India-Switzerland ties have moved beyond the India-European Free Trade Association (EFTA) trade pact to a wider partnership covering people mobility, defence and nuclear energy. During the Swiss President’s visit to New Delhi, the two countries signed agreements on migration and mobility, young professionals, and transport and infrastructure.
What is the India-EFTA TEPA, and why does it frame the visit?
What it is: The Trade and Economic Partnership Agreement (TEPA) is one trade deal linking India with all four EFTA States: Iceland, Liechtenstein, Norway and Switzerland.
First of its kind: It is India’s first free trade agreement (FTA) with any economic bloc in Europe. It came into force in October 2025.
Investment and jobs goals: TEPA aims to attract $100 billion of investment and create one million direct jobs in India.
Gains for both sides: India gains capital, technology transfers and market access for high-value goods. Switzerland gains a large, fast-growing partner when global trade is unpredictable.
The takeaway: The visit, on TEPA’s first anniversary, aims to turn a trade deal into a wider partnership.
What did the two countries sign?
Migration and mobility pact: The Migration and Mobility Partnership Agreement sets mobility rules on equal treatment principles. It also targets irregular migration, exploitation and trafficking under national laws.
Longer visas: It provides multiple-entry visas valid for up to 5 years, with stays of up to 6 months on each visit.
Students and researchers: Indian students get renewable one-year permits, widening openings for Indian students, researchers and youth.
Young professionals exchange: The Young Professionals Agreement allows 300 persons a year from each country to work in the other, a number that may rise to 500.
Transport and infrastructure: A third agreement covers transport and infrastructure. India invited Swiss firms to invest and join design and manufacturing. Eg. The Varanasi ropeway.
What else is on the bilateral agenda?
Defence and nuclear energy: The two sides found new openings in military exchanges and defence production, and agreed to deepen collaboration in nuclear energy.
Market access for Indian exports: India says decisions were taken to widen access for its agriculture, pharmaceuticals, textiles and engineering goods in Switzerland.
Swiss investment sought: India wants new Swiss investment in biotech, life sciences, banking, insurance, food processing and sustainability.
Swiss asks: Switzerland hopes to conclude an investment protection agreement soon, and wants results in talks on intellectual property (IP) protection.
Research and summits: Joint research in health, clean energy and space will start soon. The India-EFTA Prosperity Summit this week aims to turn TEPA into concrete outcomes.
Challenges
No investment treaty: Swiss investors lack treaty protection in India. Eg. India ended its older bilateral investment treaties in 2017.
Patent differences: Swiss drug makers want stronger patents, which clash with India’s curbs on evergreening (extending patents through minor changes). Eg. Section 3(d), Patents Act, 1970.
Untested investment pledge: TEPA’s investment goal depends on decisions by private EFTA firms, so a shortfall is hard to remedy.
Small exchange quotas: The young professionals quota is small against India’s large pool of graduates.
Way Forward
Investment agreement: India and Switzerland should conclude an investment protection agreement that balances investor safeguards with regulatory space.
IP working group: Both sides should set up a TEPA working group to settle IP issues without diluting Section 3(d).
Mobility data: The Ministry of External Affairs should publish yearly data on visas and exchanges used.
Defence co-production: India should link Swiss precision engineering firms to Indian defence manufacturing.
Conclusion
Switzerland and India are using their trade pact as a base for wider ties in mobility, defence and energy. Whether pending investment and intellectual property issues are settled will decide if TEPA’s investment promise is actually met.
Key numbers
Young professionals verification: 30 to 90 days to verify nationality or residency status.
TEPA target horizon: investment and jobs goals set over 15 years.
Back2Basics: European Free Trade Association (EFTA)
Formation: EFTA was set up in 1960 by the Stockholm Convention, as a free trade grouping outside the European Economic Community.
Headquarters:Geneva, Switzerland.
Not a customs union: Each EFTA member sets its own external tariffs, and none is a member of the European Union (EU).
Link to the EU market: Iceland, Liechtenstein and Norway join the EU single market through the European Economic Area (EEA). Switzerland relies on bilateral agreements instead.
Matching Previous Year Question
“[2026] The Chancellor of Germany visited India in January 2026. Which of the following is/are NOT correct in terms of outcomes?
1. MoU between All India Institute of Ayurveda and University of Hamburg
2. MoU on Youth Hockey Development between Hockey India and German Hockey Federation
3. Establishment of a bilateral dialogue mechanism on the Indo-Pacific
4. Opening of an Honorary Consul of Germany in Lucknow
(a) 2 and 3
(b) 1 and 4
(c) 3 and 4
(d) 1 only
ANSWER: B”
The India-US interim trade deal has stalled for a third time, 20 months after negotiations began, as the legal basis of US tariffs keeps shifting. India’s narrow tariff edge can vanish under the shifting US system, so the stake is durable terms rather than a wider tariff gap.
What was the interim deal meant to deliver?
What it is: An interim trade deal covers some tariffs and purchases ahead of a full agreement, like a down payment on a larger bargain.
February framework: The joint statement aimed to cut the US tariff on Indian goods from 50% to 18%.
India’s side of the bargain: India agreed to cut duties on American industrial goods and to buy more from the US.
What went wrong: The rate’s legal basis vanished within two weeks, so India’s promised advantage shrank.
The takeaway: A concession tied to a shifting US legal regime has little lasting value.
How has the legal ground under US tariffs shifted?
Court ruling: The US Supreme Court struck down the reciprocal tariffs, the country-by-country duties imposed since April 2025 under an emergency law. India’s 18% rate rested on that law.
Temporary global tariff: A temporary tariff on most imports followed, and it expired in July.
Forced-labour tariffs: From July, rates depend on how well a country blocks forced labour goods. India’s proposed 12.5% was cut to 10% after it banned such imports.
Narrow lead: Rival Vietnam pays only slightly more, and several countries pay the same as India.
Repeated stalls: A negotiating round was called off in August 2025, and a February visit was postponed.
Mixed US signals: The State Department called the deal “90 per cent-plus there”. The US Trade Representative saw nothing imminent.
Why is a tariff advantage a weak thing to rely on?
Relative edge: Washington decides who gets which rate. A US deal with Vietnam, reportedly near completion, could erase India’s margin overnight.
Shifting baseline: The baseline itself can change, through a wider probe or through sector tariffs:
a US probe into “structural excess capacity”, meaning output far beyond home demand, covers 16 economies, including India, and its findings, due by a statutory deadline of March 2027, could reset rates regardless of any deal;
generic medicines, the backbone of India’s pharma exports to the US, are exempt from new pharma duties only until a review by April 2027, and steep duties on generics are planned from 2028.
Unequal permanence: India’s tariff cuts, farm openings and purchase commitments are long-term and politically hard to reverse. India’s rate is an administrative decision Washington can revise alone.
Should India chase a wider tariff gap or durable terms?
New Delhi’s logic: Cutting tariffs and buying more gains India little unless its exporters benefit, so it wants a clear advantage over rivals before signing.
Case for durable terms: A rival’s deal, the capacity probe or sector duties can each erase a tariff gap, so bargaining power is better spent on terms harder to reverse.
Predictability as the prize:Uncertainty costs exporters more than any single rate, because it pushes firms to hedge. Washington has based tariffs on three laws in eight months.
Challenges
Executive discretion: US tariffs can change by presidential action, without legislation.
Farm sensitivities: Openings on farm products face strong domestic political resistance in India.
Unilateral withdrawal history: Washington has withdrawn trade preferences before. Eg. Revocation of India’s Generalized System of Preferences (GSP) benefits in 2019.
Way Forward
Tariff ceiling: Washington commits not to raise duties on Indian goods above the agreed level for the deal’s life.
Non-discrimination and notice: Bar less favourable treatment of India than of competitors, and require prior notice and consultation before any new tariff.
Written sector carve-outs: Start with pharmaceuticals, where some Indian speciality medicines already pay zero duty under the new pharma tariffs.
Phased, conditional concessions: Phase in India’s tariff cuts and purchase commitments, tied to US compliance.
Conclusion
The negotiation now turns on how long agreed terms last, not on how low the US tariff is. Trading India’s concessions for binding ceilings, not a passing rate gap, will decide the deal’s real value.
About India-US trade relations
Trade volume: Bilateral trade stood at $149.84 billion in 2025-26.
Trade surplus: India’s surplus with the US narrowed to $34.4 billion in 2025-26.
Investment: The US is India’s third-largest investor, with cumulative foreign direct investment (FDI) inflows of $70.65 billion (2000-2025).
Indian investment in the US: About 163 Indian companies have invested over $40 billion there (Confederation of Indian Industry).
Matching Previous Year Question
“[2026] The Chancellor of Germany visited India in January 2026. Which of the following is/are NOT correct in terms of outcomes? 1. MoU between All India Institute of Ayurveda and University of Hamburg 2. MoU on Youth Hockey Development between Hockey India and German Hockey Federation 3. Establishment of a bilateral dialogue mechanism on the Indo-Pacific 4. Opening of an Honorary Consul of Germany in Lucknow (a) 2 and 3 (b) 1 and 4 (c) 3 and 4 (d) 1 only Answer: B”
Both US charges behind its tariffs on India, structural excess capacity and weak curbs on forced-labour imports, are now contested by India. At the G20 Trade Ministers’ Meeting, the Commerce Minister said India has no excess capacity in the flagged sectors and already bans forced-labour imports. The US already levies a 10% “forced labour” tariff on India, and a US Trade Representative (USTR) probe of 60 countries could add more.
What is structural excess capacity, and what is India’s position?
What it is:Structural excess capacity means an economy produces far more than its market absorbs and exports the surplus cheaply, like a factory dumping unsold goods on a neighbouring town.
India’s growth model: India called itself the fastest-growing large economy, driven by local demand. It is building manufacturing “from design to finished goods” for domestic and global needs.
Where distortion lies: Capacity itself is not the problem. Distortion arises when production concentrates in one place because of hidden subsidies.
Shared worry: India shares concern that trade-distorting support in some economies leads to “dumping and predatory pricing“, meaning selling below cost to kill rivals.
The takeaway: India argues the target should be subsidy-driven distortion, not countries that simply produce a lot.
How does India want capacity concerns handled?
Trade remedies: Concerns should be met with anti-dumping duties, which offset below-cost imports, and countervailing duties, which offset foreign subsidies. Both need evidence and face judicial review.
No pretext:Supply-chain diversification is legitimate, but cannot justify measures outside World Trade Organization (WTO) rules.
Policy space: The burden of adjustment must not shift to developing countries, which need room to industrialise.
No unilateralism: On both excess capacity and forced labour, India said any step must be multilateral and WTO-compliant.
What has India done on forced labour?
US tariff route: In July the USTR imposed extra tariffs on 60 countries, including India, after probing whether they did enough to stop forced-labour imports.
Constitutional bar:Article 23 prohibits forced labour as a fundamental right, enforceable by the Supreme Court.
ILO commitments: India has ratified International Labour Organization (ILO) Conventions 29 and 105, the core treaties against forced labour.
Import ban: In July India amended its Foreign Trade Policy to prohibit imports of goods made with forced labour.
Firm commitment: India called its commitment to eliminating forced labour “absolute and unconditional“.
Where does India draw the line at the G20?
Evidence, not presumption: Border measures must rest on “specific and verifiable evidence“, not presumptions about whole countries, regions or sectors, and must respect due process.
Right forum: The ILO, as the universal tripartite body of governments, employers and workers, is the competent forum for labour standards.
Conditional cooperation: India backs G20 cooperation only with no monitoring of members, no new obligations and no use for unilateral trade action.
US-set agenda: The US holds the 2026 G20 Presidency, with sessions on excess capacity, forced labour and updating the Most-Favoured-Nation (MFN) principle, under which a WTO member gives all members its best tariff terms.
Challenges
Broken WTO appeals: The WTO Appellate Body has been non-functional since December 2019, so unilateral tariffs face no final ruling.
Region-wide presumptions: Some forced-labour laws presume whole regions guilty without specific evidence. Eg. The US Uyghur Forced Labor Prevention Act, 2021 presumes goods from Xinjiang are tainted.
Domestic enforcement gaps: The Bonded Labour System (Abolition) Act, 1976 bans bonded labour, yet it persists in brick kilns and farms.
MFN under review: Reopening the MFN principle could erode equal tariff treatment that developing countries rely on.
Way Forward
Supply-chain traceability: The Ministry of Labour and Employment should certify forced-labour-free supply chains for exporters.
Bilateral settlement: The Commerce Ministry should press to remove the 10% tariff in ongoing India-US trade talks.
Appellate revival: India should lead a developing country coalition to restore WTO appellate review.
Evidence-based remedies: The Directorate General of Trade Remedies (DGTR) should keep India’s own duties strictly evidence-based.
Conclusion
India accepts the goals of fair trade and free labour but rejects their use as grounds for unilateral US tariffs. The outcome of the USTR’s excess capacity probe will show whether WTO process or unilateral pressure governs this dispute.
Matching Previous Year Question
“[2017] Consider the following statements: 1. India has ratified the Trade Facilitation Agreement (TFA) of WTO. 2. TFA is a part of WTO’s Bali Ministerial Package of 2013. 3. TFA came into force in January 2016. Which of the statements given above is/are correct? (a) 1 and 2 only (b) 1 and 3 only (c) 2 and 3 only (d) 1, 2 and 3 Answer: A”
Question (2025, GS3 – 10 Marks): What are the challenges before the Indian economy when the world is moving away from free trade and multilateralism to protectionism and bilateralism? How can these challenges be met?” Linkage: Evaluates India’s trade strategy of negotiating bilateral Trade and Economic Partnership Agreements (TEPAs) to secure investment, technology, and market access as traditional WTO multilateralism faces headwinds. [2026] Which of the following countries are members of the European Union? 1. Belarus 2. Poland 3. Germany 4. Switzerland (a) 1, 2 and 4 (b) 1 and 4 only (c) 2 and 3 (d) 2 and 4 only
Mentor’s Comment
TEPA is publicised through tariff coverage, but its test is whether an investment and jobs pledge converts into commercial projects. Iceland’s contribution is knowledge, and India’s CCUS effort is at the pre-commercial stage where that knowledge is most useful. The ambition is $100 billion and one million jobs. The missing precondition is evidence of conversion, since a drying facility at Tapri and a memorandum at Raigad are not investment flows. The partnership also shifts the constraint to India. Licensing, storage assessment and monitoring require domestic institutions able to absorb the technology. The article is an ambassador’s advocacy piece, so its claims need to be read against outcome data.
Why in the News
The Trade and Economic Partnership Agreement (TEPA) between India and the four European Free Trade Association (EFTA) states, Iceland, Liechtenstein, Norway and Switzerland, entered into force on 1 October 2025. A year on, the real test is the industrial and technological partnership it enables, not tariff cuts.
What is TEPA, and what sets it apart?
What it is: TEPA is a trade deal in which each side cuts customs duties on the other’s goods, like a standing discount between regular partners.
EFTA’s offer: EFTA states cut duties on 92.2% of their tariff lines (product categories), covering 99.6% of the value of India’s exports to them.
India’s offer: India grants concessions on 82.7% of its tariff lines, covering 95.3% of EFTA’s exports, among India’s most ambitious openings to developed economies.
Investment and jobs chapter: TEPA is India’s first trade agreement with a dedicated chapter on investment and job creation. EFTA states aim to invest $100 billion over 15 years.
The takeaway: By tying market access to investment and jobs, TEPA is built for lasting industrial partnerships, not only cheaper trade.
Where can Iceland’s experience serve India’s priorities?
Geothermal direct use: Iceland uses low and medium temperature ground heat directly, not to make power. India’s Himalayan geothermal belt can do the same:
at Tapri, Kinnaur district, the Indian-Icelandic venture Geotropy dries fruit, so apple growers need not sell at low harvest-time prices;
a geothermal cooling facility at the site is due by the end of the year;
frontier posts reliant on fuel convoys gain energy security independent of roads.
Carbon capture, utilisation and storage (CCUS): CCUS traps carbon dioxide from industry and reuses or buries it. India is at a pre-commercial stage:
the Department of Science and Technology (DST) published India’s first CCUS research road map in December 2025, for the 2070 net-zero goal;
Oil and Natural Gas Corporation (ONGC), NTPC Limited and Indian Oil Corporation Limited are running pilots and feasibility studies;
Iceland’s CarbFix injects dissolved carbon dioxide into basalt, where over 95% turns to stone within two years. India’s Deccan Trap basalts are similar;
Carbon Iceland, JSW Steel and Bharatia signed a memorandum on an e-methanol project in Raigad, turning steel emissions into fuel with green hydrogen;
the gain lies in technology licensing and co-developed projects, not equipment exports.
Fisheries processing: Icelandic firms plan to process North Atlantic catch in India under TEPA. Iceland uses about 90% of each cod, far more than most fishing nations.
How does Iceland link India to the Arctic and to Europe?
Arctic Council: Iceland is a founding member of the Arctic Council, the forum of the eight Arctic States. India has been an Observer since 2013.
India’s Arctic engagement: India published its Arctic Policy in 2022 and runs the Himadri station in Svalbard. Iceland offers it a direct bilateral channel into Arctic research.
Complement to the EU deal: TEPA complements, not rivals, the European Union (EU)-India Free Trade Agreement (FTA). Together the two pacts give India more than either alone, “one plus one equalling three“.
Challenges
Investment promise unproven: Turning the investment pledge into ground-level projects remains a bureaucratic challenge.
Standards barriers: Strict European sanitary and phytosanitary (SPS) rules on food safety and plant health hold back Indian farm exports.
Investor caution: Norwegian pension funds have hesitated to invest in India over perceived regulatory unpredictability.
Thin logistics links: Few direct shipping and air-cargo routes raise freight costs.
Way Forward
Investment tracker: The Ministry of Commerce and Industry should publish yearly EFTA investment and jobs data.
Pension fund outreach: India should court Norway’s Government Pension Fund Global for Indian green bonds.
Geothermal mapping: The Ministry of New and Renewable Energy should map Himalayan direct-use sites on the Tapri model.
Joint storage pilots: DST and public sector firms should run basalt storage pilots with Icelandic partners.
Conclusion
TEPA’s worth will be judged by the plants and jobs it seeds, not by tariff schedules. Whether its investment chapter turns geothermal, carbon capture and fisheries ideas into bankable ventures will decide if the European pacts truly add up.
Key numbers
Jobs target: one million direct jobs to be facilitated under TEPA.
CCUS potential: about 750 million tonnes of carbon dioxide a year by 2050 (NITI Aayog, 2022).
CCUS Budget outlay: Rs 20,000 crore over five years (Union Budget, February).
Raigad e-methanol project: 3,00,000 tonnes a year.
First carbon-to-fuel plant: George Olah plant, Svartsengi, Iceland, making methanol since 2011-12.
The 18th BRICS Summit in New Delhi earlier this month produced a 140-point declaration that, in places, echoes the anti-colonial Bandung agenda. The debate is whether BRICS can inherit the mission of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM), and whether India, leaning towards Washington, can lead the Global South.
What did Bandung and NAM stand for?
Bandung Conference: In April 1955, leaders of 29 newly independent Asian and African countries met at Bandung, Indonesia. They agreed on ten principles, chiefly:
sovereignty and non-interference;
refusal to join great-power military blocs;
support for peoples under colonial rule.
Non-Aligned Movement: Six years later, at Belgrade, this became NAM, a platform for decolonisation. It backed Algeria, Vietnam, the anti-apartheid struggle and the Palestinians.
New International Economic Order (NIEO): In the 1970s, NAM took to the United Nations (UN) a demand for fair commodity prices, technology access and a voice in global institutions.
Loss of direction: India was NAM’s founder and moral centre. After the Soviet Union collapsed, many members, India included, drifted towards the United States (US).
The takeaway: NAM survives only in name, so BRICS is judged as its possible heir.
What did the New Delhi declaration say, and leave unsaid?
BRICS reach: Formed in 2009, BRICS now represents more than half of humanity.
Bandung echoes: The declaration seeks reform of the UN Security Council, International Monetary Fund (IMF), World Bank and World Trade Organization (WTO). It also backs:
an end to the blockade of Cuba;
a Palestinian state on the 1967 borders, with East Jerusalem as capital;
climate finance for countries that did not cause the crisis.
Not NAM’s heir: BRICS members have different systems and interests, and several are close US partners.
Silences of consensus: The declaration condemns “unilateral coercive measures” and urges “maximum restraint” in West Asia. It names neither who imposes them nor the aggressor.
Why does BRICS’s limited project still matter?
Reform, not rupture: BRICS seeks more than one centre of power, not an end to domination. It would reform the US dollar’s dominance but is silent on poor nations’ debt.
Shield against coercion: When tariffs become weapons and sanctions on one country disrupt many, alternatives give governments room:
trade in national currencies;
development finance without strings;
a reserve arrangement, a pooled emergency fund, outside the IMF.
Strength in numbers: A larger, stronger BRICS makes it harder for one power to dictate terms.
Can India lead the Global South while leaning towards Washington?
Junior partner charge: The critique holds that India acts as a “junior partner” of the US, deepening military and trade arrangements aimed at containing China.
West Asia contradiction: India embraces Israel strategically yet signed the Palestinian statehood text. Surveys across West Asia rank Israel and the US as the region’s greatest threats.
Selective silence: India has been silent on US actions against Iran, Venezuela and Cuba, and has not clearly condemned the destruction of Gaza.
Hidden poverty: Before the summit, the capital’s slums were screened from view.
Return to Bandung: The critique urges a return to Bandung’s idea of peoples’ right to decide their own destinies:
freedom from US pressure;
solidarity with Palestine and opposition to sanctions;
payment of climate debt to poorer nations;
a BRICS that is more than a lobby.
Challenges
India-China rivalry: Border friction between India and China limits BRICS’s strategic cohesion.
Expansion without criteria: A larger BRICS risks becoming a talk shop, as NAM did.
Dollar dependence: The US dollar still settles over 80% of global trade, so de-dollarisation is slow.
Way Forward
Membership criteria: BRICS should set formal criteria for full and partner membership.
Stronger bank: Members should raise the capital of the New Development Bank (NDB) and widen its Global South lending.
Debt agenda: BRICS should take up sovereign debt relief.
Consistent positions: India should judge unilateral actions by one standard, whoever acts.
Conclusion
BRICS offers the Global South a hedge against coercion, not the anti-colonial programme Bandung and NAM carried. Whether India uses BRICS to speak for that programme, or as one more seat at the table, remains unresolved.
About BRICS
Origin: A Goldman Sachs economist coined “BRIC” in 2001. The first leaders’ summit met at Yekaterinburg, Russia.
Expansion:South Africa joined in 2011. Egypt, Ethiopia, Iran and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) joined in 2024, and Indonesia a year later.
NDB: Headquartered in Shanghai, the BRICS bank has approved over $35 billion in infrastructure loans.
Matching Previous Year Question
“[2026] Which of the following countries are members of the European Union? 1. Belarus 2. Poland 3. Germany 4. Switzerland (a) 1, 2 and 4 (b) 1 and 4 only (c) 2 and 3 (d) 2 and 4 only Answer: C”
A newly established BRICS Network of Centres of Excellence (CoEs) in mental health will be piloted by India, with the National Institute of Mental Health and Neurosciences (NIMHANS) acting as its coordinating centre. It answers a problem common to the grouping. Specialist psychiatric services sit in cities while the populations that need them live in rural or underserved areas. Stigma compounds that distance, because a diagnosis is widely treated as a mark against a family rather than as a condition requiring treatment. The tension is that no member can train its way out of the treatment gap at the pace the burden is growing, so the network is betting on health workers who are not specialists and on digital delivery instead of on more specialists.
What is the BRICS Network of Centres of Excellence in mental health?
What it is: A newly established network linking designated centres of excellence in mental health across BRICS member states, with India running the pilot.
Governance work: The coordinating centre is drafting the network’s governance protocol before the network begins operating.
What it exists to do: It carries approaches developed in one member state into the health systems of the others, adapted to local conditions.
Form of collaboration: Cooperation spans technical expertise, joint research, capacity building and knowledge exchange rather than monetary grants.
How does the network intend to close the treatment gap?
Task sharing: Basic mental health support, identification and referral become part of routine primary care, carried out by frontline and non specialist health workers upskilled for the role.
Digital telehealth: Telehealth platforms extend specialist input to hard to reach and rural populations without relocating the specialists themselves.
Integration into primary health centres: Mental healthcare is placed inside the existing primary care system rather than run as a parallel vertical service.
What does each member state bring to the network?
China, an educational manga against stigma: A comic produced to challenge the ideas of losing face and parental blame follows a schoolgirl whose grades collapse under severe anxiety and depression. Her recovery begins when a classmate helps her reach a community counselling clinic, and a doctor explains that a mental health condition, like a broken leg, may require treatment and support.
Indonesia, a round the clock helpline: A 24×7 digital platform responds to mental health crises and to suicide prevention.
South Africa, pictorial screening: Screening built around pictures and stories helps community health workers identify mental health concerns during home visits.
United Arab Emirates, simulation based practice: Clinical simulations and interventions built on virtual reality are in use.
Russia, technology assisted assessment: Physiological measures such as heart rate variability and galvanic skin response are combined with biofeedback and other non invasive technologies for assessment and rehabilitation.
India, tele mental health: India brings tele mental health services designed to plug into the existing healthcare system.
Why does India’s own burden make the exchange worth having?
Scale of the affected population: An estimated 197.3 million individuals in India were affected by mental health disorders in 2017.
The treatment gap: Between 70 per cent and 92 per cent of those affected went untreated.
Workforce shortage: India is short of psychiatrists, clinical psychologists and psychiatric nurses, and most of the specialists it has are concentrated in cities.
Economic cost: Mental health conditions in India are projected to cause economic losses of USD 1.03 trillion between 2012 and 2030.
What will the network produce, and where does it stand?
Joint research agenda: Areas under consideration include screening assisted by Artificial Intelligence (AI), digital interventions, suicide prevention, biomarkers and epidemiological mapping of mental health conditions across BRICS countries.
Operational blueprints: The network is expected to share blueprints for digital platforms, tools and learning management systems.
A clinical compendium: A compendium of evidence based clinical protocols, culturally adaptable tools and public education strategies is envisaged.
Common rules of the road: Members will work on shared approaches to data privacy and cybersecurity, to the ethical deployment of AI and to mental health policies grounded in human rights.
Current stage: Centres of excellence, agreements and contact points are still being settled, and a multi country steering committee and technical working groups are being formed.
Conclusion
The network exists as an agreed structure and not yet as a delivery system. What each member has put in is a working method rather than money, so the open question is whether a method built for one country’s workforce and one country’s stigma survives transfer to another’s. The governance machinery is still being assembled, and until it is settled the network has no way to hold a member to a commitment. The marker to watch is the first pilot site at which a health worker who is not a specialist identifies a case and refers it without a psychiatrist in the building.
Back2Basics: National Institute of Mental Health and Neurosciences
Status: NIMHANS, located in Bengaluru, was declared an Institute of National Importance by an Act of Parliament in 2012.
Administrative home: It functions under the Ministry of Health and Family Welfare.
Mandate: It combines patient care, teaching and research across psychiatry, neurology and neurosurgery, and trains mental health professionals for the country.
National service role: It is the nodal institution for Tele MANAS, the national tele mental health service launched by the Ministry of Health and Family Welfare in 2022.
Matching Previous Year Question
“[2026, GS2, 10 marks] “BRICS acts as a powerful counterweight in global governance, actively amplifying the voice and influence of the Global South.” Explain the role of BRICS in projecting itself as an alternative to other groupings.”
The India-New Zealand Free Trade Agreement (FTA) comes into force on 20 October. India has secured duty free access on 100 per cent of its exports to New Zealand, a historic concession. India held firm on dairy, an opening New Zealand’s negotiators had pressed for, and kept the sector out of the deal. The agreement lands while 100 per cent United States tariffs loom over Indian goods and a trade deal with Washington remains elusive. The contested point is whether the macroeconomic size of a trade relationship is the right test of whether an agreement was worth negotiating.
What is the India-New Zealand Free Trade Agreement?
Trade volume covered: Bilateral goods trade between the two countries is $1.1 billion, which is less than 1 per cent of India’s total goods trade. The deal envisages a doubling by 2030.
Tariff outcome on each side: New Zealand gives duty free access on 100 per cent of India’s exports to it. India has kept nearly 30 per cent of its own import lines outside the tariff concessions.
Why is macroeconomic size the wrong test of a trade deal?
Trade as livelihood: Trade is a source of livelihood for lakhs of businesses, nearly half of which are micro, small and medium enterprises. A share of gross trade does not capture that.
Rerouting as insurance: Adverse developments in tariffs or the closure of trade routes can be mitigated to an extent by a nimble rerouting of trade to countries where Indian exporters hold an advantage.
The current trade environment: Indian exporters need every alternative channel that can be opened, because the largest single market for them is neither open nor settled.
Which Indian exports stand to gain?
Labour intensive lines: Textiles make up about 14 per cent of India’s exports to New Zealand. Pearls and semi precious stones constitute another 5 per cent or so.
Capital intensive lines: One third of India’s exports to New Zealand are pharmaceuticals, parts of nuclear reactors, vehicular parts, mineral fuels, electrical machinery, and iron and steel.
The mix itself: India carries a good mix of capital intensive and labour intensive exports to New Zealand. Both halves of that mix stand to benefit from the duty free access.
What did India protect, and what did it extract?
Dairy exclusion: Opening India’s dairy sector was a major demand of the New Zealand negotiators. India held firm and excluded it from the deal.
Labour mobility: India has won valuable concessions on visas for workers and students. Several western countries are clamping down on foreign worker inflows, so an alternative route carries real relief.
Investment commitment: New Zealand has committed to facilitate investments of $20 billion in India over 15 years. The commitment is smaller than, but along the same lines as, the one in India’s agreement with the European Free Trade Association (EFTA) bloc.
Why the investment matters: India needs foreign investment for economic growth and to manage its balance of payments.
Challenges to the India-New Zealand Free Trade Agreement
Duty free access does not clear non tariff requirements: A zero tariff is not market access where sanitary and phytosanitary standards and certification stop the consignment at the border. Eg. New Zealand operates one of the strictest biosecurity regimes in the world for plant and animal products. The Fix: Negotiate mutual recognition of conformity assessment and pair the agreement with testing and certification support for exporters.
Small exporters cannot use preferences they do not know about: Preference utilisation stays low where a small firm does not know the tariff line, the origin rule or the certification procedure. Eg. Low preference utilisation has been a standing complaint about India’s earlier trade agreement with the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). The Fix: Run a sector wise outreach programme through export promotion councils publishing the tariff line, the origin rule and the documentation for each covered product.
An excluded sector is a standing demand, not a settled question: A sector kept out of one agreement returns as a demand in the next round and in every other negotiation India is running. Eg. Agricultural and dairy access has been a contested demand in India’s negotiations with the United States. The Fix: State the ground for the exclusion, which is the feed certification requirement and smallholder livelihoods, as a standing position rather than renegotiating it deal by deal.
Mobility concessions depend on domestic politics abroad: A visa concession sits in a treaty schedule, and the actual issuance sits with an immigration policy that changes with the government of the day. Eg. Several western countries have tightened foreign worker inflows within the past two years. The Fix: Convert the concession into numerical quotas and processing timelines written into the agreement’s own schedule rather than a facilitation commitment.
Investment facilitation is not investment: A commitment to facilitate a sum over 15 years binds no firm to invest anything. Eg. The EFTA agreement carries a $100 billion facilitation commitment of the same design. The Fix: Attach a periodic review with published investment data, so a shortfall is visible against the timeline rather than at the end of it.
Conclusion
The case for a small trade agreement does not rest on the trade it currently covers. It rests on giving exporters a channel that does not depend on one large market staying open, and on winning terms a bigger partner would not concede. India has done both here. What is not settled is whether the same approach survives a negotiation in which the partner holds the leverage, and the pending talks with Washington are where that will show.
Back2Basics: European Free Trade Association
What it is: EFTA is an intergovernmental organisation and free trade area founded in 1960 by the Stockholm Convention.
Members: It has four member states, Iceland, Liechtenstein, Norway and Switzerland. None of them is a member of the European Union.
Relationship with the EU: Three of the four take part in the EU single market through the European Economic Area. Switzerland deals with the EU through separate bilateral agreements.
Agreement with India: India and EFTA signed the Trade and Economic Partnership Agreement (TEPA) in March 2024.
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