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Subject: Polity

  • Dozen Bengal Tribunal judges flag their EC portal: ‘Can’t serve notices, hold hearings or restore deleted voters’

    Why in the News

    The appeal route the Supreme Court built for 27 lakh voters deleted in West Bengal’s Special Intensive Revision (SIR) promises a hearing, but its tribunals cannot serve notices, hold hearings or restore voters on their portal. Judges of more than a dozen of the 19 tribunals recorded these gaps in August, in minutes sent to the Election Commission of India (ECI) and the Calcutta High Court’s Chief Justice.

    How did the appeal tribunals come about?

    1. What they are: Single-member bodies of retired High Court judges that hear a deleted voter’s appeal against removal from the roll, like an appeals court for the voter list.
    2. Court takes over: Invoking Article 142 (its power to pass any order needed for “complete justice”), the Court on February 20 ordered judicial officers to decide electors’ eligibility.
    3. Flagged by software: The ECI’s centralised software listed 60.06 lakh electors for “logical discrepancies” (mismatches its algorithm found in their records) or as “unmapped”.
    4. Deleted before polls: Judicial officers deleted 27.16 lakh of them weeks before the April polls. The Court then ordered the tribunals on March 10.
    5. The takeaway: The tribunals are the only check on deletions made in haste before an election, so their tools decide whether that check works.

    What did the judges say the portal cannot do?

    1. Serving notices: The portal, built by the ECI’s IT division, cannot serve notice, even after repeated requests. A notice format the judges approved in May was never used.
    2. Securing documents: Tribunals cannot obtain additional documents through it, so they email district officials, who respond poorly.
    3. Hearings and restoration: There is no facility for virtual hearings. A voter cannot be restored on the portal once an appeal is disposed of, even on a judicial direction.
    4. Order copies: Appellants cannot get a certified or downloadable copy of the order, so they cannot learn why they were deleted or included.
    5. Physical appeals: Appeals filed on paper with district officers are not digitised or properly recorded, which the judges warned would mean “injustice”.

    Why do the portal gaps undermine the appeal process?

    1. Court’s conditions unmet: The Court’s April 1 order told tribunals to give reasons and revisit records. The judges said that without these tools voters lose due process, a fair hearing.
    2. Ignored warning: On May 22, a tribunal judge told the Chief Justice that missing notices were slowing appeal decisions and wrong disposal figures were reaching the press.
    3. Slow disposal: Only 1.26 lakh of 38.31 lakh appeals had been decided by early September, the ECI told the Supreme Court.
    4. Repeat failure: Before the polls, the Court recorded an “urgent concern” over an ECI mistake in the judicial officers’ portal.
    5. Central control of software: Two Election Commissioners had objected that ECINET, the ECI’s main digital system, restricted field officers’ access.

    Did the deletions decide the election?

    1. Result and claim: The Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) won the April polls by a landslide, and the Trinamool Congress (TMC) blamed deletions for its defeat.
    2. Seats in question: Deletions exceeded the victory margin in 49 of 293 seats.
    3. Even split: The BJP won 26 of those seats and the TMC 21, so the claim is more political than empirical.

    Challenges

    1. Software over court orders: A portal’s design, not the Court’s order, now sets what a judicial body can do.
    2. No deadline for appeals: Rolls freeze when nominations close, so an appeal won later cannot restore a vote for that election.
    3. Opaque flagging: “Logical discrepancies” have no published definition, so a voter cannot know what to rebut.

    Way Forward

    1. Portal fix under supervision: The ECI should add notice, document, hearing, restoration and order-download functions by a deadline the Calcutta High Court sets.
    2. Digitise paper appeals: District officers should upload every physical appeal, as the ECI’s own notification requires.
    3. Public disposal data: The ECI should publish tribunal-wise disposal figures every week.

    Conclusion

    The Court built an appeal route for deleted voters, but whether it works depends on a portal the ECI controls and has not fixed. Whether either court orders those functions added will decide if the remaining appeals are heard before the rolls next decide an election.

    Key numbers

    1. Appeals by deleted voters: 22.21 lakh, ECI submission to the Supreme Court, September 2026.
    2. Appeals against inclusions: 16.10 lakh, seeking deletion of listed voters, same submission.

    Matching Previous Year Question

    “[2026, GS2, 10 marks] Is the right to vote a fundamental right? Discuss the position of the Election Commission of India while undertaking the revision of electoral rolls. Can it also examine the question of citizenship of voters?”

  • Why are States divided over the mining amendment?

    Why in the News

    Taxing mineral rights and mineral-bearing land, which a nine-judge Constitution Bench held in Mineral Area Development Authority v. Steel Authority of India (2024) to be largely a State power, now needs conditions set by the Union under the Mines and Minerals (Development and Regulation) Amendment Act, 2026. Mineral-rich States have split on challenging it, along lines of revenue dependence and political alignment.

    How does the Constitution divide power over minerals?

    1. Regulation: States regulate mines under State List Entry 23. Under Union List Entry 54, Parliament can take control in the public interest, like a master switch.
    2. Taxation: Separately, Entries 50 and 49 of the State List let States tax mineral rights (the right to extract minerals) and land.
    3. The takeaway: Regulation and taxation sit in different entries, so the dispute is whether a regulatory power can be used to cut a taxing power.

    What does the amendment change?

    1. Wider central control: The Act, passed by Parliament, extends the Centre’s regulatory power from mines and mineral development to mineral-bearing land.
    2. Tax bar: States may not impose fresh taxes on mineral rights or mineral-bearing land, except under conditions the Union government prescribes.
    3. Past dues cancelled: Mineral taxes that States imposed but had not fully collected before the Act took effect are cancelled.
    4. Clash with the ruling: The Court let Parliament limit State taxes on mineral rights, but held that Entry 54 cannot curtail their power to tax mineral-bearing land.
    5. From mining to fiscal autonomy: Using a regulatory power to limit State taxes makes this a question of the fiscal autonomy, or revenue freedom, of mineral-rich States.

    What is at stake for the Centre and the States?

    1. The Centre’s case: Uneven, multiple State levies raise domestic mineral costs, so industries turn to imports and the exchequer bears more.
    2. Lost revenue: Cancelling unrecovered dues removes a revenue source and narrows future mineral income for the major mineral-bearing States.
    3. Most dependent: Minerals supply 85% of non-tax revenue in Jharkhand and 80% in Odisha, so the curbs hit them hardest.
    4. Least dependent: The immediate impact is smaller in Telangana and Chhattisgarh.

    Why have States responded differently?

    1. Legal challenge: Karnataka, Telangana, Himachal Pradesh and Kerala plan to move the Supreme Court, saying the curbs undermine States’ fiscal powers and federalism.
    2. Kerala’s added objection: The new treatment of mineral-bearing land gives the Centre wider power over the State’s coastal and forest regions.
    3. Jharkhand’s warning: The Chief Minister warns that losing mineral taxes and past dues could hit social-security schemes benefiting millions.
    4. Odisha’s stand: The Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) government rejected the Opposition’s call for a special Assembly session, saying mineral revenue will not suffer.
    5. Alignment over dependence: Low-dependence Telangana, ruled outside the National Democratic Alliance (NDA), joined the challenge. Madhya Pradesh, Rajasthan and Chhattisgarh have not objected, so alignment decides who sues.

    How does the dispute fit India’s fiscal federalism?

    1. Asymmetric design: India’s fiscal federalism gives the Centre greater taxing powers and places greater spending duties on the States.
    2. Leverage over States: The Centre’s control of borrowing approvals and transfers limits States that depend on them.
    3. Recurring disputes: The amendment joins earlier Centre-State disputes over Goods and Services Tax compensation, Finance Commission mandates, the National Education Policy, the Citizenship Amendment Act and All-India Services rules.

    Challenges

    1. Ordinary law against a ruling: Parliament is doing by ordinary law what the Court’s reading of the State List ruled out.
    2. Retrospective loss: Cancelling dues already levied unsettles State budgets planned around them.
    3. No bargaining forum: No standing body reconciles uniform mineral costs with States’ room to tax. Eg. The Inter-State Council last met in 2016.

    Way Forward

    1. Consult on conditions: The Union should frame the prescribed conditions for State mineral taxes with States through the Inter-State Council.
    2. Transitional compensation: The Centre should compensate States for cancelled dues over a fixed transition period.
    3. Rate ceiling, not a bar: A ceiling on State mineral levies in place of Union approval would keep costs predictable.

    Conclusion

    The amendment answers industry’s cost complaint by moving taxing room from mineral-rich States to the Union, against the Court’s reading of where that power lies. Whether the Supreme Court lets a regulatory entry override a taxing entry will decide the States’ planned challenges.

    Key numbers

    1. Mineral share of non-tax revenue, Karnataka and Madhya Pradesh: 48% and 41%.
    2. Mineral share of non-tax revenue, Rajasthan: 39%.
    3. Least dependent States: Telangana 11%, Chhattisgarh 6%.

    Matching Previous Year Question

    “[2021] Which one of the following in Indian polity is an essential feature that indicates that it is federal in character? (a) The independence of the judiciary is safeguarded. (b) The Union Legislature has elected representatives from constituent units. (c) The Union Cabinet can have elected representatives from regional parties. (d) The Fundamental Rights are enforceable by Courts of Law. ANSWER: (a)”

  • House privileges vs free speech: The question before Supreme Court

    Why in the News

    Since the Searchlight case (Pandit MSM Sharma vs Sri Krishna Sinha, 1959), free speech has been held to yield to a legislature’s privileges, and a seven-judge Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court is now testing that rule. The reference began when the Tamil Nadu Legislative Assembly sentenced journalists to jail for reports it said breached its privileges.

    What are legislative privileges, and where do they meet fundamental rights?

    1. What they are: Legislative privileges are powers and immunities that let legislatures work without interference, including power to punish a breach of privilege. They work like a court’s contempt power.
    2. Constitutional source: Article 105 covers Parliament, and Article 194(3) grants State legislatures their privileges and immunities.
    3. Rights on the other side: Privileges can collide with three rights:
      • Article 19(1)(a): free speech, including press freedom;
      • Article 14: equality before the law;
      • Article 21: life and personal liberty.
    4. The question: The Bench must decide whether privileges override these rights and can be used against citizens and journalists at all.
    5. The takeaway: If privilege prevails, a legislature can jail a critic by resolution, beyond a court’s check.

    How did the Tamil Nadu dispute reach the Court?

    1. Reports referred: In 2008 the Speaker sent The Hindu’s reports of exchanges between the then Chief Minister and the Opposition to the Privileges Committee, calling them “contrary to truth”.
    2. Editorial referred: An editorial saying privilege protects the House’s functioning, not the government’s reputation, was referred too, along with Murasoli‘s Tamil translation.
    3. Jail and stay: The Assembly sentenced five journalists and Murasoli’s editor to 15 days’ imprisonment. The Supreme Court stayed the warrants and referred the matter to a Constitution Bench.

    Why do two Constitution Bench rulings conflict?

    1. Searchlight, 1959: By a 4:1 majority, the Court held that privilege includes the power to prohibit publication, since the special privilege clause prevails over the general free speech clause.
    2. Keshav Singh dispute: The Uttar Pradesh Assembly jailed Keshav Singh over pamphlets alleging an MLA’s corruption. It then ordered the Allahabad High Court judges who bailed him brought in custody.
    3. Keshav Singh opinion: On the President’s Special Reference No. 1 of 1964, the Court held that:
      • courts may examine detention ordered for breach of privilege;
      • legislatures cannot act against judges or lawyers for doing their duty;
      • Searchlight set no universal rule that Part III rights (the fundamental rights) yield.
    4. Blitz editor, 1954: The Court freed the Blitz editor, held on a Speaker’s warrant, because he was not produced before a magistrate within 24 hours.
    5. Sita Soren, 2024: Sita Soren v. Union of India held that bribery is not protected, overruling a 1998 grant of immunity to MPs who took bribes to vote.

    What do the petitioners argue?

    1. Function, not reputation: Privilege protects the House’s functioning, not a Chief Minister, a government or “the fame and reputation of the ruling party”.
    2. Liberty by resolution: Under Article 21, taking away liberty “by mere passing of a resolution” is “an anathema to the Constitution”. Any jailing must meet fairness and due process.
    3. Free press: Journalists cannot work “in an atmosphere of fear and terror”, since honest reporting is “the bedrock of parliamentary democracy”.

    Challenges

    1. No codified list: Privileges remain largely uncodified, so no one knows in advance what counts as a breach.
    2. Judge in its own cause: The House acts as complainant, judge and enforcer in a privilege case.
    3. Undefined contempt: “Contempt of the House” has no definition, so it can be turned against critics.

    Way Forward

    1. Privileges law: Parliament should enact a law defining privileges, breach and contempt.
    2. Harmonious reading: Rights should yield only as far as the House’s functioning requires.
    3. Review and time limits: Detention for breach should face prompt judicial review, and privilege motions a fixed deadline such as 60 days.

    Conclusion

    The Court must decide whether a legislature’s power to protect its work extends to punishing those who report on it. Whether the Bench confines privilege to the House’s functioning, or keeps the older rule that speech yields, will set how freely the press can cover legislatures.

    Back2Basics: Advisory jurisdiction (Article 143)

    1. Discretionary reference: Under Article 143(1), the President may refer a question of law or fact of public importance to the Supreme Court.
    2. Advisory, not binding: The Court may decline to answer, and its opinion does not bind the President. Eg. In re Kerala Education Bill (1958), the first reference.
    3. Bench strength: Article 145(3) requires at least five judges to hear a reference.

    Matching Previous Year Question

    “[2014, GS2, 12 marks] The ‘Powers, Privileges and Immunities of Parliament and its Members’ as envisaged in Article 105 of the Constitution leave room for a large number of un-codified and un-enumerated privileges to continue. Assess the reasons for the absence of legal codification of the ‘parliamentary privileges’. How can this problem be addressed?”

  • ECI must not force voters to lie. Solution may lie in a Form 6X

    Why in the News

    The Election Commission of India (ECI) has moved from deleting names in the Special Intensive Revision (SIR) to re-enrolling the eligible voters it removed, but through Form 6, a form meant only for first-time voters. Its new instructions order a special enrolment drive in 20 States and Union Territories after about 13 crore names left the draft rolls.

    What is the ECI’s corrective drive?

    1. What it is: A drive restoring eligible voters that the SIR, a door-to-door re-check of voters, wrongly removed. It is like fixing a register that dropped real members.
    2. How it works: Officials compare pre-SIR and post-SIR rolls, visit missing voters at home and help them enrol. Political parties may assist.
    3. When ordered: Instructions issued on September 29 were reinforced at an October 1 meeting with Chief Electoral Officers, the ECI’s top officer in each State.
    4. Two target groups: The drive targets young voters left unenrolled and long-registered voters deleted from the rolls.
    5. The takeaway: The ECI has in effect admitted wrongful deletions, so the legal route back now matters.

    Why must the ECI account for young voters?

    1. Long-standing commitment: The ECI long urged every new adult to register at once. The Union Cabinet’s 2011 decision to mark 25 January as National Voters’ Day reflected this.
    2. Four qualifying dates: A 2022 reform allowed enrolment on four qualifying dates a year, one per quarter, each a date on which eligibility is counted. Seventeen-year-olds could apply in advance.
    3. The 2024 lapse: The ECI must explain how many young people eligible from 2024 stayed unenrolled, and why. A corrective drive is no substitute for that explanation.

    Why is Form 6 the wrong route for deleted voters?

    1. A form for new voters: Form 6 is the “Application Form for New Voters”. Its declaration reads, “I am applying for inclusion in Electoral Roll for the first time.”
    2. A false statement: Someone who has voted for 20 or 30 years cannot sign this honestly, yet a first-time applicants’ form is being used to restore them.
    3. Penalty for voters: Under Section 31 of the Representation of the People Act, 1950, a false declaration is punishable with up to a year in prison, a fine, or both.
    4. Risk for officials: Under Sections 45 and 49 of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita (BNS), knowingly prompting or helping an offence is abetment, punishable like the offence itself.
    5. Voters who objected: Some registered voters reportedly protested but were made to file Form 6 anyway.

    How would a restoration form work?

    1. Restoration, not registration: First-time voters would register through Form 6. Wrongly deleted voters would be restored through a new Form 6X.
    2. What it would ask: The voter gives the old Electors Photo Identity Card (EPIC) number, the voter ID, and earlier roll details.
    3. Checks before restoring: Officials verify whether the person is still eligible, has shifted, is registered elsewhere or has become disqualified.
    4. No litigation needed: The electoral machinery already holds these records, so voters should not have to go to court to recover their vote.

    Challenges

    1. Weak legal footing: An entry restored on a false declaration is open to later challenge.
    2. Burden on the wronged: The ECI deleted the names, yet each deleted voter must apply again.
    3. Field capacity: Home visits depend on Booth Level Officers (BLOs) already stretched by the SIR.

    Way Forward

    1. Notify Form 6X: The Law Ministry should amend the Registration of Electors Rules, 1960, a change the author says takes a few hours.
    2. Quarterly enrolment data: The ECI should publish applications, enrolments, rejections and pendency each quarter, and account for young citizens who missed elections.
    3. Accountability: The ECI should publish the drive’s results, explain the failures behind it, and hold obstructing officials to account.

    Conclusion

    The ECI has conceded wrongful deletions but routes the remedy through a declaration that is untrue for every voter it serves. Whether a separate restoration route is created before the drive closes will decide if restored voters carry legal risk.

    Electoral roll revision in India

    1. Special Intensive Revision: A time-bound, door-to-door enumeration in which BLOs physically verify every entry, unlike the routine annual summary revision.
    2. Purpose: It removes deceased, duplicate or shifted entries and adds newly eligible citizens.
    3. Constitutional basis: Article 324 gives the ECI superintendence, direction and control over preparing electoral rolls.
    4. History: The first intensive revisions ran from 1952 to 1956, and about 14 have been held in all.

    Matching Previous Year Question

    “[2026, GS2, 10 marks] Is the right to vote a fundamental right? Discuss the position of the Election Commission of India while undertaking the revision of electoral rolls. Can it also examine the question of citizenship of voters?”

  • The knock on the Supreme Court’s door

    Why in the News

    The Election Commission of India (ECI) was designed as a multi-member body whose members check one another, but during the Special Intensive Revision (SIR) of electoral rolls it often became a one-man show. An Indian Express investigation documented this shift. Two Supreme Court judges, one sitting and one retired, have now called the SIR a threat to the right to vote, putting the Court’s own silence on test.

    What is the SIR, and what went wrong in how the ECI ran it?

    1. What the SIR is: An intensive revision prepares the voter roll afresh through house-to-house checks, rather than updating the existing list.
    2. Multi-member design: The ECI has more than one member so that no single officer decides alone, like a bench rather than a single judge.
    3. Internal checks weakened: The investigation found decisions taken by one person, which undermines the checks and balances inside the Commission.
    4. Burden on the voter: The ECI abandoned its record of inclusiveness. Vulnerable voters had to prove eligibility, facing a “hurdle race” at every SIR stage.
    5. The takeaway: When the body that guards the voter list excludes voters, the right to vote itself is at stake.

    Why do two judges call the SIR a threat to the right to vote?

    1. Sitting judge’s view: Supreme Court judge Justice Ujjal Bhuyan said the SIR’s mass disenfranchisement, or stripping citizens of the vote, violates the Constitution.
    2. Vote as the soul: He said cutting a citizen off from the vote is like “taking out the soul from the body”.
    3. Constituent Assembly’s choice: He recalled that the freedom struggle made universal adult franchise a natural choice and an essential part of democracy.
    4. Equal vote, equal value: Giving every citizen an equal vote, whatever their identity or social position, was the new nation’s first step towards equality.
    5. Retired judge’s view: Former Supreme Court judge Rohinton Fali Nariman said the SIR’s removal of voters puts the right to vote, the “heart of our democracy”, in “great peril”.

    Is the Supreme Court itself now on test?

    1. Troubling silence: The Court gave the ECI the benefit of every doubt during the SIR. The judges’ remarks reflect a disquiet the Court must now address.
    2. Pending cases: The Court is hearing cases on how the SIR was conducted and on the ECI’s appointment process and functioning.
    3. Form 6 changes: The Court has said it did not approve changes to Form 6, the application for registering new voters, which made registration harder.
    4. Internal decision-making: The Court wants answers from the ECI on how decisions were taken inside the Commission.
    5. Article 324 record: The Court has a strong record of upholding Article 324, which secures the ECI. Keeping that record requires it to keep questioning the ECI.

    Challenges

    1. Statutory right only: The right to vote is a statutory right, which weakens a voter’s challenge to deletion. Eg. Kuldip Nayar v. Union of India (2006).
    2. Executive-led appointments: The selection panel for Election Commissioners carries a government majority, which feeds doubts about independence.
    3. Document burden: Migrants, the poor and married women who moved often lack the papers the SIR demands.
    4. No recorded dissent: Decisions taken by one member leave no public record of the other members’ views.

    Way Forward

    1. Collective decisions: The ECI should take every SIR decision by a recorded vote of all its members.
    2. Notice before deletion: No name should leave the roll without individual notice and a hearing.
    3. Wider documents: The ECI should accept commonly held identity documents, including Aadhaar, as proof for inclusion.
    4. Time-bound hearings: The Supreme Court should fix a schedule to decide the SIR petitions before the next revised rolls are final.

    Conclusion

    The SIR has turned a body built to include voters into one accused of excluding them, and the Court’s restraint has let that drift continue. Whether the Court tests how the Commission reached its decisions will show if it still acts as the voter’s last guard.

    Back2Basics: Article 324

    1. Core power: Article 324 vests the superintendence, direction and control of electoral rolls and elections to Parliament, State Legislatures, and the offices of President and Vice-President in the ECI.
    2. Composition: The ECI has a Chief Election Commissioner (CEC) and such other Election Commissioners as the President fixes. It has been multi-member since 1993.
    3. Removal protection: The CEC can be removed only like a Supreme Court judge.
    4. Residuary power: The Court has read Article 324 as letting the ECI act where law is silent, but never against a statute.

    Matching Previous Year Question

    “[2026, GS2, 10 marks] Is the right to vote a fundamental right? Discuss the position of the Election Commission of India while undertaking the revision of electoral rolls. Can it also examine the question of citizenship of voters?”

  • [5th October 2026] The Hindu OpED: The ECI’s constitutional mandate is under strain

    [5th October 2026] The Hindu OpED: The ECI’s constitutional mandate is under strain

    Question (2018, GS2 – 10 Marks): In the light of recent controversy regarding the use of Electronic Voting Machines (EVM), what are the challenges before the Election Commission of India to ensure the trustworthiness of elections in India?
    Linkage: Addresses the primary constitutional burden placed on the ECI—ensuring public confidence, administrative neutrality, and procedural integrity in conducting free and fair elections amidst institutional controversies.
    [2017] Consider the following statements:
    1. The Election Commission of India is a five-member body.
    2. Union Ministry of Home Affairs decides the election schedule for the conduct of both general elections and bye-elections.
    3. Election Commission resolves the disputes relating to splits/mergers of recognized political parties.
    Which of the statements given above is/are correct?
    (a) 1 and 2 only (b) 2 only (c) 2 and 3 only (d) 3 only

    Mentor’s Comment

    The Constituent Assembly made the Election Commission independent so that it could protect voters from the executive. The Special Intensive Revision shows the reverse: independence without accountability allows the Commission itself to exclude voters. The reform question is not the Commission’s autonomy but the checks on the person who exercises it, in removal, appointment and immunity.

    Why in the News

    The Constitution placed the Election Commission of India (ECI) beyond executive control to stop partisan deletion of voters, yet the ECI now faces charges of mass deletion through a revision the law does not name. A former Secretary General of the Lok Sabha argues the Special Intensive Revision (SIR) lacks a legal basis and the Chief Election Commissioner (CEC)‘s unilateral decisions have created a constitutional crisis.

    Why did the Constitution-makers centralise and insulate the ECI?

    1. Original proposal: Draft Article 289 proposed decentralised machinery: a chief election commissioner in each province for State rolls and elections, and one at the Centre for national polls.
    2. Why it was rejected: Provincial commissioners, mostly Chief Ministers’ nominees, had deleted voters seen as opponents. Dr. B.R. Ambedkar moved a new Article centralising the machinery “outside the control of the executive government”.
    3. Loyalist fear: Shibban Lal Saxena feared a loyalist CEC and proposed appointment by a two-thirds parliamentary vote, like United States Senate confirmation.
    4. The takeaway: The mass deletion of voters that drove centralisation is now alleged against the central body itself.

    Does the law provide for a special intensive revision?

    1. Ordinary revision: Section 21(2) of the Representation of the People (RP) Act, 1950 provides for revision before each general election or by-election, or in any year the ECI directs.
    2. Method: Under Rule 25 of the Registration of Electors Rules, 1960, that revision may be intensive (roll prepared afresh), summary (existing roll updated), or partly both.
    3. Special revision: Section 21(3) allows a special revision for reasons recorded, but only for “any constituency or part of a constituency” where special circumstances exist.
    4. Limits of Article 324: Article 324 lets the ECI act where statute is silent, never against the law. Eg. Mohinder Singh Gill (1978) recognised this gap-filling power.

    Why do the deletions and the decision process raise constitutional questions?

    1. Scale of removal: About 13 crore voters have reportedly been removed nationwide, possibly the largest disenfranchisement exercise in any democracy.
    2. Article 326 conflict: Article 326 provides for universal adult suffrage, so its scheme is to include eligible voters. The SIR has instead worked to exclude them.
    3. Unilateral CEC: The two Election Commissioners (ECs) say they were excluded from crucial decisions. The author argues a decision the CEC takes alone is invalid, as is every action that follows.

    Can the CEC be held to account?

    1. Impeachment route: Opposition parties plan an impeachment motion. The CEC is removed like a Supreme Court judge, only on proved misbehaviour.
    2. Threshold barrier: The presiding officers of both Houses can disallow such a motion at the threshold.
    3. Lifelong immunity: Section 16 of the Chief Election Commissioner and Other Election Commissioners (Appointment, Conditions of Service and Term of Office) Act, 2023 shields the CEC and ECs from civil and criminal liability for life, which even the President lacks.

    Challenges

    1. Ambiguous statute: Section 21(3) does not define a special revision’s scale, so a State-wide exercise is contestable.
    2. Burden on electors: Deleted electors must prove eligibility to return. Eg. Lal Babu Hussein (1995) on this burden.
    3. No internal check: Decisions without the full Commission leave no record of dissent.
    4. Accountability gap: Threshold rejection of motions and lifelong immunity together leave little route to examine a CEC’s conduct.

    Way Forward

    1. Amend Section 21: Parliament should define State-wide revision, its procedure and safeguards in the RP Act.
    2. Recorded collective decisions: The ECI should take every SIR decision by a recorded vote of all three members.
    3. Narrow immunity: Parliament should limit Section 16 to acts done in good faith during the term.
    4. Notice before deletion: No name should leave the roll without individual notice and a hearing.

    Conclusion

    The ECI is now accused of the very exclusion it was built to prevent. Whether the Supreme Court tests the SIR’s legal basis before the remaining final rolls are published is what to watch.

    Independence of the Election Commission of India

    1. Appointment: Anoop Baranwal v. Union of India (2023) placed the Chief Justice of India on the selection panel until Parliament legislated. The 2023 Act replaced the Chief Justice with a Cabinet Minister.
    2. Unequal removal protection: An EC, unlike the CEC, can be removed on the CEC’s recommendation, so ECs lack the CEC’s security of tenure.
    3. Financial dependence: The ECI’s expenses are not charged on the Consolidated Fund of India, so they need Parliament’s vote. The Law Commission’s 255th Report recommended charging them.
    4. Post-retirement posts: No constitutional bar stops a CEC or EC taking a later government post.

  • EC releases video for EROs on SIR notice disposal; no written instructions so far

    Why in the News

    Notice cases in the Special Intensive Revision (SIR), which earlier needed documents or a hearing order to settle, can now be cleared by Electoral Registration Officers (EROs) without a hearing or documents. The Election Commission (EC) has added these options to its ERONET portal but is explaining them only through a demonstration video, with no written instructions.

    What has changed in disposing of SIR notices?

    1. What a notice case is: Electors flagged for “no mapping” or “logical discrepancies” (doubtful entries) in the draft roll are served notices. They must produce one of 12 documents prescribed by the EC.
    2. Who decides: The ERO has final authority over a constituency’s electoral roll. ERONET is the portal through which EROs record each decision.
    3. Three new options:
      • where the Booth Level Officer (BLO) has uploaded documents, the ERO can mark an elector “found OK” without a hearing order;
      • where no documents were collected, the ERO can mark the elector eligible after uploading a hearing order;
      • where notices are yet to be generated, the ERO can choose “without hearing” or “with hearing”.
    4. Earlier rule: A hearing order was needed only to mark an elector “found not eligible”, with the reason recorded.
    5. The takeaway: EROs can now clear cases faster, but the legal basis rests on a video rather than a written order.

    Why does the absence of written instructions matter?

    1. Video only: The EC’s Information Technology Department made an eight-minute video, recorded on October 1, and showed it to Delhi EROs at a meeting.
    2. Shifting instructions: One ERO said instructions had come “some written and some oral”, and many were withdrawn. Eg. Delhi EROs were told to identify “suspected foreigners”, then told not to.
    3. Statutory authority: The same ERO said he will wait for written orders, because the Representation of the People (RP) Act, 1950 vests decisions in him.
    4. Centralisation charge: Critics allege bringing ERONET under ECINET, the EC’s integrated digital platform, curtailed field officers’ powers. EROs had sought these options since the notice phase began.

    Where do the options apply, and how much can they change?

    1. Coverage: The options apply in the 10 States and Union Territories (UTs) where the third phase of the SIR is still under way.
    2. Too late for some: Final rolls were already published elsewhere. In West Bengal, 27 lakh of the 60 lakh electors served notices were left out of the final roll.
    3. Scale: Over nine crore notices have been served in the second and third phases.
    4. Limited use where hearings are fixed: The options matter little where every notice already carries a hearing venue and time. Eg. All of Delhi’s notices do.
    5. No reversal: EROs cannot reverse a case once an elector is marked ineligible. Over 350 Delhi electors were marked so, and the Delhi Chief Electoral Officer cautioned EROs against unverified use of the options.

    Challenges

    1. Natural justice: An ineligible marking cannot be reversed, so marking without a fresh hearing can wrongly exclude voters.
    2. Unequal treatment: Electors in States already finalised never got the faster route.
    3. Legal uncertainty: Decisions made on a video, not a written order, are open to later legal challenge.
    4. Field capacity: BLOs collecting documents door to door face heavy workloads.

    Way Forward

    1. Written order: The EC should issue a written order stating when each option may be used.
    2. Review window: Allow an ERO to review an ineligible marking on fresh documents.
    3. Finalised States: Let excluded electors apply afresh through a simple inclusion form.
    4. Public data: Publish constituency-wise counts of cases cleared under each option.

    Conclusion

    The new options speed up disposal of notices but leave EROs exercising statutory powers on unwritten guidance. Whether the EC issues a written order before the remaining final rolls are published, starting this month, will decide if these decisions hold.

    Key numbers

    1. Delhi notices: 33.1 lakh, all with hearing venue and time; notice phase runs till 30 November.
    2. Final roll dates: Delhi on 4 December; Haryana, Maharashtra and Telangana in November; Tripura in February 2027.

    Back2Basics: Electoral Registration Officer (ERO)

    1. Legal basis: Section 13B of the Representation of the People Act, 1950 provides an ERO for every Assembly constituency.
    2. Appointment: The EC designates an officer of the government or a local authority, in consultation with the State government.
    3. Role: The ERO prepares and revises the constituency’s electoral roll and decides claims and objections.
    4. Hierarchy: EROs work under the District Election Officer and the State’s Chief Electoral Officer.

    Matching Previous Year Question

    “[2026, GS2, 10 marks] Is the right to vote a fundamental right? Discuss the position of the Election Commission of India while undertaking the revision of electoral rolls. Can it also examine the question of citizenship of voters?”

  • Obstacle race

    Why in the News

    Opposition parties, student groups and citizens protested in Delhi, Mumbai and elsewhere on Gandhi Jayanti, demanding the resignation of Chief Election Commissioner (CEC) Gyanesh Kumar. They charge that the Special Intensive Revision (SIR), meant to “clean” electoral rolls, has become a serial disenfranchisement of lakhs of citizens.

    What is the SIR, and how does it shift the burden onto voters?

    1. What it is: The SIR is the Election Commission of India (ECI)‘s fresh, door-to-door re-verification of every elector. It is like making every member of a club re-apply for membership.
    2. Nationwide expansion: After a Supreme Court verdict upheld the SIR, the ECI extended the Bihar method to every State and Union Territory (UT). It added an undefined “logical discrepancies” exclusion ground, first used in West Bengal.
    3. Burden reversed: Electors must prove their eligibility, so many are deleted first and verified later. Deleted voters return only as fresh applicants in the claims phase, and only if they notice the deletion.
    4. Easy deletion: Mass deletion requests are easy to file and quick to process. Getting back on the roll is onerous.
    5. The takeaway: A process meant to purify the rolls now removes eligible voters first and leaves them to fight their way back.

    How large have the deletions become?

    1. Scale of removal: Nearly 13.4 crore electors have been removed from draft rolls, about 14% of the electorate before revision.
    2. Rising each phase: Each phase has deleted more than the last, from 8.3% in Bihar to 17% in the third phase.

    Which procedural changes are contested?

    1. Dissent inside the ECI: Members of the Commission itself objected to procedural changes that are plainly illegal.
    2. Form 6 altered: Form 6, the voter enrolment form, now asks whether the applicant, parents or grandparents were on the last SIR roll. The Registration of Electors Rules, 1960 were never amended.
    3. West Bengal requests: 16.1 lakh requests were filed to delete electors whom judicial officers had already cleared.
    4. Central database: A centralised roll database in New Delhi made such bulk requests possible.

    How were the protests handled?

    1. Delhi clampdown: The government refused permission, imposed prohibitory orders banning gatherings, shut the Internet near Jantar Mantar, closed 11 Metro stations and detained over 700 protesters.
    2. Mumbai defiance: Police denied permission for a gathering at Shivaji Park, but protesters assembled anyway.

    Is restoration enough, and who is accountable?

    1. Implicit admission: The ECI has asked Booth Level Officers (BLOs), the field staff who verify electors, to restore deleted voters. This concedes that the process disenfranchised many.
    2. Majority could act: Election Commissioners Sukhbir Singh Sandhu and Vivek Joshi form the ECI’s majority and could have overruled the CEC.
    3. Stake for democracy: As carried out, the SIR obstructs universal adult franchise, every adult citizen’s right to vote, and electoral democracy itself.

    Challenges

    1. Hearing before deletion: Deleting first denies due process. Eg. Lal Babu Hussein (1995) barred removal without notice and hearing.
    2. Paperless electors: Migrants, the poor and women who moved after marriage struggle to produce documents tracing parents on old rolls.
    3. Opaque criteria: “Logical discrepancies” has no published definition, so electors cannot know why they were struck off.
    4. Weak collective check: A three-member Commission whose majority stays silent offers no internal correction.

    Way Forward

    1. Notice first: The ECI should issue individual notice and hold a hearing before any name leaves the roll.
    2. Rules before forms: The Union Law Ministry should amend the 1960 Rules before any form changes.
    3. Constituency data: Publish deletions by constituency and ground, so anomalies surface early.
    4. Recorded decisions: The Commission should take SIR decisions by recorded vote of all three members.

    Conclusion

    A clean roll and an inclusive roll remain at odds, and the SIR has resolved that tension against the voter. How many deleted electors the BLO restoration drive actually returns before the final rolls will show whether the correction is real.

    Key numbers

    1. Second phase deletions: 12.9% of electors across 12 States and UTs.
    2. SIR coverage so far: 30 States and UTs.

    Matching Previous Year Question

    “[2026, GS2, 10 marks] Is the right to vote a fundamental right? Discuss the position of the Election Commission of India while undertaking the revision of electoral rolls. Can it also examine the question of citizenship of voters?”

  • A Court divided by its own architecture

    Why in the News

    A two-judge Bench of the Supreme Court has split on the challenge to the Chief Election Commissioner and other Election Commissioners (Appointment, Conditions of Service and Term of Office) Act, 2023. The judges differed not on the law’s validity but on whether a Bench of two could decide it at all, which exposes how the Court is organised.

    What does the 2023 Act provide, and what did Anoop Baranwal settle?

    1. Selection committee: The Act, enacted in December 2023, has the Prime Minister, the Leader of the Opposition and a Minister chosen by the Prime Minister recommend Election Commissioners.
    2. Interim arrangement: Earlier, in Anoop Baranwal vs Union of India (2023), a five-judge Constitution Bench had seated the Chief Justice of India (CJI) in the Minister’s place, as a stopgap until Parliament legislated.
    3. Settled principle: Baranwal read Article 324, which creates the Election Commission, to require appointments insulated from exclusive executive control. Under Article 141, that declaration binds every court.
    4. The takeaway: Parliament could drop the CJI, but the Act must still meet Baranwal’s standard of insulation from the executive.

    Why did the Bench split?

    1. Union’s late plea: Midway through hearings, the Union invoked Article 145(3) to seek at least five judges, a plea absent from its written reply.
    2. Datta’s view: Justice Dipankar Datta refused, holding that testing a committee where the executive holds two of three votes only applies Baranwal’s settled rule, so two judges suffice.
    3. Sharma’s view: Justice Satish Chandra Sharma agreed with the Union, since no ruling yet exists on the 2023 Act’s validity.
    4. Unusual referral: A split of two normally goes to three judges. Both instead asked the CJI to form a Constitution Bench, so petitioners in court since early 2024 wait again.

    Does Article 145(3) require a Constitution Bench for every new law?

    1. Text of the provision: Article 145(3) requires five judges only for a substantial question of constitutional interpretation, not for every important case or new statute.
    2. Settled test: Thakur Ganga Singh (1959) held interpretation arises only when parties advance competing readings of a constitutional provision. A three-judge Bench applied this to the provision in PUCL vs Union of India.
    3. Two-judge landmark rulings: On Sharma’s test, two-judge Benches could not have decided Shreya Singhal (Section 66A) or NALSA (transgender identity).
    4. Weak stare decisis: Stare decisis means courts stand by earlier rulings. Here a Bench of two declined to apply a principle five judges had settled.

    How has the Court’s structure produced delay?

    1. Original design: The Court began in 1950 with six judges, so the five-judge rule assumed it would mostly sit together.
    2. Today’s court: With 38 sanctioned judges sitting mainly in small panels on special leave petitions (requests to appeal), a Constitution Bench forms only when five judges are spare.
    3. Many courts in one: Scholar Nick Robinson calls the result many courts, each Bench speaking in its own voice.
    4. Decade-long references: Anoop Baranwal took eight years, and the Jai Bir Singh “industry” reference lay dormant 15 years. The judges call such delay “institutional embarrassment”.

    What reform is proposed, and what must it guard against?

    1. Permanent Constitution Bench: The joint order asks the CJI to explore a standing Bench for pure constitutional questions. The Law Commission’s 229th report (2009) proposed this, with regional Benches hearing appeals.
    2. Composition risk: The CJI can create such a Bench without amendment, but choosing its members shapes outcomes, so pre-set, transparent rules must decide composition.
    3. Inverted role: The Court, conceived as a guardian of the Constitution that also hears appeals, now sits mainly as an appellate court.

    Challenges

    1. Appeal-heavy docket: Special leave petitions leave few judges free for five-member Benches.
    2. Regional Bench resistance: The Court has long resisted regional Benches, so the Law Commission model has stalled.
    3. Elections under doubt: Commissioners chosen under the contested law will oversee several State and likely general elections before the case ends.

    Way Forward

    1. Roster committee: Bench formation should pass to a committee of the CJI and the next two senior-most judges.
    2. Reference deadlines: The Court should fix timelines for hearing references to larger Benches.
    3. Precedent discipline: A smaller Bench doubting a larger one should refer the doubt, not bypass the ruling.

    Conclusion

    Until constitutional cases get a standing Bench chosen by fixed rules, the Court will keep settling its gravest questions after the fact. Whether the CJI forms a Constitution Bench for this case, and on what rules, is the decision to watch.

    Matching Previous Year Question

    “[2022] Consider the following statements : 1. Pursuant to the report of H.N. Sanyal Committee, the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 was passed. 2. The Constitution of India empowers the Supreme Court and the High Courts to punish for contempt of themselves. 3. The Constitution of India defines Civil Contempt and Criminal Contempt. 4. In India, the Parliament is vested with the powers to make laws on Contempt of Court. Which of the statements given above is/are correct ?4 (a) 1 and 2 only (b) 1, 2 and 4 (c) 3 and 4 only (d) 3 only Answer: B”

  • ‘Left out’ voters: EC orders special drive in 20 states where SIR over

    Why in the News

    Voters deleted in the Special Intensive Revision (SIR) will now return through the plain statutory Form 6, not a form carrying an extra SIR declaration, in the 20 States and Union Territories (UTs) where the revision is over. The Election Commission of India (ECI) ordered this special drive amid scrutiny over 13 crore names struck off draft rolls in 30 States and UTs.

    What is the special drive, and how will it bring voters back?

    1. What the SIR was: A door to door recheck of every voter entry, like a fresh census of voters, that struck ineligible names off draft rolls.
    2. The directive: The ECI’s Secretary told all Chief Electoral Officers (CEOs), who run elections in each State, to enrol “left out” and first time electors under continuous updation, the routine process of adding voters at any time.
    3. Roll comparison and house visits: CEOs must compare pre-SIR and post-SIR rolls and list those deleted. Officials will then visit genuine voters to fill Form 6, the form for new voters, helped by party booth level agents.
    4. The takeaway: The Commission is using its ordinary enrolment route to repair exclusions its own revision created.

    Why was the SIR question dropped from Form 6?

    1. The July change: The online Form 6 began asking whether the applicant or the parents were on the roll after the last SIR. An 18 year old whose parents had been deleted could not answer truthfully.
    2. Who can change the form: Only the government can, by amending the Registration of Electors Rules, 1960, and it had not.
    3. Commissioners’ objection: Election Commissioners Sukhbir Singh Sandhu and Vivek Joshi objected in May that the Rules had not been amended. Sandhu later called the change “unauthorised/illegal”.
    4. The correction: The ECI’s letter to CEOs confines the declaration to the “SIR phase only”. Outside an SIR, the forms prescribed under the 1960 Rules apply.

    Why is control over ECINet contested?

    1. Dissent on record: The two Commissioners objected 14 times in 10 months to decisions taken without their knowledge, including centralised control of ECINet, the software holding every electoral roll.
    2. Law versus access: The law gives roll duties to Electoral Registration Officers (EROs), who maintain each constituency’s roll, and to CEOs. Sandhu noted that the Director General (IT) had centralised ECINet access instead, and Joshi sought an audit.
    3. Goa’s blocked restorations: Goa’s EROs cleared 97 deleted voters for restoration, but ECINet had no way to reverse a deletion. The Goa CEO’s messages to the Commission went unanswered.
    4. Review promised: The Commission’s September 26 meeting set up a committee with an independent IIT/IIIT expert to review ECINet.

    How is Maharashtra handling voters still under revision?

    1. No hearing for flagged voters: The September 26 meeting ruled that voters served notices need not appear for hearings. These were voters marked “unmapped”, meaning not linked to a relative in the previous roll, or flagged for “logical discrepancies” in their details.
    2. No hasty exclusion: Maharashtra, where the SIR is still under way, told EROs to give a fresh chance, a hearing and an order before removing any name.
    3. Documents at the doorstep: Booth Level Officers (BLOs) will collect documents at homes for the ERO to decide, and special camps will be held.
    4. Scale of the task: The State’s draft roll flagged 1.22 crore records for verification.

    Challenges

    1. Burden on the excluded: Wrongly deleted citizens must reapply as new voters.
    2. Software over statute: Statutory officers cannot correct rolls where the software blocks them.
    3. Divided Commission: Decisions bypassing two Commissioners weaken a multi member body.
    4. Uneven reach: House visits depend on BLO capacity, so migrants may still be missed.

    Way Forward

    1. Forms by rule only: The ECI should alter forms only after the government amends the Rules.
    2. Restore ERO powers: ECINet should let EROs reverse deletions overturned on evidence.
    3. Publish deletion lists: CEOs should publish booth wise SIR deletion lists.
    4. Formal sittings: The full Commission should decide roll procedure in recorded meetings.

    Conclusion

    The Commission has conceded that its revision left eligible citizens out and is using routine enrolment to restore them. Whether the software review returns control to the officers the law holds responsible will decide if future revisions repeat these exclusions.

    Key numbers

    1. Relatives’ details mismatch: 62.48 lakh records in Maharashtra’s draft roll.
    2. Unmapped to a relative in the previous roll: 59.75 lakh records in Maharashtra.
    3. Maharashtra camp dates: October 3, 4, 10 and 11.

    Matching Previous Year Question

    “[2026, GS2, 10 marks] Is the right to vote a fundamental right? Discuss the position of the Election Commission of India while undertaking the revision of electoral rolls. Can it also examine the question of citizenship of voters?”