GS Paper: Federalism

Mentor’s Comment:

This article addresses the structural evolution of Indian federalism, a core GS Paper II theme with direct constitutional and governance relevance. It equips aspirants to critically analyse Centre-State tensions beyond politics, linking doctrine, fiscal policy, and institutional accountability.

Why in the News?

The federalism debate has intensified after the Tamil Nadu-constituted Justice Kurian Joseph Committee submitted Part I of its report reviewing Union-State relations. The report questions the expanding legislative and fiscal footprint of the Union and argues that excessive centralisation is weakening functional federal balance. Since federalism forms part of the Constitution’s Basic Structure, the issue carries long-term institutional implications beyond routine political contestation.

What Is the Current Constitutional Structure of Federalism in India?

The current constitutional structure of Indian federalism is a “Union of States” (Article 1) featuring a dual polity with a strong centralizing bias, designed to balance regional autonomy with national integrity. It operates through a three-fold legislative distribution (Seventh Schedule), a written constitution, an independent judiciary, and emergency provisions (Articles 352-360) that can alter the federal balance. 

Key components of this structure include:

1. Quasi-Federal Design: Establishes a federal polity with a strong Union; sovereignty rests with the Constitution, not the States.
2. Division of Powers: The Seventh Schedule divides subjects into the Union List (exclusive central power), State List (exclusive state power), and Concurrent List (shared power).
3. Residuary Powers (Article 248): Vests residuary subjects in Parliament, strengthening central authority.
4. Emergency Provisions (Articles 352, 356, 360): Enable temporary centralisation; Article 356 permits President’s Rule in States.
5. Fiscal Federalism: The Finance Commission (Article 280) recommends tax revenue distribution between the Union and States.
6. Judicial Oversight: The Supreme Court (e.g., S.R. Bommai case) has declared federalism part of the “Basic Structure,” meaning it cannot be destroyed by constitutional amendment.
7. Cooperative/Asymmetrical Federalism: Mechanisms include the Inter-State Council (Article 263) and special provisions for certain states (Schedules V and VI). 

While often called “quasi-federal” due to these centralizing features, the system enables states to function as independent constitutional entities in ordinary times

Why Is There a Need for a Structural Reset in India’s Federal Framework?

1. Excessive Centralisation: Union intervention has expanded beyond constitutional limits. Example: Increasing central laws on education policy despite education being in the Concurrent List.
2. Diminished State Autonomy: Legislative and administrative discretion of States has narrowed. Example: Uniform GST structure limits States’ independent taxation powers.
3. Governor’s Expanding Discretion: Delays in assent affect State legislative functioning. Example: Delay in assent to Bills passed by the Tamil Nadu Assembly led to litigation before the Supreme Court.
4. Overlapping Governance Roles: Union ministries operate in State-assigned sectors. Example: Central regulatory frameworks in health and agriculture influence areas primarily managed by States.
5. Weak Institutional Dialogue: Federal mechanisms function less as consultative forums. Example: Limited effective use of the Inter-State Council under Article 263 for resolving disputes.

Has Centralisation Distorted the Original Constitutional Balance?

1. Historical Design Bias: The Constitution adopted a federal structure with a strong Centre due to post-Partition insecurity and integration of 500+ princely States.
2. Legislative Expansion: Expansion of Union legislation in Concurrent List subjects has reduced State autonomy.
3. Subordinate Legislation: Union executive increasingly overrides State laws through procedural and regulatory mechanisms.
4. Conditional Fiscal Transfers: Centrally Sponsored Schemes impose rigid templates, limiting State flexibility.
5. Administrative Duplication: Expansion of Union ministries into domains traditionally managed by States creates functional overlap.

Outcome: Centralisation increases reach but reduces contextual responsiveness.

Does Judicial Doctrine Adequately Protect Federalism in Practice?

1. Basic Structure Protection: Federalism declared part of Basic Structure in S.R. Bommai (1994).
2. Plenary State Authority: States are not administrative appendages within their allotted spheres.
3. Doctrinal-Practical Gap: Despite judicial affirmation, legislative and fiscal trends favour uniform national solutions over contextual diversity.
4. Executive Overreach: Increasing preference for central regulation in health, education, and agriculture dilutes State discretion.

Outcome: Constitutional doctrine protects federalism normatively; implementation trends weaken it functionally.

Does Over-Centralisation Reduce Governance Effectiveness?

1. Administrative Overstretch: Concentration of responsibilities burdens Union institutions beyond efficient supervisory capacity.
2. Context Insensitivity: National policy frameworks fail to reflect linguistic, ecological, agricultural, and industrial diversity.
3. Innovation Suppression: Uniform schemes restrict experimentation at State level.
4. Evidence of Success:
   1. Tamil Nadu’s noon meal scheme originated as a State innovation before national expansion.
   2. Kerala’s public health and literacy models evolved from decentralised governance
   3. Maharashtra’s employment guarantee model preceded national adoption.

Outcome: Decentralisation enables pilot-based policy diffusion and scalable innovation.

Does Fiscal Federalism Adequately Empower States?

1. Vertical Imbalance: States undertake major expenditure responsibilities (health, education, policing) but possess limited taxation powers.
2. Centrally Sponsored Schemes: Rigid conditionalities reduce State fiscal discretion.
3. GST Structure: Shared taxation reduces independent fiscal manoeuvrability.
4. Expanding Mandates: Increasing regulatory complexity and expanding central schemes stretch State resources.

Outcome: Fiscal dependency weakens accountability and policy autonomy.

Does Capacity Argument Justify Intrusive Central Control?

The Capacity Argument refers to the claim that many States lack adequate administrative, financial, or technical capability to effectively implement complex policies. On this basis, the Union justifies greater central intervention, standardisation, and control in governance domains.

1. Capacity Paradox: Claims that States lack administrative capacity lead to central intervention.
2. Dependency Cycle: Persistent intervention prevents States from developing institutional competence.
3. Accountability Deficit: Decision-making shifts away from local voters toward distant central authorities.
4. Comparative Federalism Insight: Decentralised federations globally deliver sustained quality, equity, and competitiveness through shared responsibility.

Outcome: Capacity develops through responsibility, autonomy, and corrective feedback.

What Institutional Reforms Are Being Proposed for Recalibration?

1. High-Level Committee Review: Comprehensive review of Governors’ role, legislative competence, and fiscal relations.
2. Right-Sizing Objective: Aligns authority with responsibility without weakening national unity.
3. Structural Reforms: Calls for rebalancing rather than incremental adjustment.
4. Federal Accountability: Emphasises trust-based partnership between Union and States.

Outcome: Recalibration deepens unity by strengthening cooperative federalism.

Conclusion

India’s constitutional design created a Union with strength, not supremacy. Contemporary governance trends indicate a steady expansion of central authority across legislative, fiscal, and administrative domains. The Justice Kurian Joseph Committee’s intervention reframes the debate from political contestation to structural recalibration.

A durable federal balance requires aligning authority with responsibility, restoring meaningful consultation, and strengthening institutional trust. Recalibration of Centre–State relations would enhance accountability, improve policy responsiveness, and preserve the constitutional promise of cooperative federalism.

Mentor’s Comment

This article examines the debate on the ‘impartiality of a nominated Governor’, revived after the recent Supreme Court judgment on the powers of Governors. The discussion draws heavily from the Constituent Assembly debates, views of B.R. Ambedkar, and the political context surrounding gubernatorial discretion. For UPSC aspirants, this topic is crucial for understanding Centre-State relations, federal tensions, constitutional morality, and ongoing administrative bottlenecks.

Introduction

The Supreme Court’s recent judgment on the role of Governors, along with its advisory opinion on the 16th Presidential reference, has reopened a foundational debate: What was the intended role of a Governor in an independent India? The Constituent Assembly deliberated deeply on the Governor’s impartiality, limited discretion, and non-interfering nature. Contemporary frictions between Governors and elected State governments have made these debates sharply relevant again. The article traces the evolution, constitutional position, and recurring controversies around the Governor’s office.

Why in the News 

The Supreme Court’s latest judgment on gubernatorial powers has revived a long-standing constitutional controversy over whether Governors have exceeded their intended role. The ruling sharply contrasts past practice, where Governors often withheld assent or delayed Bills, exercising broad and ambiguous discretion. This is significant because Constituent Assembly debates categorically rejected any idea of a powerful, interfering Governor and saw him as a neutral constitutional head bound by ministerial advice. The issue has resurfaced as a major federal friction point, affecting State governance and raising concerns about constitutional morality.

What was the Constituent Assembly’s vision of a Governor?

1. Limited discretion: Members clarified that the Governor’s discretion should be minimal and specifically enumerated; not a general discretionary authority.
2. Non-interfering role: Dr. Ambedkar emphasised that the Governor must not act as an agent of the Centre nor interfere with the elected State government.
3. Neutral constitutional head: The Governor was designed to be above suspicion and must not be “remote-controlled,” especially in a parliamentary system.
4. No overriding authority: Ambedkar rejected giving Governors overriding powers (e.g., veto over Bills or control over ministries).

Why were doubts raised about the impartiality of a nominated Governor?

1. Remote-control concerns: Members felt a nominated Governor could be influenced by the central government, undermining State autonomy.
2. Fear of political bias: The Governor’s lack of electoral accountability created apprehensions regarding neutrality.
3. Past colonial experience: Residual memories of Governors under the Government of India Act, 1935, who wielded significant discretionary powers, fuelled suspicion.

How did the framers restrict discretionary powers?

1. Specific limitation: Discretion only for narrow, enumerated matters such as selecting a Chief Minister when no clear majority exists.
2. Bound by Cabinet advice: Governor must act on ministerial advice in all matters except those explicitly labelled as discretionary.
3. No independent executive authority: Ambedkar insisted the Governor is not a parallel power centre.
4. Rejection of 1935 model: The Assembly refused to revive the 1935 system that gave Governors sweeping independent powers.

Why is the Bill-assent controversy central to this debate?

1. Revival of 1935 practice: Members feared that powers like reserving Bills or withholding assent could allow Governors to obstruct State legislatures.
2. Ambedkar’s key statement: “If you give him this power, he becomes exactly that”, a reminder that excessive discretion recreates colonial-style interference.
3. Judicial scrutiny: Recent court rulings criticised Governors for delaying Bills, stating this undermines democratic functioning.
4. Legislative consequences: When Governors withhold or delay assent, elected governments face administrative paralysis.

What makes the present dispute constitutionally serious?

1. Misinterpretation risk: Courts observed that vague phrases like “as soon as possible” allow Governors to delay decisions indefinitely.
2. Threat to federal balance: Unchecked gubernatorial discretion shifts power from elected representatives to a nominated authority.
3. Growing political tensions: Several States report prolonged delays in Bill assent, appointments, and emergency decisions.
4. Return of the ‘interfering authority’: The trend contradicts the original constitutional vision and Ambedkar’s categorical warnings.

Conclusion

The ongoing friction between State governments and Governors signals a deeper constitutional challenge involving federalism, democratic accountability, and the limits of nominated authority. The Constituent Assembly clearly intended the Governor to be a neutral head bound by Cabinet advice, not an autonomous decision-maker. Reviving this original spirit is essential to restore the balance between the Centre and the States and uphold constitutional morality.