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  • Take Bishkek to BRICS

    Take Bishkek to BRICS

    Why in the News

    The Bishkek SCO summit offered India a preview of the challenges awaiting BRICS: balancing strategic autonomy, geopolitical rivalry, institutional cooperation and an increasingly diverse, difficult-to-align membership.

    Why is Central Asia’s diversification an opening for India?

    1. A region loosening one dependence: Central Asia was shaped by its Soviet past and still maintains economic links with Russia, but its five countries no longer treat Moscow as their sole partner.
    2. China, Iran and the Gulf as alternatives: The region now looks to China for trade, investment and infrastructure, and to Iran and the Gulf for access to the south. The ongoing conflict complicates the southern route.
    3. Shared security concerns: The region’s growing strategic importance and shared concerns, including terrorism, are what led India and all Central Asian states except Turkmenistan to establish strategic partnerships, which gives India standing before the summit began.

    How can India build connectivity without a land route?

    1. Geography blocks the direct routes: There is no overland access through Pakistan, and Afghanistan’s airspace remains beset by security risks. The absence of direct land access has constrained trade and wider economic and cultural engagement.
    2. Connectivity as strategic geography: Connectivity goes beyond roads and railways. It shapes the economic and strategic geography of Eurasia, so India must expand engagement in ways that overcome the limits geography imposes.
    3. Start with what does not travel by road: The starting point is products and services that do not depend on roads, namely services, digital systems and technological investments.

    Why is the SCO a weak platform for India’s terrorism agenda?

    1. What India asked for: The Prime Minister called on the international community to collectively dismantle the ecosystem of terror, including its financing and recruitment networks.
    2. The will has weakened: International political will against terrorism has weakened over the past year, and the forum reflects that shift.
    3. Pakistan’s recovered standing: Over the past year Pakistan has largely overcome its diplomatic isolation, and it is set to assume the SCO’s rotational chairmanship.
    4. A forum that could not agree on words: In June last year the SCO defence ministers could not agree on the references to terrorism in their joint statement.
    5. China’s financial weight: China possesses greater financial resources than any other member and is heavily investing in Central Asian infrastructure under the Belt and Road Initiative, which sets the forum’s centre of gravity.

    Why should bilateral ties be the objective inside a multilateral forum?

    1. Weight on individual partnerships: Given the forum’s limits, Delhi should place greater weight on its individual partnerships with member states.
    2. The Uzbekistan uranium agreement: The agreement with Uzbekistan on the long-term supply of uranium is a step in that direction.
    3. Multi-vector actors want options: Central Asian countries are emerging as multi-vector actors. They seek multiple options to improve market access rather than choosing between competing powers, and India should become one of those options.
    4. The forum as a venue: A multilateral forum like the SCO is best used to advance bilateral relationships, and that is the strategy to carry forward to BRICS as India prepares to host its 18th summit.

    Conclusion

    The SCO no longer delivers on India’s terrorism agenda, and geography limits what it can deliver on connectivity. What remains useful is the room the summit gives India to sign with individual member states. The test of that approach is whether the BRICS summit in New Delhi produces bilateral agreements of the Uzbekistan uranium kind rather than only a joint declaration.

    Back2Basics: Shanghai Cooperation Organisation

    1. Origin: Founded in 2001 in Shanghai, growing out of the Shanghai Five grouping of 1996 that settled border issues between China, Russia and three Central Asian states.
    2. Membership: Ten members, China, Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, India, Pakistan, Iran and Belarus. India and Pakistan joined in 2017, Iran in 2023 and Belarus in 2024.
    3. Structure: The Secretariat is in Beijing and the Regional Anti-Terrorist Structure is in Tashkent. The chairmanship rotates annually among members, and the chair hosts the next summit.

    “[2026, GS2, 10 marks] “IPMDA (Indo-Pacific Partnership for Maritime Domain Awareness) bridges the gap between India’s SAGAR (Security and Growth for All in the Region) vision and the Quad’s collective Indo-Pacific strategy.” Make a critical assessment of the statement focusing on IPMDA.”

  • Red label for salt, sugar and fat is a good start

    Red label for salt, sugar and fat is a good start

    Why in the News

    The Food Safety and Standards Authority of India (FSSAI) has proposed front-of-pack warnings (mandatory cautions printed on the front face of a packet, not in the nutrition table on the back) in the form of red hexagonal labels on packaged food high in sugar, refined carbohydrates, salt and unhealthy fats.

    Can a warning label change what people actually eat?

    1. The case for scepticism: Eating behaviour is complex and shaped by gender, economic wherewithal, awareness and faith-based restrictions, so a label competes with several stronger determinants of choice.
    2. The evidence from Chile: Chile recorded a 24 per cent drop in sugary drink consumption after it introduced black octagonal warning labels on packages in 2016, which shows that a clear front-of-pack warning can shift consumption.
    3. Why the earlier star design failed: An earlier FSSAI proposal for a health star rating was criticised because stars are perceived as positive. Warning labels bearing stars have been associated with increased consumption of unhealthy foods, so clarity and legibility decide whether a label warns or advertises.

    Why can a label be only one part of the response?

    1. A double burden: The obesity epidemic exists alongside malnutrition, so a policy that only discourages excess consumption addresses one half of India’s nutrition problem.
    2. The broader public-health response: The label must sit inside three further measures, raising nutritional awareness, stronger regulation of junk food, and nudges towards healthier lifestyles.
    3. What a label can honestly claim: A red label on a packet will not by itself make people eat better. Its value lies in making it easier to tell healthy choices from harmful ones at the point of purchase.

    Challenges to the front-of-pack warning label proposal

    1. No notification or timeline yet: The proposal has not been notified and the implementation timeline is still awaited, so the regulator’s intent has no legal force. Eg. FSSAI’s 2022 draft for an Indian Nutrition Rating star label was never operationalised and has now been replaced by this proposal.
      The Fix: Notify the regulation with dated phases so manufacturers and consumers have a fixed compliance calendar.
    2. A threshold that misses single-nutrient products: The first of two intended phases applies the label only where a product is high in two or more unhealthy ingredients, which leaves out products high in just one. Eg. A sweetened biscuit that is high in sugar but within limits for salt and fat would carry no warning in phase one.
      The Fix: Trigger the label on any single nutrient of concern crossing its limit, as Chile’s per-nutrient octagons do.
    3. A font too small to warn: The proposed font size may be too small to be effective, so the label could exist on paper without being seen on the shelf. Eg. Chile fixes a minimum size for each octagon relative to the pack face so it cannot be shrunk into the design.
      The Fix: Prescribe a minimum label area as a share of the front panel rather than a point size alone.

    Conclusion

    A warning label sorts products, it does not by itself change appetite. The Chilean result shows the sort is worth doing when the mark is unambiguous. What decides the outcome now is the notification: the date it is issued, whether phase one keeps the two-ingredient threshold, and whether the font is large enough to be read. Those three details are what to watch when FSSAI publishes the final regulation.

    Back2Basics: Food Safety and Standards Authority of India

    1. Statutory basis: FSSAI is a statutory body established under the Food Safety and Standards Act, 2006, which consolidated earlier food laws into a single regulator.
    2. Ministry and location: It functions under the Ministry of Health and Family Welfare and is headquartered in New Delhi.
    3. Mandate: It lays down science-based standards for food articles and regulates their manufacture, storage, distribution, sale and import, including labelling and display rules.

    [2024, GS2, 15 marks] In a crucial domain like the public healthcare system, the Indian State should play a vital role to contain the adverse impact of marketisation of the system. Suggest some measures through which the State can enhance the reach of public healthcare at the grassroots level.”

  • Over 7,200 CBI cases under Prevention of Corruption Act pending trial, says CVC report

    Over 7,200 CBI cases under Prevention of Corruption Act pending trial, says CVC report

    Why in the News

    The Central Vigilance Commission (CVC) has reported in its annual report that over 7,200 cases investigated by the Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI) under the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 were awaiting completion of trial at the end of 2025.

    Where does the anti-corruption pipeline stall?

    1. Trials run past two decades: More than 400 of the 7,229 pending Prevention of Corruption Act trials have been open for over 20 years.
    2. Appeals add a second backlog: 14,083 appeals, revisions and writ petitions under the Act were pending in the High Courts and the Supreme Court.
    3. Over a third of those are more than a decade old: 3,161 were 10 to 15 years old, 1,347 were 15 to 20 years old and 739 were over 20 years old.
    4. The wider trial load is larger still: Counting cases outside the Act, 11,510 CBI court cases were pending trial at the end of the year.

    What do the investigation and conviction figures show?

    1. Convictions improved: The conviction rate in CBI cases was 71.71 percent in 2025 against 69.14 percent in 2024.
    2. Investigation pendency is small by comparison: 755 corruption related cases were pending investigation, made up of 679 regular cases, 63 preliminary enquiries and 13 Lokpal references (cases the Lokpal has referred to the CBI for investigation).
    3. A year is the usual limit, and 274 cases crossed it: Of the 679 regular cases, 274 had been pending for over one year.
    4. The intake in 2025: The CBI registered 797 regular cases, 177 preliminary enquiries and recorded 31 Lokpal references during the year.

    What capacity does the vigilance system have?

    1. One in seven CBI posts is vacant: Against a sanctioned strength of 7,300, 1,088 posts were vacant, with the largest gap of 672 in the executive ranks.
    2. Departmental inquiries under the Commission: For officers under CVC jurisdiction, 1,460 departmental inquiries were in process during 2025 and 731 were completed.
    3. Inquiries outside its purview: For employees outside its jurisdiction, 9,883 inquiries were in process and 5,561 were completed.
    4. Complaint disposal kept pace: The Commission received 34,153 complaints in 2025 in addition to 1,260 carried forward from 2024, and disposed of 35,193.

    Challenges to prosecuting corruption under the Prevention of Corruption Act

    1. Sanction is a gate the executive controls: Section 19 requires the government’s sanction before a court can take cognisance against a public servant, and Section 17A, added by the Prevention of Corruption (Amendment) Act, 2018, requires prior approval even to begin an inquiry into a decision taken in official capacity. Eg. In Vineet Narain v Union of India (1997) the Supreme Court fixed a three month limit for sanction decisions, and the 2018 amendment wrote that limit, extendable by one month, into Section 19 itself.
      The Fix: Treat sanction as deemed granted when the statutory period lapses without a decision.
    2. Special courts are too few for the load: Section 3 of the Act requires trials before special judges, and the same judges carry other criminal work, so a corruption trial waits behind the general docket. Eg. In Ashwini Kumar Upadhyay v Union of India the Supreme Court in 2021 recorded 4,984 pending criminal cases against legislators and directed special courts to prioritise them.
      The Fix: Designate exclusive special judges for Prevention of Corruption Act trials in every district with a CBI court, with a monthly disposal target monitored by the High Court.
    3. State consent limits where the CBI can act: Under Section 6 of the Delhi Special Police Establishment Act, 1946 the CBI needs a State’s consent to investigate within it, and a growing list of States has withdrawn general consent so every case needs a fresh order. Eg. West Bengal withdrew general consent in November 2018, and in 2024 the Supreme Court allowed the State’s suit against the Union over CBI investigations to proceed to trial.
      The Fix: Enact a standalone CBI statute defining its jurisdiction, as the Parliamentary Standing Committee on Personnel, Public Grievances, Law and Justice recommended in 2023.
    4. Deputation, not a cadre, staffs the agency: The CBI fills most executive posts by deputation from State police and central forces, so vacancies persist when States decline to release officers. Eg. In May 2013, during the coal block allocation hearing, the Supreme Court described the CBI as a “caged parrot” after the agency’s status report had been shared with the Law Minister.
      The Fix: Expand direct recruitment at the sub inspector and deputy superintendent levels and offer fixed tenure with cadre security to reduce reliance on deputation.

    Conclusion

    The Commission’s numbers show the agency’s work improving at the stages it controls and stalling at the stages it does not. The pendency now sits with the courts and the sanctioning authorities rather than with the investigators. The marker to watch is whether the next annual report shows the oldest trials closing rather than the backlog growing.

    Back2Basics: Central Vigilance Commission (CVC)

    1. Origin: Set up in 1964 on the recommendation of the Santhanam Committee on Prevention of Corruption, and made a statutory body by the Central Vigilance Commission Act, 2003.
    2. Composition: A Central Vigilance Commissioner and up to two Vigilance Commissioners, appointed by the President on the recommendation of a committee of the Prime Minister, the Union Home Minister and the Leader of the Opposition in the Lok Sabha.
    3. Powers over the CBI: It exercises superintendence over the CBI’s investigations of offences under the Prevention of Corruption Act by virtue of Section 4 of the Delhi Special Police Establishment Act, 1946, and reviews the progress of those investigations.
    4. Reporting: It submits an annual report to the President, and the report is laid before both Houses of Parliament.

    [2026, GS2, 15 marks] “Transparency and accountability in governance are not about controlling corruption but about creating the trust of stakeholders in the policy process by following the Rule of Law and Participatory Governance.” Comment.”

  • CJP condition, Govt request: SC quashes student protest FIRs

    Why in the News

    The Supreme Court has quashed every FIR registered across the country against students who took part in the Jantar Mantar protests over exam paper leaks, invoking its power under Article 142 of the Constitution to pass any order needed for “complete justice” in a matter before it.

    How far does the quashing reach?

    1. Five applicants, one order: A three judge Bench headed by the Chief Justice of India allowed applications by the Delhi Police and the States of Maharashtra, Bihar, Assam and West Bengal.
    2. States that never asked are covered too: The Bench was told that Madhya Pradesh and Uttar Pradesh had registered FIRs without approaching the court. It directed that any FIR on the protests of July 20 to 25, 2026 in any State or Union Territory not brought to its notice shall not be pursued or investigated and is to be treated as closed.
    3. No fresh FIRs anywhere: No State or Union Territory may register a new FIR over those protest incidents.
    4. The reason given is the protesters’ future: The Bench said it invoked Article 142 keeping in view the future of young protesters who came to protest in good faith.

    Who stays outside the protection?

    1. A fresh FIR against 2,873 named individuals: The Centre and the Delhi Police may register a new FIR in respect of 2,873 people with criminal records who were allegedly present at the protest sites.
    2. The charges the police cited: The Delhi Police had told the court those individuals faced serious charges including murder, attempt to murder, dacoity, rape and offences under the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012.
    3. Rights are preserved on both sides: The fresh FIR is to be registered without prejudice to the rights of the parties to take lawful recourse.

    What did each side commit to in exchange?

    1. The Centre asked for the widest quashing: The Solicitor General recalled the discussions that ended the July protests and the assurances given to the protesters. He urged the court to quash FIRs even in States and Union Territories that had not approached it, since the protesters doubted the assurances would be honoured.
    2. The Centre asked for time on compensation: The Solicitor General sought time to work out the modalities for compensating the families of students who took their lives after the paper leak, and said the government remained committed to its assurances.
    3. The CJP withdrew its march: Its spokesperson told the Bench that the positive assurances of the Government and the judicial sanctity now given to them made the march unnecessary, and that the party looks forward to compliance with the order.
    4. The order is conditional on both sides: The Bench recorded that both sides shall abide by the statements and commitments made before it, and made the Article 142 order subject to that understanding.
    5. It is not a precedent: The directions were issued in the peculiar facts and circumstances of the case and shall not be treated as a precedent.
    6. The Chief Justice framed it as mutual gesture: The CJI said that if both sides show a good gesture every issue can be resolved one by one, and credited both sides for creating a constructive environment for youngsters.

    What compensation framework did the Court direct?

    1. A pan India model policy: The Central government is to formulate the modalities and a policy for compensation on a pan India basis. The model policy is to be circulated to all States and Union Territories in consultation with them and adopted as a regular mechanism of compensatory measures.
    2. NEET 2026 families are paid first: For students who died by suicide in connection with NEET 2026, the Centre is to pay compensation to the affected families within three months of framing the policy.

    Challenges to settling protest FIRs through Article 142

    1. Article 142 bypasses the statutory quashing route: Section 528 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 vests the power to quash an FIR in the High Court of the State concerned, and a single Supreme Court order displaces that forum for every State at once. Eg. In Supreme Court Bar Association v Union of India (1998) a Constitution Bench held that Article 142 cannot be used to supplant substantive law or ignore a statute’s express provisions.
      The Fix: Have non-applicant States file compromise petitions in their own High Courts with the settlement terms annexed, so each quashing rests on a statutory order.
    2. Executive withdrawal was available and unused: The prosecution can withdraw a case with the court’s consent under Section 360 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023, and that route keeps the accountability for dropping cases on the government that registered them. Eg. After the farm laws were repealed in December 2021, cases against protesting farmers were withdrawn by the Union and State governments through executive decisions, not a court order.
      The Fix: Record in the order that the Centre and the States remain responsible for withdrawing any residual proceedings, so the government’s assurance is enforceable against it rather than delegated to the court.
    3. A pending charge is treated as a record: The carve out uses pendency of serious charges, not conviction, as the ground for a fresh FIR, so presence at a protest becomes an offence for one class of citizens. Eg. In Amanatullah Khan v Commissioner of Police, Delhi (2024) the Supreme Court directed the Delhi Police to revisit its rules on history sheets after finding that persons were being listed mechanically.
      The Fix: Register any fresh FIR only on individual evidence of an overt act at the site, not on a police list of those present.
    4. Court directed compensation has no statutory anchor: A model policy the Centre drafts and States adopt by consultation binds no State that declines, so relief becomes uneven across the country. Eg. Victim compensation under Section 357A of the Code of Criminal Procedure, inserted in 2009, produced uneven State schemes until the Supreme Court in Nipun Saxena v Union of India (2018) had the National Legal Services Authority frame a uniform scheme.
      The Fix: Add a victim relief chapter to the Public Examinations (Prevention of Unfair Means) Act, 2024 so compensation for leak affected candidates binds every State by statute.

    Conclusion

    The order closes the confrontation between the government and the protesters, not the paper leak problem that produced it. Its force rests on a promise from each side rather than on any finding of law. The marker to watch is the Centre’s model compensation policy and whether the States that never came to court treat their FIRs as closed.

    Back2Basics: Article 142 of the Constitution

    1. Text: Article 142(1) lets the Supreme Court pass any decree or order necessary for doing complete justice in any cause or matter pending before it, enforceable throughout India.
    2. Supporting power: Article 142(2) lets the Court secure the attendance of any person, order the discovery of documents, and punish for contempt of itself.
    3. Nature: The power is discretionary and curative, used to fill gaps where no statutory remedy fits the case before the Court.
    4. Landmark uses: The Bhopal gas settlement of 1989 and the allotment of land to the Sunni Waqf Board in M Siddiq v Mahant Suresh Das (2019), the Ayodhya title case, both rested on Article 142.

    “[2022] Consider the following statements :

    1. Pursuant to the report of H.N. Sanyal Committee, the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 was passed.

    2. The Constitution of India empowers the Supreme Court and the High Courts to punish for contempt of themselves.

    3. The Constitution of India defines Civil Contempt and Criminal Contempt.

    4. In India, the Parliament is vested with the powers to make laws on Contempt of Court.

    Which of the statements given above is/are correct ?

    (a) 1 and 2 only

    (b) 1, 2 and 4

    (c) 3 and 4 only

    (d) 3 only

  • Statistical Institute Bill referred to standing committee

    Why in the News

    The Lok Sabha Speaker has referred the Indian Statistical Institute Bill, 2026 to the Department-Related Standing Committee on Finance for examination. The Bill was introduced in the Lok Sabha during the Monsoon Session. It seeks to repeal the Indian Statistical Institute Act, 1959 and to incorporate the institute as a “body corporate” with a Board of Governors accountable to the Central government. The referral follows protests by the institute’s faculty and an Opposition demand that the Bill go to a standing committee. The tension is between a governance overhaul the government says the 1959 Act cannot deliver and a faculty that protested the Bill before it reached a committee.

    What does the Bill propose for the institute?

    1. Incorporation as a body corporate: The institute is to be incorporated to strengthen governance, promote academic excellence and research, and serve emerging needs in statistics and allied fields.
    2. The President as Visitor: The Bill makes the President the Visitor of the institute.
    3. A Board of Governors answerable to the Centre: The board is the principal policy executive body, headed by a chairperson drawn from academia, industry, education, public policy or statistical sciences. The Bill makes the board accountable to the Central government.
    4. An Academic Council under the director: The council is the principal academic body, headed by the institute’s director, with every full time professor and full time faculty member on it.
    5. A talent pipeline as the stated purpose: The Bill says the reform will build an ecosystem to train a new generation of high quality data scientists and statisticians and close the talent gap in India’s technology and financial sectors.

    Why does the government say the 1959 Act must go?

    1. The 1959 Act fixed status and one degree power: The Indian Statistical Institute Act, 1959 declared the institute an institution of national importance and let it grant degrees and diplomas in statistics.
    2. The 1995 amendment widened degrees, not governance: It added mathematics, quantitative economics, computer science and other subjects related to statistics as the institute determines from time to time.
    3. Five areas are called inadequate: The Bill says the Act has limited provisions on governance, administration, finance, accountability and functioning, and cannot respond to an evolving academic and research environment.
    4. Repeal rather than a second amendment: The government chose to repeal the 1959 Act and replace it with a comprehensive incorporation law.

    Challenges to the Indian Statistical Institute Bill, 2026

    1. A Centre accountable board reverses the founding design: The institute has run since 1932 as a registered society governed by its own council, and a statutory board answerable to the Central government moves the final say outside the institute. Eg. The Indian Institutes of Management (Amendment) Act, 2023 made the President the Visitor of the IIMs with power to appoint and remove directors, six years after the 2017 Act had handed those powers to their boards.
      The Fix: Write the board’s autonomy in academic and appointment matters into the Bill as a statutory guarantee, with the Centre’s role limited to audit and financial accountability.
    2. Statistical credibility rests on perceived independence: The institute’s faculty design methods used in national statistics, and executive control over its board invites doubt about the numbers at a time of live disputes over GDP methodology. Eg. In January 2019 two members of the National Statistical Commission, including its acting chairman, resigned after release of the Periodic Labour Force Survey for 2017-18 was withheld.
      The Fix: Fix the institute’s faculty and external statisticians as a majority on the board so the Centre’s nominees cannot outvote them.
    3. Faculty consent was not built into the process: The Bill reached introduction over faculty protest, and a governance law imposed on an academic community produces sustained non-cooperation. Eg. Delhi University’s Four Year Undergraduate Programme, introduced in 2013 without faculty consensus, was rolled back in 2014 on the University Grants Commission’s direction after sustained teacher opposition.
      The Fix: Have the standing committee take evidence from the faculty and the institute’s council before the Bill returns to the House.

    Conclusion

    The Bill’s stage is referral to the Department-Related Standing Committee on Finance after introduction in the Lok Sabha. The committee’s report is due within three months, and the Bill waits in the House until it comes. The committee’s treatment of the board’s accountability clause is what decides whether the faculty’s objection is answered or overridden.

    Back2Basics: Department-Related Standing Committees

    1. Origin: Parliament set up 17 Department-Related Standing Committees in 1993 and expanded them to 24 in 2004, each covering a set of ministries.
    2. Composition: Each has 31 members, 21 from the Lok Sabha and 10 from the Rajya Sabha, nominated by the Speaker and the Chairman, and a minister cannot be a member.
    3. Control: Sixteen committees, including Finance, work under the Lok Sabha Speaker and eight under the Rajya Sabha Chairman.
    4. Output: Their reports on Bills, demands for grants and policy are recommendatory, and the government tables an action taken report on them.

    “[2026] Consider the following statements about the Committee on the Welfare of Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes of the Parliament of India:

    1. Although members of this Committee are elected from both Houses of Parliament, the Chairperson of this Committee is appointed by the Chairman of the Rajya Sabha.

    2. Twenty members are elected by the Rajya Sabha and ten members by the Lok Sabha.

    3. No Minister, except for the Union Minister of Social Justice and Empowerment, is eligible to be a member of this Committee.

    4. Members are elected for a fixed term of two years from the date they enter their office.

    Which one of the following conclusions based on the above statements is correct?

    (a) There are four correct statements

    (b) There is only one correct statement, that is statement 2

    (c) There are two correct statements, that include statement 1

    (d) There is no correct statement

  • Jharkhand SIR faceoff: BJP agents seek to delete voters, BLOs raise red flag

    Why in the News

    Booth Level Officers (BLOs) in at least four booths of Jharkhand’s Godda district have refused stacks of Form 7 applications seeking deletion of voters from the draft electoral roll, flagging them as not genuine or not procedurally sound. The applications were brought by Booth Level Agents (BLAs) of the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), and most of the names on them are from the minority community. The draft roll was published under the State’s Special Intensive Revision (SIR), and the claims and objections round on it is still open. The BJP has complained that the BLOs are at fault for refusing the forms. BLOs are State government employees, and the State is governed by a Jharkhand Mukti Morcha (JMM)-Congress alliance, so the standoff has acquired a party colour and has reached the Chief Electoral Officer (CEO). The tension is that Form 7 requires no evidence and has no filing cap, so the only safeguard against targeted bulk deletion is the inquiry after intake, and the CEO and the local Electoral Registration Officer (ERO) disagree on whether a BLO may refuse a form at all.

    How is a Form 7 deletion supposed to work?

    1. The statutory power sits with the ERO: Section 22 of the Representation of the People Act, 1950 lets the ERO correct or delete an entry on its own motion or on an application. In each case the ERO must hold an inquiry, give the elector time to respond and then pass an order.
    2. Only three grounds justify deletion: The ERO can remove an entry where the person has died, is no longer ordinarily resident in the constituency, or is ineligible because they are not a citizen or are under 18.
    3. Form 7 is the objection instrument: Under the Registration of Electors Rules, 1960, Form 7 carries an objection to a proposed inclusion or a deletion of a name in an existing roll. Any elector may use it to delete their own name or to object to another elector in the same constituency.
    4. The applicant proves nothing but signs a declaration: The form asks for one of five reasons, death, under age, absent or permanently shifted, already enrolled, or not Indian citizen, and needs no evidence. The applicant signs a declaration that a statement known to be false is punishable.

    Where does the online filing system leave the safeguard?

    1. Filing has moved online: The form can be downloaded from the voters’ portal and handed to the BLO, or filed on the portal or the ECINet app after the applicant links a phone number to their Electors Photo Identity Card (EPIC) number. Only a person registered in the same constituency can object to a name in it.
    2. The form identifies both parties: It carries the applicant’s name, EPIC number and phone number, and the name, EPIC number if available and address of the person objected to.
    3. Processing was centralised in 2018 but decisions were not: ERONet replaced the States’ own applications with one portal for EROs, and in 2025 the Election Commission of India (ECI) folded about 40 apps and portals into ECINet. Each form is still decided by the ERO concerned, not centrally.
    4. The portal verifies nothing at filing: No proof is required, and the system does not check that the EPIC number and phone number belong to the applicant.
    5. The inquiry is the safeguard, per the ECI: The ERO must issue a notice to the elector, allow seven days to respond, hold a hearing and pass an order, and the BLO must verify by a field visit. ECI officials say a deletion happens only after this ground inquiry.

    What did the investigation find in Godda’s booths?

    1. One BLA, 25 forms in one booth: At Booth No. 9 of Maheshtikri village a single BJP BLA filed Form 7s against 25 voters.
    2. The forms were not the official ones: The Maheshtikri BLO said the BLA brought forms that were not original, described them as covering voters absent from the village, and promised 50 more. Every form named a Muslim voter.
    3. She accepted the first batch and refused the rest: The BLO took the 25 forms, then declined further forms after the Block Development Officer (BDO) instructed BLOs that such documents were not official forms.
    4. A neighbouring BLA burned 75 forms: At Pachua Kita the BLO was handed around 75 Form 7s that differed from the forms the block office had issued. The BLA said he had been told they were for adding names, and he burned all of them when questioned.
    5. Almost every objected name was Muslim: At Pachua Kita almost all the names on the 75 forms were of Muslims, and at Maheshtikri all the forms carried Muslim voters.
    6. Complaints reached the ERO from four booths: The Basantrai BDO, acting as ERO, received complaints from Maheshtikri, Pachua Kita, Lochni and Baghakol. Villagers of Maheshtikri filed their own complaint against the mass objections in Booth No. 9.

    Why do the targeted voters say the objections cannot stand?

    1. The 2003 roll should protect them: Many of the targeted voters are verified in the 2003 intensive revision, and under the ECI’s own rules this eases their inclusion in the ongoing SIR. The BLOs said every objected voter at Maheshtikri and most at Pachua Kita were mapped to the 2003 roll.
    2. Residence runs back generations: The voters trace their families in the village across generations and hold the khatian, the land record used as proof of being Jharkhandi, along with Aadhaar cards and addresses in the State.
    3. Migration for work is the likely trigger: Several are labourers who work in Delhi, Ghaziabad or outside the State and return to vote in Jharkhand. One learned of the objection against him only from an anganwadi worker.
    4. The fear is benefits and citizenship, not only the vote: Eight voters spoken to feared disenfranchisement, loss of government scheme entitlements or being treated as non-citizens, and several said they were not educated enough to understand the consequences.
    5. Preliminary checks support them: The ERO said preliminary information shows some voters sought to be deleted are living at their registered addresses, and every deletion request will be field verified.

    How does the BJP defend the bulk filings?

    1. Objections are the BLA’s job: The former BJP MLA for Godda said filing objections is part of a BLA’s responsibility. BLAs are trained in Form 6 for new voters, Form 7 for objections and Form 8 for shifting or correction of entries.
    2. Duplicate registration is the stated ground: The party’s position is that a BLA can seek deletion where a name appears at two places, and that verifying the objection is the election authorities’ job.
    3. No cap exists on filings: There is no prescribed limit on the number of applications a BLA can submit, so a single BLA filing dozens breaks no rule.
    4. The BLO breached confidentiality, per the party: A BLO must keep the details of the objected person and of the BLA confidential, and disclosure can amount to a violation of the Representation of the People Act. The BJP says the Booth No. 9 BLO’s disclosure of its BLA’s identity caused pressure and threats against him.
    5. The complaint went to the Additional CEO: The BJP’s Jharkhand SIR convenor submitted a memorandum on discrepancies in the SIR, particularly in Sahibganj and Godda districts, accusing BLOs of two booths of refusing Form 7s from its BLAs.
    6. The BLAs describe a top down supply of forms: The Maheshtikri BLA said the former MLA gave him around 25 forms with the instruction to bring them back if the BLO refused, and some came back. The Pachua Kita BLA said he got the forms from party cadres, barely knew what they were, and thought they added names.

    Why have the ERO and the CEO split on what a BLO may do?

    1. The ERO told BLOs not to act: The BDO said BLOs were instructed not to act on the forms because the source of the forms was unknown, and that an inquiry report will follow field verification.
    2. The ERO wants a complaint route instead: In his view the BLAs should first have filed a written complaint with the Sub Divisional Officer (SDO) or the ERO asking for an investigation. Any objection should come from the family concerned or carry solid evidence.
    3. The CEO found no illegality: After speaking to the Godda Assistant ERO and the Deputy Commissioner, the Jharkhand CEO said objections were filed through Form 7 and can be submitted in bulk.
    4. The CEO holds that filing itself is legitimate: A BLA who believes a voter is registered in multiple States can object, and there is nothing wrong in filing objections.
    5. The CEO says BLOs cannot reject: The BLO must first inform the Assistant ERO (AERO), who decides what is to be done, and the BLO then records a recommendation in the observation report.

    Why has a roll revision become a party contest?

    1. The revision is large and the window is short: The SIR began in Jharkhand on June 30, and the draft roll published on August 5 removed 16.48 percent of voters, around 43 lakh. The claims and objections round closes on September 4.
    2. BLOs answer to a State government of the other side: The BJP frames the refusals as partisan because the BLOs are employees of a State run by its rivals.
    3. Godda is a marginal seat: The BJP candidate lost Godda in the 2024 Assembly election to the Rashtriya Janata Dal (RJD) by more than 20,000 votes after winning it in 2020 by around 4,500.
    4. The ruling alliance calls it targeted deletion: The JMM’s local block president called the forms a BJP conspiracy to remove Muslim voters, and the Congress general secretary said the party is monitoring Form 7 deletions across the State. The RJD MLA for Godda said the BDO told him action is being taken.

    Challenges to the Form 7 objection mechanism

    1. The burden shifts to the objected elector: A voter must answer a notice within a week and attend a hearing, and a migrant worker away from home routinely misses both. Eg. In Lal Babu Hussein v Electoral Registration Officer (1995) the Supreme Court set aside deletions in Bombay where names had been struck off on suspicion of foreign nationality without a proper opportunity to be heard.
      The Fix: Serve the notice on the phone number linked to the elector’s EPIC and allow a response through the portal or a family member at the hearing.
    2. The objector’s identity is unverified: An objection can be filed under someone else’s EPIC number and phone number since nothing checks that they belong to the applicant. Eg. In Bengaluru in 2022, staff of a private firm, Chilume Enterprises, posed as Booth Level Officers and collected voter data door to door, showing how easily the intake layer is impersonated.
      The Fix: Require a one time password on the phone registered against the objector’s EPIC before the portal accepts a Form 7.
    3. False declarations carry no practical cost: Section 31 of the Representation of the People Act, 1950 makes a false declaration punishable with imprisonment of up to one year, but prosecutions of objectors are rare, so bulk filing is free. Eg. In the Bihar SIR of 2025 the Supreme Court had to direct the ECI to publish booth wise lists of the about 65 lakh excluded names with reasons before any individual could contest an exclusion.
      The Fix: Track every rejected objection to its filer and prosecute repeat filers under Section 31.
    4. Party appointed agents drive the objection pipeline: BLAs are nominated by political parties, so the volume and targeting of objections follow party incentive rather than roll accuracy. Eg. The Bihar SIR of 2025 let each BLA submit up to 50 certified enumeration forms a day, formally placing party agents inside the roll’s verification chain.
      The Fix: Require the ERO to publish booth wise counts of objections by filer during the claims window so bulk targeting is visible before the roll is finalised.

    Conclusion

    The Godda dispute is about where the safeguard against targeted deletion sits, at the BLO’s counter or in the ERO’s inquiry. The CEO has ruled that intake cannot be refused, so every objection now goes to field verification. The marker to watch is the Basantrai ERO’s inquiry report and how many of the objections it upholds once the claims window closes.

    Back2Basics: Special Intensive Revision (SIR)

    1. Legal basis: Section 21 of the Representation of the People Act, 1950 lets the Election Commission of India direct a special revision of the electoral roll for any constituency, in addition to the annual summary revision.
    2. What makes it intensive: BLOs visit every household with enumeration forms and the roll is rebuilt from those forms, rather than corrected entry by entry as in a summary revision.
    3. The current cycle: The nationwide exercise began with Bihar in June 2025 and has proceeded State by State in phases since.

    Matching Previous Year Question

    “[2026, GS2, 10 marks] Is the right to vote a fundamental right? Discuss the position of the Election Commission of India while undertaking the revision of electoral rolls. Can it also examine the question of citizenship of voters?”

  • SC seeks Centre’s response on use of ‘totalisers’ in EVM vote counting

    SC seeks Centre’s response on use of ‘totalisers’ in EVM vote counting

    Why in the News

    The Supreme Court has sought the Centre’s response on the use of “totalisers”, machines that consolidate and count votes from multiple electronic voting machine (EVM) control units at once without revealing booth-wise voting trends, as a “fall-back option”. The order came on a petition arguing that totalisers would protect voters’ privacy by concealing booth-wise voting patterns and shield them from reprisals. The Election Commission (EC) had warned the Court against the move, saying that introducing a new and unregulated mechanism at a time when the integrity of EVMs is itself under frequent public questioning could give rise to fresh allegations and controversy. The tension is between the voter’s privacy at the booth level and the booth-wise, machine-wise trail that the EC calls the backbone of a self-verifying count.

    What is a totaliser?

    1. What it does: A totaliser consolidates and counts votes from multiple EVM control units simultaneously, so the result is declared for the group rather than for each booth.
    2. How it connects: It links a cluster of 14 control units, from 14 polling stations, via a cable.
    3. What it outputs: It provides a consolidated result for each candidate across that group of EVMs, with no booth-wise breakdown.

    Why does the petitioner want totalisers?

    1. Privacy of the individual voter: Booth-wise results reveal how a locality voted, and the petitioner argued that totalisers would safeguard the privacy of individual voters.
    2. Protection from reprisals: Political parties victimise voters at the local level after identifying voting patterns in particular polling booths, and concealing the pattern removes the target.
    3. A fall-back, not a replacement: The Court framed the question to the Centre as one of a “fall-back option”, not a wholesale change in counting.

    On what legal and political grounds does the Election Commission object?

    1. The climate is wrong: The EC told the Court that the functioning and integrity of EVMs are still a subject of frequent public questioning, and that a new and as yet unregulated mechanism would further complicate public confidence in an already sensitive area.
    2. There is no law for it: Neither the Representation of the People Act, 1951 nor the Conduct of Election Rules, 1961 nor any allied enactment contains a provision recognising, regulating or governing the use of a totaliser in counting.
    3. Amendments would be needed: Substantive amendments and a revision of the statutory procedure governing the counting of votes would have to be made to include totalisers.
    4. Parties have said no: Three of six national parties and 18 of 29 State parties opposed the idea, and only the Law Commission of India, in its 255th report, suggested their selective use.

    Why does the Election Commission say totalisers would reduce transparency?

    1. Counting is witnessed booth by booth: Polling and counting are conducted in the presence of candidates and their agents.
    2. Form 17C is the reconciliation tool: Candidates and agents use Form 17C to match the vote count at the end of polling and again after counting at every polling station, and those comparisons are used in adjudications before election tribunals and courts.
    3. The trail is the backbone: The one-to-one, booth-wise and EVM-wise correspondence under Form 17C is what the EC calls the backbone of the self-verifying and transparent character of counting, and that transparency gives credence to the outcome.
    4. Parties use the pattern legitimately: Knowledge of booth-level voting lets parties improve outreach in booths where they underperformed and make corrective organisational decisions.
    5. Aggregation hides faults: Totalisers would mask technical malfunction and human error in individual EVMs, since clubbed machines stand concealed within the aggregate figure and cannot be identified or independently verified by any party.
    6. The main worry: The EC’s chief concern is that totalisers would become fodder for further misapprehension about EVMs.

    Challenges to introducing totalisers

    1. Machine-level verification would lose its anchor: The Court-ordered paper trail check works per machine, and an aggregated result has no machine to check against. Eg. Association for Democratic Reforms v. Election Commission of India (2024) required Voter Verifiable Paper Audit Trail (VVPAT) slips to be counted for five randomly selected EVMs per Assembly segment.
      The Fix: Keep the machine-wise VVPAT count and Form 17C reconciliation internal to the counting hall, and publish only the aggregated result.
    2. Small clusters still reveal patterns: In sparsely populated segments a cluster of 14 booths can map onto one or two villages, so aggregation does not conceal the locality’s vote. Eg. Hill and tribal constituencies routinely have polling stations serving a few hundred electors each.
      The Fix: Set the cluster size by elector count rather than by a fixed number of machines.
    3. The EC’s own position has moved: The Commission proposed totalisers to the Law Ministry in 2008 and the Law Commission endorsed selective use in 2015, so its present opposition invites the charge of inconsistency. Eg. The 255th report on electoral reforms cited the EC’s proposal when recommending the change.
      The Fix: Publish a reasoned position paper setting out what changed between the 2008 proposal and the present affidavit.

    Conclusion

    The Court has kept the question open and asked the Centre rather than deciding it. The next step is the Centre’s reply, and the source gives no date for it. The marker to watch is whether the Centre is willing to amend the election rules, since without that amendment the EC’s legal objection stands whatever the Court thinks of the privacy claim.

    Back2Basics: Form 17C

    1. What it is: The “Account of Votes Recorded” prepared by the presiding officer of each polling station under the Conduct of Election Rules, 1961.
    2. Part I: Records the identification numbers of the EVMs used, the total electors, the votes recorded in the machine and the number of tendered votes, and a copy goes to each polling agent at the close of poll.
    3. Part II: Records the result of counting for that machine, filled in at the counting centre and signed by the counting supervisor and candidates’ agents.
    4. Why it matters: It is the only document that lets a candidate compare votes polled at a booth with votes counted from that booth.

    [2026, GS2, 10 marks] Is the right to vote a fundamental right? Discuss the position of the Election Commission of India while undertaking the revision of electoral rolls. Can it also examine the question of citizenship of voters?”

  • Distinguished jurist: The unused route to appoint an SC judge

    Why in the News

    A sitting Supreme Court judge has called the “distinguished jurist” route to the Supreme Court under Article 124(3) an “unused mandate” of the Constitution that “needs our serious attention”. The provision has existed since the Constitution came into force, and in more than seven decades no one has been appointed under it. The judge argued that a jurist on the Bench would “diversify the Bench” and would not be “constricted by narrow technicalities”, leaving the Court better placed on public law questions. The tension is that the text permits the appointment while the process, a collegium of judges recommending candidates and Bar rules that keep academics out of practice, has never produced one.

    What is the distinguished jurist route under Article 124(3)?

    1. Three routes to the Court: Article 124(3) allows the appointment of a citizen of India who has served as a High Court judge for five years, practised as an advocate for ten years, or “is, in the opinion of the President, a distinguished jurist”.
    2. Two routes have staffed it: Most judges have been elevated from the High Courts, and a smaller number of lawyers have been appointed directly from the Bar.
    3. The third has never been used: No distinguished jurist has been appointed to the Supreme Court since 1950.

    Where did the clause come from?

    1. A Constituent Assembly amendment: H.V. Kamath moved the clause on 24 May 1949, arguing that the pool of candidates should not be “necessarily confined to Judges or Advocates”.
    2. The case he made: India needed a way to bring in men or women “possessed of outstanding legal and juristic learning” even if they had never practised law, and judges of the International Court of Justice at The Hague are chosen on similar terms.
    3. Ambedkar’s only reservation: B.R. Ambedkar did not object to the idea, wondered whether “eminent” would fit better than “distinguished”, and left the wording to the Drafting Committee, after which the amendment went through.
    4. The High Court parallel was repealed: The Constitution (Forty-second Amendment) Act, 1976, enacted during the Emergency, added a distinguished jurist route for High Court judges under Article 217, and the Constitution (Forty-fourth Amendment) Act, 1978 removed it.

    What would a jurist on the Bench change?

    1. Diversity of the Bench: The judge’s argument is that a jurist brings a background the Court’s present composition, drawn from High Courts and the Bar, does not.
    2. Public law capacity: A jurist would not remain constricted by narrow technicalities and would be in a stronger position to deal with public law issues.
    3. Academia’s influence on judging: The participation of legal academia and scholars would have a defining impact on the judicial functioning of the Supreme Court.

    Why has the route never been used?

    1. Two explanations from the judge: First, the central government and later the collegium took the view that Indian academia lacks the depth for elevation to the Supreme Court; second, neither the central government nor the collegium has seriously explored the provision.
    2. Who counts as a jurist: The term is generally understood to cover anyone engaged in serious work in the practice, teaching or research of law, including those without courtroom experience.
    3. The Bar rules shut the practice door: Bar Council rules generally prevent full-time law teachers from practising law, so an academic cannot accumulate the ten years at the Bar that the second route needs.
    4. The collegium is the gate: Appointments are initiated through the collegium (the Chief Justice of India and the senior-most judges who recommend names), so a jurist must first be recommended by the Supreme Court collegium before the appointment reaches the government.
    5. The one near miss: Upendra Baxi recalled in 2015 being addressed as “Judge Baxi” by a professor whom Justice P.N. Bhagwati had told that Baxi would be made a judge within months, an appointment that never materialised.
    6. Baxi’s verdict: “The Presidents of India have been looking with a telescope and have not found any jurist worth appointing”, which led him to call the route “a dead issue”.
    7. The Bar route still works: The most recent appointment from the Bar was Justice V. Mohana, recommended by the collegium in May 2026 and sworn in the following month.

    Challenges to using the distinguished jurist route

    1. The collegium evaluates what it knows: A body of judges assesses candidates on judgments written and cases argued, which an academic does not have. Eg. The Memorandum of Procedure for Supreme Court appointments sets out consultation for High Court judges and advocates and carries no chapter on jurists.
      The Fix: Add published criteria for the jurist route to the Memorandum of Procedure, covering scholarship, public law expertise and professional standing.
    2. The President’s “opinion” has no test: The clause leaves the standard undefined, so any appointment invites challenge as arbitrary. Eg. Supreme Court Advocates-on-Record Association v. Union of India (2015) struck down the National Judicial Appointments Commission, leaving no body outside the judiciary to frame such a test.
      The Fix: Let the collegium adopt and publish a reasoned selection note for any jurist it recommends, as it now does for some elevations.
    3. Tenure would be short: A scholar considered at the age judges are elevated would retire at 65 within a few years, which limits the institutional gain. Eg. Justice Indu Malhotra, appointed from the Bar in 2018, served three years.
      The Fix: Consider jurists in their early fifties, matching the age at which High Court judges are elevated.
    4. The depth objection is asserted, not tested: The claim that Indian academia lacks depth has never been tested against a shortlist, and other supreme courts have seated academics without judicial or Bar seniority. Eg. The United States Supreme Court seated Felix Frankfurter from Harvard Law School in 1939 and Elena Kagan, who had never been a judge, in 2010.
      The Fix: Have the collegium consider a named shortlist of jurists at least once, so the objection rests on an assessment rather than an assumption.

    Conclusion

    The route is alive in the text and dead in practice, and the reason is procedural rather than constitutional. The status is a public call from within the Court, with no proposal from the collegium or the government to act on it. The marker to watch is whether the collegium or the Memorandum of Procedure names any criterion for the route, since without one the clause stays a dead letter.

    Matching Previous Year Question

    “[2024, GS2, 15 marks] Explain the reasons for the growth of public interest litigation in India. As a result of it, has the Indian Supreme Court emerged as the world’s most powerful judiciary?”

  • The south’s muted voice as political power shifts north

    Why in the News

    The five southern States failed to speak with one voice on delimitation at the recently concluded 31st meeting of the Southern Zonal Council. The Karnataka Chief Minister demanded that the 1971 Census remain the basis for delimitation for another 25 years, and no other Chief Minister matched that position. The south’s “political retreat” from its once-influential national role comes amid growing anxieties over representation and federalism. The tension is between a structural shift, a Lok Sabha that a few Hindi heartland States can dominate, and a self-inflicted one, southern Chief Ministers whose dependence on New Delhi for funds has turned them into supplicants.

    Why has national politics tilted north since Independence?

    1. The national movement itself was north-led: Gandhi, Nehru, Netaji and Patel were the tallest leaders, and C. Rajagopalachari of Madras, T. Prakasam of Andhra and E.M.S. Namboodiripad of Keralam never had comparable national presence.
    2. Southern resistance is not part of the national memory: The resistance movements and anti-British revolts of the south are not valorised across the country, least of all in northern India.
    3. The early Congress was still inclusive: A galaxy of southern leaders in its leadership ranks let the original Indian National Congress be seen as an all-inclusive umbrella party.
    4. Demographics and language did the rest: Blame demographics or the penchant for a “national” language, parliamentary politics has produced northern domination, and both the Congress and the Jana Sangh and its successor the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) have been led from the north.
    5. Only one full-term southern Prime Minister: In nearly eight decades of independence, only one Prime Minister from the south completed a full term, and other southern Prime Ministers were seen as placeholders.
    6. Party structures reinforce it: The domination of the Nehru-Gandhi family in the Congress, and the ideological dominance of Hindi and political dominance of the Hindi heartland in the BJP, have overshadowed southern leadership.

    Where have southern leaders of stature come from, and why not from national parties?

    1. The Congress once had strong regional leaders: K. Kamaraj and C. Subramaniam in Tamil Nadu; Neelam Sanjiva Reddy, Kasu Brahmananda Reddy, Marri Chenna Reddy and Y.S. Rajasekhara Reddy in Andhra Pradesh; S. Nijalingappa, Devaraj Urs and S.M. Krishna in Karnataka; and K. Karunakaran in Keralam.
    2. The BJP has none: The party has no south Indian leader of stature in its leadership ranks, and the one who rose from within, B.S. Yediyurappa, quickly faded.
    3. Distinction came from regional parties: M.G. Ramachandran and Jayalalithaa in Tamil Nadu, Namboodiripad in Keralam, N.T. Rama Rao in Andhra Pradesh, K. Chandrashekar Rao in Telangana, and H.D. Deve Gowda, Ramakrishna Hegde and Siddaramaiah in Karnataka all rose through regional parties or national parties with a markedly regional presence.
    4. National parties deny the space: They have rarely let southern leaders acquire a national profile, and P.V. Narasimha Rao, the first south Indian Prime Minister, owed the office largely to his Hindi-speaking skills and was denied his due place in the Congress pantheon.

    What did the Southern Zonal Council reveal about the south’s stand on delimitation?

    1. One strong intervention: The Karnataka Chief Minister also called for the Lok Sabha’s strength to be retained at the present 543 seats and for women’s reservation to be implemented.
    2. One tepid mention: The Keralam Chief Minister made only a passing reference to delimitation.
    3. One retreat: The Tamil Nadu Chief Minister revised his earlier strong opposition and sought only an assurance that States would not be denied their present proportional share of representation in the Lok Sabha.
    4. One absence: The Telangana Chief Minister missed the meeting and deputed the Deputy Chief Minister.
    5. The rest was administrative: The other demands concerned financial devolution, river water disputes and administrative issues, and the most politically consequential issue did not compel the five Chief Ministers onto a common platform.

    How has dependence on New Delhi muted the southern States?

    1. Supplication for funds: Varying degrees of dependence on the Centre make each southern State supplicate for funds and echo some of the BJP’s ideological obsessions.
    2. Andhra Pradesh as the sharpest case: The Chief Minister and Deputy Chief Minister have become more communal in their political articulation than some of the BJP’s allies in the National Democratic Alliance, and the Chief Minister’s need for central funds has diminished his stature as a representative of the Telugu people, a role his party, the Telugu Desam Party, once embodied.
    3. A Centre-State committee ignored: The committee on Centre-State relations chaired by Justice Kurian Joseph, appointed last year by the then Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam government in Tamil Nadu, received little attention in the media or among the southern leadership, a silence that amounts to Chief Ministers abdicating their responsibility.
    4. Keralam’s leadership has weakened: The former Chief Minister from the Communist Party of India (Marxist) took a submissive approach to the Union government, and over two decades both the CPI(M)-led and Congress-led alliances have been unable to make their presence felt nationally.
    5. A silent forum, and silence about it: The National Development Council (NDC) has not met even once under the present Prime Minister, and hardly anyone across the political spectrum has expressed disquiet.

    What did an assertive south once extract from Delhi?

    1. A Commission from a slogan: N.T. Rama Rao’s declaration that “The Centre is a conceptual myth”, alongside other Opposition Chief Ministers, prompted the Prime Minister to appoint the Sarkaria Commission on Centre-State relations in June 1983, and its report was widely reported and discussed.
    2. A funding formula from a coalition of States: In 1968-69, Namboodiripad mobilised the Chief Ministers of Andhra Pradesh and Rajasthan to get the NDC to endorse the Gadgil Formula (the population-weighted formula for distributing Plan assistance among States).
    3. Earlier national leaderships listened: The Congress, the Janata Party and the Janata Parivar coalitions were not dismissive of southern concerns on language, Centre-State relations, allocation of funds or railway lines, and policy direction was less Hindi-heartland-centric.
    4. Those parties had a southern base: They had a consequential presence in the southern States and included influential leaders from the region, so the south did not feel its voice was stifled whatever the outcome.

    Is the south’s muted voice a product of arithmetic or of abdication?

    1. The arithmetic is already against the south: Peninsular India’s political presence in the federation is weak even under the present distribution of Lok Sabha seats.
    2. A few States can decide: The entire southern region could be rendered politically inconsequential by the strength of two and a half to three Hindi heartland States in the Lok Sabha.
    3. The delimitation design will sharpen the fear: If such scenarios enter southern political discourse, the delimitation design the Union government is pushing will only heighten political anxieties in the region.
    4. Anxiety will outrun the supplicants: Those anxieties will overwhelm the present crop of supplicant Chief Ministers, the point at which abdication stops being an option.

    Challenges to the south’s voice in national politics

    1. The seat freeze has a sunset: The freeze on Lok Sabha seat allocation lasts only until the first Census after 2026, after which a population-based readjustment reallocates seats northward. Eg. Tamil Nadu’s share of the House could fall from 7.1 percent to 6.3 percent under a population-based expansion.
      The Fix: Fix each State’s share of the Lok Sabha rather than its seat count, so any expansion preserves present proportions.
    2. Fiscal transfers also weight population: Finance Commission formulas that weight 2011 population reduce the share of States that controlled fertility early. Eg. Karnataka’s share of the divisible pool fell from 4.713 percent under the Fourteenth Finance Commission to 3.647 percent under the Fifteenth.
      The Fix: Raise the weight for demographic performance in the devolution formula so fertility decline is rewarded, not penalised.
    3. The Rajya Sabha does not protect States: Seats in the Council of States are allotted by population under the Fourth Schedule, so the second chamber replicates rather than offsets the north’s numerical weight. Eg. Uttar Pradesh holds 31 Rajya Sabha seats against Keralam’s 9.
      The Fix: Give State governments a weighted vote on Bills affecting Centre-State relations, on the model of Germany’s Bundesrat.
    4. Language policy is set centrally: Central education policy carries a language design southern States have resisted for six decades, and funds are tied to its adoption. Eg. Tamil Nadu’s two-language policy against the three-language formula of the National Education Policy, 2020, with Samagra Shiksha funds withheld over the dispute.
      The Fix: Delink scheme funding from acceptance of the language formula and leave the choice to the State, as the Constitution’s State List entry on education once did.

    Conclusion

    The south’s weakness has two sources and both are real. The seat arithmetic is beyond any Chief Minister’s control, but the failure to build a common platform is not. What to watch is whether the five southern Chief Ministers table a joint position on the basis for delimitation before the Union government’s design is legislated. Until they do, the region’s anxiety over representation has no political vehicle.

    What is the current status of Centre-State relations in India?

    1. Two commissions frame the agenda: The Sarkaria Commission, appointed in 1983 and reporting in 1988, and the Punchhi Commission of 2010 remain the reference points for reform of Centre-State relations.
    2. Plan bargaining has ended: The Planning Commission was replaced by NITI Aayog in 2015, and the NDC, the forum where States once negotiated Plan funds, has fallen dormant.
    3. Devolution stands at 41 percent: The Sixteenth Finance Commission retained the States’ share of the divisible pool at 41 percent.
    4. A delimitation design is on the table: The Constitution (One Hundred and Thirty-first Amendment) Bill, 2026 proposed expanding the Lok Sabha from 543 to 850 seats (815 for States, 35 for Union Territories) on 2011 Census data, linked the 33 percent women’s quota to that exercise, and would shift the Lok Sabha to Rajya Sabha ratio from 2.2:1 to 3.3:1.

    Constitutional Provisions Related to Centre-State Relations

    1. Article 3: Parliament may form, merge or alter States and their names without the consent of the State concerned.
    2. Article 80 and the Fourth Schedule: Rajya Sabha seats are allotted to States by population, not equally.
    3. Article 81: Fixes the composition of the Lok Sabha and the proportionality of seats to population across States.
    4. Article 82: Requires readjustment of seats after every Census by a law of Parliament.
    5. Article 263: Empowers the President to establish an Inter-State Council to inquire into and advise on inter-State disputes and common interests.
    6. Article 280: Constitutes the Finance Commission to recommend the distribution of tax proceeds between the Union and the States.
    7. Article 356: Allows President’s Rule where a State’s constitutional machinery fails.

    Laws and Rules Governing Centre-State Relations

    1. States Reorganisation Act, 1956: Creates the five Zonal Councils (Northern, Central, Eastern, Western and Southern), statutory advisory bodies chaired by the Union Home Minister with State Chief Ministers as rotating Vice-Chairpersons.
    2. Inter-State River Water Disputes Act, 1956: Lets a State request the Centre to refer a water dispute to a tribunal whose award, once gazetted, has the force of a Supreme Court order.
    3. Inter-State Council Order, 1990: Constituted the Inter-State Council under Article 263 on the Sarkaria Commission’s recommendation.
    4. Delimitation Act, 2002: Governed the last readjustment of constituency boundaries, which was done without altering any State’s seat total.

    Challenges in Centre-State Relations

    1. Politicisation of the Governor’s office: Governors from the ruling party at the Centre have withheld assent to State Bills for years. Eg. Tamil Nadu and Kerala took their Governors to the Supreme Court over delayed assent.
      The Fix: Adopt the Punchhi Commission’s fixed five-year tenure for Governors, with appointment after consulting the Chief Minister.
    2. A dormant coordination forum: The Inter-State Council has no binding authority and meets rarely, so Centre-State disputes go to court instead of to dialogue. Eg. The Council has met only 11 times since 1990, most recently in 2016.
      The Fix: Implement the National Commission to Review the Working of the Constitution’s recommendation of at least three Council meetings a year, with a dedicated secretariat.
    3. Centralisation through the fiscal channel: The Centre raises revenue through cesses and surcharges that are not shared, and delays transfers that are owed. Eg. GST compensation cess payments to States were delayed between 2019 and 2022.
      The Fix: Cap cesses and surcharges at 10 percent of gross tax revenue so the divisible pool is not artificially shrunk.
    4. Rigid Centrally Sponsored Schemes: Uniform scheme parameters ignore geographic and ecological variation across States. Eg. Recent changes to the Mahatma Gandhi National Rural Employment Guarantee Scheme’s funding shifted burden onto States.
      The Fix: Allow States to customise 25 to 30 percent of scheme parameters to local needs.

    [2026, GS2, 15 marks] How far has the Indian federal framework been successful in accommodating regional and cultural diversities? Highlight the role of asymmetric federalism and suggest measures to make dispute resolution mechanisms more effective.”

  • Majority of India’s gig workers remain out of govt’s reach

    Majority of India’s gig workers remain out of govt’s reach

    Why in the News

    Only 8.58 lakh gig workers stood registered on the e-Shram portal as of the Ministry of Labour and Employment’s reply in the Rajya Sabha in January 2026, the latest publicly available figure.

    How far has the Budget’s health cover promise actually reached?

    1. Registration against the promise: The Budget’s beneficiary figure of over one crore compares with 8.58 lakh registrations on e-Shram, the figure the Ministry gave Parliament in January 2026.
    2. The optimistic case still falls short: A doubling of registrations since January would still cover only around 15 percent of the estimated gig workforce.
    3. The promise itself drove enrolment: Registrations of gig workers on e-Shram rose sharply from 2025, and the health cover announcement is the visible cause of that surge.
    4. Registration is the gate to every benefit: Registration on e-Shram is a prerequisite for availing benefits, so an unregistered gig worker is invisible to the scheme by design.

    Why does the government not know how many gig workers India has?

    1. One source for every estimate: The figure of over one crore gig workers, quoted in many government replies in Parliament last year, comes from a single document, the NITI Aayog report “India’s Booming Gig and Platform Economy” released in June 2022.
    2. What that report estimated: It put the gig workforce at around 77 lakh in 2020-21 and projected 1.27 crore in 2024-25 and 1.43 crore in the year after.
    3. No dedicated measurement effort exists: In the absence of any effort to measure the gig workforce, official estimates rely solely on this NITI Aayog report.
    4. The national labour survey does not count them: The Periodic Labour Force Survey (PLFS) reports do not capture gig workers as a distinct category, even though the estimated gig workforce is about 2 percent of India’s total workforce of 61.6 crore as cited by the 2025 PLFS report.

    What has the government built for gig workers, and what has not arrived?

    1. e-Shram as the single register: The portal, launched in 2021, is conceptualised as an Aadhaar-seeded National Database of Unorganised Workers (NDUW) and has become the unified platform for tracking the unorganised workforce, including gig workers.
    2. A legal definition came only in 2020: The government officially defined a gig worker only in the Code on Social Security, 2020, which came into force last year.
    3. The Code’s promises remain largely on paper: The Code promised accident insurance, maternity benefits and a dedicated social security fund for gig workers, and most of these are yet to materialise.

    Where are the registered gig workers, by State and by sector?

    1. Registrations are uneven across States: The ten States with the most registered gig workers as of January 2026 are led by West Bengal (54,734), Delhi (49,479), Andhra Pradesh (39,212), Rajasthan (38,205), Karnataka (37,871), Gujarat (34,756) and Madhya Pradesh (34,351), with Maharashtra, Uttar Pradesh and Bihar completing the list.
    2. Urbanised southern States are missing from the top ten: Tamil Nadu (31,654), Telangana (29,951) and Keralam (11,219) are not among the ten States with the highest registrations, despite their high urbanisation.
    3. Twenty one sectors on paper, three in practice: NITI Aayog’s 2022 report listed 21 sectors with gig workers, including agriculture, healthcare, education and retail, but e-Shram registrations concentrate in the food industry, transportation, and domestic and household work.
    4. The sector shares are lopsided: The largest single sector accounts for 32.8 percent of registered gig workers, and construction (3.6 percent) and agriculture (3.4 percent) are the smallest of the top five sectors.

    Challenges to e-Shram as the gateway for gig worker welfare

    1. Enrolment depends on the worker, not the platform: e-Shram is a self-registration portal, and no aggregator is obliged to enrol the workers it engages. Eg. The Rajasthan Platform Based Gig Workers (Registration and Welfare) Act, 2023 instead makes aggregators register their workers with a State welfare board.
      The Fix: Require aggregators to push worker data into e-Shram at onboarding under the Code on Social Security, 2020, so registration stops depending on individual initiative.
    2. No survey category means no target to measure against: Without a gig work module in the labour survey, the government cannot say what share of the workforce any scheme covers. Eg. The Ministry’s January 2026 reply to Parliament could cite portal registrations but no survey count.
      The Fix: Add a platform and gig work classification to the PLFS questionnaire so coverage is measured against a surveyed denominator.
    3. The funding source has not been built: The Code provides for aggregator contributions of 1 to 2 percent of annual turnover, capped at 5 percent of payments to workers, and the fund those contributions were to feed has not materialised. Eg. Karnataka’s Platform Based Gig Workers (Social Security and Welfare) Act, 2025 levies its own transaction fee because no central fund is flowing.
      The Fix: Notify the contribution rules and the social security fund so central benefits do not depend on Budget-by-Budget announcements.
    4. State schemes fragment portability: State-level gig worker boards create separate registrations and benefits for a workforce that moves across State lines. Eg. A delivery worker registered in Rajasthan gains nothing from Karnataka’s fund on relocating.
      The Fix: Make e-Shram the single identifier that State boards read from, so benefits follow the worker across States.

    Conclusion

    The health cover promise has produced registrations faster than any earlier measure, but the register still holds a fraction of the workforce the promise was made for. The deeper problem is a denominator the state has never measured. The next e-Shram registration figure released to Parliament, and whether the Code’s social security fund is finally notified, are the two markers to watch.

    Back2Basics: Gig worker and platform worker under the Code on Social Security, 2020

    1. Gig worker: A person who performs work or participates in a work arrangement and earns from such activities outside the traditional employer-employee relationship.
    2. Platform worker: A person in platform work, meaning work arranged through an online platform that connects organisations or individuals with workers to provide specific services for payment.
    3. Aggregator: A digital intermediary or marketplace through which a buyer or user connects with a seller or service provider, the entity the Code identifies for contributions.
    4. Why the definitions matter: They are the first statutory recognition of gig work in India, and eligibility for the Code’s social security schemes is tied to them.

    [2024, GS3, 15 marks] Discuss the merits and demerits of the four ‘Labour Codes’ in the context of labour market reforms in India. What has been the progress so far in this regard?”

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