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Subject: Polity

  • A fifth of Telangana voters face exclusion

    Why in the News

    In Telangana, 73.47 lakh enumeration forms, nearly 22% of the electorate, were marked “Uncollectable” during the Special Intensive Revision (SIR) of electoral rolls. The large number raises concerns about balancing clean electoral rolls with the risk of excluding genuine voters.

    What is Special Intensive Revision (SIR)?

    • SIR: Special Intensive Revision of electoral rolls.
    • Conducted by the Election Commission of India (ECI) through comprehensive, house-to-house enumeration.
    • Electors submit enumeration forms; non-returned forms may be marked “Uncollectable”.
    • Doubtful cases may receive notices from Electoral Registration Officers (EROs) for verification.

    Current Status in Telangana

    • Enumeration ended: August 10, 2026.
    • Uncollectable: 73,47,075 forms, nearly 22% of the electorate.
    • Draft rolls: Scheduled for August 17.
    • Claims and objections will follow publication of the draft rolls.

    Why is it Concerning?

    1. Disenfranchisement risk: Genuine voters may be deleted along with ineligible entries.
    2. Burden on voters: Migrants, poor households and hard-to-reach groups may struggle to submit forms.
    3. Short timeline: Limited time to reconcile uncollectable forms before draft publication.
    4. Legal concerns: The process has faced challenges regarding deletion procedures.

    Safeguards After Draft Roll

    • Claims and objections: Voters can seek restoration of wrongly deleted names.
    • ERO verification: Doubtful cases can be examined before finalisation.
    • Appeals: Aggrieved voters can approach higher electoral authorities and courts.

    Constitutional & Legal Framework

    • Article 324: Gives the Election Commission of India (ECI) superintendence, direction and control over elections and electoral rolls.
    • Article 325: Provides for one general electoral roll and prohibits exclusion on grounds of religion, race, caste or sex.
    • Article 326: Provides for adult suffrage.
    • Representation of the People Act, 1950 (RPA 1950): Governs preparation and revision of electoral rolls.
    • Registration of Electors Rules, 1960: Provides procedures for claims, objections and revision.

    Back2Basics: Election Commission of India

    • Type: Constitutional body under Article 324.
    • Established: 1950.
    • Composition: Chief Election Commissioner and other Election Commissioners.
    • Mandate: Conducts elections to Parliament, State legislatures, and the offices of President and Vice-President.
    • Role in rolls: Conducts summary and intensive revisions to maintain accurate electoral rolls.

    Challenges

    1. Wrongful deletion of genuine voters.
    2. Exclusion of migrants and seasonal workers.
    3. Duplicate, dead and ineligible entries.
    4. Compressed timelines for verification and objections.
    5. Documentation burden on vulnerable voters.
    6. Loss of public trust due to perceived lack of transparency.

    [2017] For election to the Lok Sabha, a nomination paper can be filed by

    (a) Anyone residing in India

    (b) A resident of the constituency from which the election is to be contested

    (c) Any citizen of India whose name appears in the electoral roll of a constituency

    (d) Any citizen of India

  • In opposing creamy layer for SC/STs, what the government argued

    Why in the News

    The Centre has filed an affidavit in the Supreme Court opposing the introduction of a “creamy layer” income filter within reservations for Scheduled Castes (SCs) and Scheduled Tribes (STs). It has argued that the historical disadvantage faced by these communities is rooted in untouchability and social exclusion, not economic backwardness, and that any change to reservation policy is for Parliament to decide, not the courts.

    What is the creamy layer concept?

    1. Definition: The creamy layer is an income and status filter that excludes the socially and economically advanced members of a backward class from reservation benefits. Its purpose is to ensure quota benefits reach the genuinely disadvantaged within a group rather than its better-off sections.
    2. Origin and current scope: It was introduced by the 1992 Indra Sawhney judgment as a test for Other Backward Classes (OBCs). It has never been applied to SCs and STs.

    Who does reservation currently apply to in India?

    1. Category-wise quota: Central reservation stands at 15 percent for SCs, 7.5 percent for STs, and 27 percent for OBCs on the non-creamy-layer principle.
    2. Economically Weaker Sections: A 10 percent quota for Economically Weaker Sections (EWS) applies to those outside the SC, ST, and OBC categories.
    3. The ceiling: The Indra Sawhney judgment fixed a 50 percent ceiling on total reservations, though the EWS quota and some State laws now exceed it.
    4. Creamy layer coverage: The creamy layer income exclusion currently applies only to OBCs, not to SCs or STs.

    Which constitutional provisions govern reservation?

    1. Article 15(4): Allows the State to make special provisions for the advancement of socially and educationally backward classes, SCs, and STs.
    2. Article 16(4): Permits reservation in public appointments for any backward class inadequately represented in State services.
    3. Article 16(4A) and 16(4B): Enable reservation in promotions for SCs and STs and the carry-forward of unfilled reserved vacancies.
    4. Articles 341 and 342: Empower the President to notify the initial lists of SCs and STs; once notified, inclusion or exclusion can be made only by an Act of Parliament.
    5. Article 335: Requires that reservation claims be balanced with the maintenance of administrative efficiency.
    6. Articles 338 and 338A: Establish the National Commission for Scheduled Castes and the National Commission for Scheduled Tribes.
    7. 103rd Constitutional Amendment, 2019: Inserted Articles 15(6) and 16(6) to provide the 10 percent EWS reservation.

    What did the petition seek?

    1. Income-based preferences: The Public Interest Litigation (PIL), filed by a politician and advocate, sought income-based preferences across all reserved categories, including OBCs and EWS.
    2. Elite capture argument: It argued that affluent families within the SC and ST categories monopolise reservation benefits, depriving the most marginalised of access to education and public employment.
    3. Reliance on the 2024 ruling: It relied on the 2024 Supreme Court judgment permitting sub-classification of SCs and STs, in which four of the seven Constitution Bench judges suggested extending the creamy layer principle to these groups.

    What is sub-classification of Scheduled Castes?

    1. Definition: Sub-classification allows a State to divide the single SC list into sub-groups and reserve a portion of the SC quota for the most backward castes within it. The 2024 judgment upheld this power, holding SCs are not a socially homogeneous class.

    Why does the government distinguish SC/ST identification from OBC identification?

    1. Basis of SC status: SCs face historical disadvantage stemming from the practice of untouchability, a form of social exclusion not tied to income.
    2. Basis of ST status: STs are identified by their distinct cultures, geographical isolation, and backwardness.
    3. Basis of OBC status: OBCs are identified primarily through a combination of social, educational, and economic disadvantages, which makes an economic filter relevant to them.
    4. Objective of SC/ST quotas: The stated aim is social equality, overcoming historical discrimination, and inclusive participation in public life, since discrimination against these groups does not occur on the basis of economic conditions.

    What legal precedents did the Centre cite?

    1. Indra Sawhney (1992): Upheld the Mandal Commission report on OBC reservation and introduced the creamy layer test, expressly confining it to OBCs and holding it has no relevance for SCs and STs.
    2. E V Chinnaiah (2005): Held that even if a situation ever required excluding a creamy layer from SCs, only Parliament could take the necessary legislative steps.
    3. Separation of powers: The affidavit argued courts cannot direct the executive to adopt a particular policy merely because a fairer or wiser alternative exists, and the judiciary cannot substitute for the legislature in framing public policy.

    Why is the demand for a creamy layer contested?

    1. The case for it: Affluent SC and ST families capturing quota benefits leaves the poorest within these groups without access, which undercuts the stated goal of reaching the most marginalised.
    2. The case against it: Caste-based discrimination and untouchability persist regardless of a family’s income, so an economic filter would exclude people who still face social stigma.
    3. The judicial split: The 2024 Bench itself divided, with a minority favouring the extension of the creamy layer to SCs and STs, which keeps the question legally open.

    What are the major debates surrounding reservation?

    1. Social justice versus economic upliftment: Whether reservation is a remedy for historical social injustice or a tool for economic advancement, which decides if income can ever be a valid filter.
    2. The 50 percent ceiling: The Indra Sawhney cap is under pressure from State laws and the EWS quota, raising whether the ceiling is still binding.
    3. Sub-classification and creamy layer for SC/ST: The 2024 ruling reopened whether SCs form a homogeneous class and whether the better-off within them should be excluded.
    4. The empirical gap: The absence of updated caste and income data on quota beneficiaries weakens both the elite-capture claim and its rebuttal.
    5. EWS and reserved categories: The exclusion of SCs, STs, and OBCs from the EWS quota is debated as either fair balancing or fresh discrimination.

    What are the challenges to applying a creamy layer to SC/STs?

    1. Persistence of untouchability: Social exclusion continues irrespective of income, so an economic test may exclude those still facing discrimination.
    2. Absence of reliable data: No comprehensive dataset tracks the income profile of SC and ST beneficiaries, making a fair income threshold hard to set.
    3. Constitutional bar on judicial rewriting: Under Articles 341 and 342, only Parliament can alter SC and ST entitlements, limiting judicial intervention.
    4. Risk of under-representation: An income filter could shrink the eligible pool and leave reserved seats unfilled where few qualify.
    5. Definitional complexity: Fixing who counts as advanced within a socially stigmatised group is contested and administratively difficult.

    Conclusion

    The Centre’s position is that SC and ST reservation addresses caste-based social exclusion, not poverty, so the creamy layer test built for OBCs cannot be transposed onto them, and any change is a matter for Parliament. The dispute turns on an unresolved question of whether reservation is fundamentally a social-justice remedy or an economic one. Until Parliament acts or the Supreme Court settles the 2024 split, the creamy layer will not apply to SCs and STs.

    Back2Basics:

    Indra Sawhney v. Union of India (1992)

    1. What it decided: A nine-judge Supreme Court bench upheld 27 percent OBC reservation based on the Mandal Commission report.
    2. Creamy layer: It introduced the creamy layer exclusion for OBCs and confined it to them.
    3. The ceiling: It capped total reservation at 50 percent, except in extraordinary circumstances.
    4. Promotions: It barred reservation in promotions, a bar later addressed through the 77th Constitutional Amendment and Article 16(4A).

    Reservations in India

    1. About: Reservation is a form of protective discrimination that sets aside seats in education, public employment, and legislatures for historically disadvantaged groups.
    2. Scale: It covers SCs, STs, OBCs, and EWS across central and State institutions, with categories and percentages varying by State.
    3. Constitutional anchor: It flows from the equality code in Articles 14 to 16 read with the Directive Principle in Article 46, which directs the State to promote the interests of weaker sections.

    Way Forward

    1. Generate quota data: Collect updated caste-wise and income-wise data on beneficiaries to ground policy in evidence rather than assertion.
    2. Respect the legislative domain: Leave changes to SC and ST entitlements to Parliament as required by Articles 341 and 342.
    3. Target the most backward: Use the 2024 sub-classification power to reach the poorest castes within the SC list without diluting the social-justice basis.
    4. Strengthen non-quota support: Expand scholarships, coaching, and infrastructure so advancement does not depend on reservation alone.

  • Amid din, LS passes Bill to set up panel to select chiefs and members of tribunals

    Why in the news

    The Lok Sabha passed the Tribunals Reforms Bill, 2026 by voice vote without debate, creating a National Tribunals Commission (NTC) to select chairpersons and members of various tribunals. The Bill follows the Supreme Court striking down parts of the Tribunals Reforms Act, 2021 for violating separation of powers and judicial independence. It reopens the settled question of who controls tribunal appointments, the executive that the tribunals adjudicate against, or an independent body insulated from it.

    What is the National Tribunals Commission (NTC)?

    1. Purpose: The NTC is a proposed statutory body to conduct the selection of chairpersons and members of tribunals through a single, uniform process. It centralises appointments that were earlier run separately for each tribunal.
    2. Composition: It will have a chairperson and four members, two judicial and two technical. A retired Supreme Court judge or a retired Chief Justice of a High Court will be eligible to head it.
    3. Seat and scope: It will be headquartered in New Delhi and will prescribe qualifications, selection, appointment, salaries, allowances, tenure, resignation, removal, and other service conditions of tribunal members.
    4. Origin: The Supreme Court itself directed the creation of an independent commission with professional expertise, transparent selection, and an oversight mechanism for appointments.

    What is the current status of tribunal appointments in India?

    1. Statutory basis: Tribunals were introduced through the 42nd Constitutional Amendment, 1976, which added Part XIV-A and Articles 323A and 323B. They function as specialised adjudicatory bodies outside the regular court hierarchy.
    2. Bodies covered by the Bill: The selection process applies to the Central Administrative Tribunal, Armed Forces Tribunal, National Green Tribunal, Income Tax Appellate Tribunal, and the National Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission.
    3. Rationalisation drive: The Union government began rationalising tribunals in 2015 and Parliament passed the Tribunals Reforms Act, 2021 to that end. Parts of that Act were struck down by the Supreme Court.
    4. Existing safeguard: Judicial review of tribunal decisions by High Courts under Articles 226 and 227 remains, since the Court has held this power to be part of the basic structure.

    Constitutional Provisions Related to Tribunals

    1. Article 323A: Empowers Parliament to establish administrative tribunals for service matters of public servants.
    2. Article 323B: Empowers appropriate legislatures to set up tribunals for other matters such as taxation, land reforms, and industrial disputes.
    3. 42nd Amendment, 1976: Inserted Part XIV-A and the two tribunal Articles into the Constitution.
    4. Article 226 and Article 227: Vest High Courts with writ jurisdiction and power of superintendence over tribunals, a check the Supreme Court has ruled cannot be ousted.
    5. Article 136: Retains the Supreme Court’s power to grant special leave to appeal against tribunal orders.
    6. Article 50: Directive Principle requiring separation of the judiciary from the executive, the value the appointment dispute turns on.

    Why did the Supreme Court strike down parts of the 2021 Act?

    1. Separation of powers: The Court held that several provisions were contrary to separation of powers, as they gave the executive dominant control over appointments to bodies that adjudicate against the executive.
    2. Judicial independence: Provisions were found to undermine the independence of tribunal members whose tenure and removal the executive influenced.
    3. Conflict with precedent: The provisions were inconsistent with earlier judgments laying down standards for the appointment, tenure, and functioning of tribunal members.
    4. Short tenures and search committees: Earlier versions prescribed a four-year term and search-cum-selection committees weighted towards government nominees, which the Court repeatedly rejected as diluting judicial character.

    How does the Bill respond to the Court’s concerns?

    1. Uniform process: The Law Minister stated the Bill brings uniformity to selection and appointment and improves efficiency, transparency, and independence.
    2. Judicial presence: A retired Supreme Court judge or retired High Court Chief Justice heading the commission answers the Court’s demand for professional and judicial expertise in selection.
    3. No jurisdictional change: The Minister clarified the legislation does not alter the jurisdiction of any tribunal, keeping the substantive powers of each body intact.
    4. Institutional oversight: A permanent commission replaces ad hoc, tribunal-by-tribunal appointment machinery, matching the oversight mechanism the Court directed.

    Major debates surrounding tribunalisation in India

    1. Curtailment of ordinary courts: Tribunals divert cases from High Courts, raising the concern that they curtail the jurisdiction and constitutional role of the regular judiciary.
    2. Executive control versus independence: The core dispute is whether the government, a frequent litigant before tribunals, should dominate the appointment and service conditions of members who judge it.
    3. Effectiveness versus multiplicity: Tribunals were meant to reduce pendency, yet vacancies, poor infrastructure, and appeals routed back to constitutional courts have blunted that promise.
    4. Competing rulings: The line of Madras Bar Association cases and Rojer Mathew (2019) repeatedly set standards on tenure and composition that successive laws failed to meet, driving the current Bill.
    5. Access to justice: Whether specialised, low-cost adjudication genuinely widens access, or whether weak tribunals leave litigants worse off than in ordinary courts.

    Challenges to the National Tribunals Commission

    1. Composition balance: Two technical members alongside two judicial members can still tilt selection towards executive preference if the technical members are serving or retired bureaucrats.
    2. Vacancy backlog: A new selection body does not by itself clear the large pending vacancies that have crippled tribunals such as the National Green Tribunal and Debt Recovery Tribunals.
    3. Infrastructure and funding: Tribunals depend on the parent ministry for premises, staff, and budget, which the commission does not address.
    4. Fresh litigation risk: Any residual executive dominance in the composition invites another round of constitutional challenge, extending the cycle of struck-down laws.
    5. Uniformity versus specialisation: A single commission for bodies as varied as the Armed Forces Tribunal and the consumer commission may struggle to weigh domain-specific expertise.
    6. Independence of secretariat: Day-to-day functioning still routes through executive-controlled staff, which can dilute the intended insulation.

    Conclusion

    The central question is not whether tribunals should exist but who controls the people who staff them, since executive dominance over appointments compromises the independence that specialised adjudication requires. The 2026 Bill responds to the Supreme Court’s direction by creating a judicially headed National Tribunals Commission with a uniform process. Its success depends on whether the composition genuinely insulates members from the executive they adjudicate against, and on whether vacancies and infrastructure gaps are addressed alongside the appointment reform.

    What is the Separation of Powers Doctrine?

    1. About: It is the principle that legislative, executive, and judicial functions are distributed among distinct organs so that no single organ concentrates power.
    2. Rationale: It exists to prevent tyranny and protect liberty through mutual checks, and in India it underpins judicial independence as part of the basic structure.
    3. Indian form: India follows a functional, not rigid, separation, with checks and balances rather than watertight compartments, reinforced by Article 50 and judicial review.

    Key Concerns Regarding Separation of Powers in India

    1. Executive encroachment on judiciary: Control over appointments, tenure, and funding of tribunals lets the executive influence bodies meant to be independent.
    2. Delegated legislation: Wide rule-making powers transfer effective law-making to the executive with limited legislative scrutiny.
    3. Judicial overreach: Expansive judicial activism blurs the line between adjudication and policy-making.
    4. Appointment tussles: Recurring friction between the executive and judiciary over the collegium and tribunal selections reflects an unsettled balance.

    Statutory Framework Governing Tribunals

    1. Article 323A: Basis for administrative tribunals in service matters.
    2. Article 323B: Basis for tribunals in taxation, land reforms, and other listed matters.
    3. Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985: Established the Central Administrative Tribunal and State Administrative Tribunals.
    4. Tribunals Reforms Act, 2021: Rationalised tribunals and set service conditions, parts of which the Supreme Court struck down.
    5. Tribunals Reforms Bill, 2026: Proposes the National Tribunals Commission and repeals the 2021 Act once enacted.

    Back2Basics: Landmark rulings on tribunals

    1. L. Chandra Kumar v. Union of India (1997): Held that judicial review by High Courts under Articles 226 and 227 is part of the basic structure and cannot be excluded; tribunals are supplementary, not substitutes, for courts.
    2. Union of India v. R. Gandhi (Madras Bar Association, 2010): Laid down that tribunal members must have judicial character and that executive dominance in selection is unconstitutional.
    3. Rojer Mathew v. South Indian Bank (2019): Struck down rules on tribunal appointments and service conditions for compromising independence.
    4. Madras Bar Association v. Union of India (2021): Reaffirmed minimum tenure and search committee composition standards, directly shaping the 2026 Bill.

    Way Forward

    1. Insulated composition: Weight the selection body towards judicial members and independent experts rather than serving bureaucrats.
    2. Fill vacancies promptly: Use the commission to clear the standing backlog of member vacancies across tribunals on a time-bound basis.
    3. Single nodal ministry: Route tribunal administration and funding through a single, arm’s-length authority to end dependence on the litigating ministry.
    4. Fixed tenure and security: Guarantee tenure, salary, and removal protections consistent with the Supreme Court’s standards to prevent renewed litigation.
    5. Periodic performance audit: Institute an independent review of tribunal pendency, disposal, and infrastructure to keep them a genuine complement to courts.

    “[2018, GS2, 15 marks] How far do you agree with the view that tribunals curtail the jurisdiction of ordinary courts? In view of the above, discuss the constitutional validity and competency of the tribunals in India.”

  • Lok Sabha clears Bankers’ Books Evidence Bill, 2026

    Why in the News

    The Lok Sabha has cleared the Bankers’ Books Evidence Bill, 2026, replacing the colonial Bankers’ Books Evidence Act, 1891. It modernises how bank records are admitted as evidence in court, amid data-privacy concerns.

    What does the Bill change?

    1. Digital records: It recognises electronic and digital bank records as admissible evidence, aligning with modern banking.
    2. Officer powers: It empowers a senior-rank officer to certify records and use hash values to verify integrity.

    Why do concerns remain?

    1. Data privacy: Wider access to digital bank records raises questions on safeguards for customer financial data.
    2. Certification standards: The reliability of hash-based verification depends on tamper-proof audit trails.
    3. Overlap with new codes: The Bill must sit consistently with the recently enacted evidence and criminal law framework.

    Conclusion

    The Bill updates a 19th-century evidence law for a digital banking era. The next milestone is Rajya Sabha clearance and rules on data safeguards.

  • Explainer: the stakes in India’s delimitation debate

    Why in the News

    The first delimitation after the 2027 Census could alter the distribution of Lok Sabha seats among States, raising concerns over political representation and federal balance.

    What is Delimitation?

    1. Definition: Readjustment of the number and boundaries of constituencies based on population.
    2. Constitutional basis: Article 82 provides for readjustment after each Census; Article 81 deals with Lok Sabha composition.
    3. Authority: Conducted by an independent Delimitation Commission constituted by Parliament.

    Why is it Contested?

    1. Seat freeze: Inter-state allocation has been frozen using the 1971 Census until the first Census after 2026.
    2. North-South divide: Population-control States fear reduced political representation relative to high-growth States.
    3. Federalism: Unequal demographic growth creates tension between population-based representation and federal balance.
    4. Lok Sabha size: Any major increase in seats raises questions about Parliament’s size and effective representation.

    Value Addition

    • Delimitation Commission: Its orders have the force of law and generally cannot be challenged in court.
    • Key challenge: Achieving “one person, one vote” without penalising States that successfully controlled population growth.

    “[2024] How many Delimitation Commissions have been constituted by the Government of India till December 2023?

    (a) One

    (b) Two

    (c) Three

    (d) Four.

  • [10th August 2026] The Hindu OpED: The fiscal cost of unconditional cash transfers to women

    PYQ Relevance
    [UPSC 2022]     Reforming the government delivery system through the Direct Benefit Transfer Scheme is a progressive step, but it has its limitations too. Comment.
    Linkage: The PYQ Examines DBT-based welfare delivery, fiscal sustainability, and the trade-off between welfare transfers and human-capital expenditure. The article highlights the trade-off between cash transfers and spending on education, health and development.

    Mentor’s Comment

    Delhi rolled out the Lakshmi Yojana on August 1, an unconditional cash transfer (UCT) of ₹2,500 a month for eligible women, joining a rapidly growing list of States running similar schemes since 2023. Fresh State-wise expenditure data show that in several States this spending already exceeds the entire education or health budget, reopening the question of what these transfers displace. The concern is set against the 16th Finance Commission’s award period.

    What is an unconditional cash transfer?

    • Definition: A UCT is a direct income payment to a beneficiary with no work, attendance, or behaviour condition attached, unlike a conditional transfer or an in-kind subsidy.
    • This wave: The current schemes target women with a fixed monthly sum, framed as income support rather than a service.

    Why are states rushing to launch women’s UCT schemes?

    • Electoral promise: Most schemes were pledged at assembly elections and rolled out immediately, drawing the label of a pre-poll dole.
    • Near-universal spread: From 2023 onward almost every major state added a scheme, making it politically hard for any state to abstain.
    • Compensation framing: Some argue the transfers compensate women for the state’s failure to create broad opportunity and services.

    Are these transfers a benefit to women or a burden on states?

    • Used productively: Evaluations show women mostly spend the money on food, health and education, so the transfer reaches real welfare needs.
    • Fiscal pressure: The same spending expands a recurring liability that presses on existing health and education budgets.
    • Genuine trade-off: The tension is real, the cash is used well by recipients yet competes with the public services those recipients depend on.

    How much fiscal space do states actually have?

    • Committed spending: The 16th Finance Commission notes almost 44% of state expenditure is locked in interest payments, pensions and salaries.
    • Shrinking social share: Social sector revenue expenditure has stayed stable as a share of total spending since 2011-12 but has declined as a share of GDP since 2020-21.
    • Little room: With most of the budget pre-committed, new UCT outlays crowd against fresh investment in services and infrastructure.

    How large are these schemes across states?

    • Share of total spending: UCT outlays range from 10.03% of total expenditure in Jharkhand and 7.84% in West Bengal down to 0.97% in Goa and 0.26% in Himachal Pradesh.
    • Share of education spending: In the largest-scheme states the UCT bill exceeds half the entire education budget, near 74% in Jharkhand and Karnataka and 54% in West Bengal.
    • Named schemes and amounts: Karnataka Gruha Lakshmi (Rs 2,000), Madhya Pradesh Ladli Behna (Rs 1,500), Tamil Nadu Kalaignar Magalir Urimai Thogai (Rs 1,000), Maharashtra Majhi Ladki Bahin (Rs 1,500), Jharkhand Maiya Samman (Rs 2,500), Odisha Subhadra (Rs 10,000 a year), Assam Orunodoi (Rs 1,250), and Delhi Lakshmi Yojana (Rs 2,500).

    Do the transfers reach the poorest, or do barriers exclude them?

    • Rationalisation cuts: Maharashtra and Madhya Pradesh have reduced beneficiary numbers in the name of rationalisation.
    • Gatekeeping criteria: Delhi’s scheme requires a recommendation from the local MLA or MP, plausibly to cap numbers before rollout.
    • Access barriers: Lack of documents, weak bank access and errors in digital records still exclude eligible women.

    Conclusion:

    The transfers are used well by the women who receive them, but states have little fiscal room, since most spending is pre-committed and the social sector share of GDP is already falling. Without new resource mobilisation, the schemes are financed by squeezing the very education and health services their beneficiaries rely on. The unresolved question is whether states raise revenue to fund them or let public services erode.

    Back2Basics: 16th Finance Commission

    • Award period: The 16th Finance Commission’s recommendations cover the five years beginning 2026-27.
    • What it is: A constitutional body under Article 280, constituted every five years.
    • Mandate: Recommends the sharing of central taxes between the Centre and states (vertical devolution) and among states (horizontal devolution), plus grants-in-aid.

    [2022, GS2, 10 marks] Reforming the government delivery system through the Direct Benefit Transfer Scheme is a progressive step, but it has its limitations too. Comment.

  • Meta accused of stepping up takedowns of protest content

    Why in the News

    Meta is reported to be removing protest and political reels after routing takedown requests through the Ministry of Home Affairs Sahyog portal. The conflict is between the state’s power to order content removal and the citizen’s right to free speech online.

    What is Section 79(3)(b) of the Information Technology Act, 2000?

    1. Safe harbour condition: Section 79 gives intermediaries legal immunity for user content, conditional on acting on a government or court order.
    2. Takedown trigger: Under 79(3)(b), an intermediary must remove content on receiving actual knowledge through such an order.

    How does this differ from the Section 69A route?

    1. Procedural safeguards: Section 69A blocking requires a reasoned order and a review committee, with recorded justification.
    2. Weaker check: The 79(3)(b) route lacks the same documented safeguards, enabling faster and broader removals.
    3. Portal channel: Requests are routed through the MHA’s Sahyog portal, widening the volume of takedowns.

    Why does this raise a free speech concern?

    1. Political speech: Removal of protest reels targets expression at the core of Article 19(1)(a) protection.
    2. Opaque process: Users often receive no reasoned order they can challenge.

    What is the state’s justification?

    1. Public order: Removal is defended on grounds of preventing unrest and misinformation.

    Conclusion

    The dispute is over whether a fast track takedown route bypasses the procedural checks that protect online speech. The unresolved question is whether courts will require 69A style safeguards for 79(3)(b) removals.

    Back2Basics: Shreya Singhal Judgment (2015)

    1. Ruling: The Supreme Court struck down Section 66A of the IT Act for vagueness.
    2. Section 79: It read down Section 79(3)(b) to require a court or government order before takedown.

    Matching Previous Year Question

    “[2014, GS2, 12.5 marks] What do you understand by the concept ‘freedom of speech and expression’? Does it cover hate speech also? Why do the films in India stand on a slightly different plane from other forms of expression? Discuss.”

  • Supreme Court to examine whether DPDP Act is crippling RTI

    Why in the News

    The Supreme Court has agreed to examine whether the Digital Personal Data Protection Act, 2023 is being used to defeat the Right to Information Act, 2005. The conflict is between the right to informational privacy and the right of citizens to access public information.

    What is Section 44(3) of the DPDP Act, 2023?

    1. Amending provision: Section 44(3) amended Section 8(1)(j) of the RTI Act, which governs exemption of personal information.
    2. Effect: It removed the earlier public interest override, allowing any personal information to be withheld.

    Why does this threaten the Right to Information?

    1. Blanket exemption: Officials can now deny information by labelling it ‘personal data’ without a public interest test.
    2. Journalism risk: Investigative reporting that relies on named records could be gagged.
    3. Accountability loss: Asset disclosures and beneficiary lists that expose wrongdoing may fall outside access.

    What is the case for the privacy safeguard?

    1. Fundamental right: Privacy was recognised as a fundamental right under Article 21 in the K.S. Puttaswamy judgment.
    2. Data misuse: Uncontrolled disclosure of personal data can enable profiling and harm.

    What must be resolved for the two laws to coexist?

    1. Public interest test: A restored balancing standard is the missing precondition for reconciling access and privacy.

    Conclusion

    The central question is whether privacy protection can be read so widely that it nullifies transparency. The next milestone is the Court’s substantive hearing on the challenge to Section 44(3).

    Back2Basics: Right to Information Act, 2005

    1. Objective: Empowers citizens to seek information from public authorities to promote transparency and accountability.
    2. Key body: Central and State Information Commissions adjudicate appeals and complaints.
    3. Section 8: Lists exemptions from disclosure, including the personal information clause now amended.

    “[2020, GS2, 10 marks] ‘Recent amendments to the Right to Information Act will have profound impact on the autonomy and independence of the Information Commission’. Discuss.”

  • Special Intensive Revision of electoral rolls faces fresh SC scrutiny

    Why in the News

    The Supreme Court agreed to consider a plea alleging misuse of Form 7 during Uttar Pradesh’s Special Intensive Revision of electoral rolls. In Karnataka, nearly half of Bengaluru’s voters are flagged for possible deletion ahead of the draft roll. The draft roll is due on 17 August 2026.

    What is the Special Intensive Revision of electoral rolls?

    1. Definition: the Special Intensive Revision (SIR) is a house to house exercise by the Election Commission to update and verify electoral rolls.
    2. Enumeration: electors are mapped and verified, and doubtful entries are flagged for review.
    3. Draft stage: a draft roll is published, followed by a claims and objections phase before finalisation.

    What is Form 7 and how is it alleged to be misused?

    1. Form 7: a statutory mechanism under the Registration of Electors Rules, 1960, for limited and bona fide objections to inclusion, or deletion on narrow grounds.
    2. Allegation: a Congress Member of Parliament cited documented evidence of bulk, fraudulent and targeted deletion attempts.
    3. Targeting: the plea says objections hit minority and marginalised electors, including those already verified during the revision.
    4. Mechanical filing: Booth Level Officers reportedly received pre filled Form 7 applications with identical grounds and no credible basis.
    5. Respondents: the Election Commission and the Chief Electoral Officer of Uttar Pradesh are named respondents.

    What is the ASDDO flag in Karnataka?

    1. Full form: Absent, Shifted, Dead, Duplicate or Other.
    2. Scale: of Bengaluru’s 1.03 crore voters, 49.42 lakh are flagged under this category.
    3. State total: across Karnataka, 1.11 crore voters, one fifth of the 5.54 crore mapped, are flagged.
    4. Hotspots: ten Bengaluru constituencies show flagged deletions above 50 percent, led by Bommanahalli at 57.08 percent.

    [2017] For election to the Lok Sabha, a nomination paper can be filed by
    (a) Anyone residing in India.
    (b) A resident of the constituency from which the election is to be contested.
    (c) Any citizen of India whose name appears in the electoral roll of a constituency.
    (d) Any citizen of India.

  • How excessive police force turns peaceful marches into medical crises 

    Why in the News

    An analysis examines how crowd control weapons meant to be non lethal cause serious injury during protests. The tension is between the state’s duty to maintain order and its obligation to protect the right to protest safely.

    What are less lethal weapons?

    1. Non lethal intent: Less lethal weapons are meant to disperse crowds without killing, but can cause serious harm.
    2. Common types: They include tear gas, pepper and PAVA spray, lathis, pellet guns, and shock batons.
    3. Chemical agents: Tear gas is a riot control agent that irritates the eyes and respiratory tract.

    Which are the types of less lethal weapons?

    1. Tear Gas: A chemical riot-control agent that causes intense eye irritation, tearing, coughing, breathing difficulty, and temporary disorientation. Its main chemical compounds include CS Gas (2-chlorobenzalmalononitrile), CN Gas (Chloroacetophenone), OC Gas (Oleoresin Capsicum), CR Gas (Dibenzoxazepine) and Chloropicrin (PS).
    2. Pepper Spray: An oleoresin capsicum (OC)-based spray that causes severe burning of the eyes, skin, and respiratory tract, leading to temporary incapacitation.
    3. PAVA Spray: A synthetic pepper spray (Pelargonic Acid Vanillylamide) that causes intense eye irritation and pain with a more controlled and consistent effect than natural pepper spray.
    4. Lathi: A wooden or polycarbonate baton used by police for crowd control through physical force.
    5. Pellet Guns: Firearms that discharge multiple small pellets to disperse crowds; they can cause serious injuries, particularly to the eyes. They are loaded with cartridges containing hundreds of small metal sub-projectiles.
    6. Shock Batons (Stun Batons): Handheld electroshock devices that deliver a brief electric shock to temporarily immobilise a person through pain and muscle disruption.

    Why do these weapons cause medical crises?

    1. Misuse at range: Pellet guns fired at close range or at the head cause blinding injuries.
    2. Enclosed spaces: Tear gas used in confined areas raises the risk of asphyxiation.
    3. Vulnerable groups: Children and people with respiratory illness face higher harm.

    What do international and domestic norms say?

    1. Chemical Weapons Convention: Under the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons rules, the Chemical Weapons Convention bans tear gas in warfare while permitting it for domestic policing.
    2. UN guidance: The United Nations Guidance on Less Lethal Weapons sets limits on their use.
    3. Precedent: The 2016 pellet gun injuries in Jammu and Kashmir left many with permanent vision loss.

    Conclusion

    The weapons are lawful for policing yet routinely cause disproportionate harm in practice. The unresolved gap is enforceable standards on how and when they are deployed.

    Back2Basics

    The United Nations Guidance on Less Lethal Weapons

    The United Nations Human Rights Guidance on the Use of Less-Lethal Weapons in Law Enforcement, released by the UN Human Rights Office (OHCHR), provides international standards for the lawful design, testing, training, and deployment of less-lethal equipment to prevent unnecessary harm, abuse, and human rights violations during policing and assemblies.

    Core Principles

    1. Legality: Use must be strictly authorized by domestic and international law.
    2. Necessity: Force is applied only when strictly necessary to achieve a legitimate law enforcement objective.
    3. Proportionality: Harm caused must not outweigh the objective; excessive force is prohibited.
    4. Accountability: States and agencies must track, record, and review every deployment of less-lethal systems.

    Scope and Covered Equipment

    1. Chemical Irritants: Regulations on tear gas and pepper spray deployment parameters.
    2. Kinetic Impact Projectiles: Standards for rubber bullets and beanbag rounds to avoid lethal head or torso strikes.
    3. Electric-Shock Weapons: Protocols for Tasers and other projectile stun systems.
    4. Area-Effect Tools: Oversight on water cannons and acoustic disruption gear.

    PYQ Relevance

    [UPSC 2021] Though the Human Rights Commissions have contributed immensely to the protection of human rights in India, yet they have failed to assert themselves against the mighty and powerful. Analyzing their structural and practical limitations, suggest remedial measures.

    Linkage: The PYQ examines India’s human rights protection framework and institutional accountability. The article highlights excessive use of less-lethal weapons and the need for stronger human rights safeguards and accountability.