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  • India’s GDP Performance for the first quarter

    India’s GDP Performance for the first quarter

    Why in the News

    The quarterly Gross Domestic Product (GDP) estimates for the April to June quarter of financial year 2026 27 were released.

    Core Facts

    1. Compiling body: The National Statistics Office (NSO), the official statistics agency under the Ministry of Statistics and Programme Implementation (MoSPI), compiles GDP.
    2. Two approaches: GDP is estimated through the production side. It is also estimated through the expenditure side.
    3. Production measure: The production side is built from Gross Value Added (GVA), the value of output minus the value of inputs at each stage.

    Static Context

    1. GDP and GVA link: GDP equals GVA plus product taxes minus product subsidies.
    2. Base year: The current GDP series uses a 2011 12 base year, and the revision took effect in January 2015.
    3. Methodology shift: The 2015 revision moved to GVA at basic prices and expanded use of the corporate database for the industrial sector.
    4. Real and nominal: Real GDP is measured at constant prices and nominal GDP at current prices.

    Prelims Angle

    1. The difference between GDP and GVA is a repeat hook.
    2. The base year is 2011 12 and the compiling body is the NSO under MoSPI.
    3. Market prices versus basic prices is a standard trap.

    Mains Angle

    1. GS3, Indian economy, planning and growth: A question can ask about the 2015 methodology change.
    2. The growth side: It can ask about potential GDP and the factors holding India below it.

    [2021, GS3, 10 marks] Explain the difference between computing methodology of India’s Gross Domestic Product(GDP) before the year 2015 and after the year 2015.”

  • Districts as Export Hubs push decentralised trade growth

    Districts as Export Hubs push decentralised trade growth

    Why in the News

    The Districts as Export Hubs (DEH) initiative was profiled as a route to raise India’s export base from the district level.

    Core Facts

    1. Objective: The DEH initiative treats every district as an export hub. It identifies products and services in each district with export potential.
    2. Institutional design: A State Export Promotion Committee (SEPC) operates at the state level. A District Export Promotion Committee (DEPC) operates at the district level.
    3. Planning tool: Each district prepares a District Export Action Plan (DEAP). The plan maps products, gaps and support needed.
    4. Nodal body: The Directorate General of Foreign Trade (DGFT), the agency under the Ministry of Commerce and Industry that regulates India’s exports and imports, coordinates the initiative.
    5. Convergence: The initiative aligns with the One District One Product (ODOP) programme.

    Static Context

    1. Policy anchor: The Foreign Trade Policy, 2023 institutionalised districts as export hubs as a core strategy.
    2. Governing agency: DGFT issues the Foreign Trade Policy and administers export promotion schemes.
    3. ODOP link: ODOP selects one flagship product per district for branding and market access.

    Prelims Angle

    1. Nodal agency for DEH is the DGFT under the Ministry of Commerce and Industry.
    2. The two tier structure is SEPC and DEPC.
    3. The policy anchor is the Foreign Trade Policy, 2023, and ODOP convergence is a likely factual hook.

    Mains Angle

    1. GS3, Indian economy and mobilisation of resources: A question can ask how decentralised export promotion raises India’s share in global trade.
    2. The constraint side: It can probe constraints of logistics, credit and quality certification at the district level.
  • Can AI claim copyright for original work? A question of authorship

    Can AI claim copyright for original work? A question of authorship

    Why in the News

    India’s Copyright Office has rejected an application seeking copyright registration for an artwork generated by an artificial intelligence (AI) system. The application was filed by American computer scientist Stephen Thaler for a work titled ‘A Recent Entrance to Paradise’, which he said had been generated autonomously by his AI system DABUS. The application named DABUS as the author and Thaler as the owner of the copyright. The order is among the first Indian decisions to address who, if anyone, is the author when an AI system generates a work. The tension it exposes is that the Office found the image original enough to qualify for protection while holding that the entity that produced it cannot be an author.

    What is DABUS?

    1. The system: DABUS stands for Device for the Autonomous Bootstrapping of Unified Sentience, an AI system developed by Thaler.
    2. The claim made for it: The application asserted that DABUS had generated the artwork autonomously, rather than as an output directed by a human operator.

    What did the application claim and what did the Office ask?

    1. The filing: Thaler applied in 2022 to register copyright in the artwork.
    2. The first question put to him: The Copyright Office asked whether an AI system could legally be recognised as an author under the Copyright Act, 1957.
    3. The second question: It also asked who should be treated as the author if the work was indeed generated using AI.
    4. The offer he refused: During the proceedings the Office allowed Thaler to amend the application and identify himself as the author. He declined, and continued to insist that DABUS be recognised instead.

    How does the Copyright Act, 1957 treat originality?

    1. The three separate questions: The Act answers whether a work is original, who its author is, and who owns the copyright, and these are distinct questions rather than one.
    2. The protection provision: Section 13 protects original literary, dramatic, musical and artistic works.
    3. The Act does not define originality: The Copyright Office therefore interprets it from Eastern Book Company v. D.B. Modak.
    4. The judicial test: The Supreme Court in that case held that a work need not be novel or groundbreaking to receive copyright protection. It must show at least a minimum degree of creativity, and it cannot be merely copied or mechanically reproduced.

    How does the Act treat authorship and ownership?

    1. The authorship provision: Section 2(d)(vi) identifies the author of a computer generated work as “the person who causes the work to be created”.
    2. The disputed phrase: The dispute was over whether that phrase refers to the machine producing the output or to the person creating and operating the system.
    3. First ownership: Section 17 states that the author is generally the first owner of the copyright.
    4. Transfer: Sections 18 and 19 allow copyright to be assigned or transferred through legally recognised agreements.
    5. What the structure assumes: The Office noted that these provisions are built around legal persons who can hold rights, transfer them and enforce them.

    What did the Copyright Office decide?

    1. Originality was satisfied: The Office found that the image generated by the AI was original enough to qualify for copyright protection.
    2. Authorship is a legal status: The Act treats authorship as a legal status carrying rights and responsibilities, and an AI system, however sophisticated, does not presently possess such recognition under Indian law.
    3. The tool test: To interpret who “causes” a computer generated work to be created, the Office looked to American copyright cases distinguishing between a tool and the person handling it.
    4. DABUS as the tool: Although DABUS generated the final image, it did so within a system designed and set in motion by Thaler, so DABUS was treated as the tool and Thaler as the person who legally caused the work to be created.
    5. Person means natural or juristic: Where an Act refers to a “person” it usually means a natural person or a juristic person such as a company, an entity capable of owning property and entering contracts. DABUS is not a recognised juristic person.
    6. The outcome: Thaler was held to be the person capable of being identified as the statutory author, so the application as filed did not meet the criteria under the Act.

    Why was the fallback request also rejected?

    1. What was sought: Thaler asked in the alternative that DABUS be recorded as the technological generator of the work.
    2. The register cannot confer status: The Office held that the register could not be used to indirectly confer legal status on an AI system.
    3. A procedural ground as well: No proper application seeking such an entry had been made.

    What has the order left open?

    1. A future application can succeed: The order leaves open the possibility of a fresh application that identifies the author in the manner the Copyright Act, 1957 requires.
    2. The change of law is reserved: Any broader change in the law would have to come from Parliament.
    3. The stated limit on administrative power: The order records that whether legal personhood or authorship should ever be extended to autonomous artificial intelligence “remains a policy decision strictly reserved for Parliament, and cannot be introduced via administrative reinterpretation”.

    Challenges to fitting AI generated works into copyright law

    1. Human contribution is not measurable at the point of registration: A registrar cannot tell from the output whether a prompt involved creative choice or a single instruction. Eg. The United States Copyright Office refused registration for the AI generated images in the comic ‘Zarya of the Dawn’ while protecting the human written text and arrangement.
      The Fix: Require a disclosure of AI involvement and of the specific human contribution as a mandatory field in the registration application.
    2. Training data use is unresolved: Models are trained on protected works without licence, so the lawfulness of the input sits behind every question about the output. Eg. Indian news publishers and a music industry body have sought to intervene in the Delhi High Court proceedings against OpenAI on this ground.
      The Fix: Legislate a statutory text and data mining exception with a transparency obligation on training corpora, so the boundary is set rather than litigated case by case.
    3. Ownership defaults to the operator rather than the investor: Treating the person who causes creation as the author leaves the platform, the model developer and the user with competing claims over the same output. Eg. Generative service terms typically assign output rights to the user by contract, which no statute confirms.
      The Fix: Make the allocation of rights in computer generated output a default statutory rule that contracts may vary, rather than leaving it to terms of service alone.
    4. Term of protection has no anchor without a human author: Copyright duration runs from the author’s lifetime, which cannot be computed where the generating entity does not die. Eg. The United Kingdom sets a fixed 50 year term for computer generated works precisely to avoid this problem.
      The Fix: Provide a fixed term measured from the date of creation for works with no identifiable human author.
    5. Enforcement needs an accountable person: Liability for infringing output, and standing to sue over it, both require someone the law can reach. Eg. An autonomously generated image that reproduces a protected character leaves no party with a stated duty under the current provision.
      The Fix: Attach statutory responsibility for infringing output to the person who deployed the system, mirroring the authorship rule the Office has applied.

    Conclusion

    The order settles who the author is and leaves untouched what the author did. A work the law accepts as original was produced by a process its named author did not perform, and the statute has no category for that gap. Parliament is the only body that can create one. The point to watch is whether computer generated works are taken up as a legislative question, or whether the issue keeps returning through individual registration applications and appeals against their refusal.

    Back2Basics

    1. Enactment: The Copyright Act, 1957 came into force in January 1958 and is India’s governing copyright statute.
    2. Administration: It is administered through the Copyright Office, which functions under the Department for Promotion of Industry and Internal Trade.
    3. Coverage: It protects literary, dramatic, musical and artistic works, along with cinematograph films and sound recordings.
    4. Registration is optional: Copyright arises on creation of the work, and registration serves as evidence rather than as the source of the right.

    [2014, GS3, 12 marks] In a globalised world, intellectual property rights assume significance and are a source of litigation. Broadly distinguish between the terms – copyrights, patents and trade secrets.”

  • River-linking is not the solution

    River-linking is not the solution

    Why in the News

    The Union Home Minister used the Southern Zonal Council meeting at Mamallapuram to press for early resolution of water sharing disputes in the southern region, and to propose linking major rivers from the Brahmaputra to the Godavari and the Cauvery.

    Why does the Pennaiyar case undercut the promise of early resolution?

    1. The grievance: Tamil Nadu is aggrieved over what it terms a violation of the 1892 inter State agreement by Karnataka.
    2. The request and the parallel litigation: Tamil Nadu asked the Centre in November 2019 to establish a tribunal. It also moved the Supreme Court with the same demand.
    3. Negotiation without settlement: Two negotiation committees have been formed since then and 11 meetings have been held.
    4. A court direction, then an extension: The Supreme Court in February directed the Centre to form the tribunal within a month, and later extended the deadline by six months. The adjudicatory body is still not in place.
    5. The referral suggestion: The Centre asked the court whether the Pennaiyar dispute could be referred to the Mahadayi Water Disputes Tribunal instead of constituting a new one, although there is nothing in common between the two disputes.
    6. The statute does not allow it: The Interstate River Water Disputes Act, 1956 does not permit such a referral.
    7. A second unanswered demand: The Central government has not replied to Tamil Nadu’s demand, made in March this year, for a tribunal on the Mekedatu dam project proposed by Karnataka.

    What are the objections to inter-linking?

    1. The proponents’ claim: Supporters of river linking, Tamil Nadu among them, hold that the intent is not to disturb the natural flow of any river but to divert a portion of surplus water.
    2. The claim on surplus is disputed: Many experts are not convinced, and expect that once linking is allowed, benefiting regions will demand water even in times of distress.
    3. The original beneficiary loses: That escalation would eventually deprive the original beneficiaries of their quota, which converts a transfer of surplus into a redistribution of entitlement.
    4. The ecological objection: Kerala has stoutly opposed the Pamba-Achankovil-Vaippar link proposal, on the ground that it will affect the Vembanad wetland system, into which the Pamba and Achankovil rivers drain.
    5. The agency’s answer: The National Water Development Agency, the central body that prepares feasibility studies for inter-basin transfer links, says it has accounted for improving the flow of rivers in lean periods.

    What is the record of inter-basin transfer in India?

    1. A thin record over 130 years: In the last 130 odd years the country has seen only a handful of inter-basin transfer projects, most of them in south India.
    2. The projects treated as successes: The Mullaperiyar dam, the Parambikulam-Aliyar project, the Krishna Water Supply Project and the Indira Gandhi Canal Project are regarded as successful examples of inter-basin transfer.
    3. An institution without output: A Special Committee for Interlinking of Rivers was formed after 2014 and has held over two dozen meetings, without much headway.
    4. The one project that moved: The foundation stone for the ₹44,000 crore Ken-Betwa Link Project was laid in 2024.
    5. Its social cost surfaced immediately: That project has led to agitations by tribal populations in Chhatarpur.

    Why is supply side expansion reaching its limit?

    1. Land is the binding constraint: Land is becoming scarcely available for projects of this size.
    2. Acquisition faces organised resistance: Resistance among people is growing when it comes to land acquisition.
    3. The consequence for project design: The days of implementing mega irrigation projects are almost over, which removes the delivery route the linking proposal depends on.

    What does demand side management require?

    1. A shift in the object of policy: Governments at the Centre and in the States, and civil society, need to focus on demand side management instead of perpetually seeking supply side interventions.
    2. Conservation as the priority: The priority has to be conserving what is available and using it judiciously.
    3. A programme aimed at the farmer: A massive programme of sensitising and incentivising farmers on the optimal use of water has to be launched.
    4. The subsidy that drives extraction: Indiscriminate extraction of groundwater, facilitated by free electricity for agriculture in many States, is paving the way for ecological disaster and has to be curbed immediately.

    Challenges to inter-basin water transfer proposals

    1. Surplus is asserted rather than measured: A basin is declared surplus on hydrological series that predate current withdrawal and cropping intensity, so the transferable volume is an estimate that has never been revalidated. Eg. Peninsular link proposals rest on assessments framed decades before present groundwater draft in the same basins.
      The Fix: Publish a revalidated basin water budget, with the assessment year stated, before any link component is taken up for investment approval.
    2. Himalayan links depend on flows that originate outside India: A transfer scheme drawing on the Brahmaputra is exposed to upstream storage decisions India has no treaty right to see. Eg. The Brahmaputra enters India as the Yarlung Tsangpo after a long course through Tibet.
      The Fix: Make a binding upstream flow data arrangement a stated precondition before any Himalayan component of a national grid is sanctioned.
    3. Transferred water carries a permanent energy bill: Peninsular links must lift water across watersheds, so the delivered cost includes pumping power for the life of the project. Eg. Moving water across the Eastern Ghats requires sustained lift rather than gravity flow.
      The Fix: Price transferred water at its delivered cost including pumping energy, so the recipient command area faces the real cost of the supply.
    4. Alignments run through forest and protected areas: Canal alignment and submergence take the least contested land, which in practice is forest and reserve land rather than settled farmland. Eg. The Ken-Betwa link submerges part of the Panna Tiger Reserve.
      The Fix: Require a no alternative alignment finding, tested against a published route comparison, before submergence inside a protected area is cleared.
    5. New supply changes cropping and returns the shortage: A command area that receives assured water shifts to water intensive crops, so demand rises to meet the new supply within a decade. Eg. Long canal commands in western India moved to paddy and sugarcane and developed waterlogging and salinity.
      The Fix: Tie the release of transferred water to a notified crop plan and volumetric delivery through water user associations rather than to area based supply.

    Conclusion

    India is being offered more supply while the reason for the shortage stays untouched. A grid that moves water between basins does not change how the water is used once it arrives. The immediate decision point is the Pennaiyar tribunal, still unconstituted after a court set deadline and an extension of it. Free farm power, and the groundwater extraction it underwrites, is the variable that will decide whether any new transfer capacity is absorbed or simply exhausted.

    Water Resources Management in India

    1. About: Water resources management covers the planning, development and management of water quantity and quality across every use, along with the institutions, infrastructure, incentives and information systems that guide it.
    2. The hydrological imbalance: India has an effective rainfall period of 28 to 29 days in a year, so most annual flow arrives in a short window and has to be stored or lost.
    3. Agriculture dominates demand: Agriculture accounts for around 89 per cent of groundwater extraction.
    4. The institutional home: The Ministry of Jal Shakti was formed in 2019 by integrating two earlier water related ministries.

    Constitutional Framework Governing Water Resources Management

    1. Entry 17, State List: Places water supply, irrigation, canals, drainage, embankments and storage with the States, subject to Entry 56.
    2. Entry 56, Union List: Allows Parliament to regulate inter State rivers and river valleys where it declares such regulation to be in the public interest.
    3. Article 262: Empowers Parliament to provide for adjudication of inter State river water disputes, and to bar the jurisdiction of the courts including the Supreme Court over them.

    Laws and Rules Governing Water Resources Management

    1. Interstate River Water Disputes Act, 1956: Provides for the constitution of a tribunal when a State’s request for adjudication cannot be settled by negotiation.
    2. The 2002 amendment: Fixed a one year limit for constituting a tribunal and a three year limit for the award.
    3. River Boards Act, 1956: Enables the Centre to set up river boards to advise on the regulation and development of an inter State river. No board has been constituted under it.
    4. Dam Safety Act, 2021: Establishes national and State level authorities for the surveillance, inspection and maintenance of specified dams.

    Government Initiatives for Water Resources Management

    1. Atal Bhujal Yojana: Launched in 2019 to improve groundwater management in selected States through community participation.
    2. Pradhan Mantri Krishi Sinchayee Yojana: Expands assured irrigation coverage and promotes micro irrigation under the Per Drop More Crop component.
    3. National Water Mission: Targets integrated water resource management and a 20 per cent improvement in water use efficiency, with the Bureau of Water Use Efficiency set up under it in 2022.

    Challenges in Water Resources Management

    1. Groundwater is extracted faster than it recharges: Assessment blocks in the north west and the south are classified as over exploited, which means annual draft exceeds annual recharge. Eg. Central Ground Water Board assessments place large parts of Punjab, Haryana and Rajasthan in that category.
      The Fix: Extend community level water budgeting with metered abstraction, so a village sees its own draft against its own recharge each season.
    2. Cropping patterns ignore local water availability: Crop choice follows assured procurement and price, not the water the region actually has. Eg. Sugarcane in Marathwada consumes a disproportionate share of a chronically drought affected region’s irrigation water.
      The Fix: Link procurement or price support for water intensive crops to verified micro irrigation adoption on the same holding.
    3. Irrigation charges recover a fraction of the cost: Water charged below the cost of delivering it removes any incentive to use less of it. Eg. Canal water rates in most States do not cover the operation and maintenance cost of the system supplying it.
      The Fix: Move to volumetric supply at the outlet, billed through water user associations rather than assessed on irrigated area.
    4. Basin data is incomplete and not shared: Allocation disputes are argued over rival estimates because no agreed real time record of flows exists. Eg. Rival State claims in southern river disputes rest on differing assessments of the same basin’s yield.
      The Fix: Make real time gauge and groundwater data on one national platform the sole admissible basis for allocation claims.

    Matching Previous Year Question

    “[2017, GS3, 10 marks] Not many years ago, river linking was a concept but it is becoming reality in the country. Discuss the advantages of river linking and its possible impact on the environment.”

  • Fragile ecology, competing interests: The red flags in building Himalayan dams

    Fragile ecology, competing interests: The red flags in building Himalayan dams

    Why in the News

    A glacier collapse near the China Tibet border has triggered floods in Nepal that have killed over 1,100 people, with thousands still missing. The event has renewed expert concern about recent human made changes in a mountain system whose climatic conditions are shifting quickly. 13 hydropower plants, including several under construction projects, were affected.

    Why is the Himalayan system already fragile?

    1. A naturally unstable mountain system: The Himalayas are prone to earthquakes, landslides, avalanches and flash floods before any human intervention is added.
    2. The topography concentrates risk: The region carries lakes formed by melting glaciers, fast flowing rivers and steep slopes, in a zone highly vulnerable to strong earthquakes.
    3. Climate change acts on the pace of natural processes: Temperature change affects the pace and frequency of snow melting and thawing, and of glacial lake outburst floods (GLOFs), which occur when water collected from melting glaciers overflows its containing barrier.
    4. Attribution and risk are separate questions: Linking any single disaster directly to climate change still requires more scientific assessment, and the overall level of risk appears to be increasing.

    How does infrastructure build up compound the toll?

    1. Dams carry a genuine benefit: Dams and reservoirs regulate the flow of water and extend access to services for people living in remote regions.
    2. Construction alters the geology: Building a dam disturbs the geology of the area and makes it more prone to earthquakes, and the drilling and tunnelling required for further projects extends that effect.
    3. Damage runs through the assets themselves: The loss of hydropower plants in this flood dented both generation capacity and access to power.
    4. Exposure has risen with use: Infrastructure build up and high tourist footfall together compounded the disaster’s toll.

    How extensive is Himalayan hydropower now?

    1. Across the Tibetan region: One recent study identified at least 193 dams built or planned across the wider Tibetan region since 2000.
    2. In Nepal: A Nepal hydropower database lists more than 570 projects at different stages.
    3. The largest single project: China is building a massive dam on the Yarlung Tsangpo, the upper course of the Brahmaputra, near Arunachal Pradesh.
    4. A fault beneath it: In July, Chinese researchers flagged an active fault line, a fracture between two blocks of rock, directly beneath the Yarlung Tsangpo mega dam.

    Why is Himalayan dam building also a geopolitical contest?

    1. Infrastructure as a sovereignty marker: Chinese infrastructure building in Tibet is treated by China as a marker of sovereignty over Tibet, not only as an energy programme.
    2. The response is more dams: India, Nepal and Bhutan have responded with their own set of dams, and India is helping Bhutan build a series of hydropower projects.
    3. Signalling and counter signalling: The result is a pattern of signalling and counter signalling in which project decisions answer each other rather than answering the basin’s hydrology.

    What is missing in transboundary cooperation?

    1. No substantial ecosystem cooperation: There has been no substantial cooperation between China and Nepal, or between China and India, on managing the shared ecosystem.
    2. The existing mechanism is narrow: Disasters in the 2000s prompted a memorandum of understanding between India and China in 2002, with an expert level mechanism on transboundary rivers created in 2005. That mechanism has to be expanded to cover other aspects such as GLOFs.
    3. Transparency differs across the border: Nepal officially publishes fairly detailed project and licensing information. Chinese project level information exists but stays scattered across separate official documents and announcements rather than in a comparable consolidated public database.
    4. No real time upstream data: There is no clearly established public system between China and Nepal for continuous, real time sharing of upstream river flow, reservoir operations or glacial lake conditions from Tibet.
    5. Early warning fails at the border: Gaps in information and data sharing between countries complicate early warning for hazards that originate across a boundary.
    6. No arbitration route: Downstream countries lack the consensus to build alliances that can deal with China, and there is no scope for international arbitration. Even a signed agreement would face a state that does not follow such international norms, as the South China Sea dispute shows.

    What would stronger cooperation require?

    1. Continuous data sharing: Cooperation would necessarily include continuous sharing of hydrological, weather and climate data across the boundary.
    2. Paying for upstream observation: Where sustained monitoring carries a cost, downstream countries could co invest in upstream observation systems or pay for specialised datasets, creating a model that benefits both sides.
    3. Standing operational machinery: Automated public warning systems, joint scientific studies and regular emergency exercises would complement the data arrangements.
    4. A landscape rather than a national frame: A nation state centric, container approach does not fit the Himalayas, since these disasters do not confine themselves within national boundaries and their ramifications run across the landscape.

    Challenges to hydropower expansion in the Himalayas

    1. Projects sit in the highest seismic risk zones: Much of the Himalayan arc falls in seismic zones IV and V, so a design earthquake is a live engineering assumption rather than a remote one. Eg. The 2011 Sikkim earthquake damaged structures at the Teesta III project and halted work.
      The Fix: Make site specific seismic hazard assessment and independent design review a published precondition for financial closure, not a post clearance formality.
    2. Sediment load shortens the working life of a project: Himalayan rivers carry among the world’s highest silt loads, which abrades turbines and fills reservoirs faster than design assumptions allow. Eg. Run of the river plants on the Alaknanda and Bhagirathi shut down repeatedly during the monsoon for desilting.
      The Fix: Require measured basin sediment yield data in the detailed project report and size desilting capacity against it rather than against a regional average.
    3. Cascade layouts convert one failure into several: Projects built in series on the same river mean an upstream breach delivers debris and water straight into the next structure. Eg. The 2021 Chamoli flood destroyed the Rishiganga project and then struck the Tapovan Vishnugad project downstream.
      The Fix: Assess clearances at the level of the whole river cascade, so cumulative and cascading failure is evaluated once rather than project by project.
    4. Tunnelling destabilises slopes and drains aquifers: Long headrace tunnels cut through fractured rock, dewater springs and remove support from the slopes above. Eg. Land subsidence in Joshimath in 2023 followed years of tunnelling and construction in the same valley.
      The Fix: Publish pre construction and post construction spring discharge and slope movement monitoring for every tunnelled project, with construction halted on a defined trigger.
    5. Rehabilitation is settled before the risk is understood: Displaced communities are resettled onto land whose hazard exposure has not itself been mapped. Eg. Resettlement colonies for Himalayan projects have been sited on debris fans and old landslide zones.
      The Fix: Require the resettlement site to carry its own hazard clearance before the displacement award is finalised.

    Conclusion

    Himalayan risk now runs through infrastructure as much as through geology. The two positions that cannot both hold are that dams are national assets worth building at scale and that the floods which destroy them cross three borders within minutes, with no obligation on the upstream state to say what is coming. Data sharing, not engineering standards, is the binding constraint on early warning. The concrete thing to watch is whether the India China expert level mechanism is widened past monsoon river flow data to cover glacial lake and reservoir conditions.

    [2023, GS3, 10 marks] Dam failures are always catastrophic, especially on the downstream side, resulting in a colossal loss of life and property. Analyze the various causes of dam failures. Give two examples of large dam failures.”

  • [3rd September 2026] The Hindu OpED: Many layers

    [3rd September 2026] The Hindu OpED: Many layers

    Question (2024, GS3): “Elucidate the importance of buffer stocks for stabilizing agricultural prices in India. What are the challenges associated with the storage of buffer stock? Discuss.
    Linkage: This question directly addresses the core policy tool used in onion management: state-led procurement and buffer stocking to counter short-term price volatility. It highlights the storage and logistical bottlenecks that lead to post-harvest collapses.

    Mentor Comment

    Onion price management has again run through a sequence of export restrictions and post collapse procurement, and neither has protected the farmer or the consumer. Since the 1960s Indian food policy has balanced affordable consumer prices against remunerative producer prices, with state intervention aimed at managing short term volatility rather than the underlying cause. Erratic weather and the absence of long term relief have made that balancing act harder to hold. The tension is that every corrective step arrives after farmers have already made production decisions and after prices have already collapsed, so the intervention reaches neither all farmers nor all grades of produce.

    What has the Centre’s onion trade policy been since 2023?

    1. The export ban: The government banned onion exports from December 2023 to May 2024.
    2. The price floor that replaced it: A minimum export price of $550 per tonne was imposed, which sets the lowest price at which a consignment may legally leave the country and works as a soft restriction on exports. A 40 per cent export duty was imposed alongside it.
    3. The rollback: The duty was reduced to 20 per cent in September 2024 and abolished in April 2025.

    Why does intervention after the event fail farmers?

    1. Policy changes after the sowing decision: The government often changes its position after farmers have made production decisions based on the price they expected.
    2. The procurement price was below cost: During the rabi harvest, onion farmers in Maharashtra, the country’s principal supplier, argued that the Centre’s procurement price of ₹12.35 per kg would not cover cultivation costs.
    3. The correction came too late for many: The Centre subsequently raised the price to up to ₹26.45 per kg. Many farmers could not capture the higher value, including some who had already sold at ₹1 per kg because of low quality and lack of storage.
    4. Coverage is partial by grade: Intervening after prices have already collapsed does not reach all farmers or all grades of produce.

    What pressures exposed the flaw this year?

    1. Rainfall at the wrong point in the cycle: Abnormal rainfall at the time of harvest hit the crop directly.
    2. A kharif shortfall in the main supplying State: Maharashtra recorded a 5 per cent to 7 per cent drop in the kharif crop.
    3. Onion resists buffering: The known difficulties of storing onion and of maintaining large buffers compound every supply shock rather than absorbing it.
    4. Manipulation is the secondary issue: The government has alluded to some price manipulation, and the dominant problem remains that policy keeps reacting rather than acting in advance.

    What proactive measures does the record point to?

    1. Storage: Improving storage options is the first named measure, since it is what allows a crop to be held past a price trough.
    2. Trade policy stability: A less erratic trade policy would let farmers price the export channel into their sowing decisions.
    3. Inter regional movement: Moving stock more efficiently between regions addresses the distribution failure rather than the production one.
    4. Price shock protection: Protecting farmers against price shocks is the fourth measure, and it operates before a collapse rather than after it.

    Does Tamil Nadu’s targeted subsidy resolve the problem or move it?

    1. The design: Tamil Nadu will buy 1,000 tonnes of onions to distribute 1 kg per ration card at ₹35.
    2. What it gets right: The design discourages hoarding while allowing private retail prices to cool down.
    3. The delivery channel is the risk: Distribution runs through a dry grain public distribution system network, which was not built for a crop that spoils quickly.
    4. The economic case has a threshold: That case could collapse if post harvest losses exceed 10 per cent to 15 per cent, and onion is more susceptible to such losses than wheat or rice.
    5. Persistence is the second risk: The case also weakens if the subsidy has to be continued rather than used once.
    6. Replication would exhaust the buffer: If other States adopt similar measures, the Central buffer could be quickly exhausted, more so given this year’s high storage losses of around 30 per cent.
    7. Pressure transfers to the Centre: The State scheme will impose pressure on the Centre to maintain a steady supply behind it.

    Challenges to stabilising onion prices

    1. Onion is bulky, perishable and stored without a cold chain: Farm level storage relies on ventilated structures whose losses rise sharply in a wet post monsoon. Eg. The traditional onion chawls of Nashik are open sided sheds with no humidity control.
      The Fix: Link the storage capital subsidy to a verified ventilation and moisture standard rather than to built area alone.
    2. Production is geographically concentrated: A weather event in one district cluster moves the national price because supply is not spread across regions. Eg. Lasalgaon in Nashik sets the reference price for the country’s onion trade.
      The Fix: Build procurement and modern storage capacity in Madhya Pradesh, Karnataka and Gujarat so the national price is not set by one belt.
    3. Sudden trade restrictions cost long term market access: Buyers who lose supply once diversify permanently, so the export channel is thinner when the surplus returns. Eg. Bangladesh and Sri Lanka shifted to Chinese, Pakistani and Egyptian onion during the Indian export restrictions.
      The Fix: Announce any trade measure with a fixed minimum notice period and a stated expiry date written into the notification.
    4. Procurement covers only a buffer, not the crop: Agency purchase is sized to stabilise consumer supply, so the price the farmer receives is still set by the open market. Eg. National Agricultural Cooperative Marketing Federation of India (NAFED) buying is confined to buffer accumulation and market release.
      The Fix: Add a deficiency price payment triggered on the mandi price falling below assessed cultivation cost, paid directly rather than through purchase.
    5. Farmers sow without a forward price signal: Acreage decisions are made months before the price is known, which is what produces the alternating glut and shortage. Eg. A remunerative rabi price pulls extra acreage into the next kharif sowing and depresses that crop’s price.
      The Fix: Publish an official pre sowing advisory each season carrying expected national acreage and an indicative price band.

    Conclusion

    Onion policy is being run as a series of corrections applied after the price has already moved. What remains unreconciled is that every correction reaches the farmer after both the sowing decision and the distress sale are complete. Storage capacity and orderly movement of stock are the only interventions that operate before a collapse rather than after it. Whether the Centre holds one trade regime steady through a full price cycle is the test of whether the approach has changed.

  • Pichavaram mangroves valued at ₹2,485 crore: study

    Pichavaram mangroves valued at ₹2,485 crore: study

    Why in the News

    A study of the Pichavaram mangrove ecosystem in Tamil Nadu has put its total economic value (TEV) at ₹2,485.38 crore, with a per hectare value of ₹1.83 crore. The valuation covers ecological, economic and social benefits together, and includes a separate blue carbon assessment of what the forest stores. The study was carried out at the Centre for Ecological Economics and Natural Resources, Institute for Social and Economic Change, Bengaluru, and was funded by the Forest Genetics Division, Coimbatore. The tension it identifies is that most of what a mangrove supplies is non market in nature, so it never enters the accounts that development planning actually uses.

    What is ecosystem service valuation?

    1. About: Ecosystem service valuation attaches a monetary figure to the benefits a natural system supplies, so that those benefits can be compared against the returns from converting the same land to another use.
    2. The four service categories: Mangrove systems supply provisioning, regulating, supporting and cultural ecosystem services. Provisioning covers physical output such as fish, regulating covers functions such as storm buffering and climate regulation, supporting covers processes such as nutrient cycling, and cultural covers non material benefits.
    3. Total economic value: TEV is the aggregate of all these service flows expressed in one figure, rather than only the marketed output the system yields.

    What did the valuation measure?

    1. The headline value: The total economic value of the Pichavaram mangrove ecosystem stands at ₹2,485.38 crore, and the per hectare value at ₹1.83 crore.
    2. Sediment holds more carbon than the trees: The analysis found that mangrove sediments constitute a more substantial carbon reservoir than the vegetation.
    3. Soil carbon density: Average soil organic carbon stock was estimated at 251.14 tonnes of carbon per hectare, generating an economic value of ₹90.24 lakh per hectare.
    4. Combined blue carbon asset: With vegetation and soil carbon pools taken together, the total blue carbon asset value of the ecosystem is ₹1,612.40 crore. Blue carbon is the carbon captured and stored by coastal and marine vegetation and the sediment beneath it.

    Why do these benefits stay out of development planning?

    1. The services are non market: Several ecological benefits are non market in nature and are not reflected in market transactions, so they generate no price a planner can read.
    2. Undervaluation is the consequence: Many ecosystem services remain undervalued in conventional development planning even where their contribution to ecological sustainability and human well being is established.
    3. Valuation is the bridge: A single expressed figure allows a non market service to be set against a marketed alternative use of the same coastal land.

    What makes Pichavaram ecologically significant?

    1. Status: It is deemed one of the most ecologically significant coastal wetland ecosystems in India.
    2. Biodiversity and fisheries: It supports biodiversity conservation and fisheries productivity.
    3. Coastal protection and climate regulation: It provides coastal protection, climate regulation and blue carbon sequestration.
    4. Livelihood security: It underpins livelihood security for the coastal communities that depend on it.

    How was the study built?

    1. Primary and secondary data: The assessment combined primary field data with secondary sources rather than relying on modelled estimates alone.
    2. Household survey base: Primary information was collected from 302 households across five mangrove dependent villages.
    3. The villages covered: The five are MGR Thittu, Kalaignar Nagar, Chinnavaikal, Patriadi and Mudasalodai.

    What does the study recommend?

    1. Valuation inside planning: Ecosystem service valuation should be integrated into coastal development planning and environmental decision making.
    2. Mangroves as nature based solutions: Mangroves should be recognised as key nature based solutions for climate adaptation and disaster risk reduction.
    3. Finance instruments: Blue carbon financing mechanisms, carbon credit programmes and Payment for Ecosystem Services schemes should be developed for these systems.

    Challenges to using ecosystem service valuation in coastal planning

    1. A non market service produces no cash flow: A protective service is realised only when the hazard it guards against actually occurs, so it never appears in a project’s financial statement. Eg. Mangrove storm buffering shows up as damage avoided during a cyclone landfall, which no project account records.
      The Fix: Require the ecosystem service value of the land to be entered as a stated line item in the cost benefit statement of every coastal infrastructure clearance.
    2. Valuation methods are contested: Survey based techniques such as willingness to pay measure what nearby residents can afford rather than what the service is worth to the wider economy. Eg. Household surveys in poor mangrove dependent villages return low willingness to pay figures for the same service that protects a city downstream.
      The Fix: Publish the method, the sample and the confidence range alongside every headline valuation figure so the number can be contested on its assumptions.
    3. Aquaculture and land conversion drive mangrove loss: The land use that competes with mangrove is profitable, immediate and privately captured, while the service lost is diffuse and public. Eg. Shrimp pond expansion along the Tamil Nadu and Andhra Pradesh coast has cleared mangrove and adjoining back swamp.
      The Fix: Tie Coastal Regulation Zone enforcement to satellite based mangrove cover monitoring with annual public reporting at the district level.
    4. Blue carbon credits lack a settled soil accounting standard: Sediment carbon is the largest pool and the least standardised, so the same forest yields different credit volumes under different protocols. Eg. Soil carbon is measured to one metre depth in some protocols and deeper in others.
      The Fix: Adopt a single national measurement protocol for mangrove soil organic carbon before any credit is issued against Indian mangrove land.
    5. Restoration often replaces hydrology with planting: Plantation drives on sites that were never mangrove habitat produce low survival and no service recovery. Eg. Monoculture planting on open mudflats has repeatedly failed where tidal flushing was never restored.
      The Fix: Restore tidal connectivity and creek hydrology first, and allow natural regeneration to determine species composition.

    Conclusion

    A valuation changes nothing by itself. It changes outcomes only when the figure enters the document that decides land use, and coastal zone plans in India are still written without one. Tamil Nadu’s coastal clearances are the place this will show. The marker to watch is whether an approval order for coastal land begins citing a per hectare service value against the project it is approving.

    Back2Basics

    1. Location: The Pichavaram mangrove forest lies in Cuddalore district on the Tamil Nadu coast.
    2. Setting: It sits in the estuarine complex formed between the Vellar and Coleroon rivers, adjoining the Killai backwater.
    3. Scale: It is among the largest mangrove forests in India and is made up of a network of islets separated by tidal creeks.
    4. Composition: Avicennia and Rhizophora are the dominant mangrove genera across the forest.

    [2023, GS3, 15 marks] Comment on the National Wetland Conservation Programme initiated by the Government of India and name a few India’s wetlands of international importance included in the Ramsar Sites.

  • UN sets pathway to tackle ‘inevitable breach’ of the 1.5°C global warming limit

    UN sets pathway to tackle ‘inevitable breach’ of the 1.5°C global warming limit

    Why in the News

    The United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) has for the first time set out a detailed “overshoot, peak, and decline” pathway for global warming. Its report, Limiting Overshoot, states that a breach of the 1.5 degrees Celsius limit is now unavoidable and will bring irreversible ecological losses that no adaptation initiative can undo. That limit is the central goal of the Paris Agreement, 2015, which committed parties to holding the rise in average global temperatures well below 2 degrees Celsius and to pursuing efforts to limit it to 1.5 degrees Celsius above pre industrial levels. The shift is in the framing rather than in the science: the objective being planned for is no longer the prevention of a breach but the management of one, described in the report itself as by no means an acceptable or preferred pathway and simply the best remaining option.

    What is the “overshoot, peak, and decline” pathway?

    1. The sequence it describes: Average global temperature crosses the 1.5 degrees Celsius limit, rises to a peak, and is then brought back down below the limit by 2100.
    2. What it tries to control: With the crossing treated as fixed, the two variables left are the height of the peak and the length of time spent above the limit, and the pathway seeks to hold both as low as possible.
    3. What it requires that mitigation alone does not: Returning below the limit after a peak requires removing carbon dioxide already in the atmosphere, not only stopping additional emissions.

    What do the warming projections show?

    1. The breach is imminent: Global warming will cross 1.5 degrees Celsius in the next few years.
    2. Full delivery of every pledge still overshoots: A scenario in which every country delivers on its national climate plan and its net zero target puts peak warming at 1.8 degrees Celsius.
    3. Current policies point far higher: They point to a rise of about 2.6 degrees Celsius by 2100, within a range of 1.9 to 3.6 degrees Celsius.

    What are the compounding costs of time spent above 1.5 degrees Celsius?

    1. Sea level and ocean systems: Sea level rise accelerates, and coral reefs collapse.
    2. Cryosphere: Glacier loss exceeds a quarter of global glacier mass by 2100.
    3. Food systems: Global food production declines by up to 14% by 2050 without effective adaptation.
    4. Tipping points: The odds rise of irreversible transitions in the West Antarctic and Greenland ice sheets, the Atlantic Meridional Overturning Circulation, the ocean current system that redistributes heat across the Atlantic, and the Amazon.

    Why is reversing an overshoot harder than avoiding it?

    1. Delay adds warming at a fixed rate: Every five years of continued high emissions adds roughly 0.1 degrees Celsius to peak warming.
    2. Removing the same warming costs far more than adding it: Reversing that 0.1 degrees Celsius afterwards means pulling about 220 billion tonnes of carbon dioxide out of the atmosphere, over and above whatever is still being emitted.
    3. Emission cuts alone no longer close the gap: A steep scaling up of nature based removals, such as large reforestation programmes, is required alongside them.

    Why does the report single out methane?

    1. A first for the United Nations: This is the first time a report of this kind has placed significant stress on methane rather than treating carbon dioxide as the only lever.
    2. Its share of the problem is large: Methane contributes about 0.5 degrees Celsius of current warming.
    3. It is the fastest acting lever available: Cutting methane is described as the most effective way to slow warming in the near term, which is precisely what holding down the peak requires.

    How was the diplomatic ground for conceding an overshoot laid?

    1. The concession was made first at a climate conference, not in a science report: The 30th UN Climate Change Conference (COP30), held in 2025 at Belém in Brazil, produced the consensus “Global Mutirão” decision, mutirão being a Portuguese term for collective effort.
    2. What made it significant: It was the first COP text to concede that a temporary overshoot of the 1.5 degrees Celsius limit was likely, given how fast the remaining carbon budget was being spent.
    3. The political framing accompanying the report: This summer’s heat, wildfires and floods have been described as a warning of what lies ahead, with the stated objective now to make the overshoot as small and as short as possible.

    Challenges to an overshoot, peak and decline pathway

    1. Carbon removal at the required scale does not exist: The pathway assumes gigatonne scale removal that current technology and land availability cannot deliver. Eg. Operating direct air capture plants worldwide remove a volume measured in thousands of tonnes a year against a requirement measured in billions.
      The Fix: Separate emission reduction and removal targets in every nationally determined contribution, so removal cannot be used to discount a country’s reduction obligation.
    2. Overshoot creates a moral hazard in near term policy: Once a temporary breach is accepted as planned for, the incentive to cut now weakens, because the shortfall is deferred to a future removal obligation. Eg. Net zero pledges dated to mid century already rely on unspecified future removals to close the residual gap.
      The Fix: Fix binding five year interim carbon budgets, so a country’s compliance is assessed against cumulative emissions rather than against a distant target year.
    3. Tipping points are not reversible when the temperature comes back down: Bringing temperature below the limit later does not restore a system that has already crossed its threshold. Eg. An ice sheet that has begun irreversible retreat continues losing mass even after warming stabilises.
      The Fix: Set the peak temperature, rather than the end of century value, as the headline metric against which climate policy is assessed.
    4. Nature based removal competes with food and land rights: Large reforestation programmes need land that is already used for cultivation, grazing or forest dwelling communities. Eg. Plantation drives on land recorded as degraded have displaced pastoral and forest dependent use in several countries.
      The Fix: Require free, prior and informed consent and a land tenure audit before any removal project is counted towards a national target.
    5. The cost falls on countries that did not cause the overshoot: Adaptation finance to survive the period above the limit is needed by economies with the least capacity to raise it. Eg. Small island developing states face permanent territorial loss from sea level rise they contributed almost nothing to.
      The Fix: Tie disbursement from the loss and damage fund to a published overshoot period schedule, so the finance arrives during the years the harm is being incurred.

    Conclusion

    The value of this pathway is that it makes the cost of delay arithmetic rather than rhetorical. Warming added by continuing to emit is cheap and automatic; warming removed afterwards is expensive, slow and dependent on technology that has not been built at scale. That asymmetry is what converts a distant target year into an immediate operational question about the next few years of emissions. The reform that follows is to shift the metric climate policy is judged on, from a date by which a country claims to reach balance to the height of the peak its emissions in this decade produce.

    [2025, GS3, 15 marks] Write a review on India’s climate commitments under the Paris Agreement (2015) and mention how these have been further strengthened in COP26 (2021). In this direction, how has the first Nationally Determined Contribution (NDC) intended by India been updated in 2022?”

  • SC seeks govt. explanation on IPS deputation in CAPFs

    SC seeks govt. explanation on IPS deputation in CAPFs

    Why in the News

    The Supreme Court has sought an explanation from the Union Home Secretary on the implementation of its judgment of 23 May 2025, which directed the Centre to progressively reduce the deputation of Indian Police Service (IPS) officers to senior posts in the Central Armed Police Forces (CAPFs).

    What did the 2025 judgment direct?

    1. The direction: Deputation posts held by IPS officers in the Senior Administrative Grade (SAG), the level up to the rank of Inspector General, in the CAPFs were to be progressively reduced over a period of time, within an outer limit of two years.
    2. The Bench: The ruling was delivered by a two judge Bench, one of whose members has since retired.
    3. The direction has been tested once already: The Union Home Ministry’s review petition against the judgment was dismissed on 28 October 2025.

    What has the Centre reported as compliance?

    1. A cadre review across every force: Following the dismissal of the review petition, all CAPFs were directed to submit detailed cadre review proposals, which the Ministry examined and forwarded to the Department of Personnel and Training (DoPT) with the Home Minister’s approval.
    2. The proposals are in the pipeline, dated: Cadre review proposals for the CRPF, BSF, CISF, ITBP and SSB were sent between 27 July and 3 August 2026, and were forwarded to the Department of Expenditure with the DoPT’s observations and recommendations on 17 August.
    3. The remaining steps have not been taken: After the Department of Expenditure comments, the proposals go to the Cadre Review Committee headed by the Cabinet Secretary, whose recommendations are then to be considered for approval by the competent authority.
    4. Other measures claimed: The Ministry stated that it had also examined the issue of IPS deputation and undertaken statutory changes.

    Why does the Court read the compliance record differently?

    1. Deputations continued after the judgment: An affidavit informed the Court that 46 IPS officers have been brought on deputation to the CAPFs up to the SAG level since the 2025 ruling.
    2. The Bench questioned the premise of the practice: It asked whether there are no competent officers within the CAPFs to hold responsible positions, and described the position as totally wrong.
    3. The service record cited against the practice: Officers with over 25 years of service defend the borders and have made supreme sacrifices, and the Bench held that a strong lobby leaves those cadre officers completely stifled.

    How does the CAPFs (General Administration) Act, 2026 change the dispute?

    1. A statute now occupies the ground the judgment covered: The Central Armed Police Forces (General Administration) Act, 2026 was published in the Gazette on 9 April, and the stated effect is to circumvent the 2025 judgment.
    2. The Act is itself under challenge: Five writ petitions challenging the legislation have been filed and are listed for hearing on 18 November.
    3. The affected constituency is organised: Members of the All Ex-Paramilitary Forces Welfare Association staged protests against the Bill before its enactment.
    4. The next date on the compliance track: The contempt matter is listed for hearing on 22 September.

    Challenges to reducing IPS deputation in the CAPFs

    1. The forces were designed around an officer shortfall they never closed: Direct entry recruitment into CAPF cadres has not kept pace with sanctioned strength at senior levels, which is the stated justification for deputation in the first place. Eg. Vacancies across CAPF officer ranks have been reported repeatedly to Parliament by the Ministry of Home Affairs.
      The Fix: Fix a dated recruitment and promotion calendar in each cadre review, so the shortfall that justifies deputation is closed rather than carried forward.
    2. Cadre review is an executive process with no judicial deadline attached: Every stage between a force’s proposal and the competent authority’s approval is discretionary in timing. Eg. The proposals here moved between three departments over several months without reaching the Cadre Review Committee.
      The Fix: Attach an outer time limit to each stage of the cadre review chain, reported to the Court as a compliance schedule rather than as a status update.
    3. Command experience is concentrated where promotion is blocked: Officers who spend a full career in one force acquire the operational knowledge that senior posts need, and are then passed over at exactly that level. Eg. Border guarding, counter insurgency and industrial security each demand force specific expertise that a short deputation tenure cannot build.
      The Fix: Reserve a fixed proportion of Inspector General level posts in each force for cadre officers, notified in the recruitment rules rather than settled case by case.
    4. A statute can displace a judicial direction unless the underlying defect is cured: New legislation on the same subject shifts the dispute from contempt to constitutional validity and restarts the litigation clock. Eg. The five writ petitions against the 2026 Act put the question back at the beginning after a judgment and a dismissed review.
      The Fix: Amend the recruitment rules of each force to give effect to the direction, so compliance rests on subordinate legislation the Court has already read rather than on a fresh statute.
    5. Organisational identity is unresolved in law: The forces are described as paramilitary in public and as police organisations in service rules, and the ambiguity drives the parity claims on pay, pension and command. Eg. The demand for organised group A service status for CAPF cadres was itself settled only through litigation.
      The Fix: Settle the service classification of each force explicitly in the rules framed under the governing statute, so command structure follows from a stated status.

    Conclusion

    The question before the Court has changed shape since it was first answered. It began as a service dispute about who commands a force, moved to whether a direction on that dispute was being implemented, and now turns on whether a statute passed after the judgment can occupy the same ground. That last question is the one that decides the other two, and it is the pending challenge to the new Act, not the contempt proceeding, that will settle it. What to watch is whether the recruitment rules of the individual forces are amended at all, because a direction that never reaches the rules governing promotion has not been implemented whatever the affidavits record.

    Back2Basics: Central Armed Police Forces

    1. What they are: Seven armed forces of the Union under the Ministry of Home Affairs, distinct from the armed forces under the Ministry of Defence and from the State police, raised for internal security and border guarding duties.
    2. The seven forces: Assam Rifles, Border Security Force, Central Industrial Security Force, Central Reserve Police Force, Indo-Tibetan Border Police, National Security Guard and Sashastra Seema Bal.
    3. Command structure: Each force has its own directly recruited cadre, and senior posts are filled by a combination of that cadre and IPS officers on deputation from State cadres.
    4. Constitutional basis: They are raised under Entry 2A of the Union List, which covers deployment of any armed force of the Union in a State in aid of the civil power.

    [2023, GS3, 15 marks] What are the internal security challenges being faced by India? Give out the role of Central Intelligence and Investigative Agencies tasked to counter such threats.”

  • ‘Bihar’s concerns on Ganga treaty will be considered’

    ‘Bihar’s concerns on Ganga treaty will be considered’

    Why in the News

    The External Affairs Minister has written that India will decide on the renewal of the Ganga Water Treaty, 1996 with Bangladesh while keeping Bihar’s interests in consideration. The letter answers a Janata Dal (United) Member of Parliament, a former Bihar Water Resources Minister, who had called on the government not to renew the treaty on the ground that it had negatively impacted the State. The treaty expires on 31 December 2026, and its renewal is one of the major items on this year’s diplomatic calendar for the two countries. The tension is that a bilateral instrument negotiated as a foreign policy commitment is now being contested by the riparian State that says it carries the domestic cost of that commitment.

    What is the India-Bangladesh Ganga Water Treaty, 1996?

    1. What it does: It governs the sharing of Ganga waters between India and Bangladesh at the Farakka Barrage in West Bengal during the dry season, from 1 January to 31 May each year, when flows are lowest and competition for water is sharpest.
    2. How the sharing works: Availability at Farakka is measured in ten day cycles, and the water is divided between the two countries according to a formula fixed to the flow observed in that cycle rather than to a fixed annual quantity.
    3. Its term and oversight: The treaty was signed for 30 years, and a Joint Committee of officials from both countries observes flows at Farakka and reports on implementation.

    What is Bihar’s objection to renewal?

    1. The State says the costs fall upstream: Maintaining the assured flow at Farakka is held to have contributed to silt accumulation upstream in Bihar’s stretch of the Ganga, raising the riverbed and worsening flooding.
    2. The demand is framed as an entitlement, not a concession: Bihar is described as asking only for what its own scientific assessment establishes, so that 13 crore people are not left short of water for drinking, irrigation and industrial supply for another 30 years.
    3. The characterisation of the original bargain: The treaty is described as a remnant of the Gujral Doctrine era, which projected a generous image of India in the neighbourhood without serving Bihar’s interests.
    4. The demand itself: Reading the data across the treaty’s 30 years, the State’s position is that India should allow the treaty to lapse rather than renew it.

    How does the Centre say the decision will be taken?

    1. The process is inter ministerial, not purely diplomatic: Consultations involving relevant stakeholders have been held under the leadership of the Ministry of Jal Shakti to ensure broad based consultation on the future of the treaty.
    2. Bihar was represented in them: An authorised representative of the Government of Bihar participated in consultations held on 22 August 2023, 30 October 2023, 15 March 2024 and 31 May 2024.
    3. No decision has been announced: The stated position is that the government will take the appropriate decision while keeping these factors in focus.

    Why does the renewal question arrive at a difficult bilateral moment?

    1. Political contact between the two governments has thinned: The renewal is in focus partly because top level political meetings between India and Bangladesh have not been taking place.
    2. A planned visit collapsed: Talks for a New Delhi visit by Bangladesh’s Prime Minister broke down over a virtual press conference given in New Delhi by the deposed former Prime Minister of Bangladesh.
    3. The clock is fixed while the diplomacy is not: The expiry date is unaffected by the state of political contact, so the negotiating window narrows regardless of whether high level engagement resumes.

    Challenges to renewing the Ganga Water Treaty

    1. The treaty measures flow but does not allocate sediment: A water sharing formula fixed to discharge at a barrage says nothing about the silt that the same regime deposits upstream. Eg. Bihar’s objection turns on riverbed aggradation upstream of Farakka rather than on the volume of water it receives.
      The Fix: Add a sediment management protocol to the renewed instrument, with joint measurement of bed levels upstream and downstream of the barrage.
    2. A riparian State bears the cost of a Union treaty with no channel to price it: Foreign affairs is a Union subject while water is a State subject, so the State that absorbs the consequence has no formal standing in the negotiation. Eg. Bihar’s participation here was through inter ministerial consultations, which are advisory and produce no binding record of its position.
      The Fix: Institutionalise a standing riparian States consultation under the Ministry of Jal Shakti for every transboundary river negotiation, with its recommendations placed on record before signature.
    3. The lean season formula does not survive a drying trend: A sharing arrangement written around observed historical flows becomes unworkable when the flows themselves decline. Eg. Reduced Himalayan glacier melt contribution and increased upstream withdrawal both cut dry season discharge in the Ganga basin.
      The Fix: Build a variable review clause into the renewed treaty, triggering renegotiation when measured dry season flow falls below a defined threshold for consecutive years.
    4. The basin is shared by more than two countries: Bilateral treaties on a river rising in Nepal and China cannot govern the augmentation that would actually solve the shortage. Eg. Proposals to augment lean season Ganga flow depend on storage in Nepal, which is not a party to this treaty.
      The Fix: Pursue a basin level arrangement in parallel, beginning with data sharing and joint storage feasibility studies with Nepal.
    5. Non renewal is not a costless option: Allowing the treaty to lapse removes the only agreed mechanism regulating dry season flows and hands the issue to unilateral action. Eg. The pre 1996 period saw recurring disputes over Farakka withdrawals with no settled sharing formula.
      The Fix: Treat renegotiation on revised terms, rather than lapse, as the fallback position, so the sharing mechanism survives while the formula changes.

    Conclusion

    The dispute is not really about whether the treaty is renewed. It is about the absence of a mechanism to price a domestic cost inside a foreign policy decision. A State that carries the physical consequence of a river agreement participates only through consultations that leave no binding record of what it asked for and no obligation to answer it. What to watch is whether the scientific assessment Bihar rests its case on is placed on the record of the negotiation, since a claim that is never formally examined cannot be formally rejected either.

    [2026, GS1, 10 marks] “Water resources are both an asset and a source of conflict in South Asia.” Examine this statement giving examples.”

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