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  • Bitter pills

    Why in the News

    The gap between a drug’s price to retailer (PTR) and its maximum retail price (MRP) has reached 1,000% in some cases, because price control caps the final price but not the markup hospitals keep. The Supreme Court has criticised these disparities, including on cancer drugs, and suggested a fixed percentage markup across all drugs.

    How does the gap between PTR and MRP work?

    1. Two prices: The PTR is what a manufacturer charges the seller, often a hospital; the MRP is the most a patient can be charged.
    2. Hospital as chooser: These drugs are not sold over the counter, so hospitals often decide which brand a patient uses. Drug companies therefore compete for the hospital’s business, not the patient’s.
    3. Margin as bait: Companies print inflated MRPs and offer hospitals low PTRs, so the hospital pockets the difference. It works like a commission paid to the person choosing on the patient’s behalf.
    4. Hidden kickback: The practice is not technically a kickback but is one economically, since the manufacturer embeds a financial reward for picking its product.
    5. The takeaway: Hospitals push the brands with the largest margins, so patients pay more than the supply price.

    Why does the price control order leave this gap open?

    1. What the order caps: The Drug (Prices Control) Order (DPCO), 2013 caps the final maximum price of scheduled drugs (essential medicines under price control), but not the markup on hospitals’ transactions.
    2. Ceiling arithmetic: Suppose the National Pharmaceutical Pricing Authority (NPPA) calculates a drug’s market-derived average price at ₹100. The ceiling then becomes ₹116.
    3. Margin within the ceiling: A hospital that negotiates a PTR of ₹50 can still charge the full ceiling, or bill the government for a state-financed drug, and keep ₹66 without breaching the cap.

    Who bears the cost of the hidden margin?

    1. Captive patients: Competition Commission of India (CCI) investigations have established that private hospitals force patients to buy drugs from on-premise pharmacies, so patients cannot shop around.
    2. Cheaper drugs sidelined: More affordable equivalent drugs lose out because they earn hospitals less revenue, which undermines normal price competition.
    3. Financial strain: Patients face severe financial strain, a concern also flagged by drug regulators in Karnataka and Maharashtra.
    4. Treatment dropouts: Patients with cancers and chronic conditions could reduce their adherence, meaning they stop following long treatment regimens as prescribed.

    Does capping trade margins work?

    1. Margin cap pilot: In a proof-of-concept exercise in 2019, the NPPA capped the trade margins of non-scheduled anti-cancer drugs, meaning the markup allowed between manufacturer and patient.
    2. Scale of the pilot: The cap covered 42 drugs and limited their trade margin to 30%.
    3. Price fall: The Department of Pharmaceuticals later said prices of 526 brands dropped by up to 91%, showing that cancer drug MRPs carried compressible margins.

    Fixed markup or regressive margin?

    1. Regressive margin: A fixed markup should come with a regressive margin, a smaller percentage as drug prices rise, to remove sellers’ incentive to favour costlier products.
    2. Earlier refusal: The Court had refused to intervene in Siddharth Dalmia (2025).
    3. Policy vacuum: Hospitals, not patients, choose the drug, so market competition does not pull prices down. The Union and the States have not filled that gap by regulation.

    Challenges

    1. Brand-name prescribing: Prescriptions written by brand let hospitals steer patients to high-margin products.
    2. Hospital billing blind spot: Price regulators track printed MRPs, not the margin a hospital earns on each bill.
    3. State capacity: Price enforcement depends on State drug controllers, whose capacity varies widely across States.

    Way Forward

    1. Wider margin caps: The NPPA should extend trade margin caps beyond anti-cancer drugs to other high-cost hospital drugs.
    2. PTR disclosure: Require manufacturers to publish the PTR alongside the MRP so patients can see the margin.
    3. Free choice of pharmacy: Bar hospitals from forcing patients to buy from on-premise pharmacies.
    4. Generic prescribing: Enforce prescription by generic name in hospitals.

    Conclusion

    Hidden hospital margins persist because price control targets the final price, not who captures the gap below it. Whether the Supreme Court’s suggestion becomes an NPPA rule, and whether that rule is regressive, will decide if patients see lower bills.

    Back2Basics: National Pharmaceutical Pricing Authority (NPPA)

    1. Set up: The NPPA was constituted in 1997 as an independent regulator for drug prices.
    2. Parent department: It works under the Department of Pharmaceuticals, Ministry of Chemicals and Fertilizers.
    3. Mandate: It fixes and revises the ceiling prices of essential medicines and enforces the DPCO.
    4. Non-scheduled drugs: It monitors their prices, which may rise by at most 10% a year.

    Matching Previous Year Question

    “[2024, GS2, 15 marks] In a crucial domain like the public healthcare system, the Indian State should play a vital role to contain the adverse impact of marketisation of the system. Suggest some measures through which the State can enhance the reach of public healthcare at the grassroots level.”

  • How to finance rural prosperity

    Why in the News

    India’s farm credit system, built to finance crop production, must now finance the whole agricultural value chain if rural India is to capture the value created after harvest. A former Secretary of the Department of Agriculture and Farmers Welfare proposes a value chain financing framework as a reform for Viksit Bharat 2047.

    What is agricultural value chain financing, and why now?

    1. First transformation: Policy, science, irrigation and institutional credit made India a leading producer of cereals, milk, fruits, vegetables and fish, delivering food security.
    2. Value chain: Every commodity moves from production to aggregation, storage, logistics, processing, branding and markets, and enterprises and jobs emerge along it.
    3. Value chain financing: It lends to every viable activity between farm and consumer, not only to the grower. It is like funding the whole assembly line, not just the raw material.
    4. The takeaway: The next transformation must deliver rural prosperity, which depends on financing what happens after harvest.

    Why do seasonal commodities struggle for working capital?

    1. Continuous sectors: Dairy, poultry and fisheries buy and sell year-round, so they earn predictable cash flows and carry lower inventory risk.
    2. Harvest-window squeeze: Seasonal processors must buy most of a year’s raw material in a short harvest window, then finance that stock for months.
    3. Inventory burden: A firm investing ₹500 crore in a processing plant may need ₹700-800 crore just to procure, store and carry stock.
    4. Sugar’s lesson: The seasonal sugar sector grew through inventory finance and warehouse-backed lending, so the difference lies in how the chain is financed, not production potential.

    Why is production credit no longer enough?

    1. Production credit build-up: For five decades, bank nationalisation, regional rural banks, cooperatives and the Kisan Credit Card expanded crop credit, when food security was the priority.
    2. Emerging products: Banks now offer warehouse receipt financing (loans against stored produce), receivables financing (loans against payments buyers still owe) and food processing loans.
    3. NBFC models: Agri-focused non-banking financial companies (NBFCs) have pioneered value-chain lending.
    4. Missing architecture: These remain isolated initiatives, not parts of one financing system.

    How large is the financing opportunity?

    1. Output and credit gap: Farm sector Gross Value Added (GVA), output minus inputs, was ₹48.8 lakh crore, against institutional credit of ₹20 lakh crore.
    2. Opportunity size: For 2023-24, indicative estimates put the value chain financing opportunity above ₹14 lakh crore.
    3. Processing gap: India processes only 10-12% of farm produce, against 35-45% in East, South and Southeast Asia.
    4. Developed economies: The share often exceeds 60% there, where finance follows commodity-specific value chains, not production alone.

    What should the new financing framework contain?

    1. Instrument mix: The framework would combine product finance, receivables finance and warehouse receipt finance. Risk mitigation and credit enhancement tools would cut the lender’s risk of loss.
    2. Warehouse receipt finance: Loans against stored produce, where the receipt a warehouse issues for the stored crop serves as the lender’s security, so the produce backs the loan.
    3. Cash-flow lending: Lenders would judge each commodity chain’s cash flows, not conventional collateral alone.
    4. Wider reach: Credit would reach farmers, input suppliers, aggregators, warehouses, processors, transporters, exporters and retailers, spurring private investment, rural jobs and rural industrialisation.

    Challenges

    1. Collateral habit: Banks still lend mainly against land and fixed assets, so cash-flow appraisal of processors remains underdeveloped.
    2. Price risk on stored stock: A price fall during storage cuts the value of pledged inventory.
    3. Costly NBFC funding: Agri NBFCs borrow at a higher cost than banks, which limits how far their models scale.

    Way Forward

    1. Cash-flow appraisal: Banks should build commodity-specific credit appraisal using procurement and sales data.
    2. Inventory loan guarantees: A guarantee facility should cover seasonal inventory loans to processors.
    3. Electronic warehouse receipts: Scale up the electronic Negotiable Warehouse Receipt (e-NWR) system for pledging stored produce.

    Conclusion

    India’s credit institutions were built to help farmers grow food, not to finance the storage and processing that turn harvests into incomes. Whether lenders move from isolated products to one architecture that lends on cash flows will decide if this becomes a reform or stays a niche.

    Government Initiatives for Agricultural Credit

    1. Kisan Credit Card limit: The KCC loan limit under the Modified Interest Subvention Scheme (MISS) was raised from ₹3 lakh to ₹5 lakh.
    2. Interest subvention: MISS offers short-term crop loans at 7%, falling to 4% on prompt repayment.
    3. Priority Sector Lending: Banks must lend 18% of net bank credit to agriculture.
    4. Special Food Processing Fund: A ₹2,000 crore fund with the National Bank for Agriculture and Rural Development (NABARD) gives affordable credit to food-park units.

    Matching Previous Year Question

    “[2019] The economic cost of food grains to the Food Corporation of India is Minimum Support Price and bonus (if any) paid to the farmers plus (a) transportation cost only (b) interest cost only (c) procurement incidentals and distribution cost (d) procurement incidentals and charges for godowns Answer: (c)”

  • Rising sea level threat to India’s eroding coastline

    Why in the News

    India’s coastal no-build strip is still measured from today’s high-tide line, even as the shoreline retreats and the sea rises faster. The UN General Assembly (UNGA) has adopted its first ever declaration on rising sea levels, asking nations to build sea-level rise projections into coastal infrastructure planning.

    What does the UN declaration settle about statehood?

    1. Montevideo test: The 1933 Montevideo Convention defines a State by a permanent population, defined territory, government and capacity to enter into relations with other states. A sinking country risks failing the territory test.
    2. Continued statehood: The declaration’s “presumption in favour of continued statehood” lets a sinking country keep its sovereignty, UN seat and nautical boundaries. It works like a title deed that survives the flood.
    3. Displaced people: Countries must protect the human rights of those who lose homes. Eg. Over a third of Tuvalu‘s 11,000 people have sought Australian climate visas.
    4. The takeaway: Sinking island nations such as Tuvalu, Kiribati and the Maldives keep their legal existence.

    What does India gain from a pledge meant for small islands?

    1. India’s stand: India backed stable maritime zones and reaffirmed “common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities”: those who caused more warming and can pay more should do more.
    2. Island count: A 2023-24 remeasurement counts 1,298 offshore islands and islets.
    3. Island boundaries: Lakshadweep and the Andaman and Nicobar Islands push India’s sea boundaries into the Arabian Sea and Bay of Bengal, so fixed boundaries protect India too.

    Is India’s coastal law ready for a retreating shore?

    1. Eroding shoreline: The National Centre for Coastal Research (NCCR) found about a third of the mainland shoreline eroding.
    2. CRZ no-build strip: The Coastal Regulation Zone (CRZ) Notification, 2019 bars new building within 50 metres of the high-tide line in dense rural areas and 200 metres elsewhere.
    3. Moving baseline: The high-tide line marks today’s highest spring tide, so on the fastest-eroding stretches a house at the 50-metre edge reaches the water in about ten years.
    4. Unused hazard line: The Survey of India‘s hazard line factors in sea level rise, but the 2019 rules use it only for disaster management and land-use planning.

    Where does India fall short on people already displaced?

    1. Vanishing islands: In the Sundarbans, Ghoramara island has lost about half its area in five decades.
    2. Repeat displacement: Families who moved to Ghoramara from the vanished Lohachara island were displaced again within a decade, without secure tenure or livelihoods.
    3. No legal category: Indian law does not recognise people who lose land gradually to erosion, so each relocation is decided case by case.
    4. People at risk: A Frontiers in Marine Science review puts 45 million Indians at risk by 2050.
    5. Fiji’s model: Fiji wrote relocation into its Climate Change Act in 2021, backed by a trust fund.

    Challenges

    1. Locked-in rise: A UN brief finds seas will keep rising for centuries to millennia even at net zero.
    2. Adaptation finance gap: Developing countries’ adaptation needs far exceed the international public finance available.
    3. Distant finance goal: At the Baku summit, India called the new goal of $300 billion a year by 2035 “too little and too distant”.

    Way Forward

    1. Hazard-line baseline: Measure the no-build strip from the hazard line, or widen it by local erosion rates before the UN review due by September 2030.
    2. Erosion displacement law: Give families displaced by erosion land title and livelihood support by law.
    3. Finance diplomacy: Press for “timely and predictable disbursement” of adaptation finance at COP31 in Antalya in November.

    Conclusion

    The UN has secured sinking States’ legal future, but India’s coastal rules still plan against a shoreline moving inland. Whether the no-build strip moves to the hazard line before the next UN review will test India’s readiness.

    Key numbers

    1. Sea-level rise rate (World Meteorological Organization): 2.1 mm a year in 1993-2002, 4.7 mm in 2015-2024; a record 6 mm in 2024 alone.
    2. Rise by 2100 (‘Surging Seas in a Warming World’, 2024): about 38 cm at lowest emissions, about 77 cm if emissions keep climbing.
    3. Erosion (NCCR, 1990-2016): 234 sq km lost, 231 sq km gained; nearly 400 km retreating over 5 metres a year and 225 km by 3 to 5 metres; over 170 km of West Bengal in the fastest category.
    4. Adaptation finance (UN Environment Programme): needs over $310 billion a year by 2035; $26 billion of international public finance in 2023.
    5. India’s coastline (2023-24 remeasurement): 11,098 km.
    6. Ghoramara island area (Sundarbans): about 7.2 sq km shrinking to 3.6 sq km.

    Matching Previous Year Question

    “[2020] Which one of the following statements best describes the term ‘Social Cost of Carbon’? It is a measure, in monetary value, of the (a) long-term damage done by a tonne of CO2, emissions in a given year. (b) requirement of fossil fuels for a country to provide goods and services to its citizens, (c) efforts put in by a climate refugee to adapt to live in a new place. (d) contribution of an individual person to the carbon footprint on the planet Earth. Answer: (a)”

  • New efficiency norms: What will change for OEMs, small cars & SUVs

    Why in the News

    India’s car efficiency rules have moved from a proposed extra 3 g/km allowance for petrol cars weighing up to 909 kg to a single fleet-wide formula in which vehicle weight sets every carmaker’s target. The final Corporate Average Fuel Economy (CAFE)-III framework, notified on 29 September, also gives electric vehicles the biggest compliance benefit.

    What are the CAFE-III norms?

    1. What they are: CAFE norms cap the average fuel consumption across all cars a company sells, not each model, like a class average rather than each student’s score.
    2. Coverage: They apply to M1 category passenger vehicles, cars seating up to eight passengers besides the driver, manufactured or imported for sale in India.
    3. Period: The norms run for five financial years, from April 2027 to March 2032.
    4. Weight-based target: A maker’s permitted fuel consumption depends on the weighted average unladen weight (sales-weighted empty weight) of its vehicles. A heavier, SUV-led fleet gets a higher limit than a small-car fleet.
    5. The takeaway: Carmakers must now manage the efficiency of their entire portfolio rather than individual models.

    Why did the small-car concession go?

    1. Contested carve-out: Small cars became one of the most contentious points in drafting, since India’s market depends on compact, light petrol cars. A September 2025 draft proposed the extra allowance.
    2. Market concentration: Maruti Suzuki has an outsized presence in small cars. Rival carmakers argued the carve-out would disproportionately benefit a segment dominated by the largest carmaker.
    3. Changed weight formula: The reference weight, the baseline from which each fleet’s target is adjusted, rose from 1,170 kg in earlier versions to 1,229 kg. The weight adjustment is also flatter.
    4. No separate category: The final framework creates no separate category for the lightest cars. Their weight advantage is built into the broader fleet formula instead.

    What routes to compliance do carmakers get, and how has industry responded?

    1. Electric vehicle credit: Battery-electric and range-extended electric vehicles get a volume derogation factor of 3, so each counts as three vehicles when fleet performance is calculated.
    2. Carbon Neutrality Factor: This credit rewards makers for ethanol-blended petrol, biofuels and compressed biogas (CBG). It gives a route to compliance beyond efficiency gains and electrification.
    3. Industry welcome: Maruti Suzuki called it a comprehensive regulation built on scientific data and inter-ministerial consultation, recognising multiple powertrains and fuels.
    4. Predictable roadmap: Hyundai Motor India said the 3+2 year compliance block structure allows long-term product and technology planning.

    Challenges

    1. Diluted real gains: Counting each electric vehicle three times lets a maker sell more fuel-hungry cars and still meet its average.
    2. Fuel credit verification: Credits for ethanol and CBG assume cleaner fuel is actually used, which carmakers do not control.
    3. Lab versus road gap: Fuel consumption is certified on test cycles, which often understate real-world use.
    4. Softer SUV targets: A weight-based formula gives heavier fleets a higher allowance, so a shift to SUVs eases the target.

    Way Forward

    1. Taper the multiplier: The Ministry of Power should lower the derogation factor as electric vehicle sales rise.
    2. On-road checks: Testing agencies should add real-world fuel checks to certification.
    3. Public compliance data: The Ministry of Power should publish each carmaker’s fleet performance every year.
    4. Audited fuel credits: Carbon Neutrality Factor credits should be tied to verified fuel supply data from oil marketing companies.

    Conclusion

    CAFE-III ties every carmaker’s target to the weight of what it sells, which removed the case for a separate small-car carve-out. The first compliance block will show whether electric vehicle and clean fuel credits cut real fuel use or only soften the average.

    Matching Previous Year Question

    “[2020] Which one of the following statements best describes the term ‘Social Cost of Carbon’? It is a measure, in monetary value, of the (a) long-term damage done by a tonne of CO2, emissions in a given year. (b) requirement of fossil fuels for a country to provide goods and services to its citizens, (c) efforts put in by a climate refugee to adapt to live in a new place. (d) contribution of an individual person to the carbon footprint on the planet Earth. Answer: (a)”

  • SC rules out total ban on firecrackers for Deepavali

    Why in the News

    Firecracker policy for Deepavali has moved from the prospect of a total nationwide ban to a “limited and conditional relaxation” that permits next-generation joined green crackers. A Supreme Court Bench headed by Justice M.M. Sundresh ruled out the total ban, accepting suggestions from the Council of Scientific and Industrial Research-National Environmental Engineering Research Institute (CSIR-NEERI).

    What are next-generation joined green crackers?

    1. What they are: Joined crackers are a string of crackers linked to burst one after another. Green crackers are reformulated to pollute less, like a low-emission version of a regular product.
    2. Barium-free design: The green series is made without barium, a toxic chemical used for colour. Its shell or tube size, formulation, bursting duration and frequency also differ.
    3. Lower emissions: Tests show a 30% reduction in emissions compared with conventional joined crackers, with lower noise and fewer particulate emissions, the fine dust that enters the lungs.
    4. Less waste, longer bursts: Smaller shells cut solid waste generation by 4% up to 32%. The bursting time has increased five times.
    5. The takeaway: Cleaner chemistry lets the court allow festive crackers without accepting the full pollution load of conventional ones.

    What conditions has the court accepted?

    1. Compliance first: The court backed manufacture of these crackers only in compliance with applicable noise, emission and safety requirements.
    2. Approved formulations: As the Centre proposed, the crackers must conform to formulations tested and approved by the competent authority.
    3. Licensed makers only: The crackers must be made exclusively by duly licensed manufacturers.
    4. Noise and emission limits: They must stay within permissible emission levels and a noise limit of 125 dB(AI) or 145 dB(C) peak. These are decibel measures of sudden and peak loudness.
    5. Fixed design, no banned chemicals: CSIR-NEERI has prescribed the shell size, shell number and bursting duration. The crackers must be free of banned chemical ingredients.

    How will the court balance festive sentiment and clean air?

    1. Balanced view: The court said it would take a balanced view, given fears of air pollution with the onset of winter and the festive season.
    2. No total ban: The Bench remarked orally that a total ban “will hurt certain sentiments“.
    3. No round-the-clock bursting: It will not allow 24-hour bursting anywhere, as this affects the sick, the elderly and children. It will look into directing specific time windows for bursting.
    4. Further tests: The court gave the Central Pollution Control Board (CPCB) and the Union government more time for further barium and joined cracker decibel tests.

    Challenges

    1. Fake green labels: Conventional crackers sold as green are hard to tell apart at retail, so enforcement depends on market checks.
    2. Policing time windows: Bursting hours are hard to enforce across dense neighbourhoods on a single festival night.
    3. Seasonal pollution load: Crackers add to a season when stubble burning and still winter air already trap pollutants over north India.
    4. Livelihood pressure: Cracker production clustered around Sivakasi in Tamil Nadu employs many workers, so strict curbs hit jobs.
    5. Incomplete evidence: The relaxation comes before the pending barium and decibel tests are complete.

    Way Forward

    1. Verifiable packs: Approved crackers should carry QR codes that buyers and police can check against the CSIR-NEERI list.
    2. Uniform hours: The court should fix uniform bursting hours, enforced by local police.
    3. Live monitoring: The CPCB should publish noise and air quality readings through the festival.
    4. Industry transition: States should help cracker units shift to approved formulations through training and credit.

    Conclusion

    The Supreme Court has chosen regulated celebration over prohibition, resting that choice on cleaner cracker chemistry. Watch for its directions on bursting time windows and the results of the pending tests before Deepavali.

    Back2Basics: CSIR-NEERI

    1. Parent body: A laboratory of the Council of Scientific and Industrial Research, India’s largest public research network, under the Ministry of Science and Technology.
    2. Location: Headquartered in Nagpur, Maharashtra.
    3. Mandate: Research in environmental science and engineering, including air and water pollution control.
    4. Green crackers: It developed India’s first green cracker formulations after the Supreme Court’s 2018 order allowing only less-polluting crackers.

    Matching Previous Year Question

    “[2025, GS3, 10 marks] What is Carbon Capture, Utilization and Storage (CCUS)? What is the potential role of CCUS in tackling climate change?”

  • In aftermath of BRICS, going back to Bandung

    Why in the News

    The 18th BRICS Summit in New Delhi earlier this month produced a 140-point declaration that, in places, echoes the anti-colonial Bandung agenda. The debate is whether BRICS can inherit the mission of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM), and whether India, leaning towards Washington, can lead the Global South.

    What did Bandung and NAM stand for?

    1. Bandung Conference: In April 1955, leaders of 29 newly independent Asian and African countries met at Bandung, Indonesia. They agreed on ten principles, chiefly:
      • sovereignty and non-interference;
      • refusal to join great-power military blocs;
      • support for peoples under colonial rule.
    2. Non-Aligned Movement: Six years later, at Belgrade, this became NAM, a platform for decolonisation. It backed Algeria, Vietnam, the anti-apartheid struggle and the Palestinians.
    3. New International Economic Order (NIEO): In the 1970s, NAM took to the United Nations (UN) a demand for fair commodity prices, technology access and a voice in global institutions.
    4. Loss of direction: India was NAM’s founder and moral centre. After the Soviet Union collapsed, many members, India included, drifted towards the United States (US).
    5. The takeaway: NAM survives only in name, so BRICS is judged as its possible heir.

    What did the New Delhi declaration say, and leave unsaid?

    1. BRICS reach: Formed in 2009, BRICS now represents more than half of humanity.
    2. Bandung echoes: The declaration seeks reform of the UN Security Council, International Monetary Fund (IMF), World Bank and World Trade Organization (WTO). It also backs:
      • an end to the blockade of Cuba;
      • a Palestinian state on the 1967 borders, with East Jerusalem as capital;
      • climate finance for countries that did not cause the crisis.
    3. Not NAM’s heir: BRICS members have different systems and interests, and several are close US partners.
    4. Silences of consensus: The declaration condemns “unilateral coercive measures” and urges “maximum restraint” in West Asia. It names neither who imposes them nor the aggressor.

    Why does BRICS’s limited project still matter?

    1. Reform, not rupture: BRICS seeks more than one centre of power, not an end to domination. It would reform the US dollar’s dominance but is silent on poor nations’ debt.
    2. Shield against coercion: When tariffs become weapons and sanctions on one country disrupt many, alternatives give governments room:
      • trade in national currencies;
      • development finance without strings;
      • a reserve arrangement, a pooled emergency fund, outside the IMF.
    3. Strength in numbers: A larger, stronger BRICS makes it harder for one power to dictate terms.

    Can India lead the Global South while leaning towards Washington?

    1. Junior partner charge: The critique holds that India acts as a “junior partner” of the US, deepening military and trade arrangements aimed at containing China.
    2. West Asia contradiction: India embraces Israel strategically yet signed the Palestinian statehood text. Surveys across West Asia rank Israel and the US as the region’s greatest threats.
    3. Selective silence: India has been silent on US actions against Iran, Venezuela and Cuba, and has not clearly condemned the destruction of Gaza.
    4. Hidden poverty: Before the summit, the capital’s slums were screened from view.
    5. Return to Bandung: The critique urges a return to Bandung’s idea of peoples’ right to decide their own destinies:
      • freedom from US pressure;
      • solidarity with Palestine and opposition to sanctions;
      • payment of climate debt to poorer nations;
      • a BRICS that is more than a lobby.

    Challenges

    1. India-China rivalry: Border friction between India and China limits BRICS’s strategic cohesion.
    2. Expansion without criteria: A larger BRICS risks becoming a talk shop, as NAM did.
    3. Dollar dependence: The US dollar still settles over 80% of global trade, so de-dollarisation is slow.

    Way Forward

    1. Membership criteria: BRICS should set formal criteria for full and partner membership.
    2. Stronger bank: Members should raise the capital of the New Development Bank (NDB) and widen its Global South lending.
    3. Debt agenda: BRICS should take up sovereign debt relief.
    4. Consistent positions: India should judge unilateral actions by one standard, whoever acts.

    Conclusion

    BRICS offers the Global South a hedge against coercion, not the anti-colonial programme Bandung and NAM carried. Whether India uses BRICS to speak for that programme, or as one more seat at the table, remains unresolved.

    About BRICS

    1. Origin: A Goldman Sachs economist coined “BRIC” in 2001. The first leaders’ summit met at Yekaterinburg, Russia.
    2. Expansion: South Africa joined in 2011. Egypt, Ethiopia, Iran and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) joined in 2024, and Indonesia a year later.
    3. NDB: Headquartered in Shanghai, the BRICS bank has approved over $35 billion in infrastructure loans.

    Matching Previous Year Question

    “[2026] Which of the following countries are members of the European Union? 1. Belarus 2. Poland 3. Germany 4. Switzerland (a) 1, 2 and 4 (b) 1 and 4 only (c) 2 and 3 (d) 2 and 4 only Answer: C”

  • BLOs shared details for ‘verification’; hundreds of voters in Odisha nearly struck out of rolls

    Why in the News

    Booth Level Officer (BLO) logins meant to certify voter checks were used, without the BLOs’ knowledge, to file bulk deletion applications against voters they had verified. In Odisha’s Dhamnagar Assembly seat, the Election Commission of India (ECI) has approved the suspension of the Assistant Electoral Registration Officer (AERO) accused of misusing BLOs’ one-time passwords (OTPs) during the Special Intensive Revision (SIR).

    How were BLO credentials turned against voters?

    1. What Form 7 is: Form 7 is the application to object to, or seek deletion of, a name on the roll. BLOs process it on an app under their own login, confirmed by an OTP.
    2. How the misuse worked: The AERO and his staff sought OTPs from BLOs on the pretext of verification. The OTPs were then used to process Form 7s removing genuine voters.
    3. Spread across BLOs: Several BLOs in the Dhamnagar Notified Area Council (an urban local body) found such uploads. One found at least 227 in her name, another 130.
    4. Pressure on BLOs: Their police complaint says the AERO pressed them through a supervisor and threatened a show-cause notice.
    5. The takeaway: A check built on each BLO’s login became a way to strike voters off without any BLO deciding it.

    Who was targeted, and why did it raise suspicion?

    1. One community: Over 90% of the applications concerned Muslim voters. Dhamnagar, in northeast Odisha, is among the State’s few seats with a sizeable Muslim population.
    2. Already verified voters: BLOs say almost all flagged voters had been cleared in the enumeration round and traced to the 2002 SIR roll.
    3. Outlier volume: Dhamnagar alone produced over 3,000 Form 7s, against a statewide average of 141 Form 7-based deletions per seat.
    4. Narrow political margins: The Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) won the seat twice by narrow margins over the Biju Janata Dal (BJD). The BJD now seeks a thorough probe.

    How did the election machinery respond?

    1. Complaint and memorandum: 10 BLOs filed a police complaint on 4 September and approached the Bhadrak District Collector. The BJD then petitioned the State Chief Electoral Officer (CEO).
    2. Preliminary inquiry: The Electoral Registration Officer (ERO), Bhadrak’s Additional Sub-Collector, found prima facie, on a first look, that the forms were processed in an unauthorised manner.
    3. Suspension: On 21 September, the ECI approved, via the CEO, suspension and disciplinary proceedings against the AERO, also the council’s Executive Officer. Odisha’s Housing and Urban Development Department issued the order.
    4. Further action: The Collector must forward a full “draft charge” (the formal allegations), and a detailed inquiry has been ordered.
    5. Names restored: The applications were withdrawn, and most targeted voters appear in the final roll released the same day.

    Challenges

    1. Shared credentials: OTPs handed to superiors mean a login no longer proves who decided.
    2. Detection by chance: The misuse surfaced through a BLO checking her app, not a system alert.
    3. Religious targeting: Deletions aimed at one community strike at Article 325, which bars exclusion from the roll on grounds of religion.
    4. Cheap objections: Bulk Form 7s cost filers little, while flagged voters must prove eligibility again.

    Way Forward

    1. Bulk filing alerts: Flag logins processing Form 7s far above the seat average.
    2. Non-transferable login: BLO approvals should use biometric or device-bound authentication in place of shareable OTPs.
    3. Penal action: Prosecute guilty officials under Section 32 of the Representation of the People Act, 1950, which punishes breach of official duty in roll work.
    4. Protected reporting: Shield BLOs who report misuse from threats by superiors.

    Conclusion

    The SIR’s safeguards hold only if officials cannot borrow the credentials of those below them. Whether the inquiry ends in formal charges against the suspended officer is the next marker.

    Key numbers

    1. Odisha’s Form 7 deletions: 20,707 names across 147 Assembly seats.
    2. Odisha’s electorate: 3.33 crore before the SIR, 3.16 crore in the final roll.
    3. Dhamnagar’s electorate: 2.49 lakh at the start of the SIR, 2.31 lakh in the final roll.
    4. Dhamnagar enumeration deletions: 17,956 voters; the seat had 20,000 Muslim voters at the start.
    5. BJP’s winning margins: over 4,000 (2019) and 8,000-plus (2024).

    Back2Basics: Electoral Registration Officer

    1. Statutory hierarchy: Sections 13A to 13CC of the 1950 Act set up the roll machinery: a CEO per State, District Election Officers and EROs.
    2. Role of the ERO: The ERO prepares and revises the electoral roll for an Assembly constituency.
    3. Role of the AERO: AEROs assist the ERO and may perform the ERO’s functions, subject to the ERO’s control.

    Matching Previous Year Question

    “[2026, GS2, 10 marks] Is the right to vote a fundamental right? Discuss the position of the Election Commission of India while undertaking the revision of electoral rolls. Can it also examine the question of citizenship of voters?”

  • When Congress loses an election, it blames the democratic system

    Why in the News

    A mature democracy must separate electoral disappointment from institutional illegitimacy, argues a Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) national spokesperson, replying to Congress attacks on the Election Commission of India (ECI). The writer holds that the Congress’s concern for ECI independence sits uneasily with its own history.

    What separates losing an election from an illegitimate one?

    1. Two different claims: Disappointment is a normal result of political competition. Illegitimacy is a grave constitutional allegation and must rest on evidence.
    2. Accepting defeat: The writer’s party lost the Bankipur by-poll without blaming the ECI, the rolls or electronic voting machines. Sometimes the voter wanted something else.
    3. Scrutiny is legitimate: Roll revisions, scheduling and Model Code of Conduct enforcement should stay open to scrutiny.
    4. Proper channels: These include representations before the Commission, judicial review and statutory remedies.
    5. The takeaway: Treating every defeat as fraud weakens the institutions through which citizens exercise sovereign choice.

    Why does the writer say Congress’s history weakens its criticism?

    1. Shah Commission findings: The Justice J C Shah Commission on Emergency excesses made severe findings on Navin Chawla’s conduct as a Delhi administrator.
    2. Chawla’s appointment: The Congress-led United Progressive Alliance still made him Election Commissioner in 2005 and Chief Election Commissioner (CEC) in 2009.
    3. M S Gill: CEC from 1996 to 2001, he later entered Parliament on a Congress ticket and served as a Union Minister.
    4. T N Seshan: The CEC who redefined the ECI’s powers later contested a Lok Sabha election for the Congress. The writer concedes none of this proves misconduct in office.
    5. Emergency precedent: After the Allahabad High Court set aside Indira Gandhi’s election, the Emergency followed, with opponents jailed and civil liberties curtailed.

    What evidence does the writer cite for the ECI’s standing?

    1. Judicial backing: In a May 2026 judgment, the Supreme Court upheld the legal basis of Bihar’s Special Intensive Revision (SIR) of electoral rolls. Justice Surya Kant stressed correcting discrepancies in the rolls.
    2. Global role: The ECI is a founding member and former chair of the Association of World Election Bodies.
    3. Training capacity: Its India International Institute of Democracy and Election Management has trained election officials from scores of countries.
    4. Observer programmes: Foreign delegations join India’s Election Visitors’ programmes, though this is not a certificate of infallibility.

    Does the selection law answer the independence concern?

    1. Opposition’s formal role: The Leader of the Opposition now has a formal place in selecting Election Commissioners.
    2. How it came about: The role followed Anoop Baranwal v. Union of India (2023) and Parliament’s Chief Election Commissioner and Other Election Commissioners Act, 2023.
    3. Contested design: The writer accepts that the law’s design can be debated and remains under judicial scrutiny.
    4. Invitation, not accusation: The Congress should take evidence-backed grievances to the Commission and courts, not turn every disagreement into a referendum on democracy.

    Challenges

    1. Government majority on the panel: Two of three panel members are from the government side, so the Leader of the Opposition can be outvoted.
    2. Post-retirement roles: No law bars former commissioners from joining parties, which feeds suspicion of partisanship.
    3. Perception of neutrality: Partisan links of past commissioners hurt trust even without misconduct.
    4. Slow remedies: Judicial review often ends after the poll, too late for the affected election.

    Way Forward

    1. Cooling-off period: Bar former commissioners from government or political roles for two years.
    2. Consensus in selection: The panel should select by consensus, or include a member from outside the executive.
    3. Evidence-led grievances: Parties should file specific, booth level objections with the ECI.
    4. Time bound review: Courts should decide roll related petitions before polls.

    Conclusion

    Separating defeat from illegitimacy protects elections, but trust in a referee also needs rules that keep it beyond the reach of whoever holds power. Judicial scrutiny of the selection law will decide whether the Opposition’s place in it is real or nominal.

    How independent is the Election Commission by design?

    1. CEC’s tenure protection: The CEC can be removed only in the manner and on the grounds applying to a Supreme Court judge.
    2. Weaker cover for Election Commissioners: Other Election Commissioners can be removed on the CEC’s recommendation. The Tarkunde (1975) and Goswami (1990) Committees suggested they get the CEC’s protection.
    3. Financial dependence: Unlike the Comptroller and Auditor General, the ECI’s budget is not “charged” on the Consolidated Fund of India, so it needs Parliament’s vote. The Law Commission’s 255th Report recommended charging it.

    Matching Previous Year Question

    “[2026, GS2, 10 marks] Is the right to vote a fundamental right? Discuss the position of the Election Commission of India while undertaking the revision of electoral rolls. Can it also examine the question of citizenship of voters?”

  • Pause SIR and conduct an audit of voter deletions

    Why in the News

    Opposition demands to remove Chief Election Commissioner (CEC) Gyanesh Kumar have run into a legal framework that makes involuntary removal nearly impossible without government backing. A Congress Member of Parliament (MP) argues that the Special Intensive Revision (SIR) of electoral rolls should be paused and its voter deletions independently audited.

    How can a Chief Election Commissioner be removed?

    1. What the rule is: Removal of a CEC is modelled on the impeachment of a Supreme Court judge. Parliament’s presiding officers must first admit a removal petition. Both Houses must then pass it by majority.
    2. Why it exists: The high bar shields an election referee from a government displeased with its decisions.
    3. What went wrong: Earlier removal notices alleging partiality were declined by the presiding officers of both Houses. The Congress and INDIA bloc allies are preparing fresh ones.
    4. Voluntary exit only: Under Section 11 of the Chief Election Commissioner and Other Election Commissioners Act, 2023, a commissioner may resign by writing to the President.
    5. The takeaway: A shield built for independence can become an insurmountable barrier to accountability.

    Why has political pressure not moved the CEC?

    1. Street protests: The Congress held some 930 protest agitations against the CEC in one week.
    2. Opposition demands: Opposition leaders seek the CEC’s immediate resignation and criminal proceedings over alleged bias favouring the ruling party.
    3. Coalition allies: Some partners the government depends on have sought transparency on the Election Commission of India’s (ECI) internal decisions, weakening the executive’s protection of the CEC.
    4. Government’s refusal: The Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) will not yield to protests. A resignation would be claimed as an Opposition victory and cast doubt on past electoral outcomes.

    What is now before the Supreme Court?

    1. Unilateral decisions: One petition challenges policies and software modifications allegedly made without the unanimous consensus of the three-member ECI.
    2. Selection panel: A second petition challenges the Act’s selection panel. The Act replaced the Chief Justice of India with a Union Cabinet Minister, giving the executive a two-to-one majority.
    3. Immunity clause: Section 16 of the Act grants serving and former commissioners immunity from civil or criminal proceedings for acts done in official duty.
    4. Immunity under review: If the Court strikes the clause down, the writer says, the CEC could face dismissal and criminal prosecution.

    Why does the writer want the SIR paused and audited?

    1. Lost global standing: The ECI was once a model for the world, sought by the United Nations to advise emerging democracies.
    2. Scale of deletions: The writer claims the ECI has deleted “a global record 130 million voters” and reduced one polling booth to a single voter.
    3. Neutrality at risk: The CEC’s continued tenure threatens the ECI’s perceived neutrality, on which electoral credibility rests.
    4. Three demands: Pause the disputed SIR, disclose the ECI’s decision-making record, and back an independent audit of deletions and software changes.
    5. Cost of inaction: Until then, each election risks deepening the crisis of democracy it should resolve.

    Challenges

    1. Near immune office: A CEC the government backs faces no effective removal threat.
    2. Unaudited software: No independent body has reviewed the software changes behind deletions.
    3. Collective body in name: A multi-member design does not by itself ensure collective decisions.
    4. Partisan framing: Opposition-led protests let the government dismiss accountability demands as politics.

    Way Forward

    1. Independent sample audit: A panel outside the ECI should audit a sample of SIR deletions.
    2. Recorded decisions: The ECI should publish each commissioner’s position on major SIR decisions.
    3. Software disclosure: The rules driving deletions should be open to expert scrutiny.
    4. Selection reform: Parliament should add a member from outside the executive to the selection panel.

    Conclusion

    The design shields an election referee from the government but gives voters no route to hold it to account. The Supreme Court’s rulings on the selection panel and the immunity clause are where that balance can be reset.

    What is a Special Intensive Revision?

    1. Door to door check: An SIR is a time bound, house-to-house count. Booth Level Officers (BLOs) physically verify every voter entry, unlike the annual Summary Revision.
    2. Legal basis: Section 21 of the Representation of the People Act, 1950 allows a special revision at any time, for recorded reasons.
    3. Procedure: The Registration of Electors Rules, 1960 set how the revision is carried out.
    4. Past rounds: Intensive revisions have been held about 14 times, including in 2002 and the current cycle.

    Matching Previous Year Question

    “[2026, GS2, 10 marks] Is the right to vote a fundamental right? Discuss the position of the Election Commission of India while undertaking the revision of electoral rolls. Can it also examine the question of citizenship of voters?”

  • ECI and Court make it harder, not easier to trust in independent institutions

    Why in the News

    The Supreme Court and the Election Commission of India (ECI) have together handled the Special Intensive Revision (SIR) of electoral rolls in a way that disenfranchised citizens and inflicted administrative cruelty on them, argues a signed column. Because both bodies exist to guard the vote, their conduct now deepens scepticism about independent institutions.

    What went wrong with the SIR, according to the writer?

    1. What the SIR is: The SIR is a door to door recheck of every voter entry, like a census of voters. The writer accepts it may be justified in principle.
    2. Poor design and execution: It was “so badly conceived and executed” that citizens are reeling. Neither body answered critics on its fairness.
    3. Burden shifted to voters: An opaque process, including its software protocols, made citizens prove their own eligibility. The writer calls this a flaw of substance, not mere procedure.
    4. Mass appeals: The ECI filed appeals en masse against 16 lakh voters in West Bengal who had already been found eligible for inclusion.
    5. The takeaway: When the referee challenges voters it already cleared, the citizen bears the cost of protecting the vote.

    Why was the Court the only check, and how did it fall short?

    1. Shield of impeachment: The ECI controls the integrity of voting lists, and its Commissioners can be removed only by impeachment. The Supreme Court was therefore the only practical check.
    2. Safeguards not demanded: The Court could have demanded strong safeguards without curbing the ECI’s powers. It instead legitimised the exercise.
    3. Remarks from the Bench: Justice Joymalya Bagchi remarked that excluded voters could simply vote in the next election, which the writer calls ad hominem, meaning personal rather than reasoned.
    4. No urgent hearing: The Chief Justice of India (CJI) declined to expedite a petition on pending West Bengal appeals before the Rejinagar and Nandigram by-elections.

    Why does the writer see a culture of impunity, not one bad exercise?

    1. “Constitution of Impunity”: The writer’s term for arbitrary power working inside constitutional offices without abolishing them. Both bodies made up SIR procedures at will.
    2. Independence as a shield: Opposition anger targets constitutional authorities, so the government gets off lightly.
    3. Rot beyond politics: The decline spans a whole elite, including public servants, not politics alone.
    4. Nihilism about institutions: The Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), the writer says, thrives on scepticism about constitutional functionaries, and both bodies reinforced it.
    5. Invisible victims: Excluded voters stay unmobilised and out of public view, so their numbers have not turned into political pressure.

    Can better appointment rules restore trust?

    1. Appointment question revived: The Court has belatedly questioned how Election Commissioners are chosen, since the executive dominates selection.
    2. Procedure and virtue: The Court’s own conduct shows appointment rules do not decide behaviour in office: “procedure is no substitute for virtue”.
    3. Partial admission: The ECI’s press notes partly admit procedural impropriety and promise help to voters facing queries.
    4. Signals of accountability: The Chief Election Commissioner’s resignation, or the Court repairing the SIR, would signal accountability.

    Challenges

    1. Accountability gap: Impeachment level protection leaves no routine check on the ECI’s administrative choices.
    2. Opaque technology: Voter-flagging software is not public, so excluded voters cannot contest its logic.
    3. Delay as denial: An appeal decided after a poll means that vote is lost for good.
    4. Executive led selection: Government control of selection erodes confidence even in fair appointees.

    Way Forward

    1. Published protocols: The ECI should publish the software rules used to flag voters.
    2. Time bound appeals: Courts should decide exclusion appeals before the next poll in that seat.
    3. Burden on the state: The ECI should show grounds for each deletion.
    4. Balanced selection panel: Parliament should ensure no single branch holds a majority on the panel.

    Conclusion

    Independent institutions earn legitimacy by how they treat the weakest voter, not by formal insulation. Whether the Court now hears exclusion claims before votes are cast will show if that trust can be rebuilt.

    What is the Election Commission of India?

    1. Constitutional basis: Article 324 vests the “superintendence, direction, and control” of elections to Parliament, State Legislatures, President and Vice-President in the ECI.
    2. Electoral rolls: The ECI prepares and periodically revises electoral rolls.
    3. Plenary powers: Mohinder Singh Gill (1978) confirmed the ECI’s plenary powers under Article 324 to act where the law is silent.
    4. Limit on those powers: Election Commission of India v. Ashok Kumar (2000) affirmed the ECI’s power to ensure error free rolls, provided it follows natural justice.

    Matching Previous Year Question

    “[2026, GS2, 10 marks] Is the right to vote a fundamental right? Discuss the position of the Election Commission of India while undertaking the revision of electoral rolls. Can it also examine the question of citizenship of voters?”

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