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  • SC refuses extension for Aravalli panel to submit final report

    Why in the News

    The Supreme Court has refused a six month extension sought by the high powered committee it appointed to define the Aravalli hills and range, and has directed the panel to submit its final report by 30 November. The committee was constituted to evolve a uniform definition of the ecologically fragile Aravalli hills and range and to recommend measures to regulate future mining. A three judge Bench headed by the Chief Justice of India observed that the panel appeared to be waiting for the Chief Justice’s retirement, which falls on 9 February 2027, and made clear that no further extension would be granted. The Bench also directed the panel to work continuously, to file interim reports on urgent issues, and to hear all stakeholders including tribal communities in Rajasthan and Gujarat. The tension is that a definition still unsettled after repeated extensions is the same definition that determines where mining may lawfully continue in the meantime.

    What is the high powered committee tasked with?

    1. Composition: It is a five member panel constituted by the Supreme Court and headed by the Director General of the Indian Council of Forestry Research and Education (ICFRE), the Union government’s forestry research body.
    2. First task, the definition: It must evolve a single uniform definition of what counts as the Aravalli hills and the Aravalli range, applicable across the States the range runs through.
    3. Second task, mining regulation: It must recommend the measures by which future mining in the defined area is to be regulated.

    Why does a definition decide what can be mined?

    1. Protection follows the boundary: Restrictions on mining and construction attach to land identified as Aravalli, so the extent of the definition is the extent of the protection.
    2. State practice has diverged: The range runs across Delhi, Haryana, Rajasthan and Gujarat, and in the absence of one national test each State has applied its own criteria to identify protected hills.
    3. The dispute is about elevation and landform: The competing tests turn on how much a landform must rise above the surrounding ground before it qualifies as an Aravalli hill, and a stricter threshold removes large stretches from protection.
    4. The interim period is the live cost: Mining approvals continue to be processed while the definition is pending, so delay is not neutral between the parties.

    What has the Court directed the panel to do?

    1. A hard deadline: The final report is due by 30 November, with the matter listed for hearing on 2 December, by which time the report is expected to have been filed.
    2. Interim reporting: The panel must submit interim reports on specific issues that require immediate consideration rather than holding everything back until the full exercise is complete.
    3. Stakeholder hearings: The panel must hear all stakeholders before finalising its recommendations, including tribal communities in Rajasthan and Gujarat whose land and livelihood the definition affects.
    4. No further extension: The Bench recorded that the six month request would not be entertained and that no further extension would follow.

    Challenges to regulating mining in the Aravallis

    1. Illegal mining outruns enforcement: Leases are policed by State mining departments with small field staff, so extraction continues outside sanctioned boundaries and at night. Eg. The Supreme Court has repeatedly had to intervene in Aravalli mining in Haryana, including through orders restraining mining in the range’s Haryana stretch.
      The Fix: Mandate satellite based volumetric monitoring of every lease, with quarterly comparison of extracted volume against the approved mining plan.
    2. Definitional ambiguity is exploited at the margin: Where a landform’s status is arguable, the developer’s classification prevails until challenged, which converts a mapping question into a licensing loophole. Eg. Construction has advanced on Aravalli land in Faridabad on the basis that the plots were not classified as forest.
      The Fix: Publish the finalised boundary as a single geo referenced map notified in the gazette, so classification is not decided plot by plot.
    3. Land use change destroys the hill even without mining: Real estate and quarry backfilling flatten the same ridges that mining regulation is meant to protect, and neither is governed by mining law. Eg. Farmhouse and residential development has expanded steadily on the Aravalli fringes around the National Capital Region.
      The Fix: Attach the mining definition to the State land use plans as well, so the same boundary governs building permissions.
    4. The ecological function is not priced into any clearance: The range checks the eastward spread of the Thar desert and recharges groundwater, services that no mining lease valuation accounts for. Eg. Groundwater levels in the districts flanking the range have fallen faster than the State averages.
      The Fix: Require a hydrological and dust dispersion impact assessment specific to the range before a lease is granted, not a generic mining environmental clearance.
    5. Restoration obligations are rarely enforced after closure: Reclamation of a mined pit is a lease condition that lapses once the operator exits, leaving abandoned pits and unstable slopes. Eg. Disused quarries across the range have filled with water and remain unrehabilitated.
      The Fix: Hold a restoration bond sized to the assessed reclamation cost, released only after independent certification that the site has been restored.

    Conclusion

    The Court has converted an open ended technical exercise into a dated one, which is the only lever available to it while the substantive question remains with the committee. The unresolved position is that protection of the range currently depends on a definition that does not yet exist, so every month of delay is a month in which the weakest interpretation operates by default. The concrete things to watch are the interim reports the panel now owes, and the hearing on 2 December at which the recommendations on regulating mining will first be tested.

    Back2Basics: The Aravalli Range

    1. What it is: One of the world’s oldest fold mountain ranges, formed in the Proterozoic era and heavily eroded, so it survives as broken ridges rather than a continuous chain.
    2. Extent: It runs roughly 690 km from Delhi in the northeast through Haryana and Rajasthan to Gujarat in the southwest.
    3. Highest point: Guru Shikhar on the Mount Abu massif in Rajasthan, at about 1,722 metres, is the highest peak of the range.
    4. Ecological role: It acts as a barrier to the eastward advance of the Thar desert and as a groundwater recharge zone for the plains on either side.

    Matching Previous Year Question

    “[2025, GS3, 15 marks] Mineral resources are fundamental to the country economy and these are exploited by mining. Why is mining considered an environmental hazard? Explain the remedial measures required to reduce the environmental hazard due to mining.”

  • Lucknow air cleanest, Indore’s second best among cities with million-plus people

    Why in the News

    Lucknow has been ranked first among million plus population cities in Swachh Vayu Sarvekshan 2026, the annual air quality ranking run under the National Clean Air Programme (NCAP). Indore was placed second and Jabalpur third in the same category of 47 cities. The rankings were declared in Delhi and the awards were distributed by the chairperson of the National Green Tribunal (NGT). Municipal wards that improved their air quality were honoured for the first time this year. The tension sits in the scoring itself: improvement in particulate matter (PM) 10 concentrations carries a weight of only 2.5%, so a city can top the ranking while its air remains above the national standard.

    What is Swachh Vayu Sarvekshan?

    1. What it ranks: It is an annual assessment of cities under the National Clean Air Programme, scoring the actions a municipal body has taken to improve air quality rather than the air quality it has achieved.
    2. How cities are grouped: Cities and towns are placed in three population based categories, those with a million plus population, those between 3 lakh and 10 lakh, and those below 3 lakh, so a small town is not ranked against a metropolis.
    3. What is scored: The parameters cover waste management, road dust control, dust from construction and demolition waste, reduction in vehicular pollution and reduction in industrial pollution. Reduction in PM 10 concentrations carries a weight of 2.5%.
    4. What the winners receive: The top three in each category receive cash prizes and mementos, ranging from Rs 1.50 crore for the first place in the million plus category down to Rs 12.5 lakh for the third place in the smallest category.

    Which cities topped the ranking, and which trailed it?

    1. Million plus population category: Lucknow first with Rs 1.50 crore, Indore second with Rs 1 crore, and Jabalpur third with Rs 50 lakh.
    2. Cities of 3 lakh to 10 lakh: Rourkela first with Rs 75 lakh, Firozabad and Guntur sharing second place with Rs 50 lakh, and Amravati third with Rs 25 lakh.
    3. Cities below 3 lakh: Kalinga Nagar first with Rs 37.5 lakh, Angul second with Rs 25 lakh, and Talcher third with Rs 12.5 lakh.
    4. The bottom of the largest category: Chennai, Jamshedpur, Kota, Kolkata and Madurai were placed in the bottom five of the 47 million plus cities.
    5. The two largest cities: Delhi ranked 30th and Mumbai 37th in the same category.

    What did the top ranked cities actually do?

    1. Lucknow’s interventions: The city deployed electric vehicles in its waste collection fleet, used mechanised sweepers to manage road dust, and cleared legacy waste dumps.
    2. Jabalpur’s interventions: The city ran a waste to energy plant, achieved full collection of waste with scientific disposal, mechanised street sweeping and promoted electric vehicles.
    3. The common thread is municipal solid waste and dust: Both winning profiles are built on services a municipal body directly controls, and neither turns on industrial or vehicular emission sources.
    4. Indore’s standing: Indore, ranked India’s cleanest city for seven years until 2025, converted that solid waste management capacity into second place on air quality.

    Challenges to the Swachh Vayu Sarvekshan ranking

    1. Effort is scored, outcomes are not: With actual PM 10 reduction weighted at 2.5%, the survey ranks the interventions a city reports rather than the air its residents breathe. Eg. Lucknow topped the category while its annual PM 10 concentration stood at 137 micrograms per cubic metre against the national standard of 60.
      The Fix: Raise the weight on measured concentration decline and make the award conditional on continuous ambient monitoring data rather than on activity reports.
    2. The measured pollutant is the coarser one: The survey and the programme centre on PM 10, while PM 2.5 is the fraction that penetrates deep into the lungs and drives the health burden. Eg. Road dust suppression lowers PM 10 sharply without touching combustion sources that generate PM 2.5.
      The Fix: Score PM 2.5 concentration decline as a separate parameter with its own weight, so combustion sources cannot be scored around.
    3. A city boundary is not an airshed: Pollution crosses municipal limits, so a city’s ranking reflects sources it does not control alongside those it does. Eg. Delhi’s winter concentrations rise with stubble burning in neighbouring States and with emissions from thermal plants outside the city.
      The Fix: Move the assessment unit to the airshed, ranking a cluster of local bodies jointly and funding them against a common source apportionment study.
    4. Self reported action invites inflation: Cities score themselves on activities such as sweeping frequency and dust suppression that no independent agency verifies. Eg. Mechanised sweeper deployment is recorded as procurement rather than as operating hours on the road.
      The Fix: Require third party verification of a random sample of claimed interventions before the cash award is released.
    5. Baselines flatter the already polluted: A city that started from a very high concentration records a large percentage decline while remaining far above the standard. Eg. Lucknow’s PM 10 fell 45.2% from 250 micrograms per cubic metre in 2017-18, and is still more than twice the standard.
      The Fix: Score cities against the absolute standard as well as against their own baseline, so meeting the norm rather than improving on a bad start is what wins.

    Conclusion

    A ranking that scores what a municipal body did, and barely scores what happened to the air, will reward administrative activity long before it rewards clean air. The gap is visible in this year’s own result, where the winning city remains far outside the national standard. What to watch is whether the weight given to measured concentration is raised in the next survey, and whether the ward level awards introduced this year are backed by ward level monitoring data.

    Back2Basics: National Clean Air Programme

    1. What it is: A national framework launched in January 2019 by the Union Ministry of Environment, Forest and Climate Change to cut particulate pollution in cities that fail the national ambient air quality standards.
    2. Which cities it covers: It covers non attainment cities, meaning cities that did not meet the standards over a five year period, along with million plus cities, taking in 131 urban areas.
    3. The target: The original goal of a 20% to 30% reduction in particulate concentrations by 2024 against a 2017 baseline was revised to a 40% reduction by 2025-26.
    4. How it is funded: Million plus cities receive air quality grants routed through the Fifteenth Finance Commission, while the remaining cities are funded through the programme’s own allocation.

    “[2022, GS3, 10 marks] Discuss in detail the photochemical smog emphasizing its formation, effects and mitigation. Explain the 1999 Gothenburg Protocol.”

  • India’s carbon credit scheme receives U.K. official recognition

    Why in the News

    The United Kingdom has recognised India’s Carbon Credit Trading Scheme (CCTS) as a qualifying overseas carbon pricing scheme for the purpose of carbon price relief. The recognition was conveyed by His Majesty’s Treasury to the Bureau of Energy Efficiency (BEE) under the Ministry of Power. The scheme has been placed on the United Kingdom’s published indicative list of overseas carbon pricing schemes assessed as meeting the qualifying criteria under the Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (Calculation of CBAM Rate and Determination of Carbon Price Relief) Regulations 2026. A carbon border adjustment mechanism (CBAM) charges an imported good the gap between the carbon price paid where it was made and the price the importing country’s own producers pay. The recognition therefore lets a carbon price already paid in India be set off, lowering the effective CBAM liability on Indian goods. The relief is calculated on the price a tonne of carbon actually fetches in India, so a domestic market still in its early compliance cycles decides how much of the British levy an exporter escapes.

    What is the Carbon Credit Trading Scheme?

    1. Statutory basis: The scheme rests on the Energy Conservation Act, 2001, as amended by the Energy Conservation (Amendment) Act, 2022. It is administered by the Bureau of Energy Efficiency under the Ministry of Power.
    2. Compliance mechanism: Obligated entities in notified industrial sectors receive greenhouse gas emission intensity targets, stated as emissions per unit of output. An entity that beats its target earns carbon credit certificates, and one that misses it must buy them.
    3. Offset mechanism: An entity outside the compliance list can register an emission reduction project voluntarily. It earns certificates once the reduction is verified.
    4. Trading venue: Certificates are traded on the power exchanges. That trade is what produces a domestic price for a tonne of carbon dioxide equivalent.

    How does the recognition change the cost of exporting to the United Kingdom?

    1. Carbon price relief: The British levy is charged on the embedded emissions of an imported good at a British carbon rate. A carbon price already paid in the country of production is deducted from that rate where the paying scheme qualifies.
    2. The indicative list is the administrative gate: Placement on the list is what makes the deduction available to goods produced under the scheme. The list is indicative, so it fixes eligibility rather than the final rate an exporter pays.
    3. Exposed sectors: The United Kingdom’s mechanism applies from 1 January 2027 to imports of aluminium, cement, fertiliser, hydrogen, iron and steel. Indian steel and aluminium shipments are the largest exposures within that set.
    4. The obligation on the exporter survives: Recognition attaches to the scheme, not to any single firm. Each consignment must still be accompanied by emissions data for the goods concerned.

    Challenges to the Carbon Credit Trading Scheme

    1. A weak price yields a weak set off: The deduction is worth only what a carbon credit certificate sells for in India, so a low clearing price transfers most of the levy to the British exchequer anyway. Eg. Energy saving certificates under the Perform, Achieve and Trade scheme, the country’s earlier market based instrument, cleared at prices too low to change investment behaviour.
      The Fix: Set a floor price for compliance certificates, so the market cannot clear below the level at which abatement becomes worth financing.
    2. Target setting is based on intensity, not absolute emissions: An obligated entity meets its target by cutting emissions per tonne of output while expanding total output, so national emissions can rise inside a compliant market. Eg. Cement plants raise clinker substitution to cut intensity while adding fresh capacity.
      The Fix: Convert the compliance mechanism to a declining absolute cap once the first two cycles have established a reliable emissions baseline.
    3. Narrow coverage of the emitting base: The compliance mechanism reaches only large notified industrial sectors, leaving out transport, buildings and the bulk of smaller industrial units. Eg. Foundries and re-rolling mills in industrial clusters sit outside the obligated list despite being coal fired.
      The Fix: Extend the offset mechanism with sector specific methodologies for small units, so a cluster level project can be registered rather than a single plant.
    4. Measurement and verification capacity is thin: Credits are only as sound as the emissions data behind them, and accredited carbon verifiers in India are few relative to the number of obligated entities. Eg. Voluntary carbon markets globally have been discredited by projects whose claimed reductions could not be reproduced on audit.
      The Fix: Accredit and licence verification agencies ahead of the compliance deadline, with random re-audit of a fixed share of issued certificates.
    5. Overlap with earlier instruments confuses the signal: Renewable energy certificates and energy saving certificates already price parts of the same abatement, so a firm can face several partially overlapping obligations. Eg. A cement plant may hold energy saving certificates for efficiency gains that also lower its greenhouse gas emission intensity.
      The Fix: Publish a single conversion and transition schedule that folds legacy certificates into the carbon credit market on a stated date.

    Conclusion

    Recognition removes a trade barrier only to the extent that the domestic carbon market becomes real. The set off is a pass through of a price India charges itself, so the instrument that protects exporters is the same one that has to discipline them. What to watch is the clearing price at the first compliance cycle auctions and whether the European Union grants an equivalent recognition, since the European market absorbs a far larger share of Indian steel and aluminium than the British one.

    Back2Basics: Bureau of Energy Efficiency

    1. Statutory body: The Bureau was set up in 2002 under the Energy Conservation Act, 2001, and functions under the Ministry of Power.
    2. Mandate: It is charged with reducing the energy intensity of the Indian economy, meaning energy consumed per unit of gross domestic product.
    3. Standards and labelling: It runs the star rating programme for appliances and the Energy Conservation Building Code for commercial buildings.
    4. Market instruments: It designed and administers the Perform, Achieve and Trade scheme and now the carbon credit market, making it the nodal agency for India’s carbon pricing architecture.

    “[2023] Consider the following statements :

    Statement-I: Carbon markets are likely to be one of the most widespread tools in the fight against climate change.

    Statement-II : Carbon markets transfer resources from the private sector to the State.

    Which one of the following is correct in respect of the above statements?

    (a) Both Statement-I and Statement-II are correct and Statement-II is the correct explanation for Statement-I

    (b) Both Statement-I and Statement-II are correct and Statement-II is not the correct explanation for Statement-I

    (c) Statement-I is correct but Statement-II is incorrect

    (d) Statement-I is incorrect but Statement-II is correct

  • Global watchdog says rise of ‘digital hawala’ is aiding money laundering, terror financing

    Why in the News

    The latest report of the Financial Action Task Force (FATF), the inter-governmental body that sets the global standards against money laundering and terrorist financing, identifies the fusion of virtual assets with the traditional hawala system as one of the most significant developments in underground banking. The report is titled “Investigating Professional Money Laundering, Underground Banking, and the Use of Hawala and Other Similar Service Providers”. Nearly 70 per cent of surveyed jurisdictions have reported the integration of new technologies into such networks. The uses run from routine money laundering to the financing of terrorist organisations. The difficulty this creates is that a system built on trust between operators has acquired the speed and reach of digital finance without acquiring any of its supervision.

    What is “digital hawala”?

    1. The underlying system: Hawala is a centuries-old value transfer arrangement in which an operator in one country pays out to a recipient on the instruction of an operator in another, and the two settle their standing balance later between themselves.
    2. What makes it digital: “Digital hawala” covers the spectrum of technologies that facilitate the coordination, execution, settlement or concealment of these transactions.
    3. What has changed: Virtual assets now supply a settlement layer to a network that previously balanced its books through cash and trade alone.

    What are the six configurations the report identifies?

    1. Digital coordination with traditional settlement: Operators use encrypted messaging applications, shared ledgers and online platforms to communicate instructions, recruit clients and couriers, and maintain records, and settlement between them still moves through cash or trade.
    2. Digital customer interface: The client faces a mobile wallet or a fintech application, and settlement between operators again happens via cash or trade.
    3. Virtual asset-based settlement: Stablecoins are used to settle balances between operators directly, replacing the cash leg of the arrangement.
    4. Integration with formal digital infrastructure: Funds are moved through payment service providers, fintech platforms and virtual International Bank Account Numbers (IBANs), which are account identifiers issued without a physical branch relationship behind them.
    5. Artificial intelligence based tools: These automate transaction structuring, route value dynamically through mule accounts, and convert between currency and cryptocurrency at high speed.
    6. “Hawala” apps: These are bundled digital ecosystems combining messaging, cloud storage, social media, Virtual Asset Service Providers (VASPs), lending applications and gaming platforms in one product.

    Why do these configurations make detection harder?

    1. Speed and opacity rise together: The configurations make transactions faster, more opaque and more complex than the courier and ledger version they build on.
    2. The network gets larger and more durable: Digitisation expands both the reach of a network and its resilience, so removing one operator no longer breaks the chain.
    3. Digitisation is a catalyst and not a replacement: Traditional settlement mechanisms persist alongside the new layers rather than disappearing under them.
    4. Cash remains the pressure point: Cash stays critical at the collection and exit points, which is where an investigation still has a physical trail to find.

    What does the Turkiye case show about terror financing?

    1. The network’s purpose: Turkiye uncovered a “digital hawala” network financing the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL).
    2. The seizures: Raids in 2023 on a self-described ISIL “administrative officer” produced about $57,250 in cash, followed by a further $554,000.
    3. The evidence trail: Investigators recovered “hawala” notebooks alongside digital transfer receipts, so the paper ledger and the digital layer were running in parallel.
    4. The cover used: A jeweller and two mobile phone shops operated as fronts, and the transfers themselves were disguised as charity donations.

    Challenges to countering digital hawala

    1. Token settlement clears outside supervised payment rails: Balances settled in stablecoins move on public blockchains that no single national payments regulator oversees. Eg. FATF’s periodic reviews have found most assessed jurisdictions only partly compliant with its Travel Rule for virtual asset transfers.
      The Fix: Enforce originator and beneficiary information requirements on every registered Virtual Asset Service Provider, which in India are reporting entities under the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002.
    2. Mule accounts scatter the trail across thousands of holders: Automated routing splits a single transfer across accounts opened in other people’s names, so no account shows an abnormal balance. Eg. The Indian Cyber Crime Coordination Centre has identified mule accounts as the standard cash-out layer in online fraud networks.
      The Fix: Require banks to share mule account indicators in near real time through a common registry rather than case by case after a complaint.
    3. Cooperation moves slower than the transaction: Formal evidence requests between countries take months while a chain of transfers completes in minutes. Eg. FATF’s 2024 mutual evaluation of India recorded delays in concluding money laundering prosecutions despite a broadly compliant legal framework.
      The Fix: Use the Egmont Group channel between financial intelligence units for immediate operational exchange, reserving formal treaty requests for trial-admissible evidence.
    4. The fronts are ordinary licensed businesses: Jewellers, phone dealers and travel agents handle high cash turnover legitimately, so the anomaly is invisible in the trading pattern itself. Eg. Dealers in precious metals and stones are treated as designated non-financial businesses under the FATF standards precisely because of this exposure.
      The Fix: Extend beneficial ownership disclosure and threshold reporting to these trades, and audit compliance rather than relying on registration alone.
    5. The regulated perimeter lags the product: Bundled applications combining messaging, lending and gaming fit no single licensing category, so no regulator holds clear jurisdiction over them. Eg. Application stores continue to host unregistered lending and wallet products that operate across borders.
      The Fix: Adopt an activity-based test that applies value transfer obligations to any product that moves value, whatever licence category it claims.

    Conclusion

    Underground banking has not been displaced by digital finance, it has absorbed it. Enforcement is left holding a mandate built for couriers and ledgers against a network that settles in tokens and routes itself automatically. Two things decide whether that gap closes. The first is whether virtual asset supervision reaches operators who never register, and the second is whether financial intelligence units can exchange information at the speed a transfer actually moves. The next marker is India’s follow-up reporting under the FATF mutual evaluation process, where the treatment of virtual asset service providers is the specific item under assessment.

    Back2Basics

    1. What it is: FATF is the inter-governmental standard setter on money laundering, terrorist financing and proliferation financing, established in 1989 at the G7 summit in Paris.
    2. How it works: Its Secretariat is housed at the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development in Paris, and its standards are the 40 Recommendations that member states are assessed against.
    3. Its enforcement tool: It maintains two public lists, jurisdictions under increased monitoring and high-risk jurisdictions subject to a call for action, which affect a listed country’s access to international finance.
    4. India’s position: India has been a full member since 2010, and is also a member of the Asia/Pacific Group on Money Laundering.

    Matching Previous Year Question

    “[2026, GS3, 15 marks] Discuss counterfeit currency and money laundering as major sources of terror funding in India. State the actions being taken at International level to check these menaces. Highlight the role of Financial Action Task Force (FATF) and methods of compliance by its member states in preventing terror funding.”

  • US share in India’s LPG imports surged to over 50% from under 10%

    Why in the News

    The share of the United States in India’s liquefied petroleum gas (LPG) imports has crossed 50 per cent in the six months since the West Asia conflict began, against less than 10 per cent in the preceding six months. The war began with United States and Israeli strikes on Iran in late February, and it halted vessel movement through the Strait of Hormuz. India’s import basket had been dominated by Gulf suppliers, so the loss of that route forced a substitution rather than a fall in demand. The tension is that a supply system built on a short haul from four Gulf sellers has been replaced inside six months by a long haul from a single seller. The concentration has moved rather than dissolved.

    Why did a shipping chokepoint translate into an LPG shock?

    1. The route’s function: The Strait of Hormuz is a narrow waterway connecting the Persian Gulf with the Gulf of Oman and the Arabian Sea, and it is the primary evacuation route for energy supplies from the wider Gulf region.
    2. Its global weight: The strait accounted for a fifth of world oil and liquefied natural gas (LNG) flows, so its closure was a global disruption before it was an Indian one.
    3. India’s exposure through it: About 90 per cent of India’s LPG imports came from West Asia through the strait, against about 40 per cent of crude oil imports and 60 per cent of LNG imports.
    4. Why LPG was hit hardest: Movement through the strait effectively covered around 54 per cent of India’s total LPG consumption, so one blocked route touched more than half the cooking fuel base.

    How did India’s LPG import basket change in six months?

    1. Overall volumes: India’s total LPG imports in the six months to August fell 43.1 per cent from the preceding six months, to 7.14 million tonnes.
    2. United States: Supplies surged 281.1 per cent to 3.78 million tonnes for a 53 per cent share, against about 993,000 tonnes and a 7.9 per cent share in September to February.
    3. United Arab Emirates: Volumes crashed 79.8 per cent to about 958,000 tonnes, and the share of the pre-war leading supplier fell to 13.4 per cent from 37.8 per cent.
    4. Qatar: Volumes plummeted 84.7 per cent to about 405,000 tonnes, and the share shrank to 5.7 per cent from 21.1 per cent.
    5. Kuwait: Volumes fell 81.7 per cent to about 346,300 tonnes, and the share contracted to 4.9 per cent from 15.1 per cent.
    6. Saudi Arabia: Volumes fell 76.1 per cent to about 423,700 tonnes, and the share dropped to 5.9 per cent from 14.1 per cent.

    Why did the United States become the fallback supplier?

    1. Pre-existing scale: Washington was the largest LPG exporter worldwide before the crisis, so it was the only seller with spare volumes at the scale India needed.
    2. Price position: United States propane was already cheaper than Asian supplies before the war, which made the switch commercially defensible and not only an emergency measure.
    3. Availability over distance: With no nearby alternative, India accepted a higher delivered cost to bring cargoes from further away, because keeping cooking gas available was the operative priority.
    4. The precedent it follows: The redirection mirrors the earlier flow of Russian crude barrels to India, where a disrupted market was replaced by whichever seller could load immediately.

    What does the episode reveal about India’s energy import dependence?

    1. The dependence baseline: India imports over 88 per cent of its oil, 60 per cent of its LPG and about 50 per cent of its natural gas, so a routing disruption anywhere becomes a domestic supply question.
    2. Concentration is the real exposure: Four Gulf sellers on one waterway meant a single closure removed most of the basket at once, and no diversification existed to absorb it.
    3. Substitution has a time cost: Rebuilding half the basket around one distant supplier took six months of scrambling, which is the lead time a chokepoint closure imposes on an importer.
    4. The dependence is unresolved: American flows are expected to stay strong until West Asian supply normalises, and no clarity exists on when that will happen.

    Challenges to India’s LPG supply security

    1. The long haul carries a freight and transit penalty: A United States cargo takes far longer to reach an Indian port than a Gulf cargo, and the added voyage cost sits on every tonne landed. Eg. American propane bound for Asia moves through the Panama Canal, where transit slots were rationed during the drought-driven draft restrictions of 2023 and 2024.
      The Fix: Contract a share of American volumes on delivered terms with an alternative Cape of Good Hope routing priced into the contract.
    2. Import and bottling infrastructure is concentrated on one coast: India’s very large gas carrier berths and bottling capacity sit largely on the western seaboard, built around short Gulf voyages and rapid turnarounds. Eg. The major LPG import terminals cluster at west coast ports such as Kandla, Mundra and Sikka.
      The Fix: Expand east coast import capacity and extend LPG pipeline evacuation on the model of the Paradip-Haldia-Durgapur line.
    3. Administered retail prices push the shock onto the exchequer: Domestic cylinder prices are held stable, so a higher landed cost is absorbed by oil marketing companies or by the Budget rather than by the consumer. Eg. The targeted subsidy paid per cylinder under the Pradhan Mantri Ujjwala Yojana sits on top of a capped base price.
      The Fix: Move the subsidy fully to a direct transfer indexed to the import price, so the fiscal cost is visible and bounded rather than carried on company balance sheets.
    4. India holds no strategic reserve for cooking gas: Emergency stocks exist for crude oil alone, so an LPG disruption has to be managed through spot buying at the worst available price. Eg. The Indian Strategic Petroleum Reserves caverns at Visakhapatnam, Mangaluru and Padur store crude oil and not LPG.
      The Fix: Build dedicated pressurised or refrigerated LPG storage at the major import terminals with a mandated minimum cover in days of consumption.
    5. Substitution away from cylinders is only partial: Piped natural gas and electric cooking reach a limited share of households, so LPG demand cannot be shifted quickly when imports tighten. Eg. City gas distribution networks operate only in geographical areas awarded through bidding rounds by the Petroleum and Natural Gas Regulatory Board.
      The Fix: Accelerate piped connections inside already awarded city gas areas and tie household conversion targets to the licence conditions.

    Conclusion

    India has replaced a blocked route rather than reduced a dependence. The basket is now anchored on one distant seller in place of four near ones, and the switch was completed at speed because no stock cushion existed to buy time. The status is that American cargoes are expected to hold their share until West Asian supply normalises. The marker to watch is whether the Gulf share recovers once traffic through the Strait of Hormuz resumes, or whether contracts written during the disruption lock in a permanently longer supply line.

    Matching Previous Year Question

    “[2025, GS2, 15 marks] “Energy security constitutes the dominant kingpin of India’s foreign policy, and is linked with India’s overarching influence in Middle Eastern countries.” How would you integrate energy security with India’s foreign policy trajectories in the coming years?”

  • Arunachal and Aksai Chin between ‘unspecified’ claim lines on UN-endorsed map

    Why in the News

    A new world map endorsed at the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) shows Arunachal Pradesh and Aksai Chin as distinct regions lying between Indian and Chinese “claim lines”. The endorsement came through the “Correct the Map” resolution adopted on 4 September 2026, which India backed and voted for. The External Affairs Ministry has stated that its vote covered the underlying principle of promoting equal-area cartographic representation. The Ministry has also stated that the resolution constitutes no endorsement of any specific map, projection or depiction of national boundaries. The contest is over what the vote carried with it. A resolution India supported has put into circulation a boundary depiction India rejects, on a document multilateral institutions worldwide will use.

    What is the “Correct the Map” resolution?

    1. About: It is a UNGA resolution endorsing the Equal Earth cartographic projection, a method that renders every landmass at its true relative area rather than inflating the higher latitudes.
    2. The document it endorsed: The accompanying draft world map was authored by the UN Geospatial office on 1 July 2026 and taken up in informal UNGA consultations.
    3. Its legal weight: The map binds no state, and it will still be used by multilateral institutions worldwide as their reference outline.

    Why did African states push for a new projection?

    1. The founding demand: The African Union supported the Equal Earth projection in March 2026 on the ground that it represents Africa more accurately than the projection then in use.
    2. The framing used: The African Union called this approach “cognitive justice”, treating a distorted world image as a distortion of political standing and not only of geometry.
    3. The route to the Assembly: Togo prompted UNGA consultations on the map in April 2026, and the Assembly opened informal consultations in July 2026.
    4. The sponsorship: Togo sponsored the resolution with African Union support, so the campaign’s centre of gravity sat outside the states whose frontiers the map redraws.

    What does the map show along India’s contested frontiers?

    1. Arunachal Pradesh: The map marks the State’s southern border with Assam as the Chinese line and its northern border as the Indian line, and it eliminates the State’s border with Nagaland altogether.
    2. Aksai Chin: The eastern borders of the region are shown as the Indian line and the western borders as the Chinese line, leaving it as a zone between two competing depictions.
    3. The labelling change: These lines continue earlier UN maps, and unlike the 2011 UN map they are not specified as “claim lines” anywhere on the July 2026 sheet.
    4. Jammu and Kashmir: The map uses a dotted line for the Line of Control (LoC), with a printed note recording that the dotted line represents approximately the LoC agreed upon by India and Pakistan and that the final status of the region has not yet been agreed by the parties.
    5. Kalapani: The depiction runs in India’s favour on the Nepal frontier, reflecting India’s control over the Kalapani-Lipulekh-Limpiyadhura region that Nepal claims.

    Why does India’s vote sit uneasily with the map it endorsed?

    1. The stated basis of the vote: The External Affairs Ministry has framed India’s support as a vote on equal-area representation as a principle, detached from any boundary depiction.
    2. The standing red line: The Ministry’s position is that India’s sovereign territory, including Jammu and Kashmir and Ladakh, must be depicted in accordance with India’s official map, and that any inaccurate or misleading depiction is unacceptable.
    3. The gap the map leaves: No note on the map explains why Arunachal Pradesh and Aksai Chin alone were placed between two claim lines, so the depiction carries no stated cartographic reasoning a state can answer.
    4. The asymmetry in treatment: The disputed status of Jammu and Kashmir is written out in a note on the map, and the northern frontier lines carry no equivalent qualification.

    Challenges to the UN world map’s boundary depiction

    1. A non-binding map still becomes the working outline: Agencies reuse a United Nations base map in reports, datasets and briefings long after the political moment that produced it. Eg. China issued a “standard map” in 2023 placing Arunachal Pradesh and Aksai Chin within its own boundary, and India rejected the depiction formally.
      The Fix: Press for an explicit cartographic note recording the northern lines as unsettled claims, on the pattern the same map already applies to other disputed frontiers.
    2. Third party cartography hardens bilateral disputes: A published depiction gives each side a document to cite in a boundary question only the two states can settle. Eg. Nepal amended its Constitution in 2020 to adopt a map including Kalapani, Lipulekh and Limpiyadhura, and India rejected the amended map.
      The Fix: Route objections through the Working Mechanism for Consultation and Coordination on India-China Border Affairs and the India-Nepal Boundary Working Group rather than through the publisher alone.
    3. Depiction is settled in expert bodies, not in the plenary: Boundary conventions are prepared by geospatial specialists and arrive at member states as a finished draft. Eg. Cartographic standards are developed through the UN Committee of Experts on Global Geospatial Information Management rather than by a floor vote.
      The Fix: Place Indian surveyors and cartographers inside those expert bodies so a depiction is contested at drafting stage rather than after adoption.
    4. Domestic map rules carry no force on foreign publishers: India regulates how its boundaries are shown within its own jurisdiction and holds no equivalent leverage over a document issued abroad. Eg. Foreign platforms have repeatedly shown Jammu and Kashmir with dotted boundaries in editions sold outside India.
      The Fix: Publish the Survey of India’s official outline as a free machine readable dataset, so the authoritative version is the cheapest one for an international user to adopt.

    Conclusion

    A cartographic reform demanded on grounds of equity has produced a frontier depiction India does not accept, on a document India voted to endorse. The projection question and the boundary question travelled together, and only the first was ever put to the Assembly. What to watch is whether the External Affairs Ministry secures a labelling correction from the UN Geospatial office before the map settles into routine multilateral use. The second marker is whether India’s objection is recorded on the sheet itself rather than in a statement alongside it.

    Matching Previous Year Question

    “[2025, GS2, 15 marks] “The reform process in the United Nations remains unresolved, because of the delicate imbalance of East and West and entanglement of the USA vs. Russo-Chinese alliance.” Examine and critically evaluate the East-West policy confrontations in this regard.”

  • India’s opportunity to put BRICS back together

    Why in the News

    The 18th BRICS Summit is to be held in New Delhi on 12 and 13 September 2026 under India’s chairship. The grouping now carries 11 members and 10 partner countries after an expansion India and Brazil both resisted. Its founding practice of adopting documents only by consensus has been bypassed more than once since 2020, most recently at the BRICS Foreign Ministers’ meeting held in New Delhi in May 2026. The contest is over what the group is for: a reform coalition of emerging economies working inside existing institutions, or a bloc defined by opposition to the West. The summit is the point at which the chair can push that choice one way or the other.

    What is BRICS?

    1. What it is: BRICS is a grouping of Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa, formed to give the emerging economies a greater voice in global governance and institutions, particularly financial and economic ones, and to work towards a more equitable multilateral order.
    2. How it works: It has no treaty and no binding decision procedure. It operates by consensus, and its output is a summit declaration adopted by all members.
    3. What it has built: Its principal institution is the New Development Bank, the multilateral development bank established by the members to lend for infrastructure and sustainable development.

    What did India originally want from BRICS?

    1. A vehicle for reform: India was an enthusiastic early participant, treating the group as a means of securing genuine reform of multilateral institutions.
    2. The first Indian-hosted summit: The fourth BRICS summit, held in India in 2012, took the theme “Global Stability, Security and Prosperity”, which tacitly reflected a much broader geopolitical canvas than economics alone.
    3. What the Indian presidency produced: It helped lead to the establishment of the New Development Bank. Other Indian initiatives followed, including the integration of a counter-terrorism architecture into the group’s work.
    4. The current chairship’s framing: This year’s theme rests on four pillars, Resilience, Innovation, Cooperation and Sustainability, and draws on the Prime Minister’s “Humanity First” vision and a “people-centric” approach to BRICS cooperation.

    How did China’s use of BRICS diverge from the reform agenda?

    1. A different purpose from the start: China saw the group as a counterpoise to Western domination, a view India also shared initially in the specific context of reform.
    2. Why China needed the platform: A group of emerging economies accounting for nearly 20 per cent of world GDP in 2010 could amplify Chinese global ambitions in a way China could not do alone.
    3. The outreach mechanisms carried the design: BRICS-Plus and BRICS Outreach were used to reach the Global South and consolidate its profile as a second pole in a future bipolar world.
    4. Reform support proved selective: China resisted supporting the bids of India, Brazil and South Africa for permanent seats on the United Nations Security Council. India then shifted its own effort towards consolidation and intra-BRICS matters to resist Chinese grandstanding.

    What has happened to the consensus principle?

    1. Consensus is what held the group together: It is the practice that prevents a majority from binding the rest, and its erosion changes what membership is worth.
    2. The 2019 summit was the high point of restraint: The Brasilia summit was held with no invited guest countries at all, only the five original members.
    3. The first breach came in 2020: Under the Russian presidency a chair’s statement on COVID-19 was issued without consensus, probably the first such document in the group’s history.
    4. It has become routine: Non-consensus documents were resorted to again at the Foreign Ministers’ meeting in May 2026, because the new members could not agree.
    5. The failure model already exists: The danger is that BRICS goes the way of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO), where a majority can bulldoze its view through.

    What has expansion done to the group’s cohesion?

    1. China pushed it and India resisted: China pressed first for expansion of the New Development Bank and then for expansion of BRICS itself. India and Brazil both resisted and were overruled.
    2. The size now: The group has 11 members following the addition of Egypt, Ethiopia, Iran, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates and Indonesia, along with 10 partner countries.
    3. The original five manage their differences: Some of those differences are serious, and the five handle them with the maturity that keeping the group intact requires.
    4. The new members do not: They carry their bilateral conflicts into the group and are subverting it through them.
    5. The regional precedent: The South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) is the case of a grouping paralysed by the bilateral disputes of its own members.

    Is BRICS non-West or anti-West?

    1. India’s line is “non-West”: India has worked to keep the group non-West against pressure from some members to turn it explicitly anti-West.
    2. Events push the other way: China is competing with the United States for global leadership, Russia is at war with Ukraine with the full backing of Europe, and Iran is being bombarded by the United States and Israel.
    3. Two members are under direct pressure: Brazil and India have both been subjected to punitive tariffs by the U.S. President, and the U.S. Congress is considering legislation empowering the President to levy punitive tariffs on countries importing Russian oil.
    4. India’s other options are weakening at the same time: The Quad is being emasculated by the United States, India-U.S. relations are under great pressure, Pakistan is being courted by the United States at India’s expense, and global institutions are being made dysfunctional by the West.
    5. The restraint has support inside the group: Many members share India’s effort to prevent an anti-Western drift, since they gain from engaging actors in different camps in their own national interest. They want change without geopolitical realignment behind China and Russia.

    Why is de-dollarisation not moving as China wants?

    1. The parallel currency proposal has stalled: The push for de-dollarisation through the establishment of a BRICS currency is receiving a lukewarm response.
    2. The reason is who would dominate it: Members are uncomfortable with a currency dominated by the renminbi.
    3. What they will accept instead: The preference is for interlinking payment systems, central bank digital currencies and transactions settled in national currencies.
    4. China is proceeding on its own track: After a successful pilot, it is formally launching mBridge, an alternative cross-border financial payment system.
    5. What India is guarding against: An alternative Bretton Woods system dominated by China is the outcome India least wants.

    What parallel orders are being built outside BRICS?

    1. Both major powers are writing their own rules: The United States and China are enunciating parallel visions of the world and playing by rules of their own rather than internationally negotiated ones.
    2. The contested areas are new ones: Parallel structures and standards are being set in artificial intelligence, digital and Internet governance, data ownership, state control, 5G and 6G telecom, satellite navigation and electric vehicles.
    3. China has added an institution: It has set up a World AI Cooperation Organisation in Shanghai.
    4. The financial architecture already has a rival: The Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, the Belt and Road Initiative and the Digital Silk Road challenge the Bretton Woods institutions and their governance and financing models.
    5. Neither power wants reform: Both are building around the existing institutions rather than seeking to change them, and both see BRICS as one vehicle for those broader goals.

    What is “reformed multilateralism” and why does India want it back?

    1. Where it came from: The Prime Minister first articulated the vision of “reformed multilateralism” at the leaders’ retreat of the 2018 BRICS Summit in South Africa.
    2. How it became group language: By 2019 it had found its way into the summit document at Brasilia, with India, Brazil and South Africa pushing for it.
    3. What it commits the group to: Changing the governance of existing institutions rather than replacing them, which is the opposite of building parallel structures.
    4. Why it matters now: Reviving it makes BRICS a strong voice for the non-West middle powers and, by extension, for the Global South.

    Can BRICS be an organisation of Global South middle powers?

    1. A Global South middle power is a different thing: The middle powers described at Davos by the Canadian Prime Minister are broadly West-centric, and a Global South middle power does not share that anchoring.
    2. BRICS is the only credible platform: If there is a credible organisation of Global South middle powers, it is BRICS.
    3. Its largest member does not fit the description: China is hardly a middle power and holds disproportionate influence within the group.
    4. The India-China relationship is the constraint: The two need greater synergy on emerging global issues even as their bilateral differences are being contained.
    5. The composition is incomplete: Some middle powers that ought to be in the group are not represented in it, which limits what it can claim to speak for.

    Challenges to BRICS

    1. De-dollarisation is rhetorical rather than operational: The share of world trade actually settled outside the dollar has barely moved despite a decade of declarations. Eg. The US dollar is still used in over 80 per cent of global trade settlement.
      The Fix: Set a measurable target for local-currency settlement of intra-group trade and report performance against it at each summit.
    2. Intra-group trade is thin: Members trade far more with the G7 than with each other, so the group’s combined economic weight does not convert into bargaining leverage. Eg. Most members still rely on G7 markets for high-technology imports and services exports.
      The Fix: Negotiate a tariff-preference arrangement covering a limited list of goods, rather than a full trade agreement the membership cannot agree on.
    3. There is no permanent secretariat or charter: Work does not carry between summits, so each chair restarts the agenda and commitments lapse without anyone recording that they have. Eg. The New Development Bank remains the only permanent institution the group has built since its first summit.
      The Fix: Create a small standing secretariat with the single mandate of tracking summit commitments and reporting compliance.
    4. Sanctions constrain the group’s own bank: Western sanctions on Russia limit the New Development Bank’s ability to lend for certain projects, which weakens the alternative it was built to be. Eg. The bank put new transactions in Russia on hold in 2022.
      The Fix: Raise the share of local-currency lending and widen the capital base to more Global South members, so exposure to one jurisdiction’s sanctions falls.
    5. The political systems diverge too far for common positions on norms: The membership spans established democracies and autocracies, so joint declarations cannot carry commitments on rights or governance standards. Eg. Group declarations avoid the language on domestic governance that G7 communiqués routinely carry.
      The Fix: Confine collective positions to the areas where interests genuinely converge, namely institutional reform, development finance and technology standards.

    Conclusion

    BRICS is now being asked to do two jobs that pull against each other. One is to press for reform of institutions that its largest member has no interest in reforming. The other is to hold an enlarged membership carrying live bilateral quarrels inside a body that can only decide unanimously. The Delhi outcome will indicate which job the group has chosen. The specific marker is whether the summit closes on a declaration adopted by every member or on a chair’s statement issued over the heads of some.

    Global South Plurilateral Groupings in India’s Foreign Policy

    1. About: A plurilateral grouping is a small, issue-focused coalition of states that operates outside a formal treaty organisation. Its instruments are summit declarations and working groups rather than binding law.
    2. Why India uses them: They allow India to pursue different interests with different partners at the same time, which is what multi-alignment means in operation.
    3. The spread in practice: India sits in BRICS and the SCO alongside Russia and China, and in the Quad and the I2U2 grouping alongside the United States, without either set of memberships cancelling the other.
    4. What they are measured by: Their output is agenda-setting and coalition building, not enforceable commitment, so their value lies in shifting what larger institutions are willing to discuss.

    Key Facts about BRICS and Global South Groupings

    1. The name: The acronym BRIC was coined in 2001 by a Goldman Sachs economist to group high-growth emerging economies. The first Foreign Ministers’ meeting was held on the margins of the United Nations General Assembly in 2006.
    2. The first summit: The first leaders’ summit was held at Yekaterinburg in Russia in 2009, and South Africa joined in 2011 to make the grouping BRICS.
    3. Current weight: The enlarged grouping accounts for over 45 per cent of the world’s population, about 3.6 billion people, and roughly 37 per cent of global GDP measured at purchasing power parity, ahead of the G7 share.
    4. Energy: It controls roughly 42 per cent of global oil production and exports.
    5. New Development Bank: Headquartered at Shanghai, it has approved over $35 billion in infrastructure lending since it began operations.
    6. Contingent Reserve Arrangement: A $100 billion pool providing short-term liquidity support to members facing balance of payments pressure.
    7. Other Global South platforms: IBSA, the India-Brazil-South Africa Dialogue Forum, was formed in 2003. The G-77 was formed at the United Nations in 1964 with 77 founding members and now carries over 130.

    Matching Previous Year Question

    “[2026, GS2, 10 marks] “BRICS acts as a powerful counterweight in global governance, actively amplifying the voice and influence of the Global South.” Explain the role of BRICS in projecting itself as an alternative to other groupings.”

  • Civil Service candidates await Centre’s word on foundation course amid case in top court

    Why in the News

    The Centre has asked the Supreme Court for permission to let the Department of Personnel and Training (DoPT) allocate services to the 2025 Civil Services Examination recommendees without implementing the Rohith Nathan judgment. That judgment, delivered on 11 March, found that the DoPT was excluding certain Other Backward Classes (OBC) candidates from reservation by treating them as creamy layer on the basis of their parents’ salary income alone. The Court directed corrective measures within six months. The examination results had been declared on 6 March, days before the ruling, which places one entire recruitment cycle across the line the judgment drew. The 958 candidates recommended in that cycle now have no service allocation and no foundation course date.

    What is the creamy layer income test?

    1. Where it comes from: The DoPT Office Memorandum of 8 September 1993 operationalised the Supreme Court’s direction in Indra Sawhney (1992) to exclude the socially advanced sections within a backward class.
    2. How it is structured: The Memorandum sets out a Schedule of six categories. The first five exclude a candidate by the status of the parent regardless of income, covering constitutional posts, service grades, armed forces ranks, professions and trade, and property ownership.
    3. The sixth category is residual: It applies an income and wealth test to everyone the first five do not catch, using gross annual family income above the ceiling for three consecutive years.
    4. What the income test leaves out: Salary income and agricultural income are excluded from that calculation. Only income from property, business, capital gains and similar sources is counted, and the ceiling has stood at Rs 8 lakh since 2017.

    What did the Rohith Nathan judgment find, and what did it direct?

    1. The finding: A Division Bench held that the DoPT was treating equals unequally, since the single variable separating two otherwise identical candidates was the parent’s employer.
    2. How the discrimination worked: A child of a government clerk was tested without salary income and passed. A child of a public sector or private employee on the same pay was tested with salary income counted and failed.
    3. What the Court held on the test itself: The income and wealth component is a residual filter, not the primary basis for exclusion. It must apply the same way to all until the government establishes equivalence between public sector posts and government grades.
    4. The direction: The Centre was to create supernumerary posts for the petitioners within six months, with services allotted according to the candidates’ ranks in their respective examination years.

    Why is the service allocation stalled?

    1. The Centre has asked to be excused from the ruling for this cycle: Its application seeks permission for the DoPT to allocate services without implementing the judgment.
    2. The cycle straddles the ruling: Results were declared on 6 March and the judgment came on 11 March, so allocation for this batch would be the first application of whichever reading the Court settles on.
    3. Nothing moves until the hearing: The Supreme Court is set to hear the Centre on 17 September, and the allocation question is what that hearing turns on.

    What are the 958 recommendees facing?

    1. The course has not begun: The foundation course was expected to begin in August and has not started.
    2. The schedule lapsed without a replacement: A tentative start date of 24 August was circulated, and nothing has been communicated since the matter came before the Court.
    3. No communication has reached the candidates: Recommended candidates report receiving nothing from the DoPT or from the academy about when the course will start.
    4. Neither official channel has been updated: No updates on the next steps have appeared on the DoPT website or on the website of the training academy.

    Challenges to the creamy layer determination

    1. The equivalence of posts was never established: The 1993 Schedule made the rank test for public sector and private employees conditional on an equivalence with government grades that has not been drawn up in three decades. Eg. Reservation policy is the Ministry of Social Justice and Empowerment’s subject under the Allocation of Business Rules, and the DoPT can only issue instructions once that Ministry frames the policy.
      The Fix: Notify a post-equivalence table so the rank-based categories apply uniformly whoever the employer is, which removes the need for the income test in these cases altogether.
    2. The income ceiling moves by discretion rather than by indexation: With no formula, the threshold stays static through years of inflation and then jumps, so the excluded population changes for reasons unrelated to backwardness. Eg. The ceiling went from Rs 1 lakh to Rs 8 lakh in five irregular steps over 24 years.
      The Fix: Tie the ceiling to a published price or wage index with automatic annual revision.
    3. Verification rests on self-declaration: Certificates are issued on a declaration checked by local revenue staff, so a defect surfaces only when the appointment is scrutinised. Eg. Recruitment bodies cancel candidatures years after selection over defective certificates.
      The Fix: Validate income declarations against tax and land records at the point the certificate is issued rather than at the point of appointment.
    4. No data exists on who actually captures the benefit: Without caste-wise data on selections and appointments, the claim that a small number of families corner reserved posts cannot be tested either way. Eg. The Rohini Commission on sub-categorisation of Other Backward Classes worked without a comprehensive survey of selections.
      The Fix: Publish caste-wise selection and appointment data against reserved posts as a standing annual return.
    5. Central and State lists diverge: A community recognised as backward by a State is often absent from the Central list, and the same test is administered differently across the two. Eg. Candidates holding State OBC certificates have been denied central reservation.
      The Fix: Publish a mapped concordance between the Central list and each State list, so a candidate can see which list governs a given post.

    Conclusion

    The dispute is no longer about whether the exclusion was wrong, since that has been decided. It is about who absorbs the cost of correcting it, and both available answers create a fresh set of claimants. A recruitment cycle cannot be held open indefinitely, and a batch allotted on a reading the Court has already rejected moves the litigation one year forward rather than ending it. The hearing later this month is where that choice is made, and the marker is whether the Court permits an interim allotment or holds the executive to the timetable it set.

    Back2Basics

    1. What it is: The Lal Bahadur Shastri National Academy of Administration is the central training institution for the Indian Administrative Service.
    2. Where it is: It is located at Mussoorie in Uttarakhand.
    3. What the foundation course is: The Academy runs the common Foundation Course taken by fresh recruits to the All India Services and the Central Civil Services before they move to their own service academies.
    4. Who administers it: It functions under the Department of Personnel and Training, and was formed in 1959 by merging the earlier IAS Training School at Delhi and the IAS Staff College at Shimla.

    Matching Previous Year Question

    “[2024, GS1, 15 marks] Despite comprehensive policies for equity and social justice, underprivileged sections are not yet getting the full benefits of affirmative action envisaged by the Constitution. Comment.”

  • What flu surge can teach us about next pandemic

    Why in the News

    Different parts of India have reported 2 to 10 times more influenza cases this year than last year. The official position is that the circulating strain has not changed, and public advisories ask people to remain vigilant without becoming alarmed. That instruction states no action a reader can take. The detection layer built after Covid-19 is working, and the layer that must convert a detection into a decision is not. A surge of this size is the period in which that gap can be closed, since a pandemic is the worst time to learn.

    Pillars of outbreak management

    1. Surveillance: The ability to detect an outbreak early and to initiate action on that detection. For influenza it also covers genomic surveillance to identify the strain or variant behind the rise, which is what allows its virulence and the population’s susceptibility to be gauged.
    2. Prevention: Issuing advisories to high-risk individuals to avoid crowded places, promoting mask use, and vaccinating high-risk individuals and health workers.
    3. Control: Ensuring that those already infected receive proper medical care.

    What does the current surge actually show?

    1. The size of the rise: Reported influenza cases across different parts of the country are 2 to 10 times last year’s level.
    2. Hospital positivity has risen: Among patients admitted with severe acute respiratory infection (an acute respiratory illness severe enough to require hospitalisation), the positivity rate in selected hospitals was 16 per cent this year against 12 per cent last year.
    3. An unchanged strain is not by itself the answer: A well-established virus does not warrant serious concern on virological grounds alone. The scale of transmission still decides how many avoidable deaths occur.

    Why does surveillance not convert into action?

    1. No alert threshold is defined: A rise in influenza positivity past a defined threshold should trigger an alert. No such thresholds exist.
    2. The data is not public: There is no publicly available dashboard on which positivity trends can be seen, so no one outside the system can tell when a threshold would have been crossed.
    3. Responsibility is split three ways: Laboratory surveillance sits with the Indian Council of Medical Research (ICMR), response coordination with the National Centre for Disease Control (NCDC), and implementation with State health systems.
    4. No one holds authority to act on the signal: No integrated command structure exists with clear authority to coordinate and implement a response during a disease upsurge. This was the specific lesson Covid-19 offered and it was not learnt.

    Where is the line between an appropriate response and one that causes panic?

    1. The stated fear is panic: Governments hesitate to issue advisories on the ground that a public warning will itself cause alarm.
    2. The line is genuinely thin: Governments across the world struggle to place it, and the WHO has itself been accused of overreacting.
    3. The asymmetry decides it: Where the primary concern is to save lives, overreaction is the better error of the two.
    4. The current position sits on the wrong side: The response is too cautious and too bureaucratic for the scale of the surge.
    5. This is a professional capability, not a temperament: Situations of this kind require trained risk communication and named experts speaking, rather than a general advisory.

    Why does influenza vaccine use stay low even among high-risk groups?

    1. Poorly perceived threat: Influenza is treated as an ordinary seasonal illness, so the risk it carries for the elderly and the immunocompromised is discounted.
    2. Non-affordability: The vaccine is largely an out-of-pocket purchase for those outside institutional programmes.
    3. Doubtful effectiveness: Protection varies by season and by strain match, which weakens the case a physician can make for it.
    4. The annual injection requirement: Immunity does not carry over, so the decision has to be taken and paid for again every year.

    What should the response to this surge prioritise?

    1. Preventing avoidable deaths: At the current scale the objective is not to stop transmission but to keep high-risk people out of severe illness.
    2. A specific advisory rather than a general one: The advisory should tell high-risk people to avoid crowded places and to wear masks, in those terms.
    3. Immunising high-risk groups during the surge: The case for routine immunisation is debatable and the case during a major seasonal surge is not. Skipping it leaves the system unpractised for the next pandemic.
    4. Low antiviral use needs examination: Antiviral use stays low even in peak influenza season, which calls for a relook at the influenza management guidelines.
    5. The private sector has to be inside the response: Private providers and professional bodies deliver most outpatient care and cannot be reached through public system instructions alone.

    Challenges to India’s outbreak surveillance and response system

    1. Influenza carries no statutory duty to notify: Reporting rests on administrative instruction rather than legal obligation, so private-sector cases stay outside the national count. Eg. Most States have no public health Act listing notifiable conditions, and the Kerala Public Health Act, 2023 is among the few that do.
      The Fix: Enact a public health law fixing the list of notifiable conditions and placing the reporting duty on private providers as well as public ones.
    2. Vaccine composition is set for the wrong season: Supply follows the Northern Hemisphere formulation while influenza in much of India peaks with the monsoon. Eg. The WHO issues separate Northern and Southern Hemisphere composition recommendations each year.
      The Fix: Procure the Southern Hemisphere formulation for monsoon-peak States and fix the public procurement calendar to that cycle.
    3. Surveillance is an additional charge, not a post: District surveillance duties are given to serving clinical or programme officers on top of their own work, so analysis is done last. Eg. Rural Community Health Centres run at about an 80 per cent shortfall of specialists, which is the pool such officers are drawn from.
      The Fix: Create a separate public health cadre with dedicated district epidemiologist posts filled on their own recruitment line.
    4. Antiviral supply is not pre-positioned: Oseltamivir was moved from Schedule X to Schedule H1 in 2017, and the prescription-record duty that follows keeps retail stocking low outside declared alerts. Eg. Shortages appear at the retail counter in the same weeks that hospital positivity rises.
      The Fix: Stock antivirals at district hospitals ahead of the seasonal peak rather than relying on retail availability during the surge.
    5. Sequencing capacity is concentrated in a few laboratories: Sequencing volumes are set by laboratory capacity rather than by case load, so variant detection lags the epidemic curve. Eg. Sequencing effort fell sharply between Covid-19 waves and had to be rebuilt each time activity rose.
      The Fix: Fix a minimum sequencing share of positive samples per State per week as a standing requirement rather than an outbreak-time instruction.

    Conclusion

    An outbreak response is judged by the interval between a signal and a decision. India has built the layer that produces the signal and has not built the layer that must act on it, which is a governance problem rather than a scientific one. The next seasonal peak will test the same gap. The markers to watch before it arrives are whether a numeric alert threshold has been fixed and whether positivity data is published where the public can see it.

    Outbreak Surveillance and Pandemic Preparedness in India

    1. About: Disease surveillance is the continuous collection and analysis of health data to detect unusual disease activity early enough to act on it. Preparedness is the standing capacity to respond once that detection is made.
    2. The zoonotic load: Over 60 per cent of emerging infectious diseases in India are zoonotic, so animal and human surveillance cannot be run separately. Eg. Nipah virus, avian influenza, rabies and brucellosis.
    3. The triple burden: India faces infectious disease, rising non-communicable disease and emerging zoonotic threats at the same time.
    4. The standing weakness: Surveillance remains event-based rather than predictive, with communicable disease, non-communicable disease and animal health data held in separate vertical silos.

    Government Initiatives for Outbreak Surveillance and Pandemic Preparedness

    1. Integrated Disease Surveillance Programme: Collects district-level disease data and has been upgraded to carry animal health indicators for integrated surveillance.
    2. National One Health Mission: A cross-ministerial effort involving 13 departments to coordinate pandemic preparedness across human, animal and environmental health.
    3. National Institute for One Health, Nagpur: The anchor institution for research, training and policy integration on zoonotic disease.
    4. National Joint Outbreak Response Team: A multi-disciplinary team of human, animal and wildlife experts constituted for rapid outbreak investigation.
    5. BSL-3 and BSL-4 laboratory network: A national grid of high-security biosafety laboratories, with a new BSL-4 facility in Gujarat foundation-laid in January 2026.
    6. One Health Governance Framework: Released in December 2025 as a roadmap for States and Union Territories to set up State One Health Cells.

    Matching Previous Year Question

    “[2024, GS2, 15 marks] In a crucial domain like the public healthcare system, the Indian State should play a vital role to contain the adverse impact of marketisation of the system. Suggest some measures through which the State can enhance the reach of public healthcare at the grassroots level.”

  • Are nicotine pouches beyond the law?

    Why in the News

    A study led by the ICMR-National Institute of Cancer Prevention and Research has found that nicotine pouches are reaching Indian cities through online platforms, hookah shops and gig delivery services. The study follows a World Health Organization (WHO) warning issued in May 2026 on the dangers these products carry. No Indian statute clearly governs them. The two laws written for tobacco and for vaping each exclude the product for a different reason, and its status under the drugs law and the food law is contested. The gap is not a drafting accident, since the executive already holds the power to restrict a product’s import and sale on health grounds.

    What is a nicotine pouch?

    1. The product: A nicotine pouch is a small, tobacco-free sack shaped like a tea bag, containing nicotine, flavourings and plant-based fibres.
    2. How it is used: The user places the pouch between the lip and the gum for up to an hour. Nicotine is absorbed directly into the bloodstream.
    3. What distinguishes it: There is no smoke, no vapour and no spitting. That absence is what keeps it outside the definitions written for cigarettes and for electronic cigarettes.

    Does the Cigarettes and Other Tobacco Products Act, 2003 cover nicotine pouches?

    1. What the Act governs: The Cigarettes and Other Tobacco Products Act, 2003 (COTPA) regulates the marketing, advertising and sale of cigarettes and other tobacco products.
    2. The definitional limit: The Act’s definition of tobacco products does not extend to every product containing nicotine. A legislature intending to cover every extract of the tobacco plant could have said so.
    3. Strict construction applies: Restrictions on the freedom of trade and commerce are construed strictly. Nicotine pouches are not among the products listed in the Act, so they fall outside it.

    Is a nicotine pouch a drug under the Drugs and Cosmetics Act, 1940?

    1. Nicotine is unscheduled: Nicotine is not listed as a drug in any schedule of the Drugs and Cosmetics Act, 1940.
    2. Some nicotine products are approved as drugs: Nicotine patches and gums have been approved as drugs by the Drug Controller General of India for therapeutic use in treating nicotine addiction.
    3. The Schedule K exemption cuts both ways: Schedule K under the Drugs and Cosmetics Rules, 1945 lists gums and lozenges and exempts them from licensing and prescription requirements where they contain less than 2 mg of nicotine. An exemption for some nicotine products implies that the rest were meant to be regulated.
    4. The counter-reading: A pouch makes no therapeutic claim and does not purport to treat addiction. It functions as a substitute for a cigarette, which places it outside the character of a drug.

    Why does the ban on vapes not reach nicotine pouches?

    1. What the vaping law does: The Prohibition of Electronic Cigarettes Act, 2019 (PECA) bans the import and sale of vapes.
    2. Its enactment carries an implication: A separate statute would not have been needed had vapes been drugs, since the government could then have regulated them or refused licences under the drugs law. The enactment indicates that the drugs law did not give adequate power to ban them.
    3. The product does not fit the definition: A nicotine pouch contains no electronic device and produces neither smoke nor vapour, so the 2019 Act does not reach it.

    Could a nicotine pouch be treated as food?

    1. The statutory definition is wide: The Prevention of Food Adulteration Act and the Food Safety and Standards Act define food as any processed, partially processed or unprocessed substance intended for human consumption.
    2. Courts have read it widely: Rulings on supari and chewing tobacco establish that the definition has a very wide amplitude and covers items that are chewed rather than swallowed.
    3. The consequence: On that reading a nicotine pouch falls within the definition of food, which would bring it under the food safety regime rather than the tobacco or drugs regime.

    What governs the import of nicotine pouches?

    1. Two statutes supply the power: The Foreign Trade (Development and Regulation) Act, 1992 empowers the Central government to prohibit, restrict or regulate imports. Section 11 of the Customs Act, 1962 allows the government to prohibit goods wholly or partly by notification, on grounds that include the protection of human, animal or plant life.
    2. Who administers it: The Directorate General of Foreign Trade (DGFT) administers the trade statute and publishes the ITC-HS classification (the Indian Trade Clarification code list, which records whether a good is free, restricted or banned).
    3. A new customs sub-category exists: After the World Customs Organization updated the Harmonized System, code 2404 91 30 was introduced for tobacco-free single-use oral nicotine pouches and 2404 91 90 for other oral nicotine products not meant for therapeutic use. These replaced a residual category for other manufactured tobacco substitutes.
    4. The medicament codes do not apply: Codes for medicaments apply only where a product is strictly a cessation aid, which a pouch is not.
    5. The status is “restricted”, not free and not banned: Goods under 2404 91 30 cannot be cleared merely on payment of duty, and they are not prohibited outright as e-cigarettes are. They require a specific licence or permission, and the DGFT cross-references the health and other ministries before deciding.

    Can nicotine pouches be sold at duty-free shops?

    1. They are on sale now: Nicotine pouches are currently available at a few duty-free stores at Indian airports.
    2. The stores are licensed under Indian law: Duty-free stores are licensed under Section 58 of the Customs Act, 1962 and cannot claim to sit entirely outside Indian law.
    3. What the Calcutta High Court actually held: In Flemingo Duty Free Shop Pvt. Ltd. v. Shri Kaushik Bhattacharya (2024), the Court held that a duty-free store did not “import” goods into India. It was deemed located outside India for the purposes of the Customs Act, so legal metrology labelling requirements did not apply to it.
    4. The holding is narrow: Reading it as excluding all Indian law would leave no court and no police station with jurisdiction over a crime committed inside such a store.
    5. The permitted list does not include them: Cigarettes, alcohol, jewellery, watches, food and small electronic items are permitted at duty-free shops. A nicotine pouch qualifies only if it is treated as food, and its restricted customs classification makes an import licence unlikely to have been granted.

    Challenges to regulating nicotine pouches in India

    1. The sales channel sits outside every enforcement design: Tobacco control law assumes a physical shop with a visible point of sale, so an online order routed through a delivery platform meets no check. Eg. The draft Cigarettes and Other Tobacco Products (Amendment) Bill, 2020 proposed banning online sale of tobacco products and has never been enacted.
      The Fix: Place the compliance duty on the delivery platform and the payment gateway, so liability attaches where the transaction is actually recorded.
    2. Youth uptake runs ahead of regulation: Flavoured oral nicotine is marketed as a lifestyle product rather than a tobacco product, which removes the stigma that deters first use. Eg. The Global Youth Tobacco Survey conducted in India in 2019 found that 8.5 per cent of students aged 13 to 15 used tobacco in some form.
      The Fix: Prohibit characterising flavours in oral nicotine products, which is the single measure that has cut youth initiation wherever it has been applied.
    3. State action produces a patchwork rather than a rule: Food safety commissioners issue prohibition orders that lapse and must be renewed, so the legal position differs by State and by year. Eg. State bans on gutkha and pan masala are issued under Section 30(2)(a) of the Food Safety and Standards Act, 2006 and are renewed one year at a time.
      The Fix: Notify a national product standard through the food safety regulator, so the position holds across States without annual renewal.
    4. A restricted classification is not self-enforcing: Goods requiring a licence still enter through courier consignments and passenger baggage, where the volume of parcels exceeds inspection capacity. Eg. Customs seizures of e-cigarettes at Indian airports have continued in every year since the 2019 ban.
      The Fix: Add the oral nicotine codes to the risk-management system used for courier and baggage screening, so consignments are flagged automatically rather than by sampling.
    5. Health evidence is thin at the point where a decision is needed: Long-term data on the cardiovascular and oral effects of tobacco-free nicotine is limited, which lets manufacturers argue harm reduction against combustible tobacco. Eg. The current Indian evidence base rests on an institute-led study of market availability rather than on outcome data.
      The Fix: Commission a national surveillance study on oral nicotine use and its health outcomes, with its results fixed as the trigger for regulatory review.

    Conclusion

    The legal position is intricate and the remedy is not. The executive already holds the power to prohibit import and sale on health grounds, and a notification exercising it would take minutes to issue. The cost of not issuing it is known from the vaping episode: demand settles first, the ban arrives after, and smuggling replaces the legal market it was meant to close. The question before the government is therefore about timing, not about which statute applies.

    Back2Basics

    1. What it is: The ICMR-National Institute of Cancer Prevention and Research is an institute of the Indian Council of Medical Research (ICMR), the country’s apex body for biomedical research, functioning under the Department of Health Research.
    2. Where it is: It is located at Noida in Uttar Pradesh.
    3. Earlier name: It functioned as the Institute of Cytology and Preventive Oncology before being renamed in 2016.
    4. Mandate: It works on cancer prevention, early detection and population screening, and carries a substantial tobacco control research programme.

    Matching Previous Year Question

    “[2023] With reference to India, consider the following pairs: Action: The Act under which it is covered 1. Unauthorized wearing of police or military uniforms : The Official Secrets Act, 1923 2. Knowingly misleading or otherwise interfering with a police officer or military officer when engaged in their duties : The Indian Evidence Act, 1872 3. Celebratory gunfire which can endanger the personal safety of others : The Arms (Amendment) Act, 2019 How many of the above pairs are correctly matched? (a) Only one (b) Only two (c) All three (d) None ANSWER: (b)”

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