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  • BIMSTEC adopts ‘Delhi Declaration’ on terrorism

    BIMSTEC adopts ‘Delhi Declaration’ on terrorism

    Why in the News

    For the first time, the Home Ministers of the Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi-Sectoral Technical and Economic Cooperation (BIMSTEC) have met as a group and adopted a common counter terrorism text, the Delhi Declaration. India hosted the meeting, which also covered drugs, cybercrime and fugitive criminals.

    What does the Delhi Declaration commit members to?

    1. What it is: The Delhi Declaration is a shared pledge on terrorism by all seven members, Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, Myanmar, Nepal, Sri Lanka and Thailand, like neighbours agreeing to guard one street.
    2. Four commitments: Members will:
      • counter radicalisation and violent extremism conducive to terrorism;
      • prevent misuse of new and emerging technologies for terrorist purposes;
      • tackle terrorist recruitment;
      • curb terror financing through internationally agreed counter terror financing and anti money laundering standards.
    3. Condemnation: Members “strongly condemn terrorism” in all its forms, “including cross-border terrorism, wherever, by whomsoever”, and want perpetrators brought to justice under domestic and international law.
    4. UN sanctions: The declaration seeks full use of United Nations (UN) Security Council sanctions. These include the 1267 Sanctions Committee list, which freezes assets of ISIL and Al-Qaida linked people and bans their travel.
    5. The takeaway: A region that lacked any common text on terrorism now has one that names cross border terrorism, which India has long sought in regional forums.

    What cooperation did India seek?

    1. Five areas: The Union Home Minister named drug control; counter terrorism and legal cooperation; repatriation of fugitive criminals; cybersecurity and cybercrime investigation; and institutional cooperation and capacity building.
    2. Changing terrorist tactics: Terror groups now recruit through encrypted communication and social media. They also use drones, cryptocurrency and the dark web, the hidden part of the internet, to spread illegal activity.
    3. Real time intelligence: The Home Minister called for real time sharing of actionable intelligence and closer work among police, intelligence and border management agencies.
    4. No safe haven: No member should shelter fugitive criminals, and members should cooperate in their extradition.
    5. Illicit finance: India sought a coordinated regional approach to illicit financial transactions and terror financing.

    Why does a regional approach matter?

    1. Crime across borders: Criminal networks operate beyond national borders and exploit regional lacunae, gaps no single country’s law can reach, so regional cooperation is needed.
    2. India’s framing: India says it believes in sovereignty and peaceful resolution of disputes, and seeks joint action against international terrorism, organised crime and narco trade.
    3. “Cyber slavery”: The Home Minister flagged human trafficking and cyber slavery, meaning trafficking people into online scam centres and forcing them to defraud others, as grave concerns.
    4. Bangladesh’s representation: Bangladesh, the current BIMSTEC chair, sent a Senior Secretary of its Home Ministry rather than its Home Minister.

    Challenges

    1. Bilateral frictions: Disputes between members weaken joint action. Eg. The Rohingya refugee crisis between Bangladesh and Myanmar.
    2. Drug routes through Myanmar: Instability in Myanmar keeps trafficking routes into India’s Northeast open. Eg. Heroin and methamphetamine from the Golden Triangle.
    3. Weak secretariat: BIMSTEC’s secretariat has little executive authority and limited funds, so follow up depends on each member.
    4. Shifting political priorities: Changes of government alter regional commitments. Eg. The political transition in Bangladesh since 2024.

    Way Forward

    1. Binding legal instruments: Convert the declaration into ratified agreements on mutual legal assistance and extradition among all seven members.
    2. Linked financial intelligence: Connect members’ Financial Intelligence Units, the agencies that track suspicious money, to trace terror funds, including cryptocurrency flows.
    3. Joint action on scam centres: Run coordinated rescues and prosecutions against cyber slavery compounds and the networks that recruit victims.
    4. Regular ministerial review: Make the Home Ministers’ meeting a standing annual forum that reviews progress on the declaration.

    Conclusion

    BIMSTEC now has a shared text on terrorism, but its value depends on members acting on it inside their own borders. Whether the Home Ministers meet again and turn India’s areas of cooperation into working legal and intelligence arrangements is what to watch.

    Back2Basics: BIMSTEC

    1. Origin: Formed by the Bangkok Declaration of June 1997 as BIST-EC (Bangladesh, India, Sri Lanka, Thailand). Myanmar joined that year, and Nepal and Bhutan in 2004.
    2. Institutions: Its permanent secretariat has been in Dhaka since 2014. The BIMSTEC Charter, adopted at the fifth summit in 2022, gives the grouping legal status.
    3. Role for India: It links India’s Neighbourhood First and Act East policies and offers a working alternative to a dormant South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC).
    4. Bangkok Vision 2030: Adopted at the sixth summit in April 2025 as a roadmap for a prosperous, resilient and open region.

    Matching Previous Year Question

    “[2026] Match List I (BIMSTEC Centre) with List II (Location): A. BIMSTEC Cultural Industries Observatory B. BIMSTEC Energy Centre C. BIMSTEC Centre for Weather and Climate D. BIMSTEC Technology Transfer Facility 1. NOIDA 2. Bengaluru 3. Colombo 4. Thimphu (a) A-3, B-2, C-1, D-4 (b) A-3, B-1, C-2, D-4 (c) A-4, B-2, C-1, D-3 (d) A-4, B-1, C-2, D-3 ANSWER: C”

  • China says ‘never recognised’ U.T. of Ladakh; India hits back

    Why in the News

    China has moved from restored diplomatic and travel links with India to openly disowning Indian rule in Ladakh, saying it has “never recognised” the Union Territory (UT) of Ladakh. It is Beijing’s first such statement since the Prime Minister’s 2024 meeting with the Chinese President began the thaw. The trigger is India’s official naming of features in Ladakh.

    What has India named, and why?

    1. What it is: India has fixed official names for 28 features in Ladakh on maps of the Survey of India, the national mapping agency, much like a city putting up name boards on its own streets.
    2. Features named: The list falls into three groups:
      • heights: 11 peaks and five mountains;
      • land and ice: six land areas and two glaciers;
      • routes and water: two passes, a valley, a river, a lake and another waterbody.
    3. Location: Some lie along the Line of Actual Control (LAC), where the Indian Army and China’s People’s Liberation Army skirmished during a four year standoff.
    4. India’s stated purpose: The Ministry of External Affairs (MEA) says marking the places on the official map aids their accurate recognition and better awareness among the public.
    5. The takeaway: Naming a feature on an official map asserts that the state administers it, so a mapping exercise has become a sovereignty dispute.

    Why does China reject the names, and how has India replied?

    1. China’s position: China’s Foreign Ministry spokesperson called the names “illegal and void” and said the western sector of the China-India boundary belongs to China.
    2. Root of the objection: China disputes India’s August 2019 decision to split Jammu and Kashmir into UTs and dilute Article 370, which had given the former State special status.
    3. Earlier protest: In 2019 Beijing accused India of undermining China’s territorial sovereignty by unilaterally changing its domestic law.
    4. Precedent on roads: In September 2020, China made a similar claim against an Indian project to build high altitude roads in eastern Ladakh.
    5. India’s reply: The MEA spokesperson called the UT “an integral and inalienable part of India” and said no amount of Chinese denial can change this established fact.

    Why do these features matter?

    1. Friction point: The named features abut Patrolling Point 15, which saw heavy troop mobilisation after the deadly Galwan clashes of June 2020.
    2. Disengagement: The two armies agreed to stand down from that point in September 2022, as part of a series of disengagement negotiations.
    3. Rival cartographic claims: For many years both sides have reinforced claims in the Western and Eastern sectors by naming features on official maps and creating administrative jurisdictions.

    Challenges

    1. Renaming as a claim: China uses names to press claims across the LAC. Eg. Its “standardised” names for places in Arunachal Pradesh since 2017.
    2. New administrative units: China creates jurisdictions over territory India claims. Eg. Two counties in Hotan covering parts of Aksai Chin (December 2024).
    3. Undemarcated boundary: The LAC has never been jointly marked on the ground, so rival maps can claim the same ridges and valleys.
    4. Fragile thaw: Public sparring over sovereignty can stall the trade, travel and talks restored since the 2024 meeting.

    Way Forward

    1. Boundary Expert Group: Use the Expert Group on delimitation and demarcation, set up in 2025, to narrow differences sector by sector.
    2. Early harvest: Seek an “early harvest”, a first partial deal, on the boundary in the largely undisputed Middle Sector to build trust.
    3. Measured rebuttals: Keep India’s responses factual and routed through the MEA, so naming spats do not derail restored dialogue.
    4. Presence on the ground: Continue roads and habitation in eastern Ladakh, so administration on the ground matches the official map.

    Conclusion

    India and China have kept their thaw intact, but each now uses the map to restate claims the other will not concede. Whether the revived boundary mechanisms can move from managing incidents to settling the western sector is the test to watch.

    Back2Basics: Line of Actual Control (LAC)

    1. What it is: The 3,488 km de facto line separating Indian and Chinese held territory, which has never been jointly demarcated.
    2. Western Sector (Ladakh): India relies on the Johnson Line (1865), and China claims the Macartney-MacDonald Line (1899).
    3. Aksai Chin: China occupies about 38,000 sq km of Aksai Chin, which India counts as part of Ladakh.
    4. Middle and Eastern Sectors: The Middle Sector (Himachal Pradesh, Uttarakhand) is largely undisputed. In the Eastern Sector the LAC follows the McMahon Line of the Simla Convention (1914).

    Matching Previous Year Question

    “[2026, GS3, 10 marks] Ladakh is strategically located between China and Pakistan. As a measure to win hearts and minds of locals, discuss the Border Area Development Programmes (BADP) by the Central Government and civic actions by the Army. Also discuss demand of promulgation of provision of the Sixth Schedule of constitution for Ladakh.”

  • The only path to lasting peace is one state of Israel-Palestine

    Why in the News

    The Green Party of England and Wales has become the first mainstream Western party to call for “a single democratic state throughout historic Palestine”, a one state solution. It revives the case that the two state solution, the basis of diplomacy including India’s, is dead, and that only one shared state can bring lasting peace.

    What is the two state solution, and what is proposed instead?

    1. Two state solution: A Palestinian state would sit beside Israel on the borders before the 1967 Six-Day War, like splitting a disputed house into two flats. The Oslo Accords (1993) made it the basis of talks.
    2. One state solution: A single secular, democratic state across historic Palestine, with Israelis and Palestinians as equal citizens.
    3. Green Party resolution: The party, with only five MPs, also declared Zionism, the movement for a Jewish homeland, a form of racism. Jewish groups called it antisemitic.
    4. Israel’s response: Israel said the party legitimises terrorism and barred its Jewish leader from entry.
    5. The takeaway: One state has entered mainstream Western politics just as support for two states is collapsing.

    Why is the two state solution called dead?

    1. Israeli leadership: Israel’s Prime Minister says Israeli security leaves no room for Palestinian sovereignty. This states openly the outcome 30 years of policy produced.
    2. No opposition mandate: With elections imminent, Israel’s opposition offers no clear mandate for Palestinian statehood.
    3. Collapsing public support: Israeli backing for two states has fallen to 17% in recent Pew surveys, after the October 7 Hamas attack and Israel’s retaliation on Gaza.
    4. Fragmented West Bank: Thirty years of hilltop settlements, military outposts and fences have broken the West Bank into a patchwork that cannot hold a state with a sustainable economy.
    5. Settlers cannot be moved: Moving about 750,000 Israeli settlers back within Israel’s legal borders is close to impossible.

    Can Israelis and Palestinians share one state?

    1. Cost of occupation: Israel cannot occupy Gaza indefinitely, and occupation makes it a global pariah. Weakening Hamas militarily does not end the humiliation and despair that feed militancy.
    2. Sceptics’ objection: Decades of trauma divide the two peoples too deeply to share one country.
    3. Choice for both peoples: Israelis face an armed, hostile neighbour or integration with 5.5 million Palestinians. Palestinians face a hope of their own country or equal rights in a prosperous state.
    4. Arab citizens of Israel: About 2 million Arab citizens already live in Israel fairly peacefully, but as second class citizens.
    5. Zionism’s founders: Theodor Herzl, founder of political Zionism, imagined in his 1902 novel Altneuland (“Old New Land”) a secular state where Arab citizens voted and sat in parliament.

    What do other divided societies show?

    1. Belgium: A constitutional framework guaranteeing protections for each group holds its linguistic and cultural divisions together.
    2. Northern Ireland: After decades of sectarian violence, former enemies share power in a system overseen by Britain and the Republic of Ireland.
    3. South Africa, Bosnia and Lebanon: These arrangements are imperfect, and fragile in Lebanon. They still show shared governance works better than endless war.

    Challenges

    1. Demographic fear: Israeli Jews fear being outnumbered, so few Israeli parties will campaign for one state.
    2. Law that privileges one people: Israeli law defines the state by Jewish identity. Eg. The Basic Law on the Nation State (2018).
    3. Fragile power sharing: Shared rule can freeze divisions. Eg. Lebanon’s confessional system repeatedly paralyses government.

    Way Forward

    1. Guaranteed group safeguards: Write protections for each community, underwritten by foreign powers both sides accept.
    2. Green resolution as catalyst: Use it to build consensus on one state offering peace, dignity and equal rights.
    3. India’s lead: India’s historic support for Palestinian rights outlasts its recent tilt towards Israel. It can lead on one state and regain a central place in multilateral diplomacy.

    Conclusion

    The two state framework has lost its political base in Israel and its territorial base on the ground, yet no government backs one shared state. Whether a government, India included, adopts the idea beyond a minor party’s resolution will decide if it enters diplomacy.

    India and the Israel-Palestine Question

    1. Early recognition: India was the first non Arab country to recognise Palestine, in 1988, and treated the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) as its people’s sole legitimate representative.
    2. De-hyphenation: India opened full diplomatic relations with Israel in 1992 and keeps independent ties with both sides.
    3. Stated position: India backs “a sovereign, independent Palestine coexisting with Israel” and funds West Bank schools and IT centres under the India-Palestine Development Partnership.

    Matching Previous Year Question

    “[2018] The term “two-state solution” is sometimes mentioned in the news in the context of the affairs of (a) China (b) Israel (c) Iraq (d) Yemen ANSWER: (b)”

  • The other G2, and three lessons for India

    Why in the News

    US President Donald Trump has allowed imports of Russian diesel until April 2027, after a call with Russian President Vladimir Putin. Weeks earlier he had signed a law allowing tariffs of up to 100% on countries such as India that buy Russian oil. The move revives a second “G2”, a US-Russia accommodation India has fewer reasons to fear than a US-China one.

    What is the “other G2”, and why has diesel revived it?

    1. What it is: G2 means two great powers settling major questions between themselves, like two dominant shareholders running a company. India fears a US-China G2 dominating Asia.
    2. The other G2: A US-Russia strategic accommodation is the second possibility.
    3. Domestic trigger: With diesel above $6 a gallon and inflation hanging over the 3 November congressional elections, cheaper fuel for farmers and truckers is an urgent priority in Washington.
    4. Exemption for itself: Having carved out a diesel exemption for itself, Washington may hesitate to impose fresh oil sanctions on India.
    5. The takeaway: US domestic needs can soften its Russia policy, which can reduce the friction India’s Russian partnership creates with Washington.

    How has Washington pursued a thaw with Moscow?

    1. First term record: Trump pressed for Russia’s return to the G8, which suspended it after the 2014 annexation of Crimea. At Helsinki in 2018 he resisted calling Russia an adversary.
    2. Second term outreach: Talks in Riyadh in February 2025 reopened high level engagement. Russia’s investment envoy then offered openings in energy, Arctic development and minerals.
    3. Summits so far: The Alaska summit of August 2025 failed to end the war, and US envoys met Putin in Moscow last month.
    4. Meetings ahead: The two may meet at the November Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) summit in Shenzhen, possibly with China’s President. Moscow has yet to accept an invitation to December’s G20 summit in Miami.

    What does each side want, and what stands in the way?

    1. Commerce first: Trump wants economic cooperation to open a path to peace rather than follow a settlement, betting that profitable ventures soften political antagonism.
    2. Putin’s incentives: Sanctions relief brings revenue, investment and technology, and engagement restores standing and reduces dependence on China. A settlement recognising territorial gains would let him claim victory.
    3. US domestic resistance: If Democrats regain Congress, or even the House, they could use investigations, sanctions laws and spending control to obstruct a rapprochement. Republican opposition to concessions adds a constraint.
    4. Ukraine and Europe: Ukraine will resist a bargain that rewards invasion. Europeans fear a deal could leave them exposed to Russian assertion.

    What three lessons follow for India?

    1. Fluid great power ties: A US-Russia thaw could ease American pressure on India’s Russian energy purchases and defence ties, so Delhi should weigh its opportunities as carefully as its costs.
    2. No ideological obligation: Moscow does not treat confrontation with Washington as an ideological duty, and values engagement with it as a great power peer. Eg. In the early 1990s, its eagerness for US ties pushed India down its priorities.
    3. Europe’s weight: India’s trade, technology, investment and defence stakes in Europe have risen, and Russia’s confrontation with Europe could outlast any US-Russia deal.

    Challenges

    1. Russia-China closeness: Russia’s “no limits” partnership with China limits its neutrality in India-China disputes.
    2. Payment hurdles: Western sanctions complicate settling India-Russia trade. Eg. Over $40 billion in rupees stuck in Russian banks’ Vostro accounts.
    3. The Ukraine dilemma: India must balance US partnership expectations, ties with Moscow and distance from a Sino-Russian axis.

    Way Forward

    1. Contribute to Ukraine peace: Delhi should help wherever it can.
    2. Russia-Europe dialogue: Encourage direct talks between Russia and Europe on ending the war and on a lasting European and Eurasian security order.
    3. Rupee reinvestment: Encourage Russia to reinvest its rupee surplus in Indian infrastructure to balance trade.

    Conclusion

    A US-Russia accommodation would meet only part of India’s needs, because Europe’s security, where India’s stake is now larger, would stay unsettled. Another meeting of the two Presidents and the US Congress’s response are the markers to watch.

    About India-Russia Relations

    1. Strategic partnership: Ties were elevated to a “special and privileged strategic partnership” in 2010.
    2. Defence dependence: Russia’s share of Indian arms imports fell from 70% to under 45% in a decade, but it remains India’s largest defence partner.
    3. Trade: Bilateral trade crossed $68 billion in 2025, driven by oil, defence and fertilisers.
    4. Trade target: The latest annual summit set a goal of $100 billion in trade by 2030.

    Matching Previous Year Question

    “[2025, GS2, 10 marks] With the waning of globalization, post-Cold War world is becoming a site of sovereign nationalism. Elucidate.”

  • India-U.S. ties and the hurdle of American unilateralism

    India-U.S. ties and the hurdle of American unilateralism

    Why in the News

    The United States has suspended the Permanent Labour Certification (PERM) programme for eight global IT companies, including Indian ones, accusing them of misusing immigration and labour certification systems. It is one of a series of unilateral US actions now straining India-US ties.

    What is the PERM programme, and why does its suspension hurt India?

    1. What it is: PERM lets US companies hire non-US professionals. It is a step in an employer sponsored green card (US permanent residence) application, like an employer vouching for a foreign worker.
    2. Firms named: They include Infosys, Tata Consultancy Services, Wipro, Cognizant and HCL.
    3. Scale of use: The US says the eight firms received over 2,30,000 H-1B approvals (temporary skilled work visas) and over 1,00,000 labour certifications.
    4. Indian stake: Indians account for over 70% of approved H-1B petitions each year.
    5. The takeaway: The suspension follows ill treatment of and racist attacks on Indians, so India sees a pattern of US action, not an isolated incident.

    Why has trade become a visible source of discord?

    1. Trade surplus: India sold $33.8 billion more to the US than it bought, on bilateral trade above $140 billion last financial year.
    2. Farm and dairy access: The US wants access to India’s dairy and agriculture sectors, which India cannot concede.
    3. Russian oil: India has refused to halt Russian oil imports even after additional US tariffs and sanctions.
    4. Stalled interim deal: An interim trade framework announced in February 2026 has stalled, and the Finance Minister says talks have “plateaued”.

    Why has the defence partnership not delivered co-production?

    1. Purchases without transfer: India has acquired over $22 billion of US military hardware since 2002, but co-production and technology transfer, the US sharing how to build the equipment, remain elusive.
    2. Commitments made: In February 2025 the US agreed to co-produce Javelin anti tank missiles and Stryker combat vehicles in India.
    3. Ten year framework: The two countries signed a Framework for the US-India Major Defence Partnership in October 2025.
    4. Engine delays: Delayed GE F404 engines for the Tejas fighter show the cost of relying on foreign suppliers.
    5. INDUS-X: The India-US Defence Acceleration Ecosystem (INDUS-X), launched in 2023, has yet to deliver co-development.

    Why do Pakistan and technology deepen the distrust?

    1. Mediation claims: The US President’s repeated claims that he ended the India-Pakistan conflict after Operation Sindoor (May 2025) have irked India.
    2. Courting Pakistan’s military: Washington’s courting of Pakistan’s Chief of Defence Forces is a major irritant.
    3. Mecca Pact: This pact of Saudi Arabia, Pakistan and Türkiye, reportedly blessed by Washington, worries India.
    4. Nuclear promise unmet: The 2008 India-US civil nuclear agreement promised US designed reactors in India, a promise still largely unrealised.
    5. Technology on paper: The Initiative on Critical and Emerging Technology (iCET) of 2023 and the Transforming the Relationship Utilizing Strategic Technology (TRUST) initiative of February 2025 remain largely declarations.

    Is this a difficult phase or a structural problem?

    1. Restraint met with pressure: India’s strategic restraint increasingly meets US pressure and disregard for Indian interests.
    2. A lonelier power: The External Affairs Minister has observed that the US is “deliberately becoming a lonelier power”.

    Challenges

    1. Visa restrictions: Tighter US immigration rules erode Indian IT firms’ competitiveness. Eg. A $100,000 H-1B visa fee.
    2. Autonomy against convergence: India’s ties with Russia and Iran clash with US expectations. Eg. US sanction threats over India’s S-400 purchase.
    3. Sanctions on connectivity: US sanctions on Iran hamper Indian projects such as Chabahar Port.

    Way Forward

    1. Full trade agreement: Convert the interim framework into a comprehensive trade agreement that shields farm and dairy lines.
    2. Security of supply pacts: Insulate technology transfer from political shifts through long term Security of Supply Arrangements, pacts for priority defence supplies.
    3. Totalisation agreement: Sign a social security pact so Indian professionals in the US do not pay into a system they cannot draw from.

    Conclusion

    The India-US partnership has widened on paper, but each unilateral US step weakens Indian confidence in what is signed. Delivery of the stalled trade deal and the defence co-production commitments will show if the relationship can rest on equality rather than imposition.

    Bilateral Initiatives in India-US Relations

    1. Foundational agreements: Four defence pacts let the two militaries protect shared information, use each other’s logistics, communicate securely and share geospatial data.
    2. STA-1 status: Since 2018, Strategic Trade Authorisation Tier 1 eases Indian access to US high technology items.
    3. COMPACT: The 2025 Catalyzing Opportunities for Military Partnership, Accelerated Commerce and Technology initiative launched Mission 500, targeting $500 billion in trade by 2030.

    Matching Previous Year Question

    “[2020, GS2, 15 marks] What is the significance of Indo-US defence deals over Indo-Russian defence deals? Discuss with reference to stability in the Indo-Pacific region.”

  • States seek urgent funds to sustain women livelihood mission, no word on NULM 2.0 yet

    Why in the News

    Support for urban poor women’s self help groups (SHGs) has gone from a centrally funded mission reaching about 1 crore women to a funding pause with no successor scheme. At least five States ruled by different parties, Tamil Nadu, Karnataka, Maharashtra, Madhya Pradesh and Tripura, have written to the Prime Minister and the Ministry of Housing and Urban Affairs (MoHUA) warning that the pause will cut SHGs’ access to bank credit.

    What was DAY-NULM, and how did it work?

    1. What it is: The Deendayal Antyodaya Yojana-National Urban Livelihoods Mission (DAY-NULM) organised poor urban women into SHGs, groups that save together and borrow from banks as one unit, like a savings club.
    2. Term: It began in 2014, replacing the Swarna Jayanti Shahari Rozgar Yojana, and ran until October 2024.
    3. Support given: Each group received a revolving fund of Rs 10,000, seed money members lend among themselves. Training, interest subvention (a subsidy lowering the interest on bank loans) and micro enterprise support followed.
    4. Reach and cost: It created 10.02 lakh SHGs at a cost of about Rs 9,000 crore to the Centre and States.
    5. The takeaway: Mission staff and subsidies kept these groups able to borrow from banks, and the money for both has stopped.

    What has happened since the mission ended?

    1. Pilot in place of a scheme: MoHUA ran a pilot, the Deendayal Jan Aajeevika Yojana-Shehari (DJAY-S), until December 2025 as a bridge to a new scheme.
    2. Expansion approved, then dropped: A MoHUA letter of 4 December 2024 recorded the Department of Expenditure‘s in principle approval to extend the pilot nationwide. It has since been dropped.
    3. No word on NULM 2.0: MoHUA has not announced a successor. It says a new livelihood programme is under discussion and no State demand is pending.

    What are the States asking for?

    1. Tamil Nadu: The Chief Minister sought Rs 350 crore, noting that the State’s mission funds were exhausted by April 2025.
    2. Maharashtra: The State mission sought Rs 80.99 crore of central share, having last received funds in March 2024.
    3. Madhya Pradesh: It sought Rs 101 crore, including Rs 13.71 crore of interest subsidy owed on loans that run beyond the scheme’s closure.
    4. Tripura: Without fresh funds for two years, it sought Rs 6.5 crore owed to groups running mid day meals, canteens and uniform stitching.
    5. Karnataka: Unable to pay staff since July 2025, it asked to use pilot money for salaries.

    Why does the funding pause matter?

    1. Credit chain at risk: Tripura warns that without mission support, group links to banks built over years will weaken. Maharashtra reports staff pay and subsidy dues piling up monthly.
    2. Borrowers in good faith: Madhya Pradesh argues that closing a scheme does not cancel subsidy already earned, so borrowers would bear the cost.
    3. Centre’s convergence case: MoHUA says other missions now use SHGs to deliver their work, such as PM Awas Yojana, Swachh Bharat Mission, Atal Mission for Rejuvenation and Urban Transformation (AMRUT) and PM Surya Ghar: Muft Bijli Yojana.

    Challenges

    1. No successor design: Without NULM 2.0, States cannot plan staffing or new group formation.
    2. Convergence is not support: Delivering other schemes gives SHG women work, not the credit and enterprise backing the mission funded.
    3. Groups going dormant: Unsupported groups stop meeting and saving. Eg. National Bank for Agriculture and Rural Development (NABARD) records defunct SHGs.

    Way Forward

    1. Clear committed dues: MoHUA should release the central share owed for interest subsidy and revolving fund liabilities.
    2. Notify NULM 2.0: Announce the successor’s design and timeline, drawing on the pilot’s lessons.
    3. Bridge funding for staff: Permit pilot funds or a transition grant to pay mission staff until the new scheme starts.

    Conclusion

    Urban SHGs built over a decade still exist, but the money and staff that kept them creditworthy have lapsed. Whether MoHUA settles committed dues and notifies a successor mission, or relies on convergence alone, will decide if this urban credit chain holds.

    Key numbers

    1. Tamil Nadu SHGs: 1.72 lakh groups with 18.70 lakh members.
    2. DJAY-S pilot: 25 cities in 13 States.
    3. Tripura SHGs formed under NULM: 6,796.
    4. SHG convergence: over 1.5 lakh SHG women with Swachh Bharat Mission, 50,000 as AMRUT Mitra, about 38,000 SHGs under the PM Formalisation of Micro Food Processing Enterprises scheme.

    Back2Basics: SHG-Bank Linkage Programme

    1. Origin: NABARD pioneered it in 1992, letting banks lend to SHGs as groups.
    2. Joint liability: The group shares responsibility for repayment, so peer pressure keeps repayment above 96%.

    Matching Previous Year Question

    “[2021, GS2, 10 marks] Can the vicious cycle of gender inequality, poverty and malnutrition be broken through microfinancing of women SHGs? Explain with examples.”

  • CSR is at Rs 40,000 crore. Now, count the impact

    Why in the News

    India’s Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) law has mobilised about Rs 2.6 lakh crore in ten years, including Rs 40,794 crore spent in 2024-25. The case now made is that CSR must shift from counting money spent to counting outcomes, since the money follows company locations rather than development need.

    What is the CSR mandate, and what has it built?

    1. What it is: The CSR law, part of the Companies Act, 2013, took effect in 2014. It makes large companies spend part of their profit on social development, like a compulsory charity budget.
    2. Who must spend: A company crossing any one of three thresholds, on net worth, turnover or net profit, must spend 2% of its net profits on CSR.
    3. Scale reached: Last year 29,500 companies funded 72,000 projects, making CSR among the world’s largest mandatory private sector contributions to development finance.
    4. The takeaway: CSR has solved the problem of raising money for development, but nobody yet knows what that money changes on the ground.

    Why does CSR money not reach where it is most needed?

    1. Location over need: Companies spend close to their own operations, so a firm’s location, not where development lags most, now decides where CSR money goes.
    2. Top two States: Last year Maharashtra received Rs 8,631 crore and Gujarat Rs 4,549 crore of CSR funds.
    3. Four State share: With Karnataka and Delhi, four States together took more than Rs 20,000 crore, close to half of all CSR spending.
    4. Projects without a sum: Much CSR money does valuable work in education, health and livelihoods, but no one tracks what thousands of separate projects add up to.

    What three reforms are proposed for the next decade?

    1. Outcome indicators: Reporting should track outcome indicators, meaning measured changes in people’s lives, alongside the amount spent, with standard definitions for each.
    2. Aggregation and collaboration: The CSR law already permits companies to collaborate, so firms should pool funds around shared themes and geographies, turning scattered projects into long term strategic interventions.
    3. Pooling at district scale: Ten companies spending Rs 10 crore each on unrelated projects produce useful outputs. Together, Rs 100 crore against a common results framework can change a district’s system.
    4. Core competency: Firms should deploy knowledge, networks and managerial capability, not just money. Eg. A food company can support farmer productivity better than an unrelated school programme.

    What should CSR be measured against?

    1. Supplement, not substitute: The real test of CSR is whether it moves national development indicators as an addition to public expenditure, never as a replacement for it.
    2. Profit and purpose: Profit and purpose reinforce each other, so well targeted CSR creates value for the country and for the companies backing it.

    Challenges

    1. Spend based reporting: Companies report money spent rather than results, so a project counts as complete once the funds are released.
    2. Sector skew: Funds cluster in a few popular sectors, and legal aid, gender justice and governance receive minimal attention.
    3. Concentration among implementers: Large NGOs capture most CSR grants. Eg. The top 100 NGOs receive 60% of CSR funds.

    Way Forward

    1. Standard outcome metrics: The Ministry of Corporate Affairs (MCA) should notify sector wise outcome indicators to be disclosed alongside spending.
    2. Thematic district pools: Industry bodies should set up district level pools that several companies fund against one results framework.
    3. Steer funds to deficit districts: Direct pooled CSR towards Aspirational Districts, where development gaps are widest.

    Conclusion

    India has built a large, mandatory pool of private development money but still judges it by what goes out, not by what changes. Whether companies pool their funds, report outcomes and follow need rather than headquarters will decide if CSR moves the country’s development indicators.

    Key numbers

    1. CSR applicability thresholds: net worth Rs 500 crore, turnover Rs 1,000 crore or net profit Rs 5 crore.
    2. Karnataka and Delhi CSR receipts (2024-25): Rs 3,395 crore and Rs 2,753 crore.

    Government Initiatives for Corporate Social Responsibility

    1. National CSR Portal: The MCA publishes company, State and sector wise CSR spending that firms disclose in their annual filings.
    2. Impact assessment rule: The Companies (Corporate Social Responsibility Policy) Amendment Rules, 2021 require firms with large CSR obligations to commission independent impact assessments of big projects.
    3. Unspent CSR Account: Unspent money for ongoing projects must move to a separate account and be spent within three financial years, or go to a fund listed in Schedule VII, the Act’s list of permitted CSR activities.

    Matching Previous Year Question

    “[2013, GS3, 10 marks] With a consideration towards the strategy of inclusive growth, the new Companies Bill, 2013 has indirectly made CSR a mandatory obligation. Discuss the challenges expected in its implementation in right earnest. Also discuss other provisions in the Bill and their implications”

  • Legal aid cuts jail time for undertrials, but help often arrives late

    Why in the News

    Free legal aid is every poor prisoner’s right, yet over three quarters of India’s prisoners in 2022 were undertrials, held before trial. That ranks India fourth in the world by undertrial share. An evaluation of a Maharashtra prison programme finds legal aid sharply raises bail success, but help arrives only after months in jail.

    Why do undertrials need legal aid?

    1. What it is: Free legal aid gives a prisoner who cannot pay a lawyer state funded help to seek bail and defend the case, like free treatment at a government hospital.
    2. Why it exists: The Legal Services Authorities Act, 1987 created the National Legal Services Authority (NALSA) to provide free legal services to weaker sections.
    3. What went wrong: Three decades on, outreach is thin, awareness low and quality uneven, so poor undertrials stay jailed because they cannot navigate the system or afford a lawyer.
    4. The takeaway: India’s problem is not how many it jails, about 41 per 1,00,000, but how long it holds people not yet convicted.

    How does the Maharashtra programme work?

    1. Design: The programme has worked in eight Maharashtra prisons since 2018. Prayas (Tata Institute of Social Sciences) and the Fair Trial Fellowship (National Law University, Delhi) run it, with Azim Premji Foundation funding.
    2. Target groups: Casual workers, women abandoned by their families, minorities and migrant workers, those least able to get a lawyer.
    3. Records studied: The evaluation compared over 22,000 undertrials’ records with district court records.
    4. Typical participant: In their late twenties, with close to half schooled only to primary level. 18% are women and 57% casual wage workers.

    What does legal aid change for bail?

    1. Bail success: 84% of participants’ bail applications succeeded, against 26% of all applications in the same district courts.
    2. Not just minor cases: Participants did better in 28 of 29 districts, and the gap holds within each category of offence severity.
    3. Sharp change at intake: Before joining, no group of participants had more than about 6% of its members on bail. After joining, every group had at least 61%.
    4. How it works: Staff help undertrials file bail pleas, coordinate advocates, gather documents and meet release conditions, cutting the paperwork and delays (procedural frictions) that prolong detention.

    Why does late help cost so much?

    1. Months lost before help: Participants spent an average 171 days in jail before joining. Those bailed spent a further 115 days.
    2. Year long waits: In 2018 about 37% of Maharashtra’s undertrials had been held for more than a year.
    3. Wage losses: Lost wages, estimated from similar workers’ pay in the Periodic Labour Force Survey (PLFS), reach about Rs 2 lakh for some age groups.
    4. Economic return: Shorter detention eases prison overcrowding, cuts prison spending and limits income losses.

    Challenges

    1. Late identification: Legal aid cannot recover the months already spent in jail before intake.
    2. Missing data: Caste, religion, income and migration status are missing for much of the sample, so it is unclear who benefits most.
    3. Weak evidence base: Participants were not randomly selected, so the comparisons are descriptive, not causal, and the wage losses are upper bound estimates.

    Way Forward

    1. Reach prisoners at arrest: Legal services authorities should identify eligible prisoners at or soon after arrest.
    2. Record social profiles: Programmes should record each participant’s caste, religion, income and migration status.
    3. Rigorous evaluation: Compare participants with similar defendants in court records, and track them after release.

    Conclusion

    Legal aid works once it reaches an undertrial, but it reaches most too late to prevent needless detention. Moving help to the point of arrest will decide whether this right shortens jail time at scale.

    Key numbers

    1. Study periods: court records 2015 to 2020; programme records 2018 to 2023.
    2. Bail share by group: as low as 1% before intake, as high as 92% after.
    3. Maharashtra undertrials, 2018: 26,898.
    4. Participants earning under Rs 80,000 a year: over 60%.
    5. Loss after intake, by charge: about Rs 80,000 for the most serious against Rs 21,000 for the least.

    Back2Basics: Legal Services Authorities Act, 1987

    1. Constitutional basis: It gives effect to Article 39A, the Directive Principle on free legal aid, and took effect on 9 November 1995.
    2. Three tiers: NALSA, with the Chief Justice of India as Patron in Chief, heads State and District Legal Services Authorities.
    3. Who qualifies: Section 12 entitles persons in custody, women, children and Scheduled Caste and Scheduled Tribe members, among others, to free legal services.

    Matching Previous Year Question

    “[2023, GS2, 10 marks] Who are entitled to receive free legal aid? Assess the role of the National Legal Services Authority(NALSA) in rendering free legal aid in India.”

  • Muslims disproportionately flagged in Delhi SIR

    Why in the News

    Muslims form 13.6% of electors on Delhi’s draft Special Intensive Revision (SIR) roll but 20.3% of those flagged for “logical discrepancies”, a software check the Election Commission of India (ECI) never formally announced. Muslims were about 60% more likely to be flagged, mostly through family size checks.

    What is a “logical discrepancy” flag?

    1. What it is: A notice issued when the ECI’s software finds an elector’s entry implausible, often against family members’ details, so the elector must prove eligibility. It works like a bank’s fraud alert freezing a card.
    2. Who decides: ERONET, the ECI’s central software, generates the flag, not the Electoral Registration Officers (EROs), the statutory custodians of the rolls.
    3. Scale in Delhi: 33.12 lakh of 97.54 lakh draft roll electors received notices.
    4. Two kinds of notice: Some were “Unmapped with Last SIR”, not linkable to the previous roll. The other 19.33 lakh were flagged for logical discrepancies under eight reasons.
    5. The takeaway: A software rule no published order describes now decides which voters must prove they belong on the roll.

    Who gets flagged, and how often?

    1. Roll share matches Census: The Muslim share of electors is close to their 12.9% share in Census 2011, so the roll itself is balanced.
    2. Flag rate: Nearly one in three Muslim electors (318 per thousand) was flagged for logical discrepancies, against 197 per thousand others.
    3. Four reason categories: Name mismatches skewed far less, with Muslims 15.5% of those flagged. A category with “no reasons mentioned” held nearly 60,000 electors.

    Why do the family size checks skew the result?

    1. Five family size reasons: These flag six or more children linked to one parent, implausibly wide or narrow age gaps between parents, children and grandparents, and siblings born too close together.
    2. Concentrated impact: Muslims were 30% of those flagged on these reasons, and 58% of those flagged for six or more children.
    3. Nearly three times as likely: 152 per thousand Muslim electors were flagged on family size, against 56 per thousand others.
    4. Fertility overlap: The reasons track higher Muslim fertility, but National Family Health Survey (NFHS) data show Muslim women’s total fertility rate (average births per woman) fell from 4.41 to 2.36.
    5. Unreliable ages: Many older Indians born at home lack exact birth dates. The ECI has not said whether an odd age gap alone disqualifies a voter.

    How did an unannounced check enter the SIR?

    1. Absent from the orders: Neither the Bihar SIR order of June 2025 nor the Phase 2 direction of October 2025 mentioned these notices.
    2. Quiet start: The ECI first used the flags in West Bengal, midway through Phase 2.
    3. First written mention: The ECI’s May 2026 direction for Phase 3, covering 19 States and Union Territories, first mentions them.
    4. Bihar comparison: Bihar’s revision ran without these checks, and Muslims formed 18.4% of deletions against a 17.7% adult share, roughly in proportion.

    Challenges

    1. Opaque criteria: The ECI has not explained the eight reasons, so an elector cannot contest the classification.
    2. Equal roll guarantee: Article 325 bars exclusion from the roll on grounds only of religion, so a check with skewed impact invites legal challenge.
    3. Officers sidelined: EROs answer for the roll in law but do not control the software, so nobody owns a wrong flag.

    Way Forward

    1. Publish the rules: The ECI should notify the eight reasons, their thresholds and the order authorising them.
    2. Return the decision to EROs: Treat software output as advisory, with EROs recording reasons for each notice.
    3. Independent audit: Audit ERONET externally for disparate impact across communities.

    Conclusion

    A central software check, never notified, falls hardest on one community. Whether the ECI publishes its reasons before final rolls will decide if the revision cleans the roll or filters voters out.

    Key numbers

    1. Muslim electors, Delhi draft roll: roughly 13.3 lakh.
    2. Unmapped electors: 13.79 lakh, of whom 7.6% Muslim.
    3. Flagged on family size: 6.75 lakh, of whom 1.4 lakh for six or more children.
    4. Family size thresholds: parent age gap above 50 or below 15 years; grandparent gap below 40 years; sibling gap under nine months.
    5. Hindu women’s total fertility rate, NFHS: 3.3 (1992-93) to 1.94 (2019-22).

    Back2Basics: Special Intensive Revision (SIR)

    1. What it is: A time bound, house to house check of every voter entry by Booth Level Officers, unlike a routine summary revision.
    2. Legal basis: Article 324 gives the ECI superintendence over rolls. Section 21 of the Representation of the People Act, 1950 permits a special revision for recorded reasons.

    Matching Previous Year Question

    “[2026, GS2, 10 marks] Is the right to vote a fundamental right? Discuss the position of the Election Commission of India while undertaking the revision of electoral rolls. Can it also examine the question of citizenship of voters?”

  • When the state paints dissent as disorder

    Why in the News

    The mass detention of Opposition leaders, students and demonstrators in Delhi protests demanding the Chief Election Commissioner‘s resignation has reopened whether the state may treat peaceful dissent as disorder. The Supreme Court has clarified that such assemblies may be regulated, not prohibited.

    What does the right to peaceful assembly protect?

    1. What it is: Article 19(1)(b) guarantees citizens the right to assemble peaceably and without arms. It works like a public road that traffic police may regulate but not close for good.
    2. Limits on the right: Article 19(3) permits reasonable restrictions, including for public order, so only a peaceful assembly is protected.
    3. Regulable, not refusable: Himat Lal K Shah (1973) held that assembly is a fundamental right the state may regulate but not refuse arbitrarily. Ramlila Maidan Incident (2012) held that arbitrary executive action cannot extinguish peaceful protest.
    4. The takeaway: The state may manage when and where people protest, but cannot treat a peaceful crowd as a threat.

    How do other democracies draw the line?

    1. United States, First Amendment: It protects the right to “peaceably assemble”, subject to reasonable time, place and manner rules.
    2. United States, Brandenburg vs Ohio (1969): Speech urging unlawful acts is punishable only when aimed at, and likely to cause, imminent lawless action.
    3. Germany, Article 8 of the Basic Law: It protects assembly “peacefully and without arms”.
    4. Germany, Brokdorf decision (1985): The Federal Constitutional Court treated demonstrations as integral to democracy and required proportionate limits, with a ban only as a “last resort”.

    What did the framers decide on preventive detention?

    1. Article 22’s origin: Draft Article 15A, debated in September 1949, became Article 22.
    2. Fear of executive whim: H V Kamath and Pandit Thakur Das Bhargava warned against detention on mere executive whim.
    3. Ambedkar’s compromise: B R Ambedkar held that a young state facing Partition violence needed preventive detention, with safeguards: grounds communicated, and an advisory board‘s approval for detention beyond three months.
    4. 44th Amendment safeguards: Preventive detention entered as an exception, not a routine tool. The 44th Constitutional Amendment (1978) added safeguards that are still not in force.

    Why do the Delhi detentions fail the constitutional test?

    1. Concentric circles test: Ram Manohar Lohia vs State of Bihar (1966) separated “law and order”, “public order” and “security of the State”. Only an aggravated breach of law and order becomes a public order issue.
    2. Earlier Lohia ruling: In Ram Manohar Lohia (1960) the Court held illegal a detention over a mere call to stop paying irrigation rates.
    3. Delhi as law and order: The peaceful protests are at most a law and order matter, so detaining MPs, lawyers and journalists even after the Supreme Court’s directions is not justified as public order.
    4. Liberty precedents: Arnab Goswami (2020) held that even a day’s loss of liberty is grave. Justice H R Khanna‘s dissent in ADM Jabalpur (1976) rejects liberty resting on executive grace.
    5. Three tests: Detention is valid only if:
      • the assembly was not peaceful;
      • the feared disorder was specific and imminent;
      • custody was proportionate: short, with grounds given and production before a magistrate within 24 hours under Article 22(1) and (2).

    Challenges

    1. Elastic “public order”: The Constitution leaves the ground undefined, so police can stretch it to cover mere inconvenience.
    2. Routine prohibitory orders: Blanket bans on gatherings under Section 163 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 can foreclose assembly before any disorder.
    3. Short detentions escape review: Release within hours ends the case before any court tests the grounds.

    Way Forward

    1. Notify the 44th Amendment: The Union government should bring the pending advisory board safeguards into force.
    2. Written grounds: Police should record grounds and timings for each detainee, open to a magistrate’s review.
    3. Alternative venues, not bans: Authorities should offer a larger site or capped numbers before refusing any assembly.

    Conclusion

    The Constitution lets the state manage protest and, in narrow cases, detain in advance, but never recast peaceful dissent as disorder. The test now is whether courts examine each Delhi detention or let it lapse.

    Back2Basics: Preventive detention

    1. Nature of the power: Detention to prevent a future act, not punish a past one, on executive satisfaction without trial.
    2. Ordinary safeguards excluded: Article 22(3) switches off the arrest safeguards, including the magistrate rule, for preventive detainees.
    3. Longer detention: Article 22(7) lets Parliament prescribe cases where detention may exceed three months without an advisory board’s opinion.
    4. Central statute: The National Security Act, 1980 allows preventive detention to protect security and public order.

    Matching Previous Year Question

    “[2014, GS2, 12 marks] What do you understand by the concept “freedom of speech and expression”? Does it cover hate speech also? Why do the films in India stand on a slightly different plane from other forms of expression? Discuss.”