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GS Paper: GS2-19.Effect of policies and politics of developed and developing countries on India’s interests, Indian diaspora.

  • The spectre of a post-COVID-19 world

    Context

    As COVID-19 spreads exponentially across the world, profound uncertainty and extreme volatility are wreaking havoc of a kind seldom encountered previously. It might, hence, be wise to start thinking of what next, if at least to try and handle a situation created by the most serious pandemic in recent centuries.

    China’s important role

    • No previous experience: The problem with the novel coronavirus is that with the exception of China, which battled another coronavirus epidemic in 2003 — SARS epidemic — there is little available for most nations on which to base their assessment of what next.
    • Further drop in China’s growth rate: What is known is that China’s growth rate has further plummeted, even as it was confronting an economic slowdown which had been in the works for some time.
    • Economic downturn internationally: The consequences for the global economy of China ceasing to be the world’s biggest exporter of manufactured goods are considerable.
    • And with no country in a position to replace it, this development will precipitate a further economic downturn internationally.

    Uncertainties before epidemic

    • The COVID-19 pandemic could not have come at a more difficult time.
    • Uncertain economic environment: The world was already having to contend with an uncertain economic environment, with industries in turn facing newer challenges such as having to adjust to a shift from cost efficiencies to innovation and breakthrough improvements.
    • Added to this were: a global slowdown, increasing political and policy uncertainties, alterations in social behaviour, new environmental norms, etc.
    • India’s position: Newly emerging economies, such as India, were even more affected by all this, than some of the older established ones.

    Impact on India and what lies ahead?

    • Estimate of cost by ADB: An early estimate by the Asian Development Bank, soon after the epidemic was declared, was that it would cost the Indian economy $29.9 billion.
    • A recent industry estimate pegs the cost of the lockdown at around $120 billion or 4% of India’s GDP.
    • May require six months to recover after epidemic: The Confederation of Indian Industry (CII) had at one point warned that the COVID-19 impact, and the existing stress in the financial sector, meant that India would require up to six months even after the entire course of the COVID-19 epidemic is over to restore normalcy and business continuity.
    • The COVID-19 Taskforce under the Finance Minister come up with measures to mitigate the economic hardship engendered by the pandemic, and finally a three-week-long lockdown.
    • Several precautionary measures based on guidelines in vogue elsewhere in the world for preventing pandemics of this kind, have also been introduced including ‘home isolation’, ‘home quarantine’, etc.
    • The prognosis as to what lies ahead is indeed bleak.
    • On the economic plane, according to most experts, a global recession seems inevitable.
    • The decline in demand: Uncertainty, panic and lockdown policies are expected to cause demand worldwide to decline in a precipitous way.
    • Start of downward cycle: Decline in demand will inevitably lead to a vicious downward cycle, where companies close down, resulting in more lay-offs and a further drop in consumption.
    • A precipitous decline in GDP would follow.
    • Massive funds would be needed: To compensate for this loss, massive inflows of government funds would be needed, but most governments, India included, might find it difficult to find adequate resources for this purpose.
    • Right time for fund: Equally important, if not more so, is that such massive inflows of funds (if they are to be effective) should be here and now, and not later, by which time the situation may well have spiralled out of control. Global coordination was a must in the extant situation.

    Disruption in the global order- Implications for the position of the US

    • COVID-19 is, in turn, expected to bring about major changes in the global order.
    • Changes would get accelerated: Some of these changes have, no doubt, been in the making for some time, but would get accelerated.
    • As of now, though the U.S. is no longer the global power that it once was, it is hardly in retreat.
    • Retreat from Afghanistan, not the end: The US is, without doubt, increasingly disinclined to act as the world’s gendarme, as instanced by its retreat from Afghanistan after a dubious accord with the Afghan Taliban,
    • But this was not the end of the road as far as U.S. power was concerned.
    • The US would step back further: Post COVID-19, however, and given that the U.S. is among the countries badly affected by this pandemic, together with existing uncertainties affecting its financial markets, the U.S. can be expected to step back even further — from one of assertion to neutrality in global affairs.
    • Already, U.S. command of the global commons has weakened. Meantime, China and Russia have strengthened their relationship and improved their asymmetric capabilities.
    • US not the largest economy by PPP: The challenge from China is becoming more obvious by the day — measured by purchasing power parity, the S. is not the largest economy in the world as of now.
    • Russian challenge: Even more daunting from a U.S. standpoint, and also representing a sea-change from the recent past, Russia has become far more economically and politically stable and an important power broker in West Asia.
    • Impact on liberal international order: These shifts cannot but, and are likely to, have a direct impact on the liberal international order. It could, in turn, give a boost to authoritarian regimes and authoritarian trends.

    Impact on social behaviour

    • Moving away from the political and economic consequences of COVID-19 are other concerns arising from an extended lockdown, social distancing and isolation.
    • The epidemic of despair: Psychologists are even talking of an ‘epidemic of despair’ arising from a fear of unknown causes, resulting in serious anxiety and mental problems.
    • Problems due to extended isolation: Extended isolation, according to psychologists, can trigger a different kind of pandemic even leading to possible suicidal tendencies, fits of anger, depression, alcoholism and eccentric behavioural patterns.

    Inequality and impact

    • The impact is not the same for all: Another fallout from the current epidemic might well be the extent to which inequality in incomes impact segments of the population, facing a common malaise.
    • Countries lacking a comprehensive nation-wide health system would find this an even more difficult situation to handle.
    • Meantime, as the economy weakens, accompanied by job losses, those without high levels of skills would fall further behind.
    • This is evident to some extent already given recent reports of mass migration across the Indian landmass.
    • Out of work migrant labour, unable to find new jobs since they lack the necessary skills, are attempting to return to their normal habitat, bringing in their wake untold suffering and, perhaps even the spread of the virus.
    • This has all the makings of a huge human tragedy. Existing curbs on their movement would further exacerbate the problem, and could even lead to a major law and order situation.

    Possibility of the rise of digital authoritarianism

    • One possible, and unexpected, aspect of the COVID-19 epidemic could be the thrust it could provide to ‘digital authoritarianism’.
    • China’s authoritarian methods seem to have helped it to contain the spread of the virus — at least for the time being.
    • Somewhat similar tactics are being employed by some other countries as well.
    • In turn, leaders across many nations may find China’s methods, and the embracing of technology to refashion authoritarianism for the modern age irresistible, and a standard to be adapted, even if they profess to be democratic.
    • The rise of digital autocracies could lead to digital repression, and in the age of AI-powered surveillance, create a capacity for predictive control, or what is often referred to as ‘social management’.

    Conclusion

    The pandemic even after it’s over could change the world in more than one ways and we must be cautious in our approach in accepting or rejecting these changes brought about by the epidemic.

  • The art of China’s legalpolitic

    Context

    A resolution has been moved in the US Senate calling on the international community to inquire into the origins of the virus in China’s Wuhan province. Delhi could learn a trick or two from Beijing on how to make international law the keystone of India’s diplomacy, especially in the multilateral domain.

    Fixing responsibility for the outbreak on China

    • Compensation demand: Lawyers and activists have begun to sue China in US courts demanding compensation. Politicians are not far behind.
    • The U.S. Senate resolution: A resolution has been moved in the US Senate calling on the international community to inquire into the origins of the virus in China’s Wuhan province, quantify the damage inflicted on the rest of the world, and design a mechanism of reparations from Beijing.
    • Basis of the demand for compensation: The case for China’s culpability is based on the principles of state responsibility and Beijing’s alleged failure to respect the obligation, under the 2005 International Health Regulations (IHR), to notify the world on the outbreak of the epidemic.
    • Is the basis valid? Many international jurists dismiss these claims by citing the principles of sovereign state immunity, the lack of precedent in holding states to account for the spread of infectious disease beyond their borders and the absence of provisions for reparations under the IHR.

    The interplay between legality, moralpolitik and geopolitics

    • Gulliver and Lilliputs of the world: On the face of it, China is too much of a Gulliver to be tied down by legal Lilliputs.
    • The Legalpolitik: Before we dismiss international law as not real law, “legalpolitik” can put some real pressure on big nations and contribute to the power play among them.
    • Role of public opinion: As public opinion began to intrude into diplomacy over the last two centuries, legality and moralpolitik have become an integral part of geopolitics.

    Difficulty in proving the case against China

    • The cost of a pandemic: Most world leaders know, whether they say it aloud or not, the international costs of the pandemic could have been far lesser if China had acknowledged the spread of the virus from Wuhan early on and informed other countries.
    • It is one thing to know but entirely another to prove it under the law.
    • The pursuit of claims is a waste of time: Most governments believe the pursuit of claims against Beijing is a waste of time.
    • Political heft of China: If Beijing can make the World Health Organisation toe its line and prevent the rest of the world, including US President Donald Trump, from describing COVID-19 as the “China Virus”, it is unlikely to be impressed by a few legal impresarios from the West.
    • Precedence of defying the law: After all, China had dismissed the unanimous verdict of the International Court of Justice in 2016 on Beijing’s territorial claims over the South China Sea.
    • Beijing did not even bother to appear in the case filed by the Philippines.
    • China had simply declared that the ICJ has no jurisdiction in the matter.

    The relation between power and law in international relations

    • Power prevails: That power tends to prevail over law is certainly truer in international relations than domestic politics.
    • Law in the domestic domain: In the domestic domain, the state as the highest authority compels citizens to abide by the law, with force if necessary.
    • Law in the international arena: In the international arena, no single actor has a monopoly over the instruments of force.
    • We have multiple sovereigns but no “world government” that can compel deviant states to conform to rules.

    Role of the UNSC

    • In theory, the members of the UN Security Council can authorise coercion — in the form of economic sanctions or military force.
    • This, in turn, involves building a consensus among major powers, including the five permanent members of the UNSC who wield a veto.
    • In reality, then, the UNSC can’t act against one of the five permanent members.
    • Beijing, which was so eager to get the UNSC to discuss the situation in Jammu and Kashmir since last August, has simply blocked all suggestions for a discussion on the corona crisis in recent days.

    Are laws meaningless in the global arena?

    • Legal narratives have the weight of their own: While outcomes in international conflicts tend to be defined by power, the international discourse on any conflict today is framed in legal terms.
    • Whether it is a conversation between a state and its citizen or among governments or in a country’s outreach to the global society, legal narratives have a weight all of their own.
    • Delhi, for example, has struggled in recent days to counter the global interpretation of its domestic actions.
    • Importance of legal argument: Winning the legal argument, China has learnt from the history of great power relations, is very much part of great power jousting.
    • The negative lessons are from the Soviet Union that dismissed the Western legal arguments during the Cold War as based on the logic of capital and empire.
    • That did not convert many beyond the choir.
    • The positive lessons are from Great Britain and the United States.
    • The enduring Anglo-Saxon hegemony is rooted not just in economic and military power. It has always been underwritten by a powerful legal tradition that shapes the global narrative on most issues.
    • China developing own narrative: As it mounts a massive propaganda offensive against the US on the corona crisis, China’s state lawyers have filed a case in the Wuhan Intermediate People’s Court last week accusing various US government agencies of covering up the origin of the coronavirus.
    • China’s own narrative: It is no longer about China defending against a powerful international narrative; it is developing one of its own.

    Conclusions

    • 1. Make international law keystone of diplomacy: India has been at the receiving end of China’s legalpolitik — most recently on the quest for the membership of the Nuclear Suppliers Group and the constitutional changes in Kashmir.
    • Delhi could learn a trick or two from Beijing on how to make international law the keystone of India’s diplomacy, especially in the multilateral domain.
    • 2. Reinvest in the geo-legal arts: If China could emulate US and Britain on leveraging legalpolitik for strategic ends, India should not find it too hard to reinvest in the geo-legal arts that Delhi inherited from the Anglo-Saxons but seems to have lost along the way.

  • The deep void in global leadership

    Context

    The coronavirus’s flight across the world at lightning speed has exposed the total void in collective leadership at the global level.

    No global plan of action to combat the virus

    • No plan of action: Three months into the catastrophic war declared by an invisible virus, there is as yet no comprehensive, concerted plan of action, orchestrated by global leaders.
    • The G20 meeting: The G20 has just had a virtual meeting, at the prodding of Prime Minister Narendra Modi.
    • $ 5-trillion into the world economy: It is encouraging to learn that the G20 leaders have agreed to inject $5-trillion into the world economy to partially counter the devastating economic impact of the pandemic. This is indeed good news.
    • Need to do more: But taking collective ownership to fight a global war against the virus will require a lot more than writing cheques.

    SAARC meeting stands out in the world

    • Pandemic is not treated as a common enemy: World leaders are obviously overwhelmed with their own national challenges and do not appear inclined to view the pandemic as a common enemy against mankind, which it is.
    • Delay in reporting by China: China delayed reporting the virus to the World Health Organisation (WHO), and perhaps, contributed to the exacerbation of the spread of the virus across the globe.
    • Unilateral suspension of flight by the US: It was reported that the Trump administration did not even inform the European Union before it shut off flights from Europe.
    • Why the SAARC meeting stands out? It must be acknowledged that the initiative taken by Mr Modi in the early days to convene a meeting of South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation countries stands out in contrast to the pusillanimous leadership around the world.

    Need for leaders of nations to come together for collective global action.

    • Pandemic to persist: There is no evidence that, at the global level, the pandemic has abated yet and would be brought under control soon.
    • Massive lockdown, not a solution: To imagine that nations would be able to tame the virus soon with massive shutdowns might be just wishful thinking.
    • National shutdowns and physical distancing have been a challenge not only in the United States and some European countries, but it would also be more so in populous countries such as India.
    • At any rate, such lockouts come at enormous economic and social costs.
    • The utility of long suspension of international travel: As long as the virus is alive in some corner of the world, it would resume its travel across the world the moment international travel restrictions are relaxed.
    • Is it realistic to imagine that international travel will remain suspended until the last virus alive on this planet is extinguished?
    • This is a war. A good war against a bad enemy, and a common enemy, that respects no borders.
    • It is a global challenge to be fought by collective global leadership: If this global challenge is not a battle to be fought by a collective global leadership, nothing else is.
    • And yet, the typical response by all affected nations has been to impose ‘National distancing’ by closing borders.
    • While this is no doubt, a most appropriate response, there is a much bigger and emergent need for leaders of nations to come together for collective global action.

    Two reasons for the lack of collective global action

    • 1. Right-wing nationalism: The swing towards right-wing nationalism, as a guiding political ideology, in large swathes of the world, particularly in the U.S.
    • This ideology posits ‘global good’ being in conflict with and inimical to national interests.
    • 2. Ineffectiveness of the multilateral institutions: The United Nations was the outcome of the shared vision of the world leaders after World War II, that collective action is the only way forward to prevent the occurrence of another war.
    • That institution has notoriously failed to live up to its expectations to maintain peace among nations in the nearly 80 years since its formation.
    • Its affiliate organisations have, in several ways, failed to deliver on their lofty missions.
    • In particular WHO has proven to be too lethargic in reacting to pandemics in the past.
    • Its responses to COVID-19 has come under the scanner, not merely for incompetence, but also for lack of intellectual integrity.

    G-20 offers hope

    • A nimble outfit, not burdened with bureaucracy, is required to manage a global crisis of the nature that we are confronted with, today.
    • The G20, with co-option of other affected countries, itself might serve the purpose for the present.
    • What the global leadership must acknowledge: What is important is for the global leaders to acknowledge what every foot soldier knows: winning a war would require the right strategy, rapid mobilisation of relevant resources and, most importantly, timely action.
    • The following actions should come out of such a collective-
    • 1. Dealing with the shortages: The collective should ensure that shortages of drugs, medical equipment and protective gear do not come in the way of any nation’s capacity to contain or fight the pandemic.
    • Assistance from other countries: It is very likely that some nations that have succeeded in bringing the pandemic under control, such as China, Japan or South Korea, might have the capability to step up production at short notice to meet the increasing demand from other countries which are behind the curve.
    •  Development of information exchange: This would typically involve urgent development of information exchange on global production capacity, present and potential, demand and supply.
    • This is not to mean that there should be centralised management, which is not only infeasible but counterproductive, as the attendant bureaucracy will impede quick action.
    • A common information exchange could restrain the richer countries from predatory contracting of global capacities.
    • 2. Protocol among participant countries: Protocols might need to be put in place among participating countries to ensure seamless logistics for the supply chain for essential goods and services to function efficiently.
    • This might be particularly necessary in the context of controls on international traffic and national shutdowns.
    • There would need to be concomitant accord to eliminate all kinds of tariff and non-tariff barriers.
    • 3. Exchange of information: There needs to be an instantaneous exchange of authenticated information on what clinical solutions have succeeded and what has not.
    • A classic example is an issue relating to hydroxychloroquine, which is being used experimentally, bypassing the rigours of randomised clinical trials.
    • While there is no substitute to classic clinical proof, the more field-level information is shared within the medical community, the better will be the success rates of such experimentation.
    • 4.Cross country collaboration on the trials: This is a time to have cross-country collaboration on laboratory trials and clinical validation for vaccines and anti-viral drugs.
    • It must be acknowledged that WHO has already moved on this issue, although, perhaps, belatedly.
    • The best way to ensure speedy research is to pool global resources.
    • This attempt to collaborate might also bring in its wake an acceptable commercial solution that adequately incentivises private research while ensuring benefits being available to the entire world at affordable costs.
    • Such a framework might be necessary for sustained collaborations for future challenges.
    • 5. Easy movement of trained health professionals: There is a need to facilitate easy movement of trained health professionals across the world to train others and augment resources wherever there are shortages.
    • In other words, nations should come together to organise a global army to fight the pandemic, equipped with the best weapons and tools.
    • 6. The anticipation of food shortages: We must anticipate food shortages occurring sooner or later, in some part of the world, consequent to the national shutdowns.
    • Ironically, while we might have saved lives from the assault of the novel coronavirus, we might run the risk of losing lives to starvation and malnutrition, somewhere in the world if we do not take adequate precautions.
    • This requires not only coordinated global action; it would also turn out to be the test of global concern for mankind in general.

    Reconstruction of the global economy

    • Devastation no less than after the world war: Eventually, there is no doubt that human talent will triumph over the microscopic virus. But the economic devastation, that would have been caused as a result will be no less than the aftermath of a world war.
    • What should the reconstruction of economy involve? An orderly reconstruction of the global economy, which is equitable and inclusive, will eventually involve renegotiating terms of trade among key trading blocs, concerted action among central bankers to stabilise currencies, and a responsible way to regulate and manage global commodity markets.

    Conclusion

    Does India have the power to awaken the conscience of the Superpowers and catalyse collective global action? Remember, historically, it is always the weakling or the oppressed, who have caused transformational changes in the world order.

  • Terrorist attack in Kabul’s Gurudwara

    Context

    Attack on gurdwara underlines that the US-Taliban deal has brought Afghanistan no respite.

    The futility of US-Taliban deal highlighted

    • The attack on a gurdwara in Kabul, in which 25 people were killed, has shown that the coronavirus may well be vanquished by science, but human beings will continue to inflict barbarity upon each other.
    • Within hours, it was claimed by the Islamic State, which later also said it had carried it out in revenge for Kashmir.
    • The deal not leading to peace: If there were still doubts left on this score, it must be clear after this attack that the US-Taliban deal was not an arrangement to return Afghanistan to peace.

    Why the attack matters for India?

    • The gurdwara attack was the first strike after the agreement claimed by the IS.
    • A provision in pact: Under the pact, the Taliban have committed themselves to eliminate the Islamic State from Afghanistan.
    • Yet to start honouring commitment: If the IS claim is true, the Taliban have yet to begin honouring that commitment.
    • India’s reaction: Appearing to hint at something more sinister, the ministry of external affairs called the attack “diabolical” and condemned the “perpetrators and their backers”, a formulation usually reserved for attacks suspected to have emanated from or to have the backing of Pakistan.
    • Connection of attack with India: The Taliban’s operational leadership is now in the hands of Sirajuddin Haqqani of the Haqqani group, which has been blamed for several attacks on Indian targets, including the 2008 Indian Embassy bombing in Kabul.
    • The Taliban have denied having anything to do with the gurdwara attack, and Pakistan has condemned it strongly.
    • The question over IS in Afghanistan: Who, really, is the IS in Afghanistan is a question that security experts have been asking for some time now.

    COVID-19 outbreak in Afghanistan

    • Appeal for ceasefire: The UN Secretary-General made an appeal for an immediate ceasefire in theatres of conflict across the world, to enable governments, health workers and humanitarian aid agencies to access those who might be most vulnerable to COVID-19.
    • The epicentre of the outbreak is Herat, where over 1,00,000 Afghans recently crossed over from Iran.
    • After the number of confirmed cases rose to 58, the province has been placed under lockdown.
    • But the government is hobbled in its efforts to contain the disease, both by a contested election result — Afghanistan has two presidents — and the burden of an agreement that has brought it no respite.

    Conclusion

    With the recently concluded US-Taliban deal delivering no peace and coronavirus spreading unabated, Afghanistan faces two contagions, new and old — COVID-19 and the relentless violence.

  • A revival of multilateralism, steered by India

    Context

    A leadership role by India in mobilising world collaboration would be in keeping with its traditional activism globally.

    Challenges and two aspects associated with it.

    • The COVID-19 pandemic has brought out in sharp relief the compelling reality that has been staring us in the face for the past several years.
    • This reality has two aspects.
    • First aspect: That most challenges confronting the world and likely to confront it in the future are cross-national in character. They respect no national boundaries and are not amenable to national solutions.
    • Second aspect: These challenges are cross-domain in nature, with strong feedback loops.
      • A disruption in one domain often cascades into parallel disruptions in other domains.
      • For example, the use of chemical fertilizers and toxic pesticides may promote food security but have injurious health effects, undermining health security.
      • Whether at the domestic or the international level, these inter-domain linkages need to be understood and inform policy interventions. The UN Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) reflect this awareness.

    Rise in nationalism

    • Need for multilateral approach: The intersection of cross-national and cross-domain challenges demand multilateral approaches.
      • They require empowered international institutions of governance.
      • Underlying these must be a spirit of internationalism and solidarity, a sense of belonging to common humanity.
    • Moving in the reverse direction-Rise of nationalism: Over the past decade and more, the world has been moving in the reverse direction. There has been an upsurge in narrow nationalism, an assertion of parochial interests over the pursuit of shared interests and a fostering of competition among states rather than embracing collaboration.
    • The global challenge of COVID-19: COVID-19 has brought these deepening contradictions into very sharp relief. This is a global challenge which recognises no political boundaries. It is intimately linked to the whole pattern of large-scale and high-density food production and distribution.
    • Health crisis turned into economic crisis: It is a health crisis but is also spawning an economic crisis through disrupting global value chains and creating a simultaneous demand shock. It is a classic cross-national and cross-domain challenge.

    How countries are dealing with COVID-19 and possible outcomes

    • No coordination at the international level: But interventions to deal with the COVID-19 crisis are so far almost entirely at the national level, relying on quarantine and social distancing. There is virtually no coordination at the international level.
    • Blame game at the international level: We are also seeing a blame game erupt between China and the United States which does not augur well for international cooperation and leadership.
    • The hopeful outcome of international cooperation: While this is the present state of play, the long-term impact could follow alternative pathways.
      • One, the more hopeful outcome would be for countries to finally realise that there is no option but to move away from nationalistic urges and embrace the logic of international cooperation through revived and strengthened multilateral institutions and processes.
    • The depressing outcome of intense nationalist trends: The other more depressing consequence may be that nationalist trends become more intense, countries begin to build walls around themselves and even existing multilateralism is further weakened.
      • Institutions such as the United Nations and the World Health Organization which are already marginalised may become increasingly irrelevant.
      • There could be a return to autarkic economic and trade policies and an even deeper and more pervasive anti-globalisation sentiment.
    • Depression decade ahead: Unless there is a conscious effort to stem this through a reaffirmation of multilateralism, we are looking at a very depressing decade ahead.
      • This is when the world needs leadership and statesmanship, both in short supply.
    • Contrast with the financial crisis: This is in contrast to the U.S.-led response to the global financial and economic crisis of 2008 when the G-20 summit was born and a coordinated response prevented catastrophic damage to the global economy.

    Leadership role for India

    • Is there a role here for India which is a key G-20 country, the world’s fifth-largest economy and with a long tradition of international activism and promotion of rule-based multilateralism?
    • In this context, Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s remarks at the recent Economic Times Global Business Summit are to be welcomed.
      • While speaking of the COVID-19 crisis, he said, “Like today, the world is facing a huge challenge in the form of Corona Virus. Financial institutions have also considered it a big challenge for the financial world. Today, we all have to face this challenge together. We have to be victorious with the power of our resolution of ‘Collaborate to Create’.”
      • He went on to observe that while the world today is “inter-connected, inter-related and also interdependent”, it has “not been able to come on a single platform or frame a Global Agenda, a global goal of how to overcome world poverty, how to end terrorism, how to handle Climate Change issues.”
    • From “Equal distance” to friendship with all: Modi lauded government’s policy of seeking friendship with all countries as contrasted from the earlier policy of non-alignment. He seemed to suggest that non-alignment was a defensive policy which advocated “equal distance from every country”.
      • Now, he claimed, India was still “neutral” — presumably meaning non-alignment — “but not on the basis of distance but on the basis of friendship”.
      • He cited India’s friendship with Iran and Saudi Arabia, and with the U.S. as well as Russia.

    India’s foreign policy

    • Non-alignment: Mr Modi may wish to distinguish his foreign policy from that of his predecessors, but what he describes as its “essence” is hardly distinguishable from the basic principles of Indian foreign policy since Nehru.
    • Non-alignment was not defensive: India’s non-alignment was anything but defensive. The international peace-keeping contribution that the Prime Minister referred to has its origins in Nehru’s sense of international responsibility.
    • Friendship with all: India has always professed its desire to have friendly relations with all countries but has been equally firm in safeguarding its interests when these are threatened.
    • Mutually beneficial partnership: India’s non-alignment did not prevent it from forging strong and mutually beneficial partnerships with major countries.
      • The India-Soviet partnership from 1960-1990 is an example just as the current strategic partnership with the U.S. is.
    • Foreign policy rooted in a civilisational sense: The foreign policy of his predecessors had been rooted in India’s civilisational sense, its evolving place in the international system and its own changing capabilities.
      • Their seminal contributions should be acknowledged and built upon rather than proclaim a significant departure.

    Move in line with traditional foreign policy

    • The Prime Minister’s plea for global collaboration to deal with a densely interconnected world is in line with India’s traditional foreign policy.
      • Move in keeping with traditional activism on a global scale: A leadership role in mobilising global collaboration, more specifically in fighting COVID-19 would be in keeping with India’s traditional activism on the international stage.
    • Commendable SAARC move: The Prime Minister has shown commendable initiative in convening leaders of the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation nations for a regional collaborative effort on COVID-19.
      • International initiative: This should be followed by an international initiative, either through the G-20 or through the U.N.

    Way forward

    • Reformed and Strengthened U.N. should be India’s agenda: The Prime Minister made no reference to the role of the U.N., the premier multilateral institution, as a global platform for collaborative initiatives. There may have been irritation over remarks by the UN Secretary-General on India’s domestic affairs and the activism displayed by the UN Commissioner for Human Rights on the Citizenship (Amendment) Act controversy.
      • The U.N. Secretary General’s statement on India’s domestic affairs and activism by UN Secretary-General on India’s domestic affairs should not influence India’s long-standing commitment to the U.N. as the only truly inclusive global platform enjoying international legitimacy despite its failings.
      • If one has to look for a “single platform” where a Global Voice could be created, as the Prime Minister suggested, surely a reformed and strengthened U.N. should be on India’s agenda.
    • Opportunity for India in the pandemic: The COVID-19 pandemic presents India with an opportunity to revive multilateralism, become a strong and credible champion of internationalism and assume a leadership role in a world that is adrift. The inspiration for this should come from reaffirming the wellsprings of India’s foreign policy since its Independence rather than seeking to break free.

  • A crisis-hit Iran at the crossroads

    Context

    The coronavirus pandemic creates fresh possibilities for cooperation between the West Asian nation and its neighbours.

    Challenges faced by Iran

    • Hardest hit by COVID-19 among the West Asian countries: Iran, the hardest-hit among the West Asian countries in the global pandemic, is on the front line of the battle against the coronavirus that causes the causes coronavirus disease, COVID-19.
    • Healthcare reeling under combined load: With nearly 900 deaths and over 14,000 cases of infection, its health-care system is reeling under the combined effect of the pandemic and American sanctions.
    • Possibility of social unrest resurfacing: The masses thronging the streets some weeks ago may have receded out of fear of both the coronavirus and the wrath of the regime, but there is a possibility of social unrest resurfacing if the government’s response to the spread of the virus is ineffective and shortages are exacerbated.
    • Emergency funding from IMF: Iran has already approached the International Monetary Fund for $5-billion in emergency funding to combat the pandemic.
    • Easing of some sanctions by the US: The U.S. Treasury had announced in end-February that it was lifting some sanctions on the Central Bank of Iran to facilitate humanitarian trade such as the import of testing kits for COVID-19. Clearly, Iran thinks this is inadequate.

    Iran’s nuclear policy

    • Iran to resumed nuclear activities: Following the U.S.’s decision to jettison the deal, Iran had announced that it would resume its nuclear activities but had agreed to respect the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inspections and enhanced monitoring as part of its obligations under the additional protocol.
    • What were the conditions of JCPOA? The JCPOA limited Iran to enrich uranium only up to a 3.67% concentration and its stockpile to 300 kg of UF6 (corresponding to 202.8 kg of U-235), and further capped its centrifuges to no more than 5,060, besides a complete cessation of enrichment at the underground Fordow facility.
      • It also limited Iran’s heavy water stockpile to 130 tonnes.
    • Restriction on enrichment lifted by Iran: Since July 2019, Iran has lifted all restrictions on its stockpiles of enriched uranium and heavy water.
      • It has been enriching uranium to 4.5%, beyond the limit of 3.67%.
      • Moreover, it has removed all caps on centrifuges and recommenced enrichment at the Fordow facility.
      • An increased stockpile of Uranium: As of February 19, Iran’s enriched uranium stockpile totalled 1,020.9 kg, compared to 372.3 kg noted in the IAEA’s report of November 3.
      • IAEA’s second report: In a second report issued on March 3, the IAEA has identified three sites in Iran where the country possibly stored undeclared nuclear material or was conducting nuclear-related activities.
      • The IAEA has sought access to the suspect sites and has also sent questionnaires to Iran but has received no response.
    • Possibility of being on the collision course with the UNSC: The United Kingdom, France and Germany had invoked the JCPOA Dispute Resolution Mechanism (DRM) as early as in January this year.
    • The threat to abandon the NPT: With the next Review Conference of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) set to take place in New York from April 27 to May 22, 2020, Iran’s threat to abandon the NPT if the European Union takes the matter to the UN Security Council (UNSC) may yet only be bluster, but the failure of the DRM process would certainly put Iran on a collision course with the UNSC.
    • Support from China at UNSC: A sympathetic China, which holds the rotational presidency of the UNSC for March, should diminish that prospect, albeit only temporarily.
    • Possibility of reversing the sanctions: As things stand, the terms of UNSC Resolution 2231, which had removed UN sanctions against Iran in the wake of the JCPOA, are reversible and the sanctions can be easily restored.
      • That eventuality would prove disastrous, compounding Iran’s current woes.
    • Possibility of Iran continuing its nuclear program: While recognising that cocking a snook at the NPT in the run-up to the NPT RevCon and the U.S. presidential elections will invite retribution, Iran may use the global preoccupation with the pandemic to seek a whittling down of sanctions and to continue its nuclear programme.
      • More breathing time amid due to pandemic: In the event that the NPT RevCon is postponed due to the prevailing uncertainty, Iran may yet secure some more breathing time.

    Iran’s ties with China and implications for India

    • China- only major country to defy the US sanctions: Meanwhile, the U.S. continues to implement its “maximum pressure policy”. China remains the only major country that continues to defy U.S. sanctions and buy oil from Iran, apart from a small quantum that goes to Syria.
      • The sale of oil to China, however, does little to replenish Iran’s coffers. China is eschewing payments in order to avoid triggering more sanctions against Chinese entities.
    • Trilateral naval exercise: When seen in the context of the trilateral naval exercise between China, Iran and Russia in the Strait of Hormuz in the end of December 2019 codenamed “Marine Security Belt”, these developments suggest a further consolidation of Sino-Iran ties in a region of great importance to India.
      • Inclusion of Pakistan in the exercise: Over time, this could expand into a “Quad” involving China’s “all-weather friend” Pakistan in the Indian Ocean and the northern Arabian Sea, with broader implications for India as well as the “Free and Open” Indo-Pacific.

    Conclusion

    • Iran’s foreign policy to remain unchanged: The first round of Iran’s parliamentary elections in February showed that the hardliners are firmly ensconced. The fundamental underpinnings of Iran’s foreign policy are likely to remain unchanged.
    • Possibility of cooperation among neighbours: Yet, the rapid spread of the coronavirus in the region creates fresh possibilities for cooperation between Iran and its neighbours, if regional tensions are relegated to the back-burner.
    • Laudable example by India: Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s initiative to develop a coordinated response to the pandemic in the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation framework, indeed, sets a laudable example.
    • Much depends on Iran’s willingness: Much though will depend on Iran’s willingness to rein in its regional ambitions and desist from interference in the domestic affairs of others.

  • Fighting COVID-19 together for a shared future

    Context

    The Chinese government has mobilised the whole nation with confidence, unity, a science-based approach and targeted response.

    Aspects that were focused by China to deal with COVID-19

    • Formulated timely strategies for epidemic prevention and control.
    • Strengthened a unified command and response in Wuhan and Hubei.
    • Coordinated the prevention and control work in other regions.
    • Strengthened scientific research, emergency medical and daily necessity supplies.
    • Effectively maintained social stability.
    • Strengthened public education.
    • Actively engaged in international cooperation.

    Mutual support between India and China

    • China and India have maintained close communication and cooperation on epidemic prevention and control. In a letter to President Xi, India’s Prime Minister has expressed support for China.
    • China appreciates the medical supplies provided by India and have helped facilitate the safe return of Indian nationals in Hubei.
    • The global footprint of COVID-19: China has been closely following the global footprint of COVID-19.

    Cooperation on a global level for disease control:

    • Chines govt. will stay in close communication with WHO.
    • Share its epidemic control experience with other countries.
    • Seek closer international cooperation on medicine and vaccine development.
    • Provide assistance to the best of its capabilities to countries and regions that are affected by the spread of the virus in keeping with its role as a responsible major
    • The Chinese reach-out: China has provided various kinds of assistance including testing reagents, remote assistance and medical supplies to countries with a severe outbreak.
    • Sharing of experience and protocol for treatment: China have shared diagnosis and treatment experience and protocols with many countries including India.
      • China is ready to maintain communication with India, share experience in a timely manner, render assistance and make joint efforts to overcome the epidemic.

    Impact and recovery of China

    • Robust economy: The impact on the Chinese economy will be short-lived and generally manageable. China has a resilient economy with robust domestic demand and a strong industrial base. We will definitely sustain the good momentum of economic and social development and meet the goal of achieving moderate prosperity in our society and eradicating extreme poverty in China.
    • Strengthen coordination and communication: China will also strengthen coordination and communication with economic and trading partners and give priority to the resumption of production and supply of leading enterprises and key sectors that have a major impact on the stability of global supply chains.
      • The fundamentals of China’s economy will remain strong in the long run, and China will remain an important engine for global economic growth.

    Conclusion

    The history of civilisation is also one of a history of fighting diseases and a great journey of ceaseless global integration. To prevail over a disease that threatens all, unity and cooperation is the most powerful weapon.

     

     

     

  • Fail-safe exit for America, but a worry for India

    Context

    The recently negotiated peace deal between the United States and the Taliban is unlikely to bring peace to Afghanistan, is geopolitically disadvantageous for India, and has serious implications for our national security.

    Power dynamics of the US-Taliban deal

    • An honourable exit for India: The terms of the deal, the manner in which it was negotiated as well as the geopolitical context in which it was stitched up indicate that it was more about providing an honourable exit route for the U.S.
    • Violence after concluding the deal: Within 24 hours of the much-publicised deal, violence and major disagreements about the deal began erupting in Afghanistan.
    • Why there are the prospects of instability in Afghanistan: Given that the Taliban negotiated from a position of strength, the Trump administration from weakness and little political will, and that the Ashraf Ghani administration in Afghanistan was by and large a clueless bystander in all of this, means that the country is perhaps on the verge of yet another long-drawn-out and internecine battle.

    The changed Taliban

    • Taliban of the 1990s: When the Taliban came to power in the mid-1990s in Kabul, it had few backers in the world.
      • Nor was it seen as a useful commodity by the great powers or the states in the region, except for Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates.
    • United pushback from the rest of the world: The international community was almost united in offering a normative pushback against the violent outfit.
      • As a result, the Taliban was at best reluctantly tolerated until it messed up towards the end of its regime in Kabul.
    • The pressure of Northern Alliance: The Northern Alliance, supported by countries such as Russia and India, kept up its military pressure against the Taliban while it was in power.
    • How today’s Taliban is different from the past: The situation today, at least for the moment, is perhaps the exact opposite of what was the case then.
      • Lessons learned to deal with the international system: The Taliban today is also more worldly-wise and might have learned, during its exile, to deal with the international system and play the game of balance of power.
      • Not necessarily the puppet: More so, it may not necessarily be a puppet of the Pakistani deep state once it returns to power.

    International acceptance of the Taliban

    • Lending the legitimacy to Taliban: Given the war fatigue and the geopolitical stakes in Afghanistan, most of the key players in the region and otherwise have been in negotiations with the Taliban one way or another, and for one reason or another, lending the terror group certain legitimacy in the process.
    • Why countries want good relations with the Taliban: Anyone desirous of a stake in Afghanistan or does not want its domestic turmoil to spill over into their country would want to keep the Taliban in good humour.
      • Suitable withdrawal of the US: There is another reason why the Taliban has many suitors — because of the U.S. withdrawal by and large suits everyone, be it China, Pakistan, Iran, or Russia.
      • The US bigger challenge: Suddenly, the Taliban appears to have been forgiven for its sordid past and unforgivable sins because for most of these countries, the U.S. is the bigger challenge than the Taliban.

    Why India’s strategy is diplomatically flawed?

    • Only state at losing end: The only state that seems to be on the losing end, unfortunately, of this unfolding game of chess and patience in Afghanistan is India.
      • Why the earlier Taliban was anti-India? The earlier Taliban regime was anti-India, it was also because India had militarily supported the Northern Alliance that kept up the military pressure against the Taliban.
      • Today’s Taliban does not share the same animus for India.
    • Need for Change in India’s approach: India, could have rejigged its approach to the Taliban this time around. However, it put all its eggs in the Ashraf Ghani basket, even on the eve of the signing of the peace deal in Doha.
    • Not a diplomatic strategy by India: India also, for most intents and objectives, adopted a puritanical approach to the Taliban.
      • There are 2 reason India is neither reaching out to the Taliban nor exploiting the fissures within it-
      • Because it did not want to irk the elected government in Kabul and-
      • It adopts a moralistic approach to dealing with extremist groups in general — not a smart diplomatic strategy.
    • Self-defeating position: This moralistic attitude, also a diplomatically lazy one, I would say, that be it Pakistan or Afghanistan, India would only talk to the legitimate government in that country, is a self-defeating position.
      • The world is not that perfect, nor state all that uniform, created in the shape and image of the Westphalian forefather.
      • Smart statecraft, therefore, is dealing with what you have and making the best of it.

    What would be the result of India’s strategy?

    • Impact on relations with Afghanistan: India’s relations with Afghanistan will take a hit in the immediate aftermath of the deal.
      • Limited ability to influence the outcomes: With China, India’s strategic adversary, deeply involved in the geopolitics and geo-economics of the region, including in Afghanistan, India’s traditional ability to influence the region’s political and security outcomes will be severely limited.
      • This will be further exacerbated by the withdrawal of the U.S., India’s closest friend, from the region.
      • India’s relation with the other players in the region: Other regional actors in Afghanistan are also less friendly towards India than ever before: Iran feels let down by India given how the latter has behaved towards it at the behest of the Americans.
      • Relation with Russia: For Russia, India is only one of the many friends in the region — the exclusivity of Russia-India relations is a thing of the past — and Pakistan would consider targeting India a fair game.
    • Counter Strategy: Unless New Delhi carefully envisages a counter-strategy, these factors will increasingly push India into a geopolitical tough spot in the region.
      • Need to focus on the region: India should worry us that our political class is focused on domestic politics while the region is becoming ever more uncertain and evidently unfavourable to us.

    Taliban and Kashmir Angle of the deal

    • Negligible physical impact but the possibility of psychological impact: While the direct physical impact of the Taliban’s return to power in Afghanistan on Kashmir will be negligible, this will not be without serious implications for the unfolding situation in Kashmir’s restive regions.
      • Psychological impact: The most important impact is going to be psychological.
      • Interpretation of the event: Disenchanted Kashmiri youngsters, and there are a lot of them, will interpret the events in Afghanistan as follows: “If the mighty superpower USA could be defeated by the Taliban in Afghanistan with help from the Pakistan army, defeating Indian forces in Kashmir won’t be impossible after all.”
      • This enthusiasm is completely misplaced, but that is not the point.
      • That the Kashmiri youth might pick up guns drawing inspiration from the situation in Afghanistan is indeed the point.
    • Increase in Pakistan’s utility: The U.S.-Taliban deal cannot survive without Pakistan’s assistance towards ensuring its success, and the U.S. and its allies recognise that. Such recognition of Pakistan’s utility provides the country with ability, as and when it wishes to, to up the ante in Kashmir.
    • The geopolitical significance of Pok and Aksai Chin claim: India’s official statement which describes Afghanistan as a “contiguous neighbour” — meaning that India considers Pakistan-occupied Kashmir (PoK) a part of its sovereign territory — will make Pakistan and China sit up and take notice.
      • Claim making reconciliation more difficult: India also made a similar claim about Aksai Chin in the wake of its August decision on Kashmir. Erstwhile rhetorical claims on PoK and Aksai Chin have suddenly assumed a lot more geopolitical significance today making conciliatory approaches to conflict resolution ever more difficult.

    Conclusion

    Given that a new Taliban-led dispensation in Afghanistan will be far more accepted by the international community than the last time around also means increased acceptability for such regimes in general, either out of necessity or as a function of geopolitical calculations. That the Taliban mass-murdered its opponents into statehood in the 21st century and that this might provide potential inspiration to other outfits in the region and outside should indeed worry us.

     

     

     

  • The diplomatic cost

    Context

    The CAA and violence in Delhi have started to take its toll on India’s secular foreign policy.

    The US and other’s reaction to the situation in India

    • Trump visit to India: President Trump referred to India as a democracy which was peaceful and tolerant. He lauded freedom, rule of law, liberty and protection of human dignity, adding graphically that where India had the holy Ganges, it also had the Golden Temple and Jama Masjid.
      • Assurance to the critics at home: He thereby cleverly reassured critics at home, especially in the US Congress, that he was not ignoring the values the two great democracies shared.
      • However, as the situation in Delhi spun into violence the next day, in an untutored media interaction at the US ambassador’s residence, he ducked questions about the CAA or Delhi riots, nonchalantly remarking it was “up to India” to deal with it.
      • This may have brought comfort to the Indian government but the world at large differed.
    • Response from the other countries: Delhi had already exchanged angry words with Malaysia, Turkey and even Indonesia over their varied critique of India’s handling of its Muslim minority when Iran joined the issue.

    Iran’s response to violence in India

    • Condemnation by foreign ministers: Iranian Foreign Minister Javad Zarif condemned the “wave of organised violence against Indian Muslims”, adding that “Iran has been a friend of India”.
      • India’s foreign ministry summoned the Iranian ambassador to protest the inappropriateness of the minister’s remark.
    • The reaction by the Iranian Supreme Leader: Soon after, Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei found the time, in the middle of the COVID-19 outbreak, to excoriate the Indian government.
      • Adding insult to injury, he appended #IndianMuslimsInDanger.
    • No reaction on China problems: A facile response, can be that Iran is being hypocritical as it has not expressed remorse over the Chinese repression of Uyghurs.
    • The difference in India’s importance to China: China is a veto-wielding member of the UN Security Council, which also sustains the Iranian economy despite US sanctions. On the other hand, India has a Shia population second only to that of Iran.

    Relations with Iran

    • Two consulates in India: There are two Iranian consulates in India in Hyderabad and Mumbai. Iran seeks the third one in Lucknow.
      • Qom also hosts many Shia students, particularly from the Kargil region.
    • Historic links between the two countries: After Humanyun’s exile in Iran (1530-40) before recovering the Indian throne, the Persian language and culture fired the cultural renaissance at the Mughal court.
      • Religio-cultural heritage importance: India is important for Iran for its religio-cultural heritage, unlike China, which is needed for transactional and strategic reasons.
    • Two interrelated questions flow from this reasoning:
      • 1. What is Iran’s importance for India and the trajectory of India-Iran relations over the last two decades?
      • 2. And why is Iran adopting this sharp tone over what the Indian government argues is an internal matter?
    • Convergence in the relations: The closest India-Iran strategic convergence began in the 1990s, particularly after Kabul fell to the Taliban in 1996. These ties blossomed under reformist Iranian President Mohammad Khatami and Indian Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee.
    • Tehran Declaration: In 2001, the two signed the Teheran Declaration. Khatami in his opening remarks said that Iran always admired India’s secular credentials and Vajpayee had maintained that tradition.
      • In 2003, Khatami was the chief guest at India’s Republic Day and a New Delhi Declaration was issued.
    • Deterioration in relations and impact of India-US relation: The relationship began to slip as Iran’s clandestine nuclear programme and assistance from Pakistan’s rogue scientist A Q Khan was uncovered in mid-2003.
      • Impact of India-US closeness: Concomitantly, India was drawing closer to the US and negotiating a nuclear cooperation agreement.
      • The US used the nuclear issue to cause a cleavage as Indian and Iranian interests began seriously diverging.
      • Taliban factor: In any case, the Taliban had been ejected from Afghanistan and US troops literally surrounded Iran, having in 2003 overthrown Saddam Hussein. Geo-strategy trumped diplomacy.

    The US-Iran relation cycle

    • The nuclear deal with Iran: Iran-US relations also went through a cycle, with President Barack Obama recalibrating US policy towards the Gulf and West Asia.
      • Countering ISIS: Calculating that without Iran, ISIS could not be countered, the US in 2015 endorsed the nuclear deal that P-5 and Germany negotiated to end the nuclear stand-off.
    • Missing warmth of the 1990s: Although India-Iran relations after that returned to near normal as most US sanctions were lifted, the warmth of the 1990s was missing.
      • Iran was now beginning to extend its influence and role across Iraq and West Asia.
    • Maximum Pressure strategy of the US: President Donald Trump in 2016 reversed US policy and since then “maximum pressure” has been applied on Iran via tightened sanctions.
    • India’s engagement with Saudi Arabia and UAE: PM Modi also moved more forthrightly to engage Saudi Arabia and the UAE.
    • The fallout of the US strategy reversal: A fallout of the US policy reversal has been an exacerbation of not only the Shia-Sunni split but a Sunni-Sunni split as Qatar and Turkey are with Iran.

    Changing polity and increasing influence in the neighbourhood

    • Conservatives elected to power: In Iran’s parliamentary election on February 28, extremely conservative members have been elected, the moderates having been vetoed by the Guardians Council earlier.
      • Turnout was a low 43 per cent, due partly to fear of the coronavirus.
    • Increasing influence in the neighbourhood: Iran is even more isolated, though determined to resist US demands, due to communications being curtailed due to the virus.
      • Relations with the Taliban: It has good working relations with the Taliban and converging interests to see that US troops exit the region.
      • The friendly government in Baghdad: Iran is battling to ensure a friendly government in Baghdad, despite the killing of Major General Qasem Soleimani, by keeping militias aligned to it in play.

    Conclusion

    • Perception of India: Khamenei’s tweet reflects the perception that India is in the US-Saudi-Emirati corner and of little use as long as Trump is president.
      • Growing closeness Abu Dhabi, Riyadh and Ahmedabad would have led Iran to this conclusion.
    • Leveraging India’s dependence: In the Islamic world, Iran by publicly defending Indian Muslims embarrasses the silent Saudis.
      • It also calculates that India needs access to Afghanistan through Chabahar to assist the Ghani government or influence developments there.

     

  • Pieces of peace

    Context

    “Agreement for Bringing Peace to Afghanistan” between the US and Taliban signed on February 29 in Doha, is just another piece in the overall strategy of the US for Afghanistan.

    Pakistan’s support to the Taliban and unchanged Afghan policy of the US

    • Continuation of the same hard-nosed policy: While rolling out the Afghan policy in August 2017, it was emphasised by the current US dispensation that it was making amends to the Afghan strategy of the previous dispensation.
      • In reality, it has been a continuation of the same hard-nosed line.
    • How Pakistan supported the Taliban? The US and allies had got a rude shock when it dawned on them that between 2001 and 2008, the Taliban had used training and recuperation centres in Pakistan to regain domination over most parts of Afghanistan.
      • Benefiting from the Coalition Support Fund: Pakistan had actively aided the Taliban and al Qaeda (AQ), while continuing to benefit from handsome Coalition Support Funds and a seat at the “high table”.
      • Support of the Pakistan Army: All failures were blamed on inadequate numbers of International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) and Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF), which were ill-equipped to challenge the Taliban, backed by a professional Pakistan Army.
      • Misdiagnosed cause: The Obama administration diagnosed that lack of governance, corruption and fragmented polity were other key factors.

    What was the comprehensive Afghanistan Strategy?

    • COIN doctrine and “troop surge”: A comprehensive Afghanistan strategy review led to replicating its “troop surge” strategy, which was believed to have succeeded in Iraq, leading to total withdrawal of US troops (December 2011).
      • At the heart of the troop surge was the Counterinsurgency (COIN) doctrine of the US Field Manual.
    • COIN plus CT: The military strategy in Afghanistan was split into COIN plus CT (Counter Terrorism) objectives.
      • The Taliban movement was treated as an insurgency.
      • What was involved in COIN: The COIN efforts entailed protecting population centres and highways, building numbers and capability of the ANSF to take on insurgents, with emphasis on good governance and support for reconstruction.
      • It also included reconciliation and reintegration of lower to mid-level willing Taliban.
      • The UN designations of Taliban and AQ were separated to pave the way for “peace talks” with Taliban commanders who were tired of fighting.
    • What this strategy achieved? The US-led ISAF troop surge helped create time and space to build and strengthen the ANSF over three times and succeeded in pushing the Taliban back to outlying areas.
      • Even today these territorial gains have not been reversed, except in some areas.
      • As the ANSF gained strength and depth, the US led-ISAF mission became a NATO led-Resolute Support mission.
    • How changing geopolitical circumstances increased challenges? The CT effort yielded rich dividends for the US and allies, in the Af-Pak region and even beyond.
      • The rise of ISIS: From the build-up of ISIS in 2014 to the loss of its Caliphate in 2019 and recently to the killing of General Solemani, the CT challenges of the US and allies in the Af-Pak region and periphery have become graver than ever.
      • These elements had a bearing on the Afghan strategy rolled out in August 2017.
      • Good progress was made in building up the ANSF, with a strong focus on three key elements — Special Forces, Air Force, and Afghan Intelligence (NDS).

    The US withdrawal

    • Objectives of the withdrawal: Emphasising that “consequences of a rapid exit were predictable and unacceptable”, it outlined two key objectives —
      • Preventing a resurgence of safe havens that threatened the security of Afghanistan and the US interests in Afghanistan and Pakistan.
      • Preventing terrorists from getting nukes or nuclear material which could be used against the US or elsewhere.
    • What is the recalibrated strategy: The “recalibrated” strategy envisaged following-
      • Time-bound but condition-based withdrawal.
      • Support for the Ghani government.
      • ANSF to take on the Taliban.
      • Talks with the Taliban and for Pakistan to demonstrate commitment on dismantling safe havens that threatened US objectives.
      • Overall, the strategy remained the same, except for the withdrawal of the US from a role in nation-building.
    • What are the results of the strategy? There has been a greater emphasis on the strengthening of ANSF.
      • The regular assessments by the US show an increasing role and success of the Afghan Special Forces.
      • The Air Force and the NDS in playing the lead in keeping the Taliban from running over capitals.
      • By and large, the ANSF have been successful in maintaining the balance and the Taliban-control has not slipped to 2009 levels.
      • In the meantime, US forces have dropped to 10 per cent of the peak (in 2011).
      • With the re-election of President Ghani, it is assured that the US line of thinking will prevail over the Afghan government.
      • Role of Pakistan in the process: On its part, Pakistan has demonstrated its intent by delivering top-rung Taliban, including Mullah Baradar in its custody since 2010, and Anas Haqqani released as part of the process, for the talks.
      • Even if there is no comprehensive ceasefire or full withdrawal ever, Pakistan is unlikely to be blamed.

    What Pakistan achieved from the peace process?

    • Return of Afghan refugee: Pakistan has been rewarded in more ways than one. It managed to return lakhs of Afghans.
    • Fencing on the eastern border of Afghanistan: It builds a fence along the eastern parts of Afghanistan to prevent cross-border attacks.
    • Targeting the key TTP leaders: Pakistan got the US and Afghan forces to target key TTP leaders, starting with TTP chief Mullah Fazlullah in June 2018.
      • Since January this year, three top TTP leaders have been killed in Kabul and Kunar.
      • This has also helped build the Pakistan narrative that Afghan soil is being used to target Pakistan.
    • Changing the international narrative in its favour: Even though it is facing “calibrated” heat on FATF sanctions, Pakistan has managed to change the international narrative in its favour.
      • The 24th report (July 2019) of the UNSC monitoring committee has stated, “Al Qaeda continues to cooperate closely with LeT and the Haqqani Network”, but there is no reference to LeT or Haqqani in the 25th report (January 2020).
      • This report has also asserted that ISIL-K has established informal contact with other terrorist groups, including Jamaat-ul-Ahrar, TTP and Lashkar e-Islam.
      • Meanwhile, these groups regularly attack Pakistani posts along the Afghan border.
      • All key anti-Pakistan groups are now being categorised as ISIL-K supporters, even though Pakistan has run the so-called Daesh networks in eastern Afghanistan for years.
      • The UNSC reports also highlight the positive role of Taliban in targeting ISIL-K.

    Conclusion

    • The election in the US has bearing on the process: In an election year, the US needs to show that it is not fighting someone else’s battles and is making “sincere efforts” at peace-making.
      • The “Agreement” demonstrates sincerity.
      • At the same time, the US has to continue steering the Afghan strategy to keep terror networks in check.
      • The peace process has already created a comfort-loving, globe-trotting leadership in the top echelons of the Taliban, who would continue to talk, even if the current Agreement falters.
    • Pakistan is again sitting on the high table: As the LeT and Haqqani networks go missing from UN reports and JeM chief Masood Azhar and pro-Pak TTP leader Ehasanullah Ehsan go conveniently “missing” from Pakistan soil, the pressure on Pakistan has eased.
      • The new non-state entities backed by Pakistan, such as the AQIS and ISKP/IS-Kashmir/IS-Hind will become more visible.
      • The rank and file of LeT, JeM, HUJI etc can easily be transferred to these new entities, while many more can be recruited under new banners.
      • Online propaganda of these entities, including in Indian languages, is already visible and likely to escalate.