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Subject: Polity

  • Why is the Centre opposed to totalisers?

    Why in the News

    A three judge Bench of the Supreme Court headed by the Chief Justice of India has asked the Central government to examine introducing totaliser machines for counting votes recorded in Electronic Voting Machines (EVM), in order to protect the secrecy of booth-wise voting patterns and prevent electors at individual booths from being identified and victimised. The direction was given on September 1, 2026, on a public interest petition filed in 2014 by Yogesh Gupta and Imran Khan seeking that votes cast at the various polling stations in a constituency be mixed before counting. The Election Commission of India has supported the measure since 2008 and has recommended it to the Union government. The Centre has opposed it throughout, arguing at different points that booth-wise disclosure causes no intimidation and that a totaliser could leak data before counting begins. The tension is between the secrecy of the ballot at the level of a locality and the granular booth data that campaigns and the administration both now rely on.

    What is a totaliser?

    1. What it does: A totaliser allows the votes cast in about 14 polling booths to be counted together, against the present practice of tallying votes booth by booth.
    2. How it connects: It is an interface connected to the main control unit of a cluster of 14 EVMs.
    3. What it outputs: Pressing the result button gives the consolidated votes polled by each candidate across the 14 machines, without revealing the voting pattern of any individual polling area.
    4. Who built it: It was developed by Bharat Electronics Limited, Bengaluru and Electronics Corporation of India Limited, Hyderabad.

    Why was the petition filed?

    1. The stated purpose: The petitioners sought a direction to the poll panel to mix the votes cast at various polling stations in a constituency, on the ground that this was necessary to stop candidates intimidating voters in areas that had rebuffed them.
    2. The illustration offered: The petitioners cited alleged intimidation by a late former Deputy Chief Minister of Maharashtra in the Baramati constituency during the last general election, where voters were allegedly threatened that his party would detect voting patterns from the EVM readings and cut off their water supply.
    3. Booths map onto communities: Polling booths in India are marked geographically, so where social groups live in segregated clusters, which is the case across much of rural India and increasingly in urban slums, a booth result roughly identifies how a numerically large community voted.
    4. The risk has grown since 2014: Advanced geospatial tools now allow booth trends to be correlated with social settings and causal inferences to be drawn from that correlation, which goes beyond what the petitioners feared when they filed.

    What has been the Centre’s position?

    1. The 2017 argument, that there is no harm: The Centre told the apex court that identifying booth-wise voting patterns did not lead to voter intimidation and that there was no need to stop the disclosure of booth-wise results.
    2. The 2017 argument, that there is a benefit: It contended that knowledge of booth-wise vote shares allowed candidates to work harder in areas where support for them was low, producing better results for everyone involved.
    3. The 2018 argument, that the machine is the risk: The Additional Solicitor General told the Bench, then led by the Chief Justice of India, that installing a totaliser could lead to a data breach even before vote counting began.
    4. The ministerial decision on record: A Law Ministry affidavit told the Court that a group of ministers headed by the then Union Home Minister had decided that intimidation or victimisation of voters as apprehended may not occur on a larger scale in this era of media activism.

    What is the Election Commission’s stand?

    1. Consistent support since 2008: The poll body first suggested the measure to the United Progressive Alliance government in 2008 and has recommended the totaliser system to the Union government since.
    2. The 2018 submission: It told the Supreme Court that a time has come for introduction of the totaliser for counting of the votes.
    3. The position in the current hearings: Counsel for the Commission backed the goal of protecting voter anonymity, and that support has carried into the present round.
    4. The caveats it has entered: It flagged practical and legal difficulties in implementing the proposal, including how booth-wise verification would work and how the exercise interacts with the Voter Verifiable Paper Audit Trail (VVPAT), the printer attached to a voting unit that shows the elector a paper slip of the vote cast before it drops into a sealed box.

    What has the Court now directed?

    1. The direction to the Centre: The Court asked the Central government to state its position on introducing a totaliser system for counting votes recorded through EVMs.
    2. The specific questions: It sought to know whether there are any impediments to introducing such a mechanism and whether there would be any negative impact from it.
    3. The deadline on the data breach point: The Centre’s repetition of the data breach apprehension prompted the Court to give the Election Commission two weeks to respond to that fear.
    4. The parallel instruction: The Commission has also been asked to submit its proposal to the government, which moves the question from litigation into an executive decision.

    Challenges to introducing the totaliser

    1. Booth level data has administrative uses beyond campaigning: Turnout and result data at the polling station is what flags a station for scrutiny or a re-poll. Eg. An implausibly high turnout at a single station is the standard trigger for ordering a re-poll there.
      The Fix: Retain booth-wise data with the Election Commission for audit and re-poll decisions, and publish only the aggregated cluster result.
    2. A re-poll cannot be isolated once votes are mixed: If the machines of 14 booths have been aggregated, a re-poll ordered at one of them cannot be separated from the counted total. Eg. Re-polls after booth capturing or machine failure are ordered station by station, not cluster by cluster.
      The Fix: Run the totaliser only after every re-poll in the constituency is complete and the machines are back in the strongroom.
    3. Slip verification is anchored to the polling station: The mandatory VVPAT count is done for randomly selected polling stations and compared against that station’s electronic count, which presumes station-wise totals exist. Eg. The Supreme Court’s direction requires slip counting in five randomly selected polling stations in each assembly segment.
      The Fix: Complete the station-wise slip verification first and aggregate through the totaliser only after the match is recorded.
    4. Clustering does not conceal a pattern in a homogeneous area: Where one community occupies most of a 14 booth cluster, the aggregate reveals its voting pattern as clearly as a single booth would. Eg. Reserved constituencies with geographically concentrated settlements would gain little anonymity from aggregation.
      The Fix: Form clusters across socially mixed areas rather than across contiguous ones, so no single cluster maps onto a single community.
    5. The Commission cannot act alone: Counting procedure is governed by the Conduct of Elections Rules, 1961, and the mixing provision presently covers ballot papers rather than voting machines. Eg. Rule 59A permits mixing of ballot papers before counting in specified elections and does not extend to EVMs.
      The Fix: Amend Rule 59A to extend the existing mixing provision to electronic voting machines, which is the single step that converts the recommendation into a usable power.

    Conclusion

    The Election Commission has backed this measure across successive governments and it has still not been introduced, because the decision sits with the Centre and not with the poll body. The objection now on record has shifted from denying that booth-level victimisation happens to warning that the counting device itself is insecure, which is a question about design and custody rather than about whether ballot secrecy is worth extending to a locality. The Centre’s reply to the Court and the Commission’s fresh proposal to the government are the two documents that decide whether the proposal moves this time.

    Matching Previous Year Question

    “In the light of recent controversy regarding the use of Electronic Voting Machines (EVM), what are the challenges before the Election Commission of India to ensure the trustworthiness of elections in India?”

  • Voter lists shrink by 15.7% in 17 States and U.T.s after SIR

    Why in the News

    Draft electoral rolls published after the third phase of the Special Intensive Revision (SIR) show the electorate in 17 States and Union Territories falling 15.7 per cent, from 35,50,50,008 at the 2024 Lok Sabha elections to 29,93,00,115. Maharashtra recorded the largest drop in absolute numbers at 15,896,198 electors, or 17.08 per cent, and Delhi and Chandigarh the sharpest percentage falls at 35.89 per cent and 31.84 per cent. The revision rebuilds the roll rather than updating it, so an elector’s presence on the previous roll does not by itself carry them onto the new one. Of the 6.15 crore electors deleted in this phase, 1.11 crore are marked dead, and the remainder are recorded as absent, multiply enrolled or in an others category. The contest is over that remainder, since absence at the moment of verification is not the same thing as ineligibility.

    What happened to the rolls between the 2024 polls and the revision?

    1. The rolls first grew: Between the 2024 Lok Sabha elections and the cut-off date for the enumeration phase, these States and Union Territories added around 57.75 lakh electors, taking the cumulative total to 36,08,07,394.
    2. One State drove most of the addition: Maharashtra added 47.92 lakh electors, and ten other States including Haryana added about 9.83 lakh between them.
    3. Six States and Union Territories moved the other way: Delhi’s roll fell from 1,52,14,638 at the polls to 1,45,10,299 before the revision, a drop of more than 7 lakh.
    4. The other five declines: Uttarakhand fell by 4.7 lakh, Odisha by 3.17 lakh, Chandigarh by 1.44 lakh, Punjab by 1.1 lakh and Arunachal Pradesh by 10,937.

    What are the deletions made of?

    1. Death is the smaller share: Of the 6.15 crore electors deleted, 1.11 crore are marked dead, which is the only category that is verifiable against an independent record.
    2. Absence is the largest category: 4.52 crore electors are marked absent, meaning the enumerator did not find them at the registered address during the field round.
    3. Duplicate registration: 49.58 lakh are recorded as having multiple enrolments, which removes a name from one roll rather than removing the person from the electorate.
    4. The residual: Around 3 lakh fall into an others category that the draft does not break down further.

    Where does the exercise now stand?

    1. The current phase: The third phase covers 16 States and three Union Territories. Draft rolls have been published for 17 of them, with Nagaland due on September 20 and Tripura on October 21.
    2. Final rolls begin: The rollout of final lists starts with Mizoram, Sikkim and Manipur on September 6, and the numbers in the final lists can rise, since the Election Commission provides a window for claims and objections and for registration of new voters.
    3. Already completed: The revision is over in Bihar, West Bengal, Tamil Nadu, Kerala, Puducherry, Uttar Pradesh, Rajasthan, Madhya Pradesh, Gujarat, Chhattisgarh, Goa, the Andaman and Nicobar Islands and Lakshadweep.
    4. Assam is on a different track: A special revision was conducted there instead, because of legal questions connected to the National Register of Citizens (NRC), the Assam-specific register of citizens prepared under Supreme Court supervision.
    5. What remains: With the third phase, the exercise covers the entire country except Himachal Pradesh, Jammu and Kashmir and Ladakh, whose schedule is to be announced later.

    Challenges to the Special Intensive Revision

    1. The largest deletion category is the least verifiable: An elector recorded as absent may be a migrant worker away for the season rather than a person who has moved permanently. Eg. Out-migration from eastern Uttar Pradesh and Bihar peaks between sowing and harvest, which is when field verification is conducted.
      The Fix: Accept a claim filed remotely from a declared work address, with the home address retained, before a deletion on grounds of absence is confirmed.
    2. The remedy reaches the wrong address: The claims and objections window opens after publication and depends on the elector learning of the deletion, and notices are served at the registered address the elector was not found at. Eg. A household away for work misses both the enumeration visit and the notice that follows it.
      The Fix: Require the booth level officer to record a served notice and one repeat attempt before any absence-based deletion becomes final.
    3. The burden of proof inverts: In an intensive revision the existing roll stops being evidence of eligibility, so an elector already enrolled must establish the claim again. Eg. Electors absent from the previous intensive revision roll have had to produce documentary proof of eligibility rather than relying on their existing entry.
      The Fix: Treat the previous roll as presumptive evidence, and require the Electoral Registration Officer to record a specific ground before displacing that presumption.
    4. Field capacity is thin at the point where accuracy is decided: A single booth level officer covers a polling station of up to 1,500 electors within a fixed enumeration window. Eg. The verification and the draft publication in this phase ran across 19 States and Union Territories simultaneously.
      The Fix: Publish the per-officer elector load and the number of verification visits made, so the quality of the field round can be audited rather than assumed.

    Conclusion

    The draft numbers are not the final numbers. The claims and objections window decides whether an elector deleted in absence returns to the roll, and its use depends on people who are away learning that they were removed. A revision that removes duplicate entries and a revision that removes voters produce the same headline figure and are not the same event. The final lists are where the two become distinguishable.

    Back2Basics: Special Intensive Revision

    1. An intensive revision rebuilds the electoral roll from scratch, enumerating every elector afresh, rather than adding and deleting names at the margin as a summary revision does.
    2. It is conducted by the Election Commission of India under the Representation of the People Act, 1950 and the Registration of Electors Rules, 1960.
    3. The sequence is fixed: house-to-house enumeration, publication of a draft roll, a window for claims and objections, then publication of the final roll.
    4. The last countrywide intensive revision was carried out in 2002-03, and revisions since then have been summary revisions.

    Matching Previous Year Question

    “Is the right to vote a fundamental right? Discuss the position of the Election Commission of India while undertaking the revision of electoral rolls. Can it also examine the question of citizenship of voters?”

  • CJP cases scrapped: Supreme Court’s much-debated powers under Article 142

    Why in the News

    The Supreme Court has used Article 142 of the Constitution to quash first information reports filed across several States against participants in the nationwide examination protests led by the Cockroach Janta Party (CJP). The order gives legal force to an assurance the Union government had already given to CJP members. A negotiated settlement between the Centre and a protest group therefore takes effect as a judicial decree. Article 142 allows the Court to pass any decree or order necessary for doing “complete justice” in a matter pending before it, and it neither defines that phrase nor states when the power may be used. The Court has itself held that this power may fill a gap in a statute but may not override a statutory scheme. What is contested is whether quashing thousands of pending cases in a single order, without examining any of them on its own facts, fills such a gap or replaces one.

    What is Article 142?

    1. The text of the power: Article 142 lets the Supreme Court pass such decree or order as is necessary for doing complete justice in any cause or matter pending before it.
    2. What the provision leaves open: It does not define “complete justice” and it does not specify the circumstances in which the power may be used.
    3. Its statutory ancestor: The provision traces to Section 210 of the Government of India Act, 1935, and behind that to the colonial practice of deciding disputes on “justice, equity and good conscience” where the written law was silent.

    How did a power this wide enter the Constitution without debate?

    1. Adopted as Draft Article 118: The provision appeared in the Draft Constitution as Article 118 and was adopted by the Constituent Assembly on 27 May 1949 without a debate.
    2. Two amendments were dropped: Two amendments to it were moved and then withdrawn.
    3. The nearest the Assembly came to discussing it: During an earlier debate on a related Article granting the court special leave to hear appeals, the member Krishna Chandra Sharma compared the proposed powers to the Privy Council’s own power to step in wherever justice demanded, appeal or no appeal.
    4. The scope was left to the Court: The content of the Court’s widest power was worked out case by case over the following seven decades rather than settled at the drafting stage.

    How has the Court used this power?

    1. The Bhopal gas tragedy settlement: Article 142 was used to secure a payout of 470 million dollars from Union Carbide and to quash the criminal cases against the company.
    2. The Ayodhya title dispute: The power was used to settle the dispute on a “preponderance of probability” and to direct that five acres of land be given to the Muslim side.
    3. A convict’s release: The Court ordered the release of A G Perarivalan, a convict in the Rajiv Gandhi assassination case.
    4. Routine civil use: The provision is also used to grant divorce where a marriage has irretrievably broken down, and in public interest litigation.
    5. The measured scale of its use: An empirical study by researchers at the Indian Institute of Management, Ahmedabad examined every case between 1950 and 2023 citing “Article 142” or “complete justice”, and found 1,579 references and 791 direct invocations, mostly in civil matters.

    Has the Court fenced its own power?

    1. Consistency with law and rights: In Prem Chand Garg versus State of Uttar Pradesh (1962) the Court held that orders under Article 142 must still be consistent with fundamental rights and with the law.
    2. Supplement, not supplant: In Supreme Court Bar Association versus Union of India (1998) the Court held that Article 142 can supplement a statute by filling a gap the law leaves open. The same ruling held that it cannot supplant a statute or override an existing statutory scheme.
    3. The limits are not self enforcing: The Court has often disregarded its own caution, and no institution outside the Court can hold it to these two rulings.
    4. Discretion multiplies across benches: The effect of an undefined discretion is magnified in a court of 38 judges sitting mostly in benches of two.

    How does the CJP order test that limit?

    1. The ordinary statutory route: A first information report is examined on its own facts before being quashed under Section 528 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023, with the court asking whether an offence is made out or whether the case is plainly malicious.
    2. What the order did instead: Thousands of first information reports across several States were clubbed together and quashed without that scrutiny, as part of a negotiated settlement.
    3. The statutory scheme is displaced, not supplemented: The order substitutes the Court’s view of how the law ought to operate for the procedure the statute lays down for quashing.
    4. The Court also decides who is excluded: The same discretion under Article 142 determines which protesters are left out of the relief.
    5. The scholarly objection: Legal scholar Gautam Bhatia argues that criminal law provisions cannot be overridden through a blanket judicial decree.

    Why had Article 142 already drawn criticism?

    1. The Tamil Nadu Bills order: The Court used the same provision last year to deem long withheld Bills of the Tamil Nadu legislature as assented to.
    2. The response from the Vice President: The Vice President described that use of the power as a “nuclear missile” against democratic institutions.
    3. A former law officer’s warning: A former Attorney General of India wrote in 2017 that the provision had done “tremendous good” for deprived sections of society, and that it was time to build in checks and balances.
    4. A proposal to restrict who may invoke it: After the Sabarimala judgment the same former Attorney General described Article 142 as a “Kamdhenu from which unlimited powers flowed”, and proposed that only Constitution Benches of five judges be allowed to invoke it, so that its use does not turn on the reading of a single smaller Bench.

    Challenges to Article 142

    1. No stated standard for “complete justice”: The Constitution attaches no test to the power, so its width is settled afresh in each case by the Bench exercising it. Eg. In Delhi Development Authority versus Skipper Construction Company (1996) the power was used to reach the personal assets of persons who were not parties to the proceeding before the Court.
      The Fix: Require every order made under the provision to record on the face of the order the specific statutory gap it is filling and the limits of the relief granted.
    2. Bench strength does not scale with the consequence: No minimum Bench is prescribed, so an order altering an outcome for an entire class can issue from a small Bench. Eg. A three judge Bench in 2024 set aside the declared result of the Chandigarh mayoral election and declared the defeated candidate elected.
      The Fix: Maintain a published, reasoned compilation of orders made under the provision, so a body of standards accumulates instead of scattered discretion.
    3. The relief creates no right for the next litigant: An order for complete justice is granted on the facts of one case, so a similarly placed person cannot claim the same relief from a lower court. Eg. Divorce on the ground of irretrievable breakdown, allowed in Shilpa Sailesh versus Varun Sreenivasan (2023), is available only from the Supreme Court, since that ground does not exist in the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955.
      The Fix: Where the power is repeatedly used to fill the same statutory gap, refer that gap to the Union government with a reasoned recommendation to amend the statute.
    4. Only the same court can correct such an order: An order issues from the highest court, so the sole remedy is a review or a curative petition before that court. Eg. The curative petition route created in Rupa Ashok Hurra versus Ashok Hurra (2002) is itself a judge made remedy and succeeds in very few cases.
      The Fix: List every order that departs from a statutory scheme for a compliance hearing before the same Bench, so an order that misfires is corrected on the record.

    Conclusion

    The Court’s limits on its own widest power are self imposed, and nothing outside the Court enforces them. The unresolved question is whether a power designed to fill silences in the law may be used to set aside a procedure the law expressly provides, on terms agreed between a litigant and the government. What to watch is whether the Court itself frames a standard for when the power may be exercised, because no other institution can.

    Back2Basics: Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023

    1. What it is: The statute governing criminal procedure in India, covering investigation, arrest, trial and the powers of criminal courts.
    2. What it replaced: It came into force on 1 July 2024 in place of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973.
    3. Its companion statutes: It was enacted alongside the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 and the Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023.
    4. The quashing power it carries: Section 528 preserves the inherent powers of a High Court, which include quashing proceedings to prevent abuse of the process of a court.

    [2019, GS2, 10 marks] Do you think that constitution of India does not accept principle of strict separation of powers rather it is based on the principle of ‘checks and balance’? Explain.”

  • Courtroom dramas, clipped and shared

    Why in the News

    The Supreme Court has barred the use and circulation of audio and video clips of judicial proceedings on social media and other digital platforms without prior permission from court registrars.

    What does the interim order leave unsettled?

    1. The stated reason: A Bench led by the Chief Justice of India said “isolated excerpts” risked “trivialising” the administration of justice.
    2. The carve out: The Court later clarified that “recognised news outlets” may continue reporting on proceedings, but may not “utilise” audio or video clips.
    3. The undefined term: The Court did not define “recognised news outlets”, which leaves independent journalists unable to tell whether they are covered.
    4. Who has been added to the case: High Courts and social media intermediaries, including Meta, LinkedIn and X Corp, have been brought into the proceedings while the Court considers a broader protocol.

    How was live streaming established as a right?

    1. The barrier that prompted the petition: Interns were allowed inside Supreme Court courtrooms only on certain days to prevent overcrowding, and litigants travelling from remote parts of the country often could not enter the courtroom hearing their own case.
    2. The ruling: In September 2018 the petition in Swapnil Tripathi v. Supreme Court of India culminated in a ruling recognising live streaming as part of the right to access justice under Article 21 of the Constitution.
    3. The reasoning: The public’s right to know how justice is administered is integral to a functioning democracy, on the principle that sunlight is the best disinfectant.
    4. The direction to High Courts: The Court urged High Courts to introduce live streaming gradually while framing rules to govern its use.
    5. The safeguards built in from the start: Matrimonial cases, sexual assault cases and proceedings involving children and juveniles were excluded from live streaming.

    How far has live streaming actually spread?

    1. The Supreme Court’s start: The Court began live streaming proceedings before its Constitution Benches in 2022. These Benches comprise five or more judges deciding substantial questions concerning the interpretation of the Constitution.
    2. The limit on coverage: The Court has 17 functioning courtrooms and largely streams only Constitution Bench hearings, which sit intermittently.
    3. The audience: The Court’s official YouTube channel has amassed over 2.67 lakh subscribers.
    4. A rare exception: A video of the suo motu hearing in the R.G. Kar rape and murder case, uploaded in September 2024, has been viewed nearly 48,000 times, and is one of the few instances of a rape case streamed on the channel.
    5. The High Courts: Live streaming was operational in 11 High Courts as of March 2026, per a statement to the Lok Sabha. Gujarat, Karnataka and Calcutta stream daily from a majority of their courtrooms.
    6. The first mover: The Gujarat High Court became the first to formally go live on YouTube in July 2021, and its channel now has nearly 1.97 lakh subscribers.

    Where does unauthorised courtroom footage actually come from?

    1. Virtual hearing access: The Supreme Court and the High Courts allow lawyers and litigants to join hearings virtually through platforms such as Cisco Webex, with links often published in the daily cause lists.
    2. How the links spread: Links are shared indiscriminately beyond litigants and lawyers, so anyone logged in can record the proceeding.
    3. Why the exclusion list does not hold: A High Court can pause streaming for a sensitive case while the virtual hearing continues, so footage from sexual offence, matrimonial and child custody matters has reached social media.
    4. The rule that already covers this: The Supreme Court e-Committee’s Model Rules of 2021 prohibit unauthorised dissemination of courtroom footage and its use for commercial, promotional or advertising purposes.

    Why is a permission regime contested?

    1. The shift it marks: Requiring an ordinary citizen to seek a registrar’s permission to share a proceeding that is already being live streamed converts open access into a permission regime.
    2. The procedural gap: There is no stated method for seeking permission, no ground on which it is to be granted or refused, and no recourse where it is refused.
    3. Who the exemption favours: An exemption confined to “recognised news outlets” advantages established media organisations over citizen journalists and smaller newsrooms.
    4. The inconsistency: A written account of a courtroom exchange remains permitted while a video clip faithfully reproducing the same exchange does not.
    5. The alternative safeguard proposed: Expanding live streaming and archiving on authorised platforms would let a complete official record expose a manipulated clip, which a circulation ban does not.
    6. Where a line is accepted: Artificially generated or doctored video should be prohibited, and faithful reporting permitted whatever the medium.

    What does the case for reporting oral remarks rest on?

    1. What an oral remark is: Judges use oral observations to test arguments, and a prima facie view expressed at the outset can change as arguments unfold. Such remarks do not necessarily reflect the reasoning recorded in the final order.
    2. Why they are still reported: Oral observations offer insight into judicial thinking and hold a mirror to the institution, which is the ground on which they are treated as reportable despite carrying no binding value.
    3. The precedent: Chief Election Commissioner vs M.R. Vijayabhaskar (2021) protected the reporting of oral remarks. The Supreme Court there stressed the role of public scrutiny in ensuring institutional accountability.
    4. The cost feared on the Bench: The prospect of being quoted out of context could make judges more circumspect and less willing to engage freely with counsel, and the litigant bears the consequence.
    5. The risk predates the medium: Oral remarks were misquoted in print long before social media, which locates the problem in reporting quality rather than in the format.
    6. What that implies for reporting: Court proceedings are technical, so an accurate account depends on journalists trained to follow what is happening.

    What has clipping already exposed about judicial conduct?

    1. The Karnataka episode: In September 2024 videos of a Karnataka High Court judge circulated online. He was seen referring to a Muslim dominated locality in west Bengaluru as “Pakistan” in one video, and making a sexist remark to a woman lawyer in another.
    2. The response to it: A Supreme Court Bench took suo motu cognisance within days and cautioned judges against “casual observations” reflecting communal bias or misogyny. The judge apologised and the proceedings were closed.
    3. A more recent instance: A reported reference to “cockroaches” by the Chief Justice of India during a hearing on fake law degrees drew widespread criticism and gave rise to the Cockroach Janta Party, which went on to lead protests against examination paper leaks. The remark was later said to have been misquoted.
    4. What draws an audience: Matrimonial and custody cases attract the most attention, with controversial matters drawing over one lakh views.
    5. The effect on the Bar: Lawyers use a judge’s remark to build a social media following, and a client who can watch the hearing is less willing to accept an unnecessary adjournment.

    How have the Bar and legal media responded?

    1. The Bar Council circular: In July 2026 the Bar Council of India prohibited reels and promotional content from court premises.
    2. The enforcement machinery it created: State Bar Councils were directed to designate social media ethics nodal officers to handle complaints. Lawyers were directed to submit a signed undertaking on professional social media conduct at the time of enrolment.
    3. The change in legal media: A legal news portal has largely shifted to explanatory videos without courtroom footage since the interim order, having earlier limited its edits to trimming pauses and removing litigants’ personal details.
    4. The editorial line already being drawn: Heated exchanges between the Bench and the Bar were withheld where, viewed in isolation, they could misrepresent what actually happened in court.

    What should a permanent protocol take into account?

    1. How news is consumed: People aged 18 to 24 citing social media as their main source of news rose from 21 per cent in 2015 to 39 per cent in 2025, overtaking news websites and apps, per a March 2026 Reuters Institute report.
    2. The nature of that consumption: Young audiences are increasingly “social first”, with much of their news reaching them incidentally rather than through a deliberate search.
    3. What that means for a video bar: Permitting an oral exchange to be reported in print while restricting its circulation as video sits at odds with how that audience actually receives news.
    4. The process objection: An institutional reform of this kind should involve all High Courts and other stakeholders rather than proceed as a unilateral decision.

    Challenges to regulating the circulation of courtroom footage

    1. A registrar is not a speech regulator: Prior permission to publish places a restriction on speech in the hands of an administrative officer, while Article 19(2) permits restriction only on stated grounds and by a law that is clear. Eg. In Shreya Singhal v. Union of India (2015) the Supreme Court struck down Section 66A of the Information Technology Act, 2000 for vagueness about what speech it punished.
      The Fix: Specify the classes of proceeding from which clips may not be circulated at all, so the restriction operates by defined category rather than by case by case permission.
    2. Enforcement begins only after publication: A clip that has circulated cannot be recalled, and removal depends on intermediaries acting on a notice. Eg. Blocking and takedown under Section 69A of the Information Technology Act, 2000 and the Information Technology Rules, 2021 operate after the content is already public.
      The Fix: Route the registry’s removal requests through the intermediary grievance officer channel with a fixed response time, and record each outcome on the case file.
    3. There is no authoritative record to check a disputed clip against: Most hearings are neither streamed nor archived, so a viewer cannot compare an excerpt with the full proceeding it came from. Eg. Transcripts of Supreme Court hearings were introduced only as a pilot for Constitution Bench matters in 2023.
      The Fix: Publish an official transcript and full recording for every streamed hearing, and treat that record as the reference against which a disputed clip is judged.
    4. Contempt is an uncertain remedy: Action against a distorted clip would rest on criminal contempt, which is discretionary and slow, and using it against reportage carries its own cost to free speech. Eg. The Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 makes fair and accurate reporting of proceedings a defence, so a distortion case turns entirely on interpretation.
      The Fix: Handle distortion through a fast correction and right of reply mechanism at the registry, and reserve contempt for deliberate fabrication.
    5. An exclusion list does not protect identity: A case outside the excluded categories can still identify a vulnerable party, since names, addresses and medical details are read out in open court. Eg. Bail and quashing matters routinely disclose a complainant’s identity in offences whose reporting is otherwise restricted by law.
      The Fix: Mask party identifiers in the streamed audio and in the published record, as judgments in sexual offence cases already do.

    Conclusion

    The order changes the default rather than the rules on any single case. The Court has not yet drawn the line between publishers who may use footage and those who may not, and the reach of the restriction turns entirely on where that line falls. The case returns to the Bench on 18 September, with the High Courts and the platforms now on record. The test of whatever protocol emerges is whether it separates a distorted clip from a faithful one, or merely separates one publisher from another.

    Back2Basics: The Supreme Court e-Committee

    1. What it is: A body of the Supreme Court that oversees the computerisation of the Indian judiciary.
    2. When it was set up: It was constituted in 2004 to advise on a national policy for information and communication technology in the courts.
    3. What it runs: It steers the eCourts Mission Mode Project, covering case information systems, electronic filing and virtual hearing infrastructure across district courts and High Courts.
    4. What it issues: It frames model rules on court technology for adoption by individual High Courts, which are free to modify them.

    [2014, GS2, 12 marks] What do you understand by the concept “freedom of speech and expression”? Does it cover hate speech also? Why do the films in India stand on a slightly different plane from other forms of expression? Discuss.

  • SC pushes for raising retirement age in district judiciary as backlog tops 5 cr

    SC pushes for raising retirement age in district judiciary as backlog tops 5 cr

    Why in the News

    The Supreme Court has directed States to raise the retirement age of judicial officers in the district judiciary from 60 to 62 years. A three judge Bench headed by the Chief Justice of India passed the order on 1 September, and the text was published on Friday. The Court recorded that 5.18 crore cases lie pending in district courts across the country. It described stopping the attrition of experienced judicial talent as the “crying need of the hour”, warning that access to justice would otherwise remain “a mere chimera” because of unfilled posts. Only seven States have agreed so far. The rest have resisted on the ground of financial burden, which the Court has held to be arithmetically misconceived.

    What has the Court directed, and to whom?

    1. The seven States that agreed: Chhattisgarh, Karnataka, Madhya Pradesh, Maharashtra, Sikkim, Tamil Nadu and West Bengal have agreed to enhance the retirement age of their judicial officers.
    2. The deadline for them: These State governments have been directed to amend their service rules within two months.
    3. The condition attached: The High Court concerned will enhance superannuation to 62 years for an officer on attaining 60, subject to an assessment of that officer’s suitability.
    4. The States and Union Territories yet to agree: Andhra Pradesh, Arunachal Pradesh, Assam, Bihar, Goa, Gujarat, Haryana, Himachal Pradesh, Jharkhand, Keralam, Manipur, Meghalaya, Mizoram, Nagaland, Odisha, Punjab, Rajasthan, Telangana, Tripura, Uttarakhand, Uttar Pradesh, the National Capital Territory of Delhi, Jammu and Kashmir and Puducherry have responded with a direct refusal or have taken no position at all.
    5. The deadline for them: They have been directed to take a decision on enhancement to 62 years within two weeks.

    Why does the Court treat attrition rather than recruitment as the binding constraint?

    1. Recruitment has not filled the cadre: Most recruitment drives undertaken in the various States have not produced optimum recruitment or filled the sanctioned cadre strength.
    2. The gap is universal: A yawning gap between sanctioned strength and working strength persists across the board.
    3. Recruitment is slow by design: Selecting independent and competent judicial officers is an arduous task, so a post is not refilled at the speed at which it falls vacant.
    4. What that leaves as the available lever: Retaining an officer already in service is the only step that adds working strength without waiting for a recruitment cycle.

    Why does the Court reject the financial burden objection?

    1. What the States fear: States cite the cost of paying the maximum salary in the pay scale for a further two or five years, and a higher outlay on retiral benefits.
    2. The parity fear: States also apprehend that employees in other State services would demand the same extension for themselves.
    3. Why the Court calls that misconceived: Judicial officers render a specialised service, so an extension confined to them does not found a claim by other cadres.
    4. The 1992 precedent quoted: The alleged burden on the State exchequer is negligible against the enormous advantage the administration of justice and society at large derive from a higher retirement age.
    5. The double spend: A State that retains retirement at 60 pays post retiral dues to the officer who has left and salary to the officer newly appointed, in the same period.
    6. What continuation does to that cost: Allowing an experienced officer to serve to 62 postpones the post retiral outlay rather than adding to it.

    What safeguard have the High Courts proposed?

    1. Why most High Courts agreed: Most State High Courts consented to the enhancement because they are face to face with the crisis in the dispensation of justice.
    2. The rider: Some High Courts, including Madras, have recommended a thorough assessment of judicial work as a condition precedent to continuation in service.
    3. What the rider is for: Only competent officers of proven integrity would be permitted to continue in the cadre.
    4. The Court’s view of it: The suggestion preserves experienced officers while removing what the Court called the “clog of deadwood” that blocks the entrance of young blood into the system.

    Challenges to raising the retirement age in the district judiciary

    1. The sanctioned strength is itself inadequate: Extending tenure fills posts within an existing cadre, and the cadre was fixed against a judge to population ratio far below what has been recommended for India. Eg. The Law Commission’s 120th report of 1987 recommended 50 judges per million population, against a sanctioned figure that has stayed close to 21.
      The Fix: Revise sanctioned cadre strength against a stated case load norm, and attach a dedicated State budget line to the additional posts.
    2. A suitability assessment can become an informal removal power: Continuation to 62 will turn on a High Court’s assessment, which inserts a discretionary stage into a service that otherwise holds tenure until superannuation. Eg. Compulsory retirement of judicial officers on the administrative side has repeatedly been challenged before the Supreme Court.
      The Fix: Publish the assessment criteria in advance and require a written reasoned order with an internal review, so a refusal to extend can be tested.
    3. Court infrastructure does not expand with tenure: A retained officer needs a courtroom, support staff and record space, and district court infrastructure is funded through a centrally sponsored scheme that depends on State matching contributions. Eg. The Centrally Sponsored Scheme for Development of Infrastructure Facilities for the Judiciary has run since 1993-94 with persistent shortfalls in court halls and residential units.
      The Fix: Link the release of infrastructure funds to the number of judicial officers actually working in a district rather than to sanctioned posts.
    4. The promotion chain below is frozen: Officers waiting for elevation to the District Judge cadre and for High Court appointment from the service quota face a two year delay in every vacancy. Eg. Appointments to High Courts from the district judiciary already move slowly through the collegium process.
      The Fix: Expand the number of posts in the higher judicial service in step with the extension, so the vacancy chain continues to move.
    5. Pendency has drivers that bench strength does not reach: Adjournments, failure of service of summons and the volume of government litigation extend case life independently of how many judges sit. Eg. Government departments and their agencies remain the largest single class of litigant before Indian courts.
      The Fix: Enforce the three adjournment limit already written into Order XVII of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, and screen government appeals before they are filed.

    Conclusion

    The Court has converted a suggestion into a directed timeline, and the decision now sits with State governments rather than with the judiciary. Its reasoning treats the age of superannuation as the one lever that can be pulled without waiting for a recruitment cycle to conclude. The case is listed again on 1 October, by which time the States that have not responded are required to have taken a position.

    Back2Basics: The District Judiciary under the Constitution

    1. Article 233: The Governor appoints district judges in consultation with the High Court exercising jurisdiction in that State.
    2. Article 234: Persons other than district judges are appointed to the State judicial service by the Governor, under rules made after consulting the State Public Service Commission and the High Court.
    3. Article 235: Control over district courts and subordinate courts, including posting, promotion and leave of judicial officers, vests in the High Court.
    4. Why a State government must act: Conditions of service, including the age of superannuation, are fixed by rules the State government frames, so a High Court’s consent by itself does not change a retirement age.

    [2017, GS2, 10 marks] Critically examine the Supreme Court’s judgement on ‘National Judicial Appointments Commission Act, 2014’ with reference to appointment of judges of higher judiciary in India.

  • Presumed guilty, SIR’s spreading stain

    Why in the News

    An investigation into four booths in Godda, Jharkhand has documented Bharatiya Janata Party workers filing Form 7 objections in bulk, seeking deletion of names from the draft electoral rolls. Many of the voters marked for deletion had already submitted the required documents. Others had lived in the same house for generations or were mapped onto the 2003 rolls. The booths sit inside the Special Intensive Revision (SIR) of electoral rolls, an exercise that has produced 13 crore deletions nationwide. An inquiry has been ordered into the Godda booths. The contest is over who must prove what: roll maintenance is a routine statutory duty, and a revision that asks a voter to establish belonging converts it into a test of citizenship.

    What is the Special Intensive Revision of electoral rolls?

    1. A full re-verification, not a routine update: The Election Commission of India (ECI) requires an existing voter to submit fresh documentary proof of eligibility, in place of the ordinary practice of adding and deleting names on application.
    2. Form 7 is the deletion instrument: Under the Registration of Electors Rules, 1960, Form 7 allows an objection to a proposed inclusion, an objection to an existing name, or a request for deletion.
    3. An earlier intensive roll is the baseline: A voter traceable to the 2003 rolls is treated as verified, and every other voter must produce documents afresh.

    What did the Godda booths reveal about how deletions are sought?

    1. Bulk objections came from workers of one party: Form 7s were submitted in lots at a minimum of four booths, producing a standoff between election officials and Bharatiya Janata Party workers.
    2. Compliance did not protect a voter: Names of people who had filed the required documents, or who were mapped onto the earlier intensive roll, still appeared on the objection lists.
    3. The pattern points at a specific set of voters: Objections filed in bulk raise the concern of deletion aimed at minority voters rather than at genuine duplication or migration.
    4. An inquiry is the response so far: Officials ordered an inquiry after the report, and no change has been made to how third party objections are received.

    How does the revision shift the burden of proof onto the voter?

    1. The voter answers an accusation she was never served: The exercise asks her to establish belonging, in place of requiring the objector to establish ineligibility.
    2. The documents demanded are hard to access: Proof of the kind sought is least available to the poorest and the least documented households.
    3. The deadlines are unrealistic: The window to respond is shorter than the time it takes to obtain a record from a revenue or municipal office.
    4. The process itself is the penalty: A voter finally retained on the roll has still spent days, travel and money defending a name she already held.

    Where does the Supreme Court’s role in the exercise now stand?

    1. It intervened in Bihar: The Court directed the Commission to accept Aadhaar as acceptable proof. It also nudged the Commission toward recording reasons for a deletion.
    2. It stepped back in West Bengal: The Court gave the Commission the benefit of every doubt and did not press the questions the exercise had raised.
    3. The added layers do not close the process: Micro-observers, judicial officers, a bulky under adjudication list and 19 appellate tribunals were set up too late and carry no deadline, so the appellate process runs on after polling ends.
    4. Exclusion carries no defined consequence: A deleted voter is told nothing about what follows, whether detention, deportation, denial of benefits, prolonged litigation or reapplication.

    What does criticism from within the electoral establishment add?

    1. Legality is being separated from fairness: A former Election Commissioner described the revision as legal but not fair, and located justice in the spirit of the law rather than its letter.
    2. The critique names the judiciary alongside the Commission: Statutory institutions and constitutional bodies were described as acting on a might is right basis, with the judiciary validating the result.
    3. Participation is the cost being incurred: About 33 percent of the electorate already does not vote, and anxiety over the roll adds a fresh reason to disengage.

    Challenges to the Special Intensive Revision

    1. No threshold governs a third party objection: The Rules fix no limit on how many Form 7 objections one person may file and no standard of scrutiny before a name is acted on. Eg. Bihar’s revision produced a draft roll from which about 65 lakh names were dropped in a single cycle.
      The Fix: Cap objections per objector per booth and require a recorded hearing before any deletion made on a third party objection.
    2. Documentary proof excludes the least documented: A verification standard built on legacy papers falls hardest on people who never received them. Eg. The National Register of Citizens exercise in Assam left about 19 lakh people off the final list in 2019, largely on documentary grounds.
      The Fix: Treat a name on the immediately preceding final roll as presumptive proof, so the objector carries the burden of displacing it.
    3. The statutory appeal has no disposal clock: Section 24 of the Representation of the People Act, 1950 provides an appeal to the District Magistrate and then to the Chief Electoral Officer, without a fixed period for decision. Eg. The Bengal appellate tribunals will decide claims after the votes have been counted.
      The Fix: Fix a statutory disposal period ending before the last date for nominations, with the name restored by default if it lapses.
    4. Migrant workers are structurally exposed: A voter absent from the constituency during verification cannot answer an objection filed against her. Eg. Census 2011 recorded about 45 crore internal migrants in India.
      The Fix: Allow verification through a designated relative or a digital filing that returns a dated acknowledgement.
    5. Deletions are published as counts, not as reasons: The Commission reports how many names were removed and not the category of ground on which each was removed. Eg. A household learns of a deletion from the published roll rather than from a served notice.
      The Fix: Publish booth level deletion grounds in a machine readable form, so a pattern is visible before an election rather than after it.

    Conclusion

    An electoral roll needs continuous cleaning and updating, and that is not in dispute. The dispute is over who carries the burden of proof, and over what a voter is owed when she cannot discharge it. The tests to watch are two: whether the Commission is required to record a reason for every deletion, and whether an excluded voter receives a final decision before polling rather than after it.

    Back2Basics

    1. The Representation of the People Act, 1950 provides for the allocation of seats in Parliament and the State legislatures, the delimitation of constituencies, and the qualifications of voters.
    2. It is the statute under which electoral rolls are prepared and revised, with the machinery of electoral registration officers and booth level machinery drawn from it.
    3. Section 21 empowers the Election Commission to direct a special revision of an electoral roll for any constituency, for reasons to be recorded.
    4. Section 24 provides the appeal against an inclusion or a deletion, first to the District Magistrate and then to the Chief Electoral Officer.

    [2018, GS2, 10 marks] In the light of recent controversy regarding the use of Electronic Voting Machines (EVM), what are the challenges before the Election Commission of India to ensure the trustworthiness of elections in India?

  • All Ladakh districts to have autonomous hill development councils

    Why in the News

    Ladakh’s Lieutenant Governor has approved the notification creating Ladakh Autonomous Hill Development Councils (LAHDCs) for each district of the Union Territory. Elected hill councils existed only in Leh and Kargil, and the notification extends the framework to the five districts notified in April. The councils are the only elected tier of self government in Ladakh, which has had no legislature since it was constituted as a Union Territory without one. The Leh Apex Body (LAB) and the Kargil Democratic Alliance (KDA) are in talks with the Ministry of Home Affairs (MHA) for something the notification does not provide: a legislature, and protection for land and environment under the Sixth Schedule of the Constitution.

    What is a Ladakh Autonomous Hill Development Council?

    1. It is a statutory district level body: The councils were created under the Ladakh Autonomous Hill Development Councils Act, first in 1995 and then in the 1997 Act that governs them.
    2. It is directly elected: The Act provides for 26 directly elected councillors in each council, who then elect a chief executive councillor from among themselves.
    3. Its functions are developmental and land related: Powers concerning allotment, use and occupation of land vested in the council by the government, formulation of the district’s development programmes, special measures for employment generation, public health and sanitation, and local road transport sit with it.
    4. Elections require a separate notification: Polls to the newly constituted councils will be held after a formal notification is issued under Section 8 of the 1997 Act.

    What has the notification changed?

    1. All seven districts get a council: Leh, Kargil, Sham, Nubra, Changthang, Zanskar and Drass will each have a hill council.
    2. Elected local government reaches beyond two districts: The framework was earlier confined to Leh and Kargil, the two long standing district headquarters and the most densely populated areas of the Union Territory.
    3. It completes a step begun in April: The Lieutenant Governor notified the creation of the new districts in April, and the councils follow for each of them.
    4. The stated purpose is district level planning: Seven councils are expected to decentralise governance and let local priorities enter district level planning and development directly.

    Why does the expansion not settle the Ladakh demand?

    1. The demand is constitutional, not administrative: The LAB and the KDA are seeking a legislature for Ladakh and Sixth Schedule protection for land and environment, neither of which a hill council can supply.
    2. Talks continue on a separate track: The MHA has fixed a meeting of its sub committee for 9 September, the previous meeting having been held on 22 May.
    3. One existing council is running without a mandate: The term of the Leh council ended in October 2025 and fresh elections have not been announced since, which is without precedent for that body. The Kargil council last went to the polls in October 2023.
    4. More bodies do not equal more powers: Extending a council with land allotment and development functions widens the number of devolved units, and leaves untouched the legislative and protective powers the two bodies are asking for.

    Challenges to the Ladakh Autonomous Hill Development Councils

    1. The councils hold no legislative power: They plan and execute within powers delegated by the administration, and cannot legislate on land, forest or inheritance the way an autonomous district council under the Sixth Schedule can. Eg. The Bodoland Territorial Council in Assam legislates on subjects transferred to it, which no Ladakh hill council can do.
      The Fix: Specify the subjects transferred to each council in a schedule to the Act, so its jurisdiction does not depend on an executive order.
    2. Finances flow through the Union Territory administration: A council’s plan depends on funds released by an administration it does not elect, so its priorities can be reordered upstream. Eg. Ladakh has no legislature to vote its budget, so the entire allocation is decided through the Union Territory’s administrative route.
      The Fix: Fix a formula based untied share of the Union Territory’s budget for each council, released on a published calendar.
    3. Elections can lapse without consequence: Nothing forces a poll when a council’s term ends, so an elected body can be replaced by administrative control by default. Eg. The Leh council has been without an elected body since its term ended in October 2025.
      The Fix: Make the election notification under Section 8 mandatory within a fixed period before the term expires, enforceable by the courts.
    4. The new districts are thinly populated and lightly staffed: Sham, Nubra, Changthang, Zanskar and Drass have small populations spread over long distances, so each new council needs an administrative apparatus that does not yet exist. Eg. Zanskar remains cut off by road for several months each winter, which limits both administration and service delivery.
      The Fix: Sanction a standard district cadre and a linked digital service delivery backbone for each new council before its first election.
    5. Two councils have historically pulled in different directions: Leh and Kargil have differed on statehood and on religious and political representation, and seven councils multiply the coordination problem. Eg. The LAB and the KDA came together only after 2020, having earlier taken opposing positions on the Union Territory demand.
      The Fix: Constitute a statutory Ladakh level council of chief executive councillors to settle inter district allocation and present a single position to the Centre.

    Conclusion

    Devolution has widened in Ladakh at the district level and has not deepened in the powers each district holds. The two claims now sit against each other: an administration that has multiplied elected bodies, and representative groups that are asking for a legislature and a constitutional shield that no number of councils can substitute for. The sub committee meeting on 9 September is the next point at which that gap either narrows or is confirmed. The more immediate test is whether the notification for the new councils is followed by a poll date for the one that has been without an elected body for nearly a year.

    Back2Basics: Sixth Schedule of the Constitution

    1. What it provides: The Sixth Schedule, read with Articles 244(2) and 275(1), provides for the administration of tribal areas through Autonomous District Councils and Regional Councils.
    2. Where it applies: It currently covers tribal areas in four States, namely Assam, Meghalaya, Tripura and Mizoram. Ladakh is not covered by it.
    3. What the councils can do: These councils can make laws on land, forest other than reserved forest, shifting cultivation, village administration, inheritance, marriage and social customs, subject to the Governor’s assent.
    4. What powers they hold beyond lawmaking: They may constitute village courts for disputes among Scheduled Tribes, and may levy specified taxes and collect land revenue within their areas.

    “[2022, GS2, 10 marks] To what extent, in your opinion, has the decentralisation of power in India changed the governance landscape at the grassroots ?

  • Bar Council has no power to punish students: SC

    Why in the News

    The Supreme Court has held that the Advocates Act, 1961 confers no power, expressly or impliedly, on the Bar Council of India (BCI) or the State Bar Councils to take disciplinary or punitive action against law students. A three judge Bench headed by the Chief Justice of India recorded that only the parent university or the competent authority under law holds disciplinary power over students. The holding answers the BCI’s letters of 13 August, which asked NALSAR, the National Academy of Legal Studies and Research, to open an inquiry against students who had protested at their convocation, and asked the State Bar Councils to block their professional enrolment. The regulator withdrew those letters and argued that no cause of action survived. The Court fixed the boundary of the regulator’s jurisdiction anyway, to protect university space and the right to dissent against a repetition.

    What is the Bar Council of India and where does its authority begin?

    1. It is a statutory regulator of the legal profession: The BCI is constituted under the Advocates Act, 1961, and the State Bar Councils are constituted under the same Act for each State.
    2. Its core functions are professional: It lays down standards of professional conduct and etiquette for advocates, safeguards their rights and privileges, and exercises disciplinary control over the profession.
    3. It also recognises law degrees: The Act gives it a role in promoting legal education and in recognising universities whose law degrees qualify a person for enrolment as an advocate.
    4. The roll of advocates is maintained by the States: A State Bar Council enrols an advocate and maintains the roll on which that advocate’s name appears.

    What did the Court actually hold?

    1. The statute contains no power over students: The Advocates Act, 1961 confers no express or implied power on the BCI or the State Bar Councils to discipline or punish law students.
    2. Jurisdiction begins at enrolment: The regulator’s disciplinary powers under the Act are limited to registered advocates, so it does not enter the picture before a student is enrolled.
    3. Disciplinary power over students is exclusive to the institution: Only the parent university or the competent authority under law can take action against a student.
    4. The letters were extinguished: The 13 August letters were declared obsolete, and the Indian Express account records them as being without authority of law and bad in law.
    5. The chairperson’s position was covered too: The BCI’s chairperson was held to lack jurisdiction over students in the same terms as the body itself.

    Why did the Court rule after the letters were withdrawn?

    1. The regulator sought closure: The BCI said the letters to NALSAR and the State Bar Councils had been withdrawn within an hour, and argued that the controversy should be given a quietus.
    2. A withdrawal leaves the power claim intact: A letter recalled without a finding on jurisdiction leaves the same body free to issue another one, which is what the Court’s boundary setting order forecloses.
    3. The petition alleged a chilling effect: Two former NALSAR graduates argued that the letters had created a chilling effect on freedom of speech and freedom of association among students.
    4. The order is framed prospectively: It was designed to safeguard university space and students’ right to express dissent freely against future attempts to breach it.
    5. A parallel grievance was routed elsewhere: The same Bench allowed young lawyers to approach the Delhi High Court over an alleged mob assault at the BCI premises during a sit in demanding the chairperson’s resignation.

    What was the underlying dispute?

    1. The protest was over a convocation invitation: Students objected to the Chief Justice of India being chief guest at their convocation, following oral comments in court comparing youth to “cockroaches” and “parasites”.
    2. The regulator’s response targeted enrolment: Its letters sought an inquiry against the protesting students and moved to block the entry of the 2026 batch into the profession.
    3. Enrolment is the leverage point: A threat to withhold enrolment reaches a student’s entire career rather than a single academic year, which is why the Court treated it as more than an internal disciplinary question.

    Challenges to the Bar Council of India’s regulatory role

    1. Its powers over legal education overlap with those of universities: The regulator prescribes curriculum and inspects institutions that are already regulated by the University Grants Commission and by their own statutes, which produces conflicting requirements. Eg. National Law Universities established by State Acts answer to their own governing bodies and to the BCI at the same time.
      The Fix: Confine the regulator to prescribing the outcomes a degree must meet for enrolment, and leave institutional governance to the university and its parent statute.
    2. Entry costs have been set beyond the statute: State Bar Councils charged enrolment fees far above the statutory ceiling, which priced first generation entrants out of the profession. Eg. In Gaurav Kumar v. Union of India (2024), the Supreme Court held enrolment fees above the Rs 750 and Rs 125 limits in Section 24(1)(f) of the Advocates Act, 1961 to be illegal.
      The Fix: Route enrolment collections through a published statutory account audited annually, so any charge beyond the ceiling is visible at source.
    3. Disciplinary complaints against advocates stall: Complaints against advocates routinely outrun the one year period in which a State Bar Council must decide them, after which the case is transferred to the national body and slows further. Eg. Section 36B of the Advocates Act, 1961 was inserted precisely because State level proceedings were not being completed.
      The Fix: Publish a disciplinary docket with case age for every State Bar Council, and make transfer automatic and reported rather than discretionary.
    4. The regulator is elected by those it regulates: Members are chosen by advocates on the rolls, which makes strong action against the profession’s own interests unlikely. Eg. Bar strikes have continued after the Supreme Court held in Ex-Capt. Harish Uppal v. Union of India (2002) that lawyers have no right to strike.
      The Fix: Add non advocate members drawn from academia and the judiciary to the disciplinary committees, so professional discipline is not decided by peers alone.
    5. Its rulemaking has repeatedly been struck down for exceeding the Act: The body has issued rules on matters the statute does not cover, and courts have then had to read them down. Eg. Bar Council rules requiring a certification examination and restricting practice have been litigated repeatedly on the ground of statutory competence.
      The Fix: Require every new rule to cite the section of the Advocates Act, 1961 that authorises it, and to be laid before the Centre before it takes effect.

    Conclusion

    A regulator that cannot reach students has to be told so before it acts, not after it withdraws. The order converts an ad hoc retreat into a settled limit, which is the difference between a grievance resolved and a power denied. What remains unreconciled is the regulator’s continuing authority over legal education alongside a complete absence of authority over the people receiving it. The next test of that line will be whether the body confines itself to prescribing what a law degree must contain, or returns to acting on how students behave during the degree.

    Matching Previous Year Question

    “[2022] With reference to India, consider the following statements : 1. Government law officers and legal firms are recognised as advocates, but corporate lawyers and patent attorneys are excluded from recognition as advocates. 2. Bar Councils have the power to lay down the rules relating to legal education and recognition of law colleges. Which of the statements given above is/are correct ? (a) 1 only (b) 2 only (c) Both 1 and 2 (d) Neither 1 nor 2 ANSWER: (b)”

  • SC orders oversight of Bar Council decisions

    SC orders oversight of Bar Council decisions

    Why in the News

    The Supreme Court has held that the Bar Council of India (BCI) chairperson is serving only as a pro tem office holder whose term ends with the next election.

    What is the Bar Council of India?

    1. Statutory regulator of the legal profession: The BCI is constituted under the Advocates Act, 1961 to regulate advocates, legal education and professional conduct across India.
    2. Its legitimacy runs through bar elections: Its members are elected by the State Bar Councils from among their own members, so a lapsed election cycle at the State level freezes the central body too.
    3. The two law officers sit on it by office: The Attorney General and the Solicitor General are permanent ex officio members of the Council.
    4. A continuity provision guards against a vacuum: The proviso to Section 4(3) of the Advocates Act, 1961 allows the last chairperson or vice chairperson to continue until a new Council is in place.

    Why is the chairperson’s continuance in question?

    1. The Rules cap the term at two years: Rule 12(2), Chapter I, Part II of the Bar Council of India Rules fixes the maximum tenure of the BCI chairperson at two years, and the current term began on 17 April 2025.
    2. A notification stretched it to 2030: A gazette notification of 21 April 2025 notified the tenure of the chairperson and vice chairperson until 16 April 2030.
    3. A notification cannot override the parent statute: The Bench observed that a notification cannot go beyond the Rules or empower a body to grant itself additional tenure.
    4. Continuity has run for over a decade: Petitioners questioned an uninterrupted term as BCI chairperson of more than 12 years since November 2014.
    5. The anti vacuum proviso has been used to postpone elections: Petitioners argued that a provision meant to prevent an administrative vacuum has instead been used to avoid holding fresh elections and to perpetuate the existing office holders.

    What allegations were placed before the Court?

    1. A trust holding the Council’s assets: Petitioners questioned the formation of the BCI Pearl First Trust in 2020, in which the chairperson and other BCI office bearers are described as “permanent managing trustees”.
    2. The earlier trust’s finances were moved into it: The financial assets and incomes of the earlier BCI Trust were transferred to the new Trust.
    3. Trusteeship outlasts elected office: The office bearers would continue as permanent managing trustees even after their Council tenures expire, which the Bench questioned as elected members becoming permanent trustees beyond their capacity.
    4. A land arrangement with a State government: A tie up between the Trust and the Goa government proposes a university on 56 acres of land in that State.
    5. Expenditure on felicitations: Counsel described the financial expenditures pulled from BCI records on felicitations, running into crores, as “jolting”.
    6. Concentration of power over successive terms: Counsel for the petitioners argued that what the record shows over the years is a concentration of powers in the same office bearers.

    What did the NALSAR episode expose?

    1. An enrolment ban aimed at one graduating batch: The BCI made an aborted attempt to bar the professional enrolment of the National Academy of Legal Studies and Research (NALSAR) batch of 2026.
    2. The trigger was student dissent: The students had objected to the Chief Justice of India attending their convocation, dissenting against oral remarks that termed youths “cockroaches” and “parasites”.
    3. The reaction spread across national law universities: Students of the National Law Universities at Delhi and Bengaluru expressed solidarity with their NALSAR counterparts.
    4. The Court itself backed the protest: The Chief Justice of India supported the students’ right to protest, and questions arose over whether the chairperson had acted on his own.
    5. The measure was withdrawn: An apology was eventually issued and the enrolment bar did not take effect.

    Why has the Court chosen supervision over removal?

    1. The Bench declined to adjudicate the allegations now: The Court said it did not want to encourage “shadow boxing” around the allegations at this stage.
    2. The stated ground is institutional: It said it would intervene to maintain the “institutional integrity and credibility” of the BCI until the next bar body elections.
    3. Routine functioning is left undisturbed: The incumbent office bearers continue pro tem so that the Council’s day to day functioning is not interrupted.
    4. The check is prior and external, not appellate: Policy decisions now require prior notice to the two law officers and an invitation to them to participate, rather than review after a decision is taken.
    5. The regulator did not resist: Counsel for the BCI told the Court they welcomed the direction to take the concurrence of the highest law officers in policy matters.

    What does the election timetable require?

    1. Women members are co opted first: The Chief Justices of the High Courts must complete the co option of two women members to the State Bar Councils within a fortnight.
    2. Composition is notified next: Each State Bar Council must then notify its new composition within a week.
    3. Office bearers and BCI representatives follow: The newly constituted State Bar Councils must elect their chairperson, vice chairperson, other office bearers and one representative to the BCI within three weeks of notification of their composition.
    4. The central body is reconstituted last: The BCI is formed from those State representatives, so the pro tem arrangement ends only once the State level cycle finishes.

    Challenges to the Bar Council of India

    1. Elections are not self executing: Nothing in the statutory scheme compels the Council to go to the polls on schedule, so a continuity proviso can substitute for a mandate indefinitely. Eg. The present dispute reached the Supreme Court only because petitioners moved it, not because any internal trigger fired.
      The Fix: Write a fixed election calendar into the Advocates Act, 1961, with the continuity proviso lapsing automatically on a stated date.
    2. The regulator writes the rules it is bound by: The BCI frames the Rules governing tenure, enrolment and legal education, and no external body vets them before they take effect. Eg. The instrument extending the chairperson’s tenure was issued by the Council itself.
      The Fix: Require prior publication and a stated objection window for any Rule affecting tenure, enrolment or recognition.
    3. Legal education answers to two regulators: BCI control over law school recognition sits alongside the University Grants Commission’s authority over degree granting universities, so institutions face two sets of standards. Eg. National Law Universities are created by State Acts and funded as universities, yet their graduates’ right to practise depends on BCI enrolment.
      The Fix: Constitute a single joint standard setting body for legal education, with the BCI confined to professional entry.
    4. Discipline moves slowly by design: Complaints against advocates go to State Bar Council disciplinary committees, and a case not decided within a year transfers to the BCI, which lengthens the process rather than shortening it. Eg. Section 36B of the Advocates Act, 1961 provides for that transfer on the expiry of one year.
      The Fix: Publish disposal timelines and pendency data for every disciplinary committee, State and central.
    5. Entry testing does not feed back into approval: The All India Bar Examination tests an individual’s eligibility to practise, and it does not evaluate the law college that produced the candidate. Eg. Colleges retain BCI approval regardless of how their graduates perform in that examination.
      The Fix: Link a law college’s continued approval to the disclosed performance of its graduates in the Bar examination.

    Conclusion

    The Court has not removed the incumbent. It has bounded him. A regulator whose elections had lapsed is now supervised by the two law officers who already sat on it by office, and its bar elections have been put on a calendar the Court set. The unresolved part is structural. Judicial supervision arrived because the profession’s own rules carried no consequence for a Council that simply did not go to the polls. The marker to watch is whether the fresh Councils are constituted on that timetable, or the interim arrangement outlasts it.

    [2022] With reference to India, consider the following statements :

    1. Government law officers and legal firms are recognised as advocates, but corporate lawyers and patent attorneys are excluded from recognition as advocates.

    2. Bar Councils have the power to lay down the rules relating to legal education and recognition of law colleges.

    Which of the statements given above is/are correct ?

    (a) 1 only

    (b) 2 only

    (c) Both 1 and 2

    (d) Neither 1 nor 2

  • Cauvery needs a distress-sharing pact

    Cauvery needs a distress-sharing pact

    Why in the News

    The Tamil Nadu Chief Minister has opened the sluice gates of the Mettur Dam, giving some relief to Cauvery Delta farmers after a delayed irrigation season. The Tamil Nadu government has ascribed the delay to a deficit in the southwest monsoon and to Karnataka’s failure to honour its water sharing obligation under the Supreme Court’s 2018 verdict.

    What is the Cauvery Management Authority?

    1. What it was set up to do: The Authority was constituted to oversee the implementation of the Supreme Court’s 2018 verdict on the sharing of the Cauvery’s waters.
    2. Its statutory basis: It was created under the Inter-State River Water Disputes Act, 1956, following the Court’s direction that a scheme be framed to give effect to the award.
    3. How it operates: A regulation committee assesses storage, inflows and crop water requirements and advises the Authority, which then directs releases between the basin States.
    4. Where it works: The Authority has functioned during normal monsoon years, when the allocation the verdict fixed can simply be applied.

    Why did this year’s Mettur schedule slip?

    1. The normal calendar: In a normal year the dam opens on 12 June and its gates are shut on 28 January, giving the region’s agriculturists a 230 day irrigation window.
    2. The schedule is not self executing: That calendar is contingent on the monsoon and on the release of water in the Cauvery’s upstream by Karnataka.
    3. What went wrong this year: The Tamil Nadu government attributed the delay to the southwest monsoon deficit and to Karnataka not meeting its release obligation.
    4. What the opening actually buys: With the rainfall deficit narrowing in August, the Tamil Nadu government has leeway to release water for 45 days, well short of a full season.

    What does the 2018 verdict not settle?

    1. No distress sharing formula: The Court did not codify a formula for water sharing in years when the rains play truant, so a deficit year has no rule to fall back on.
    2. The sustainability direction did not bind: The Court’s emphasis on sustainable water use was lost on the two States, which continued to plan as though the allocation were guaranteed.
    3. The gap shows up on the first bad monsoon: The dispute flared again in 2023, the first below par monsoon after 2018, and the same pattern has repeated this year.
    4. Litigation is the default, not the exception: Tamil Nadu has said it will continue legal efforts to secure its share, which returns the question to a forum that has already declined to write a distress rule.

    Why has the Mekedatu proposal deepened the deadlock?

    1. The proposal: Karnataka’s push for the Mekedatu Dam on the river has reignited old fears downstream.
    2. Karnataka’s case: The Karnataka government argues the dam would primarily serve Bengaluru’s water needs while allowing better regulation of releases.
    3. Why it has not landed: That argument has found no takers in Tamil Nadu, where a storage structure upstream reads as an instrument of control rather than of regulation.
    4. The underlying shift: The Cauvery today has to meet the competing demands of agriculture and urbanisation, and the two States sit on opposite sides of that shift.

    What would a negotiated settlement have to contain?

    1. A move away from the courtroom: Rather than lean on the judiciary, the Cauvery dependent States would do well to come together and plan for the efficient use of the river’s waters.
    2. Demand side measures: Solutions range from disincentivising water intensive crops to encouraging decentralised water management.
    3. The expertise required: Any such plan will need inputs from hydrologists, economists, agricultural scientists and farmers’ organisations.
    4. The political precondition: Representatives of the two States will need to sit together, understand each other’s fears and shed confrontationist attitudes.

    Challenges to the Cauvery Management Authority

    1. No enforcement machinery of its own: The Authority depends on the two State governments to execute its release directions and holds no independent field administration. Eg. Its directions in the deficit year of 2023 were contested by Karnataka and taken back to the Supreme Court.
      The Fix: Give the Authority operational control over gate operations at specified control points for the duration of a declared distress period.
    2. Storage and inflow data are State reported and contested: Each State submits its own figures on realisable flows, so the Authority arbitrates between rival datasets before it can decide anything. Eg. The two States have filed conflicting inflow estimates for the same periods at Biligundlu, the inter State measuring point.
      The Fix: Place telemetry at every control point under a jointly audited third party gauge network publishing real time readings.
    3. Groundwater sits outside the allocation: The award divides surface flows alone, so competing extraction continues unregulated on both sides of the border. Eg. The Central Ground Water Board classifies several assessment units in the Cauvery basin as over exploited.
      The Fix: Notify a joint basin wide extraction cap alongside the surface allocation, so a shortfall in releases is not simply pumped out of the aquifer.
    4. Electoral cycles set State positions: Water release becomes an electoral question in both States, which raises the political cost of any concession to the point where none is offered. Eg. Assembly resolutions and shutdowns in Karnataka have followed release orders in successive dispute years.
      The Fix: Shift the release decision to a pre agreed rule curve triggered by reservoir storage, so no government has to announce a discretionary concession.

    Conclusion

    A river shared by two States needs a rule for the bad years, not only for the good ones. The Cauvery has one for the good years, and every deficit season is therefore litigated afresh. The forward step is a negotiated distress sharing pact between the basin States, agreed before the next failed monsoon rather than during it, and covering the cities as well as the fields. Until such a pact exists, each shortfall will keep arriving at a court that has already declined to supply the formula the States will not write for themselves.

    Back2Basics: Mettur Dam

    1. Where it is: The dam is built across the Cauvery at Mettur in the Salem district of Tamil Nadu, at the point where the river enters the plains.
    2. When it was built: It was completed in 1934 and is one of the oldest large dams in India.
    3. What it holds: Its reservoir is known as the Stanley Reservoir, and it serves irrigation, drinking water and hydroelectric generation.
    4. What it commands: Releases from Mettur irrigate the Cauvery delta districts, which is why the date on which its gates open sets the cropping calendar for the region.

    [2013, GS2, 10 marks] Constitutional mechanisms to resolve the inter-state water disputes have failed to address and solve the problems. Is the failure due to structural or process inadequacy or both? Discuss.”