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GS Paper: Parliament & State Legislatures

  • Department-related Standing Committees (DRSCs)

    Fewer sittings of Parliament are compensated by the working of department-related standing committees (DRSCs) praised Rajya Sabha Chairman.

    What are Standing Committees?

    • Standing Committee is a committee consisting of Members of Parliament.
    • It is a permanent and regular committee which is constituted from time to time according to the provisions of an Act of Parliament or Rules of Procedure and Conduct of Business.
    • The work done by the Indian Parliament is not only voluminous but also of a complex nature, hence a good deal of its work is carried out in these Parliamentary Committees.
    • Standing Committees are of the following kinds :
    1. Financial Standing Committees (FSC)
    2. Department Related Standing Committees (DRSC)
    3. Others Standing Committees (OSC)

    About DRSCs

    • There are 24 Department-related Standing Committees (DRSCs). Each of these committees have 31 members – 21 from Lok Sabha and 10 from Rajya Sabha.
    • The 17 Departmentally Related Standing Committees were formally constituted with effect from April, 1993.
    • After experiencing the working of the DRSC system for over a decade, the system was restructured in July,2004 wherein the number of DRSCs was increased from 17 to 24.
    • These members are to be nominated by the Speaker of Lok Sabha or the Chairman of Rajya Sabha respectively. The term of office of these committees does not exceed one year.
    • These committees are serviced either by Lok Sabha secretariat or the Rajya Sabha secretariat depending on who has appointed the chairman of that committee.

    Equal to 10 House sittings

    • During a usual sitting of Parliament, the Houses are convened for six hours. Calculating it accordingly, the meeting of these committees amount to 10 sittings of Parliament.
    • Proportionately, the work done by the 16 Committees of Lok Sabha amounts to another 20 sittings of the Parliament.
    • In all, the work put in by the total 24 DRSCs in examining the Demands for Grants of all the ministries equals 30 days of functioning of the Parliament, which is quite significant.
    • If the working of the committees is taken into account for the entire year, it will amount to significantly higher number of days.
  • Private Members Bill

    A member in Rajya Sabha appeared to abandon his plan of introducing a private member’s Bill on the Uniform Civil Code (UCC), a code that would be applicable to all religious communities in personal matters such as marriage, divorce, inheritance and adoption.

    Private Member’s Bill

    • A private member’s Bill is different from a government Bill and is piloted by an MP who is not a minister. An MP who is not a minister is a private member.
    • Individual MPs may introduce private member’s Bill to draw the government’s attention to what they might see as issues requiring legislative intervention.

    Difference between private and government Bills

    • While both private members and ministers take part in the lawmaking process, Bills introduced by private members are referred to as private member’s Bills and those introduced by ministers are called government Bills.
    • Government Bills are backed by the government and also reflect its legislative agenda.
    • The admissibility of a Private Bill is decided by the Chairman in the case of the Rajya Sabha and the Speaker in the case of the Lok Sabha.
    • Before the Bill can be listed for introduction, the Member must give at least a month’s notice, for the House Secretariat to examine it for compliance with constitutional provisions and rules on legislation.
    • While a government Bill can be introduced and discussed on any day, a private member’s bill can only be introduced and discussed on Fridays.

    Has a private member’s bill ever become a law?

    • No private member’s Bill has been passed by Parliament since 1970.
    • To date, Parliament has passed 14 such Bills, six of them in 1956.
    • In the 14th Lok Sabha, of the over 300 private member’s Bills introduced, roughly four per cent were discussed, the remaining 96 per cent lapsed without a single dialogue.
    • The selection of Bills for discussion is done through a ballot.
  • Explained: Regulation of Parliamentary Speech and Conduct

     

    Two days of heated exchanges in Parliament have brought back recurring questions around “unparliamentarily” speech and conduct.

    No absolute privilege

    • Article 105(2) of the Constitution lays down that “no Member of Parliament shall be liable to any proceedings in any court in respect of anything said or any vote given by him in Parliament or any committee thereof”.
    • However MPs do not enjoy the freedom to say whatever they want inside the House.

    Checks on MPs’ speech

    • Whatever an MP says is subject to the discipline of the Rules of Parliament, the “good sense” of Members, and the control of proceedings by the Speaker.
    • These checks ensure that MPs cannot use “defamatory or indecent or undignified or unparliamentary words” inside the House.
    • Rule 380 (“Expunction”) of the Rules of Procedure and Conduct of Business in Lok Sabha regulates the speech of MPs.
    • It says: “If the Speaker is of opinion that words have been used in debate which are defamatory or indecent or unparliamentary or undignified, the Speaker may, while exercising discretion order that such words be expunged from the proceedings of the House.”
    • Rule 381 says: “The portion of the proceedings of the House so expunged shall be marked by asterisks and an explanatory footnote shall be inserted in the proceedings as follows: ‘Expunged as ordered by the Chair’.”

    What are Unparliamentary expressions?

    • There are phrases and words, literally in thousands, both in English and in other Indian languages that are “unparliamentary”.
    • The Presiding Officers — Speaker of Lok Sabha and Chairperson of Rajya Sabha — have the job of keeping these bad words out of Parliament’s records.
    • For their reference and help, the Lok Sabha Secretariat has brought out a bulky tome titled ‘Unparliamentary Expressions’, the 2004 edition of which ran into 900 pages.
    • The list contains several words and expressions that would probably be considered rude or offensive in most cultures; however, it also has stuff that is likely to be thought of as being fairly harmless or innocuous.
    • The state legislatures too are guided mainly by the same book, which also draws heavily from unparliamentarily words and phrases used in the Vidhan Sabhas and Vidhan Parishads of India.

    Examples of unparliamentary

    • Among the words and phrases that have been deemed unparliamentary are “scumbag”, “shit”, “badmashi”, “bad” (as in “An MP is a bad man”), and “bandicoot”, which is unparliamentary if an MP uses it for another, but which is fine if he uses it for himself.
    • If the Presiding Officer is a “lady”, no MP can address her as “beloved Chairperson”.
    • The government or another MP cannot be accused of “bluffing”. “Bribe”, “blackmail”, “bribery”, “thief”, “thieves”, “dacoits”, “bucket of shit”, “damn”, “deceive”, “degrade”, and “darling”, are all unparliamentary.
    • MPs or Presiding Officers can’t be accused of being “double minded”, having “double standards”, being of “doubtful honesty”, being “downtrodden”, indulging in “double talk”, being “lazy”, “lousy”, a “nuisance” or a “loudmouth”.
    • No Member or Minister can be accused of having “deliberately concealed”, “concocted”, of being of a “confused mind”, or being “confused and unintelligent”.
    • An illiterate MP can’t be called “angootha chhaap”, and it is unparliamentary to suggest that a member should be sent to the “ajayabghar” (museum).
  • [op-ed snap] Course correction for the Speaker’s office

    Context 

    Recently the Supreme Court of India recommended that Parliament should rethink as to whether disqualification petitions ought to be entrusted to a Speaker as a quasi-judicial authority when such a Speaker continues to belong to a particular political party either de jure or de facto.

    What the SC recommended?

    • Provision of a ‘Permanent Tribunal’: The SC was of the opinion that Parliament may seriously consider a Constitutional amendment to substitute-
      • The Speaker of the Lok Sabha and Legislative Assemblies with a ‘permanent Tribunal headed by a retired Supreme Court judge or a retired Chief Justice of a High Court.
      • Or some other outside independent mechanism.
    • What the ‘Permanent Tribunal’ achieve?
      • Impartiality and timely decisions: This is to ensure that such disputes are decided both swiftly and impartially.
      • Proper functioning of the democracy: It will give teeth to the provisions contained in the Tenth Schedule, which are so vital in the proper functioning of India’s democracy’.

    Range of functions of the Speaker

    • What is the nature of the duties of the Speaker?
      • Role under 10th schedule: Under 10th Schedule, the nature of duties of the Speaker, is as an “arbiter” or a “quasi-judicial body”. But it also extends to a range of its functions.
      • What other functions are performed by the Speaker? While facilitating the business of the House and to maintain decorum in the House, the Speaker has ‘extensive functions to perform in matters regulatory, administrative and judicial, falling under her domain.
      • She enjoys vast authority under the Constitution and the Rules, as well as inherently’.
      • Ultimate interpreter: She is the ‘ultimate interpreter and arbiter of those provisions which relate to the functioning of the House. Her decisions are final and binding and ordinarily cannot be easily challenged.
      • She decides the duration of debates, can discipline members and even override decisions by committees.
      • A representative of the House: She represents the collective voice of the House and is the sole representative of the House in the international arena’

    Issue of alleged bias

    • Allegations of bias by the Speaker: On several occasions, the Speaker’s role has been questioned on the allegation of bias. The office has been criticised for being an agent of pernicious partisan politics.
      • The Supreme Court has observed in Jagjit Singh versus State of Haryana“…certain questions have been raised about the confidence in the matter of impartiality on some issues having political overtones which are decided by the Speaker in his capacity as a Tribunal.”
    • As a minority view, Justice J.S. Verma in Kihoto Hollohan vs Zachillhu And Others observed: “The Speaker being an authority within the House and his tenure being dependent on the will of the majority therein, the likelihood of suspicion of bias could not be ruled out.”
    • What is the problem with the neutrality of the Speaker? Howsoever desirable the proposition of neutrality maybe, in the present circumstances, it would be unrealistic to expect a Speaker to completely abjure all party considerations.
      • Structural issues: There are structural issues regarding the manner of appointment of the Speaker and her tenure in office.
    • Why the Speaker prefers to maintain party membership: A member is appointed to the office of the Speaker if a motion nominating her is carried in the House.
      • Since the electoral system and conventions in India have ‘not developed to ensure protection to the office, there are cogent reasons for Speakers to retain party membership.
      • Elections are not always by consensus and there have been cases when different parties have fielded their own candidates.
      • All political parties campaign in the constituency of the Speaker.
      • Even if the Speaker is re-elected to the House, the office of the Speaker in India is still open for elections’.
    • Way forward
      • Revamp the structure: What is required is not merely incidental changes in the powers of the Speaker; rather a major revamp in the structure of the office itself is necessary.
      • How to ensure the neutrality of the Speaker? The scheme should be brought wherein Speakers should renounce all political affiliations, membership and activity once they have been elected, both within the Assembly and in the country as a whole.
    • Replicating the UK model:
    • Reference can be sought from the United Kingdom where the ‘main characteristic of the Speaker of the House of Commons is neutrality.
    • Once elected, the Speaker gives up all-partisan affiliation, as in other Parliaments of British tradition, but remains in office until retirement, even though the majority may change.
    • She does not express any political views during debates and is an election candidate without any ticket.
    • Impartiality, fairness and autonomy in decision-making are the hallmarks of a robust institution.
    • It is the freedom from interference and pressures which provide the necessary atmosphere where one can work with an absolute commitment to the cause of neutrality as a constitutional value.

    Conclusion

    At a time when India’s fall in ranks in the latest Democracy Index has evoked concern, it is expected that Parliament will pay heed to the reasoning of the Supreme Court and take steps to strengthen the institution of the Speaker.

     

     

  • Legislative Councils and its abolition

    The Andhra Pradesh Assembly recently passed a resolution to abolish the state’s Legislative Council (LC).

    Legislative Councils

    • The LC or Vidhan Parishad is the upper house in those states that have a bicameral legislature; the lower house being the State Legislative Assembly.
    • Its establishment is defined in Article 169 of the Constitution of India.
    • Each Member of the State LC serves for a six-year term, with terms staggered so that the terms of one third of a State Legislative Council’s membership expire every two years.
    • This arrangement parallels that for the Rajya Sabha, the upper house of the Parliament of India.
    • Q member of LC must be a citizen of India, at least 30 years old, mentally sound, not an insolvent, and must be enrolled on the voters’ list of the state for which he or she is contesting an election.
    • Under Article 171, a Council cannot have more than a third of the number of MLAs in the state, and not less than 40 members.

    Representation in an LC

    MLCs are chosen in the following manner:

    • One third are elected by the members of local bodies such as municipalities, Gram panchayats, Panchayat samitis and district councils.
    • One third are elected by the members of Legislative Assembly of the State from among the persons who are not members of the State Legislative Assembly.
    • One sixth are nominated by the governor from persons having knowledge or practical experience in fields such as literature, science, arts, the co-operative movement and social service.
    • One twelfth are elected by persons who are graduates of three years’ standing residing in that state.
    • One twelfth are elected by persons engaged for at least three years in teaching in educational institutions within the state not lower than secondary schools, including colleges and universities.

    Abolition of LC

    • Article 169(1) of the Constitution allows Parliament to either create or abolish a Council in a state “if the Legislative Assembly of the State passes a resolution to that effect.
    • The resolution must by a majority of the total membership of the Assembly and by a majority of not less than two-thirds of the members of the Assembly present and voting.

    Councils in the Constitution

    • Under Article 168, states can have either one or two Houses of legislature. Article 169 leaves the choice of having a Vidhan Parishad to individual states.
    • The Constituent Assembly was divided on having a second chamber in the states.
    • It was argued that a second House can help check hasty actions by the directly elected House, and also enable non-elected persons to contribute to the legislative process.
    • However, it was also felt that some of the poorer states could ill afford the extravagance of two Houses.
    • It has been pointed out that the Councils can be used to delay important legislation, and to park leaders who have not been able to win an election.

    Councils in other states

    • Besides Andhra Pradesh, five other states have Vidhan Parishads — Bihar (58 members), Karnataka (75), Maharashtra (78), Telangana (40), UP (100).
    • Jammu and Kashmir had a Council until the state was bifurcated into the Union Territories of J&K and Ladakh.
    • In 1986, the M G Ramachandran government in Tamil Nadu abolished the Council.
    • The DMK government passed a law revives it, but the subsequent J Jayalalithaa-led government withdrew it after coming to power in 2010.
    • The Odisha Assembly has passed a resolution for a Legislative Council. Proposals to create Councils in Rajasthan and Assam are pending in Rajya Sabha.
  • [op-ed snap] When defection is a mere detour for an MLA

    Context

    In the recently concluded by-election in Karnataka, most of the disqualified MLA’s were re-elected. This set of the event lay down a well-structured framework to sidestep the law, it even set a dangerous precedent for neutralising the consequences of the Anti-Defection Law altogether.

    Historical background

    • Defection is not new to the Indian political landscape.
    • An independent MLA from Haryana had switched parties three times in two weeks in 1967.
    • The recurrence of this phenomenon led to the 1985 Anti-Defection Law.

    Provisions of the law

    • The law defined three grounds for disqualification-Giving up party membership, violation of whip, and abstaining from voting.
    • Before the amendment, the law allowed for a “split” in the party if at least one-third of the MLAs defect.
    • 91st Constitutional Amendment in 2003 deleted the provision allowing split.
    • Resignation is not the condition for disqualification.
    • This loophole was exploited by the MLAs in Karnataka while they resigned.
    • The resignation was not accepted by the speaker of the house and declared the MLAs disqualified.
    • Law puts no time constraint on the speaker to decide on the resignation of MLAs.

    Speaker as a tribunal under law

    • The law originally protected the Speaker’s decision from judicial review.
    • This safeguard was struck down in Kihoto Hollohan v. Zachillhu and Others (1992).
    • In this case, the SC upheld the Speaker’s discretionary power, it underscored that the Speaker functioned as a tribunal under the law.
    • This made the Speaker’s decision subject to judicial review.
    • The same was said in Shrimanth Balasaheb Patel & Others v. Speaker Karnataka Legislative Assembly & Others (2019).

     

    Neutral role of the SC

    • The SC struck down ban on Karnataka disqualified MLAs from contesting election till 2023.
    • This effectively removed the only possible permanent solution to the problem.

     

    Way forward

    The minimum period limit of six years is needed to ensure that the defectors are not allowed to enter the election fray for at least one election cycle which is five years.