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GS Paper: GS2-18.Bilateral, regional and global groupings and agreements involving India and/or affecting India’s interests.

  • How will I2U2 (India, Israel, UAE and USA) grouping transform India’s position in global politics ?

    The I2U2 grouping was formalized in 2022 as a minilateral platform to promote cooperation in food security, energy, technology, and infrastructure. It is termed as the West Asian Quad.

    Six Key Areas of Cooperation

    Health

    Water

    Energy

    Transportation

    Food Security

    Space

    I2U2 Transforming India’s Position in Global Politics

    Geopolitical Transformation

    Positions India as a bridge between the Indo-Pacific and West Asia, linking Act East and Link West policies.

    Strategic autonomy – cooperation with the US and Israel while maintaining relations with Iran and the Arab world.

    Elevates India as a regional stabilizer in a volatile West Asian geopolitical landscape.

    Countering China’s influence in West Asia

    Geoeconomic Dimension

    Joint investments in infrastructure, energy, and food security. Eg- UAE funding a $2 billion food corridor in Gujarat.

    Integrates India into emerging West Asia–Indo-Pacific supply chains.

    Defence and Security Cooperation

    Strengthens intelligence sharing and counterterrorism collaboration.

    Supports maritime security and enhances India’s strategic depth in the Western Indian Ocean region.

    Connectivity and Infrastructure

    Aligns with India–Middle East–Europe Economic Corridor (IMEC).

    Enhances security in chokepoints like the Suez Canal.

    Enhances India’s credibility as a reliable partner in minilateral frameworks (Quad, BRICS, SCO, G20).

    Challenges Associated with I2U2

    Complex strategic balancing: Balancing ties with Iran while deepening cooperation with US–Israel–UAE bloc.

    Regional Instability: Ongoing Israel–Palestine conflict and tensions in Iran–US relations.

    Limited Institutional Framework: Absence of a formal secretariat or enforcement mechanism.

    Uncertainty of US Leadership under Trump

    China may view I2U2 as a containment alliance, increasing competition in West Asia.

    Way Forward

    Institutionalize I2U2 with clear mechanisms for project implementation and funding.

    Leverage the platform to promote peace and stability in the region.

    Expand the agenda to include climate resilience, humanitarian aid, and disaster response.

    Strengthen linkages with Quad, IMEC, and G20 initiatives.

    The I2U2 marks a paradigm shift in India’s diplomacy and emergence as a bridge nation between East and West, consolidating its role as a key pillar in 21st-century multipolar global politics.

  • Do you think that BIMSTEC is a parallel organisation like the SAARC? What are the similarities and dissimilarities between the two? How are Indian foreign policy objectives realized by forming this new organisation?

    According to S. Jaishankar, SAARC has become a dead horse. In this context, BIMSTEC, established in 1997, to promote regional cooperation among South and Southeast Asian countries has emerged as a pragmatic alternative to SAARC.

    BIMSTEC as a Parallel Organisation like the SAARC – Similarities

    Regional Cooperation Objective to promote economic, technical, and social cooperation. Eg- SAFTA and BIMSTEC FTA negotiations

    Developmental Focus: Emphasis on poverty reduction, trade, connectivity, and sustainable growth. Eg- BIMSTEC Transport Connectivity Master Plan

    Consensus-Based Decision-Making: Eg- BIMSTEC Charter, 2022 was adopted only after all members’ approval

    Institutional Mechanisms: Function through summits, ministerial meetings, and working groups. Eg- BIMSTEC Leaders’ Summit

    Multi-sectoral Agenda: Cooperation in transport, energy, agriculture, health, environment, and security. Eg- SAARC 11 priority sectors and BIMSTEC 14 priority areas

    Differences

    BIMSTEC connects South and Southeast Asia, while SAARC is confined to South Asia.

    SAARC includes Pakistan, leading to frequent political blockages. BIMSTEC is ‘SAARC-Pakistan’

    SAARC is primarily a political and developmental forum, whereas BIMSTEC focuses on sectoral partnerships in economy, connectivity, and technology.

    SAARC functioning is largely stalled, whereas BIMSTEC is expanding sectoral cooperation, adopted its Charter in 2022 and established a permanent Secretariat in Dhaka

    SAARC has limited security cooperation, whereas BIMSTEC actively engages in counter-terrorism, cyber security, maritime security, and disaster management. Eg- BIMSTEC National Security Advisers’ Meetings

    SAARC maintains Permanent Observer Status at the UN whereas BIMSTEC does not.

    BIMSTEC Fulfilling India’s Foreign Policy Objectives

    Regional Integration – Provides a Pakistan-free alternative to pursue regional cooperation and development.

    Bridge to Southeast Asia: advances India’s Act East Policy. Eg- IMT Trilateral Highway.

    Neighbourhood First and Indo-Pacific strategies – Increased connectivity, humanitarian cooperation, and development projects project India as a responsible power.

    SAGAR Vision: Reinforces India’s role as a “Net Security Provider” in the Indian Ocean through cooperation in maritime security, disaster management, and coastal resilience.

    Tapping Trade Potential in the Bay of Bengal through blue economy initiatives and port-led development.

    Group’s cohesion and sustainability is key to realise ‘Vision 2030’ adopted in the recent 6th BIMSTEC summit.

  • ‘Virus of Conflict is affecting the functioning of the SCO’. In the light of the above statement point out the role of India in mitigating problems.

    The SCO, evolved from the Shanghai Five (1996), was founded in 2001, as a Eurasian political, economic, and security organisation.

    Virus Conflict within SCO

    China-India border tensions (Galwan 2020) – undermine mutual trust.

    India-Pakistan rivalry over terrorism. Eg- Pahalgam Attack

    The China-Pakistan-Russia axis creates an internal power imbalance.

    China’s BRI expansionism – violates sovereignty. Eg- CPEC through PoK.

    Russia-Ukraine conflict divides members’ geopolitical alignments.

    Afghanistan instability – differing member approaches toward Taliban.

    India’s Role in Mitigating Problems

    Dialogue-based dispute resolution – SCO as a platform for engagement with China and Pakistan. PM Modi (2023): “SCO must not be divided by barriers of mistrust.”

    Act as a Balancer to China – Supported by CAR and Russia

    Enhancing Economic and Connectivity Alternatives – Promotes Chabahar Port and INSTC.

    Pushes for energy partnerships and supply-chain diversification with Central Asia.

    Encourages collaboration in AI, digital governance, and fintech. Eg- UPI as Model for CARs

    Active role in RATS (Tashkent) to share intelligence on terrorism. Calls for zero tolerance against extremism and radicalisation.

    Promotes respect for territorial integrity and international law. Advocates transparency in connectivity and infrastructure projects.

    Supports inclusive multipolarity in global and regional affairs. Acts as a moderating voice against bloc politics.

    Using India’s civilizational linkages to bridge ideological divides. Eg- Buddhist and sufi diplomacy with Central Asian nations.

    Climate Cooperation – joint action on climate resilience, renewable energy, and green hydrogen initiatives.

    SCO can help realise India’s ambitions on “multi-alignment”, “strategic autonomy” and becoming a “balancing power” in the world.

  • Discuss the geopolitical and geostrategic importance of Maldives for India with a focus on global trade and energy flows. Further also discuss how this relationship affects India’s maritime security and regional stability amidst international competition?

    The Maldives, located southwest of India in the central Indian Ocean, sits astride critical Sea Lines of Communication (SLOCs) that carry a major share of global oil and trade flows.

    Geopolitical and Geostrategic Importance of Maldives for India

    Strategic Location on Global Trade Routes through which over 80% of India’s crude oil and global container traffic transit.

    Energy Security Corridor- positions near the Eight Degree Channel are vital for the free flow of energy from the Persian Gulf to Indian and East Asian markets.

    As part of India’s SAGAR vision, Maldives strengthens India’s maritime domain awareness (MDA) through coastal radar systems integrated with India’s Information Fusion Centre – Indian Ocean Region (IFC-IOR).

    Economic and Blue Economy Cooperation for trade connectivity and sustainable ocean management.

    Impact on India’s Maritime Security Amidst International Competition

    India’s partnership with Maldives enables real-time monitoring of sea lanes, joint patrols, and defense training, enhancing maritime security in the Arabian Sea-Central IOR belt.

    The Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and Chinese-funded infrastructure projects in Maldives (e.g., Sinamalé Bridge, port expansions) raise concerns of strategic encirclement (“String of Pearls”).

    Securing SLOCs Against Non-Traditional Threats like piracy, smuggling, terrorism, and illegal fishing.

    First-Responder Advantage- India’s humanitarian and disaster-relief operations (e.g., Operation NEER, COVID-19 aid) reinforce its role as the preferred security partner in the Indian Ocean Region (IOR).

    Impact on India’s Regional Stability Amidst International Competition

    Maintaining Balance of Power in the IOR- Maldives’ cooperation ensures that strategic outposts in the central Indian Ocean remain friendly to India and aligned with its Indo-Pacific vision.

    Shifts between pro-India and pro-China governments in Maldives (e.g., “India Out” campaigns) requires non-interference and developmental diplomacy to ensure long-term engagement.

    Regional Multilateralism and Cooperative Security through the Colombo Security Conclave and Indian Ocean Rim Association (IORA).

    India’s investments in infrastructure, tourism, and climate adaptation projects foster goodwill, ensuring Maldives remains a stable democratic partner in an increasingly contested Indo-Pacific.

    Challenges

    India’s Panipat Syndrome – Reactive rather than proactive diplomacy

    Political Instability due to Chinese influence (Deep Pocket Diplomacy)

    India’s delivery deficit and Big Brother Syndrome

    Way Forward

    Expand joint naval patrols, intelligence sharing

    Gujaral Doctrine – non-intrusive, partnership-based approach

    Institutionalize Political and Strategic Dialogue- 2+2 Ministerial Dialogue

    Provide viable alternatives to Chinese Belt and Road projects via Neighbourhood First and SAGAR

    A stable, sovereign, and friendly Maldives is essential for India’s ambition of Net Security Provider in IOR.

  • Critically analyse India’s evolving diplomatic, economic and strategic relations with the Central Asian Republics (CARs) highlighting their increasing significance in regional and global geopolitics.

    The region of Central Asia is located in the heart of Eurasia and denoted as Heartland by Helford Mackinder. It connects Europe, West Asia, South Asia, and Russia.

    Significance of CARs in Regional and Global Geopolitics-

    Energy Hub- CARs hold 4% of global gas and 3% of oil reserves. Turkmenistan (gas), Kazakhstan (uranium, oil).

    Strategic Location- Land bridge between Europe, Russia, South Asia, and China, vital for Eurasian connectivity (BRI, INSTC, Ashgabat).

    Security Buffer- Acts as a buffer against terrorism and extremism from Afghanistan.

    Great Power Competition- Arena for China-Russia-US rivalry; China’s BRI investments exceed USD 60 billion.

    India’s Engagement-

    Diplomatic-

    Connect Central Asia Policy – based on 4 Cs-Commerce , Connectivity , Consular and Community.

    Institutionalized through India-Central Asia Summit (2022) and SCO membership (2017).

    Economic-

    Trade at USD 3 billion (2023);

    Focus on energy, IT, and pharma

    US$1 billion line of credit for development projects in infrastructure, IT, energy and agriculture in 2020.

    Joined Ashgabat Agreement (2018) and INSTC.

    Strategic-

    Cooperation on counterterrorism (SCO RATS)

    India operates Ayni Air Base (Tajikistan)

    Invests via ONGC Videsh in Kazakhstan.

    Challenges-

    Connectivity gaps due to lack of direct access (Pakistan barrier).

    China’s dominance under BRI and Russia’s influence in security.

    Instability in Afghanistan affecting corridors.

    Low trade volumes and implementation delays in projects like TAPI.

    US sanctions on Iran hinder Chabahar-INSTC route.

    Early finalization of FTA between India and the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) and air corridors can help to realise India’s energy security, connectivity, and strategic depth.

  • India–Africa digital partnership is achieving mutual respect, co-development and long-term institutional partnerships. Elaborate.

    In the words of PM Modi, “Africa will remain at the center of our attention. Our partnership is not just about sharing resources but about sharing dreams and a vision for a brighter future.”

    India-Africa Digital Partnership

    Foundation of Mutual Respect-

    South-South Cooperation– based on equality, non-conditionality, and mutual benefit.

    Unlike the Chinese “Digital Silk Road”, India provides low-cost and interoperable solutions.

    Africa views India as a partner in capacity building, not a neo-colonial actor. (Shashi Tharoor)

    Co-development through Technology and Capacity Building-

    Pan-African e-Network (2009)- Connects 48 African countries with India for tele-education and telemedicine.

    India’s Aadhaar, UPI, CoWIN, and DigiLocker systems serve as models for Africa’s Digital Transformation Strategy (2020-2030). Eg- Namibia – NPCI Pact for a UPI-like instant payment system

    ITEC Program- Trains African professionals in e-governance, AI, fintech, and cybersecurity, promoting shared digital growth.

    Long-term Institutional Partnerships-

    India-Africa Forum Summit (IAFS) & Voice of Global South Summit (2023)- Institutionalize digital cooperation as a core agenda.

    EXIM Bank LoCs & Tech Parks- Fund ICT hubs and innovation centers (e.g., Ethiopia, Rwanda, Tanzania).

    Start-up collaboration under Digital India-Digital Africa initiative, in agri-tech, e-health, fintech, and education.

    Triangular cooperation with Japan under Asia-Africa Growth Corridor (AAGC) supports digital infrastructure.

    Education and Skilling – Eg- IIT Madras campus in Zanzibar (first overseas IIT)

    The digital partnership reflects a new model of South-South cooperation for inclusive digital transformation

  • Guardrails in AI growth to protect developing nations

    Why in the News?

    The United Nations General Assembly established a Global Dialogue on AI and an Independent International Scientific Panel on AI, marking the first attempt to create a global scientific body dedicated to this technology. This development has exposed a core tension: AI governance is simultaneously moving toward global coordination and fragmenting into competing national regulatory frameworks. The asymmetry between AI-capable and AI-dependent nations determines who controls both the risks and the benefits of this transition.

    What is the current global AI governance landscape and why is it structurally insufficient?

    1. Parallel and voluntary structures: Most existing frameworks have voluntary participation, varying legal force, and focus on specific aspects, safety, ethics, or standards, with no common binding floor.
    2. EU AI Act 2024: The most comprehensive binding framework to date. It prioritises safe, transparent, non-discriminatory, and environmentally friendly AI. Its extraterritorial reach is limited to EU-market participants.
    3. UN Global Dialogue on AI: UNGA invited every country to participate. An Independent Scientific Panel makes periodic assessments to inform the Dialogue. It lacks enforcement authority.
    4. Annual global AI summits: The most recent edition was held in New Delhi in February 2025. Outcomes remain consultative and have not produced enforceable international agreements.
    5. Regulatory fragmentation: Each country developing its own framework forces companies to satisfy differing requirements across geographies, creating pressure to favour permissive jurisdictions.
    6. Innovation slowdown risk: Companies may roll out services only in regulatory-friendly markets, deepening access inequality for developing nations.

    What makes global AI governance necessary?

    1. Cross-border technology: AI systems operate across jurisdictions and affect multiple countries simultaneously.
    2. Regulatory fragmentation: Different national regulations increase compliance costs and slow innovation.
    3. Unequal regulatory capacity: Many developing countries lack the expertise and institutions needed to regulate AI effectively.
    4. Global public impact: AI influences economic growth, governance, healthcare, education, and security.
    5. Need for common standards: Shared principles can improve safety, interoperability, and trust.

    How does regulatory fragmentation produce asymmetric harm for developing nations?

    1. Infrastructure concentration: A few countries already possess the computing, talent, and financial resources to support the entire AI ecosystem, before global rules are set.
    2. Regulatory capacity deficit: Many countries in Asia and Africa lack institutions to frame robust domestic AI regulations or protect their national interests in international negotiations.
    3. Data sovereignty trap: Insisting that all AI development remain within national boundaries accelerates power concentration rather than distributing it.
    4. Digital colonisation risk: Developing countries become consumers of AI systems designed elsewhere, with no input into their values, benchmarks, or constraints.
    5. Denial of transformative benefits: AI is a technology of the order of the steam engine. Excluding developing nations from its benefits is a disservice to humanity, not merely to affected countries.
    6. Minimum regulatory floor: A globally agreed set of minimum standards is the only mechanism that ensures developing countries benefit from AI advances without surrendering domestic policy space.

    Does global AI regulation resolve the equity problem or does it risk replicating the nuclear non-proliferation trap?

    The equity problem refers to the structural exclusion of predominantly the Global South from the economic benefits, decision-making processes, and capacity building surrounding artificial intelligence.

    1. Non-proliferation analogy: Global AI regulation could restrict unrestricted AI development to only certain countries or companies, creating a permanent hierarchy between technology producers and users.
    2. Nuclear regime parallel: This outcome embeds existing power differentials into binding international law, replicating a governance structure that legitimises asymmetry rather than correcting it.
    3. Biological and chemical weapons treaties: Existing international agreements already control dangerous dual-use technologies. Proposals may extend this logic to AI models and to the infrastructure required to build them.
    4. Logic of restriction: The case for restricting AI capable of enabling next-generation biological or chemical weapons is logically defensible. The risk is who draws the boundary and in whose interest.
    5. Political capture risk: “Responsible AI” defined by incumbent powers locks in first-mover advantage and treats developing nations as permanent recipients rather than co-producers of governance norms.

    What do international governance models demonstrate about the feasibility of a globally agreed AI floor?

    1. EU AI Act: binding regulatory precedent: Demonstrates that comprehensive, legally enforceable AI governance is achievable at supranational scale. Sets de facto global standards through market leverage.
    2. UN Global Dialogue: universalist participation model: Universal country invitation distinguishes it from club-based governance. Participatory architecture is its most relevant design feature for developing nations.
    3. Google AI Commons: private open-access precedent: Demonstrates that large AI actors can adopt open-access norms voluntarily. Lacks enforceable accountability.
    4. Trusted AI Commons: India-hosted hybrid model: A one-stop repository of tools, benchmarks, datasets, and protocols for testing AI deployment, with liberal licensing. Significant as a Global South-led governance mechanism.
    5. Limits of existing models: None produces a binding universal minimum floor. The EU Act covers only its market; the UN Dialogue lacks enforcement; Commons models are voluntary. The gap between architecture and enforceable standards remains open.

    What is the Trusted AI Commons and does it constitute an adequate institutional response to the governance deficit?

    1. Definition: A repository of tools, benchmarks, datasets, and protocols needed to develop and deploy AI systems safely and responsibly. Functions as a one-stop shop for AI testing and deployment support.
    2. Institutional origin: Main outcome of the New Delhi AI Impact Summit, February 2026. Hosted and managed by India through India’s AI Mission.
    3. Licensing design: Open, accessible, with liberal licensing. Aggregates tools already developed worldwide, including by IIT Madras, rather than commissioning new ones.
    4. Practical function (example): A country testing an AI system for agriculture can use the Commons to locate available tools, benchmarks, datasets, and protocols in one place, without needing domestic AI infrastructure to find or validate them.
    5. Adequacy gap: Addresses the access and deployment deficit. Does not create a binding minimum floor. Does not build regulatory capacity in developing nations. Necessary but insufficient.
    6. India’s strategic significance: Hosting the Commons positions India as a norm-setter rather than a norm-follower, consistent with its broader foreign policy of strategic autonomy: the ability to act independently of major power blocs in international affairs. 

    The Trusted AI Commons

    1. It is an open, federated, and voluntary global platform designed to serve as a consolidated repository for AI safety benchmarks, evaluation tools, standards, and deployment frameworks.
    2. The initiative was integrated into the New Delhi Declaration on AI Impact.

    Core Objectives & Utility: The platform is designed to act as a “one-stop shop” for developers, researchers, and regulators to access non-proprietary resources.

    1. Open Accessibility: Provides tools under liberal, open-source licensing to prevent safety mechanisms from being locked behind big-tech barriers.
    2. Standardised Evaluation: Hosts cross-jurisdictional benchmarks to test AI behavior against bias, misalignment, and operational errors before deployment.
    3. Global Interoperability: Fosters cross-border collaboration by mapping technical safety frameworks across different international standards.

    Hosting and Management

    1. Initial Leadership: The Trusted AI Commons is initially hosted and managed by India under the auspices of the Ministry of Electronics and Information Technology (MeitY) and the IndiaAI Mission.
    2. Collaborative Network: Rather than building every mechanism from scratch, it aggregates tools from leading global research bodies, such as the Centre for Responsible AI (IIT Madras), the UK AI Security Institute, and Mozilla

    Conclusion

    Fragmented national AI regulation concentrates power in AI-capable nations and denies developing countries both protection and access. A globally agreed minimum regulatory floor is the necessary condition for equity but if framed through non-proliferation logic, it encodes existing power hierarchies into international law. The Trusted AI Commons addresses the access deficit but does not substitute for binding global governance. The central unresolved precondition is universal participation in the design of global AI rules, not merely in their implementation.

  • The key hurdle to climate targets: Electrification

    Why in the News?

    At the Bonn climate talks, Turkey proposed raising the global electrification target to 35% by 2035, ahead of hosting COP31 in Antalya with Australia in November. Electricity meets only a small fraction of the world’s energy needs, and most of that electricity is itself generated from fossil fuels. This exposes a gap between rising clean electricity generation and the much slower pace at which economies actually switch their energy consumption to electricity.

    Where does electrification fit among existing global climate goals?

    1. Paris Agreement temperature targets: The 2015 Paris Agreement commits the world to limiting the rise in global temperatures within 2 degrees Celsius, preferably 1.5 degrees Celsius, from pre-industrial times.
    2. Renewable capacity target: Annual COP meetings have produced the goal of increasing the installed capacity of renewable energy.
    3. Net-zero target: COP meetings have also produced the goal of achieving a global net-zero emissions target.
    4. Climate finance target: Mobilising climate finance is a further goal that has emerged from COP meetings.
    5. Electrification as a new addition: The 35% electrification target, if agreed upon, would be one more addition to this existing set of climate-related global goals, all aimed at reducing the world’s dependence on fossil fuels and speeding up the energy transition.

    How is the progress of the energy transition measured?

    1. Total Primary Energy Supply (TPES): A measure of all energy available for use in an economy, including energy consumed in producing, transforming and transporting energy itself.
    2. Final Energy Consumption (FEC): A measure of energy ultimately used by end-consumers. It excludes energy burnt to produce electricity, energy used in refining petroleum, diesel burnt in transporting fuel, and transmission and distribution losses.
    3. Structural difference between fossil fuels and renewables: Fossil fuels are direct sources of energy and only require to be burnt to produce energy, whereas renewable sources such as solar, wind, nuclear or hydropower have to be converted into electricity before they can be put to use.
    4. Why electrification rate is the relevant metric: Because renewable sources require conversion into electricity before use, every final use of energy would have to be electrified for a complete transition away from fossil fuels to be possible.

    Why does electrification remain limited despite rising electricity demand?

    1. Slow movement in FEC share: Electricity’s share in FEC rose only from 17.7% in 2015 to 21% in 2025, a modest increase over a decade.
      1. Global electricity share in FEC: Electricity accounted for only 21% of total final energy consumption (TFEC) in 2025, according to the IEA.
      2. India’s electricity share in FEC: The corresponding figure for India is about 23%, according to government data.
    2. Rising generation volumes: Global electricity generation increased from about 24 terawatt-hours (TWh) in 2015 to over 32 TWh in 2025, a rise of nearly 33%.
    3. Generation growth has outpaced consumption-side electrification: Electricity output rose by a third over the decade while its share of final consumption rose by only about 3 percentage points.
    4. Hard-to-electrify sectors persist: Shipping, aviation, heavy-duty and long-haul trucks, high-temperature industrial processes in iron, steel, cement and ceramics, and many residential needs like heating remain largely unelectrified and cannot run on renewables.

    Which sectors remain difficult to electrify?

    1. Aviation: Long-distance air travel lacks commercially viable large-scale electric alternatives.
    2. Shipping: Heavy maritime transport depends on high-energy-density fuels.
    3. Heavy Industry: Steel, cement and chemicals require high-temperature industrial processes.
    4. Long-Haul Freight: Heavy trucks face battery and charging limitations.
    5. Energy-Intensive Manufacturing: Several production processes remain dependent on fossil fuels.

    Why does renewable energy success not automatically translate into climate success?

    1. Steady rise in clean generation share: The share of non-fossil sources (renewables, hydro and nuclear) in electricity generation rose from 33.6% in 2015 to 42.6% in 2025, according to the IEA.
    2. Electricity itself is still the majority fossil: In 2025, only about 42% of all electricity generated worldwide came from non-fossil sources, meaning most electricity generated is still fossil-based.
    3. Compounding effect on total energy use: Only 21% of total final energy consumption is met through electricity, and only about 42% of that electricity is clean.
    4. The reality-check figure: This means just over 8% of total energy consumed in the world is currently clean.
    5. Three decades of policy effort, limited consumption-side result: Nearly three decades of favourable policies, financial incentives and technology innovation to promote cleaner fuels have left more than 90% of current global energy use still dependent on fossil fuels.

    How ambitious is the proposed 35% electrification target?

    1. IRENA’s threshold for 1.5°C: The International Renewable Energy Agency states that a 35% electrification rate by 2035 is the minimum needed to keep any realistic hope of staying on the 1.5-degrees Celsius pathway.
    2. Investment requirement: Achieving that level of electrification requires about $1.2 trillion to be pumped into electricity systems every year.
    3. Accompanying requirements: Rapid expansion in renewables and battery storage systems must also happen alongside this investment.
    4. Scale of the gap from current trajectory: The IEA projects electricity’s share of global FEC will rise to only about 24% by 2030, against a target of 35% by 2035, even as non-fossil sources (renewables plus hydro and nuclear) are projected to supply nearly half of global electricity by 2030.

    What risks could derail even this limited trajectory?

    1. Geopolitical uncertainty: It is unclear how wars and geopolitical tensions will affect the pace of energy transition.
    2. Two opposing pressures: Greater uncertainty in fossil fuel supplies and rising oil prices may push some countries toward renewables, while the economic fallout of conflicts may squeeze budgets available for new technologies and infrastructure.
    3. Risk of reverting to convenient fuels: Countries may be tempted to use whatever energy source is easily available, regardless of its climate impact.

    What do international targets indicate about the future direction of climate policy?

    1. COP28 Consensus: Countries agreed to accelerate the global energy transition.
    2. IRENA Roadmap: The agency proposes raising electrification to 35% by 2035.
    3. Net-Zero Pathways: Most credible decarbonisation scenarios require major electrification gains.
    4. Renewables-Electrification Link: Renewable expansion and electrification must progress together.
    5. Long-Term Transition: Climate targets increasingly depend on transforming energy consumption patterns, not merely energy production.

    Conclusion

    Clean electricity generation has scaled steadily, but the constraint on climate targets has shifted to how much of total energy consumption is electrified, not how clean the electricity supply is. Only about 8% of global energy consumption is currently clean, and electricity’s FEC share is projected to reach just 24% by 2030 against a 35% by 2035 target. Hence, climate progress will remain limited unless transport, industry and buildings convert their direct fossil-fuel use to electricity at a much faster pace.

    PYQ Relevance

    [UPSC 2022] Do you think India will meet 50 per cent of its energy needs from renewable energy by 2030? Justify your answer.

    Linkage: The question examines India’s renewable energy transition and the feasibility of achieving climate commitments. The article argues that renewable energy expansion alone is insufficient; achieving climate goals also requires rapid electrification of final energy consumption.

  • Iran gets ‘understanding’, world gets Hormuz, Trump gets his exit 

    Why in the News?

    The United States and Iran signed a 14-clause Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) on June 17-18, 2026, opening a 60-day negotiating window for a final agreement. The MoU ends active hostilities, reopens the Strait of Hormuz, creates a pathway for sanctions relief, and revives nuclear diplomacy. It also departs significantly from the 2015 JCPOA by deferring key disputes over enrichment, ballistic missiles, and Iran’s regional network.

    What are the key clauses of the US-Iran MoU?

    1. Ends Hostilities: Clause 1 establishes a formal cessation of military operations involving Iran, Israel, and the United States.
    2. Establishes Non-Interference: Clause 2 commits both sides to refrain from actions aimed at destabilising the other, including regime-change efforts.
    3. Creates a 60-Day Negotiating Window: Clause 3 allows both sides to extend negotiations by mutual consent before a final settlement is reached.
    4. Reopens the Strait of Hormuz: Clauses 4 and 5 remove the US naval blockade and guarantee uninterrupted maritime transit through Hormuz.
    5. Creates an Economic Package: Clauses 6, 7, 10 and 11 provide for reconstruction assistance, sanctions relief, sanctions waivers, and release of more than $100 billion in frozen Iranian assets. At present sanctions waivers will act as interim arrangement before sanctions removal is operationalised
    6. Retains Nuclear Monitoring: Clauses 8 and 12 reaffirm Iran’s commitment not to pursue nuclear weapons and establish a monitoring mechanism.
    7. Seeks International Legitimacy: Clause 14 envisages a binding UN Security Council resolution endorsing the final arrangement.

    Why is the Strait of Hormuz central to the agreement?

    1. Global Energy Chokepoint: Nearly 20% of global oil trade and about 25% of global LNG shipments pass through Hormuz.
    2. Iran’s Principal Leverage: Control over Hormuz provides Iran with significant influence over global energy markets.
    3. Prevention of an Energy Shock: Reopening the Strait removes the immediate risk of disruption to nearly 20% of global oil trade and 25% of global LNG shipments.
    4. Shared Interest: The US, Iran, Gulf states and energy-importing economies all benefit from uninterrupted maritime traffic.
    5. Potential New Governance Framework: A future Iran-Oman arrangement inspired by the Montreux Convention governing the Turkish Straits.

    How does the MoU depart from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) framework?

    1. Broader Than a Nuclear Agreement: The 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) focused on Iran’s nuclear programme. The MoU links nuclear issues, sanctions, reconstruction, maritime security and regional stability.
    2. Different Sequencing: The JCPOA imposed nuclear restrictions before sanctions relief. The MoU prioritises sanctions relief and economic normalisation before addressing several unresolved security questions.
    3. No Requirement to Transfer Enriched Uranium: Unlike the JCPOA framework, the MoU does not require Iran to transfer its enriched nuclear stockpile to a third country.
    4. Ballistic Missiles Excluded: Clause 9 of the MOU contains no commitment regarding Iran’s ballistic missile programme.
    5. Regional Networks Excluded: The agreement contains no provisions on Iran’s relationships with Hezbollah and other regional non-state actors.
    6. Response to the JCPOA Collapse: The framework emerges after the US withdrawal from the JCPOA in 2018 and Iran’s subsequent departure from many of its commitments.

    Does the sanctions package constitute real relief or merely a promise of future relief?

    1. Relief Is Deferred: Clause 7 commits to sanctions relief but leaves implementation to the negotiation period.
    2. Multiple Sanctions Regimes Remain: Nuclear, counter-terrorism and designation-based sanctions remain interconnected and unresolved.
    3. Sanctions Waivers Act as a Bridge: Clause 10 creates temporary relief before full implementation.
    4. Asset Unfreezing Provides Immediate Benefits: More than $100 billion in frozen assets are scheduled to become available to Iran
    5. Large Economic Upside: According to estimates, sanctions easing could generate approximately $60 billion annually in Iranian oil and fuel revenues.

    Has the MoU meaningfully constrained Iran’s nuclear capability?

    1. Clause 8- No Nuclear Weapons Commitment: Iran reiterates that it will not procure or develop nuclear weapons and reaffirms its stated position since 2003.
    2. Clause 12- Monitoring Mechanism: The MoU establishes a mechanism to monitor implementation of the agreement and future commitments.
    3. No Restriction on Enrichment Capacity: The agreement does not require Iran to dismantle or reduce its existing uranium enrichment capability. This is a significant divergence from the original US position and from the 2015 JCPOA, under which the negotiation timeline (roughly 2013-15) required limiting Iran’s 60%-enriched uranium stockpile.
    4. No Transfer of Enriched Uranium Stockpiles: Unlike the JCPOA framework, the MoU does not mandate transfer or reduction of Iran’s accumulated enriched uranium stockpile.
    5. Ballistic Missile Programme Remains Outside the Agreement: None of the 14 clauses contain any reference to negotiations over ballistic missiles or Iran’s relationships with regional non-state actors.
    6. Core Non-Proliferation Questions Remain Deferred: The agreement establishes monitoring and political commitments but postpones decisions on enrichment limits, stockpiles and missile capabilities to future negotiations.

    What gives the MoU more binding force than the JCPOA had, and what remains unresolved on enforcement?

    1. Clause 14- Binding UNSC resolution: This clause provides for a binding UN Security Council resolution endorsing the deal, notable because it proceeds despite the Trump administration’s general disdain for UN mechanisms.
    2. Anchored to existing resolution: The JCPOA was endorsed by UNSC Resolution 2231, whose binding nature was affirmed in the text through Article 25 of the UN Charter.
    3. New resolution’s terms uncertain: The new UNSC resolution will have to be similar to Resolution 2231, but Iran could potentially seek fail-safe arrangements that weaken its binding character.
    4. No enforcement detail in available clauses: Clause 12 provides a monitoring mechanism, but no clause specifies consequences for non-compliance, leaving enforcement design open for the 60-day negotiation.

    Why does the agreement create a strategic dilemma for Israel? 

    1. Iran Gains Before Major Concessions: Sanctions relief, asset access and diplomatic legitimacy arrive before resolution of missile and proxy issues.
    2. Maximum Pressure Weakens: The agreement shifts US policy from coercion to managed engagement.
    3. Military Options Narrow: The de-escalatory framework reduces immediate scope for escalation against Iran.
    4. Hezbollah and Regional Networks Remain: The agreement leaves Israel’s principal security concerns largely untouched.
    5. US and Israeli Priorities Diverge: Washington prioritises stability and conflict management. Israel prioritises long-term constraints on Iranian capabilities.

    Is this MoU a genuine resolution of the US-Iran conflict, or a deferral of its hardest elements?

    1. Visible De-escalation Achieved: Hostilities have paused. The Hormuz blockade has ended. A path to sanctions relief and reconstruction has opened.
    2. Core Disputes Remain Deferred: Iran’s enriched uranium stockpile, ballistic missile programme and regional proxies remain outside the agreement.
    3. Implementation Is the Real Challenge: The JCPOA provides a negotiating template. The challenge is securing compliance during the 60-day window.
    4. Strategic Questions Remain Open: The MoU does not restrict Iran’s existing enrichment stockpile. The core non-proliferation debate has been postponed to future negotiations.

    Conclusion

    The US-Iran MoU is not a non-proliferation settlement; it is a crisis-management framework. It secures Hormuz, pauses hostilities, unlocks a pathway to sanctions relief, and creates political space for further negotiations. The agreement’s success rests on postponing the issues that have historically prevented compromise, enrichment stockpiles, ballistic missiles, and Iran’s regional network. Whether those deferred questions can be resolved within the 60-day window will determine whether the MoU becomes a durable successor to the JCPOA or merely a temporary pause in a longer confrontation.

    PYQ Relevance

    [UPSC 2018] In what ways would the ongoing US-Iran Nuclear Pact Controversy affect the national interest of India? How should India respond to this situation?

    Linkage: The PYQ examines the strategic implications of US-Iran engagement for regional stability and national interests. The article analyses how the US-Iran MoU manages tensions through diplomacy while leaving key strategic issues unresolved.

  • What does the India-Russia logistics agreement allow?

    Why in the News?

    India and Russia operationalised the Reciprocal Exchange of Logistics Agreement (RELOS) in January 2025 after signing it during the Russian President’s visit to India in December 2024. The agreement attracted attention due to claims that it allows stationing of troops on each other’s territory, prompting official clarification that RELOS is a logistics support arrangement and not a military basing agreement.

    Why have logistics agreements become an important instrument of modern defence cooperation?

    1. Operational Sustainment: Logistics agreements provide access to fuel, repair, replenishment and maintenance facilities during deployments.
    2. Force Mobility: They enable military assets to operate across larger geographical areas without establishing overseas bases.
    3. Humanitarian Response: They facilitate Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief (HADR) missions and evacuation operations.
    4. Interoperability: They standardise procedures for port calls, airfield access and logistical coordination between armed forces.
    5. Strategic Flexibility: They allow defence cooperation without creating alliance obligations.

    India’s Existing Logistics Agreements

    CountryAgreementYear
    United StatesLogistics Exchange Memorandum of Agreement (LEMOA)2016
    FranceReciprocal Logistics Support Agreement2018
    SingaporeNaval Logistics Support Agreement2018
    South KoreaAgreement on Mutual Logistics Support2019
    AustraliaMutual Logistics Support Arrangement (MLSA)2020
    JapanAcquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreement (ACSA)2020
    RussiaReciprocal Exchange of Logistics Agreement (RELOS)2024 (operationalised in 2025)

    What does the India-Russia RELOS agreement actually provide?

    1. Reciprocal Logistics Access: Armed forces of both countries can access designated facilities for supplies, repair and refuelling.
    2. Port and Airfield Support: The agreement covers port calls by warships and use of airspace and airfield infrastructure.
    3. Military Asset Support: It applies to ships, aircraft, vehicles and other military equipment.
    4. Operational Cooperation: It covers exercises, training activities, HADR missions and military exchanges.
    5. Administrative Framework: It establishes procedures for accounting, reimbursement and logistical coordination.
    6. Additional Services: It includes medical support, technical assistance and delivery of food and essential supplies.

    Why is RELOS being wrongly interpreted as a troop-stationing or military basing agreement?

    1. No Permanent Bases: RELOS does not create military bases on the territory of either country.
    2. No Troop Stationing Rights: The agreement does not permit permanent deployment of military personnel.
    3. No Alliance Commitment: It does not create mutual defence obligations or collective security arrangements.
    4. Consent-Based Access: Visits and logistical support require mutual agreement and prior coordination.
    5. Official Clarification: The Ministry of Defence clarified that RELOS is similar to LEMOA and other logistics support agreements signed by India.
    6. Administrative Nature: The agreement simplifies logistics procedures rather than altering military command structures.

    What does RELOS reveal about India’s evolving approach to strategic partnerships?

    1. Strategic Autonomy: India continues to expand defence cooperation without joining military alliances.
    2. Multi-Alignment: India maintains logistics arrangements with countries belonging to different geopolitical blocs.
    3. Networked Partnerships: Similar agreements exist with the United States, France, Japan, Australia and several other countries.
    4. Russia’s Continuing Relevance: The agreement reinforces the long-standing India-Russia defence relationship.
    5. Expanded Operational Reach: Access to Russian facilities increases India’s logistical options across Eurasia and the Arctic region.
    6. Issue-Based Cooperation: Defence cooperation is increasingly organised around operational requirements rather than alliance structures.

    Why does logistics cooperation matter even without alliance commitments?

    1. Military Effectiveness: Logistics determines the ability to sustain operations over long distances.
    2. Reduced Infrastructure Costs: Countries gain access to support facilities without maintaining overseas bases.
    3. Rapid Deployment Capability: Forces can respond more quickly during emergencies, exercises and humanitarian missions.
    4. Greater Strategic Reach: Logistics access expands the geographical range of military operations.
    5. Preservation of Policy Independence: States retain decision-making autonomy despite deepening defence cooperation.

    Conclusion

    The significance of RELOS lies not in troop deployment, military basing rights or alliance formation. Its importance lies in institutionalising reciprocal logistics support that expands operational reach while preserving India’s strategic autonomy. The agreement reflects a broader shift in defence cooperation where military mobility and logistical access are increasingly valued over formal alliance commitments.

    PYQ Relevance

    [UPSC 2020] What is the significance of Indo-US defence deals over Indo-Russian defence deals? Discuss with reference to stability in the Indo-Pacific region.

    Linkage: The question compares India’s defence partnerships with the United States and Russia and their implications for strategic interests. RELOS shows that India is not replacing Russia with the United States; instead, it is pursuing diversified defence partnerships