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GS Paper: GS2-19.Effect of policies and politics of developed and developing countries on India’s interests, Indian diaspora.

  • Fighting COVID-19 together for a shared future

    Context

    The Chinese government has mobilised the whole nation with confidence, unity, a science-based approach and targeted response.

    Aspects that were focused by China to deal with COVID-19

    • Formulated timely strategies for epidemic prevention and control.
    • Strengthened a unified command and response in Wuhan and Hubei.
    • Coordinated the prevention and control work in other regions.
    • Strengthened scientific research, emergency medical and daily necessity supplies.
    • Effectively maintained social stability.
    • Strengthened public education.
    • Actively engaged in international cooperation.

    Mutual support between India and China

    • China and India have maintained close communication and cooperation on epidemic prevention and control. In a letter to President Xi, India’s Prime Minister has expressed support for China.
    • China appreciates the medical supplies provided by India and have helped facilitate the safe return of Indian nationals in Hubei.
    • The global footprint of COVID-19: China has been closely following the global footprint of COVID-19.

    Cooperation on a global level for disease control:

    • Chines govt. will stay in close communication with WHO.
    • Share its epidemic control experience with other countries.
    • Seek closer international cooperation on medicine and vaccine development.
    • Provide assistance to the best of its capabilities to countries and regions that are affected by the spread of the virus in keeping with its role as a responsible major
    • The Chinese reach-out: China has provided various kinds of assistance including testing reagents, remote assistance and medical supplies to countries with a severe outbreak.
    • Sharing of experience and protocol for treatment: China have shared diagnosis and treatment experience and protocols with many countries including India.
      • China is ready to maintain communication with India, share experience in a timely manner, render assistance and make joint efforts to overcome the epidemic.

    Impact and recovery of China

    • Robust economy: The impact on the Chinese economy will be short-lived and generally manageable. China has a resilient economy with robust domestic demand and a strong industrial base. We will definitely sustain the good momentum of economic and social development and meet the goal of achieving moderate prosperity in our society and eradicating extreme poverty in China.
    • Strengthen coordination and communication: China will also strengthen coordination and communication with economic and trading partners and give priority to the resumption of production and supply of leading enterprises and key sectors that have a major impact on the stability of global supply chains.
      • The fundamentals of China’s economy will remain strong in the long run, and China will remain an important engine for global economic growth.

    Conclusion

    The history of civilisation is also one of a history of fighting diseases and a great journey of ceaseless global integration. To prevail over a disease that threatens all, unity and cooperation is the most powerful weapon.

     

     

     

  • Fail-safe exit for America, but a worry for India

    Context

    The recently negotiated peace deal between the United States and the Taliban is unlikely to bring peace to Afghanistan, is geopolitically disadvantageous for India, and has serious implications for our national security.

    Power dynamics of the US-Taliban deal

    • An honourable exit for India: The terms of the deal, the manner in which it was negotiated as well as the geopolitical context in which it was stitched up indicate that it was more about providing an honourable exit route for the U.S.
    • Violence after concluding the deal: Within 24 hours of the much-publicised deal, violence and major disagreements about the deal began erupting in Afghanistan.
    • Why there are the prospects of instability in Afghanistan: Given that the Taliban negotiated from a position of strength, the Trump administration from weakness and little political will, and that the Ashraf Ghani administration in Afghanistan was by and large a clueless bystander in all of this, means that the country is perhaps on the verge of yet another long-drawn-out and internecine battle.

    The changed Taliban

    • Taliban of the 1990s: When the Taliban came to power in the mid-1990s in Kabul, it had few backers in the world.
      • Nor was it seen as a useful commodity by the great powers or the states in the region, except for Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates.
    • United pushback from the rest of the world: The international community was almost united in offering a normative pushback against the violent outfit.
      • As a result, the Taliban was at best reluctantly tolerated until it messed up towards the end of its regime in Kabul.
    • The pressure of Northern Alliance: The Northern Alliance, supported by countries such as Russia and India, kept up its military pressure against the Taliban while it was in power.
    • How today’s Taliban is different from the past: The situation today, at least for the moment, is perhaps the exact opposite of what was the case then.
      • Lessons learned to deal with the international system: The Taliban today is also more worldly-wise and might have learned, during its exile, to deal with the international system and play the game of balance of power.
      • Not necessarily the puppet: More so, it may not necessarily be a puppet of the Pakistani deep state once it returns to power.

    International acceptance of the Taliban

    • Lending the legitimacy to Taliban: Given the war fatigue and the geopolitical stakes in Afghanistan, most of the key players in the region and otherwise have been in negotiations with the Taliban one way or another, and for one reason or another, lending the terror group certain legitimacy in the process.
    • Why countries want good relations with the Taliban: Anyone desirous of a stake in Afghanistan or does not want its domestic turmoil to spill over into their country would want to keep the Taliban in good humour.
      • Suitable withdrawal of the US: There is another reason why the Taliban has many suitors — because of the U.S. withdrawal by and large suits everyone, be it China, Pakistan, Iran, or Russia.
      • The US bigger challenge: Suddenly, the Taliban appears to have been forgiven for its sordid past and unforgivable sins because for most of these countries, the U.S. is the bigger challenge than the Taliban.

    Why India’s strategy is diplomatically flawed?

    • Only state at losing end: The only state that seems to be on the losing end, unfortunately, of this unfolding game of chess and patience in Afghanistan is India.
      • Why the earlier Taliban was anti-India? The earlier Taliban regime was anti-India, it was also because India had militarily supported the Northern Alliance that kept up the military pressure against the Taliban.
      • Today’s Taliban does not share the same animus for India.
    • Need for Change in India’s approach: India, could have rejigged its approach to the Taliban this time around. However, it put all its eggs in the Ashraf Ghani basket, even on the eve of the signing of the peace deal in Doha.
    • Not a diplomatic strategy by India: India also, for most intents and objectives, adopted a puritanical approach to the Taliban.
      • There are 2 reason India is neither reaching out to the Taliban nor exploiting the fissures within it-
      • Because it did not want to irk the elected government in Kabul and-
      • It adopts a moralistic approach to dealing with extremist groups in general — not a smart diplomatic strategy.
    • Self-defeating position: This moralistic attitude, also a diplomatically lazy one, I would say, that be it Pakistan or Afghanistan, India would only talk to the legitimate government in that country, is a self-defeating position.
      • The world is not that perfect, nor state all that uniform, created in the shape and image of the Westphalian forefather.
      • Smart statecraft, therefore, is dealing with what you have and making the best of it.

    What would be the result of India’s strategy?

    • Impact on relations with Afghanistan: India’s relations with Afghanistan will take a hit in the immediate aftermath of the deal.
      • Limited ability to influence the outcomes: With China, India’s strategic adversary, deeply involved in the geopolitics and geo-economics of the region, including in Afghanistan, India’s traditional ability to influence the region’s political and security outcomes will be severely limited.
      • This will be further exacerbated by the withdrawal of the U.S., India’s closest friend, from the region.
      • India’s relation with the other players in the region: Other regional actors in Afghanistan are also less friendly towards India than ever before: Iran feels let down by India given how the latter has behaved towards it at the behest of the Americans.
      • Relation with Russia: For Russia, India is only one of the many friends in the region — the exclusivity of Russia-India relations is a thing of the past — and Pakistan would consider targeting India a fair game.
    • Counter Strategy: Unless New Delhi carefully envisages a counter-strategy, these factors will increasingly push India into a geopolitical tough spot in the region.
      • Need to focus on the region: India should worry us that our political class is focused on domestic politics while the region is becoming ever more uncertain and evidently unfavourable to us.

    Taliban and Kashmir Angle of the deal

    • Negligible physical impact but the possibility of psychological impact: While the direct physical impact of the Taliban’s return to power in Afghanistan on Kashmir will be negligible, this will not be without serious implications for the unfolding situation in Kashmir’s restive regions.
      • Psychological impact: The most important impact is going to be psychological.
      • Interpretation of the event: Disenchanted Kashmiri youngsters, and there are a lot of them, will interpret the events in Afghanistan as follows: “If the mighty superpower USA could be defeated by the Taliban in Afghanistan with help from the Pakistan army, defeating Indian forces in Kashmir won’t be impossible after all.”
      • This enthusiasm is completely misplaced, but that is not the point.
      • That the Kashmiri youth might pick up guns drawing inspiration from the situation in Afghanistan is indeed the point.
    • Increase in Pakistan’s utility: The U.S.-Taliban deal cannot survive without Pakistan’s assistance towards ensuring its success, and the U.S. and its allies recognise that. Such recognition of Pakistan’s utility provides the country with ability, as and when it wishes to, to up the ante in Kashmir.
    • The geopolitical significance of Pok and Aksai Chin claim: India’s official statement which describes Afghanistan as a “contiguous neighbour” — meaning that India considers Pakistan-occupied Kashmir (PoK) a part of its sovereign territory — will make Pakistan and China sit up and take notice.
      • Claim making reconciliation more difficult: India also made a similar claim about Aksai Chin in the wake of its August decision on Kashmir. Erstwhile rhetorical claims on PoK and Aksai Chin have suddenly assumed a lot more geopolitical significance today making conciliatory approaches to conflict resolution ever more difficult.

    Conclusion

    Given that a new Taliban-led dispensation in Afghanistan will be far more accepted by the international community than the last time around also means increased acceptability for such regimes in general, either out of necessity or as a function of geopolitical calculations. That the Taliban mass-murdered its opponents into statehood in the 21st century and that this might provide potential inspiration to other outfits in the region and outside should indeed worry us.

     

     

     

  • The diplomatic cost

    Context

    The CAA and violence in Delhi have started to take its toll on India’s secular foreign policy.

    The US and other’s reaction to the situation in India

    • Trump visit to India: President Trump referred to India as a democracy which was peaceful and tolerant. He lauded freedom, rule of law, liberty and protection of human dignity, adding graphically that where India had the holy Ganges, it also had the Golden Temple and Jama Masjid.
      • Assurance to the critics at home: He thereby cleverly reassured critics at home, especially in the US Congress, that he was not ignoring the values the two great democracies shared.
      • However, as the situation in Delhi spun into violence the next day, in an untutored media interaction at the US ambassador’s residence, he ducked questions about the CAA or Delhi riots, nonchalantly remarking it was “up to India” to deal with it.
      • This may have brought comfort to the Indian government but the world at large differed.
    • Response from the other countries: Delhi had already exchanged angry words with Malaysia, Turkey and even Indonesia over their varied critique of India’s handling of its Muslim minority when Iran joined the issue.

    Iran’s response to violence in India

    • Condemnation by foreign ministers: Iranian Foreign Minister Javad Zarif condemned the “wave of organised violence against Indian Muslims”, adding that “Iran has been a friend of India”.
      • India’s foreign ministry summoned the Iranian ambassador to protest the inappropriateness of the minister’s remark.
    • The reaction by the Iranian Supreme Leader: Soon after, Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei found the time, in the middle of the COVID-19 outbreak, to excoriate the Indian government.
      • Adding insult to injury, he appended #IndianMuslimsInDanger.
    • No reaction on China problems: A facile response, can be that Iran is being hypocritical as it has not expressed remorse over the Chinese repression of Uyghurs.
    • The difference in India’s importance to China: China is a veto-wielding member of the UN Security Council, which also sustains the Iranian economy despite US sanctions. On the other hand, India has a Shia population second only to that of Iran.

    Relations with Iran

    • Two consulates in India: There are two Iranian consulates in India in Hyderabad and Mumbai. Iran seeks the third one in Lucknow.
      • Qom also hosts many Shia students, particularly from the Kargil region.
    • Historic links between the two countries: After Humanyun’s exile in Iran (1530-40) before recovering the Indian throne, the Persian language and culture fired the cultural renaissance at the Mughal court.
      • Religio-cultural heritage importance: India is important for Iran for its religio-cultural heritage, unlike China, which is needed for transactional and strategic reasons.
    • Two interrelated questions flow from this reasoning:
      • 1. What is Iran’s importance for India and the trajectory of India-Iran relations over the last two decades?
      • 2. And why is Iran adopting this sharp tone over what the Indian government argues is an internal matter?
    • Convergence in the relations: The closest India-Iran strategic convergence began in the 1990s, particularly after Kabul fell to the Taliban in 1996. These ties blossomed under reformist Iranian President Mohammad Khatami and Indian Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee.
    • Tehran Declaration: In 2001, the two signed the Teheran Declaration. Khatami in his opening remarks said that Iran always admired India’s secular credentials and Vajpayee had maintained that tradition.
      • In 2003, Khatami was the chief guest at India’s Republic Day and a New Delhi Declaration was issued.
    • Deterioration in relations and impact of India-US relation: The relationship began to slip as Iran’s clandestine nuclear programme and assistance from Pakistan’s rogue scientist A Q Khan was uncovered in mid-2003.
      • Impact of India-US closeness: Concomitantly, India was drawing closer to the US and negotiating a nuclear cooperation agreement.
      • The US used the nuclear issue to cause a cleavage as Indian and Iranian interests began seriously diverging.
      • Taliban factor: In any case, the Taliban had been ejected from Afghanistan and US troops literally surrounded Iran, having in 2003 overthrown Saddam Hussein. Geo-strategy trumped diplomacy.

    The US-Iran relation cycle

    • The nuclear deal with Iran: Iran-US relations also went through a cycle, with President Barack Obama recalibrating US policy towards the Gulf and West Asia.
      • Countering ISIS: Calculating that without Iran, ISIS could not be countered, the US in 2015 endorsed the nuclear deal that P-5 and Germany negotiated to end the nuclear stand-off.
    • Missing warmth of the 1990s: Although India-Iran relations after that returned to near normal as most US sanctions were lifted, the warmth of the 1990s was missing.
      • Iran was now beginning to extend its influence and role across Iraq and West Asia.
    • Maximum Pressure strategy of the US: President Donald Trump in 2016 reversed US policy and since then “maximum pressure” has been applied on Iran via tightened sanctions.
    • India’s engagement with Saudi Arabia and UAE: PM Modi also moved more forthrightly to engage Saudi Arabia and the UAE.
    • The fallout of the US strategy reversal: A fallout of the US policy reversal has been an exacerbation of not only the Shia-Sunni split but a Sunni-Sunni split as Qatar and Turkey are with Iran.

    Changing polity and increasing influence in the neighbourhood

    • Conservatives elected to power: In Iran’s parliamentary election on February 28, extremely conservative members have been elected, the moderates having been vetoed by the Guardians Council earlier.
      • Turnout was a low 43 per cent, due partly to fear of the coronavirus.
    • Increasing influence in the neighbourhood: Iran is even more isolated, though determined to resist US demands, due to communications being curtailed due to the virus.
      • Relations with the Taliban: It has good working relations with the Taliban and converging interests to see that US troops exit the region.
      • The friendly government in Baghdad: Iran is battling to ensure a friendly government in Baghdad, despite the killing of Major General Qasem Soleimani, by keeping militias aligned to it in play.

    Conclusion

    • Perception of India: Khamenei’s tweet reflects the perception that India is in the US-Saudi-Emirati corner and of little use as long as Trump is president.
      • Growing closeness Abu Dhabi, Riyadh and Ahmedabad would have led Iran to this conclusion.
    • Leveraging India’s dependence: In the Islamic world, Iran by publicly defending Indian Muslims embarrasses the silent Saudis.
      • It also calculates that India needs access to Afghanistan through Chabahar to assist the Ghani government or influence developments there.

     

  • Pieces of peace

    Context

    “Agreement for Bringing Peace to Afghanistan” between the US and Taliban signed on February 29 in Doha, is just another piece in the overall strategy of the US for Afghanistan.

    Pakistan’s support to the Taliban and unchanged Afghan policy of the US

    • Continuation of the same hard-nosed policy: While rolling out the Afghan policy in August 2017, it was emphasised by the current US dispensation that it was making amends to the Afghan strategy of the previous dispensation.
      • In reality, it has been a continuation of the same hard-nosed line.
    • How Pakistan supported the Taliban? The US and allies had got a rude shock when it dawned on them that between 2001 and 2008, the Taliban had used training and recuperation centres in Pakistan to regain domination over most parts of Afghanistan.
      • Benefiting from the Coalition Support Fund: Pakistan had actively aided the Taliban and al Qaeda (AQ), while continuing to benefit from handsome Coalition Support Funds and a seat at the “high table”.
      • Support of the Pakistan Army: All failures were blamed on inadequate numbers of International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) and Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF), which were ill-equipped to challenge the Taliban, backed by a professional Pakistan Army.
      • Misdiagnosed cause: The Obama administration diagnosed that lack of governance, corruption and fragmented polity were other key factors.

    What was the comprehensive Afghanistan Strategy?

    • COIN doctrine and “troop surge”: A comprehensive Afghanistan strategy review led to replicating its “troop surge” strategy, which was believed to have succeeded in Iraq, leading to total withdrawal of US troops (December 2011).
      • At the heart of the troop surge was the Counterinsurgency (COIN) doctrine of the US Field Manual.
    • COIN plus CT: The military strategy in Afghanistan was split into COIN plus CT (Counter Terrorism) objectives.
      • The Taliban movement was treated as an insurgency.
      • What was involved in COIN: The COIN efforts entailed protecting population centres and highways, building numbers and capability of the ANSF to take on insurgents, with emphasis on good governance and support for reconstruction.
      • It also included reconciliation and reintegration of lower to mid-level willing Taliban.
      • The UN designations of Taliban and AQ were separated to pave the way for “peace talks” with Taliban commanders who were tired of fighting.
    • What this strategy achieved? The US-led ISAF troop surge helped create time and space to build and strengthen the ANSF over three times and succeeded in pushing the Taliban back to outlying areas.
      • Even today these territorial gains have not been reversed, except in some areas.
      • As the ANSF gained strength and depth, the US led-ISAF mission became a NATO led-Resolute Support mission.
    • How changing geopolitical circumstances increased challenges? The CT effort yielded rich dividends for the US and allies, in the Af-Pak region and even beyond.
      • The rise of ISIS: From the build-up of ISIS in 2014 to the loss of its Caliphate in 2019 and recently to the killing of General Solemani, the CT challenges of the US and allies in the Af-Pak region and periphery have become graver than ever.
      • These elements had a bearing on the Afghan strategy rolled out in August 2017.
      • Good progress was made in building up the ANSF, with a strong focus on three key elements — Special Forces, Air Force, and Afghan Intelligence (NDS).

    The US withdrawal

    • Objectives of the withdrawal: Emphasising that “consequences of a rapid exit were predictable and unacceptable”, it outlined two key objectives —
      • Preventing a resurgence of safe havens that threatened the security of Afghanistan and the US interests in Afghanistan and Pakistan.
      • Preventing terrorists from getting nukes or nuclear material which could be used against the US or elsewhere.
    • What is the recalibrated strategy: The “recalibrated” strategy envisaged following-
      • Time-bound but condition-based withdrawal.
      • Support for the Ghani government.
      • ANSF to take on the Taliban.
      • Talks with the Taliban and for Pakistan to demonstrate commitment on dismantling safe havens that threatened US objectives.
      • Overall, the strategy remained the same, except for the withdrawal of the US from a role in nation-building.
    • What are the results of the strategy? There has been a greater emphasis on the strengthening of ANSF.
      • The regular assessments by the US show an increasing role and success of the Afghan Special Forces.
      • The Air Force and the NDS in playing the lead in keeping the Taliban from running over capitals.
      • By and large, the ANSF have been successful in maintaining the balance and the Taliban-control has not slipped to 2009 levels.
      • In the meantime, US forces have dropped to 10 per cent of the peak (in 2011).
      • With the re-election of President Ghani, it is assured that the US line of thinking will prevail over the Afghan government.
      • Role of Pakistan in the process: On its part, Pakistan has demonstrated its intent by delivering top-rung Taliban, including Mullah Baradar in its custody since 2010, and Anas Haqqani released as part of the process, for the talks.
      • Even if there is no comprehensive ceasefire or full withdrawal ever, Pakistan is unlikely to be blamed.

    What Pakistan achieved from the peace process?

    • Return of Afghan refugee: Pakistan has been rewarded in more ways than one. It managed to return lakhs of Afghans.
    • Fencing on the eastern border of Afghanistan: It builds a fence along the eastern parts of Afghanistan to prevent cross-border attacks.
    • Targeting the key TTP leaders: Pakistan got the US and Afghan forces to target key TTP leaders, starting with TTP chief Mullah Fazlullah in June 2018.
      • Since January this year, three top TTP leaders have been killed in Kabul and Kunar.
      • This has also helped build the Pakistan narrative that Afghan soil is being used to target Pakistan.
    • Changing the international narrative in its favour: Even though it is facing “calibrated” heat on FATF sanctions, Pakistan has managed to change the international narrative in its favour.
      • The 24th report (July 2019) of the UNSC monitoring committee has stated, “Al Qaeda continues to cooperate closely with LeT and the Haqqani Network”, but there is no reference to LeT or Haqqani in the 25th report (January 2020).
      • This report has also asserted that ISIL-K has established informal contact with other terrorist groups, including Jamaat-ul-Ahrar, TTP and Lashkar e-Islam.
      • Meanwhile, these groups regularly attack Pakistani posts along the Afghan border.
      • All key anti-Pakistan groups are now being categorised as ISIL-K supporters, even though Pakistan has run the so-called Daesh networks in eastern Afghanistan for years.
      • The UNSC reports also highlight the positive role of Taliban in targeting ISIL-K.

    Conclusion

    • The election in the US has bearing on the process: In an election year, the US needs to show that it is not fighting someone else’s battles and is making “sincere efforts” at peace-making.
      • The “Agreement” demonstrates sincerity.
      • At the same time, the US has to continue steering the Afghan strategy to keep terror networks in check.
      • The peace process has already created a comfort-loving, globe-trotting leadership in the top echelons of the Taliban, who would continue to talk, even if the current Agreement falters.
    • Pakistan is again sitting on the high table: As the LeT and Haqqani networks go missing from UN reports and JeM chief Masood Azhar and pro-Pak TTP leader Ehasanullah Ehsan go conveniently “missing” from Pakistan soil, the pressure on Pakistan has eased.
      • The new non-state entities backed by Pakistan, such as the AQIS and ISKP/IS-Kashmir/IS-Hind will become more visible.
      • The rank and file of LeT, JeM, HUJI etc can easily be transferred to these new entities, while many more can be recruited under new banners.
      • Online propaganda of these entities, including in Indian languages, is already visible and likely to escalate.

     

  • A U.S. strategy only meant to isolate China

    Context

    Since 2017, the United States government has released a few reports and fact sheets on its new Indo-Pacific strategy. Buried in these documents is a much deeper agenda of the U.S. government: to use three large Asian states — Australia, India, and Japan — to isolate China. There is nothing else to it.

    The scale of BRI and the US objections

    • Objections to BRI: The U.S. government has made it clear that what it finds most objectionable is China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), which has signed on more than 70 countries in the world.
    • What BRI aims to achieve? Adopted in 2013, the BRI is intended as a mechanism to-
      • Development of new markets: BRI aims to end China’s reliance upon the markets of the West and to develop new markets in other continents.
      • Building infra: It is also intended to use China’s massive surpluses to build infrastructure in key parts of Africa, Asia, and Latin America.
      • Investment of $ 1.3 trillion: By 2027, according to estimates by Morgan Stanley, China will spend about $1.3 trillion on this ambitious construction project.
      • Involvement of Saudi Arabia: Even Saudi Arabia, a close ally of the U.S., has made the BRI one of the cornerstones of its Saudi Vision 2030 plan.
    • Involvement of Pakistan: While China has invested $68 billion to build the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor from Xinjiang to Pakistan’s Gwadar Port.
      • Saudi Arabia has agreed to invest $10 billion in the port itself.

    Significance of the BRI and comparison with the US spending

    • Staggering scale and participation: The scale of Chinese investment, and the participation of a range of countries with different political identities in the BRI, is staggering.
    • Loss of appetite in the US to spend: At the Indo-Pacific Business Forum in July 2018 the U.S. said that it has spent $2.9 billion through the Department of State and the USAID (United States Agency for International Development).
      • It has lined up hundreds of millions of dollars more through its U.S. Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC) and the Overseas Private Investment Corporation.
      • Inadequate US spending: If one adds up all the money that the U.S. intends to spend for economic projects, it is still a fraction of the amount spent by China.
      • ‘America First’ attitude: There is no appetite in Washington, D.C., with its ‘America First’ attitude, to funnel more money towards investments in the region currently being built by the BRI.

    Military Claims of the US and investment

    • US investment with military presence: It appears as if U.S. investments will come only with military claims.
      • The case of Nepal: A few years ago, Nepal discovered a large amount of uranium in Mustang, near the Nepal-China border; this has certainly motivated U.S. interest in Nepal’s economy.
      • If the U.S. money comes with U.S. military presence, this will create a serious flashpoint in the Himalayas.

    Raising human right and transparency issue against China

    • The argument of human rights and transparency
      • Rhetorical argument: Unable to outspend the Chinese, the U.S. government is making a rhetorical argument that it has more respect for “transparency, human rights, and democratic values” than China, which “practices repression at home and abroad”.
    • The argument of transparency and the debt trap
      • Debt trap used by the US: It is hard to imagine the U.S. being “transparent” with its trade deals. It is equally hard to imagine the U.S. being able to argue that it would not put countries into debt.
      • Debt crisis created by the US in the 1980s: The U.S. government enabled a massive Third World debt crisis in the 1980s, which was then used by the U.S.-driven International Monetary Fund’s Structural Adjustment Programs to strangle countries in Africa, Asia, and Latin America.
      • This history is alive, and it makes a mockery of the U.S.’s attempt to say that its own approach is superior to that of China’s.

    US withdrawal from multilateralism

    • Apart from that, the U.S. government has already indicated that it is uninterested in multilateral deals.
    • Withdrawal from TPP: The US withdrew from the Trans-Pacific Partnership in 2017, for instance.
      • Australia and Japan shrugged, and then put their energy into the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership, which sidelines the U.S.

    The claim of free and open Indo-Pacific

    • Renaming the Pacific Command: In May 2018, the U.S. military’s Pacific Command was renamed the Indo-Pacific Command, a symbolic gesture that provides a military aspect to the Indo-Pacific Strategy.
    • What free and open mean to the US? The U.S. government has made it clear that for all its talk of a “free and open Indo-Pacific”, what it actually wants is an Indo-Pacific with fewer Chinese ships and more U.S. warships.
    • Just before this renaming, the U.S. National Security Strategy of 2017 noted that “China seeks to displace the United States in the Indo-Pacific region”, and so the Indo-Pacific Strategy intends for the S. to fight for its dominance in the Pacific Ocean, the Indian Ocean, and in the Asian rim.
    • This is a very dangerous war that the U.S. seeks to impose on Asia.

    India adopting the US project of Indo-Pacific

    • Australia and Japan moving away: As the military aspect of the Strategy increased, both Australia and Japan edged away from full-scale adoption of the U.S. project.
      • Japan has begun to use the term “Indo-Pacific” without the word “Strategy”.
      • Australia has signed onto a “comprehensive strategic partnership” with China.
    • Only India adopting the project: Only India remains loyal to the agenda set by U.S. President Donald Trump.
      • No US strategy to contain China: In all the documents released by the U.S. government and in all the speeches by officials, there is no discussion of the strategy to contain China.
      • There is only rhetoric that skates into the belligerent territory.

    Conclusion

    India would be advised to study the U.S. project rather than jump into it eagerly. Room for an independent foreign policy for India is already narrowed, and room for independent trade policy is equally suffocated. To remain the subordinate ally of the U.S. suggests that India will miss an opportunity to be part of a reshaped Asia.

     

     

  • Location in news: Idlib Province

     

    The nine-year-old war in Syria is currently raging in the northwestern province of Idlib, with rapidly escalating tensions between government forces of President Bashar al-Assad and the Turkish military.

    Background

    • President’s Assad’s forces are backed by Russia, who are clashing with thousands of Turkish troops south of its border with Syria.
    • Turkey has closed the border and is trying to seal itself from waves of displaced refugees as Assad presses forth with a brutal campaign to take back Idlib.

    Why is Idlib important?

    • Assad has been pushing to recapture Idlib, which, along with parts of neighbouring Hama, Latakia and Aleppo, are the last remaining strongholds of the rebel opposition and other groups that have been attempting to overthrow Assad since 2011.
    • At one point, the opposition held large parts of Syria under its control, but that changed after Assad, with Russian military support, slowly regained control over most of the country.
    • In 2015, Idlib province was overtaken by opposition forces.
    • Now, Syrian government forces are attempting to capture the strategic M4 and M5 national highways that connect Idlib, Aleppo and Damascus, the capital of the country.
    • Idlib skirts the two national highways and lies between Aleppo in the north and Damascus in the south.
    • It’s proximity to the Turkish border makes Idlib strategically important to the Syrian government.

    Who controls Idlib now?

    • Since the province fell to opposition forces, there is no one group that controls Idlib, but rather, several separate factions.
    • International watchdogs say that the dominant faction in Idlib is the Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), a UN-designated terrorist organization set up in 2017, with links to al-Qaeda.
    • Also operating in Idlib is the Turkey-backed Syrian National Army, an armed opposition group. Included in the mix are the remnants of the Islamic State.
    • Watch groups say that other factions in Idlib strongly oppose the presence of IS fighters in the province.

    Why is Idlib important for Turkey?

    • Idlib’s proximity to the Turkish border makes it not only important for the Syrian government, but also a cause of concern for Turkey.
    • Since the war started in Syria, thousands of displaced Syrians have sought refuge in Turkey over the years.
    • According to the latest known figures, Turkey presently hosts some 3.6 million refugees and is feeling the socio-economic and political strain of their presence in the country.
    • More conflict in Idlib would only serve to displace more people, pushing them towards the Turkish border.
    • Turkey has been witnessing a surge in hostility among its citizens towards refugees and a fresh wave of refugees will only exacerbate the situation.

  • Terms of transaction

    Context

    Trump administration seems supportive of India as part of its Indo-Pacific strategy, while also counting gains for itself.

    No substantive outcomes of the visit stated

    • Neither side has so far publicly touted any major substantive outcomes of the visit.
    • Creation of positive atmosphere: To create some positive atmospherics, the Indian Cabinet Committee on Security just gave final approval to $3 billion worth of pending contracts to purchase military helicopters from US companies Lockheed Martin and Boeing.
      • Missile defence system sale: The US Administration, on its part, informed Congress of its willingness to authorise the sale of another $1.8 billion worth missile defence system.
      • The move is indicative of the US’s growing willingness to allow higher technology defence equipment to India.
    • Placing India at level (STA-1) similar to its closest allies: The Trump Administration has gone farther than its predecessors in the technology levels it is willing to offer.
      • Including Guardian drones in 2017, and placing India at STA-1 level, similar to its closest allies and partners.
    • The expected MoUs: The spokesperson of the Ministry of External Affairs indicated on February 20 that five MoUs can be expected, inter alia,-
      • On intellectual property.
      • Trade facilitation and
      • Homeland security.
    • Making sense of the US’s actions in the present context: There will also be the regulation joint statement.
      • Analysing in greater details: This time, the statement will be parsed in more than usual detail for indications of future direction and intent for the partnership.
      • It is the time when the US has been talking of “Make America Great Again”, advocating for sovereignty and nationalism.
      • The US is also decrying-Alliance commitments, Readying to sign an agreement with the Taliban by month-end leading to a drawdown of US troop presence.
      • Yet, it is articulating repeatedly about India being a lynchpin of its “Free and Open Indo-Pacific Strategy”.

    No development on the limited trade front

    • No progress on limited trade package: The two countries have not been able to finalise even a “limited trade package”, which has been under discussion for two years.
    • Gaps between the expectations: Obviously, there is a gap between what India can accommodate, and what the US negotiators want for their own political reasons.
    • The Trump administration has taken several steps that have negatively impacted India.
      • It has imposed additional tariffs on steel and aluminium imports from India, ostensibly on national security grounds.

    Contradictory impulses

    • The above action flies in the face of citing strategic partnership and convergence in Indo-Pacific strategy.
    • GSP withdrawal: It has withdrawn hitherto available GSP benefits from certain categories of labour-intensive Indian products.
    • Labelling India a ‘Developed’ country: The US has taken India out of its list of “developing” countries, lowering the threshold for countervailing trade action.
    • Against the spirit of the beneficial rise of India: These actions go against the grain of the US articulation that it sees the rise of India to be in US benefit.
      • Treating the trade deficit with China and India on equal footing: It also does not make sense when India is an overall trade deficit country.
      • Even though it has a $20 billion surplus with the US which pales compared to China’s $350 billion surplus.
    • Unprecedented actions against the closest allies: Trump has taken unprecedented action against the closest US allies.
      • He has also repeatedly publicly ridiculed Indian tariffs, claiming recently that India has not treated the US fairly.

    What the future holds for the India-US relationship

    • Is the US “all-weather” partner: Given the contradictory impulses, it would be fair to ask what the future holds for the India-US relationship, and where would the Trump visit and its aftermath take us.
      • Can India consider the US a reliable and “all-weather” partner, or be constantly juggling convergences and divergences?
    • The factors that affected relationship: Historically, four factors have affected the India-US relationship at any point of time:
      • US global posture and priorities.
      • Strength of bilateral relations.
      • The role assigned to Pakistan in its global objectives.
      • The strategy towards China.

    Evolution of India-US relationship

    • Under Democrat Presidents
    • Roosevelt Period: During the Second World War, Roosevelt pushed Britain to grant independence to India, facilitated a separate official Indian representation in Washington through an Agent-General since 1941.
      • But did not go far enough fearing disruption of the necessary wartime alliance. In the post-war period.
    • Truman Period: Truman spoke of partnering with developing countries for their industrial and scientific progress.
      • He welcomed Indian PM Nehru for an acclaimed visit in 1949.
      • But initiated the Cold War containment strategy against the Soviet Union, and the assessment of newly independent countries from that lens.
    • Kennedy Period: He was extremely supportive of democratic India’s economic assistance requirements, and for military assistance during the 1962 China conflict.
    • Carter Period: Carter, wedded to human rights issues, acclaimed India’s post Emergency elections.
      • But was critical on non- proliferation differences.
    • Clinton Period: Clinton stabilised the relationship after the dissonance and sanctions following our 1998 nuclear tests.
      • And gave full support to India’s position during the 1999 Kargil conflict with Pakistan.
    • Obama Period: He came out in support of India’s permanent membership of the UN Security Council, and declared India a Major Defence Partner, enabling higher-level technology authorisations.
    • Under Republican Presidents
    • Eisenhower Period: Eisenhower embraced and armed Pakistan in its CENTO and SEATO military alliances.
      • India as a bulwark against China: He emphasised food and economic assistance to India seeing it as a democratic bulwark against a Communist China.
      • First-ever visit to India by the US president: He made a successful first-ever visit of a serving US President to India, welcomed also by a 5 lakh crowd in Connaught Place.
    • Nixon Period: He visited India for a day in 1959, was upset with Indian criticism of his Vietnam military offensives.
      • Sided completely with Pakistan during the Bangladesh crisis of 1971.
      • He sent the US seventh fleet into the Bay of Bengal to pressurise India and sought to reorder the global balance by outreach to China through a secret Kissinger visit that year.
    • Reagan Period: He explored economic and scientific cooperation with India, but was absorbed with Pakistan’s support in pushing the Soviet Union out of Afghanistan.
    • George W Bush Period: George W Bush transformed the relationship with the civil nuclear cooperation agreement of 2008.
      • Perceiving again the technological, military and political challenge to the US from a rising China.

    Conclusion

    It is clear that India’s interests have been impacted a bit by party orientation on issues, but more by the overall global circumstance. Under the present circumstance, therefore, India will have to deal with a transactional administration, supportive of strengthening India as part of its Indo-Pacific strategy, but also counting the gains for itself.

     

  • An agenda for Modi-Trump

    Context

    With the withdrawal of the US from Afghanistan and other regions, India must think about its new role in the region.

    The US plans for Afghanistan and the Gulf-cause of concerns for India

    • Why it matters? Prime Minister Narendra Modi will be eager to get a first-hand briefing from the US President on his plans for the Af-Pak region and the Gulf.
      • These two regions are vital to India’s economic, political and military security.
    • End of an important era in northwestern frontier: The impending withdrawal of US forces from Afghanistan and the downsizing of the American security role in the Gulf region mark the end of an important era in India’s northwestern frontiers — both land and maritime.
    • Can India overcome the past reluctance? The question is whether Modi and Trump can overcome the past reluctance in both capitals to collaborate in the regions west of India.
      • Suitable for both the countries: There is a good fit between-
      • America’s downward adjustment in the region under Trump, and-
      • India’s ambition to play a larger role in the Gulf and the Indian Ocean.

    Broad understandingIndo-Pacific and extending it to the West

    • Development in the last three years: Over the last three years of the Trump presidency, Delhi and Washington had developed a broad understanding of how to secure the Indo-Pacific that the US had defined.
    • Need to extend the same to Western Indian Ocean: Officials in Delhi frequently complained that these common perspectives did not extend to the Western Indian Ocean.
    • In recent weeks, though, senior US officials have said the Indo-Pacific region extends to the east coast of Africa.
      • Question of strategic cooperation: Extending Indo-Pacific is not a question of defining geography but finding ways to secure common ground through strategic cooperation.

    Elevation of South West Asia to the top of America’s security concerns

    • Filling the vacuum created by the British Empire: As the sun set over the British empire in the east after a century and a half, the US stepped in to fill the breach.
      • What began as a cautious entry into the Indian Ocean became a full-blown military power projection at the end of the 1970s.
    • Other events that played an important role? The dramatic rise in oil prices, the Islamic Revolution in Iran and its threat to export it to the Arab World, and the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan, saw the elevation of South West Asia to the top of America’s security concerns.
    • Events after Gulf War: The First Gulf War during 1990-91 saw the US intervene to restore the sovereignty of Kuwait that was swallowed by Iraq’s Saddam Hussein.
      • 9/11 attacks: The terror attacks on September 11, 2001, invited a ferocious response from the US that ousted the Taliban from power in Afghanistan.

    The Iraq and Afghanistan war-Endless wars

    • Costly failures: Notwithstanding the initial successes in both Afghanistan and Iraq, there is a growing consensus in the US that these occupations have been costly failures.
      • Trump has been among the first political leaders in the US to call these wars initiated by a Republican predecessor in the White House as “stupid”.
      • The promise of ending the endless wars: During his presidential campaign in 2016 and since Trump has promised to end the “endless wars” in the Greater Middle East and bring the boys back home.
      • It is an idea that has found considerable resonance among Democrats.
    • Focusing on great power competition instead of small wars: While the security establishment is not willing to give up, US is now focusing more on the great power competition with Russia and China than the small wars that had preoccupied it over the last three decades.
    • The Oil factor: The steep decline in US energy dependence on the Gulf, too, has reduced the salience of the region in Washington.

    Three consequence of the change in the US policy

    • Cutting down the military commitments
      • The Middle East and Africa: Trump has been cutting down military commitments in the Middle East and Africa.
      • His officials are about to sign an agreement with the Taliban that provides for American withdrawal from Afghanistan.
      • Maritime front: On the maritime front, Trump has called on all major powers, especially those importing oil from the Gulf, to contribute to the security of shipping in the Strait of Hormuz.
    • How it matters for India?
      • Challenges of limiting the consequences: The challenge for Indian policymakers has been to limit the consequences of what seems a definitive turn in US policy.
      • Chance to extend the own role: It should also be about seizing the possibilities for expanding India’s own role in the western marches of the Subcontinent.
    • To expand its role Delhi needs to make a few important shifts in its own thinking.
      • One, it must overcome the still powerful belief in sections of the Indian establishment that the US-Pakistan relationship is unchanging.
      • The US tilt toward India and away from Pakistan: Over the last two decades, there has been a tilt in US policies away from Pakistan and towards India.
      • For instance, the US pressures on Pakistan to vacate the Kargil heights, an exclusive nuclear exemption to India and efforts to rein in Pakistan’s cross-border terrorism during the Obama years.
      • Support in Trump period: Trump went further to acknowledge that Pakistan is part of the problem in Afghanistan and turned up the heat on Pakistan’s support for terrorism.
      • He has supported India’s efforts at the UNSC to bring Masood Azhar to book in the face of Chinese resistance.
      • Helped India isolate Pakistan at the Financial Action Task Force.
      • Prevented the UNSC from discussing Kashmir.
      • But India must also recognise: That there will be a measure of cooperation between the US and Pakistan.
      • Delhi’s focus should, instead, be on expanding its own security cooperation with the US in the troubled lands to the west of India.
    • India needs to prepare for a larger security role in Afghanistan
      • Question of being at the next-door: Trump has been asking a simple question: If India is next door to Afghanistan, should it not be doing more for Afghan security?
      • Need to explore the options: The NDA government has stepped up security assistance to Kabul. As Afghanistan enters a turbulent phase, regional and other powers are bound to fill the vacuum left by the US.
      • There are many options–  between doing nothing and sending the Indian army into Afghanistan- that Delhi and Washington could discuss.
    • Need to increase Naval activity
      • Increased role as regional security provider: Delhi has already stepped up its naval activity within the Gulf and beyond as part of its emergence as a regional security provider.
      • Cooperation with others: Effectiveness of India’s role will rise manifold if it acts in concert with the US and other partners.
      • Modi and Trump could begin by laying the political foundation for such cooperation.

    Conclusion

    At the beginning of Trump’s term, sceptics dismissed the prospects for India-US security cooperation in the eastern Indian Ocean and the Pacific, but progress has been steady. That cooperation can and must be extended now to the Western Indian Ocean.

     

  • Forging a new India-U.S. modus vivendi

    Context

    It is clearer than perhaps ever before in recent times, that New Delhi needs the continued support of the U.S. government on almost everything substantial that matters to India in its quest to be a power of substance in the international system.

    Preparing for Trump 2.0

    • The world may have to deal with Mr Trump for four more years after the end of his present term this year.
    • Where India can benefit from constructive ties with the US?
      • A fairer trade regime.
      • Accessing cutting-edge technology.
      • The fight against terrorism.
      • Stabilising our region.
      • New Delhi stands to benefit from constructive ties on all issues, given a more sensitive United States.
    • India must, therefore, seek greater understanding and engagement should there be a Trump 2.0.
    • Understanding the asymmetrical partnership: Asymmetrical partnerships, as we know from history, are rarely easy.
      • Partnership with the superpowers: Partnerships with superpowers are even more difficult; in international politics, as in life, even the best of unequal relationships results in a loss of some dignity and autonomy. 

    Why the partnership with the US matters for India?

    • The growing influence of China in Indo-Pacific: Without the United States, the region could become willy-nilly part of a new Chinese tributary system.
      • Chance of more organic rule-based order: With a fully engaged United States, the region has at least the chance of creating a more organic rules-based order.
    • Past consequences for India: the history of “estrangement” with the United States, during the Cold War, has had consequences for vital national interests that continue to cast their shadow on the present.
      • Jammu and Kashmir (J&K).
      • Nuclear non-proliferation.
      • Festering of the Pakistan “problem”.
      • The Chinese humiliation of 1962, are just a few examples.
    • Change in the perception over the US: But much of course has changed today.
    • Anti–Americanism is outdate: Anti-Americanism, once the conventional wisdom of the Indian elite, seems outdated.
      • Close alignment with the US: New Delhi has, over the decades, gone on to align itself more closely with Washington.
      • Opinion in favour of the stronger ties: More important, both within India and in the U.S., the consensus across the mainstream of political opinion favours stronger relations between the two countries.

    Pro-US tilt of the Indian Foreign policy

    • A survey suggests support for Trump: According to the latest Pew Surveys of Global Opinion, support for Mr Trump in India is high enough to suggest a great deal of public affection for the American President.
      • That itself is a marker of the way India and Indians now see the world.
    • Reason for the change in geo-strategic change: The reason for the change in New Delhi’s geostrategic outlook can be summarised quickly.
      • If the 1971 Friendship Treaty with the Soviet Union was a response to the continuing U.S. tilt towards Pakistan and the beginnings of a Washington-Beijing entente.
      • China factor: At present, it is the prospect of a potentially hegemonic China in the Indo-Pacific region is helping to cement the relationship.
      • Beijing has managed to alienate nearly all its neighbours and allies, except North Korea and Pakistan.
    • Gains made in bilateral ties in the last 3 years:
      • COMCASA– A foundational military agreement that allows for the sharing of encrypted communications and equipment.
      • Export control law relaxation: A change in U.S. export control laws that places India in a privileged category of NATO and non-NATO U.S. allies;
      • 2+2 dialogue: New ‘2+2’ foreign and defence ministers dialogue.
      • Oil export to India: An exponential increase in U.S. oil exports to India.
      • Tri-lateral military exercise: The inauguration of the first India-U.S. tri-service military exercise and expansion of existing military exercises.
      • The signing of Industrial Security Annex: The signing of an Industrial Security Annex that will allow for greater collaboration among the two countries’ private defence industries.
      • Inclusion of India in a U.S. security Initiative: The inclusion of India and South Asia in a U.S. Maritime Security Initiative.

    Preparing for the President from Democratic Party

    • There is, of course, a chance that we may have a Democratic President next year.
    • Bipartisan support in the US: In those circumstances, we can only hope that the bipartisan consensus on engaging India will prevail.
      • To be sure, however, a new President will seek to put his/her own imprimatur on the relationship.
      • Democrats and the Human Right issue: The Democrats will clearly be more proactive on human rights and on issues of inclusion and diversity, which would make a greater demand on India and test its capacity and creativity.
    • Indian diaspora: India, of course, continue engaging with its strongest source of support in the United States: the Indian diaspora.
      • Fortunately, there is a near consensus on the need to strengthen this constituency.

    Conclusion

    In any case, there is little doubt that whoever is the next occupant of the White House, a retreat from multilateralism (especially on trade-related issues) and concern about China will continue to be the two main pillars of contemporary American foreign policy. If for only those reasons, Mr Trump’s reason has undeniable significance.

     

     

     

  • Explained: The EU data strategy

    The European Commission has recently released a “European strategy for data… to ensure the human-centric development of Artificial Intelligence” and a white paper on artificial intelligence.

    EU data strategy

    • The new documents present a timeline for various projects, legislative frameworks, and initiatives by the European Union, and represent its recognition that it is slipping behind American and Chinese innovation.
    • The strategy lays out “why the EU should act now”.
    • The blueprint hopes to strengthen Europe’s local technology market by creating a “data single market” by 2030 to allow the free flow of data within the EU.
    • To aid a “data-agile economy”, the Commission hopes to implement an “enabling legislative framework for the governance of common European data spaces” by the latter half of the year.
    • By the beginning of 2021, the Commission will make high-value public sector data available free through Application Programming Interfaces (APIs) — a pathway for two different applications to speak to each other.
    • Between 2021 and 2027, the Commission will invest in a High Impact Project to jump-start data infrastructure. Several other initiatives are laid out, including a cloud services marketplace.

    Why such strategy?

    • The EU has the potential to be successful in the data-agile economy. It has the technology, the know-how and a highly skilled workforce.
    • However, competitors such as China and the US are already innovating quickly and projecting their concepts of data access and use across the globe, the strategy states.
    • With American and Chinese companies taking the lead on technological innovation, Europe is keen to up its own competitiveness.

    What does the EU move mean for legislation?

    • Europe has been a frontrunner when it comes to technology regulation.
    • Its General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) released in 2018 was a game-changer across the industry. In the recent strategy, the GDPR is seen as giving the “solid framework for digital trust.”
    • Parliamentarians are discussing India’s current Personal Data Protection (PDP) Bill in a Joint Select Committee.
    • The recent draft of the PDP introduced a clause on non-personal data, mandating entities to hand over such data to the government on command.
    • This was not included in the draft proposed by the Justice B N Sri Krishna Committee in October 2018.
    • Some of the movement around the PDP Bill comes from a desire to strengthen India’s own data economy, similar to the EU’s desire.

    Has India done anything similar?

    • The Union Cabinet approved the National Data Sharing and Accessibility Policy (NDSAP) in 2012.
    • As part of the initiative, the government worked with the US government to release data.gov.in, a site of government data for public use.
    • The Economic Survey of 2018 envisioned a similar use of non-personal data.
    • Just as the EU’s strategy discusses “data for public good”, the chapter titled “Data ‘Of the People, By the People, For the People’” advocated that the government step in to sectors that private players ignore, marking the first time India’s Economic Survey has isolated “data” as a strategic focus.
    • Other data integration efforts have been announced or implemented by NITI Aayog (the National Data & Analytics Platform), the Smart Cities Mission (India Urban Data Exchange), and the Ministry of Rural Development (DISHA dashboard).
    • In 2018, the National Informatics Centre worked with PwC and other vendors to create a Centre of Excellence for Data Analytics aimed at providing data analysis help to government departments.