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  • BRICS: evolution, cooperation and India’s leadership ahead of the 18th Summit

    BRICS: evolution, cooperation and India’s leadership ahead of the 18th Summit

    Why in News

    India hosts the 18th BRICS Summit on 12 to 13 September 2026 at Bharat Mandapam, New Delhi. BRICS is a grouping of major emerging economies.

    Current stage and next milestone

    India chairs BRICS for the fourth time in 2026. The leaders’ sessions run on 12 to 13 September 2026. The chairship has already run over 350 ministerial meetings across 25 cities.

    Core facts

    1. Origin: The acronym BRIC was coined in 2001 by Goldman Sachs. It projected Brazil, Russia, India and China as future major economies.
    2. Formation: South Africa joined in 2010, forming BRICS.
    3. Membership now: The grouping has 11 full members: Brazil, China, Egypt, Ethiopia, India, Indonesia, Iran, Russia, Saudi Arabia, South Africa and the United Arab Emirates. A Partner Country framework adds ten more nations.
    4. Weight: Members hold 49.5% of global population, 40% of global Gross Domestic Product and 26% of global trade.
    5. India’s chairships: They occurred in 2012, 2016, 2021 and 2026.
    6. Theme 2026: Building for Resilience, Innovation, Cooperation and Sustainability.
    7. Three pillars: Political and security cooperation, economic and financial cooperation, and cultural exchanges.
    8. 2026 agenda: Agriculture, health, urban infrastructure, Micro, Small and Medium Enterprises, supply chains and climate resilience.

    Static Context

    1. The New Development Bank (NDB) is the BRICS development bank. It was set up at the 6th Summit via the Fortaleza Declaration of 2014. Its headquarters is in Shanghai.
    2. The Contingent Reserve Arrangement is the BRICS currency swap framework for balance of payments support.
    3. The 16th Summit was held at Kazan, Russia, in 2024. The latest expansion admitted Egypt, Ethiopia, Iran, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates.

    Prelims angle

    NDB headquarters at Shanghai and its Fortaleza Declaration origin; BRICS membership list and the 11 member count; India’s chairship years; the NDB is a BRICS body, not an Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation body.

    Mains angle

    GS Paper 2, global groupings affecting India’s interests. BRICS suits a question on its role as a counterweight in global governance and a platform for the Global South.

    Matching Previous Year Question

    “[2025] Consider the following statements with regard to BRICS:
    I. The 16th BRICS Summit was held under the Chairship of Russia in Kazan.
    II. Indonesia has become a full member of BRICS.
    III. The theme of the 16th BRICS Summit was Strengthening Multiculturalism for Just Global Development and Security.
    Which of the statements given above is/are correct?
    (a) I and II
    (b) II and III
    (c) I and III
    (d) I only
    Answer: (a)”

    “[2026, GS2, 10 marks] “BRICS acts as a powerful counterweight in global governance, actively amplifying the voice and influence of the Global South.” Explain the role of BRICS in projecting itself as an alternative to other groupings.”

  • Seventh Gender Samvaad centres women’s leadership in rural livelihoods

    Why in News

    The Deendayal Antyodaya Yojana National Rural Livelihoods Mission (DAY NRLM) held the seventh Gender Samvaad on women’s agency in livelihoods.

    Core facts

    1. Theme: The edition focused on moving women from participation to leadership in livelihoods.
    2. Scale: Over 6 lakh stakeholders joined. Participation rose from 1,400 in April 2021 to near 6 lakh by September 2025.
    3. SHG base: The Self Help Group (SHG) movement represents over 100 million women.
    4. Lakhpati Didi: 346 million Lakhpati Didis earn over ₹1,00,000 a year. A Lakhpati Didi is an SHG woman with annual household income at or above ₹1 lakh.
    5. State models cited: Maharashtra’s Women Farmers’ Empowerment Bill recognises women without formal land titles. Odisha’s Bhubaneswar Declaration advances women’s land rights. Andhra Pradesh’s natural farming is led by women’s SHGs.
    6. Institution building: The focus is on strengthening Cluster Level Federations, Producer Groups and Farmer Producer Organisations (FPO). Governance, financial record keeping and credit readiness are flagged for the United Nations International Year of Women Farmers 2026.
    7. Entrepreneurship drive: The National Campaign on Entrepreneurship II runs from 21 August to 21 November 2026. It promotes enterprise development, value chains and market access for SHG women.

    Static Context

    1. DAY NRLM launched in 2011 as Aajeevika. It mobilises rural poor women into SHGs and their federations. The Ministry of Rural Development runs it.
    2. Gender Samvaad launched in April 2021. It is a joint platform of DAY NRLM and the Institute for What Works to Advance Gender Equality (IWWAGE). It shares gender practice across State Rural Livelihoods Missions.
    3. An SHG is a small voluntary savings and credit group, usually of 10 to 20 members. The SHG Bank Linkage Programme connects these groups to formal bank credit.

    Prelims angle

    DAY NRLM launch as Aajeevika in 2011 under the Ministry of Rural Development; Lakhpati Didi income threshold of ₹1 lakh; the SHG Bank Linkage Programme; distinction between Self Help Groups and Farmer Producer Organisations.

    Mains angle

    GS Paper 2, development processes and the role of SHGs. The theme fits a question on SHGs as vehicles of women’s economic empowerment and poverty reduction.

    Matching Previous Year Question

    “[2012] How does the National Rural Livelihood Mission seek to improve livelihood options of rural poor?
    1. By setting up a large number of new manufacturing industries and agri-business centres in rural areas
    2. By strengthening ‘Self-Help Groups’ and providing skill development
    3. By supplying seeds, fertilizers, diesel pumpsets, and micro-irrigation equipment free of cost to farmers
    (a) 1 and 2 only
    (b) 2 only
    (c) 1 and 3 only
    (d) 1, 2 and 3
    Answer: (b)”

    “[2020, GS2, 15 marks] “Micro-Finance as an anti-poverty vaccine, is aimed at asset creation and income security of the rural poor in India”. Evaluate the role of Self Help Groups in achieving the twin objectives along with empowering women in rural India.”

  • Securing Farmers’ Future with Dignity: seven years of the farmer pension scheme

    Why in News

    The Pradhan Mantri Kisan Maandhan Yojana (PM KMY) completed seven years. PM KMY is a voluntary contributory pension scheme for small and marginal farmers.

    Core facts

    1. Launch: PM KMY launched on 12 September 2019.
    2. Core benefit: It assures a minimum pension of ₹3,000 per month from the age of 60.
    3. Enrolment: Total enrolment is 24,96,252 farmers as of February 2026. Haryana leads with 5.75 lakh. Bihar follows with 3.46 lakh.
    4. Outlay used: Government investment since 2019 is ₹540.66 crore.
    5. Administration: It is a Central Sector Scheme under the Department of Agriculture and Farmers Welfare. The Life Insurance Corporation of India (LIC) is the pension fund manager.
    6. Eligibility: It covers farmers holding cultivable land up to two hectares. The entry age band is 18 to 40 years. Names must appear in land records as of 1 August 2019.
    7. Contribution: The farmer pays ₹55 to ₹200 per month by entry age. The government matches the farmer’s contribution equally.
    8. Family pension: A surviving spouse receives 50% of the pension, that is ₹1,500 per month.
    9. Exclusions: Income tax payers, registered professionals and beneficiaries of other pension schemes are barred. These other schemes include the National Pension System (NPS), the Employees State Insurance Corporation (ESIC), the Pradhan Mantri Shram Yogi Maandhan (PM SYM) and the Pradhan Mantri Laghu Vyapari Maandhan (PM LVM).
    10. Enrolment route: Enrolment runs through Common Service Centres using Aadhaar, a bank account and mobile One Time Password. A farmer may route PM KISAN benefits into the PM KMY contribution.

    Static Context

    1. PM KISAN is the Pradhan Mantri Kisan Samman Nidhi. It transfers ₹6,000 per year in three instalments to landholding farmer families.
    2. A Central Sector Scheme is funded fully by the Union government. A Centrally Sponsored Scheme splits funding between the Centre and the states.
    3. LIC is a statutory insurer. It was set up under the Life Insurance Corporation Act, 1956.

    Prelims angle

    PM KMY pension amount of ₹3,000 and entry age 18 to 40; LIC as the fund manager; the two hectare landholding ceiling; the distinction between Central Sector and Centrally Sponsored schemes; overlap bars with PM SYM and NPS.

    Mains angle

    GS Paper 2, welfare schemes for vulnerable sections. The scheme suits a question on old age income security for the unorganised and agrarian workforce.

    Matching Previous Year Question

    “[2016] Regarding ‘Atal Pension Yojana’, which of the following statements is/are correct?
    1. It is a minimum guaranteed pension scheme mainly targeted at unorganized sector workers.
    2. Only one member of a family can join the scheme.
    3. Same amount of pension is guaranteed for the spouse for life after subscriber’s death.
    Select the correct answer using the code given below.
    (a) 1 only
    (b) 2 and 3 only
    (c) 1 and 3 only
    (d) 1, 2 and 3
    Answer: (c)”

  • Inclusive and trusted intelligent finance pitched at Global Fintech Festival 2026

    Why in News

    The Ministry of Communications set out India’s digital finance record at the Global Fintech Festival 2026 in Mumbai.

    Core facts

    1. Guiding frame: Finance must become inclusive before it becomes intelligent. Connectivity, compute and trust are named the new digital trinity.
    2. Internet access: It expanded from 25 crore users to 100 crore users over a decade.
    3. Broadband access: It grew from 6 crore to 103 crore, a 16 fold rise in ten years. About 6.5 lakh villages now join the digital economy.
    4. 5G rollout: The fifth generation (5G) network covers 99.9% of districts and 85% of the population within 26 months of its 2022 launch. It runs on over 5 lakh base stations with ₹4.5 lakh crore capital expenditure.
    5. Data price: Data costs about 10 cents per gigabyte. India is stated as the world’s most affordable data market.
    6. Unified Payments Interface (UPI): UPI is a real time retail payment system linking bank accounts for instant transfers. It processed 24,162 crore transactions worth ₹314 lakh crore in the 2025 to 2026 financial year. It forms 84% of domestic digital transactions and 49% of global real time payment volumes.
    7. UPI abroad: It is live in nine countries at no cost. Expansion to 20 more nations is planned.
    8. Financial inclusion base: 60 crore Pradhan Mantri Jan Dhan Yojana (PMJDY) accounts are open. 9 billion documents sit on DigiLocker, the government’s digital document wallet.
    9. Rural coverage: Under Digital Bharat Nidhi, 22,000 towers are being placed across 34,000 villages without telecom links.
    10. Fraud tools: Sanchar Saathi blocks suspicious connections and stolen devices. ASTR, an Artificial Intelligence (AI) tool, cut 88 lakh suspicious mobile connections. The Financial Fraud Risk Indicator blocks fraudulent transfers before withdrawal.
    11. Stated vision: A Trust Grid would integrate telecom, digital identity, UPI and financial systems. The 6G mission targets 10% of global patents.

    Static Context

    1. UPI is operated by the National Payments Corporation of India (NPCI). NPCI is an umbrella body for retail payments set up in 2008 under the guidance of the Reserve Bank of India (RBI) and the Indian Banks’ Association.
    2. Digital Bharat Nidhi is the successor to the Universal Service Obligation Fund (USOF). It was renamed under the Telecommunications Act, 2023. It funds telecom access in commercially unviable rural and remote areas.
    3. PMJDY launched in 2014 as the national financial inclusion mission. It provides basic savings accounts, RuPay cards and overdraft access.
    4. DigiLocker operates under the Ministry of Electronics and Information Technology. It issues and stores verified documents linked to Aadhaar.

    Prelims angle

    UPI versus Central Bank Digital Currency (Digital Rupee) distinctions; the operator of UPI is NPCI, not RBI; Digital Bharat Nidhi sits under the Telecommunications Act, 2023 and replaces the USOF; PMJDY launch year 2014; Sanchar Saathi as the fraud reporting platform.

    Mains angle

    GS Paper 3, Indian economy and inclusive growth. The digital public infrastructure stack can frame a question on how far technology driven financial inclusion closes welfare and credit gaps.

    Matching Previous Year Question

    “[2026] Which one of the following statements about Unified Payments Interface (UPI) and Central Bank Digital Currency (Digital Rupee) is NOT correct?
    (a) UPI is a real-time payment system but Digital Rupee is akin to sovereign paper currency
    (b) In case of UPI, settlement for end users happens instantly; in case of Digital Rupee, wallet balance gets transferred to another wallet (no traditional settlement)
    (c) UPI transactions are recorded by banks and reflected in bank statements; in case of Digital Rupee, no data is captured in bank statements
    (d) In both the cases (UPI and Digital Rupee), the liability lies with the users and their respective banks
    Answer: (d)”

    “[2023, GS3, 10 marks] What is the status of digitalization in the Indian economy? Examine the problems faced in this regard and suggest improvements.”

  • For Bihar flood problem, solution lies beyond

    Why in the News

    Bihar received 27 per cent below normal rainfall between 1 June and the first week of September, and large parts of the state are still under water. Six rivers, the Ganga, Gandak, Kosi, Budhi Gandak, Punpun and Ghaghra, have risen above danger levels in different stretches. The flooding therefore cannot be explained by how much rain fell on the state, which locates the cause in how its rivers and channels are managed. The state’s inherited answer has been containment, holding rivers inside defined channels behind embankments since colonial times. That method separates a river from its floodplain, and with silt raising the bed year on year it reduces the channel’s capacity to carry the discharge it is given. The contested question is whether flood works should keep aiming to hold the river in, or to give it space to spread safely.

    Why did rivers cross danger levels in a deficit monsoon?

    1. The rainfall record for the season: The state recorded 27 per cent below normal rainfall for the period from 1 June to the first week of September.
    2. Two causes acting together: High upstream river flows combined with erratic weather, meaning spells of heavy localised rainfall inside an overall seasonal deficit, pushed rivers over their banks.
    3. A tributary can flood because the main river is high: The unusually high level of the Ganga created a backwater effect in the Gandak and the Punpun, the condition where a high level in the receiving river obstructs the outflow of a river draining into it.
    4. What that effect did: Both tributaries drain into the Ganga, and its high level made their discharge difficult, so water backed up in the tributaries and added to the flooding.
    5. Danger level is a gauge based threshold: It is the level fixed for each gauge site above which a river threatens habitation and property, so six rivers crossing it in different stretches describes localised failures rather than one basin wide event.

    What does containment by embankment do to a river?

    1. It cuts the river off from its floodplain: Embankments separate rivers from the floodplains that would otherwise absorb and spread a high discharge.
    2. The bed rises inside the confined channel: Continuous silt deposition raises the riverbed and reduces the channel’s capacity to carry flow.
    3. A breach concentrates the damage: When an embankment breaches, artificially contained water rushes into homes and fields at a depth and force an unconfined flood would not produce.
    4. Each year of containment narrows the next year’s margin: A rising bed inside fixed embankments means the same discharge sits higher against the same defences, so the safety margin shrinks with no change in rainfall.

    Why will higher embankments not settle the problem?

    1. The premise needs revisiting: The state needs to reconsider the idea that higher or stronger embankments will by themselves contain floods, since the containment is what raises the bed against them.
    2. Maintenance remains an obligation: Existing embankments protect settlements and land that have grown up behind them, so the choice is not between maintaining them and abandoning them.
    3. The stated objective is the opposite of containment: Persistent monsoon floods point to the need to give the river space to spread safely during periods of high discharge, which a confined channel is designed to prevent.
    4. This is an execution problem, not a knowledge problem: The measures required are already identified in policy, and the flooding continues, which places the failure in implementation rather than in diagnosis.

    What must accompany embankment maintenance?

    1. Restoration of drainage channels: The natural and constructed drains that carry water off the land have to be reopened, since water that cannot drain stays on fields after the river level falls.
    2. Protection of floodplains: The land a river needs during high discharge has to be kept free of the construction and occupation that turns a spread into a disaster.
    3. Better land use planning: Where settlement, cropping and infrastructure are permitted has to follow the flood behaviour of the stretch rather than precede it.
    4. Restoration of wetlands: Wetlands in the basin hold and release flood water, and their loss transfers that volume to the channel and to the settlements behind the embankment.
    5. Deployment of early warning systems: Warning converts an unavoidable flood into an evacuated one, and it is the only measure on this list that reduces loss without altering the river.

    Why has an existing basin plan not changed the outcome?

    1. The imperatives are already on record: The Ganga Basin River Management Plan, implemented for more than a decade, acknowledges these requirements.
    2. The outcome has not followed: Persistent monsoon floods in Bihar show how much remains to be done to give the river room to spread during high discharge.
    3. One requirement sits outside the state’s control: Addressing Bihar’s concerns requires greater coordination between the riverine states on reservoir releases, since a downstream state’s peak is partly set by upstream release decisions.

    Where does the Farakka question sit in this argument?

    1. The state’s long standing contention: Bihar has argued that the barrage and the India-Bangladesh Ganga water sharing treaty compounded its river management challenges.
    2. The mechanism it alleges: Its case is that the barrage altered the Ganga’s flow regime, affecting the movement and deposition of the river’s sediment load.
    3. The causal claim is not settled: The extent to which this contributes to flooding in Bihar remains contested, so it cannot carry the whole explanation for the season’s flooding.
    4. The claim still belongs in the negotiation: Renegotiation of the 1996 treaty, which expires in December, should take account of Bihar’s concerns over silt accumulation and the state’s river management needs.
    5. The evidence base has to be current: Any new arrangement needs to be informed by updated data on river flows and climate change projections rather than on historical records alone.
    6. The principle extends past this treaty: In a period of erratic weather, states and countries sharing a river basin have to strengthen coordination to manage flows and reduce flood related distress.

    Challenges to embankment based flood control in Bihar

    1. The network is too long to maintain to standard: Bihar carries roughly 3,800 km of flood embankments, and every weak section of it is tested in the same few weeks each year. Eg. Breaches are recorded each season at several points across different river systems rather than at one predictable location.
      The Fix: Publish a stretch wise condition rating for the full embankment length before each monsoon, with repair funds released against the ratings rather than spread evenly.
    2. Containment creates waterlogging behind the line: An embankment that keeps a river out also keeps rainwater and local drainage in, so land behind it is lost to standing water rather than to flooding. Eg. Large areas in the Kosi and Gandak belts of north Bihar remain waterlogged well after river levels have fallen.
      The Fix: Build and maintain sluice and pump drainage at every point where an embankment crosses a natural drain, and treat the outfall as part of the embankment asset.
    3. People live between the embankments: Villages inside the embanked corridor are flooded every year by design, without the protection the structure was built to provide. Eg. Settlements between the eastern and western Kosi embankments are inundated annually while the land outside them is defended.
      The Fix: Fix a statutory resettlement and compensation entitlement for households inside the embanked corridor, separate from general flood relief.
    4. The decisive failure point can lie outside the state: The Kosi and the Gandak are regulated by structures in Nepalese territory, so a breach beyond Bihar’s jurisdiction can determine its flood year. Eg. The 2008 Kosi flood followed a breach at Kusaha, upstream of the barrage in Nepal, and displaced close to three million people in Bihar.
      The Fix: Establish a joint pre monsoon inspection and certification regime with Nepal for the Kosi and Gandak structures, with agreed repair timelines.
    5. Warning lead time is short because the catchment is foreign: Rainfall and discharge data from the upper catchments decide how much notice a district can be given, and that data is not generated within India. Eg. A peak on the Kosi can reach the Bihar plains within a day of heavy rainfall in its Nepalese catchment.
      The Fix: Extend real time telemetry sharing across the upper catchments and route it directly to district administrations rather than only to state control rooms.
    6. Silt removal has no funded programme: Reversing a raised bed is slow work with no annual budget head behind it, so the only measure reliably funded is raising the embankment. Eg. Dredging in the state is undertaken for navigation on specific stretches rather than for restoring channel capacity across a river.
      The Fix: Create a standing sediment management head in the state’s water resources budget, reporting channel capacity rather than embankment height as its outcome.

    Conclusion

    A flood season inside a rainfall deficit places the cause in the river system rather than in the monsoon, and that changes what a flood programme should be measured against. Protection built on confining rivers cannot hold once the beds inside those confinements keep rising. The question Bihar now faces is whether it makes channel capacity and floodplain space the stated objective of its flood works, or continues to judge success by the height and length of its defences. The water negotiation ahead is where the state’s sediment case will either become an operating rule or remain a grievance.

    Back2Basics: Ganga Basin River Management Plan

    1. What it is: A basin scale plan that treats the Ganga as a single hydrological unit, covering environmental flows and sediment alongside pollution abatement, rather than as a set of separate state level works.
    2. Why a basin frame: The Ganga basin covers about 861,000 sq km in India, close to 26 per cent of the country’s geographical area, spread across 11 states.
    3. Who carries the Ganga programme: The National Mission for Clean Ganga, under the Ministry of Jal Shakti, is the implementing arm of the National Ganga Council and was constituted as an authority under the Environment (Protection) Act, 1986.
    4. What a basin plan can and cannot do: It sets requirements across the basin and depends on state departments and inter state coordination to execute them, which is how its imperatives can stand on record for years without changing outcomes on the ground.

    Matching Previous Year Question

    “[2017, GS1, 15 marks] In what way can floods be converted into a sustainable source of irrigation and all – weather inland navigation in India?”

  • Farakka treaty nearing expiry, JDU revives campaign against barrage

    Why in the News

    Janata Dal (United), a partner in the ruling coalition in Bihar, has launched a campaign across 12 districts of the state along the Ganga demanding that the Farakka barrage be dismantled, and opposing any renewal of the India-Bangladesh Ganga water sharing treaty. The treaty it is targeting was signed in December 1996 and set a 30 year framework for sharing Ganga waters at the barrage during the dry season. That framework lapses this December, which converts a standing state grievance into a live negotiating question. The state government’s own position is narrower, that Bihar’s interest should be guarded in the treaty, with the Chief Minister stating in Munger that the state receives Ganga water for only four months of the year against a need for year round flow. A bilateral water sharing arrangement is the Union government’s to negotiate, and what is now being pressed is not a better share but the removal of the structure the sharing is measured at.

    What does the 1996 Ganga water sharing treaty do?

    1. Who it binds and what it covers: It is a bilateral agreement between India and Bangladesh, signed in December 1996, regulating the sharing of Ganga waters at the Farakka barrage in West Bengal.
    2. The season it governs: It applies primarily to the dry season, running from 1 January to 31 May, which is when the flow available at the barrage is least able to meet both countries’ requirements.
    3. Why a 30 year term was written in: The treaty established a binding framework for 1996 to 2026 to replace the earlier short term stopgap arrangements and give both sides predictable distribution.
    4. Where it now stands: That framework lapses this December, so continuation requires a fresh negotiation rather than an automatic rollover.

    Why was the barrage built, and what did it change on either side?

    1. The purpose it was built for: The barrage was built in 1975 to divert water from the Ganga into the Hooghly river, to flush out silt and keep Kolkata Port navigable.
    2. The downstream effect in Bangladesh: The diversion reduced downstream flow into Bangladesh, producing severe water shortages, increased soil salinity and ecological stress in the south of that country.
    3. The upstream effect Bihar reports: Heavy silt trapped behind the barrage has raised the Ganga’s riverbed, destroying the river’s natural storage capacity and driving seasonal floods.
    4. One structure sits behind both complaints: The diversion that sustains a port channel downstream is the same arrangement that holds sediment upstream, so the barrage is what both sets of grievances point at.

    What is Bihar’s stated grievance?

    1. A flood and parch cycle upstream: The state government’s position is that the barrage has created a severe flood and parch dynamic upstream of it, alternating inundation with shortage rather than steadying the flow.
    2. Four months of water against a year round need: The Chief Minister has stated that Bihar currently receives Ganga water only from July to October, and requires flow throughout the year.
    3. What the state asks of the Union government: Its stated demand is that the treaty safeguard Bihar’s interest, which places a riparian state’s claim inside a negotiation it is not a party to.

    What is the campaign demanding, and how is it being run?

    1. A demand to dismantle, not to renegotiate: The party is demanding that the barrage be dismantled, citing a stance its chief and former Chief Minister has repeatedly taken with the Union government that the structure causes heavy siltation and floods.
    2. Outright opposition to renewal: The party’s stated position is that it is completely against renewal, on the ground that the treaty fails to serve the state’s interests and remains a primary cause of flooding.
    3. Where it is being taken: The ‘Nitish Samvad’ campaign covers the 12 districts through which the Ganga flows in Bihar, and has so far covered four, Buxar, Bhojpur, Begusarai and Khagaria.
    4. How it is being conducted: It is led by the party’s national working president, a Rajya Sabha member, and carries recorded audio messages of the party chief, who is not travelling for it.
    5. The timetable it is working to: The party intends to finish the campaign well before the treaty ends in December, which places it ahead of any decision on renewal.

    Challenges to renegotiating the Ganga water sharing framework

    1. A riparian state has no seat at the table: Water is a State subject, and a treaty with a foreign country is the Union government’s exclusive power, so a state can press a claim and cannot block an agreement. Eg. The India-Bangladesh Teesta water sharing draft has remained unsigned since 2011 over West Bengal’s objections, without the state being a party to it.
      The Fix: Constitute a standing consultative mechanism with the basin states before negotiation opens, with their submissions placed on record as part of the Indian position.
    2. The sharing formula rests on historical flows: The arrangement was built on the average dry season availability recorded at the barrage over four earlier decades, and that baseline no longer describes current or projected flows. Eg. Its operation depends on how much water actually arrives at the barrage in each ten day period of the dry season.
      The Fix: Write the next arrangement on a rolling flow record revised at fixed intervals, rather than on a single fixed historical average.
    3. Sediment has no institutional owner: The dispute Bihar raises is about silt rather than volume, and no authority holds the power to order desilting or to set a sediment budget for the river. Eg. The approach channel at Farakka itself requires repeated dredging to stay open, which relocates silt rather than reducing the load.
      The Fix: Attach a sediment management protocol to the barrage’s operating rules, naming the responsible authority and the annual dredging and disposal obligation.
    4. The flood peaks are set outside India: The Kosi and the Gandak, the rivers that deliver Bihar’s worst flood peaks, rise in Nepal, so peak discharge is governed by catchments and structures beyond this treaty’s scope. Eg. The Kosi and Gandak barrages stand in Nepalese territory and are operated by India under the 1954 Kosi Agreement and the 1959 Gandak Agreement.
      The Fix: Pair the Ganga negotiation with a flow data sharing and release coordination arrangement with Nepal on the Kosi and Gandak.
    5. Removing the structure moves the problem rather than ending it: Dismantling the barrage would restore downstream flow and withdraw the diversion that keeps the Bhagirathi-Hooghly channel and the Kolkata port route navigable. Eg. The feeder canal at Farakka exists solely to carry that diverted flow into the Bhagirathi-Hooghly system.
      The Fix: Commission an independent flow and sediment study of the barrage’s upstream and downstream effects, so the dismantling demand is tested against measured alternatives rather than settled politically.

    Conclusion

    A dry season sharing arrangement is now being contested on grounds it was never written to address, since the demand from Bihar concerns sediment and flood behaviour rather than the volume of water allotted. That mismatch is what makes renewal harder than an extension of terms. The decision to watch is whether the Union government opens the negotiation with a stated position on siltation upstream of the barrage, or confines it to the dry season allocation. Confined to allocation, a new agreement settles the bilateral question and leaves the domestic one exactly where it started.

    Back2Basics: Farakka Barrage

    1. Where it stands: Across the Ganga in Murshidabad district of West Bengal, a short distance upstream of the point where the river enters Bangladesh.
    2. Its scale: The barrage runs about 2,240 metres across the river and carries a road and rail link over it.
    3. How the diversion works: A feeder canal roughly 38 km long carries water from above the barrage into the Bhagirathi-Hooghly, the channel the diversion was designed to sustain.
    4. Who operates it: The Farakka Barrage Project authority, under the Union Ministry of Jal Shakti, runs the structure and its regulating gates.

    Matching Previous Year Question

    “[2016, GS1, 12 marks] Present an account of the Indus Water Treaty and examine its ecological, economic and political implications in the context of changing bilateral relations.”

  • As India probes origin of 5 baby orangutans, Indonesia prepares ground for repatriation

    Why in the News

    Indonesia’s Ministry of Forestry has written to India offering government to government and Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora (CITES) coordination on five baby orangutans, and is preparing the technical requirements for their repatriation. The letter, sent by its Directorate of Species and Genetic Conservation, went to the Director General of Forests and Special Secretary in the Ministry of Environment, Forest and Climate Change, who is also India’s CITES Management Authority. It follows the rescue of the five animals from a forest in Balasore district of Odisha, after which a preliminary assessment placed them as Sumatran and raised the possibility of an organised transnational wildlife trafficking network. Indonesia has stated that it respects the judicial and statutory procedures applicable in India, and the Indian side has replied that state forest authorities must finish their official investigation first. Any decision on custody, transport or transfer also needs the authorisation of a competent judicial court. Repatriation is therefore not held up by either government’s willingness, and it waits on a genetic result and a court order.

    What does CITES do, and what does Appendix I mean?

    1. What the treaty regulates: CITES is a multilateral treaty more than 50 years old that regulates global trade in wild animals and plants, so that the trade is legal, sustainable, traceable and does not threaten a species’ survival in the wild.
    2. What Appendix I does: It prohibits trade in species that are endangered, which removes commercial international trade in a listed species from the set of lawful transactions.
    3. How it operates inside a country: Each party designates a Management Authority that issues permits, verifies specimens and handles correspondence with other parties, which is why Indonesia’s letter went to that office in India rather than through a general diplomatic channel.
    4. What it does not settle: The Convention regulates trade and leaves the disposal of confiscated live animals, including whether they return to the country of origin, to the seizing country’s own law and courts.

    What has Indonesia asked for, and what has it offered?

    1. The information sought: Its communication asked for details of the incident, the species, the animals’ health, the investigation being carried out, and the collection of genetic samples.
    2. The offer on verification: It conveyed its readiness to cooperate with India on species and origin verification.
    3. The commitment if origin is confirmed: If the animals are confirmed as originating from Indonesia, it would undertake the measures needed for repatriation under CITES and its own national laws.
    4. The logistics already being assembled: It is preparing health examinations, quarantine arrangements, genetic identification, transport, animal welfare safeguards and appropriate post arrival rehabilitation.

    Why does the origin question turn on DNA rather than appearance?

    1. What the current assessment rests on: The animals are suspected to be from Sumatra on the basis of preliminary observations of their physical and morphological characteristics.
    2. What morphology cannot establish: Conclusive identification requires a DNA examination, which would fix their species, their geographical origin, and whether they came from the wild or had been held in captivity earlier.
    3. The range is wider than the working assumption: The animals could be from either Indonesia or Malaysia, and only DNA sampling can establish which population they belong to.
    4. Why the wild or captive finding matters: It separates a fresh capture from the wild from an animal moved out of an existing captive collection, and the two point to different chains of supply.

    What does the case suggest about the trafficking chain?

    1. A network rather than a single consignment: The possibility of an organised transnational wildlife trafficking network is being taken seriously on the Indonesian side.
    2. An enforcement arm has been brought in: Indonesia’s Directorate General of Forestry Law Enforcement has been roped in alongside its conservation directorate.
    3. The chain details sought from India: It has asked for the suspected trafficking route, the point of entry, the transit countries, the documentation, and the preliminary investigation findings.
    4. The jurisdictional follow through: Where the evidence reveals persons, transactions or collection points inside Indonesian jurisdiction, Indonesian authorities would act under national law and through international law enforcement cooperation.
    5. No names at this stage: The stated position is that identifying particular individuals or networks before the evidence is formally established would be premature.

    Challenges to returning trafficked wildlife to its country of origin

    1. Statutory machinery for the Convention arrived late: A Management Authority with powers written into domestic law is what lets a seizure move through a treaty process rather than an ad hoc one. Eg. India joined CITES in 1976 and acquired statutory CITES provisions, including a designated Management Authority and a schedule for listed specimens, only through the Wild Life (Protection) Amendment Act, 2022.
      The Fix: Publish a standing disposal protocol for confiscated live exotic animals, so custody, testing and transfer follow one written sequence from the day of seizure.
    2. A genetic result needs something to compare against: A DNA sample names a population only where reference profiles for wild populations already exist in an accessible library. Eg. Orangutans are recognised as three separate species, Bornean, Sumatran and Tapanuli, so a match has to resolve to a population rather than to an island.
      The Fix: Route seizure samples through a designated wildlife forensic laboratory that holds or can obtain source country reference profiles under a standing arrangement.
    3. Custody cost and welfare risk grow with the proceedings: Infant animals have to be housed, fed and treated for as long as the investigation and the court process run, and the holding facility is rarely built for the species. Eg. The five animals are being held in a zoological park in Odisha while the state investigation continues.
      The Fix: Set a statutory outer limit for a disposal decision on confiscated live animals, with interim custody vested in a facility equipped for the species.
    4. A returned great ape cannot simply be released: Infant orangutans learn foraging, nest building and predator avoidance from their mothers, so an orphaned animal needs years of rehabilitation before any release is possible. Eg. Indonesia’s own orangutan centres in Sumatra and Kalimantan run multi year forest school programmes before a release attempt.
      The Fix: Name the receiving rehabilitation centre and its capacity in the repatriation arrangement before the transfer is authorised, not after.
    5. No single authority covers the whole route: Source, transit and seizure fall under different national agencies, so the chain is investigated in fragments by bodies with no shared case file. Eg. The South Asia Wildlife Enforcement Network and its Southeast Asian counterpart exist precisely because wildlife crime routes cross the jurisdiction of several enforcement agencies.
      The Fix: Constitute a joint investigation team with named nodal officers in the source, transit and seizure countries at the point of seizure rather than after the first findings.

    Conclusion

    Both governments have already agreed on the process, so neither the treaty nor diplomacy is what decides where these animals end up. The sequence runs through a state forest investigation, a genetic result, and a court’s authorisation for custody and transfer, in that order. The step to watch is whether the genetic examination is commissioned early enough to be available when the court takes up the custody question, since a case decided without it settles the animals’ future on appearance alone. The wider test is whether the seizure produces a traced route and named collection points, or ends as five rescued animals and no network.

    Back2Basics: Orangutans

    1. What they are: The only great apes found in Asia, tree dwelling and native to the rainforests of Borneo and Sumatra in Indonesia and Malaysia.
    2. How many species: Three are recognised, the Bornean, the Sumatran and the Tapanuli, the last described as a separate species in 2017 and the rarest of the great apes.
    3. Conservation status: All three are listed as critically endangered on the International Union for Conservation of Nature (IUCN) Red List.
    4. Reproductive pace: Females give birth once in six to eight years, the longest interval of any land mammal, which is why a poached infant is not replaced within a generation.

    Matching Previous Year Question

    “[2015] With reference to the International Union for Conservation of Nature and Natural Resources (IUCN) and the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora (CITES), which of the following statements is/are correct? (1) IUCN is an organ of the United Nations and CITES is an international agreement between governments. (2) IUCN runs thousands of field projects around the world to better manage natural environments. (3) CITES is legally binding on the States that have joined it, but this Convention does not take the place of national laws. Select the correct answer using the code given below. (a) 1 only (b) 2 and 3 only (c) 1 and 3 only (d) 1, 2 and 3 ANSWER: (b)”

  • Looking up at the drones

    Why in the News

    Data pooled from over 1,200 drones intercepted in Punjab since 2024 has mapped the cross border smuggling network that flies them. The mapping names the launch pads inside Pakistan’s Punjab, the Indian villages where payloads are dropped, the hours of peak activity and the altitudes flown. It follows an interception count that has held steady rather than fallen, with 294 Pakistani drones downed by the Border Security Force (BSF) and allied agencies in Punjab in 2024, 287 in 2025 and roughly the same number again by August 2026. Punjab had answered the threat in August 2025 with the Rs 51.4 crore ‘Baaz Akh’ (Hawk Eye) Anti-Drone System (ADS), the first state level anti-drone grid in the country. The same dataset shows why that answer is not holding, since drones now carry satellite links and a return to home fail-safe that turns them back before they can be brought down. The network along Punjab’s 550-km International Border is therefore better understood than at any point since 2019 and no easier to stop.

    What is the ‘Baaz Akh’ Anti-Drone System?

    1. What it is: A state funded anti-drone grid deployed by the Punjab government as a second line of defence behind the BSF’s own portable interception equipment.
    2. The four functions it performs: It detects a drone’s movement and signal, tracks it on a digital map, jams its control link, and forces an emergency landing for ground recovery.
    3. What it jams: It disrupts either radio frequency control signals or satellite navigation frequencies, and can identify the ground control station operating the drone.
    4. Its reach: The system works over a range of 8 to 10 km and issues automated alerts to security agencies.

    What does the intercepted drone data reveal about the network’s geography?

    1. Eight launch pads, two of them primary: Sustained sorties come from at least eight launch pads in Pakistan’s Punjab, with the villages of Jahman and Masteki as the main two.
    2. Both primary pads face Tarn Taran: Jahman sits directly across from the Khalra sector in Tarn Taran district. Masteki lies in the Sehjra enclave, a pocket of Pakistani territory surrounded by India on three sides, roughly opposite Khem Karan town.
    3. The remaining pads: They lie near Kasur, opposite Khem Karan; Qila Jiwan Singh, opposite Rajatal in the Attari sector; Wagah, opposite Attari; and Narowal, across from Dera Baba Nanak in Gurdaspur district.
    4. The landing areas: Payloads are dropped at Bhindi Saidan, Attari, Rajatal, Dall, Daleri, Maari Meghaan, Wan and villages around Khem Karan including Kals and Mastgarh.
    5. Where the drones are recovered: The highest number of interceptions on the Indian side occur 3.5 km to 10 km from the International Border.

    What do the timing and flight patterns show?

    1. A fixed nightly window: Maximum activity falls between 10 pm and 4 am, at an average of 12 to 15 drones an hour.
    2. The drops cluster on two days: The highest number of consignment drops take place on Thursdays and Saturdays.
    3. Sortie length separates stock from modified platforms: The average sortie runs 45 minutes, and modified drones average 24 minutes. Eg. One DJI Matrice drone recorded 42.67 minutes and a DJI Matrice 4 Pro recorded 15 minutes before it was downed.
    4. Altitude separates them too: Commercial DJI platforms fly at about 500 feet, and a modified eight rotor platform, the octocopter, was tracked at 2,500 feet.
    5. The drop point is chosen for pickup, not for accuracy: Consignments are dropped on agricultural fields for couriers to collect. Navigational error and incorrect GPS data put some payloads onto farmhouses and homes instead.

    How has the technology changed since the incursions began?

    1. The 2019 baseline: Pakistani drones were first noticed in Punjab around 2019, operating on rudimentary radio frequency direction control.
    2. The 2026 platform: Drones now operating in Punjab carry satellite communication and anti-jamming capability, and some downed in Punjab were navigating on Starlink satellite links.
    3. The airframes are commercial and Chinese made: The platforms in use for drug smuggling include the DJI Mavic 4 Pro, which can fly multiple sorties, and the DJI Matrice 300 RTK, which carries a large payload.
    4. The payload has not narrowed: The consignments carry narcotics, weapons and explosives, launched from pads deep inside Pakistan’s Punjab and dropped across the border under cover of darkness.

    Why does the fence no longer decide what crosses the border?

    1. It was built for a different mode of entry: The 462-km fence along the International Border went up mainly in the late 1980s and early 1990s to stop infiltration and smuggling during the militancy years.
    2. What it consists of: It is a multi-layered barrier of 8 to 12 feet, topped with rows of concertina and razor wire and, in places, high voltage ‘cobra’ wires, with a patrol track, observation towers and border outposts along it. Most of the feasible land border had been fenced and floodlit by 1993.
    3. It does not stand on the border: Older ground rules placed it some 150 yards inside Indian territory. In many stretches it was built two to three km in, leaving large tracts of farmland between the fence and the Zero Line.
    4. The gaps are physical as well as aerial: The line carries riverine and flood related gaps, and the incursions it was built to stop now arrive over it rather than through it.

    Why does detection not translate into seizure?

    1. The return to home fail-safe defeats the jam: Drones detect the interference from jamming, locking or control signal disruption and fly back to their launch point in Pakistan before they can be neutralised or recovered on the Indian side.
    2. Jamming weakens with distance: Some attempts fail simply because the drone is too far from the jamming unit when it is engaged.
    3. Autonomous platforms are not vulnerable to the method: Current systems fail against resilient drone networks built with features that reduce dependence on radio frequency control, which is what jamming targets.
    4. Coverage is thin: Security officers put the requirement at at least 100 jamming units for effective wider coverage, against the units now deployed on vehicles and in fixed positions.
    5. Recovery depends on people, not the grid: Interception is a layered system requiring coordination between the BSF, police quick reaction teams and ground recovery parties, so detection without a rapid ground response yields no seizure.
    6. Three threats the grid does not yet address: Small and low signature drones go undetected, drones operating together in swarms on artificial intelligence and decentralised communication are anticipated, and remote terrain with harsh weather leaves some drop zones inaccessible.

    What role do the border villages play in interception?

    1. They are the first reporting layer: Punjab set up village defence committees to help tackle cross border smuggling and drones, and their members coordinate with the BSF and local authorities on stray drones and recovered weapons.
    2. The reporting chain is unreliable: A committee member in Gilpan, where a drone dropped a kg of contraband in his kitchen garden 700 metres from the fence, got no response from the local police station or the Deputy Superintendent of Police, and the local police moved only after the Senior Superintendent of Police in Tarn Taran was called.
    3. Recovery is a race the couriers usually win: In the same village a second drone dropped a payload at the village edge that evening. The BSF received the location and moved to cordon the area, and the men had already collected the consignment and fled by the time it arrived.
    4. Farmers fear prosecution more than the drop: A farmer whose field received a consignment in Mahawa, Amritsar, approached the committee fearing arrest, and the police eventually filed a case against unidentified persons.
    5. Some settlements sit inside the flight path: Mahawa lies a kilometre from the Zero Line with nearly 150 of its 2,800 acres between the Zero Line and the fence, and drones travel up to six kilometres inside the border directly over houses and fields.
    6. Activism against the trade carries a cost: The sarpanch of Attari village, a settlement of around 25,000 known for its campaigning against drugs and smuggling, was injured in an alleged attack by narcotics smugglers.

    Challenges to countering cross border drone smuggling

    1. The cost asymmetry runs the wrong way: A commercial quadcopter costs a fraction of the detection and jamming equipment needed to stop it, so the defender pays more per sortie than the smuggler. Eg. The DJI platforms recovered in Punjab are off the shelf civilian models sold for survey and photography work.
      The Fix: Shift procurement toward cheap distributed sensors feeding one command picture, rather than a small number of high cost integrated units.
    2. Jamming cannot be used freely in civil airspace: Broad spectrum jamming and navigation spoofing interfere with civil aviation and telecom signals, which limits where and how long a grid can be switched on. Eg. Amritsar’s Sri Guru Ram Dass Jee International Airport sits within a few tens of kilometres of the border stretches under surveillance.
      The Fix: Authorise narrow band directional jamming tied to a designated counter drone corridor, cleared in advance with the civil aviation regulator.
    3. Attribution stops at the launch pad: A recovered drone establishes the route and the airframe, and it does not establish who financed or ordered the consignment. Eg. Cases from border villages routinely close against unidentified persons because the courier is the only link recoverable on the ground.
      The Fix: Treat each recovered drone as a forensic exhibit, with serial, flight log and payload traced through a single dedicated investigation unit rather than by the local police station.
    4. Responsibility is split across agencies: Border guarding, state policing and airspace regulation sit with different authorities, so no single body owns the counter drone task end to end. Eg. Punjab’s grid is a state asset operating alongside the BSF’s own portable interception equipment on the same stretch of border.
      The Fix: Place the state grid, the border force’s equipment and police response under one joint operations centre per border district.
    5. Interdiction does not touch demand: Stopping a consignment in the air does nothing to the narcotics market that pays for the next one. Eg. Village committee members link the drone drops directly to drug use among young people in the border belt.
      The Fix: Pair the counter drone grid with treatment and de-addiction capacity in the border districts, so the seized supply is not simply replaced.
    6. Legal cover for the technology is thin: Bringing down an aircraft, jamming a signal and seizing a payload each rest on different statutory powers, and none was written with armed drones in mind. Eg. Civil drone operations in India are governed by the Drone Rules, 2021, which regulate lawful operators rather than hostile cross border flights.
      The Fix: Enact a standing counter unmanned aircraft framework naming the authorities empowered to detect, jam, down and seize, and the evidentiary status of what is recovered.

    Conclusion

    The border belt’s smuggling geography is no longer a matter of inference, since the launch pads, the drop villages, the flying hours and the altitudes are now on record. That record shifts the problem from intelligence to coverage, because a mapped network still needs equipment dense enough to engage it before it turns back. The measure to watch is whether the jamming grid reaches the density its own operators have asked for, and whether the annual interception count starts falling rather than holding flat. A count that stays level while the grid expands would show the platforms are outrunning the countermeasure rather than being contained by it.

    Back2Basics: Border Security Force

    1. What it is: India’s primary border guarding force, raised on 1 December 1965 after the India-Pakistan war exposed the limits of relying on state armed police on the border.
    2. Who it reports to: It is a Central Armed Police Force under the Ministry of Home Affairs, and it guards the India-Pakistan and India-Bangladesh borders in peacetime.
    3. Where its powers come from: The Border Security Force Act, 1968 gives its personnel powers of search, seizure and arrest within a notified belt running inland from the border.
    4. How far that belt extends: The Union government extended that jurisdiction to 50 km from the border in Punjab, West Bengal and Assam in 2021, up from 15 km in Punjab.

    Matching Previous Year Question

    “[2023, GS3, 10 marks] The use of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) by our adversaries across the borders to ferry arms / ammunitions, drugs, etc., is a serious threat to internal security. Comment on the measures being taken to tackle this threat.”

  • The BRICS Summit allows India to advance its global ambitions

    Why in the News

    India hosts the BRICS Summit at the Bharat Mandapam in New Delhi, with leaders and representatives of 11 BRICS countries opening deliberations on the future of global governance. Forging a joint statement is never easy at a multilateral conference whose members are themselves parties to ongoing conflicts. The grouping was a five member body at India’s earlier hostings, where managing consensus was easier, and enlargement since 2024 has changed that. The largest share of the host’s difficulty comes from the United States, which has accused the bloc of working against the dollar and has threatened tariffs on every member over its payments agenda. India is at the same time seeking to restore ties with that administration on trade and on its Indo-Pacific strategy, so hosting the bloc risks the relationship the hosting is partly meant to balance.

    Why is consensus harder than at India’s earlier hostings?

    1. The scale of the responsibility: Hosting BRICS is the second time in recent years, after the G-20 Summit in 2023, that India has had to shoulder a major multilateral conference.
    2. The earlier hostings were smaller: India hosted the coalition of emerging economies in 2012, 2016 and virtually in 2021, when it was a grouping of just five major powers.
    3. Who joined: The expansion in 2024 added Egypt, Ethiopia, Iran, Saudi Arabia and the UAE, and Indonesia was inducted in 2025.
    4. What the enlargement did and did not do: BRICS’ identity has evolved with the new membership. A common focus remains elusive.

    Which conflicts among members block a common text?

    1. Conflicts involving members have multiplied: Global conflicts involving BRICS members have grown alongside the enlargement.
    2. The war involving Iran is the sharpest case: Iran is a victim of the United States and Israeli strikes, and the UAE was attacked by Iran in retaliation. Both are members of the grouping.
    3. Neither will accept a shared account: Iran and the UAE have been unwilling to agree to a common narrative on the problem, which is precisely what a joint statement requires.
    4. India’s own position has divided the grouping: India’s position on Israel came into conflict with other members earlier this year, since the grouping has traditionally taken a much more critical line on Israel’s actions.

    Why does the United States pose the largest problem for the host?

    1. The accusation is about the dollar: The United States President has accused the grouping of plotting to overthrow the United States dollar’s domination of the global economy.
    2. The threatened instrument: He has been threatening tariffs on all members for planning to increase intra-BRICS payments and trade.
    3. What India is attempting in parallel: The government is seeking to restore ties with the United States administration on trade and on its Indo-Pacific strategy.
    4. The risk is not proportionate to the conduct: Hosting BRICS risks invoking American displeasure however irrational that displeasure is, so the host cannot manage the risk simply by adjusting the agenda.

    Why is a grouping that refuses the anti-western label still a counter to the G-7?

    1. The label the bloc rejects: The grouping prefers not to be called anti-western.
    2. What it functions as: It is a powerful counter to the G-7 and to western-led thinking.
    3. The scale behind the counter: BRICS accounts for half the world’s population, two fifths of the global economy and a fourth of global trade.
    4. Its energy position: It includes many of the world’s top energy producers and its biggest consumers, which gives it weight in energy markets that requires no declaration to exercise.
    5. The rise that produced this: BRICS was first conceptualised 25 years ago and convened a summit in 2009, and its countries have risen in global stature and economic heft since, with intra-BRICS trade benefitting.

    What does the presidency deliver for India?

    1. Heft on the global high table: Being part of BRICS gives India more weight in advancing its ambitions in global forums.
    2. Visibility from the chair: The presidency has ensured India prominence on the world stage.
    3. What a successful summit would signal: A presidency that reconciles the grouping’s competing strands would demonstrate the bloc’s capacity to act, and would count as a significant achievement for Indian diplomacy.
    4. The cost side of the same presidency: The prominence comes with exposure, since the host is read abroad as the author of whatever the bloc’s declaration says.

    Challenges to India’s BRICS presidency

    1. Consensus gives every member a veto over the text: A declaration requires all eleven members to agree, so the member with the narrowest interest sets the ceiling on what the document can say. Eg. The bloc’s Rio declaration of 2025 ran to 126 points, which is what accommodating every member’s preferred language produces.
      The Fix: Move contested political language into a chair’s statement issued alongside the declaration, so a single dispute does not shrink the agreed economic text.
    2. Enlargement raised the number of bilateral disputes inside the room: Every admission adds that member’s quarrels to the set the chair must accommodate in one document. Eg. The grouping now contains both Iran and Saudi Arabia, whose diplomatic relations were restored only in 2023.
      The Fix: Publish admission criteria requiring a candidate to hold working diplomatic relations with every existing member, so enlargement does not import an active rupture.
    3. The forum has no secretariat to carry work between summits: BRICS has no treaty and no permanent staff, so each chair rebuilds the agenda and the follow up machinery for a single year. Eg. Ministerial and working group outcomes are recorded in a declaration with no standing body tracking their implementation.
      The Fix: Create a small permanent secretariat funded by member contributions, mandated only to track commitments made in past declarations.
    4. The dollar question is a liability the bloc cannot settle: Members disagree on currency arrangements and the disagreement is read abroad as a shared plan, so the bloc absorbs the cost of a policy it has not adopted. Eg. Tariff threats have been aimed at every member over intra-BRICS payments, including at members that oppose a common currency.
      The Fix: State in the declaration that payment interoperability is a transaction cost measure and that no common currency is under consideration, so the agenda and the accusation are separated on the record.
    5. A chair’s agenda outlives the chairship only if the successor adopts it: A one year presidency sets themes that lapse where the next chair’s priorities differ. Eg. The sustainability agenda India is building on was the centrepiece of Brazil’s chairship the previous year.
      The Fix: Record a three year rolling work programme in the declaration, so an incoming chair inherits commitments rather than restating themes.

    Conclusion

    The presidency’s difficulty is not the agenda but the arithmetic. A grouping of eleven operating by consensus produces the text its least flexible member will accept. India’s gain from the chair is visibility, and visibility is also what attaches the bloc’s positions to the host. The two objectives this summit is being judged against, a document every member can sign and a relationship with Washington that survives it, pull in opposite directions and neither has been given up. What to watch is how the declaration handles the payments question, since that single paragraph is where the summit’s diplomatic cost will be set.

    Back2Basics: how BRICS takes decisions

    1. It is an informal grouping: BRICS has no founding treaty, no charter and no permanent secretariat, so it operates as a coordination forum rather than as an international organisation.
    2. The chair rotates annually: One member holds the chairship for a calendar year, hosts the leaders’ summit and sets the year’s agenda and meeting calendar.
    3. Decisions are taken by consensus: Every outcome document is adopted by agreement among all members, so no member can be outvoted and any member can withhold language.
    4. Outputs are political, not binding: A summit declaration records agreed positions and commitments with no enforcement mechanism, and implementation rests with each member’s own government.

    Matching Previous Year Question

    “[2025, GS2, 10 marks] With the waning of globalization, post-Cold War world is becoming a site of sovereign nationalism. Elucidate.”

  • Brazil to Iran: Why you can’t put all of BRICS in the anti-West box

    Why in the News

    India presides over the BRICS summit in Delhi with a two fold task: to convey the forum’s shared objective of democratising the international system, and to dispel the widespread impression that it seeks to overthrow the United States led order. Both the forum’s champions and its detractors read it through an anti-Western lens. Supporters celebrate BRICS as a vehicle for resisting Western dominance, and critics warn that it is becoming a counter-bloc led by China and Russia. Neither reading survives contact with the membership, which is divided over whether its national aim is accommodation with the West, autonomy from it, parity within it, or direct confrontation. Delhi’s burden at this summit is to keep the forum from conflating autonomy from America with antagonism towards it.

    Why does one anti-Western label not fit eleven members?

    1. Four national aims, not one: Members differ over whether their national aim is accommodation with the West, autonomy from it, parity within it, or direct confrontation, so the forum’s political orientation is a spectrum rather than a position.
    2. The confrontational pole: Iran sits closest to an anti-Western pole, since resistance to United States power is central to its state ideology and its recent history.
    3. The other end of the spectrum: At the opposite end sit members with deep economic, security and institutional ties to the West, which they maintain while pursuing greater autonomy.
    4. Where the two largest powers sit: Russia and China lie between the extremes. Both are in strategic competition with the West, and neither can be understood apart from its desire for status, influence and a seat at the Western high table.

    Why does Brazil break the West versus Global South opposition?

    1. Its standing in the grouping: Brazil is Latin America’s largest power and a strong advocate for reforming global institutions.
    2. Its institutions are Western in origin: Its geography, language, religion, legal tradition, political institutions and elite reference points are rooted in the Iberian and Euro-Atlantic worlds.
    3. Its diplomatic tradition reinforces this: Brazil is a constitutional democracy whose diplomatic tradition privileges international law and multilateralism.
    4. What it is actually dissatisfied with: Brazil is not seeking to overthrow the West from outside. It is a Western power dissatisfied with how authority is distributed within the order it inhabits.
    5. What that produces in practice: Brasilia rejects automatic alignment with Washington, and is equally uncomfortable with systematic anti-Western mobilisation.
    6. Distance from Eurasia shapes the position: Brazil sits far from Eurasia and, unlike Delhi, is not emotionally invested in Moscow.
    7. China is an economic partner rather than a security problem: Brazil has no direct conflict with Russia or China, and does not share India’s security challenges with Beijing. Beijing is a leading economic partner of Brazil.

    What is Brazil’s position on de-dollarisation and a common currency?

    1. What it supports: Brazil supports cheaper and faster bilateral settlement mechanisms, including trade in national currencies where that is useful.
    2. What it rejects: Brazil has rejected the notion that BRICS must promote de-dollarisation or develop a common currency to displace the dollar.
    3. The stated reason: A shared currency would require political trust, economic convergence and institutional integration that BRICS does not have.
    4. What the position reveals: Brazil’s engagement with the great powers rests on national interest rather than on ideology, and its payments position is the clearest instance of that.

    How is India’s non-Western position different from an anti-Western one?

    1. The identity claim: The External Affairs Minister has consistently underlined India’s non-Western identity, which rests on India being a post-colonial state and a developing country.
    2. Where the distinction lies: India shares political values with the West. It does not want to become a geopolitical appendage to the United States and Europe.
    3. The record of Western partnership: India’s partnerships with the United States, Europe, Japan and Australia have deepened across trade, technology, defence and diaspora.
    4. Two memberships held at once: Delhi’s participation in the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (Quad) sits alongside its membership of BRICS.
    5. What makes the forum useful, and what would end that: BRICS is useful to India precisely because of its diversity. It ceases to serve Indian interests if it becomes a China-led alliance against the West.
    6. Why the anti-Western framing is also poor analysis: Delhi knows that Moscow and Beijing, despite their confrontations with Washington, remain interested in negotiating a new balance with it.

    Why are Russia and China not seeking an exit from the Western order?

    1. Russia’s break is structural: Russia’s contradiction with the West is now deep and structural, shaped by the Ukraine war, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) role in European security, and sanctions.
    2. Yet Moscow wants recognition inside it: Russia is also eager for Western recognition as a great power, and for a say in managing European and global security.
    3. What China challenges: China challenges American primacy in Asia, reduces its exposure to Western technology restrictions, and presents BRICS as part of a more representative order.
    4. Why it cannot exit: China’s rise was inseparable from access to Western markets, capital and technology, and it retains strong economic interdependence with the United States.
    5. What Beijing is actually seeking: China is not seeking an exit from the United States led world. It wants to be America’s co-equal in shaping it.

    Where do the newer members and Iran sit on the spectrum?

    1. Egypt: Egypt remains tied to Washington on security.
    2. The United Arab Emirates: The UAE has extensive commercial and strategic links with the United States and Europe.
    3. Indonesia: Indonesia’s “free and active” diplomacy is designed to retain manoeuvring room among the major powers.
    4. What the three have in common: They seek autonomy, closer ties with China and a stronger voice for the Global South. None seeks membership of a unified anti-Western camp.
    5. Iran is the nearest exception: Resistance to the United States and Israel is central to the Islamic Republic’s political identity, and BRICS offers Tehran legitimacy and a means to counter the American effort to isolate it.
    6. Even Iran is not settled internally: Iran’s domestic debate continues to pit advocates of resistance against those favouring diplomacy and reconciliation with the United States.

    Challenges to India’s position that BRICS is non-Western rather than anti-Western

    1. A consensus text is attributed to every signatory: Language agreed with members at the confrontational end of the spectrum is read abroad as the position of all eleven, including the host. Eg. Tariff threats were aimed at every BRICS member over an alleged collective plan against the dollar, not only at the members proposing one.
      The Fix: Insist that any payments or currency language in a declaration name the specific mechanism and its purpose, so a settlement arrangement cannot be read as currency displacement.
    2. The forum has no charter to bound what it commits members to: BRICS has no treaty and no defined competence, so nothing limits the subjects a declaration may cover. Eg. The grouping’s declarations have expanded from development finance into positions on conflicts in West Asia and in Europe.
      The Fix: Adopt a standing framework document defining the forum’s subject areas, so an item outside them needs an explicit decision rather than a paragraph.
    3. Expansion imports the members’ own quarrels: Each admission adds a set of bilateral disputes the forum must now accommodate inside a single text. Eg. Iran and the United Arab Emirates are both members, and the UAE was attacked by Iran during the current war in West Asia.
      The Fix: Handle conflict language through a separate chair’s statement rather than the consensus declaration, so one dispute cannot hold the economic agenda hostage.
    4. Hedging is cheap only while both sides decline to price it: Simultaneous membership of the Quad and of BRICS is sustainable while neither partner charges for it, and a partner that does charge converts India’s balance into a cost. Eg. The tariff round on India last year followed disagreements in trade talks alongside its Russian oil purchases.
      The Fix: Separate India’s BRICS agenda from its security alignments in public terms, so each partner judges a defined economic programme rather than an alignment.

    Conclusion

    The anti-Western reading of BRICS is wrong as description and useful as politics, which is why it survives. It lets a critic in Washington treat eleven different national calculations as one bloc, and it lets a member at the confrontational end claim the weight of the other ten. India’s difficulty is that the second use invites the first, and the forum has no rule that stops either. What to watch is whether the Delhi declaration describes the reform of institutions its members intend to remain inside, or the displacement of an order most of them depend on.

    About BRICS

    1. How it began: The acronym BRIC was coined in 2001 by a Goldman Sachs economist to identify four high growth emerging economies. The first meeting of their foreign ministers took place on the margins of the United Nations General Assembly in 2006.
    2. How it became a summit body: The first formal leaders’ summit was held at Yekaterinburg in Russia in 2009, and South Africa joined in 2011, which gave the grouping its present acronym.
    3. How it expanded: The 2023 Johannesburg summit decided on enlargement. Egypt, Ethiopia, Iran and the United Arab Emirates joined in 2024 and Indonesia in 2025, with Saudi Arabia’s formal status remaining nuanced.
    4. The partner tier: A “Partner Country” category was introduced in 2024 to engage states such as Malaysia, Thailand and Nigeria without granting full membership.

    Initiatives and Institutions under BRICS

    1. New Development Bank: Established in 2015 and headquartered in Shanghai, it lends for infrastructure and sustainable development in emerging economies, and had approved over $35 billion in infrastructure loans by 2025.
    2. Contingent Reserve Arrangement: A $100 billion fund created in 2015 to provide short term liquidity support to a member under balance of payments pressure.
    3. BRICS Pay: A cross-border payment system in pilot stage, intended to let members settle trade without routing instructions through SWIFT.
    4. Research and technology bodies: The grouping has set up a Vaccine Research and Development Centre for technology transfer, a Partnership on New Industrial Revolution covering artificial intelligence and green technology, and a Space Council created in 2025 to coordinate deep space and lunar research.

    Key Facts about BRICS

    1. Membership: Eleven full members: Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa, Egypt, Ethiopia, Indonesia, Iran, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates.
    2. Share of population and output: The grouping represents over 45% of the world’s population and accounts for roughly 37% of global GDP measured at purchasing power parity, which is above the G7’s share.
    3. Energy weight: Members together control roughly 42% of global oil production and exports.
    4. How it is organised: BRICS works through an annually rotating chairship, with the chair hosting the leaders’ summit and setting the year’s agenda. Decisions are taken by consensus among all members.

    Matching Previous Year Question

    “[2026, GS2, 10 marks] “BRICS acts as a powerful counterweight in global governance, actively amplifying the voice and influence of the Global South.” Explain the role of BRICS in projecting itself as an alternative to other groupings.”

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