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  • SC backs voters’ right to prosecute candidates

    Why in the News

    A false or concealed nomination affidavit can now be taken to court on a complaint by any private citizen, not only by a public servant or a competent authority. A two judge Bench of the Supreme Court has held that no law confines such complaints to officials, giving the citizen-voter a direct way to enforce honest disclosure by candidates.

    What is a false affidavit offence, and why does it matter?

    1. What the affidavit is: Every candidate files a sworn personal affidavit with the nomination, declaring assets, educational qualifications and criminal antecedents. It works like a sworn job application read by the voter.
    2. Why it exists: The affidavits are part of the legislative effort to keep elections pure and democracy healthy. Voters must be educated and well informed about the candidates seeking their vote.
    3. The offence: Filing false details or hiding facts to mislead voters is punishable under Section 125-A of the Representation of the People Act, 1951 (RPA), with up to six months’ jail, a fine, or both.
    4. Nature of the offence: It is non-cognisable, so the police cannot investigate or arrest without a magistrate’s order, and bailable, so the accused has a right to bail.
    5. The takeaway: An affidavit is only as useful as its accuracy, so the question of who may complain about a false one decides whether disclosure has teeth.

    What did the Court decide about who can complain?

    1. The procedural bar: Section 195 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (CrPC) allows a court to take cognisance (formally take up a case) of certain offences only on a complaint by a public servant.
    2. The holding: The Bench held that this restriction does not apply to Section 125-A. No court is barred from taking up the offence on a complaint by a private person.
    3. Legislative intent: Had Parliament wanted only public servants to complain about false affidavits, it could have amended Section 195 CrPC to say so.
    4. No limiting provision: No enactment says only a public servant may lodge a Section 125-A complaint. The Court said this absence strengthens its reading.

    Why does the ruling matter for electoral politics?

    1. Standing for voters: The ruling gives the vigilant citizen-voter locus standi (the legal right to bring a case) to act directly against dishonesty in electoral politics.
    2. Scrutiny from day one: Transparency now begins at the nomination stage, before a vote is cast, and no longer depends on an official choosing to complain.

    Challenges

    1. Light penalty: The maximum punishment under Section 125-A is small set against the gain of winning a seat by hiding facts.
    2. Frivolous complaints: Open standing lets rivals file politically motivated complaints to harass candidates during a campaign.
    3. Burden on the complainant: A private complainant must gather proof of hidden assets or cases without a police investigation.
    4. Slow trials: Criminal cases against elected representatives often outlast the term they were elected for.
    5. No truth check at scrutiny: Returning Officers check whether an affidavit is complete, not whether its contents are true.

    Way Forward

    1. Stiffer penalty: Parliament should raise the jail term for a false affidavit to at least two years, as the Law Commission’s 244th Report (2014) recommended.
    2. Time-bound trials: Special courts for cases against legislators should decide Section 125-A complaints within a fixed period.
    3. Data cross-checks: The Election Commission of India (ECI) should match declared assets against income tax records and publish mismatches.
    4. Early screening: Magistrates should test a complaint’s documentary basis before issuing summons, so that harassment complaints fail early.

    Conclusion

    The ruling moves the enforcement of candidate disclosure from officials to voters themselves. Whether it changes candidates’ behaviour depends on courts deciding such complaints quickly and on a penalty heavy enough to outweigh the gain from concealment.

    Back2Basics: Candidate affidavit (Form 26)

    1. Legal basis: Section 33A of the RPA requires the disclosure, made in an affidavit in Form 26 filed with the nomination paper.
    2. Origin: The duty traces to Union of India v. Association for Democratic Reforms (2002). That judgment recognised the voter’s right to know a candidate’s background.
    3. Party disclosure: Political parties must also publish their candidates’ criminal records on their websites and in newspapers.
    4. Voter access: The ECI’s Know Your Candidate app lets voters read these declarations.

    Matching Previous Year Question

    “[2020] Consider the following statements: 1. According to the Constitution of India, a person who is eligible to vote can be made a minister in a State for six months even if he/she is not a member of the Legislature of that State. 2. According to the Representation of People Act, 1951, a person convicted of a criminal offence and sentenced to imprisonment for five years is permanently disqualified from contesting an election even after his release from prison. Which of the statements given above is/are correct? (a) 1 only (b) 2 only (c) Both 1 and 2 (d) Neither 1 nor 2 ANSWER: (d)”

  • SIR needs reform. But let’s go by numbers, not protestors’ slogans

    Why in the News

    Claims that 13 to 14 crore voters were deleted in the Special Intensive Revision (SIR) come down to about 1 crore wrongly removed, once those never on the rolls are counted out. In the nine States with final rolls, home to three in five Indian adults, the rolls fall 7.1 crore short of the adult population, mostly young adults who had never registered.

    What does disenfranchisement actually mean here?

    1. What the SIR is: A house to house check of every roll entry by booth level officers, replacing the routine annual revision.
    2. What the Constitution requires: Article 326 sets three conditions: Indian citizenship, the age of eighteen and ordinary residence. Anyone meeting them is entitled to registration.
    3. What disenfranchisement is: It is the gap between the final roll and an expected roll, meaning one listing everyone who would normally register and no one else.
    4. The takeaway: Measuring deletions against all adults counts people who never registered as though they had been removed, which inflates about one crore wrongful removals into seven crore.

    How large is the shortfall once the unregistered are counted?

    1. Adults against names: The nine States hold 59.9 crore adults against 52.8 crore names on the final rolls.
    2. The young who never registered: On the Election Commission’s own rolls before the revision, four in ten young adults in Uttar Pradesh and Bihar were unregistered, 5.2 crore across the nine States.
    3. Older non-registrants: Another 1.5% of adults are older people who never registered, or who moved and never registered again.
    4. The expected roll: Those groups put 6.1 crore adults off the roll in the normal course, so the expected roll is 53.8 crore.

    Were the rolls clean before the revision?

    1. Names the rolls carried: Before the revision the nine States had 58.6 crore names, nearly 5 crore more than a clean roll holds.
    2. What the surplus was: The difference was the dead, the departed and the duplicated, which an intensive revision exists to remove.
    3. A critic concedes: One author of the higher estimate now accepts that the old rolls left out up to 10% of adults, and that most deletions are legitimate.
    4. Where the roll overshoots: Bihar’s final roll holds 7.4 crore names against 6.8 crore expected, largely migrants working elsewhere who stay registered at home.

    What does voluntary registration look like elsewhere?

    1. A roll never matches the population: Where registration is voluntary, the roll always falls short of the adults, and nobody calls that disenfranchisement.
    2. Canada: 4% to 7% of eligible Canadians are missing from the lists.
    3. Britain: 11% to 14% of Britons are missing.
    4. United States: A quarter of American voting age citizens are not on the rolls.

    Challenges

    1. Haste before elections: The revision was run quickly, often just before State elections, leaving little time for corrections.
    2. Paperwork on the poorest: Document demands and discrepancy notices over a misspelt name fell on poor and migrant voters, those least able to answer.
    3. Unequal impact: The discrepancy rules fell hardest on identifiable communities. Eg. Muslims in Murshidabad and Malda.
    4. Appointments law: The 2023 law on appointing Election Commissioners lets the government effectively choose them, which feeds doubt about its impartiality.

    Way Forward

    1. Burden on the state: Where citizenship is doubted the state should prove its case before a tribunal, not ask a registered citizen to prove it again.
    2. Publish the removals: The Election Commission should publish the national post-revision roll, and removals by reason, State and booth.
    3. Settle the passport question: The Commission and the Ministry of External Affairs should state jointly that a passport, issued after police verification, proves citizenship.
    4. Standing tribunals: Roll appeals should go to year round tribunals that decide them before the poll, not after it.

    Conclusion

    The case for reform does not rest on the largest available number, and inflating the count of excluded voters lets the Election Commission dismiss genuine exclusions with invented ones. Until a citizen on the roll is presumed a citizen unless the state shows otherwise, every revision will reopen the same dispute.

    Key numbers

    1. Share short: The nine States’ rolls are 12% below the projected adult population.
    2. Appeals in West Bengal: Fewer than 0.05% of 34 lakh appeals were heard before election day.
    3. Appeals upheld: Tribunals have since found 90% of appellants valid.
    4. West Bengal’s shortfall: The final roll fell about 60 lakh short of the expected roll.
    5. Unregistered young in Uttar Pradesh: 2.3 crore, counted by the Commission in 2024 before the revision.

    Matching Previous Year Question

    “[2026, GS2, 10 marks] Is the right to vote a fundamental right? Discuss the position of the Election Commission of India while undertaking the revision of electoral rolls. Can it also examine the question of citizenship of voters?”

  • BJP has no bad option, Congress has no good option

    Why in the News

    The government’s promise to keep every State’s share of seats in a Lok Sabha enlarged to 850 gave way to Bills that distributed seats on the 2011 Census, and those Bills failed. The Congress president has since written to the Prime Minister a fourth time since April, seeking an all party meeting before fresh delimitation proposals are finalised. The Centre has disclosed no proposal.

    What is actually being decided?

    1. The real question: The dispute is over how much the Lok Sabha grows and how seats are divided among States, not whether delimitation happens.
    2. Women’s reservation is settled: One third of Lok Sabha and Assembly seats will be reserved for women at the next delimitation, whatever the total.
    3. The default rule: As the Constitution stands, seats must be reallocated among States on the 2027 Census.
    4. The takeaway: Keeping State shares in a bigger House needs a constitutional amendment, and so does freezing the House at 543 seats. Without one, population decides.

    Why does the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) want a bigger Lok Sabha?

    1. No gain from proportions alone: Raising the total and holding each State’s share leaves relative strength unchanged, so the stated position brings no evident advantage.
    2. Keeping the South on board: Marginalising peninsular India further would damage its claim to be a national party with legitimacy in every region.
    3. Room for the women’s quota: Adding half as many seats again lets the women’s reservation be implemented without displacing sitting male members.
    4. Space for caste claims: As demands for caste based representation grow, a bigger House has more room for competing claims, which suits its social engineering, meaning coalitions built across caste groups.

    Why is the BJP in a win-win position?

    1. If the amendment passes: It gains additional seats to distribute, and the room for social engineering grows with them.
    2. If it fails: Reallocation on population shifts a larger share of existing seats to the populous northern heartland States where it is strongest, and boundaries can still be redrawn.

    Why does the Congress have no good option?

    1. Its own plan cannot pass: Freezing the House at its present strength needs an amendment the party cannot carry.
    2. The absolute numbers argument: Even with shares maintained, a bigger House widens the gap in absolute numbers between States, and majorities are decided by numbers.
    3. Defeating an amendment leaves the default: The party counts the defeat of any amendment as a success, leaving reallocation on the latest Census in force.
    4. What that costs: Keralam, Tamil Nadu and similarly placed States would lose representation in absolute numbers and in share, and the Congress would be blamed.
    5. An ally wants clarity: The Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam will back delimitation that maintains current proportions, and wants to know how that is legislated.

    Challenges

    1. North-South divide: Southern States read reallocation on population as a penalty for successful population control. Eg. Tamil Nadu’s share falling from 7.1% to 6.3%.
    2. The Rajya Sabha weakens: A much larger Lok Sabha outweighs the Council of States in joint sittings, cutting the federal chamber’s leverage.
    3. Gerrymandering suspicion: Boundaries redrawn without a published method invite the charge that seats were shaped to suit the ruling party.

    Way Forward

    1. Publish the draft: The Centre should release the delimitation Bills and the allocation formula before introduction, so States can examine them.
    2. Use the Inter-State Council: The allocation formula should go to the Inter-State Council to build a consensus balancing population with development indicators.
    3. Match the Upper House: Any enlargement of the Lok Sabha should be matched by more Rajya Sabha seats, to preserve the Council’s weight.

    Conclusion

    Delimitation now turns on a choice between amending the Constitution to protect State shares and letting the default rule reallocate seats on population, and one party gains either way. Until the Centre publishes its proposals, the States that stand to lose cannot argue their case before the terms are drafted.

    Delimitation in India

    1. What it is: Delimitation fixes the boundaries of territorial constituencies to reflect population change, and reallocates seats among States.
    2. Article 82: It requires a Delimitation Act after every Census. Article 170 provides the same readjustment for State Assemblies.
    3. The freeze: The 42nd Amendment, 1976 froze seat allocation on the 1971 Census until 2000. The 84th Amendment, 2001 extended it to the first Census after 2026.
    4. Past exercises: Delimitation Commissions have been constituted four times, in 1952, 1963, 1973 and 2002.

    Matching Previous Year Question

    “[2024] How many Delimitation Commissions have been constituted by the Government of India till December 2023? (a) One (b) Two (c) Three (d) Four* ANSWER: (d)”

  • Labour survey changes planned to gauge gig, unpaid house work

    Why in the News

    India’s main employment survey is moving from counting only work done for pay to also asking who works through a digital platform and who does unpaid work at home. The Ministry of Statistics and Programme Implementation (MoSPI) plans these changes in the Periodic Labour Force Survey (PLFS) from January, and has invited feedback by November 7.

    What is the PLFS, and what does it miss?

    1. What it is: The PLFS is a household survey that asks members what work they did, and counts a person as employed on the basis of what they did in the preceding seven days.
    2. Why it matters: It is the official source of India’s employment and unemployment rates, so policy rests on the activities its questions recognise as work.
    3. What it misses: Platform work is irregular and often done alongside another job, and work done for one’s own household earns nothing, so a question about paid work captures neither.
    4. The takeaway: Work that was invisible to the official count becomes countable, which decides whether it is recognised in policy at all.

    What will households be asked about platform work?

    1. Platform work in the last year: Households will be asked whether any member worked with a digital platform over the last 365 days. Eg. Ola, Uber, Zomato, Amazon, Urban Company.
    2. Nature of the work: They will be asked what goods or services the member provides, and whether the member works for more than one platform.
    3. Motives and difficulties: They will be asked what prompted the member to take up platform work, and the main challenges faced in it.
    4. Already in trial: Data on digital platform workers, a subset of gig workers paid per task rather than a regular wage, has been collected on a trial basis since January 2026.

    What will it ask about unpaid household work?

    1. Own use or for sale: Members will be asked whether what they make and the work they do is for their own consumption or for sale. Eg. Fetching water, cooking, cleaning, childcare, helping elders.
    2. Whether they want paid work: Members will be asked whether they sought work for pay or profit in the previous 30 days, and whether they want such work now.
    3. Why they did not look: They will be asked the main reason for not looking, with family and household responsibilities among the options offered.
    4. Why the PLFS carries it: The Time Use Survey, which records how people spend their day, is not annual, so the labour survey is being used to find the same thing.

    Why does counting this work matter?

    1. The scale of unpaid work: The 2024 Time Use Survey found that females above six spend over four and a half hours a day on unpaid domestic and caregiving work, against 37 minutes for men.
    2. Choice or obligation: Experts had asked MoSPI to test whether women do care work by choice or because they see it as their responsibility.
    3. A workforce still growing: A NITI Aayog report estimated gig and platform workers will rise to 2.35 crore by 2029-30, the base figure for any social security cover.

    Challenges

    1. Recall over a year: Asking members to remember a whole year of irregular platform work invites error, since few can recall it accurately.
    2. Secondary work missed: Platform work done alongside a main job can go unreported when a member names only the principal activity.
    3. No time diary: Asking whether work is for own use records that it happened, not how many hours it took, which is what a time diary measures.
    4. Break in the series: New questions change what the survey measures, so readings before and after the revision are not strictly comparable.

    Way Forward

    1. Publish the concordance: MoSPI should publish how the new categories map to the old ones, so users can compare across the revision.
    2. Align with the welfare register: The Ministry of Labour and Employment should match the platform work categories to e-Shram, the national database of unorganised workers, so the count supports benefit delivery.
    3. Report the trial first: MoSPI should release the trial’s platform worker findings before finalising the questionnaire.

    Conclusion

    The revised questionnaire is out for comment before the next survey round. What to watch is whether the unpaid work questions survive the comment window, and whether the platform worker estimates are published as a regular series.

    Matching Previous Year Question

    “No direct PYQ traced in the provided files. Thematic PYQ: [2023, GS3, 15 marks] Most of the unemployment in India is structural in nature. Examine the methodology adopted to compute unemployment in the country and suggest improvements.”

  • India’s bullet train project took a long detour

    Why in the News

    India’s first bullet train line has moved from a Japanese system bought whole, due in 2022, to a hybrid of Japanese track and civil design, European signalling and Indian built trains. Work on the Mumbai-Ahmedabad High Speed Rail began in September 2017, and the first section is now expected by December 2027. The change followed a divergence over cost, choice and indigenisation, meaning building the parts in India.

    What was agreed in 2017, and what is being built now?

    1. What the project is: A dedicated high speed railway between Mumbai and Ahmedabad, built for trains far faster than any in service in India.
    2. Why Japan was the partner: Japan, which runs the Shinkansen bullet train network, offered to finance the whole project on highly concessional terms, meaning unusually cheap loans.
    3. What is being built: The hybrid keeps Japanese track and civil design, and the Japanese financing package.
    4. The Indian train: The B28 is being developed by BEML Limited, the public sector heavy equipment maker, in Bengaluru.
    5. The takeaway: A project launched as an imported system has become a mixed one, so the hard part is no longer construction but making the parts work together.

    Why did the two sides diverge?

    1. Japan’s expectation: Japan expected to export the entire system, track, rolling stock (the trains) and signalling, because it was financing the project.
    2. India’s objective: India did not want to be tied to a single high cost imported solution, and wanted cost effectiveness, choice and indigenisation for later high speed lines.
    3. A system not built for export: The Shinkansen was designed for domestic use as a comprehensive system, not for piecemeal export.
    4. Announcement before planning: Timelines and costs were announced before procurement, approvals and construction schedules were settled. It was the first complex project the two attempted together.

    What pushed the cost and the timeline out?

    1. Land acquisition: Land and legal right of way for much of the route fell into uncertainty when the Maharashtra government changed after the 2019 election, and was settled only after the next.
    2. Pandemic and Japanese politics: The Covid-19 pandemic held up work, and Japan has had four changes of administration since the project was announced.
    3. The train withdrawn: Japan phased out the trainset meant for India and could not supply its E10 successor before 2034. India then decided to build its own train.
    4. Cost: The cost has nearly doubled to about Rs 2 lakh crore from Rs 1.08 lakh crore, and a special budget allocation is likely to meet the surge.

    What does other countries’ experience show?

    1. Delays are common: Large high speed projects slip and overrun elsewhere. Eg. Japan’s Hokkaido Shinkansen and the United Kingdom’s High Speed 2.
    2. Mixed systems already run: The choices on rolling stock and signalling drew on South Korea, Taiwan, China and European networks, where similar systems run with variations.

    Challenges

    1. Two train types, one corridor: India must prove it is safe to run two different bullet trains and their separate signalling systems on the same line.
    2. The total systems approach: The Shinkansen is designed as one integrated system, so one train and its signalling may eventually have to go.
    3. Certification depends on Japan: Japanese experts clear all drawings, designs, construction schemes and quality control, which ties the Indian train’s approval to them.
    4. Trust for the next project: The Indian side’s detailed planning and adherence to agreed terms were found lacking, which makes the next joint venture harder to agree.

    Way Forward

    1. One interface specification: The Ministry of Railways should publish a single interface standard for track, signalling and rolling stock before trial runs begin.
    2. An independent safety case: The Commissioner of Railway Safety should certify mixed operation of the Indian and Japanese trainsets before passenger service starts.
    3. Order visibility: Indian Railways should commit rolling stock orders for later corridors, so indigenisation does not rest on one line.

    Conclusion

    A project begun as the import of a complete foreign system has ended as a negotiated mixture, cheaper to buy and harder to engineer. What to watch is the opening of the first section, and whether a Japanese trainset is ever added to a line built around an Indian one.

    Key numbers

    1. Route: 508 km between Mumbai and Ahmedabad.
    2. Speeds: Shinkansen trains run at 300 kmph, the B28 at a maximum operational 250 kmph.
    3. Signalling contract: Awarded to a European-Indian joint venture in June 2025.
    4. Approvals: Feasibility study by Japanese consultants in December 2013, Union Cabinet approval in December 2015.

    Matching Previous Year Question

    “No direct PYQ traced in the provided files. Thematic PYQ: [2014, GS3, 12 marks] National Urban Transport Policy emphasises on ‘moving people’ instead of ‘moving vehicles. Discuss critically the success of the various strategies of the Government in this regard.”

  • The problem is inflation’s second-round effects

    Why in the News

    The Monetary Policy Committee (MPC) has voted to raise interest rates and to shift its stance to calibrated tightening, which signals further rate rises. The increase was unanimous, but two members voted against the change of stance, preferring a neutral posture. How far tightening now goes turns on whether second-round effects take hold.

    What are second-round effects, and why do they decide the next move?

    1. Second-round effects: A shortage raises prices once. Second-round effects follow when workers ask for higher wages and sellers raise prices in advance, so a one off jump becomes lasting inflation.
    2. Supply side inflation: Prices pushed up by scarce food or costly energy pass through the index once and then fade.
    3. Why the distinction decides policy: Interest rates cannot add rainfall or oil. They cool demand, so more tightening is justified only where price rises have spread.
    4. The takeaway: The argument inside the committee is not about the latest inflation reading. It is about whether the shock is being built into wages and prices.

    Where do the committee’s members differ?

    1. Supply side reading: One member argued that inflation is driven largely by supply side factors and shows no sign of overheating or of becoming generalised.
    2. Entrenchment reading: Another member cautioned that the data increasingly suggests price pressures are getting entrenched, meaning built into the economic system’s wages and prices.
    3. The Governor’s reading: The Reserve Bank of India (RBI) Governor saw rising signs of generalisation, meaning price rises spread across most of the Consumer Price Index (CPI) basket rather than a few items.

    What does the price evidence show?

    1. Household expectations: The RBI’s household survey shows three month ahead expectations have jumped. Expectations shape the wages people ask for and the prices sellers set.
    2. Limited embedding so far: The central bank’s own reading finds only limited signs that sellers are building supply side cost pressures into their pricing.
    3. Food, fuel and weather: Global food prices are hardening, crude oil is dear, and a strengthening El Nino, a periodic Pacific warming that shifts rainfall, threatens the winter sown rabi crops.

    How much more tightening does this justify?

    1. The case for more: If pressures are spreading through wages and pricing behaviour, rates must rise further before expectations harden.
    2. The case against: If the pressure is a run of supply shocks, higher rates cut demand and growth without touching the cause.
    3. Deciding factors: Further tightening depends on how members read supply pressures, whether second-round effects take hold, and how growth and inflation move together.

    Challenges

    1. Shocks outside policy reach: Tightening against a crude oil shock buys price control at the cost of growth.
    2. Expectations turn self-fulfilling: Households that expect dearer goods press for higher wages, so a survey reading can become actual inflation.
    3. Transmission lags: A change in the repo rate, the rate at which the RBI lends to banks, reaches loans and demand only over several quarters, so a rise can bite after the shock passes.

    Way Forward

    1. State the exit test: The MPC should set out in its resolution what evidence would make it stop tightening, so firms can plan.
    2. Supply measures with the Centre: The government should use buffer stock releases and duty changes on food staples, since the first round pressure is on supply.
    3. Publish the expectations detail: The RBI should release the household survey’s city and group level readings, so the spread is visible.

    Conclusion

    Monetary policy has turned hawkish on a judgement that price pressures are no longer confined to supply, a judgement not all of the committee’s members share. Whether tightening goes further rests on evidence that wages and pricing behaviour are moving, not on the next inflation reading.

    Key numbers

    1. Spread of inflation: 37% of commodities in the CPI basket had inflation above 4% in August, against 20% in March (RBI Governor, MPC minutes).
    2. Household expectations: Three month ahead expectations up 70 basis points to 9.9% (RBI household survey).
    3. Energy price: Brent crude oil trading at around $115 a barrel.

    Back2Basics: Monetary Policy Committee (MPC)

    1. What it is: The six member committee that fixes the policy repo rate, set up under Section 45ZB of the Reserve Bank of India Act, 1934.
    2. Composition: Three RBI members, including the Governor as chairperson, and three appointed by the Centre, with the Governor holding a casting vote.
    3. The target: Under the Monetary Policy Framework Agreement of 2015 the target is 4% headline CPI inflation, with a tolerance band of two percentage points either side.

    Matching Previous Year Question

    “[2017] Which of the following statements is/are correct regarding the Monetary Policy Committee (MPC)? 1. It decides the RBI’s benchmark interest rates. 2. It is a 12-member body including the Governor of RBI and is reconstituted every year. 3. It functions under the chairmanship of the Union Finance Minister. Select the correct answer using the code given below: (a) 1 only (b) 1 and 2 only (c) 3 only (d) 2 and 3 only ANSWER: (a)”

  • [UPSC Webinar] 7 Months to Prelims 2027: Your Complete Roadmap by Sreejay Sir | 24 October 2026, 5:00 PM IST

    [UPSC Webinar] 7 Months to Prelims 2027: Your Complete Roadmap by Sreejay Sir | 24 October 2026, 5:00 PM IST

    In this session, Sreejay Sir will explain how you can stop collecting material and start working a plan built around what UPSC actually asks.

    Leave with a clear plan for UPSC 2028

    One evening. 45 minutes. A strategy you can actually follow.

    Join live on Zoom: Saturday, 24 October 2026 at 5:00 PM IST

    Register free now

    Free webinar · FREE CIVILSDAILY PRACTICE KIT for all joinees · Limited seats

    What you will learn

    1. How to make planned revision strategy based on high-yielding Microthemes.
    2. Current Affairs integration and consolidation wtith the static portion.
    3. How to plan for the mocks and course correct after the mocks
    4. Testing and revision through Microthemes

    Who should attend

    • 2027 attempt aspirants
    • Candidates struggling with dynamic Prelims patterns, note-making depth, and last-minute Current Affairs overload, Aspirants struggling with revision for 2027 attempt, issues in time-management, Aspirants not improving in terms of syllabus completion

    About the speaker

    Sreejay Sir
    • Sreejay Sir has guided high-ranking civil servants – AIR 59, AIR 225, and AIR 703.
    • Widely recognized for designing the Logical Elimination System for the Prelims.
    • 3-Round Paper Solving, 4 Levels of Elimination various innovations that have become industry standard.
    • Over 1000+ students have cleared prelims under his Mentorship

    Session details

    • Date: Saturday, 24 October 2026
    • Time: 5:00 PM IST
    • Platform: Zoom (Live)
    • Duration: 45 minutes, followed by open Q&A
    • Fee: Free for the first 100 registrations. Once those close, attendance is paid.
    • Seats: 200
    • Bonus: FREE CIVILSDAILY PRACTICE KIT for all joinees

    FAQs

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    Free for the first 100 registrations. Once those close, attendance is paid. Register early to secure a free seat.

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    Attend live to get the most out of the session and the Q&A.

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    No. Bring a notebook and your biggest doubt.

    Only 200 seats. FREE CIVILSDAILY PRACTICE KIT for all joinees.

    Free live webinar

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    Sat, 24 Oct 2026

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  • For migrant children, access to school is not enough

    Why in the News

    Seasonal migration begins as the Kharif (monsoon-sown crop) harvest ends. This year, drought is turning many seasonal migrants into “climate migrants” headed for sugarcane fields, brick kilns and construction sites. Their children lose months of schooling, and policy still measures success by access and enrolment rather than by whether they learn.

    Why does seasonal migration push children out of learning?

    1. What it is: Seasonal migration means families leave home for months each year to work elsewhere, taking their children along. For the child, it is like missing half of every school year.
    2. Drought as driver: Intense drought, drying fields and shrinking livelihoods are pushing more families toward distant worksites this year.
    3. Scale: The last Census counted 9.29 crore migrant children, and no reliable estimate exists of how many are out of school.
    4. What the disruption does: Breaks in schooling often last five to six months, and they:
      • widen learning gaps;
      • weaken social ties and the child’s sense of belonging at school;
      • raise irregular attendance and dropout;
      • pull children into child labour, as they start helping parents at work.
    5. The takeaway: Children who move with their parents lose schooling time that the system neither tracks nor makes up.

    What has policy done so far?

    1. Sarva Shiksha Abhiyan (2001): It made a systematic effort to remove barriers to school access for migrant children and expanded schools in remote, underserved areas.
    2. Alternative models: It promoted seasonal hostels, residential schools, bastishalas (settlement schools), sakharshalas (sugarcane schools), tent schools at construction sites and transit education centres.
    3. Law and policy: The Right of Children to Free and Compulsory Education Act, 2009 and the National Education Policy (NEP) 2020 both recognise migrant children’s exclusion and stress inclusive education.
    4. NITI Aayog roadmap: Its report, ‘School Education System in India: Temporal Analysis and Policy Roadmap for Quality Enhancement’, recommends:
      • migration-responsive schooling;
      • bridge learning centres;
      • portable school records;
      • inter-State transfer mechanisms;
      • tracking systems.

    Why is access to school not enough?

    1. Access-first focus: In practice, policy has stayed fixed on access and enrolment, which are only the first steps.
    2. Learning needs: Getting migrant children into class is not enough. They need remedial teaching to catch up, academic and mental health support, and care for their emotional well-being.
    3. Beyond worksite schools: Schools at worksites help, but equitable, context-responsive alternative models must also meet migrant children’s distinct learning needs, as NEP 2020 advocates.
    4. Teacher preparation: Most teacher education programmes assume settled, formal schooling, so teachers are not prepared to address the inequalities migrant children face in classrooms.

    Challenges

    1. Invisible children: With no count of out-of-school migrant children, schemes cannot target the children they are meant to reach.
    2. Separate State systems: Source and destination States run different school systems, languages and curricula, so a migrating child struggles to continue the same course.
    3. Mid-session disruption: Migration after the Kharif harvest falls in the middle of the school year, so admission drives at the start of the year miss these children.

    Way Forward

    1. Migration-responsive teacher education: Integrate migration-responsive pedagogy into teacher education programmes without delay.
    2. Records that travel: Implement NITI Aayog’s portable records and inter-State transfer mechanisms, so a child’s schooling moves with the family.
    3. Bridge and remedial support: Run bridge learning centres and remedial teaching for children returning from worksites.
    4. Measure learning: Judge the system by whether migrant children learn, participate and progress, not only by whether they enrol.

    Conclusion

    Schooling for migrant children has been designed to bring them into classrooms, not to keep their learning continuous as they move. What to watch is whether States begin measuring migrant children’s learning, not only their enrolment, during this migration season.

    Schemes and Initiatives for School Education

    1. Samagra Shiksha: It integrates schooling from pre-school to Class 12, with a focus on universal access and bringing out-of-school children back into formal education.
    2. NIPUN Bharat Mission: It targets foundational literacy and numeracy, so that every child can read and do basic arithmetic by the end of Grade 3.
    3. National Child Labour Project (NCLP): It mainstreams rescued child labourers into formal schools through bridge courses, special training and a stipend.
    4. Automated Permanent Academic Account Registry (APAAR): The “One Nation, One ID” for students links a learner’s academic records and transfers on one portal.

    Matching Previous Year Question

    “[2020, GS2, 15 marks] National Education Policy 2020 is in conformity with the Sustainable Development Goal-4 (2030). It intends to restructure and reorient education system in India. Critically examine the statement.”

  • Fossil fuel in the farm, and food as fuel: a double bind

    Fossil fuel in the farm, and food as fuel: a double bind

    Why in the News

    The West Asia and Russia-Ukraine conflicts, together with El Nino (a Pacific warming that weakens India’s monsoon), are testing two trends in Indian farming. One is the “fossilisation” of farming, its reliance on petroleum-based inputs. The other is the “fuelisation” of food, the diversion of crops to make fuel.

    What is the “fossilisation” of farming?

    1. What it is: Farming that ran on bullocks and manure now runs on fossil fuels and their by-products. It is like a home moving from firewood to cooking gas: easier, but exposed to prices.
    2. Mechanisation: India’s tractor population has crossed 1.2 crore, and combines and motor pumps have replaced bullocks and the Persian wheel.
    3. Fertilisers: About 67.5% of chemical fertiliser nutrients come from two products, urea and di-ammonium phosphate (DAP).
    4. Pesticides: Most crop protection chemicals are built from naphtha, a crude oil product, and their solvents are largely petroleum-based.
    5. The takeaway: Oil and gas price rises now reach the farm through its machines, nutrients and sprays.

    How have the wars raised farm input costs?

    1. Gas for urea: Liquefied natural gas (LNG), the main feedstock for nitrogen fertilisers, rose from about $11 to $30 per million British thermal units over the past year.
    2. Naphtha: Northwest European naphtha cargoes rose from about $515 to $910 a tonne in the same year.
    3. Sulphur: This by-product of oil refining and gas processing is essential for every phosphorus fertiliser, including DAP and single super phosphate (SSP). It has soared from below $300 a tonne to over $1,000.
    4. Why sulphur spiked: Ukraine’s strikes on Russian refineries and gas plants, and Iran’s attacks on Gulf energy infrastructure, squeezed supply.

    What is the “fuelisation” of food?

    1. Reverse fossilisation: With Brent crude above $100 a barrel, turning food crops into biofuel becomes profitable, so farming becomes a fuel source, not only a fuel user.
    2. Ethanol in India: India blends ethanol from sugarcane, rice, maize and other cereals up to 20% in petrol.
    3. Biodiesel abroad: Vegetable oils can become fatty acid methyl esters (FAME), a diesel substitute. Since July, Indonesia requires all diesel to contain 50% palm oil FAME.
    4. Policy response: The government has banned using sugarcane juice and B-heavy molasses for ethanol. Grains may follow as El Nino weakens the monsoon.

    Can farming absorb a twin shock this time?

    1. The last twin shock: In 1979-80, farm output contracted sharply and the oil import bill doubled on the back of Iran’s Islamic Revolution.
    2. Diversified incomes: More farm income now comes from dairying, poultry, aquaculture and horticulture, not field crops alone.
    3. Irrigation buffer: About 56% of gross cropped area is now irrigated, nearly double the share then, so sharp output falls of the old kind are unlikely.

    Challenges

    1. Import dependence: India imports oil, gas, ammonia, rock phosphate, sulphur, muriate of potash and pesticide ingredients, so price spikes abroad hit farmers and the subsidy bill.
    2. Wasted nitrogen: Urea is 46% nitrogen, but crops absorb only a third of it. The rest escapes as ammonia or washes away as nitrate.
    3. Locked phosphorus: About three fourths of the phosphorus in DAP gets “locked up” in the soil, out of the roots’ reach that season.

    Way Forward

    1. Balanced fertilisers: Gradually replace urea and DAP with ammonium sulphate and complex fertilisers that lose less nitrogen and lock up less phosphorus.
    2. Biostimulants: Use biostimulants that expand roots and alter plant metabolism to raise nutrient uptake.
    3. Plant defence: Cut chemical pesticides by triggering plants’ own defence mechanisms, an approach similar to vaccines.
    4. Solar and drip irrigation: Shift irrigation progressively to solar pumps and drip systems.

    Conclusion

    Indian agriculture now sits on both sides of the energy market, buying fossil inputs and supplying biofuel crops, so an oil shock hits it twice. What to watch is whether ethanol curbs extend to grains and efficient fertilisers cut import exposure.

    Key numbers

    1. Tractors: Hardly 8,500 in 1950-51; 11.6 lakh sold in 2025-26 alone.
    2. Fertiliser use (N, P and K): 69,800 tonnes in 1950-51; 33.5 million tonnes in 2025-26.
    3. Farm output, 1979-80: Contracted 12.8%.
    4. Irrigated share of gross cropped area: 17.1% in 1950-51; 29% in 1979-80.

    Schemes and Initiatives for the Fertiliser Sector

    1. Neem-coated urea: Coating all urea with neem improves efficiency and curbs diversion of subsidised urea to non-farm use.
    2. Nutrient Based Subsidy (NBS): Phosphatic and potassic fertilisers are subsidised according to their nutrient content.
    3. Nano fertilisers: Nano Urea Plus and Nano DAP reduce bulk fertiliser use and import dependence.

    Matching Previous Year Question

    “[2020] With reference to chemical fertilizers in India, consider the following statements: 1. At present, the retail price of chemical fertilizers is market-driven and not administered by the Government. 2. Ammonia, which is an input of urea, is produced from natural gas. 3. Sulphur, which is a raw material for Phosphoric acid fertilizer, is a by-product of oil refineries. Which of the statements given above is/are correct? (a) 1 only (b) 2 and 3 only (c) 2 only (d) 1, 2 and 3 ANSWER: (b)”

  • Nepal becomes first beneficiary of global funding for loss & damage

    Nepal becomes first beneficiary of global funding for loss & damage

    Why in the News

    For the first time, a country will receive money from the global fund created to pay for climate damage that has already happened. The Fund for Responding to Loss and Damage (FRLD) has provisionally set aside $20 million for Nepal after the August floods, meeting a long-pending demand of developing countries.

    What is the FRLD, and why was it created?

    1. What it is: The FRLD pays for climate harm that has already happened and cannot be adapted to, unlike funds that cut emissions or build defences. It works like international disaster relief.
    2. Who demanded it: Developing countries, especially small and least developed ones, pressed for it, because they are most exposed and have the least resources to cope.
    3. Creation: After over a decade and a half of negotiations, it was created at COP27, the UN climate conference held at Sharm el-Sheikh, Egypt, in 2022.
    4. Operationalisation: It began work at COP28 in Dubai the next year, with the first round of pledges. The World Bank hosts it on an interim basis.
    5. The takeaway: Nepal’s grant is the first test of whether the fund can move money to a disaster-hit country.

    What has the FRLD decided for Nepal?

    1. Emergency meeting: The FRLD Board met in emergency session at the request of Nepal and other developing countries. It “provisionally set aside” Nepal’s grant.
    2. Formal application: Nepal must file a formal request, which the Board will consider at its December meeting.
    3. Single-event cap: Each request must lie between $5 million and $20 million, so Nepal got the most allowed for one event. Countries may file separate requests for separate incidents.
    4. The disaster: A rock and ice avalanche on 26 August in the northeastern Rasuwa district set off the floods. They were a glacial lake outburst flood (GLOF), assessed as induced by climate change.
    5. Human toll: The floods killed more than 1,300 people, and over 5,000 are still missing.

    Why is the grant both a milestone and a token?

    1. Operational step: The approval is a small but significant step in making the loss and damage framework work for vulnerable countries.
    2. Scale gap: Nepal puts its initial recovery and reconstruction needs at no less than $4.71 billion, so the grant covers under one per cent.
    3. Release delay: A former Director General of the International Solar Alliance (ISA) warned that money is released only after Nepal’s further project proposals are cleared, so relief may come late.
    4. Queue of requests: By June, the fund had received 176 requests from 119 countries, all still pending.

    Challenges

    1. Small capital base: The fund’s reserves are a small fraction of the reconstruction bills climate disasters leave.
    2. Slow approval cycle: Grants wait for formal applications and scheduled Board meetings, delaying relief after a fast disaster.
    3. Per-event ceiling: The cap on each request cannot match losses that run into billions of dollars.
    4. Voluntary funding: Contributions are voluntary, so the fund depends on donors’ goodwill. Eg. The United Arab Emirates’ $100 million led the early pledges.

    Way Forward

    1. Fast-track window: The Board should release part of a grant before the full project proposal clears.
    2. Larger pledges: Developed countries should raise and deliver pledges at the coming climate conference.
    3. Higher ceiling: The Board should review the per-event cap for disasters of Nepal’s scale.

    Conclusion

    The loss and damage fund has moved from pledges to its first allocation, but the sum shows how far its resources fall short of the losses it was built to meet. What to watch is whether the Board confirms Nepal’s grant at its next meeting and how fast the money arrives.

    Key numbers

    1. Nepal’s assessed economic loss: At least $2.69 billion (Nepal government estimate).
    2. Value of pending FRLD requests: $2.8 billion, as of June 2026.
    3. Share of reconstruction cost: Under 0.5% of an estimated $5 billion (former ISA Director General).

    Back2Basics: Glacial Lake Outburst Flood (GLOF)

    1. What it is: The sudden release of water held in a glacial lake, which sends a large volume downstream in a short time.
    2. How the lake forms: Meltwater collects behind a moraine ridge or an ice dam left by a retreating glacier, so loose debris or ice holds it back.
    3. What breaches it: An avalanche or landslide into the lake, seepage that erodes the moraine, or failure of the ice dam.
    4. Why it is tracked: Glacier retreat is adding to the number and volume of Himalayan glacial lakes, so national inventories monitor them.

    Matching Previous Year Question

    “[2016] With reference to the Agreement at the UNFCCC Meeting in Paris in 2015, which of the following statements is/are correct? 1. The Agreement was signed by all the member countries of the UN and it will go into effect in 2017. 2. The Agreement aims to limit the greenhouse gas emissions so that the rise in average global temperature by the end of this century does not exceed 2oC or even 1.50C above pre-industrial levels. 3. Developed countries acknowledged their historical responsibility in global warming and committed to donate $ 1000 billion a year from 2020 to help developing countries to cope with climate change. Select the correct answer using the code given below. (a) 1 and 3 only (b) 2 only (c) 2 and 3 only (d) 1, 2 and 3 ANSWER: (b)”

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