The counter cited is that UNESCO guidelines themselves require exclusion of an area where a project disrupts the livelihood or daily life of the local population.

    Can protection and settlement be mapped on the same hills?

    1. The question conservationists are asking: For conservationists the central issue is whether human activity in the Western Ghats can continue without weakening ecological safeguards.
    2. The question residents are asking: For residents the distinction between forest and settlement is critical, because their houses, farms and livelihoods are embedded in the same landscape that conservation policy seeks to protect.
    3. The same hills read two ways: The same slopes are treated as a fragile ecological system requiring protection and as a lived landscape of farms, homes and communities built over generations. The disagreement has simmered through more than a decade of committees, consultations and draft notifications.

    Conclusion

    Seven drafts have narrowed the area and settled nothing. The Centre and the State are not arguing about protection; they are arguing about the unit the line is drawn on, and each successive draft has restated that disagreement rather than resolved it. With the objection window now shut, the decision point is whether the Centre finalises the notification on its own mapping or reopens the plot level verification the State’s committee asked for.

    Matching Previous Year Question

    “[2016] Gadgil Committee Report’ and ‘Kasturirangan Committee Report’, sometimes seen in the news, are related to (a) constitutional reforms (b) Ganga Action Plan (c) linking of rivers (d) protection of Western Ghats Answer: (d)”

  • Union Minister to join Naga peace negotiations; encouraging: NSCN (IM)

    Why in the News

    The Centre has agreed to include a Union Minister or a group of Union level Ministers in the Naga peace talks. The step meets a longstanding demand of the National Socialist Council of Nagalim (Isak Muivah), or NSCN (IM), for political representation in the negotiations. It follows the appointment of Ajit Lal, a former Joint Intelligence Committee chief, as the Centre’s pointsman for the talks seven months ago. The talks have run since 1997 and produced a Framework Agreement in 2015 that was never converted into a settlement. A day after welcoming the new format, the group’s External Publicity Wing described a Nagalim national flag and a Nagalim national constitution as non negotiable, two demands the Centre has said will not be met.

    What is the Naga peace process?

    1. The negotiating track: The Union government has been holding talks with the NSCN (IM) since 1997 to resolve the decades long insurgency in the Naga hills through a peace accord.
    2. The Framework Agreement: A Framework Agreement between the government and the NSCN (IM) was signed on 3 August 2015. Little was achieved after it.
    3. The interlocutor mechanism: The Centre negotiates through an appointed pointsman rather than through a minister. The post has passed from a former Indian Police Service officer to a former Additional Director of the Intelligence Bureau and now to a former Joint Intelligence Committee chief, who holds the post of Adviser (North East) in the Ministry of Home Affairs.
    4. The ceasefire boundary: Participation in the talks runs alongside a ceasefire, and a Naga armed group outside that ceasefire is outside the negotiation as well.

    What does political level representation change in the talks?

    1. The concession on format: The Centre has agreed to bring a Union Minister, or a group of Union level Ministers, into the negotiation framework. The talks so far have been conducted by an appointed official.
    2. The group’s stated expectation: The NSCN (IM) said the decision will “expedite the political process” and create the momentum for “an honourable and enduring political settlement”.
    3. The demand behind it: The security establishment’s reading is that the NSCN (IM) has always wanted the negotiations to be political, with political representatives involved, rather than conducted at the official level.

    Why did the talks stall after the Framework Agreement was signed?

    1. Disagreement over the 2015 text: The parties fell out over the Framework Agreement itself, and the dispute over what it committed either side to hardened the group’s position.
    2. Public accusations on both sides: The NSCN (IM) accused the then interlocutor of “mischief” and of attempts to “segregate Naga society”. The interlocutor called the NSCN an “armed gang” and accused it of running a “parallel government” engaged in extortion.
    3. A stalemate rather than a rupture: The exchanges virtually pushed the talks into a stalemate without ending them, and the public altercations of the early 2020s made a settlement appear more distant.
    4. A change of interlocutor did not help: The post passed to a former Additional Director of the Intelligence Bureau and the talks still failed to make much headway.

    What explains the change in the NSCN (IM)’s tone?

    1. First acceptance of the interlocutor: The group welcomed the current pointsman’s appointment as “interlocutor” for the first time, calling it a “significant and encouraging development that reflects the GoI’s renewed resolve to advance the peace process with seriousness and urgency”. He was appointed Adviser (North East) in February.
    2. Prior standing with the Nagas: He had officiated as interlocutor for five months in 2014, and his relations with the Nagas are cited as one reason the present step became possible.
    3. A State government kept inside the process: The NSCN (IM) thanked the Nagaland government for its “sincere participation and active facilitation”, and said its engagement has been instrumental in sustaining the peace process.

    How does the breakaway Eastern Flank constrain the NSCN (IM)?

    1. A rebel faction outside the ceasefire: The Eastern Flank, based in Myanmar, is a hardline faction that has refused negotiations with the government and is not under any ceasefire agreement.
    2. The defection that gave it standing: In 2024 Ikato, son of NSCN co founder Isak Chishi Swu, joined the faction, accusing the NSCN (IM) leadership of being “corrupt” and of “compromising the (Naga) national interest for their own selfish gain”. He was appointed its chairman in July this year.
    3. The legitimacy problem it creates: The chairmanship confers legitimacy because he is Isak’s son and a Naga from Nagaland. The NSCN (IM) is led by Muivah, a Tangkhul from Manipur.
    4. Popular impatience adds to it: Patience in Nagaland has been wearing thin over the delay in concluding the peace process, which builds further pressure on the NSCN (IM).

    Can a political upgrade survive the demands the Centre has ruled out?

    1. The two non negotiables: The External Publicity Wing of the NSCN (IM) asserted that the ongoing political negotiations rest on “sovereignty” between the government and the NSCN, and described the “Nagalim national flag and Nagalim national constitution” as “non negotiable”.
    2. The Centre’s stated limit: Delhi has said a Naga flag and a separate Naga constitution will not be conceded. The same two items are the group’s core demands.
    3. Hardliners narrow the room to compromise: The Eastern Flank’s position makes it costlier for the NSCN (IM) to soften on either demand, because any concession would be read against a faction that has refused to negotiate at all.

    Conclusion

    The talks have changed their format without changing their content. Ministerial participation answers a question about who sits at the table. It does not touch the two demands the Centre has ruled out, and the group restated both within a day of welcoming the new arrangement. What to watch is whether a ministerial round is actually convened, and whether the faction sitting outside the ceasefire is brought into one.

    Matching Previous Year Question

    “[2025, GS3, 15 marks] What are the major challenges to internal security and peace process in the North-Eastern States? Map the various peace accords and agreements initiated by the government in the past decade.”

  • Revisiting India’s nuclear doctrine without revising it

    Why in the News

    India’s nuclear doctrine has remained largely unchanged since it was operationalised in 2003, while the security environment it was written for has shifted. Its core commitments, credible minimum deterrence and a declared No First Use (NFU) posture, have endured across more than two decades. The question now raised is whether a framework crafted for the early 2000s still fits the security challenges of the mid 2020s. The tension is that the doctrine’s chief asset is its predictability, so examining it in public costs something even if nothing is changed, while leaving it unexamined costs something too as the assumptions beneath it shift.

    What does India’s 2003 nuclear doctrine commit to?

    1. Credible minimum deterrence: India maintains an arsenal sized to inflict unacceptable damage in retaliation rather than to match an adversary weapon for weapon.
    2. No First Use: India will not use nuclear weapons first. One stated exception retains the option of nuclear retaliation following a major biological or chemical attack on India or on Indian forces.
    3. Massive retaliation: A nuclear attack on India invites retaliation designed to be unacceptable rather than proportionate.
    4. Survivability and civilian control: The posture rests on a survivable second strike capability and on firm civilian control of the arsenal.

    Where did the doctrine come from?

    1. Pokhran II, 1998: The tests established India as a nuclear weapons state.
    2. Kargil, 1999: The conflict showed that nuclear deterrence did not rule out conventional war between two nuclear armed neighbours.
    3. The 1999 Draft Nuclear Doctrine: It set out the framework the government later acted on, seeking to reconcile deterrence with restraint.
    4. The Cabinet Committee on Security decision: On 4 January 2003 the Committee operationalised the posture the draft had proposed.
    5. What it delivered: Judged by its original objectives, the doctrine has provided continuity, predictability and strategic stability for more than two decades.

    What has changed in the strategic environment since 2003?

    1. A closer China and Pakistan alignment: The two nuclear armed neighbours posed distinct challenges when the doctrine was formulated and pose interconnected ones now. China has expanded and modernised its nuclear forces, strengthened military infrastructure along the Line of Actual Control (LAC) and deepened defence cooperation with Pakistan, while Pakistan has diversified its capabilities, including tactical nuclear weapons intended to offset India’s conventional advantage.
    2. Technologies that reshape deterrence: Artificial Intelligence (AI), cyber capabilities, space based surveillance, hypersonic weapons and ballistic missile defence shorten decision making timelines, increase the vulnerability of command and control networks and complicate assumptions about assured retaliation. They do not invalidate the doctrine’s core principles, they alter the environment those principles must operate in.
    3. A more multipolar system: The Indo Pacific has become a key arena of great power competition, shaped by rivalry between the United States and China, closer coordination between China and Russia, and India’s expanding partnerships. Nuclear doctrine can no longer be read through bilateral deterrence alone, since regional crises are increasingly shaped by wider geopolitical competition.

    What would a review actually examine?

    1. Doctrines as policy instruments: Strategic doctrines are policy instruments rather than immutable documents, so periodic examination is an ordinary act of statecraft.
    2. Scope of a review: It could cover emerging technologies, command and control resilience, second strike capabilities and the continuing relevance of existing concepts, including the doctrine’s approach to retaliation.
    3. Massive retaliation under scrutiny: Pakistan’s tactical nuclear weapons were intended to complicate India’s response options below the level of a strategic exchange, which raises the question of whether India’s declaratory posture gives sufficient deterrent clarity across the full range of nuclear contingencies.
    4. Review is not revision: A review of NFU could reaffirm its rationale, clarify its scope and confirm that supporting capabilities remain credible, without touching the core principles.

    Why does reopening declaratory policy carry its own risk?

    1. The reputational asset: The doctrine has reinforced India’s image as a restrained and responsible nuclear power while providing continuity in deterrence.
    2. Cost of ambiguity: Ambiguity over established principles, particularly NFU, would create uncertainty, encourage adversaries to recalibrate and complicate crisis management.
    3. The stated priority: Strengthening operational capabilities and modernising delivery systems answers the same pressures without reopening declaratory policy at all.

    What capabilities must back the declared policy?

    1. Survivability: A doctrine that promises retaliation is only as credible as the share of the arsenal that survives a first strike.
    2. Command, control and early warning: Command and control, intelligence, early warning and cyber resilience have to be assessed together, since between them they set the time in which a retaliation decision can be taken.
    3. The nuclear triad: Delivery across land, air and sea has to be judged as one system rather than platform by platform.
    4. Alignment with diplomacy: Nuclear policy has to sit alongside India’s broader diplomatic objectives and its strategic autonomy rather than run separately from them.

    Challenges to India’s nuclear deterrent posture

    1. Maturity of the sea based leg: The sea leg is the most survivable part of any triad and is also India’s newest and smallest. Eg. INS Arihant, commissioned in 2016, was India’s first indigenously built ballistic missile submarine, and the fleet built around it remains small.
      The Fix: Sustain the submarine building programme to the point where at least one boat can be kept on deterrent patrol continuously.
    2. No risk reduction channel with China: India has no bilateral nuclear risk reduction or crisis communication arrangement with its larger nuclear neighbour. Eg. India and Pakistan exchange lists of their nuclear installations every 1 January under the 1988 agreement barring attacks on such facilities, and no comparable arrangement exists with China.
      The Fix: Negotiate a nuclear risk reduction and direct communication arrangement with China on the model of that existing agreement.
    3. Exclusion from nuclear export control regimes: India sits outside the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG), which limits its influence over the rules governing transfers of nuclear technology and material. Eg. China has blocked India’s entry into the Group.
      The Fix: Keep converting bilateral civil nuclear agreements into declared support for membership, so the bid rests on a broader base than a single blocking vote.
    4. Opacity of the arsenal: India publishes no official figures on warhead numbers, force posture or readiness, so the credibility of a minimum deterrent rests on assertion rather than on demonstrated capability. Eg. Published estimates of India’s warhead count come from independent research institutes rather than from any official Indian release.
      The Fix: Issue a periodic unclassified statement of doctrine and force posture, as several other nuclear armed states do, so the deterrent is legible without disclosing targets.

    Conclusion

    India’s declaratory policy and the capability behind it are two different things, and only one of them is genuinely under strain. A doctrine’s value lies in being predictable, so any signal that it is under reconsideration spends the asset it exists to protect. What remains unresolved is whether a posture designed against two separate adversaries holds when those adversaries plan together and the time available to decide keeps shrinking. The marker to watch is whether India’s next set of capability decisions is presented as a review of readiness or as a revision of policy, because the two send opposite signals to the same audiences.

    Government Initiatives on Nuclear Deterrence in India

    1. Nuclear Command Authority: Constituted in January 2003, it is the body that authorises the use of nuclear weapons, with a Political Council chaired by the Prime Minister and an Executive Council chaired by the National Security Adviser.
    2. Strategic Forces Command: Created in 2003 under the Integrated Defence Staff, it manages and administers India’s nuclear delivery systems.
    3. Voluntary testing moratorium: India has maintained a unilateral moratorium on further nuclear explosive testing since 1998, while remaining outside the Nuclear Non Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT).

    Back2Basics: Cabinet Committee on Security

    1. What it is: The highest decision making body of the Union Cabinet on national security, defence and strategic policy.
    2. Composition: It is chaired by the Prime Minister, with the Ministers of Defence, Home Affairs, External Affairs and Finance as its members.
    3. Mandate: It clears major defence acquisitions, senior appointments in the security and intelligence establishment, and decisions on nuclear and strategic policy.
    4. Basis: It is a Cabinet Committee constituted under the Government of India (Transaction of Business) Rules, 1961, and is neither a constitutional nor a statutory body.

    Matching Previous Year Question

    “No direct PYQ traced in the provided files. Closest microtheme: Geo-politics affecting India’s Interest.”

  • Manga, helpline and AI: India pilots BRICS’ mental health support network

    Why in the News

    A newly established BRICS Network of Centres of Excellence (CoEs) in mental health will be piloted by India, with the National Institute of Mental Health and Neurosciences (NIMHANS) acting as its coordinating centre. It answers a problem common to the grouping. Specialist psychiatric services sit in cities while the populations that need them live in rural or underserved areas. Stigma compounds that distance, because a diagnosis is widely treated as a mark against a family rather than as a condition requiring treatment. The tension is that no member can train its way out of the treatment gap at the pace the burden is growing, so the network is betting on health workers who are not specialists and on digital delivery instead of on more specialists.

    What is the BRICS Network of Centres of Excellence in mental health?

    1. What it is: A newly established network linking designated centres of excellence in mental health across BRICS member states, with India running the pilot.
    2. Governance work: The coordinating centre is drafting the network’s governance protocol before the network begins operating.
    3. What it exists to do: It carries approaches developed in one member state into the health systems of the others, adapted to local conditions.
    4. Form of collaboration: Cooperation spans technical expertise, joint research, capacity building and knowledge exchange rather than monetary grants.

    How does the network intend to close the treatment gap?

    1. Task sharing: Basic mental health support, identification and referral become part of routine primary care, carried out by frontline and non specialist health workers upskilled for the role.
    2. Digital telehealth: Telehealth platforms extend specialist input to hard to reach and rural populations without relocating the specialists themselves.
    3. Integration into primary health centres: Mental healthcare is placed inside the existing primary care system rather than run as a parallel vertical service.

    What does each member state bring to the network?

    1. China, an educational manga against stigma: A comic produced to challenge the ideas of losing face and parental blame follows a schoolgirl whose grades collapse under severe anxiety and depression. Her recovery begins when a classmate helps her reach a community counselling clinic, and a doctor explains that a mental health condition, like a broken leg, may require treatment and support.
    2. Indonesia, a round the clock helpline: A 24×7 digital platform responds to mental health crises and to suicide prevention.
    3. South Africa, pictorial screening: Screening built around pictures and stories helps community health workers identify mental health concerns during home visits.
    4. United Arab Emirates, simulation based practice: Clinical simulations and interventions built on virtual reality are in use.
    5. Russia, technology assisted assessment: Physiological measures such as heart rate variability and galvanic skin response are combined with biofeedback and other non invasive technologies for assessment and rehabilitation.
    6. India, tele mental health: India brings tele mental health services designed to plug into the existing healthcare system.

    Why does India’s own burden make the exchange worth having?

    1. Scale of the affected population: An estimated 197.3 million individuals in India were affected by mental health disorders in 2017.
    2. The treatment gap: Between 70 per cent and 92 per cent of those affected went untreated.
    3. Workforce shortage: India is short of psychiatrists, clinical psychologists and psychiatric nurses, and most of the specialists it has are concentrated in cities.
    4. Economic cost: Mental health conditions in India are projected to cause economic losses of USD 1.03 trillion between 2012 and 2030.

    What will the network produce, and where does it stand?

    1. Joint research agenda: Areas under consideration include screening assisted by Artificial Intelligence (AI), digital interventions, suicide prevention, biomarkers and epidemiological mapping of mental health conditions across BRICS countries.
    2. Operational blueprints: The network is expected to share blueprints for digital platforms, tools and learning management systems.
    3. A clinical compendium: A compendium of evidence based clinical protocols, culturally adaptable tools and public education strategies is envisaged.
    4. Common rules of the road: Members will work on shared approaches to data privacy and cybersecurity, to the ethical deployment of AI and to mental health policies grounded in human rights.
    5. Current stage: Centres of excellence, agreements and contact points are still being settled, and a multi country steering committee and technical working groups are being formed.

    Conclusion

    The network exists as an agreed structure and not yet as a delivery system. What each member has put in is a working method rather than money, so the open question is whether a method built for one country’s workforce and one country’s stigma survives transfer to another’s. The governance machinery is still being assembled, and until it is settled the network has no way to hold a member to a commitment. The marker to watch is the first pilot site at which a health worker who is not a specialist identifies a case and refers it without a psychiatrist in the building.

    Back2Basics: National Institute of Mental Health and Neurosciences

    1. Status: NIMHANS, located in Bengaluru, was declared an Institute of National Importance by an Act of Parliament in 2012.
    2. Administrative home: It functions under the Ministry of Health and Family Welfare.
    3. Mandate: It combines patient care, teaching and research across psychiatry, neurology and neurosurgery, and trains mental health professionals for the country.
    4. National service role: It is the nodal institution for Tele MANAS, the national tele mental health service launched by the Ministry of Health and Family Welfare in 2022.

    Matching Previous Year Question

    “[2026, GS2, 10 marks] “BRICS acts as a powerful counterweight in global governance, actively amplifying the voice and influence of the Global South.” Explain the role of BRICS in projecting itself as an alternative to other groupings.”

  • A declining United Nations is not good news for a rising India

    Why in the News

    India’s standing is rising while the authority of the United Nations (UN) falls, and the second movement works against the first. Rivalry among major powers opens room for manoeuvre and makes agreements harder to trust at the same time, which is a poor bargain for a power that needs commitments to hold when relations sour. This year’s General Assembly session will not resolve that, because the governments whose consent the UN needs are often pursuing the very objectives it was established to restrain. Indian diplomacy therefore carries two tasks at once. It must win more influence over UN decisions, and it must help make those decisions matter, and the two pull against each other when the organisation’s own members are the ones weakening it.

    Why does a weakening United Nations hurt a rising India rather than free it?

    1. Durability of agreements: India needs arrangements that hold when relations sour, and an organisation that cannot enforce its own decisions cannot supply them.
    2. Sovereignty and rule making: New Delhi has long defended sovereignty and resisted intrusive international rule making. Constraints imposed by powerful countries can leave it with even less say than a negotiated rule would.
    3. Who writes the rules: The operative question is not India’s size but its influence over who sets the rules it will have to live under.
    4. Multilateral arrangements as leverage: They give India a voice in those negotiations and room to cooperate with countries it disagrees with elsewhere.
    5. Limits of economic weight: A larger economy will not by itself remove the vulnerability. In a world split into rival financial and technological systems, access to a market or a technology could increasingly require accepting the conditions of one camp.

    What has left the Security Council unable to restrain its strongest members?

    1. The design assumption: The Council was built to work when the major powers could agree, and the veto gives each permanent member the means to block action when they cannot.
    2. Live conflicts: Ukraine, Gaza and the war involving Iran and the Gulf expose the Council’s inability to restrain its strongest members and their clients.
    3. The cost of neglect: Sudan demonstrates what follows where the Council does not engage at all.
    4. Charter enforcement: Appeals to the UN Charter have little effect when the states expected to uphold it can prevent its enforcement.

    How does economic coercion reach Indian businesses without a Council decision?

    1. Unilateral coercive measures: Restrictions imposed by one state extend the problem out of the diplomatic arena and into everyday commerce.
    2. The commercial chokepoint: An Indian company may be free to trade under Indian law and still find that a foreign bank will not process its payment or an insurer will not cover its cargo.
    3. Weaponised interdependence: Control over financial, insurance and technology networks lets powerful states project national restrictions far beyond their borders without authorisation from the Security Council, which leaves Indian businesses exposed to rules their government had no part in writing.

    What does the United Nations still deliver, and who is hollowing it out?

    1. Universal membership: It gives smaller countries a claim to be heard without a major power’s invitation, which no plurilateral grouping replicates.
    2. Agency work: UN agencies deliver relief, document the human cost of crises and organise the scientific assessments used in climate negotiations.
    3. A forum for the strained: As climate shocks and widening inequalities press on developing countries, the UN gives them a place to press claims on climate finance and sustainable development.
    4. Secretariat inefficiency: The organisation still falls short too often, and the Secretariat must simplify procedures, cut duplication and spend carefully.
    5. Member state behaviour: Governments weaken the organisation they invoke when convenient. They assign tasks they do not fund, delay payments they owe and cut assistance while expecting the UN to absorb the damage.
    6. Mandate against resources: A peace operation given an ambitious mandate and inadequate resources is being set up to fail.

    Why is artificial intelligence a test of who writes the rules that matter?

    1. Warning from the scientific panel: The UN’s independent scientific panel has warned that Artificial Intelligence (AI) agents could become harder for humans to control.
    2. Industry at the Council table: Technology executives briefed the Security Council on the risks of AI on 23 September, and the Council has a role wherever AI threatens international security.
    3. Limits of that table: Companies bring essential expertise and commercial interests together, and the reach of AI into employment, education and development needs wider consideration than a security body can give it.
    4. India’s stated position: Safety standards and access to technology should be negotiated where developing countries have a voice, because permanent members and a few technology firms cannot represent everyone whose future those rules will shape.

    How can India widen its influence before Council reform arrives?

    1. Partners for Multilateralism: India helped launch this coalition, known as P4M, with Brazil, Canada, Kenya, the European Union, Australia and Barbados, a group that deliberately spans different diplomatic camps.
    2. The coalition’s declaration: It records that economic interdependence is being used to exert pressure, disrupting trade, supply chains and development finance.
    3. Value of mixed partners: Each partner holds relationships that could help India persuade countries it might not otherwise persuade. Joint proposals on climate finance or on protection against economic coercion could attract wider support without waiting for agreement on the more contentious questions of reform.
    4. The permanent membership claim: India rests its case on being the world’s most populous democracy and a major economy, and Africa’s exclusion from permanent membership makes the case for Council reform harder to ignore.
    5. Why the claim stalls: Regional rivalries obstruct agreement on expansion, and Charter amendments require ratification by all five permanent members.
    6. The elected seat: India is seeking support at this Assembly for an elected Security Council seat for the 2028 to 2029 term, against Tajikistan, which has never served on the Council, in the June 2027 election.
    7. The peacekeeping record: A founding member in 1945, India has contributed more than 275,000 personnel to UN peacekeeping, and can use that record to argue for mandates troops can carry out and for affected countries to be heard before the Council acts.

    Challenges to India’s bid for a larger role at the Security Council

    1. China’s withheld endorsement: China is the only permanent member that has not backed India’s candidature for a permanent seat with a clear commitment. Eg. It has also blocked India’s entry into the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG).
      The Fix: Pursue issue specific bargains where Indian and Chinese positions already converge, so the reform bid is not the only channel through which the relationship is tested.
    2. Organised opposition from the Uniting for Consensus group: A bloc of middle powers lobbies for expansion in the non permanent category alone, which keeps regional competitors out of a permanent seat. Eg. Pakistan, Italy and Mexico have consistently pressed that position.
      The Fix: Build the General Assembly numbers first, since any expansion needs a two thirds majority there before ratification is even reached.
    3. Negotiations without a text: The Intergovernmental Negotiations (IGN) on Council reform have run for over a decade without producing a single negotiating text to amend. Eg. The 2026 session ended without consensus even on the framework for expansion.
      The Fix: Press for one consolidated negotiating text carrying a fixed review date, so the process yields a document rather than another round of statements.
    4. Standing outside the non proliferation treaties: Critics cite India’s position outside the two central nuclear treaties as a disqualifier for permanent membership. Eg. India has stayed out of the Nuclear Non Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) while maintaining a voluntary moratorium on further nuclear explosive testing.
      The Fix: Anchor the bid in the non proliferation record and the peacekeeping record rather than in treaty signatures, and press for criteria based rather than membership based tests.

    Conclusion

    India’s stake in the United Nations is not sentimental, it is contractual. A rising power that cannot make its agreements hold gains freedom of manoeuvre and loses predictability, and predictability is the scarcer of the two. The unresolved question is whether India’s growing weight can be converted into influence over who writes the rules, or whether it will keep being governed by rules made where it has no vote. The test will come when a rule India helped write obstructs the choices of a state powerful enough to ignore it.

    About United Nations Reform

    1. Expansion of the Security Council: Reform proposals seek to increase both permanent and non permanent seats to bring in India, Brazil, Japan, Germany and African representation.
    2. Veto restructuring: A voluntary code of conduct would limit use of the veto in cases of mass atrocities or genocide.
    3. Empowering the General Assembly: The Assembly’s role in security matters would be strengthened for occasions when the Council is deadlocked.
    4. Inclusive multilateralism: Regional blocs such as the African Union would be formally institutionalised within the UN Charter.

    Government Initiatives for United Nations Reform

    1. The G4 grouping: India, Brazil, Germany and Japan support each other’s bids for permanent seats and press a common reform model.
    2. The L.69 Group: A cross regional grouping of developing countries from Asia, Africa, Latin America and the Caribbean, including small island developing states, which India leads in pressing for expansion in both membership categories.
    3. Voice of Global South Summit: Convened by India since 2023 to aggregate developing country positions and carry them into the G20 and other bodies. It is a consultation mechanism rather than an institution.

    Back2Basics: Elected Seats on the UN Security Council

    1. Composition: The Council has 15 members, five permanent and ten elected.
    2. Election and term: Elected members serve two year terms and are chosen by the General Assembly by a two thirds majority, with the ten seats distributed across regional groups.
    3. Voting weight: An elected member votes on every resolution but holds no veto, and a substantive resolution needs nine votes in favour with no permanent member voting against.
    4. India’s record: India has served eight terms as an elected member, most recently in 2021 and 2022.

    Matching Previous Year Question

    “[2025, GS2, 15 marks] “The reform process in the United Nations remains unresolved, because of the delicate imbalance of East and West and entanglement of the USA vs. Russo-Chinese alliance.” Examine and critically evaluate the East-West policy confrontations in this regard.”

  • Conflict and consensus: The rupture in the poll panel

    Why in the News

    The functioning of the three member Election Commission of India (ECI) is under scrutiny after an investigation reported that two Election Commissioners placed objections on record at least 14 times in 10 months. The poll body has responded that its decisions have been unanimous. It describes the recorded entries as observations that form part of the deliberative process. The dispute is over whether a recorded objection is a dissent or a step inside a deliberation that ends in agreement.

    How does the Election Commission take decisions?

    1. Article 324: Article 324 of the Constitution vests the superintendence, direction and control of the preparation of electoral rolls and of the conduct of elections in the Commission. It covers elections to Parliament, to the legislature of every State and to the offices of President and Vice President.
    2. Composition: The Commission consists of the Chief Election Commissioner (CEC) and such number of other Election Commissioners as the President may appoint, subject to the provisions of law. The CEC acts as the Chairman of the Commission.
    3. Section 17: Section 17 of the Chief Election Commissioner and Other Election Commissioners (Appointment, Conditions of Service and Term of Office) Act, 2023 requires the business of the Commission to be transacted in accordance with that Act.
    4. Section 18: Section 18 requires all business of the Commission to be transacted unanimously as far as possible. A matter on which the CEC and the other Election Commissioners differ is decided by the opinion of the majority.
    5. Equal voting rights: All three members hold one vote each, and the CEC is the first among equals. Two of the three can therefore decide a matter that is not settled unanimously.

    What does the record of past differences show?

    1. The 1993 expansion: The Commission was permanently expanded from a single member body to a three member commission in 1993. Differences have emerged between the individuals holding the posts since then.
    2. T.N. Seshan vs Union of India (1995): The then Chief Election Commissioner had challenged the appointment of the two Election Commissioners in the Supreme Court. The Court upheld the appointment and ruled that the three members hold equal status and an equal say in decision making.
    3. The 2009 removal request: In January 2009 the then Chief Election Commissioner wrote to the President seeking the removal of an Election Commissioner, citing a lack of political neutrality. No such action followed, and that Commissioner was later appointed Chief Election Commissioner.
    4. The 2019 dissent: The majority view in 2019 gave the Prime Minister and the then president of the Bharatiya Janata Party a clean chit on complaints of Model Code of Conduct violations. A member of the Commission recorded a dissent against that view, and objected that his dissent notes were not being carried into the final orders passed by the Commission.
    5. The 2020 resignation: That member was in line to take over as Chief Election Commissioner on the basis of seniority. He opted to resign from the Commission in 2020.

    How is a dissent distinguished from an observation?

    1. Recording a dissent: An Election Commissioner who disagrees with the majority view can record a dissent note on the file.
    2. The observation on the draft revision order: Before the Commission issued the order starting the Special Intensive Revision (SIR) of electoral rolls on 24 June 2025, an Election Commissioner observed on the draft order that the exercise should not lead to harassment of voters and citizens. The recorded wording asked that genuine voters and citizens, particularly the old, the sick, persons with disabilities, the poor and other vulnerable groups, should not feel harassed and should be facilitated.
    3. Treated as an observation: That entry was treated as an observation rather than a dissent, and the revision order was eventually unanimous.
    4. Objections recorded since: The two Election Commissioners have recorded objections on files several times since. The subjects include the functioning of the poll body’s information technology infrastructure and the insertion of a new declaration in the voter enrolment form, Form 6.
    5. Routine differences: Differing opinions on matters before the Commission are a routine occurrence, on the conduct of elections and on administrative matters alike. The Commission meets once or twice a week to discuss pending matters.

    What has the Election Commission said?

    1. Observations as standard practice: Operational queries or inputs raised by members of the Commission at the draft stage are described as standard administrative practice aimed at safeguarding voter rights. The suggestions given by the Commissioners are described as being for further improving the electoral processes.
    2. Part of the decision making process: Differing views and observations are described as a normal part of deliberation in any institution, arriving before a final decision is taken.
    3. Every officer may suggest: Every officer of the Commission, and not only the three Commissioners, is authorised to give suggestions for improving the electoral system.
    4. Unanimity claimed: All decisions taken in recent months are described as the outcome of unanimous decisions. The Commission cited the recent elections in Bihar, Kerala, Tamil Nadu, Puducherry, Assam and West Bengal in support.

    Conclusion

    The statute makes unanimity a preference and a majority decision lawful, so a recorded difference inside the poll body is not by itself a breach of procedure. What the record cannot settle is whether an entry on a file is a suggestion or a refusal to agree, because the Commission alone decides how that entry is finally described. Past differences ended in a resignation, in an appointment and in a court ruling on equal status, never in a published account of who disagreed with what. A requirement that a dissent be carried into the final order is the change that would put that description beyond the Commission’s own choice.

    Back2Basics: Model Code of Conduct

    1. What it is: The Model Code of Conduct is a set of non statutory norms agreed upon by political parties. It exists to prevent the ruling party from misusing state machinery and to curb unethical campaign practices.
    2. Duration: It takes effect the moment the poll body announces the election schedule and remains in force until the results are declared.
    3. Penalties: The Code carries no statutory penal provision. The Commission can issue warnings, censure a candidate or delay a poll, and criminal violations such as bribery and hate speech are prosecuted under the Representation of the People Act, 1951 and the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023.
    4. Evolution: It began in 1960 as a short set of instructions for the Kerala Assembly elections. It was consolidated into its present form in 1991.

    Matching Previous Year Question

    “[2017] Consider the following statements: 1. The Election Commission of India is a ‘ five-member body. 2. Union Ministry of Home Affairs decides the election schedule for the conduct of both general elections and bye-elections. 3. Election Commission resolves the disputes relating to splits/mergers of recognized political parties. Which of the statements given above is/are correct ? (a) 1 and 2 only (b) 2 only (c) 2 and 3 only (d) 3 only Answer: (d)”

  • Declaration part of Form 6 changed since SIR in Bihar

    Why in the News

    The declaration attached to Form 6, the application for fresh registration as a voter, has changed substantially across the phases of the Special Intensive Revision (SIR) of electoral rolls. A first time applicant must now furnish details drawn from the last revision. The declaration itself was introduced during the first phase of the revision in Bihar. Two Election Commissioners flagged the change in separate notes and letters in May 2026 and in August 2026. The dispute is whether an addition of this kind could be made at all without the Union government amending the rule the form sits inside.

    What is Form 6?

    1. Purpose of the form: Form 6 is the application a person files for inclusion in the electoral roll as a new voter. The Election Commission of India (ECI) uses it for fresh voter registrations.
    2. Statutory status: Form 6 is attached to the Registration of Electors Rules, 1960. It therefore carries the legal force of that rule and not of an administrative form.

    What did the first phase declaration ask for?

    1. Birth period brackets: The declaration used in Bihar sought to confirm the exact period of a new voter’s birth. The three brackets were birth before 1987, birth between 1987 and 2004, and birth after 2004.
    2. Applicants born before 1 July 1987: Only the applicant’s own document was needed to prove date or place of birth.
    3. Applicants born between 1 July 1987 and 2 December 2004: The applicant needed their own document along with one parent’s document, of either the father or the mother.
    4. Applicants born after 2 December 2004: The applicant needed their own document along with documents for both parents establishing date or place of birth.
    5. Parent who is not an Indian citizen: A copy of that parent’s passport and visa, valid at the time of the applicant’s birth, also had to be submitted.

    How did the declaration change in the later phases?

    1. Names in the last revision: In the second phase, a new voter filling Form 6 had to declare whether their own name or their parents’ names appeared in the last SIR.
    2. Constituency, booth and serial numbers: The applicant also had to give the assembly constituency number, the polling booth number and the serial number at which those names appeared in the electoral rolls of the last SIR.
    3. The third option on ECINet: An applicant without that information could choose a third option when filling the form online on the ECINet portal.
    4. Mandatory in practice: The field was not formally marked mandatory. An applicant could not submit the online form without completing it.
    5. Continuation into the third phase: The addition continued into the third phase of the revision. That phase was announced in May this year.

    Who has the power to change Form 6?

    1. Limits on the poll body: The ECI cannot redesign the form on its own, because the form is part of a rule it did not make.
    2. The amending authority: Only the Union government can amend the rules, acting through the Ministry of Law and Justice. The rules are made under the Representation of the People Act, 1950.

    What is the Commission’s account of the change?

    1. Approval by the full Commission: The stated position of the ECI is that adding a separate declaration form with Form 6 and with Form 8, the form used for changing particulars, was approved by the full three member Commission when the revision began in Bihar. It was ratified again in the later phases.
    2. The form itself unamended: The Commission’s account is that Form 6 was never amended and that only a declaration was added alongside it.
    3. The change in the online module: The change in the online module was made so that a person filling the form does not have to sign electronically twice.
    4. Judicial approval cited: The Commission cites a Supreme Court order of 27 May upholding the power to add the declaration form.

    Conclusion

    The declaration now asks a first time applicant for information from a revision they may never have been part of. What remains unresolved is whether an addition that operates as a condition of registration can be made without the Union government amending the rule it sits inside. The objections recorded inside the poll body put that question to the institution itself and not only to the courts. The next phase of the revision is where the answer will show.

    Back2Basics: Special Intensive Revision

    1. What it is: A Special Intensive Revision is a time bound enumeration, with Booth Level Officers visiting households in person. The routine annual exercise, the Summary Revision, carries no such door to door verification of every entry.
    2. Legal basis: Section 21 of the Representation of the People Act, 1950 authorises the poll body to carry out a special revision of the electoral roll at any time, for reasons recorded in writing.
    3. Objectives: The exercise verifies the residence of every registered voter, removes deceased, duplicate and shifted entries, and registers citizens who have newly turned 18.
    4. History: Intensive revisions have been carried out about 14 times. Eg. The exercises of 1983, 1995, 2002 and 2004, and the current cycle.

    Matching Previous Year Question

    “[2026, GS2, 10 marks] Is the right to vote a fundamental right? Discuss the position of the Election Commission of India while undertaking the revision of electoral rolls. Can it also examine the question of citizenship of voters?”

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