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  • Behind Nepal’s compensation demand for devastating flood

    Why in the News

    Nepal has written to the United Nations fund for responding to loss and damage after a catastrophic flash flood killed more than 1,000 people. The country had already decided to shift its diplomatic position, seeking ‘compensation’ for natural disasters in place of aid. Its Foreign Minister framed the claim as a matter of legal and moral liability rather than charity, and named China, the United States and India as major industrial emitters carrying a historical responsibility to compensate vulnerable nations. The contest is over what a country with negligible emissions is owed and by whom. Aid is discretionary and can be refused; compensation asserts a liability that the international climate regime has never accepted.

    What is the loss and damage fund?

    1. What it does: The fund was set up in 2022 to help countries respond to the economic hits from extreme events, in addition to financing mitigation and adaptation.
    2. What has been promised: Around USD 822 million has been pledged to it.
    3. What is actually available: Around USD 350 million is allotted for disbursement.
    4. How it is financed: Contributions are voluntary. The United Arab Emirates has provided USD 100 million, and much of the remaining contribution has come from Europe.

    What happened in Nepal?

    1. The scale: More than 1,000 people are dead and thousands remain missing nearly ten days later, with whole villages, bridges and roads swept away.
    2. Two amplifiers: The impact was heightened by heavy infrastructure development by China in Tibet, which has affected the Himalayas, and by climate change.
    3. The range as a water store: The Himalayas are referred to as the third pole, given their huge reservoirs of ice and water.
    4. A long flagged risk: Melting of Himalayan glaciers has been observed for years, with climatologists warning of severe consequences.

    Who has actually caused the accumulated emissions?

    1. The United States leads: It is the leading contributor at 25 per cent of the CO2 accumulated in the atmosphere, which is the key cause of climate change.
    2. Europe and China follow: Europe is next at around 20 per cent, with China now fast catching up at 15 per cent of the global stock.
    3. India’s share of the stock is small: India’s contribution is under 4 per cent.
    4. India’s per capita emissions are half the average: India emits around 2 tonnes of CO2 per person a year, against a global average of 4.5 tonnes.

    Why has Nepal replaced aid with compensation?

    1. The stated ground: Nepal’s greenhouse gas emissions are negligible, and its position is that it is bearing the consequences of a problem it did not create.
    2. The causal claim: The rapid melting of glaciers and the resulting mountain floods are presented as direct consequences of global climate change.
    3. The legal framing: The Foreign Minister described the claim as a matter of legal and moral liability rather than charity.
    4. The practical driver: The size of the rehabilitation requirement makes access to international funding necessary, and seeking solidarity in place of aid suits a young and globally aware government.

    Why did the demand name India?

    1. The three named emitters: The Foreign Minister named China as the world’s top emitter, the United States as second and India as third.
    2. Current output, not accumulated stock: That ranking rests on current annual emissions, which places India very differently from where its share of the accumulated stock places it.
    3. A balancing act: The inclusion of India alongside the two largest emitters is read as Nepal’s practice of balancing its two neighbours.
    4. The walk back: Nepal’s Prime Minister thanked India and China for their assistance after the floods. The Foreign Minister later said the issue was not about shifting blame to one country or another but about working together.

    Does the shift from aid to compensation gain anything?

    1. The two words carry different obligations: Aid is offered at the giver’s discretion. Compensation asserts a claim the payer is obliged to meet.
    2. The fund is built on the first: Contributions to the loss and damage fund are voluntary, so a liability framing has no forum inside the fund that could compel a payment.
    3. The diplomatic cost is immediate: The claim was softened within days, once the neighbours it named turned out to be the ones supplying relief.
    4. The gain is agenda setting: A liability framing raises the political price of underfunding the mechanism. It does not create a right to be paid.

    Challenges to the loss and damage fund

    1. The regime expressly excludes liability: Loss and damage is recognised under Article 8 of the Paris Agreement, and the decision adopting the agreement records that Article 8 does not involve or provide a basis for any liability or compensation. Eg. Small island states pressed for a liability provision in 2015 and accepted its exclusion in order to secure the agreement.
      The Fix: Negotiate an agreed needs based replenishment cycle, so predictable funding substitutes for a legal claim that will not be conceded.
    2. The hosting arrangement is contested: The fund was operationalised at the 2023 Conference of the Parties in Dubai with the World Bank as interim host for four years, over developing country objections about the Bank’s governance and its fees. Eg. Developing country negotiators sought an independent secretariat outside the Bank’s board structure.
      The Fix: Fix a firm date for the review of the hosting arrangement and publish the fee and governance terms against which it will be judged.
    3. Access is slowest where need is highest: Climate funds require accreditation of a national entity and detailed project proposals, which the least developed countries take years to complete. Eg. National implementing entities in several least developed countries have waited years for Green Climate Fund accreditation.
      The Fix: Create a rapid disbursement window that releases a fixed sum on a declared national disaster, without a project proposal.

    Conclusion

    The claim Nepal made and then softened will outlast the flood that produced it. The climate regime has built a fund for loss and damage without the liability that would make any claim on it enforceable, and a country facing a rehabilitation bill it cannot carry will keep pressing at that gap. What is worth watching is not whether the demand is repeated but whether the next replenishment round ties contributions to assessed need rather than to donor discretion. Until it does, a small mountain state’s only real leverage is the moral argument it was persuaded to withdraw.

    Matching Previous Year Question

    “[2022, GS2, 15.0 marks] Clean energy is the order of the day. Describe briefly India’s changing policy towards climate change in various international fora in the context of geopolitics.”

  • India, China Corps Commander talks went on for two days: MEA

    Why in the News

    India and China held Corps Commander-level military talks in the eastern sector on 6 and 7 September, the Ministry of External Affairs has said. The talks were the first Senior Highest Military Commander-Level Flag Meeting, and were held on two consecutive days at Wacha on the Indian side in Arunachal Pradesh and at Damai on the Chinese side. They took place amid ongoing tensions in the Taksing area of the Upper Subansiri district of Arunachal Pradesh. The meeting was held pursuant to understandings reached between the Special Representatives of the two countries, and comes days before the Chinese President’s likely visit to India. The question it raises is whether a channel built to manage friction points can do anything about the undefined boundary that keeps producing them.

    What is the Corps Commander-level mechanism?

    1. Talks between field commanders: It is a military-to-military channel in which the corps commander responsible for a sector meets his counterpart, with other officers present, to resolve issues on the ground.
    2. It began in the west: The mechanism has existed in eastern Ladakh since 2020 to resolve the military standoff between India and China along the Line of Actual Control (LAC), the notional line separating the two sides’ areas of control.
    3. Its record there: India and China have held 23 rounds of Corps Commander-level meetings at the Chushul-Moldo border meeting point in eastern Ladakh.
    4. Both sectors now carry it: The Ministry of External Affairs has confirmed that a similar mechanism also exists in the Western Sector.

    Who met, and where?

    1. A two day, two country format: The flag meeting was held at Wacha on the Indian side on Sunday, 6 September, and at Damai on the Chinese side on Monday, 7 September.
    2. A corps commander led the Indian side: The commander of the Army’s III Corps, also called the Spear Corps, met his Chinese counterpart along with other officers.
    3. The formation involved: III Corps is headquartered at Rangapahar near Dimapur in Nagaland.
    4. The announcement: The Ministry of External Affairs confirmed the talks at a press conference on Tuesday, 8 September.

    What produced the meeting?

    1. A political track above it: The talks took place pursuant to understandings reached between the Special Representatives of India and China in August 2025 and August 2026.
    2. Who the Special Representatives are: India is represented by the National Security Adviser and China by its Foreign Minister, and the two met in Beijing on 25 August.
    3. An officials track below it: The talks also followed discussions at the Working Mechanism for Consultation and Coordination (WMCC), the standing forum of diplomatic and military officials on border affairs, which met in Beijing in May 2026 and in New Delhi in August 2026.

    Why does the timing matter?

    1. The friction has moved east: The mechanism that produced 23 rounds was built for eastern Ladakh. The tension now being managed is in Arunachal Pradesh.
    2. A summit is days away: The talks come ahead of the Chinese President’s likely visit to India for the BRICS Summit on 12 and 13 September.
    3. The diplomatic track has been busy: Two rounds of Special Representative understandings and two meetings of the officials’ forum preceded this flag meeting in the year before it.

    Challenges to the border talks mechanism

    1. The channel manages friction, not the boundary: Commander level talks settle patrolling, deployment and local incidents, and they do not address where the line itself runs. Eg. The rounds held in eastern Ladakh produced disengagement at specific points without altering any claim on the alignment.
      The Fix: Return the Special Representatives’ track to sector by sector clarification of the alignment, with an agreed exchange of maps as the first deliverable.
    2. Disengagement is not de-escalation: Troops pulled back from a friction point remain deployed in depth, with the roads, habitat and airfields built during the standoff still in place. Eg. Buffer zones created after 2020 removed contact but also removed patrolling access for both sides.
      The Fix: Pair every disengagement step with a verified and reciprocal reduction in rear area deployments, checked by agreed technical means.
    3. Routine contact in the east runs at a lower level: Day to day communication between the two armies operates through Border Personnel Meeting points staffed well below corps level, which slows the handling of a serious incident. Eg. In the eastern sector these points are at Bum La and Kibithu in Arunachal Pradesh.
      The Fix: Convert the new commander level flag meeting into a scheduled annual mechanism rather than an incident driven one, with a dedicated hotline between the two corps headquarters.

    Conclusion

    The commander level channel now exists in the eastern sector and has met once. What it can settle is patrolling, deployment and local incidents. What it cannot settle is where the line runs, which stays with the political track above it. The next marker is the Chinese President’s visit to Delhi later this month, and whether the two leaders convert a new military channel into a dated timetable for clarifying the alignment in the east.

    Matching Previous Year Question

    “[2024, GS3, 15.0 marks] India has a long and troubled border with China and Pakistan fraught with contentious issues. Examine the conflicting issues and security challenges along the border. Also give out the development being undertaken in these areas under the Border Area Development Programme (BADP) and Border Infrastructure and Management (BIM) Scheme.”

  • Perilous retreat: Gram sabhas must have a veto on issues relating to tribal land

    Why in the News

    The Committee on Public Undertakings has suggested that a project require the consent of only most, rather than all, of the gram sabhas affected by it. The Scheduled Tribes and Other Traditional Forest Dwellers (Recognition of Forest Rights) Act, 2006 is framed in spirit to require the consent of every affected village assembly before forest land is diverted. The Tribal Affairs Ministry has declined to claim jurisdiction over the question, leaving the reading of that requirement to the Centre and the State governments. The contest is between a consent rule that protects the specific village losing its land and a counting rule under which the villages losing least can decide for the village losing most.

    What is the Forest Rights Act, 2006?

    1. What it recognises: The Act recognises individual and community rights over forest land for Scheduled Tribes and other traditional forest dwellers who have depended on that land.
    2. Why it was passed: It was enacted to undo the “historical injustices” meted out to forest-dependent communities whose occupation of forest land had never been recorded.
    3. Where the authority sits: The gram sabha is the body that initiates the determination of the nature and extent of individual and community forest rights.
    4. What it does to land diversion: The consent of the affected gram sabhas is the barrier a project must clear before forest land is diverted for non-forest use.

    What would a majority consent threshold change?

    1. Assemblies become stakeholders: A regime deeming the acquiescence of 70 to 75 per cent of affected gram sabhas to suffice would reduce them from democratic bodies protecting the constitutional rights of their specific inhabitants to corporate stakeholders.
    2. The village that loses most can be outvoted: A project developer may bypass the consent of a village located directly within a proposed reservoir, once less affected villages provide their no-objection certificates.
    3. The change is jurisprudential, not procedural: A right held by a particular community because of its dependence on a particular forest cannot be surrendered by the agreement of other communities, so the threshold alters what the consent requirement is for.
    4. Classification disputes feed the same result: The political fight over classifying tribal communities alters who qualifies as a community member, which makes it easier to split a village assembly and engineer consent.

    What does the Tribal Affairs Ministry’s recusal produce?

    1. A regulatory vacuum: The refusal of the Tribal Affairs Ministry to claim jurisdiction leaves the Centre and the State governments unchecked in rewriting the rules by which forested land is diverted for non-forest use.
    2. The recusal rests on a technicality: The Ministry has located the question between the Forest Rights Act and the Environment Ministry’s rules in order to recuse itself.
    3. The consequence is substantive: That bureaucratic manoeuvre could strip forest-dependent communities of their most potent legal instrument.

    What is the legal position on consent as it stands?

    1. No express clause for every gram sabha: The Forest Rights Act does not include a clause requiring a no-objection certificate from every affected gram sabha.
    2. That does not make consent optional: The claim that no legal requirement presently exists, and that gram sabha decisions can be bypassed, is untrue.
    3. The route to any change is legislative: A government that wishes to move to a majority rule must change the relevant rules or legislation openly and democratically, rather than through an administrative reading of the existing text.

    Why do energy targets and forest rights collide?

    1. Infrastructure is being scaled rapidly: The government has been scaling up energy infrastructure, including the long-stalled Teesta-IV project, to meet macroeconomic goals.
    2. The same state wrote the protection: The Forest Rights Act was passed by that state to undo historical injustices, so the consent requirement is a commitment it made against its own future convenience.
    3. The chosen path avoids the argument: Proceeding on the notion that the consent requirement was never part of the Act settles the conflict by denying that it exists, rather than by weighing the claims on either side.

    What does land carry for forest-dependent communities?

    1. It is the base of everything else: Land is the foundation of these communities’ livelihoods, culture, identity and political autonomy.
    2. The struggle has been over dispossession: Communities have fought to resist displacement and dispossession and to secure customary collective ownership.
    3. They also supply public goods: Scheduled Tribe communities render social and environmental services and contribute to national development, including by helping meet India’s climate commitments.
    4. The recommendation follows from that: The Centre and the States should strengthen the powers conferred on gram sabhas in Scheduled Areas by the Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013 and the Panchayats (Extension to the Scheduled Areas) Act, 1996.

    Challenges to gram sabha consent under the Forest Rights Act

    1. Community forest rights lag individual titles: Most titles distributed under the Act are individual. Community forest resource rights, which are what a gram sabha exercises against a diversion, are recognised in a small share of eligible villages. Eg. Recognised community forest resource titles are concentrated in Maharashtra, Odisha and Chhattisgarh, with minimal recognition in several other States.
      The Fix: Complete community forest resource mapping and vesting in a village before any diversion proposal over its forest is processed.
    2. The consent requirement rests on executive instruction: It operates through Ministry circulars in the forest clearance process rather than through an express section of the Act, so it can be narrowed without going to Parliament. Eg. A 2009 circular of the Ministry of Environment and Forests made a gram sabha consent certificate part of the forest clearance record.
      The Fix: Write the consent requirement into the Act itself, so that any dilution requires an amendment debated in Parliament.
    3. Statutory exemptions have been widening: The Forest (Conservation) Amendment Act, 2023 removes categories of land from the forest clearance process, and the consent step travels with that process. Eg. Land within 100 km of an international border proposed for a strategic linear project falls outside the clearance requirement.
      The Fix: Retain the gram sabha consent step for every exempted category where forest rights have been recognised, independent of the clearance exemption.
    4. A refusal has no protected life: Nothing bars a fresh proposal over the same forest after a gram sabha has rejected one, so refusal delays a project rather than settling the question. Eg. In Orissa Mining Corporation v. Ministry of Environment and Forests (2013) the Supreme Court referred the bauxite mining question in the Niyamgiri hills to 12 gram sabhas, and all of them rejected it.
      The Fix: Bar a fresh diversion proposal over the same land for a fixed period following a gram sabha rejection, as land acquisition law already does.

    Conclusion

    The consent requirement is the one instrument that makes a village’s refusal legally consequential, and the change under discussion replaces refusal with arithmetic. Two positions cannot both hold: that the right belongs to a particular community because it depends on a particular forest, and that other communities may supply the consent on its behalf. The Environment Ministry can settle which of the two governs, and the honest route to that is an open amendment rather than a fresh reading of existing rules. Until it does, the strength of a village assembly’s veto depends on which ministry is willing to claim jurisdiction over it.

    Back2Basics: Panchayats (Extension to the Scheduled Areas) Act, 1996

    1. What it does: It extends Part IX of the Constitution, on panchayats, to the Fifth Schedule areas with modifications.
    2. The gram sabha’s status: It makes the gram sabha, rather than the elected panchayat, the primary body competent to safeguard traditions, customs, cultural identity and community resources.
    3. Consultation before acquisition: It requires consultation with the gram sabha before land is acquired in Scheduled Areas and before displaced persons are resettled.
    4. Control over resources: It vests ownership of minor forest produce in the gram sabha and gives it a role in preventing land alienation and in granting minor mineral concessions.

    Matching Previous Year Question

    “[2013] Under the Scheduled Tribes and Other Traditional Forest Dwellers (Recognition of Forest Rights) Act, 2006, who shall be the authority to initiate the process for determining the nature and extent of individual or community forest rights or both? (a) State Forest Department (b) Distrit Collector/Deputy Commissioner (c) Tahsildar/Block Develoment Officer/Mandal Revenue Officer (d) Gram Sabha ANSWER: (d)”

  • Concerns over the Census questions

    Why in the News

    The Central government has notified the questions to be asked of every individual during the population enumeration phase of the 2027 Census. In a departure from past Censuses, the schedule seeks personal details that cannot be used to generate any useful statistics: the names of the parents of every individual, nationality as declared, the permanent residential address, the place of COVID-19 vaccination, the number of bank accounts held, and mobile, Aadhaar, voter identity and passport numbers. The same details are the ones required to prepare or update a population register. The contest is over whether a questionnaire built partly out of identifiers still serves the statistical purpose the Census exists for.

    What is a population census?

    1. The United Nations definition: A census is the total process of planning, collecting, processing, analysing, disseminating and evaluating demographic, economic and social data at the smallest geographic level, at a specified time, covering all persons in a country or in a well delimited part of it.
    2. Its output is statistics, not records: The exercise generates statistics for the use of the government in particular and society in general, so the information an individual gives is used only to compile the relevant statistics.
    3. Confidentiality is a founding principle: Principle 6 of the United Nations Fundamental Principles of Official Statistics requires individual data collected by statistical agencies to be strictly confidential and used exclusively for statistical purposes. India has adopted these principles.

    What is new in the 2027 questionnaire?

    1. Household relationships: Respondents must give the details of the parents of every individual, and of the spouses of the married persons in the household.
    2. Status and residence: Nationality as declared and the permanent residential address are to be recorded.
    3. A pandemic era question: The place of COVID-19 vaccination is to be recorded.
    4. Financial detail: The total number of bank accounts held by each person is to be recorded.
    5. Identifiers: Mobile number, Aadhaar number and voter identity card number are to be recorded if available, along with the passport number of Indian passport holders and whether the person holds a driving licence.
    6. The length of the schedule: The questionnaire runs to 40 questions, many of them requiring descriptive answers.

    Why have names never entered Census databases?

    1. A name identifies, it does not measure: An individual’s name has no relevance to the exercise beyond identifying the person during enumeration. Names have been placeholders and have not been present in Census databases.
    2. India has never computerised them: There have been no attempts in the Indian Censuses to computerise names at all.
    3. Other countries record names for a declared later use: Some countries include the name and open past Census data for genealogical study. Eg. Past data from the United States Census can be accessed 72 years after the exercise, and India has no comparable rule or policy.

    Which households cannot answer these questions?

    1. Institutional households: Wardens of hostels, old age homes and jails must supply the names of every resident along with the names of their parents.
    2. Students are counted where they are not present: Large numbers of children study away from home in hostels and as paying guests. February falls towards the end of the academic year, so they may not be at home and would not be eligible for enumeration at their normal households.
    3. Ordinary households have gaps too: A respondent may not know the details of grandparents living with them.
    4. Visitors and staff are also covered: Visitors and domestic servants living in a household for the entire duration of the enumeration period are to be enumerated there, and the respondent may be unable to obtain their details.

    What can the identifier questions actually produce?

    1. ‘If available’ is undefined: It is unclear whether availability refers to the household member concerned or to the respondent. Read as the respondent, the numbers will not reach the Census, since respondents are frequently housewives or elderly parents who do not hold these details for every member.
    2. The numbers do not tabulate: These are not data items usable for any tabulation, beyond determining whether such a number exists.
    3. The field cost is prohibitive: More than 30 lakh enumerators would have to sit with households to record these numbers correctly, and they may lack the time and patience to obtain the relevant records.
    4. The respondent carries no duty of care: The respondent is not a Census functionary, so an individual whose identifiers are disclosed by a household respondent has no protection against their misuse.

    What would the bank account question have to be to work?

    1. The tabulation it supports is narrow: The total number of bank accounts held by each person yields a distribution of persons by number of accounts, and little else.
    2. The same distribution exists elsewhere: For account holders, the number can be obtained by tabulating accounts against each Permanent Account Number (PAN), which is required to open a bank account.
    3. A simpler question meets the policy need: If the object is only to identify persons without any bank account, asking whether the person holds one is enough.
    4. The field reality: A schoolteacher appointed as an enumerator will struggle to get a correct count of accounts from upper class respondents, who may not answer even the simpler questions.

    Why was the nationality question dropped after 1961?

    1. Declaration does not establish status: Nationality as declared may serve no useful purpose, since a person residing illegally may declare Indian nationality.
    2. India tried it and abandoned it: The question was asked in the 1951 and 1961 Censuses and was discarded from 1971 onwards.
    3. A comparable decision abroad: The United States decided, after considerable debate, not to include the citizenship question in its 2020 Census.

    Is the Census being used to build the National Population Register?

    1. The proposal has a history: Proposals to update the National Population Register (NPR) during the 2021 Census exercise drew objections from several States.
    2. States control the field staff: The Census is conducted by enumerators appointed by the State government under Section 4(2) of the Census Act, 1948, so a State may refuse the use of its staff for work that is not part of the Census. The Citizenship Act says nothing about a State government’s role in preparing the NPR.
    3. The new questions fit the register, not the statistics: Details of parents, permanent address and nationality are useful for preparing or updating the NPR, which is to form the basis for preparing the National Register of Citizens. They add no statistics of their own.
    4. Extraction would breach confidentiality: Collecting the information through the Census questionnaire and later extracting it for another organisation within the government may violate the principle of confidentiality.
    5. The objection is to the route, not the register: Preparing a population register or a citizen register is unobjectionable and its uses are well recognised. The collection for it should run through a transparent process with a legal basis, without jeopardising the Census.

    What does the length of the schedule do to data quality?

    1. Respondent fatigue: The time a long descriptive schedule takes per household invites disinterest, and the respondent answers similar questions again for every individual in the household.
    2. Casual replies follow: A disinterested respondent supplies answers that are recorded as data, so fatigue enters the dataset rather than showing up as non-response.
    3. Enumerator workload: Recording names and addresses has significantly increased the enumerator’s workload.
    4. The output degrades: Loading the Census with questions that generate no statistics may seriously affect the quality of Census data.

    Challenges to the 2027 Census

    1. The decadal series carries a gap: The last completed Census was in 2011, so sampling frames, welfare targeting and constituency data have run for over a decade on an ageing base. Eg. Household surveys draw their samples from Census frames, which have not been refreshed since 2011.
      The Fix: Fix a statutory calendar for enumeration and for data release, so the exercise cannot be deferred by administrative decision.
    2. The general data protection regime does not cover this risk: Census records rely on the secrecy provisions of the Census Act. The general law carries wide exemptions for government processing. Eg. The Digital Personal Data Protection Act, 2023 permits the Union government to exempt instrumentalities of the State from its obligations.
      The Fix: Notify an express purpose limitation for Census records that bars their transfer into any non statistical database.
    3. Digital self enumeration excludes the least connected: The 2027 Census offers self enumeration through a digital application, which the households most likely to be missed are least able to use. Eg. Internet access and smartphone ownership remain lowest among the poorest rural households.
      The Fix: Keep full enumerator coverage as the default and treat self enumeration as an additional channel rather than a substitute.
    4. Caste enumeration adds a classification burden: The 2027 Census will record caste, and caste names vary across regions, languages and spellings, which makes field coding unreliable. Eg. The 1931 Census, the last to enumerate caste comprehensively, recorded several thousand caste and sub caste entries.
      The Fix: Publish a pre coded State wise caste list with a residual open field, so enumerators record rather than classify.

    Conclusion

    The questionnaire stands notified, and enumeration will run on it unless the government revises the schedule before the field work begins. The unresolved point is not whether the state may build a population register, which nobody disputes. It is whether the Census, whose cooperation from a household rests on the assurance that answers become numbers and nothing else, is the right instrument to build one with. Every question that cannot be tabulated tests that assurance, and a household that begins to doubt it answers the rest of the schedule differently.

    Back2Basics: National Population Register

    1. What it is: A register of the usual residents of the country, prepared at the local, sub district, district, State and national level.
    2. Legal basis: It is prepared under the Citizenship Act, 1955 and the Citizenship (Registration of Citizens and Issue of National Identity Cards) Rules, 2003.
    3. Who is a usual resident: A person who has resided in a local area for six months or more, or who intends to reside there for the next six months or more, irrespective of citizenship.
    4. Its status now: The register was first prepared in 2010 alongside the house listing phase of Census 2011 and was updated in 2015.

    Matching Previous Year Question

    “No direct PYQ traced in the provided files”

  • Inside India’s problem with reporting child sexual abuse material

    Why in the News

    The National Human Rights Commission (NHRC) has issued notices to two Union ministries and the Delhi Police over paid Instagram advertisements. The advertisements allegedly used search terms such as “rape video” and “child video” to direct users to Telegram channels offering child sexual abuse material (CSAM). The Commission has directed that an Action Taken Report reach it within two weeks. The advertisements had passed the review systems of Meta, which owns Instagram, and remained available until the company’s attention was drawn to them. Two questions follow from that failure: whether the statutory duty to report the offence was complied with, and whether a platform whose artificial intelligence systems actively shape content can still claim the legal protections available to intermediaries.

    What is a CyberTipline report?

    1. An alert raised by the platform: A CyberTipline report is generated when a technology platform detects suspected child sexual abuse material and refers it for law enforcement follow up.
    2. It locates the material, not its source: A report often identifies where the material was found, not where it originated, and establishing origin requires a separate investigation.
    3. How it reaches an Indian investigator: Reports are processed by the National Crime Records Bureau (NCRB) and the Indian Cybercrime Coordination Centre (I4C), and are then routed and assigned to the relevant State and district authorities.

    What has the Commission asked of the platform?

    1. Whether the offences were reported at all: Meta has been asked whether the alleged offences were reported, and, if they were not, to identify those responsible for ensuring compliance.
    2. The duty lies on any person: Section 19 of the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences (POCSO) Act, 2012 requires any person who apprehends that an offence under the Act is likely to be committed, or who knows one has been committed, to report it to the Special Juvenile Police Unit or the local police.
    3. Internal processes do not discharge it: The Commission’s stated position is that the obligation cannot be substituted by internal correspondence, grievance redressal or regulatory engagement.

    Is a platform that shapes content still an intermediary?

    1. The systems do more than host: A supplementary representation before the Commission argued that Meta’s artificial intelligence assisted tools generate captions, recommend posting schedules, optimise engagement and assist monetisation.
    2. The classification question has been referred: The Ministry of Information and Broadcasting has been asked to examine whether such functions remain consistent with intermediary status, or whether they resemble the role of a publisher of online curated content under the Information Technology Rules, 2021.
    3. The stake in the answer: Intermediary status carries protection from liability for content that others post. A publisher of curated content carries responsibility for what it puts out.

    How many reports arrive, and how many become cases?

    1. The volume: India received around 1.9 million CyberTipline reports in 2025.
    2. The conversion is small: Only a fraction of those reports translate into police action.
    3. Verification precedes registration: Authorities conduct a preliminary verification before a first information report is registered, and not every report progresses beyond that stage.

    Where does a report stall before an FIR?

    1. Report quality varies: The reports vary significantly in quality and completeness, so many cannot carry a preliminary verification at all.
    2. A prima facie test on the material: Investigators assess whether the flagged material prima facie depicts child sexual abuse material. Once jurisdiction is identified and the material verified, the case is forwarded to the local police station or cyber police unit.
    3. Age is the recurring obstacle: Verifying the age of the victim is among the more recurring difficulties, since poor image quality, blurred visuals or uncertainty about age obstruct that finding.
    4. Attribution comes last: Only once a first information report is registered do investigators begin identifying the individual behind the account.

    What decides the outcome in court?

    1. A designated forum: Cases are generally tried before the special courts designated under the POCSO Act.
    2. Convictions turn on digital evidence: Defence arguments frequently focus on whether the accused was actually the person using the device, the SIM card or the internet connection linked to the offence.
    3. An unidentified offender ends the case: Where investigators cannot identify the person responsible, police may file a closure report.

    Challenges to CSAM detection and prosecution in India

    1. Encryption removes the point of detection: Offenders increasingly use encrypted platforms, where the service provider cannot scan content and therefore generates no report at all. Eg. End to end encrypted messaging leaves no server side copy for a platform to match against a database of known material.
      The Fix: Require significant platforms to report metadata level signals, such as advertising keywords and channel invitation links, where the content itself is not visible to them.
    2. Synthetic material defeats hash matching: Detection relies on matching a file against databases of known material, and newly generated images produce no match. Eg. Images of children produced by generative models carry no prior hash record.
      The Fix: Extend detection to classifier based models and recognise synthetic child sexual abuse material explicitly as an offence in the governing statute.
    3. The reporting duty has no platform specific machinery: Section 19 places the duty on any person, and prescribes no route by which a foreign incorporated platform files with an Indian police unit. Eg. Reports currently arrive through the CyberTipline chain rather than as a statutory filing by the company.
      The Fix: Prescribe a designated reporting channel and a fixed filing deadline for significant social media intermediaries under the Information Technology Rules.
    4. Judicial expansion has outpaced investigative capacity: The offence has been widened by the courts, and district cyber units have not grown to match it. Eg. In Just Rights for Children Alliance v. S. Harish (2024) the Supreme Court held that storing and viewing child sexual abuse material is itself an offence under Section 15 of the POCSO Act.
      The Fix: Fund district cyber forensic units and a national facility for medical and forensic age estimation, so verification is not left to the investigating officer’s judgement.

    Conclusion

    Detection is not the constraint in this system. The constraint sits between an automated alert and a chargeable case, where verification, jurisdiction and identification each remove a share of what was reported, and a closure report is the default outcome when identification fails. A platform whose systems recommend, caption and monetise what appears on it is not simply carrying what other people post, and the protection designed for a passive carrier does not obviously fit it. How the Ministry of Information and Broadcasting answers that classification question is the thing to watch.

    Back2Basics: National Human Rights Commission

    1. A statutory body: The NHRC was constituted under the Protection of Human Rights Act, 1993, and is not a constitutional body.
    2. Composition: It has a Chairperson and members, with the chairpersons of specified national commissions, including the National Commission for Protection of Child Rights, as ex officio members.
    3. Powers: It inquires suo motu or on a petition into a violation of human rights or negligence in preventing one, and holds the powers of a civil court for that inquiry.
    4. Limits: Its findings are recommendatory, and it can require the concerned government to report the action taken on them.

    Matching Previous Year Question

    “[2017] In India, it is legally mandatory for which of the following to report on cyber security incidents? 1. Service providers 2. Data Centres 3. Body corporate Select the correct answer using the code given below: (a) 1 only (b) 1 and 2 only (c) 3 only (d) 1, 2 and 3 ANSWER: (d)”

  • Safety in Delhi needs a regulatory reset

    Why in the News

    A building collapse in Satya Niketan has reopened the question of who is answerable for building safety in Delhi. Comparable failures have occurred at Saidulajab, Hauz Rani, Tughlakabad Extension, Palam and Vivek Vihar. Delhi already runs an online single window system for building proposals, built on Automated Development Control Regulations (Auto DCR) software, and that system reached none of these structures. The contest is between a regulator that examines the plans submitted to it and a city where the dangerous construction is precisely the construction that submits no plan.

    How does Delhi’s single window building approval system work?

    1. Online filing and document verification: Building proposals are submitted online. The Auto DCR software and the Building Plan Approval Management System verify the mandatory documents.
    2. Fee and site visit: The system issues a scrutiny fee challan for online payment. It then sends an SMS to the building inspector and the architect carrying the details of the site visit.
    3. Automated reading of the drawing: Auto DCR creates entities such as plots, building layouts and roads from the submitted drawings, using layers, geometrical mapping and reports.
    4. Rule checking and status: AutoCAD and allied software analyse the plans against the development control regulations and the building bye-laws, and the compliance status is available online before the plans are examined for approval.

    Which laws does illegal construction breach?

    1. Planning and municipal law: Illegal construction violates the Master Plan for Delhi, the Unified Building Byelaws, the Delhi Development Act and the Delhi Municipal Corporation Act, 1957.
    2. Fire law: It also violates the Delhi Fire Service Act, 2007, which is the source of the fire safety clearance a building is required to hold.
    3. The city absorbs the cost: Unapproved construction adds load to transport, services and civic amenities that were planned for a lower density.
    4. The failures are recurrent: Frequent fire incidents and structural failures in illegal constructions have endangered lives.

    Why is Delhi’s exposure larger than the collapses suggest?

    1. Seismic exposure: Delhi falls in Seismic Zone IV, where earthquakes may be severe, so unengineered construction carries a citywide risk rather than a single owner’s risk.
    2. Two cities with one problem: Planned development coexists with informal growth in slums and unauthorised colonies. Both are plagued by building violations along with a lack of oversight and enforcement.
    3. Safety is not conditional on tenure: The city cannot afford unsafe buildings irrespective of the type of development, the land ownership or the land use.

    Why has repeated official attention changed so little?

    1. The findings already exist: Courts, the commissions headed by G T Nanavati and by Baleshwar Prasad, and the high level committee headed by Tejendra Khanna have all underlined building safety, with very little impact.
    2. Monitoring is the weak link: Haphazard development and weak monitoring systems produce inefficiencies, delays and a loss of accountability.
    3. Non-compliance carries no standing consequence: Every building without a structural and fire safety certificate should be sealed and should display a safety related warning, and no such automatic consequence operates today.

    Why does approving plans not produce safe buildings?

    1. The department sees only what is filed: Building departments mainly deal with the plans they receive, so massive illegal and risky constructions are left out of the process altogether.
    2. The digital reform did not widen the net: The single window system improved the handling of submitted proposals. It brought no unauthorised construction into any approval or inspection stream, which is why the reform has not been successful.
    3. The software trails the city it regulates: The system needs updating to handle redevelopment, green buildings, transit oriented development and approvals under mixed land use.

    What would demunicipalising building regulation mean?

    1. Separating the regulator from the political apparatus: The proposal is to make the regulatory function for buildings independent of the municipal and political structure that currently houses it.
    2. One structure performs two conflicting roles: The same municipal apparatus both sanctions construction and polices it, so enforcement competes with local political interest.
    3. Bringing in the settlements now left out: Radical reform is required so that structures in informal settlements, urban villages and resettlement colonies receive regulatory attention.

    What can technology detect that inspection does not?

    1. Remote detection of new construction: Geospatial artificial intelligence, using high resolution satellite imagery and LiDAR (laser based remote sensing that measures distances to build a three dimensional model of a surface), can monitor and detect unauthorised construction.
    2. Continuous tracking in place of periodic visits: Spatial data driven Real-Time Morphological Tracking can change how building and layout plans are approved, and improve compliance with the building bye-laws, the Fire Services Act and land use stipulations.
    3. Less discretion, less rent: Automated detection reduces the human interface in approval and enforcement, and reduces the corruption that discretion creates.

    Challenges to an independent building regulator for Delhi

    1. Authority over building control is already split: Sanction and enforcement are divided among the Municipal Corporation of Delhi, the New Delhi Municipal Council, the Delhi Development Authority and the Delhi Cantonment Board, so a new regulator adds a layer unless it absorbs theirs. Eg. The Delhi Development Authority prepares the Master Plan, and the municipal bodies sanction individual building plans under it.
      The Fix: Vest building safety certification in one statutory authority for the whole National Capital Territory, with the municipal bodies acting as its field arms.
    2. Unauthorised construction carries statutory protection: Punitive action against unauthorised colonies has repeatedly been suspended by law, so a regulator inherits a built stock it cannot act against. Eg. Successive National Capital Territory of Delhi Laws (Special Provisions) Acts have protected specified categories of unauthorised construction from demolition and sealing.
      The Fix: Convert that protection into a time bound retrofitting and certification requirement, so regularisation buys structural safety rather than immunity alone.
    3. Detection is not structural assessment: Satellite imagery and LiDAR identify a new or altered footprint, and they cannot read load bearing capacity, foundation integrity or the quality of materials. Eg. A failure triggered by excavation under an existing building leaves no external signature beforehand.
      The Fix: Pair remote detection with a mandatory structural audit by empanelled engineers for every building above a defined height or age.
    4. Certification capacity does not exist at that scale: Sealing every building without a structural and fire safety certificate presumes a supply of qualified structural engineers and fire auditors the city does not have. Eg. Fire safety clearance is required only above a prescribed building height, and even that stock is audited irregularly.
      The Fix: Licence and empanel private structural auditors under statutory personal liability, with random state verification of the certificates they issue.

    Conclusion

    Building regulation in Delhi is organised around a transaction, the filing of a plan, and the buildings that kill people are the ones that never generate that transaction. Better software and further audit requirements leave that structure untouched. The reform with any prospect of changing outcomes starts from the built stock rather than from the file, detects change on the ground, and carries the authority to act on what it finds without asking an elected municipal body first. Whether the proposal for a regulator of that kind moves past commentary is the thing to watch.

    Urban Governance in India

    1. Cities carry the economy: Cities house about 37 per cent of the population and generate close to 70 per cent of India’s Gross Domestic Product (GDP).
    2. The urban share keeps rising: Urban India is projected to reach about 60 crore people, or 40 per cent of the population, by 2036.
    3. Authority is fragmented by design: Municipal functions are split across urban local bodies, development authorities and parastatal agencies, so no single body answers for a city.
    4. Cities raise almost nothing of their own: Urban local bodies raise under 0.6 per cent of GDP as own revenue, of which property tax accounts for about 0.15 per cent.

    Constitutional Framework Governing Urban Governance

    1. Part IXA, Articles 243P to 243ZG: Inserted by the Constitution (Seventy-fourth Amendment) Act, 1992, it gives municipalities constitutional status and fixes their composition, duration and elections.
    2. Twelfth Schedule: Lists 18 functions a State may devolve to municipalities, including urban planning, regulation of land use and construction of buildings, and fire services.
    3. Article 243W: Empowers State legislatures to confer powers and responsibilities on municipalities as institutions of self government and for the Twelfth Schedule functions.
    4. Article 243Y: Requires the State Finance Commission to review municipal finances and recommend the sharing of State taxes with municipalities.

    Laws and Rules Governing Urban Development

    1. National Building Code of India, 2016: A model code issued by the Bureau of Indian Standards setting requirements for structural safety, fire and life safety and building services. States give it force through their own bye-laws.
    2. Model Building Bye-Laws, 2016: A template issued by the Ministry of Housing and Urban Affairs for State and municipal bye-laws, covering sanction procedure, setbacks, parking and fire safety.
    3. Real Estate (Regulation and Development) Act, 2016: Requires registration of projects and agents with a State regulatory authority, and fixes promoter liability for structural defects for five years from possession.
    4. Disaster Management Act, 2005: Provides the statutory basis for disaster management plans and for safety and retrofitting norms in hazard prone areas.

    Challenges in Urban Governance

    1. Devolution under the Seventy-fourth Amendment is incomplete: Many States have not transferred the listed functions or empowered mayors, so the body closest to a building is not the body that controls it. Eg. Urban planning and land use regulation sit with State owned development authorities in most large cities.
      The Fix: Complete activity mapping for the Twelfth Schedule functions and provide for directly elected mayors with a fixed tenure.
    2. Municipal finances cannot fund enforcement: Weak own revenue leaves cities without the technical staff to inspect, audit or prosecute. Eg. Successive Finance Commissions have tied municipal grants to property tax reform and audited municipal accounts.
      The Fix: Shift property tax to capital value with periodic revision, and make audited accounts a condition for central mission funds.
    3. Most urban land is not planned at all: Only about 30 per cent of urban land is properly planned, so the majority of growth happens outside any development control regime. Eg. Census towns cross the urban thresholds without having any urban local body.
      The Fix: Extend statutory planning coverage to census towns and peri urban areas before they are built out.
    4. Urban disaster risk is outrunning municipal capacity: Flooding, fire and heat concentrate on the least regulated built stock and on the poorest occupants. Eg. The Disaster Management (Amendment) Act, 2025 provides for Urban Disaster Management Authorities in large cities.
      The Fix: Make the city disaster authority the owner of building safety audits, with the power to seal non compliant structures.

    Matching Previous Year Question

    “[2023, GS2, 10.0 marks] “The states in India seem reluctant to empower urban local bodies both functionally as well as financially.” Comment.”

  • Reclaiming universities through trust, student voice

    Why in the News

    The Supreme Court has stayed the Bar Council of India (BCI)’s order against the graduating batch of the National Academy of Legal Studies and Research (NALSAR), Hyderabad. The same intervention quashed all first information reports (FIRs) against the protesting students. It declared that the BCI has no disciplinary control over students. It also reduced the three year practice condition for writing the judicial services examination to one year. The order follows a protest by law students seeking a say in their own convocation, widely attributed to an oral remark by the Chief Justice of India that was quickly clarified. The contest is over whether campus unrest is a failure of student discipline or a failure of a governance model that leaves students out of the decisions binding them.

    What is academic freedom?

    1. The freedom to teach, research and question: Academic freedom is the entitlement of those engaged in scholarly teaching and research to decide what to study, what to teach and what to challenge, without direction from the government or the university administration.
    2. No express Indian guarantee: The Constitution of India does not mention academic freedom. Article 5(3) of the German Basic Law guarantees scientific freedom (Wissenschaftsfreiheit) as a right of everyone engaged in scholarly teaching and research.
    3. A recognised right elsewhere: The Constitutions of Japan, South Africa, Portugal and Spain contain a comparable freedom. Article 137 of the Basic Law of Hong Kong provides that educational institutions may retain autonomy and enjoy academic freedom.
    4. Its limit is conduct, not speech: The freedom carries no right to defame or to engage in anti-national activity. Where an academic activity involves conduct rather than speech, the state is entitled to regulate that conduct.

    Why is curriculum the sharp edge of the dispute?

    1. Curriculum is set without the people it binds: University curriculum should be decided by the stakeholders, including students. Eg. Delhi University dropped a paper on the Delhi Sultanate along with some other papers.
    2. Students read such changes as political: Curriculum changes of this kind are seen as having ideological reasons rather than academic ones, which turns an academic decision into a governance grievance.
    3. The direction of restraint runs both ways: Government is not to dictate to universities what to teach, how to teach and what not to teach. Universities owe the same freedom to their departments and faculties.
    4. The campus exists for the contested question: Universities are meant to be a special place for reflection, inquiry and discussion, which is the function a closed curriculum process removes.

    What do experiences abroad show about academic freedom under pressure?

    1. The United States has used funding as leverage: Federal funding has been weaponised to reshape campus culture. Diversity programmes have been dismantled and research funding in areas such as climate change has been reduced.
    2. Permitting protest has itself invited pressure: Universities have faced pressure for allowing student protests, including those over Gaza.
    3. Neither ideological side is exempt: Right wing and left wing regimes have both, at times, sought to control universities.
    4. The pattern is old: Arnold Toynbee resigned from King’s College London in 1924 over his writings on the Greek army’s atrocities. Professors were persecuted during the McCarthy era.
    5. Funders now shape the research agenda: Declining public funding has left research agendas increasingly influenced by funders, corporations and pharmaceutical companies.

    What is the control model of university governance?

    1. Authority sits in one office: Most universities remain Vice-Chancellor centric. Students, who are the reason universities exist, have little say in their governance.
    2. Grievances have no route upward: Vice-Chancellors rarely hold open houses and are often inaccessible to ordinary students. Unaddressed grievances leave students feeling ignored, and some then take extreme steps.
    3. Control substitutes for dialogue: Administrations adopted the control model as governments increasingly sought to control universities. A community of highly educated faculty and young people requires dialogue, trust and openness rather than surveillance.
    4. Knowledge creation needs the opposite conditions: Universities exist to innovate and create knowledge, which requires the freedom to question everything and challenge existing ideas.

    How does under-investment compound the control problem?

    1. The policy target has not been met: The National Education Policy 2020 promises public investment of 6 per cent of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) in education. Public investment has steadily declined and hovers around 4 to 4.1 per cent.
    2. Higher education gets the smallest share: Within that spending, higher education receives the smallest allocation, so the system is over-regulated and grossly underfunded at the same time.
    3. Autonomy is not alien to the system: The ancient Gurukul system was entirely autonomous, and the present arrangement regulates far more and funds far less.
    4. The shortfall is visible on campus: Public university infrastructure has deteriorated and hostels are in acute shortage, which produced the recent deaths in New Delhi. Faculty positions remain vacant and guest faculty are poorly paid.
    5. Teaching and examinations both fail the student: Poor teaching frustrates students. Repeated examination paper leaks add to their stress.

    What do Vice-Chancellor appointments reveal?

    1. Natural justice is overlooked: In one case a Vice-Chancellor changed the composition of the selection committee, chaired it and voted in the selection of his wife. She was appointed as Vice-Chancellor.
    2. The courts did not correct it: The judiciary declined to follow its own precedents of quashing such appointments.
    3. An adverse record is not a bar: Individuals with questionable records and adverse Central Vigilance Commission (CVC) reports have been appointed, and some State universities face allegations of bribery.
    4. Recruitment rewards leaning over merit: Faculty recruitment over-emphasises ideological leanings rather than merit. Ideological governments may prefer candidates with particular leanings, and merit should not be completely undermined on that account.
    5. Examination integrity follows appointment integrity: No examination system can be foolproof where paper setters, moderators or testing officials are appointed for reasons other than absolute merit and integrity.

    Who actually absorbs the blame for campus unrest?

    1. The anger travels past the administration: Student frustration erupts against the government rather than against university administrations. The government received the criticism for the actions of the Vice-Chancellor in the appointment case.
    2. Much of it is avoidable on campus: The backlash could largely be avoided where administrations engage students in meaningful dialogue and provide timely relief.
    3. The government is not a bystander either: Administrations adopted the control model because governments sought control of universities, so the incentive that produced the model is a governmental one.

    What does the liberty model change?

    1. Trust is the operative mechanism: The liberty model of governance was implemented across three universities over 16 years. Students who are trusted act more responsibly in turn.
    2. Access without gatekeeping: Students met the Vice-Chancellor without appointments and raised personal concerns and difficulties. That access made frank conversations possible when difficult or unpopular decisions had to be taken.
    3. Unpopular ideas are protected: The model treats the university as a space where even the most unpopular ideas can be freely debated, which is the opposite of the top-down model.
    4. Students sit inside the decisions: Students are given a meaningful role in academic, administrative and financial decisions, including faculty appointments, procurement, curriculum design and the drafting of university regulations.
    5. A statutory precedent already exists: Students at Aligarh Muslim University have a statutory role in selecting the Vice-Chancellor.

    Challenges to the liberty model of university governance

    1. Participation rights can be captured by party politics: Campus unions aligned to national parties can convert a participation right into a channel for external political control. Eg. Delhi University Students’ Union elections are contested by the student wings of national parties.
      The Fix: Tie student participation to reserved seats on academic and finance bodies with fixed terms, so it runs through statutory channels rather than street mobilisation.
    2. A Vice-Chancellor cannot devolve powers that are not his: Faculty appointments and university finances are governed by University Grants Commission (UGC) regulations and State legislation, so student participation in them rests on the incumbent’s discretion. Eg. The Vice-Chancellor is himself selected by the Chancellor or Visitor from a search committee panel.
      The Fix: Amend university statutes to create student membership on selection and finance committees, so participation has a legal basis rather than a personal one.
    3. The model lapses with the person who ran it: A governance style adopted by one Vice-Chancellor ends when that office changes hands, since nothing in the statute compels a successor to continue it. Eg. Open house access is an administrative practice and not a rule.
      The Fix: Write grievance redressal timelines and open house frequency into university ordinances so the practice survives a change of office.
    4. Trust cannot supply what money supplies: Dialogue does not create hostel seats, permanent faculty or laboratory funding, which are the material grounds of much campus unrest. Eg. Sanctioned faculty posts in central and State universities stay vacant regardless of the governance style adopted.
      The Fix: Link central grants to filled sanctioned posts and audited hostel capacity, so funding follows the deficits that generate protest.

    Conclusion

    The Supreme Court’s order settles who may discipline a law student. It does not settle who governs a campus. Curriculum decisions, convocation arrangements and appointments all turn on whether students hold any formal seat in university decision making, and at present they hold almost none. The measure worth watching is whether university statutes are amended to give students standing on academic and selection bodies, since a governance practice resting on the person in office leaves with that person.

    Higher Education in India

    1. Second largest system in the world: Total enrolment is estimated at 4.65 crore in 2026, up from 3.42 crore in 2014-15.
    2. Institutional spread: India hosts over 1,168 universities and 45,473 colleges, against 760 universities in 2014-15.
    3. Participation is short of the target: The Gross Enrolment Ratio in higher education, meaning enrolment at that stage as a share of the population in the corresponding age group, stands at 28.4 per cent against the National Education Policy 2020 target of 50 per cent by 2035.
    4. Women now enrol marginally more than men: The Gender Parity Index stands at 1.01, indicating slightly higher female than male participation for the first time.

    Constitutional Framework Governing Higher Education

    1. Entry 25, List III: Education, including technical and medical education and universities, is a Concurrent List subject after the Constitution (Forty-second Amendment) Act, 1976.
    2. Entry 66, List I: Coordination and determination of standards in institutions of higher education and research is reserved to the Union.
    3. Entry 63, List I: Banaras Hindu University, Aligarh Muslim University and Delhi University are institutions of national importance under Union competence, along with any other so declared by Parliament.
    4. Article 30(1): Religious and linguistic minorities have the right to establish and administer educational institutions of their choice.
    5. Article 19(1)(a): Free speech on campus is protected, subject only to the restrictions Article 19(2) itself permits.

    Laws and Rules Governing Higher Education

    1. University Grants Commission Act, 1956: Establishes the UGC to coordinate and determine standards in university education and to disburse grants to universities and colleges.
    2. All India Council for Technical Education Act, 1987: Creates the statutory regulator for technical education, covering planning, norms and approval of technical institutions.
    3. National Council for Teacher Education Act, 1993: Creates the regulator for teacher education programmes and the institutions that run them.
    4. Anusandhan National Research Foundation Act, 2023: Establishes the National Research Foundation to seed and fund research across higher educational institutions, including State universities.

    Government Initiatives for Higher Education

    1. National Education Policy 2020: Replaces the National Policy on Education, 1986, and is built on access, equity, quality, affordability and accountability.
    2. Academic Bank of Credits: A digital repository holding course credits, which enables multiple entry and exit within a degree programme.
    3. Automated Permanent Academic Account Registry (APAAR): A single student identifier linking academic records, skills and transfers in one portal.
    4. Prime Minister’s Research Fellowship: Doctoral fellowships for research scholars, expanded to award 10,000 new fellowships.

    Challenges in Higher Education Governance

    1. Fragmented regulatory structure: Multiple bodies issue overlapping and sometimes conflicting guidelines to the same institution, which delays academic decisions. Eg. A technical department inside a university answers to the All India Council for Technical Education and the UGC at the same time.
      The Fix: Consolidate approvals under a single higher education regulator with separate verticals for funding, standard setting and accreditation.
    2. Quality is unmeasured across much of the system: Over 30 per cent of Indian higher educational institutions remain unaccredited as of early 2026. Eg. Accreditation by the National Assessment and Accreditation Council is not a precondition for most colleges to award degrees.
      The Fix: Make one completed accreditation cycle a condition for degree granting status and for central grants.
    3. Research spending is stagnant: Research and development expenditure stands at 0.64 per cent of GDP, against about 2.4 per cent in China and 3.4 per cent in the United States. Eg. India contributes under 5 per cent of global research publications.
      The Fix: Route National Research Foundation funding towards State universities, which carry most enrolment and almost none of the research grant.
    4. Employability does not follow the degree: Curricula are not aligned to hiring requirements, so enrolment growth does not convert into work. Eg. Only about 4 per cent of higher education carries formal skill training.
      The Fix: Embed apprenticeship credits inside degree programmes under the National Credit Framework.

    Back2Basics: Bar Council of India

    1. A statutory body under the Advocates Act, 1961: It regulates the legal profession and legal education in India.
    2. Standard setting: It lays down standards of professional conduct and etiquette for advocates, and prescribes the conditions on which a law degree is recognised for enrolment.
    3. Composition: Its members are elected by the State Bar Councils, with the Attorney General of India and the Solicitor General of India as ex officio members.

    Matching Previous Year Question

    “[2014, GS2, 12.5 marks] Should the premier institutes like IITs/IIMs be allowed to retain premier status, allowed more academic independence in designing courses and also decide mode/criteria of selection of students. Discuss in light of the growing challenges.”

  • PAC flags failure to transfer Rs 9,222 cr. in cess collections

    Why in the News

    The Public Accounts Committee (PAC) has flagged the failure to transfer Rs 9,222 crore of cess and levy collections to their designated reserve funds. Members questioned the Union Finance Ministry’s explanation on the issue. The committee reiterated its earlier recommendation that such collections be used only for the purposes for which they were raised. It had made that recommendation once already, in its 69th report tabled in August 2023, and the stated position of the chairperson is that ignoring the directions of a parliamentary standing committee amounts to an insult to Parliament. The tension is that a cess is justified to the taxpayer by an earmarked purpose. Its proceeds can still remain unmoved and available for ordinary expenditure.

    What is the Public Accounts Committee?

    1. A parliamentary financial committee: The PAC examines the appropriation accounts and the finance accounts of the Union government, along with the audit reports of the Comptroller and Auditor General (CAG).
    2. Its composition: It has 22 members, 15 elected by the Lok Sabha and 7 by the Rajya Sabha, each serving a one-year term. Ministers cannot be members.
    3. Chaired from the Opposition: By convention followed since 1967, the chairperson is drawn from the Opposition benches.
    4. It works after the money is spent: The committee scrutinises expenditure already incurred, so its function is post-facto accountability rather than approval of spending.

    What did the audit find?

    1. Collections that never reached their funds: An audit examination for 2024-25 found that money collected through various cesses and levies was not transferred to four designated reserve funds during the year.
    2. Where the finding is recorded: The finding forms part of Paragraph 3.3.1 of the CAG’s Report No. 6 of 2026.
    3. The explanation was not accepted: Members of the committee questioned the Finance Ministry’s account of why the transfers did not happen.

    What had the committee already recommended?

    1. Assess the amount and the duration: The 69th report called for scientific assessments of how much a cess should raise and for how long it should run.
    2. Review whether the purpose was served: It called for periodic reviews to evaluate whether the objectives a cess was raised for had actually been achieved.
    3. Credit the proceeds regularly: It called for regular crediting of cess proceeds to the reserve funds created to hold them.

    Why does the non-transfer matter?

    1. Purpose is the entire justification: The committee’s position is that cess collections must go to the purposes for which they were raised, and not toward financing the government’s budgetary deficit.
    2. The burden falls on everyone: A cess is collected from the whole population, whether or not a person pays income tax, and reaches the middle class and the poor alike.
    3. An unfunded fund is a fund in name only: A reserve fund that exists on paper but is never credited cannot finance the programme it was created for, so the earmarking becomes a description rather than a constraint.

    Conclusion

    A cess earns its political acceptance from a named purpose, and that acceptance is spent at the moment of collection whether or not the money ever reaches the fund. The committee can record the lapse and can repeat itself, but it cannot compel a transfer, which is why the same paragraph returns to it audit cycle after audit cycle. The current status is a recommendation standing reiterated and unimplemented for a third year. The next test is whether the Finance Ministry files an action taken note committing to a crediting timetable, rather than one restating the accounting position that produced the audit finding.

    Back2Basics: Cess

    1. What it is: A cess is a tax imposed on top of an existing tax, levied for a specific stated purpose rather than for general revenue.
    2. It stays outside the divisible pool: Article 270 keeps cesses and surcharges out of the pool of central taxes shared with the States, so a State receives no share of the collections.
    3. How the earmarking is meant to work: Proceeds are credited to the Consolidated Fund of India and are then to be transferred to a designated reserve fund from which the stated purpose is financed.
    4. Examples in force: The Health and Education Cess, the Road and Infrastructure Cess and the Goods and Services Tax Compensation Cess.

    Matching Previous Year Question

    “[2013] Consider the following statements : The Parliamentary Committe on Public Accounts 1. Consists of not more than 25 members of the Lok Sabha 2. Scrutinizes appropriation and finance accounts of the Government 3. examines the report of the Comptroller and Auditor General of India Which of the statements given above is/are correct? (a) 1 only (b) 2 and 3 only (c) 3 only (d) 1, 2 and 3 ANSWER: (b)”

  • Punjab stand on judge sets disturbing precedent

    Why in the News

    Justice Ashwani Kumar Mishra has taken oath as Chief Justice of the Punjab and Haryana High Court, with the front-row chair reserved for the Punjab Chief Minister left empty. A day earlier the State Cabinet had asked the Punjab Governor to hold off the oath-taking. Its stated ground was that the Centre notified the appointment without the State’s consent, in breach of the Memorandum of Procedure (MoP) that governs judicial appointments. The Supreme Court Collegium had recommended Justice Mishra and three other judges as chief justices of four High Courts on 6 August, and the Centre notified the appointment on 5 September. The contest is between a State’s right to be consulted on a High Court appointment and a consultative process that fixes no deadline for the State to answer.

    What is the Memorandum of Procedure?

    1. The rulebook for judicial appointments: The MoP sets out the sequence by which judges of the higher judiciary are recommended, consulted upon and appointed.
    2. It requires the States to be consulted: Before a High Court appointment is notified, the Centre must consult the State concerned.
    3. It fixes no time limit on the State: The document sets no deadline for a State to send its response.
    4. It is an executive document, not a statute: The MoP is settled between the Centre and the judiciary, and a revised version sought after the National Judicial Appointments Commission was struck down in 2015 remains unfinished.

    What is Punjab’s case?

    1. Consent was not obtained: The Cabinet’s position is that the Centre notified the appointment without the State’s concurrence, which it treats as a breach of the MoP.
    2. No deadline binds the State: Punjab is correct that the MoP prescribes no deadline for a State’s response, so a delayed reply violates nothing on the document’s own terms.
    3. The flexibility has a purpose: That absence of a deadline exists because judicial appointment is designed as a consultative process rather than a clearance queue.

    Why does the case not hold?

    1. Weeks were available and went unused: If the State government had reservations about Justice Mishra, it had weeks in which to put them on file, where they could have been examined on their merits.
    2. The silence blocked three other courts: The delay in Punjab’s response held up all four chief justice appointments recommended in the same Collegium resolution.
    3. The court had recently ruled against the State: As Acting Chief Justice, Justice Mishra’s bench pulled up Punjab in August for withholding dearness allowance dues and for finding ample money for advertising. His court also heard a Mohali case in which allegations were made against the Chief Minister’s wife, which the ruling party has described as politically motivated.

    Is this an isolated episode?

    1. The same move was attempted in Delhi: The Aam Aadmi Party earlier sought to have Justice Swarana Kanta Sharma taken off the appeal in the excise policy case in which its leaders are arraigned as accused.
    2. The precedent this sets: Treating an adverse order as a personal affront converts a judicial outcome into a ground for obstructing an appointment, which is a template no political party should be able to rely on.

    What reform does the episode point to?

    1. Defined timelines belong in the MoP: The episode makes the case for writing fixed response periods into a document that currently has none.
    2. A benchmark already exists on the other side: The Supreme Court has set the Centre a benchmark of three to four weeks for clearing names reiterated by the Collegium.
    3. Deemed consent closes the gap: A comparable window for State responses, after which consent is treated as given, would remove the ambiguity this episode exposed.

    Conclusion

    Disagreement between the Centre and a State over an appointment is ordinary constitutional business, and nothing about it is improper. Withholding a reply is not disagreement; it is the absence of one, and it quietly converts a consultative step into a veto that no rule ever granted. A written objection with reasons can be examined and answered; silence can only be waited out. What remains unresolved is whether the duty to consult carries a corresponding duty to respond, and the present arrangement supplies no answer either way.

    Back2Basics: The Collegium

    1. What it is: The Collegium is the body of senior judges that recommends appointments and transfers in the higher judiciary. It finds no mention in the text of the Constitution.
    2. Its composition: For Supreme Court appointments it consists of the Chief Justice of India and the four seniormost judges of the Supreme Court.
    3. Where it came from: It emerged from the Second Judges Case (1993), which read “consultation” in Articles 124 and 217 as concurrence, and was expanded by the Third Judges Case (1998).
    4. Its binding force: The government may return a recommendation once, but a name reiterated by the Collegium is binding on it.

    Matching Previous Year Question

    “[2025, GS2, 15.0 marks] Discuss the evolution of collegium system in India. Critically examine the advantages and disadvantages of the system on appointment of the Judges of the Supreme Court of India and that of the USA.”

  • 2,843 km, 400-plus trains: Corridors cut time and cost, offer last-mile link

    Why in the News

    The last three sections of the Western Dedicated Freight Corridor (WDFC) have been inaugurated at Vadodara, completing India’s dedicated freight rail network. The three sections cover 326 kilometres and were developed at a cost of over Rs 20,700 crore. Their commissioning closes the 1,506-km western corridor, and with the 1,337-km Eastern Dedicated Freight Corridor (EDFC) already commissioned in October 2023, the network now runs to 2,843 km. The corridors were built to relieve trunk routes whose line capacity utilisation had reached between 115 and 150 per cent. The open question is whether separate freight track alone can lift rail’s share of national freight from about 27 per cent to the 45 per cent the National Rail Plan targets.

    What are the Dedicated Freight Corridors?

    1. Freight-only railway lines: The Dedicated Freight Corridors (DFCs) are high-speed railway lines built to carry goods traffic alone, physically separated from the passenger network.
    2. Two routes, east and west: The project comprises an eastern corridor and a western corridor, together among the largest infrastructure works ever undertaken by the Railways.
    3. A dedicated executing entity: The Dedicated Freight Corridor Corporation of India Limited (DFCCIL), a special purpose vehicle, was set up for the construction, operation and maintenance of the corridors.

    Why were separate freight lines needed at all?

    1. Trunk routes were saturated: The Howrah-Delhi route on the east and the Mumbai-Delhi route on the west were running at line capacity utilisation of between 115 and 150 per cent, and the Railways saw a dip in freight traffic as a result.
    2. The load shifted to road: The National Highways running along these corridors make up 0.5 per cent of the road network yet account for almost 40 per cent of total road freight.
    3. Freight earnings carry the system: Freight services account for over 65 per cent of the Railways’ total earnings, and that revenue subsidises passenger travel.

    What does each corridor cover?

    1. The western corridor: The WDFC runs 1,506 km from the Jawaharlal Nehru Port Trust (JNPT) in Navi Mumbai to Dadri near Noida in Uttar Pradesh. Its final three sections are New Sanand (N)-New Makarpura, New Umbergaon-New Saphale, and New Saphale-New JNPT.
    2. The last stretch reaches the port: The Vaitarna (Saphale) to JNPT stretch in Maharashtra is now operational, and freight loading is expected to rise further on the strength of that direct port connectivity.
    3. The eastern corridor: The EDFC runs 1,337 km from Ludhiana in Punjab to Sonnagar in Bihar and was fully commissioned in October 2023.
    4. Two segments of differing capacity: The EDFC has an electrified double-line segment of 936 km between Sonnagar and Dadri, and an electrified single-track segment of 401 km between Sahnewal in Punjab and Khurja in Uttar Pradesh.
    5. The alignment avoids towns: The EDFC detours around densely populated towns including Mirzapur, Allahabad, Kanpur, Etawah, Firozabad, Tundla, Hathras, Aligarh, Hapur, Meerut, Muzaffarnagar, Ambala, Rajpura, Sirhind, Doraha and Sahnewal.

    What traffic do the corridors actually carry?

    1. Containers dominate the west: Western corridor traffic mainly comprises ISO containers from JNPT and Mumbai Port in Maharashtra and from Pipavav, Mundra and Kandla ports in Gujarat. These move to Inland Container Depots (ICDs) in north India, mostly at Tughlakabad in Delhi, Dadri in Uttar Pradesh, Dhandari Kalan in Punjab and Khatuwas in Rajasthan.
    2. Bulk cargo is expected to follow: The western corridor is also expected to carry fertilisers, foodgrain, salt, coal, iron, steel and cement.
    3. Minerals dominate the east: The EDFC caters mostly to coal and mineral traffic originating in eastern India.

    What operational gain do the corridors deliver?

    1. Volume of movement: About 426 freight trains run daily across both corridors.
    2. Speed roughly doubles: The average speed of trains on the DFCs was over 50 kmph, double the average speed of freight trains on the non-DFC network.
    3. The recorded monthly figures: In April and May the average speed was 44.9 kmph and 44.7 kmph on the EDFC, and 53.6 kmph and 52.3 kmph on the WDFC.
    4. Three stated benefits: Separation from the passenger network gives the corridors reduced transit time, lower cost, and last-mile connectivity at certain locations.

    How were the corridors financed, and what comes next?

    1. A bilateral origin: The DFC project was first discussed at a Japan-India meeting in April 2005 and was included in the declaration of cooperation signed between the two sides. A feasibility study report followed in October 2007.
    2. Concessional debt carried most of the cost: Funding came through debt from the World Bank of Rs 14,900 crore and from the Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA) of Rs 38,722 crore, with gross budgetary support meeting the remainder.
    3. A third corridor is planned: This year’s Budget announced a corridor connecting Dankuni in West Bengal to Surat in Gujarat, and its detailed project report is under preparation.

    Where does rail freight stand against its own target?

    1. The current modal share: Rail carries around 27 per cent of national freight traffic.
    2. The stated target: The National Rail Plan envisages raising that share to 45 per cent by 2030, which works out to 3,000 million tonnes.
    3. The present base: The Railways recorded its highest ever loading of 1,670 million tonnes in the 2025-26 financial year.

    Conclusion

    Completing the corridors changes what the network is capable of carrying; it does not by itself change what a shipper chooses. Rail wins cargo only where door-to-door cost and delivery reliability beat road, and both are decided at terminals, first-mile handling and pricing rather than on line-haul track. The gap between the current modal share and the National Rail Plan target is therefore a terminal and tariff problem now, not a track problem. The marker to watch is whether the next corridor is planned together with its feeder terminals rather than after them.

    Back2Basics: PM Gati Shakti National Master Plan

    1. What it is: A national master plan for multimodal connectivity, launched in October 2021, intended to end siloed infrastructure planning across ministries.
    2. How it works: It runs as a Geographic Information System based digital platform on which ministries and States map their projects on common layers, so alignments and utilities are visible to every planning agency at once.
    3. Who runs it: It is anchored in the Department for Promotion of Industry and Internal Trade under the Ministry of Commerce and Industry.
    4. What it is paired with: The National Logistics Policy, 2022 supplies the services and regulatory side of the same objective, which is lowering logistics cost as a share of output.

    Matching Previous Year Question

    “[2021, GS3, 15.0 marks] “Investment in infrastructure is essential for more rapid and inclusive economic growth.”Discuss in the light of India’s experience”

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