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GS Paper: GS2-19.Effect of policies and politics of developed and developing countries on India’s interests, Indian diaspora.

  • A U.S. strategy only meant to isolate China

    Context

    Since 2017, the United States government has released a few reports and fact sheets on its new Indo-Pacific strategy. Buried in these documents is a much deeper agenda of the U.S. government: to use three large Asian states — Australia, India, and Japan — to isolate China. There is nothing else to it.

    The scale of BRI and the US objections

    • Objections to BRI: The U.S. government has made it clear that what it finds most objectionable is China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), which has signed on more than 70 countries in the world.
    • What BRI aims to achieve? Adopted in 2013, the BRI is intended as a mechanism to-
      • Development of new markets: BRI aims to end China’s reliance upon the markets of the West and to develop new markets in other continents.
      • Building infra: It is also intended to use China’s massive surpluses to build infrastructure in key parts of Africa, Asia, and Latin America.
      • Investment of $ 1.3 trillion: By 2027, according to estimates by Morgan Stanley, China will spend about $1.3 trillion on this ambitious construction project.
      • Involvement of Saudi Arabia: Even Saudi Arabia, a close ally of the U.S., has made the BRI one of the cornerstones of its Saudi Vision 2030 plan.
    • Involvement of Pakistan: While China has invested $68 billion to build the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor from Xinjiang to Pakistan’s Gwadar Port.
      • Saudi Arabia has agreed to invest $10 billion in the port itself.

    Significance of the BRI and comparison with the US spending

    • Staggering scale and participation: The scale of Chinese investment, and the participation of a range of countries with different political identities in the BRI, is staggering.
    • Loss of appetite in the US to spend: At the Indo-Pacific Business Forum in July 2018 the U.S. said that it has spent $2.9 billion through the Department of State and the USAID (United States Agency for International Development).
      • It has lined up hundreds of millions of dollars more through its U.S. Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC) and the Overseas Private Investment Corporation.
      • Inadequate US spending: If one adds up all the money that the U.S. intends to spend for economic projects, it is still a fraction of the amount spent by China.
      • ‘America First’ attitude: There is no appetite in Washington, D.C., with its ‘America First’ attitude, to funnel more money towards investments in the region currently being built by the BRI.

    Military Claims of the US and investment

    • US investment with military presence: It appears as if U.S. investments will come only with military claims.
      • The case of Nepal: A few years ago, Nepal discovered a large amount of uranium in Mustang, near the Nepal-China border; this has certainly motivated U.S. interest in Nepal’s economy.
      • If the U.S. money comes with U.S. military presence, this will create a serious flashpoint in the Himalayas.

    Raising human right and transparency issue against China

    • The argument of human rights and transparency
      • Rhetorical argument: Unable to outspend the Chinese, the U.S. government is making a rhetorical argument that it has more respect for “transparency, human rights, and democratic values” than China, which “practices repression at home and abroad”.
    • The argument of transparency and the debt trap
      • Debt trap used by the US: It is hard to imagine the U.S. being “transparent” with its trade deals. It is equally hard to imagine the U.S. being able to argue that it would not put countries into debt.
      • Debt crisis created by the US in the 1980s: The U.S. government enabled a massive Third World debt crisis in the 1980s, which was then used by the U.S.-driven International Monetary Fund’s Structural Adjustment Programs to strangle countries in Africa, Asia, and Latin America.
      • This history is alive, and it makes a mockery of the U.S.’s attempt to say that its own approach is superior to that of China’s.

    US withdrawal from multilateralism

    • Apart from that, the U.S. government has already indicated that it is uninterested in multilateral deals.
    • Withdrawal from TPP: The US withdrew from the Trans-Pacific Partnership in 2017, for instance.
      • Australia and Japan shrugged, and then put their energy into the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership, which sidelines the U.S.

    The claim of free and open Indo-Pacific

    • Renaming the Pacific Command: In May 2018, the U.S. military’s Pacific Command was renamed the Indo-Pacific Command, a symbolic gesture that provides a military aspect to the Indo-Pacific Strategy.
    • What free and open mean to the US? The U.S. government has made it clear that for all its talk of a “free and open Indo-Pacific”, what it actually wants is an Indo-Pacific with fewer Chinese ships and more U.S. warships.
    • Just before this renaming, the U.S. National Security Strategy of 2017 noted that “China seeks to displace the United States in the Indo-Pacific region”, and so the Indo-Pacific Strategy intends for the S. to fight for its dominance in the Pacific Ocean, the Indian Ocean, and in the Asian rim.
    • This is a very dangerous war that the U.S. seeks to impose on Asia.

    India adopting the US project of Indo-Pacific

    • Australia and Japan moving away: As the military aspect of the Strategy increased, both Australia and Japan edged away from full-scale adoption of the U.S. project.
      • Japan has begun to use the term “Indo-Pacific” without the word “Strategy”.
      • Australia has signed onto a “comprehensive strategic partnership” with China.
    • Only India adopting the project: Only India remains loyal to the agenda set by U.S. President Donald Trump.
      • No US strategy to contain China: In all the documents released by the U.S. government and in all the speeches by officials, there is no discussion of the strategy to contain China.
      • There is only rhetoric that skates into the belligerent territory.

    Conclusion

    India would be advised to study the U.S. project rather than jump into it eagerly. Room for an independent foreign policy for India is already narrowed, and room for independent trade policy is equally suffocated. To remain the subordinate ally of the U.S. suggests that India will miss an opportunity to be part of a reshaped Asia.

     

     

  • Location in news: Idlib Province

     

    The nine-year-old war in Syria is currently raging in the northwestern province of Idlib, with rapidly escalating tensions between government forces of President Bashar al-Assad and the Turkish military.

    Background

    • President’s Assad’s forces are backed by Russia, who are clashing with thousands of Turkish troops south of its border with Syria.
    • Turkey has closed the border and is trying to seal itself from waves of displaced refugees as Assad presses forth with a brutal campaign to take back Idlib.

    Why is Idlib important?

    • Assad has been pushing to recapture Idlib, which, along with parts of neighbouring Hama, Latakia and Aleppo, are the last remaining strongholds of the rebel opposition and other groups that have been attempting to overthrow Assad since 2011.
    • At one point, the opposition held large parts of Syria under its control, but that changed after Assad, with Russian military support, slowly regained control over most of the country.
    • In 2015, Idlib province was overtaken by opposition forces.
    • Now, Syrian government forces are attempting to capture the strategic M4 and M5 national highways that connect Idlib, Aleppo and Damascus, the capital of the country.
    • Idlib skirts the two national highways and lies between Aleppo in the north and Damascus in the south.
    • It’s proximity to the Turkish border makes Idlib strategically important to the Syrian government.

    Who controls Idlib now?

    • Since the province fell to opposition forces, there is no one group that controls Idlib, but rather, several separate factions.
    • International watchdogs say that the dominant faction in Idlib is the Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), a UN-designated terrorist organization set up in 2017, with links to al-Qaeda.
    • Also operating in Idlib is the Turkey-backed Syrian National Army, an armed opposition group. Included in the mix are the remnants of the Islamic State.
    • Watch groups say that other factions in Idlib strongly oppose the presence of IS fighters in the province.

    Why is Idlib important for Turkey?

    • Idlib’s proximity to the Turkish border makes it not only important for the Syrian government, but also a cause of concern for Turkey.
    • Since the war started in Syria, thousands of displaced Syrians have sought refuge in Turkey over the years.
    • According to the latest known figures, Turkey presently hosts some 3.6 million refugees and is feeling the socio-economic and political strain of their presence in the country.
    • More conflict in Idlib would only serve to displace more people, pushing them towards the Turkish border.
    • Turkey has been witnessing a surge in hostility among its citizens towards refugees and a fresh wave of refugees will only exacerbate the situation.

  • Terms of transaction

    Context

    Trump administration seems supportive of India as part of its Indo-Pacific strategy, while also counting gains for itself.

    No substantive outcomes of the visit stated

    • Neither side has so far publicly touted any major substantive outcomes of the visit.
    • Creation of positive atmosphere: To create some positive atmospherics, the Indian Cabinet Committee on Security just gave final approval to $3 billion worth of pending contracts to purchase military helicopters from US companies Lockheed Martin and Boeing.
      • Missile defence system sale: The US Administration, on its part, informed Congress of its willingness to authorise the sale of another $1.8 billion worth missile defence system.
      • The move is indicative of the US’s growing willingness to allow higher technology defence equipment to India.
    • Placing India at level (STA-1) similar to its closest allies: The Trump Administration has gone farther than its predecessors in the technology levels it is willing to offer.
      • Including Guardian drones in 2017, and placing India at STA-1 level, similar to its closest allies and partners.
    • The expected MoUs: The spokesperson of the Ministry of External Affairs indicated on February 20 that five MoUs can be expected, inter alia,-
      • On intellectual property.
      • Trade facilitation and
      • Homeland security.
    • Making sense of the US’s actions in the present context: There will also be the regulation joint statement.
      • Analysing in greater details: This time, the statement will be parsed in more than usual detail for indications of future direction and intent for the partnership.
      • It is the time when the US has been talking of “Make America Great Again”, advocating for sovereignty and nationalism.
      • The US is also decrying-Alliance commitments, Readying to sign an agreement with the Taliban by month-end leading to a drawdown of US troop presence.
      • Yet, it is articulating repeatedly about India being a lynchpin of its “Free and Open Indo-Pacific Strategy”.

    No development on the limited trade front

    • No progress on limited trade package: The two countries have not been able to finalise even a “limited trade package”, which has been under discussion for two years.
    • Gaps between the expectations: Obviously, there is a gap between what India can accommodate, and what the US negotiators want for their own political reasons.
    • The Trump administration has taken several steps that have negatively impacted India.
      • It has imposed additional tariffs on steel and aluminium imports from India, ostensibly on national security grounds.

    Contradictory impulses

    • The above action flies in the face of citing strategic partnership and convergence in Indo-Pacific strategy.
    • GSP withdrawal: It has withdrawn hitherto available GSP benefits from certain categories of labour-intensive Indian products.
    • Labelling India a ‘Developed’ country: The US has taken India out of its list of “developing” countries, lowering the threshold for countervailing trade action.
    • Against the spirit of the beneficial rise of India: These actions go against the grain of the US articulation that it sees the rise of India to be in US benefit.
      • Treating the trade deficit with China and India on equal footing: It also does not make sense when India is an overall trade deficit country.
      • Even though it has a $20 billion surplus with the US which pales compared to China’s $350 billion surplus.
    • Unprecedented actions against the closest allies: Trump has taken unprecedented action against the closest US allies.
      • He has also repeatedly publicly ridiculed Indian tariffs, claiming recently that India has not treated the US fairly.

    What the future holds for the India-US relationship

    • Is the US “all-weather” partner: Given the contradictory impulses, it would be fair to ask what the future holds for the India-US relationship, and where would the Trump visit and its aftermath take us.
      • Can India consider the US a reliable and “all-weather” partner, or be constantly juggling convergences and divergences?
    • The factors that affected relationship: Historically, four factors have affected the India-US relationship at any point of time:
      • US global posture and priorities.
      • Strength of bilateral relations.
      • The role assigned to Pakistan in its global objectives.
      • The strategy towards China.

    Evolution of India-US relationship

    • Under Democrat Presidents
    • Roosevelt Period: During the Second World War, Roosevelt pushed Britain to grant independence to India, facilitated a separate official Indian representation in Washington through an Agent-General since 1941.
      • But did not go far enough fearing disruption of the necessary wartime alliance. In the post-war period.
    • Truman Period: Truman spoke of partnering with developing countries for their industrial and scientific progress.
      • He welcomed Indian PM Nehru for an acclaimed visit in 1949.
      • But initiated the Cold War containment strategy against the Soviet Union, and the assessment of newly independent countries from that lens.
    • Kennedy Period: He was extremely supportive of democratic India’s economic assistance requirements, and for military assistance during the 1962 China conflict.
    • Carter Period: Carter, wedded to human rights issues, acclaimed India’s post Emergency elections.
      • But was critical on non- proliferation differences.
    • Clinton Period: Clinton stabilised the relationship after the dissonance and sanctions following our 1998 nuclear tests.
      • And gave full support to India’s position during the 1999 Kargil conflict with Pakistan.
    • Obama Period: He came out in support of India’s permanent membership of the UN Security Council, and declared India a Major Defence Partner, enabling higher-level technology authorisations.
    • Under Republican Presidents
    • Eisenhower Period: Eisenhower embraced and armed Pakistan in its CENTO and SEATO military alliances.
      • India as a bulwark against China: He emphasised food and economic assistance to India seeing it as a democratic bulwark against a Communist China.
      • First-ever visit to India by the US president: He made a successful first-ever visit of a serving US President to India, welcomed also by a 5 lakh crowd in Connaught Place.
    • Nixon Period: He visited India for a day in 1959, was upset with Indian criticism of his Vietnam military offensives.
      • Sided completely with Pakistan during the Bangladesh crisis of 1971.
      • He sent the US seventh fleet into the Bay of Bengal to pressurise India and sought to reorder the global balance by outreach to China through a secret Kissinger visit that year.
    • Reagan Period: He explored economic and scientific cooperation with India, but was absorbed with Pakistan’s support in pushing the Soviet Union out of Afghanistan.
    • George W Bush Period: George W Bush transformed the relationship with the civil nuclear cooperation agreement of 2008.
      • Perceiving again the technological, military and political challenge to the US from a rising China.

    Conclusion

    It is clear that India’s interests have been impacted a bit by party orientation on issues, but more by the overall global circumstance. Under the present circumstance, therefore, India will have to deal with a transactional administration, supportive of strengthening India as part of its Indo-Pacific strategy, but also counting the gains for itself.

     

  • An agenda for Modi-Trump

    Context

    With the withdrawal of the US from Afghanistan and other regions, India must think about its new role in the region.

    The US plans for Afghanistan and the Gulf-cause of concerns for India

    • Why it matters? Prime Minister Narendra Modi will be eager to get a first-hand briefing from the US President on his plans for the Af-Pak region and the Gulf.
      • These two regions are vital to India’s economic, political and military security.
    • End of an important era in northwestern frontier: The impending withdrawal of US forces from Afghanistan and the downsizing of the American security role in the Gulf region mark the end of an important era in India’s northwestern frontiers — both land and maritime.
    • Can India overcome the past reluctance? The question is whether Modi and Trump can overcome the past reluctance in both capitals to collaborate in the regions west of India.
      • Suitable for both the countries: There is a good fit between-
      • America’s downward adjustment in the region under Trump, and-
      • India’s ambition to play a larger role in the Gulf and the Indian Ocean.

    Broad understandingIndo-Pacific and extending it to the West

    • Development in the last three years: Over the last three years of the Trump presidency, Delhi and Washington had developed a broad understanding of how to secure the Indo-Pacific that the US had defined.
    • Need to extend the same to Western Indian Ocean: Officials in Delhi frequently complained that these common perspectives did not extend to the Western Indian Ocean.
    • In recent weeks, though, senior US officials have said the Indo-Pacific region extends to the east coast of Africa.
      • Question of strategic cooperation: Extending Indo-Pacific is not a question of defining geography but finding ways to secure common ground through strategic cooperation.

    Elevation of South West Asia to the top of America’s security concerns

    • Filling the vacuum created by the British Empire: As the sun set over the British empire in the east after a century and a half, the US stepped in to fill the breach.
      • What began as a cautious entry into the Indian Ocean became a full-blown military power projection at the end of the 1970s.
    • Other events that played an important role? The dramatic rise in oil prices, the Islamic Revolution in Iran and its threat to export it to the Arab World, and the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan, saw the elevation of South West Asia to the top of America’s security concerns.
    • Events after Gulf War: The First Gulf War during 1990-91 saw the US intervene to restore the sovereignty of Kuwait that was swallowed by Iraq’s Saddam Hussein.
      • 9/11 attacks: The terror attacks on September 11, 2001, invited a ferocious response from the US that ousted the Taliban from power in Afghanistan.

    The Iraq and Afghanistan war-Endless wars

    • Costly failures: Notwithstanding the initial successes in both Afghanistan and Iraq, there is a growing consensus in the US that these occupations have been costly failures.
      • Trump has been among the first political leaders in the US to call these wars initiated by a Republican predecessor in the White House as “stupid”.
      • The promise of ending the endless wars: During his presidential campaign in 2016 and since Trump has promised to end the “endless wars” in the Greater Middle East and bring the boys back home.
      • It is an idea that has found considerable resonance among Democrats.
    • Focusing on great power competition instead of small wars: While the security establishment is not willing to give up, US is now focusing more on the great power competition with Russia and China than the small wars that had preoccupied it over the last three decades.
    • The Oil factor: The steep decline in US energy dependence on the Gulf, too, has reduced the salience of the region in Washington.

    Three consequence of the change in the US policy

    • Cutting down the military commitments
      • The Middle East and Africa: Trump has been cutting down military commitments in the Middle East and Africa.
      • His officials are about to sign an agreement with the Taliban that provides for American withdrawal from Afghanistan.
      • Maritime front: On the maritime front, Trump has called on all major powers, especially those importing oil from the Gulf, to contribute to the security of shipping in the Strait of Hormuz.
    • How it matters for India?
      • Challenges of limiting the consequences: The challenge for Indian policymakers has been to limit the consequences of what seems a definitive turn in US policy.
      • Chance to extend the own role: It should also be about seizing the possibilities for expanding India’s own role in the western marches of the Subcontinent.
    • To expand its role Delhi needs to make a few important shifts in its own thinking.
      • One, it must overcome the still powerful belief in sections of the Indian establishment that the US-Pakistan relationship is unchanging.
      • The US tilt toward India and away from Pakistan: Over the last two decades, there has been a tilt in US policies away from Pakistan and towards India.
      • For instance, the US pressures on Pakistan to vacate the Kargil heights, an exclusive nuclear exemption to India and efforts to rein in Pakistan’s cross-border terrorism during the Obama years.
      • Support in Trump period: Trump went further to acknowledge that Pakistan is part of the problem in Afghanistan and turned up the heat on Pakistan’s support for terrorism.
      • He has supported India’s efforts at the UNSC to bring Masood Azhar to book in the face of Chinese resistance.
      • Helped India isolate Pakistan at the Financial Action Task Force.
      • Prevented the UNSC from discussing Kashmir.
      • But India must also recognise: That there will be a measure of cooperation between the US and Pakistan.
      • Delhi’s focus should, instead, be on expanding its own security cooperation with the US in the troubled lands to the west of India.
    • India needs to prepare for a larger security role in Afghanistan
      • Question of being at the next-door: Trump has been asking a simple question: If India is next door to Afghanistan, should it not be doing more for Afghan security?
      • Need to explore the options: The NDA government has stepped up security assistance to Kabul. As Afghanistan enters a turbulent phase, regional and other powers are bound to fill the vacuum left by the US.
      • There are many options–  between doing nothing and sending the Indian army into Afghanistan- that Delhi and Washington could discuss.
    • Need to increase Naval activity
      • Increased role as regional security provider: Delhi has already stepped up its naval activity within the Gulf and beyond as part of its emergence as a regional security provider.
      • Cooperation with others: Effectiveness of India’s role will rise manifold if it acts in concert with the US and other partners.
      • Modi and Trump could begin by laying the political foundation for such cooperation.

    Conclusion

    At the beginning of Trump’s term, sceptics dismissed the prospects for India-US security cooperation in the eastern Indian Ocean and the Pacific, but progress has been steady. That cooperation can and must be extended now to the Western Indian Ocean.

     

  • Forging a new India-U.S. modus vivendi

    Context

    It is clearer than perhaps ever before in recent times, that New Delhi needs the continued support of the U.S. government on almost everything substantial that matters to India in its quest to be a power of substance in the international system.

    Preparing for Trump 2.0

    • The world may have to deal with Mr Trump for four more years after the end of his present term this year.
    • Where India can benefit from constructive ties with the US?
      • A fairer trade regime.
      • Accessing cutting-edge technology.
      • The fight against terrorism.
      • Stabilising our region.
      • New Delhi stands to benefit from constructive ties on all issues, given a more sensitive United States.
    • India must, therefore, seek greater understanding and engagement should there be a Trump 2.0.
    • Understanding the asymmetrical partnership: Asymmetrical partnerships, as we know from history, are rarely easy.
      • Partnership with the superpowers: Partnerships with superpowers are even more difficult; in international politics, as in life, even the best of unequal relationships results in a loss of some dignity and autonomy. 

    Why the partnership with the US matters for India?

    • The growing influence of China in Indo-Pacific: Without the United States, the region could become willy-nilly part of a new Chinese tributary system.
      • Chance of more organic rule-based order: With a fully engaged United States, the region has at least the chance of creating a more organic rules-based order.
    • Past consequences for India: the history of “estrangement” with the United States, during the Cold War, has had consequences for vital national interests that continue to cast their shadow on the present.
      • Jammu and Kashmir (J&K).
      • Nuclear non-proliferation.
      • Festering of the Pakistan “problem”.
      • The Chinese humiliation of 1962, are just a few examples.
    • Change in the perception over the US: But much of course has changed today.
    • Anti–Americanism is outdate: Anti-Americanism, once the conventional wisdom of the Indian elite, seems outdated.
      • Close alignment with the US: New Delhi has, over the decades, gone on to align itself more closely with Washington.
      • Opinion in favour of the stronger ties: More important, both within India and in the U.S., the consensus across the mainstream of political opinion favours stronger relations between the two countries.

    Pro-US tilt of the Indian Foreign policy

    • A survey suggests support for Trump: According to the latest Pew Surveys of Global Opinion, support for Mr Trump in India is high enough to suggest a great deal of public affection for the American President.
      • That itself is a marker of the way India and Indians now see the world.
    • Reason for the change in geo-strategic change: The reason for the change in New Delhi’s geostrategic outlook can be summarised quickly.
      • If the 1971 Friendship Treaty with the Soviet Union was a response to the continuing U.S. tilt towards Pakistan and the beginnings of a Washington-Beijing entente.
      • China factor: At present, it is the prospect of a potentially hegemonic China in the Indo-Pacific region is helping to cement the relationship.
      • Beijing has managed to alienate nearly all its neighbours and allies, except North Korea and Pakistan.
    • Gains made in bilateral ties in the last 3 years:
      • COMCASA– A foundational military agreement that allows for the sharing of encrypted communications and equipment.
      • Export control law relaxation: A change in U.S. export control laws that places India in a privileged category of NATO and non-NATO U.S. allies;
      • 2+2 dialogue: New ‘2+2’ foreign and defence ministers dialogue.
      • Oil export to India: An exponential increase in U.S. oil exports to India.
      • Tri-lateral military exercise: The inauguration of the first India-U.S. tri-service military exercise and expansion of existing military exercises.
      • The signing of Industrial Security Annex: The signing of an Industrial Security Annex that will allow for greater collaboration among the two countries’ private defence industries.
      • Inclusion of India in a U.S. security Initiative: The inclusion of India and South Asia in a U.S. Maritime Security Initiative.

    Preparing for the President from Democratic Party

    • There is, of course, a chance that we may have a Democratic President next year.
    • Bipartisan support in the US: In those circumstances, we can only hope that the bipartisan consensus on engaging India will prevail.
      • To be sure, however, a new President will seek to put his/her own imprimatur on the relationship.
      • Democrats and the Human Right issue: The Democrats will clearly be more proactive on human rights and on issues of inclusion and diversity, which would make a greater demand on India and test its capacity and creativity.
    • Indian diaspora: India, of course, continue engaging with its strongest source of support in the United States: the Indian diaspora.
      • Fortunately, there is a near consensus on the need to strengthen this constituency.

    Conclusion

    In any case, there is little doubt that whoever is the next occupant of the White House, a retreat from multilateralism (especially on trade-related issues) and concern about China will continue to be the two main pillars of contemporary American foreign policy. If for only those reasons, Mr Trump’s reason has undeniable significance.

     

     

     

  • Explained: The EU data strategy

    The European Commission has recently released a “European strategy for data… to ensure the human-centric development of Artificial Intelligence” and a white paper on artificial intelligence.

    EU data strategy

    • The new documents present a timeline for various projects, legislative frameworks, and initiatives by the European Union, and represent its recognition that it is slipping behind American and Chinese innovation.
    • The strategy lays out “why the EU should act now”.
    • The blueprint hopes to strengthen Europe’s local technology market by creating a “data single market” by 2030 to allow the free flow of data within the EU.
    • To aid a “data-agile economy”, the Commission hopes to implement an “enabling legislative framework for the governance of common European data spaces” by the latter half of the year.
    • By the beginning of 2021, the Commission will make high-value public sector data available free through Application Programming Interfaces (APIs) — a pathway for two different applications to speak to each other.
    • Between 2021 and 2027, the Commission will invest in a High Impact Project to jump-start data infrastructure. Several other initiatives are laid out, including a cloud services marketplace.

    Why such strategy?

    • The EU has the potential to be successful in the data-agile economy. It has the technology, the know-how and a highly skilled workforce.
    • However, competitors such as China and the US are already innovating quickly and projecting their concepts of data access and use across the globe, the strategy states.
    • With American and Chinese companies taking the lead on technological innovation, Europe is keen to up its own competitiveness.

    What does the EU move mean for legislation?

    • Europe has been a frontrunner when it comes to technology regulation.
    • Its General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) released in 2018 was a game-changer across the industry. In the recent strategy, the GDPR is seen as giving the “solid framework for digital trust.”
    • Parliamentarians are discussing India’s current Personal Data Protection (PDP) Bill in a Joint Select Committee.
    • The recent draft of the PDP introduced a clause on non-personal data, mandating entities to hand over such data to the government on command.
    • This was not included in the draft proposed by the Justice B N Sri Krishna Committee in October 2018.
    • Some of the movement around the PDP Bill comes from a desire to strengthen India’s own data economy, similar to the EU’s desire.

    Has India done anything similar?

    • The Union Cabinet approved the National Data Sharing and Accessibility Policy (NDSAP) in 2012.
    • As part of the initiative, the government worked with the US government to release data.gov.in, a site of government data for public use.
    • The Economic Survey of 2018 envisioned a similar use of non-personal data.
    • Just as the EU’s strategy discusses “data for public good”, the chapter titled “Data ‘Of the People, By the People, For the People’” advocated that the government step in to sectors that private players ignore, marking the first time India’s Economic Survey has isolated “data” as a strategic focus.
    • Other data integration efforts have been announced or implemented by NITI Aayog (the National Data & Analytics Platform), the Smart Cities Mission (India Urban Data Exchange), and the Ministry of Rural Development (DISHA dashboard).
    • In 2018, the National Informatics Centre worked with PwC and other vendors to create a Centre of Excellence for Data Analytics aimed at providing data analysis help to government departments.

  • When Yankee goes home

    Context

    Delhi needs to unlearn some of the assumptions about US policy as it prepares to host Trump next week. While the diaspora is important and could be of some value in dealing with Trump, it can’t override the deeper forces animating American politics.

    Changing America under Trump

    • Restriction on immigration: Trump’s America wants the Americans to come home but is shutting the door on unrestricted immigration from the rest of the world.
      • Domestic critics say America has been a nation of immigrants and Trump is wrong to keep them out.
      • Why the restriction on immigrants? But Trump has much support among the working people who know-
      • Immigration keeps wages low.
      • Helps the capitalist class and-
      • Disrupts the familiar cultural and social landscape.
    • Some want America out
      • Some chancelleries in the world demand that America must go home.
      • The president of the Philippines wants to end Manila’s century-old relationship with the US military.
      • Iran wants America out of the Gulf.
      • Russia and China would like to see the US forces out of Europe and Asia respectively.
      • The world is paying serious attention to the possibility of Yankee going home.

    Downsizing of the US role and how the world is responding?

    • Downsizing
      • In the Gulf, Trump wants the Asian powers to police the vital sea lines of communication.
    • In Europe and Asia, he wants the allies to do more for their own security.
    • How the world is responding?
      • Europe’s response In Europe, France and Germany are now talking about creating new defence capabilities for the European Union amidst the prospect for American security retrenchment.
      • How the Asian countries are responding? In Asia, Japan is debating a larger security role.
      • In the Gulf, America’s Arab allies are scrambling to diversify their security dependence.

    America First policy

    • What is America First policy? The idea of downsizing America’s role, along with the rejection of free trade and open borders, is at the very heart of Trump’s America First policy.
    • Resistance to the policy: To be sure there is deep resistance in the US to these ideas that run counter to America’s post-war internationalism.
      • Wall Street on the East Coast and Silicon Valley on the West Coast along with the old foreign and security policy establishment in Washington all oppose Trump’s America First focus.
    • Widespread support to the policy: Trump’s message, however, resonates across the political divide in the US.
      • Many candidates for the presidential nomination of the Democratic Party agree with Trump’s goal of ending America’s “endless wars” in the Middle East.
      • Many in the working classes, who traditionally supported the Democrats, believe Trump is right in arguing that free trade has hollowed out American industry and eliminated manufacturing jobs.

    How the changes matter for India?

    • Prepare for the changes: America is at an inflection point; India needs to come to terms with the profound changes unfolding in the US.
    • No intervention policy: The Indian political classes castigated the US for excessive interventions in the affairs of other nations.
      • Trump now says such interventions are counterproductive and all nations must strengthen their sovereignty.
    • Critical of globalisation: Indians criticised the US for imposing globalisation on others; the US President is now one of the biggest critics of globalisation.
      • Trump’s America is not the one we have known.
    • India’s sensitivity to the US domestic politics: As India broadened its engagement with America in the last two decades, Delhi has become more sensitive to the US domestic political dynamics.
      • In getting the US to ease off on Kashmir and nuclear issues, Delhi had to look beyond the foreign policy establishment to generate better US appreciation of India’s concerns and interests.
    • Indian diaspora: One of the instruments that came in handy was the mobilisation of the Indian diaspora, it emerged as a key factor in elevating the bilateral relationship in the 21st century.
      • While the diaspora is important and could be of some value in dealing with Trump, it can’t override the deeper forces animating American politics.

    Conclusion

    Delhi’s success with the US will depend on the kind of strategic imagination it can display on trade cooperation, securing Afghanistan after America’s withdrawal, stabilising the Gulf and developing a new global compact on migration that is sensitive to domestic political considerations and yet contributes to the collective economic development.

     

     

     

     

  • Hype Trumps Hope

    Context

    US president’s visit comes when a mutually beneficial framework of bilateral relationship stands disrupted.

    Significance previous U.S. President’s visits

    • The Clinton visit:  The Clinton visit occurred against the backdrop of a new assessment within the American strategic community of India’s potential role in the post-Cold War era and against the backdrop of the rise of China.
      • Recognition of India’s nuclear power: He implicitly recognising India’s nuclear power status.
      • Kashmir issue: He suggested that the line of control (LoC) between India and Pakistan should be viewed as the international border so as to bury the “Kashmir issue” forever and-
      • Visas for Indians: increasing entry visas for Indians that has since contributed to the emergence of a sizeable community of Indian Americans.
      • As a counter to China: It was suggested that the rise of democratic India would be in the interests of the US and so the latter ought to be supportive of the former.
    • The Bush visit:
      • Political context: The rise of China and of radical Islam and jihadi terrorism provided the geopolitical context.
      • Economic context: The growth of an increasingly open Indian economy provided the economic context.
      • Cooperation in civil nuclear energy: Influenced by this new thinking, President George Bush took the next steps in strategic partnership and led the initiative to promote cooperation in the field of civil nuclear energy that also explicitly recognised India as a nuclear weapons power.
      • As heads of state, Clinton and Bush altered US-India bilateral relations in a fundamental way.
    • The Obama visit:
      • P2P relation: His second visit was more a recognition of the growing importance of people-to-people (P2P) relations and
      • Defence sales to India: The visit also aimed at promoting defence sales to India.
      • During the nuclear deal negotiations, US Congresspersons would often suggest that it was a “123 for 126” deal — that is, they would vote in favour of the 123 agreement in Congress in the hope that India would buy 126 fighter jets from the US.
      • That hope remains as yet unfulfilled, with the French getting the Rafale deal and no decision taken on the purchase of US fighter jets.

    America First policy of Trump

    • The credit for laying the foundation for a new and supportive post-Cold War relationship between the US and India goes singularly to President Bush.
    • Disruption with the arrival of Trump: The mutually beneficial framework that Bush helped create to promote the bilateral relationship has been rudely disrupted by the arrival of Donald Trump in Washington DC.
      • End of GSP: Trump’s “America First” policy offers no space for offering India “special and differential” treatment on any front, least of all trade.
      • Status of the Indian economy from the US perspective: With per capita annual national income of US $60,000, Trump’s America has no qualms declaring India, with a per capita annual average national income of US $2,000 a “developed economy” not deserving of any leniency in trade policy.
      • Clubbing together with China: To club China, a $15-trillion economy, with a $3-trillion India on the trade front is not just stupid but an affront to Indian sensibilities.

    What are the hopes and what could be the outcomes of the visit?

    • No bi-partisan support to India’s rise: It has to be recognised that neither Democratic liberals nor Republican conservatives are any longer willing to be supportive of the Bush-Rice paradigm that views India’s rise in benign and mutually beneficial terms.
      • Inward-orientation in both the countries: Today the relationship seems caught in the pincers between the inward-orientation of rightwing nationalists in both nations.
      • No hope of change: There is no reason as yet to believe that this unfortunate state of affairs will be altered by the Trump visit next week.
    • Stand on Pakistan or Kashmir: Trump has also moved away from the Clinton-Bush framework on India-Pakistan relations and moved closer to approach of wanting to insert the US into the equation on Kashmir.
      • Appeasement of Pakistan: Trump’s motives are no different from those that initially drove Obama-namely, to appease Pakistan in the hope of securing a peaceful exit from Afghanistan.
      • Expect differences to persist: At best, India can hope to limit the damage Trump may do to strategic stability in the region.
    • Visa and investment: There will be much talk about US investments in India and increased visas for Indians going to the US.
      • Corporate interests: Both are driven largely by US corporate interests.
      • Given the direction of the Modi government’s trade policy, one cannot expect any dramatic concessions being made.
      • Defence purchases: The best India can do for the US is to buy more defence equipment and ease up on some trade restrictions.
      • Defence sales to India are an essentially commercial activity and much of it can go on even in the absence of strategic convergence and shared geopolitical perspectives.
    • Brain-drain and need to focus on education: Much is made of Indian Americans heading US multinationals and the Great Indian Diaspora in the US.
      • Outmigration of talent: The continued neglect of education in India is increasing the outmigration of talent, offering the US a reservoir of talent.
      • Drain on national resources: While the Indian elite celebrates this out-migration, the fact is that it is a drain on national resources.

    Conclusion

    In sum,  with the supportive Bush-Rice doctrine defining the post-Cold War US-India partnership virtually abandoned, and the new Trump doctrine treating India as a “developed” economy, demanding parity on trade, bilateral relations have become uncertain and testy. To hide the lack of substance in the relationship the Trump visit will focus on the hype and Prime Minister Modi has perfected the art of diplomacy as mass entertainment.

     

     

  • Bangladesh fares better

    Content

    In the last decade, on a range of social development indicators, Bangladesh has fared better than India. So it is highly unlikely that Bangladeshis would want to leave their cherished homeland for India.

    Comparison with Bangladesh on the development indicators

    • Growth rate: This year Bangladesh’s economic growth rate has surpassed India.
    • Social development indicators: In the last decade, on a range of social development indicators, from infant mortality to immunisation, Bangladesh has fared better.
    • India lagging behind the neighbours in quality of life: Undoubtedly, since economic liberalisation, Indians have grown much richer than Bangladeshis, but in terms of quality of life our neighbour largely outshines us.
      • India trails across several (not all) composite indices from the latest Global Hunger Index to the Gender Development Index.
      • Even on the 2019 World Happiness Index, Bangladeshis score better.
      • While, technically, on the Human Development Index, Bangladesh scores marginally less, this is largely because the index merges income and non-income parameters.

    How India’s neighbour forged ahead in social development?

    • Dissolving the inequality and bridging the social and gender distances: In the case of Bangladesh, the most prominent factor has been-
      • Removing inequality: The country’s ability to dissolve inequalities through sustained investment in public services and-
      • Bridging the social distance: The bridging of social and gender distances.
    • Development in Healthcare: Till the Eighties, Indians lived longer than most South Asians.
      • But now, despite being poorer, an average Bangladeshi female child at birth can expect to live for four years more.
      • Fewer Bangladeshi children also die before their fifth birthday.
      • Community clinics: The formula for this success has been relatively simple. Since 2009, the government has constructed well-stocked “community clinics” in every third village.
      • Home delivery of medicines: For four decades, committed cadres of government health workers have delivered medicines and family planning to women in the comfort of their homes.
    • Achievement in Education: On the education front, even though India has a demographic dividend, Bangladesh has achieved a marginal advantage in youth literacy.
      • Further, across income quintiles, Bangladeshi girls have higher educational attainments than boys.
      • Free textbooks: The government provides free textbooks in the government, non-government (NGO) and madrassa-run schools promptly at the start of the academic year, without the chronic delays which plague India.
      • The greater proportion of expenditure on educations: Economist Jean Drèze has aptly described India as amongst the world champions in social underspending. In contrast, Bangladesh despite being a poorer neighbour since the Nineties has spent a greater proportion of government expenditure on education and healthcare.
      • The fruits of these sustained investments have reaped rich dividends.
    • Nutrition: On the nutrition front too, Bangladesh fares better.
      • Thirty-three per cent of Bangladeshi children are underweight compared to India’s 36 per cent as per the demographic health surveys.
      • Similarly, a greater proportion of Indian children are also stunted.
      • Further, the inequality between wealth quintiles is starker in India.
      • A few years ago, the Bangladeshi government, with the help of NGOs, hired a unique cadre of “Pushti Apas” (nutrition sisters) who went door-to-door in their social endeavours.
      • Unlike the Indian Poshan Abhiyan’s focus on vegetarian foods, they did not shy away from teaching mothers to feed growing infants a balanced diet with mashed fish, meat and eggs.
    • Sanitation: Even at the turn of the millennium, at least 80 per cent of Bangladeshi homes had toilets, even if rudimentary.
      • By 2016, 96 per cent of households and 80 per cent of schools in had proper sanitation.
      • Apart from the typical Islamic emphasis on hygiene, local governments not only provide cement rings for free to poor families but they also regularly spread messages through community group discussions, mosques, mass media and schools.
      • Local entrepreneurs have also ensured that with the innovation of plastic pans, the cheapest toilets cost less than Chinese mobile phones.
    • Women empowerment: Bangladeshi women are also increasingly assertive.
      • The 2006 World Bank Survey on Gender Norms found a growing trend of “educational hypogamy”.
      • In sharp contrast to India’s decline, Bangladeshi women also have higher labour force participation.

    Contrast

    • In comparison, India is grappling with the worst unemployment levels in 45 years and sinking economic growth rates. Government ministers should pull up their own socks, instead. Berating our neighbours with the false bogey of illegal immigrants, in light of the Citizenship Amendment Act, is nothing but an unjustifiable distraction. Instead, it would be far wiser for the Indian government to humbly learn the recipe of South Asian success to improve the lives of citizens from the impressive “Shonar Bangla”.

  • USTR takes India off developing country list

     

    The Office of the United States Trade Representative (USTR) has published a notice, amending lists of developing and least-developed countries that are eligible for preferential treatment with respect to countervailing duties (CVD) investigations.

    New classification by US

    • To harmonise U.S. law with the World Trade Organization’s (WTO) Subsidies and Countervailing Measures (SCM) Agreement, the USTR had, in 1998, come up with lists of countries classified as per their level of development.
    • These lists were used to determine whether they were potentially subject to U.S. countervailing duties. The 1998 rule is now “obsolete” as per the USTR notice.
    • Countries not given special consideration have lower levels of protection against a CVD investigation.
    • A CVD investigation must be terminated if the offending subsidy is de minimis (too small to warrant concern) or if import volumes are negligible.
    • The de minimis thresholds and import volume allowance are more relaxed for developing and least-developed countries.

    Criteria set by US

    • The USTR used the following criteria to determine whether a country was eligible for the 2% de minimise standard:

    (1) Per capita Gross National Income or GNI

    (2) share of world trade

    (3) other factors such as Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) membership or application for membership, EU membership, and Group of Twenty (G20) membership.

    Delisting India

    • India was, until February 10, on the developing country list and therefore eligible for these more relaxed standards. It has now been taken off of that list.
    • India, along with Brazil, Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand and Vietnam were taken off the list since they each have at least a 0.5% share of the global trade, despite having less than $12, 375 GNI (the World Bank threshold separating high-income countries from others).
    • India was taken off the list also because — like Argentina, Brazil, Indonesia and South Africa — it is part of the G20.
    • Given the global economic significance of the G20, and the collective economic weight of its membership (which accounts for large shares of global economic output and trade), G20 membership indicates that a country is developed a/c to USTR.