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GS Paper: GS2-06.Parliament and State Legislatures (structure, functioning, conduct of business, powers & privileges; issues therein)

  • House privileges vs free speech: The question before Supreme Court

    Why in the News

    Since the Searchlight case (Pandit MSM Sharma vs Sri Krishna Sinha, 1959), free speech has been held to yield to a legislature’s privileges, and a seven-judge Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court is now testing that rule. The reference began when the Tamil Nadu Legislative Assembly sentenced journalists to jail for reports it said breached its privileges.

    What are legislative privileges, and where do they meet fundamental rights?

    1. What they are: Legislative privileges are powers and immunities that let legislatures work without interference, including power to punish a breach of privilege. They work like a court’s contempt power.
    2. Constitutional source: Article 105 covers Parliament, and Article 194(3) grants State legislatures their privileges and immunities.
    3. Rights on the other side: Privileges can collide with three rights:
      • Article 19(1)(a): free speech, including press freedom;
      • Article 14: equality before the law;
      • Article 21: life and personal liberty.
    4. The question: The Bench must decide whether privileges override these rights and can be used against citizens and journalists at all.
    5. The takeaway: If privilege prevails, a legislature can jail a critic by resolution, beyond a court’s check.

    How did the Tamil Nadu dispute reach the Court?

    1. Reports referred: In 2008 the Speaker sent The Hindu’s reports of exchanges between the then Chief Minister and the Opposition to the Privileges Committee, calling them “contrary to truth”.
    2. Editorial referred: An editorial saying privilege protects the House’s functioning, not the government’s reputation, was referred too, along with Murasoli‘s Tamil translation.
    3. Jail and stay: The Assembly sentenced five journalists and Murasoli’s editor to 15 days’ imprisonment. The Supreme Court stayed the warrants and referred the matter to a Constitution Bench.

    Why do two Constitution Bench rulings conflict?

    1. Searchlight, 1959: By a 4:1 majority, the Court held that privilege includes the power to prohibit publication, since the special privilege clause prevails over the general free speech clause.
    2. Keshav Singh dispute: The Uttar Pradesh Assembly jailed Keshav Singh over pamphlets alleging an MLA’s corruption. It then ordered the Allahabad High Court judges who bailed him brought in custody.
    3. Keshav Singh opinion: On the President’s Special Reference No. 1 of 1964, the Court held that:
      • courts may examine detention ordered for breach of privilege;
      • legislatures cannot act against judges or lawyers for doing their duty;
      • Searchlight set no universal rule that Part III rights (the fundamental rights) yield.
    4. Blitz editor, 1954: The Court freed the Blitz editor, held on a Speaker’s warrant, because he was not produced before a magistrate within 24 hours.
    5. Sita Soren, 2024: Sita Soren v. Union of India held that bribery is not protected, overruling a 1998 grant of immunity to MPs who took bribes to vote.

    What do the petitioners argue?

    1. Function, not reputation: Privilege protects the House’s functioning, not a Chief Minister, a government or “the fame and reputation of the ruling party”.
    2. Liberty by resolution: Under Article 21, taking away liberty “by mere passing of a resolution” is “an anathema to the Constitution”. Any jailing must meet fairness and due process.
    3. Free press: Journalists cannot work “in an atmosphere of fear and terror”, since honest reporting is “the bedrock of parliamentary democracy”.

    Challenges

    1. No codified list: Privileges remain largely uncodified, so no one knows in advance what counts as a breach.
    2. Judge in its own cause: The House acts as complainant, judge and enforcer in a privilege case.
    3. Undefined contempt: “Contempt of the House” has no definition, so it can be turned against critics.

    Way Forward

    1. Privileges law: Parliament should enact a law defining privileges, breach and contempt.
    2. Harmonious reading: Rights should yield only as far as the House’s functioning requires.
    3. Review and time limits: Detention for breach should face prompt judicial review, and privilege motions a fixed deadline such as 60 days.

    Conclusion

    The Court must decide whether a legislature’s power to protect its work extends to punishing those who report on it. Whether the Bench confines privilege to the House’s functioning, or keeps the older rule that speech yields, will set how freely the press can cover legislatures.

    Back2Basics: Advisory jurisdiction (Article 143)

    1. Discretionary reference: Under Article 143(1), the President may refer a question of law or fact of public importance to the Supreme Court.
    2. Advisory, not binding: The Court may decline to answer, and its opinion does not bind the President. Eg. In re Kerala Education Bill (1958), the first reference.
    3. Bench strength: Article 145(3) requires at least five judges to hear a reference.

    Matching Previous Year Question

    “[2014, GS2, 12 marks] The ‘Powers, Privileges and Immunities of Parliament and its Members’ as envisaged in Article 105 of the Constitution leave room for a large number of un-codified and un-enumerated privileges to continue. Assess the reasons for the absence of legal codification of the ‘parliamentary privileges’. How can this problem be addressed?”

  • PAC pulls up Railways over gaps in amenities despite promises

    Why in the News

    The Public Accounts Committee (PAC) has recorded concern over persistent deficiencies in passenger amenities and sanitation across railway stations, after a Comptroller and Auditor General (CAG) audit found that bio toilets were deficient or non functional at 491 of the 512 stations inspected. The Committee was examining the CAG’s Report No. 31 of 2026 on passenger amenities and sanitation at stations. The finding is not new to the Committee. Four PAC reports on the same subject have been presented since 2007, each flagging key deficiencies, and the Ministry of Railways has continued to file action taken reports without producing significant improvement on the ground. The tension is therefore not about what is wrong at stations but about what an accountability mechanism can do when its findings are answered on paper and left unimplemented for close to two decades.

    What is the Public Accounts Committee?

    1. About: The Public Accounts Committee is a parliamentary financial committee that examines the accounts showing the appropriation of sums granted by Parliament and the audit reports of the Comptroller and Auditor General laid before the House.
    2. Composition and tenure: It has 22 members, 15 elected from the Lok Sabha and 7 from the Rajya Sabha, elected annually by proportional representation through the single transferable vote.
    3. Chairmanship: By convention followed since 1967, the Chairperson is drawn from the Opposition, which is what gives the Committee’s scrutiny of the executive its independent character.
    4. Follow up instrument: A ministry responds to the Committee’s recommendations through an action taken report, which is the formal record of what the executive says it has done.

    What did the audit find on station amenities?

    1. Bio toilets, presented as the fix, failed at scale: A facility the Indian Railways projected as a game changer was found deficient or non functional at the overwhelming majority of stations inspected.
    2. Water vending machines: Audit teams found deficiencies at 29 of 77 stations where these machines were checked.
    3. Wi-Fi facilities: Deficiencies were recorded at 65 of 380 stations checked.
    4. The assurance being tested: The audit measured these findings against what the Ministry had told the Parliamentary Standing Committee on Railways in the 2020 to 2021 year, that bio toilets, water vending machines and Wi-Fi facilities had been introduced.

    Why did the Committee call the Railways’ response inadequate?

    1. A record of repeated findings: Four Committee reports on passenger amenities and sanitation have been presented since 2007, each identifying key deficiencies.
    2. Findings acknowledged and not acted on: The Chairperson noted that the Railways ignored those findings while continuing to submit action taken reports.
    3. Scale is not an excuse: The Chairperson accepted the scale and complexity of managing the Indian Railways, and held that this should not hamper basic services for citizens.
    4. The deficiencies are elementary: The services named as carrying serious discrepancies are drinking water, seating arrangements, fans and roofing on platforms, none of which is a technically difficult provision.

    What has the Committee directed now?

    1. A backward looking review: The Ministry has been directed to review the Committee’s observations made since its 2007 report, rather than only the latest audit.
    2. A dated response: The Ministry must submit a response within a month, detailing the measures it will take to address the deficiencies.
    3. A follow up sitting: The Committee will call another meeting with Railway officials after that month to discuss the response.

    Challenges to the Public Accounts Committee

    1. Recommendations carry no enforcement: The Committee can record a finding, but no rule compels the executive to implement it, and the House does not vote on its recommendations. Eg. Four reports on the same subject since 2007 have each been answered without a corresponding change at stations.
      The Fix: Require the ministry concerned to lay a compliance statement against every recommendation, naming the responsible department and a date, so non implementation becomes a recorded decision.
    2. Scrutiny is entirely after the fact: The Committee examines accounts of money already appropriated and spent, so it cannot stop an outlay that is going wrong while it is going wrong. Eg. An audit report on amenities reaches the Committee years after the facilities it examines were installed.
      The Fix: Pair the post audit examination with a mid year review of the schemes flagged adversely in the previous year’s audit, before the next tranche is released.
    3. Policy is outside its remit: The Committee may ask whether money was spent as voted, not whether the policy behind the spending was sound. Eg. A finding that bio toilets are non functional does not allow the Committee to examine whether that technology should have been selected.
      The Fix: Refer the design question to the departmentally related standing committee at the same sitting, so the audit finding and the policy review proceed together.
    4. Annual reconstitution breaks continuity: Members are elected for a one year term, so an examination running across sessions is inherited by a differently composed Committee. Eg. An inquiry opened in one Committee’s year is concluded by members who did not hear the original evidence.
      The Fix: Carry an unfinished examination forward to the succeeding Committee with the same member acting as rapporteur on that subject.

    Conclusion

    The Committee has not discovered a new problem. It has recorded that an accountability loop has been running for close to two decades without closing: the audit finds, the Committee recommends, the Ministry responds, and the station stays as it was. The Chairperson’s direction converts that pattern into a dated test, a written response on measures within a month and a sitting with Railway officials after it. Whether that response names specific works against specific stations, or restates the assurances the audit has already found unfulfilled, is the thing to watch.

    Matching Previous Year Question

    “[2017, GS2, 10] Discuss the role of Public Accounts Committee in establishing accountability of the government to the people.”

  • PAC flags failure to transfer Rs 9,222 cr. in cess collections

    Why in the News

    The Public Accounts Committee (PAC) has flagged the failure to transfer Rs 9,222 crore of cess and levy collections to their designated reserve funds. Members questioned the Union Finance Ministry’s explanation on the issue. The committee reiterated its earlier recommendation that such collections be used only for the purposes for which they were raised. It had made that recommendation once already, in its 69th report tabled in August 2023, and the stated position of the chairperson is that ignoring the directions of a parliamentary standing committee amounts to an insult to Parliament. The tension is that a cess is justified to the taxpayer by an earmarked purpose. Its proceeds can still remain unmoved and available for ordinary expenditure.

    What is the Public Accounts Committee?

    1. A parliamentary financial committee: The PAC examines the appropriation accounts and the finance accounts of the Union government, along with the audit reports of the Comptroller and Auditor General (CAG).
    2. Its composition: It has 22 members, 15 elected by the Lok Sabha and 7 by the Rajya Sabha, each serving a one-year term. Ministers cannot be members.
    3. Chaired from the Opposition: By convention followed since 1967, the chairperson is drawn from the Opposition benches.
    4. It works after the money is spent: The committee scrutinises expenditure already incurred, so its function is post-facto accountability rather than approval of spending.

    What did the audit find?

    1. Collections that never reached their funds: An audit examination for 2024-25 found that money collected through various cesses and levies was not transferred to four designated reserve funds during the year.
    2. Where the finding is recorded: The finding forms part of Paragraph 3.3.1 of the CAG’s Report No. 6 of 2026.
    3. The explanation was not accepted: Members of the committee questioned the Finance Ministry’s account of why the transfers did not happen.

    What had the committee already recommended?

    1. Assess the amount and the duration: The 69th report called for scientific assessments of how much a cess should raise and for how long it should run.
    2. Review whether the purpose was served: It called for periodic reviews to evaluate whether the objectives a cess was raised for had actually been achieved.
    3. Credit the proceeds regularly: It called for regular crediting of cess proceeds to the reserve funds created to hold them.

    Why does the non-transfer matter?

    1. Purpose is the entire justification: The committee’s position is that cess collections must go to the purposes for which they were raised, and not toward financing the government’s budgetary deficit.
    2. The burden falls on everyone: A cess is collected from the whole population, whether or not a person pays income tax, and reaches the middle class and the poor alike.
    3. An unfunded fund is a fund in name only: A reserve fund that exists on paper but is never credited cannot finance the programme it was created for, so the earmarking becomes a description rather than a constraint.

    Conclusion

    A cess earns its political acceptance from a named purpose, and that acceptance is spent at the moment of collection whether or not the money ever reaches the fund. The committee can record the lapse and can repeat itself, but it cannot compel a transfer, which is why the same paragraph returns to it audit cycle after audit cycle. The current status is a recommendation standing reiterated and unimplemented for a third year. The next test is whether the Finance Ministry files an action taken note committing to a crediting timetable, rather than one restating the accounting position that produced the audit finding.

    Back2Basics: Cess

    1. What it is: A cess is a tax imposed on top of an existing tax, levied for a specific stated purpose rather than for general revenue.
    2. It stays outside the divisible pool: Article 270 keeps cesses and surcharges out of the pool of central taxes shared with the States, so a State receives no share of the collections.
    3. How the earmarking is meant to work: Proceeds are credited to the Consolidated Fund of India and are then to be transferred to a designated reserve fund from which the stated purpose is financed.
    4. Examples in force: The Health and Education Cess, the Road and Infrastructure Cess and the Goods and Services Tax Compensation Cess.

    Matching Previous Year Question

    “[2013] Consider the following statements : The Parliamentary Committe on Public Accounts 1. Consists of not more than 25 members of the Lok Sabha 2. Scrutinizes appropriation and finance accounts of the Government 3. examines the report of the Comptroller and Auditor General of India Which of the statements given above is/are correct? (a) 1 only (b) 2 and 3 only (c) 3 only (d) 1, 2 and 3 ANSWER: (b)”

  • Statistical Institute Bill referred to standing committee

    Why in the News

    The Lok Sabha Speaker has referred the Indian Statistical Institute Bill, 2026 to the Department-Related Standing Committee on Finance for examination. The Bill was introduced in the Lok Sabha during the Monsoon Session. It seeks to repeal the Indian Statistical Institute Act, 1959 and to incorporate the institute as a “body corporate” with a Board of Governors accountable to the Central government. The referral follows protests by the institute’s faculty and an Opposition demand that the Bill go to a standing committee. The tension is between a governance overhaul the government says the 1959 Act cannot deliver and a faculty that protested the Bill before it reached a committee.

    What does the Bill propose for the institute?

    1. Incorporation as a body corporate: The institute is to be incorporated to strengthen governance, promote academic excellence and research, and serve emerging needs in statistics and allied fields.
    2. The President as Visitor: The Bill makes the President the Visitor of the institute.
    3. A Board of Governors answerable to the Centre: The board is the principal policy executive body, headed by a chairperson drawn from academia, industry, education, public policy or statistical sciences. The Bill makes the board accountable to the Central government.
    4. An Academic Council under the director: The council is the principal academic body, headed by the institute’s director, with every full time professor and full time faculty member on it.
    5. A talent pipeline as the stated purpose: The Bill says the reform will build an ecosystem to train a new generation of high quality data scientists and statisticians and close the talent gap in India’s technology and financial sectors.

    Why does the government say the 1959 Act must go?

    1. The 1959 Act fixed status and one degree power: The Indian Statistical Institute Act, 1959 declared the institute an institution of national importance and let it grant degrees and diplomas in statistics.
    2. The 1995 amendment widened degrees, not governance: It added mathematics, quantitative economics, computer science and other subjects related to statistics as the institute determines from time to time.
    3. Five areas are called inadequate: The Bill says the Act has limited provisions on governance, administration, finance, accountability and functioning, and cannot respond to an evolving academic and research environment.
    4. Repeal rather than a second amendment: The government chose to repeal the 1959 Act and replace it with a comprehensive incorporation law.

    Challenges to the Indian Statistical Institute Bill, 2026

    1. A Centre accountable board reverses the founding design: The institute has run since 1932 as a registered society governed by its own council, and a statutory board answerable to the Central government moves the final say outside the institute. Eg. The Indian Institutes of Management (Amendment) Act, 2023 made the President the Visitor of the IIMs with power to appoint and remove directors, six years after the 2017 Act had handed those powers to their boards.
      The Fix: Write the board’s autonomy in academic and appointment matters into the Bill as a statutory guarantee, with the Centre’s role limited to audit and financial accountability.
    2. Statistical credibility rests on perceived independence: The institute’s faculty design methods used in national statistics, and executive control over its board invites doubt about the numbers at a time of live disputes over GDP methodology. Eg. In January 2019 two members of the National Statistical Commission, including its acting chairman, resigned after release of the Periodic Labour Force Survey for 2017-18 was withheld.
      The Fix: Fix the institute’s faculty and external statisticians as a majority on the board so the Centre’s nominees cannot outvote them.
    3. Faculty consent was not built into the process: The Bill reached introduction over faculty protest, and a governance law imposed on an academic community produces sustained non-cooperation. Eg. Delhi University’s Four Year Undergraduate Programme, introduced in 2013 without faculty consensus, was rolled back in 2014 on the University Grants Commission’s direction after sustained teacher opposition.
      The Fix: Have the standing committee take evidence from the faculty and the institute’s council before the Bill returns to the House.

    Conclusion

    The Bill’s stage is referral to the Department-Related Standing Committee on Finance after introduction in the Lok Sabha. The committee’s report is due within three months, and the Bill waits in the House until it comes. The committee’s treatment of the board’s accountability clause is what decides whether the faculty’s objection is answered or overridden.

    Back2Basics: Department-Related Standing Committees

    1. Origin: Parliament set up 17 Department-Related Standing Committees in 1993 and expanded them to 24 in 2004, each covering a set of ministries.
    2. Composition: Each has 31 members, 21 from the Lok Sabha and 10 from the Rajya Sabha, nominated by the Speaker and the Chairman, and a minister cannot be a member.
    3. Control: Sixteen committees, including Finance, work under the Lok Sabha Speaker and eight under the Rajya Sabha Chairman.
    4. Output: Their reports on Bills, demands for grants and policy are recommendatory, and the government tables an action taken report on them.

    “[2026] Consider the following statements about the Committee on the Welfare of Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes of the Parliament of India:

    1. Although members of this Committee are elected from both Houses of Parliament, the Chairperson of this Committee is appointed by the Chairman of the Rajya Sabha.

    2. Twenty members are elected by the Rajya Sabha and ten members by the Lok Sabha.

    3. No Minister, except for the Union Minister of Social Justice and Empowerment, is eligible to be a member of this Committee.

    4. Members are elected for a fixed term of two years from the date they enter their office.

    Which one of the following conclusions based on the above statements is correct?

    (a) There are four correct statements

    (b) There is only one correct statement, that is statement 2

    (c) There are two correct statements, that include statement 1

    (d) There is no correct statement

  • Delay in prorogation of Parliament leading to suspicion: Ramesh

    Why in the News

    The Monsoon Session of Parliament has not been prorogued 17 days after both Houses were adjourned sine die, so the session remains technically alive. The consequence is that the government can reconvene Parliament without issuing a fresh presidential summons, and speculation has followed about a Special Session to revive the Delimitation Bill. The Congress has formally objected, calling the delay mystifying and saying it suggests mischief. The tension is that a step treated as a formality decides who controls the timing of the next sitting, and that control currently rests entirely with the executive.

    What is prorogation?

    1. Definition: Prorogation formally terminates a session of Parliament, as distinct from an adjournment, which only ends a sitting.
    2. Who exercises it: It is done by the President, acting on the advice of the Council of Ministers, and a fresh session after it requires a fresh summons.
    3. Adjournment sine die is not the same thing: Adjournment sine die ends the sittings of a session without fixing a date to reassemble, and the presiding officer may still call the House back until prorogation is notified.
    4. Effect on business: Pending Bills do not lapse on prorogation. Pending notices, motions and questions before the House do lapse.

    What has actually happened with the Monsoon Session?

    1. The sittings ended in mid August: Both the Lok Sabha and the Rajya Sabha were adjourned sine die on 13 August, bringing the Monsoon Session to a close in practical terms.
    2. The session was never formally ended: Prorogation has not been notified 17 days after the last meeting of the House.
    3. The gap has a functional value: Keeping the session alive allows the government to reconvene Parliament without a fresh presidential summons.
    4. A specific legislative purpose is suspected: The delay has generated speculation about a Special Session to revive the Delimitation Bill.

    What is the Opposition objecting to?

    1. The objection is to the silence, not the delay alone: The Congress communications chief said the continued delay leads to suspicions that mischief is afoot.
    2. The numbers argument is being made publicly: The party’s position is that the Union Home Minister does not command the two thirds majority the legislation would need, and is engaging in bluff.
    3. The objection was raised at the highest level: The Congress president wrote to the Prime Minister restating the party’s position on delimitation and on the expansion of the Lok Sabha.

    What are the Congress’s linked demands?

    1. A freeze on Lok Sabha strength: The party has asked that the existing strength of the Lower House be frozen at 543 seats for the next 15 years.
    2. Implementation of women’s reservation: It has sought implementation of the legislation reserving a third of the seats for women Members of Parliament in time for the 2029 Lok Sabha election.

    Challenges in the exercise of the prorogation and summoning power

    1. The Constitution fixes no minimum number of sitting days: Article 85 requires only that six months not elapse between two sessions, which sets a floor on gaps and none on work. Eg. The Lok Sabha has in several recent years sat for fewer than 70 days against the roughly 130 days it averaged in the 1950s. Fix. Enact a fixed parliamentary calendar prescribing a minimum number of annual sitting days, as the National Commission to Review the Working of the Constitution recommended.
    2. Summoning is effectively an executive decision: The President acts on ministerial advice, so the government decides when the legislature that scrutinises it will meet. Eg. Legislatures in several States have met for single day sessions to satisfy the six month requirement. Fix. Give a fixed proportion of members the power to requisition a sitting, as several parliamentary systems provide.
    3. Long inter session gaps enable government by ordinance: Where the House is not in session, the executive can legislate through ordinances under Article 123 and seek approval later. Eg. Ordinances have been repromulgated across successive gaps, a practice the Supreme Court criticised in Krishna Kumar Singh vs State of Bihar (2017). Fix. Require an ordinance to be laid with a written statement of the immediate necessity that justified bypassing the House.
    4. Deferred prorogation leaves members in an undefined status: With the session alive but not sitting, notices and motions neither lapse nor come up for disposal. Eg. Questions and motions admitted for a session that is neither prorogued nor reconvened simply remain pending without a listing date. Fix. Provide by rule that prorogation follows adjournment sine die within a fixed number of days unless the House is recalled.

    Conclusion

    The dispute is not about whether the government may keep a session alive, since the power plainly permits it, but about whether a power designed as a formal closing step can be held open to preserve an option over legislation. What to watch is whether a Special Session is convened before prorogation is notified, since that would confirm the delay was a legislative strategy rather than an administrative lapse.

    Back2Basics

    1. Definition: Delimitation is the redrawing of the boundaries and the reallocation of the number of seats of Lok Sabha and State Assembly constituencies to reflect changes in population.
    2. Constitutional basis: Article 82 requires readjustment after every census, on principles Parliament determines by law.
    3. Machinery: A Delimitation Commission is constituted under a Delimitation Act, and its orders cannot be questioned in any court.
    4. The current freeze: The 84th Constitutional Amendment Act, 2001 froze the number of Lok Sabha seats allocated to each State on the 1971 census figures until the first census taken after 2026.

    Matching Previous Year Question

    “[2024] With reference to the Parliament of India, consider the following statements: 1. Prorogation of a House by the President of India does not require the advice of the Council of Ministers. 2. Prorogation of a House is generally done after the House is adjourned sine die, but there is no bar to the President of India proroguing the House which is in session. 3. Dissolution of the Lok Sabha is done by the President of India who, save in exceptional circumstances, does so on the advice of the Council of Ministers. Which of the statements given above is/are correct? (a) 1 only (b) 1 and 2 (c) 2 and 3* (d) 3 only ANSWER: (c)”

  • Cong: LS not prorogued, is Shah still pushing delimitation Bill?

    Why in the News

    The Congress general secretary in-charge of communications has questioned why the Lok Sabha has not been prorogued ten days after being adjourned sine die. He asked whether the Union Home Minister was still in search of a two-thirds majority to get the Constitutional Amendment Bill on delimitation passed in a special session. The reference is to a twin legislative package: a Constitutional Amendment Bill to advance women’s reservation to 2029, and a Delimitation Bill to increase the strength of the Lok Sabha to up to 850 seats. A House that has been adjourned sine die but not prorogued remains technically in session, which leaves the Presiding Officer able to reconvene it without a fresh summons from the President. A former Secretary General of the Lok Sabha has stated that no clear rule fixes when Parliament should be prorogued after a House is adjourned sine die.

    What is prorogation?

    1. The act itself: Prorogation is the formal termination of a session of a House of Parliament by the President. It ends the session, unlike adjournment, which only suspends a sitting.
    2. Who exercises it: The President prorogues the House on the advice of the Council of Ministers. The Prime Minister advises the President on summoning and proroguing Parliament and on dissolving the Lok Sabha.
    3. How it differs from adjournment sine die: Adjournment sine die is the termination of a sitting for an indefinite period, and it is done by the Presiding Officer of the House. The House remains in session until prorogation is notified.
    4. What it does to pending business: Prorogation ends all pending notices, including questions and motions, other than Bills, which do not lapse on prorogation. Bills lapse only on dissolution of the Lok Sabha, subject to the exceptions the Constitution provides.

    Why does the ten day gap matter?

    1. The normal interval: The time gap between the adjournment of the Lok Sabha sine die and its prorogation is generally two to four days. There are many instances when adjournment and prorogation have taken place on the very same day.
    2. The interval in this case: Ten days have passed since the House was adjourned sine die. No information on its prorogation has been made available.
    3. The longer precedents cited: The gap for the Monsoon Session was 28 days in 2015 and 20 days in 2021. The Congress position is that no comparable legislative move was pending on either occasion.
    4. What an unprorogued House permits: A House still in session can be reconvened by the Presiding Officer without the President issuing a fresh summons. The procedural cost of resuming business is therefore lower than convening a special session from scratch.
    5. The political inference drawn: The Congress reading is that the delay preserves the option of resuming the same session once the numbers for a Constitutional Amendment are assembled. The Union Minister of Parliamentary Affairs did not respond to a request for comment.

    What is the twin legislative package at issue?

    1. The Constitutional Amendment Bill: It seeks to advance the implementation of women’s reservation to 2029. The 106th Constitutional Amendment of 2023 provides 33 per cent reservation for women in the Lok Sabha and State Assemblies, and ties implementation to the next Census and a fresh delimitation.
    2. The Delimitation Bill: It seeks to increase the strength of the Lok Sabha to up to 850 seats. A delimitation exercise would be required to give effect to that expansion.
    3. What delimitation is: Delimitation is the act of fixing the limits or boundaries of territorial constituencies to reflect population changes. Article 82 mandates Parliament to enact a Delimitation Act after every Census.
    4. The freeze the package would end: The 42nd Amendment of 1976 froze seat allocation on the 1971 Census until 2000, and the 84th Amendment of 2001 extended that freeze until the first Census after 2026. The proposed expansion is the first readjustment of Lok Sabha strength since that freeze was imposed.
    5. Why the majority threshold governs the timing: A Constitutional Amendment Bill requires a special majority, which includes a majority of the total membership of each House and two-thirds of members present and voting. The Bill cannot be moved to a vote until that support exists.

    Is there a rule the delay breaches?

    1. No fixed interval is prescribed: No clear rule states when Parliament should be prorogued after a House is adjourned sine die, in the assessment of a former Secretary General of the Lok Sabha. Prorogation is described as a routine practice rather than a timed obligation.
    2. The constitutional source of the power: Article 85(2)(a) empowers the President to prorogue the Houses from time to time. Article 85(2)(b) separately empowers the President to dissolve the Lok Sabha.
    3. The only hard timing rule: Article 85(1) requires that six months shall not intervene between the last sitting of one session and the first sitting of the next. That is the outer limit on the gap between sessions, not on the gap before prorogation.
    4. Where the discretion actually sits: The President acts on the advice of the Council of Ministers in exercising the power. The executive therefore controls both the summoning and the closing of a session.

    Challenges to prorogation as a procedural check

    1. The timing is entirely executive-controlled: No statute or rule of procedure obliges the government to advise prorogation within a stated period. Eg. The interval has ranged from the same day to 28 days for the Monsoon Session of 2015. Fix. Prescribe an outer limit in the Rules of Procedure requiring prorogation within a fixed number of days of adjournment sine die.
    2. Parliament cannot summon itself: Members have no mechanism to require a sitting where the executive does not advise one. Eg. The Article 85(1) six month rule is the only enforceable constraint, and it permits long stretches with no sitting. Fix. Adopt a statutory parliamentary calendar fixing the number of sitting days per year, as the National Commission to Review the Working of the Constitution recommended in 2002 at 110 days.
    3. The special session route bypasses the ordinary calendar: A session convened outside the three-session cycle compresses notice, scrutiny and committee referral. Eg. The Women’s Reservation Bill in 2023 was introduced and passed within a special session convened for the purpose. Fix. Require that any Bill taken up in a special session first stand referred to a Departmentally Related Standing Committee.
    4. Prorogation ends scrutiny instruments without ending the government’s agenda: Questions and motions lapse on prorogation and Bills survive it, so the balance of the reset favours the executive. Eg. A pending starred question falls away while the Bill it concerned remains on the books. Fix. Carry over admitted questions and motions to the succeeding session on the model used for Bills.
    5. The ordinance route substitutes for a sitting House: A prorogued House allows the executive to legislate by ordinance under Article 123. Eg. Ordinances have been repromulgated across successive gaps between sessions rather than replaced by legislation. Fix. Enforce the bar on repromulgation laid down in Krishna Kumar Singh v. State of Bihar (2017) by requiring a laid statement of reasons for every ordinance.

    Conclusion

    The Lok Sabha stands adjourned sine die and not yet prorogued ten days on, which keeps the session formally alive and the option of reconvening it open. No rule fixes the permissible interval, so the delay is unusual rather than irregular, and the objection raised is about intent rather than legality. The twin legislative package at issue, the Constitutional Amendment on women’s reservation and the Delimitation Bill that accompanies it, remains untabled for a vote. The next milestone is the notification of prorogation or the summoning of a session in which the Constitutional Amendment Bill is moved.

    “[2024] With reference to the Parliament of India, consider the following statements:

    1. Prorogation of a House by the President of India does not require the advice of the Council of Ministers.

    2. Prorogation of a House is generally done after the House is adjourned sine die, but there is no bar to the President of India proroguing the House which is in session.

    3. Dissolution of the Lok Sabha is done by the President of India who, save in exceptional circumstances, does so on the advice of the Council of Ministers.

    Which of the statements given above is/are correct?

    (a) 1 only

    (b) 1 and 2

    (c) 2 and 3

    (d) 3 only

  • Modi-ism must evolve into institution-centred nation-building

    Modi-ism must evolve into institution-centred nation-building

    Why in the News

    The political and governing order built around the Prime Minister, given the name Modi-ism, is being tested against the constitutional settlement rather than only against its delivery record. The 2024 verdict returned the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) with 240 seats and made coalition partners necessary, which qualified a leader centred mandate without rejecting it.

    What is the governing order named Modi-ism?

    1. About: Modi-ism is the name given to the political and governing order built around the Prime Minister. It is a method of acquiring power, exercising authority and defining the nation.
    2. Named features: The order is built on eight elements: a commanding leader, a disciplined party organisation, civilisational assertion, centralised decision-making, technology-driven welfare, infrastructure-led development, high-energy national security and direct communication with citizens.
    3. Central promise: The promise is a strong leader, a purposeful state and a stronger India.

    What has the order actually delivered?

    1. Political transformation: The BJP moved from being a major national formation to the central axis of Indian politics. It expanded beyond its traditional geographical and social constituencies and made leadership itself the principal electoral proposition.
    2. The 2024 qualification: The BJP fell to 240 seats in 2024 and required its National Democratic Alliance (NDA) partners to form the government. The verdict chose continuity and restored the relevance of consultation, coalition and restraint.
    3. Delivery at scale: Infrastructure construction, digital public platforms, direct benefit transfers, financial inclusion, sanitation, housing, electrification and welfare delivery at scale strengthened the state’s capacity to reach citizens.
    4. Poverty measurement: NITI Aayog estimated multidimensional poverty at 11.28 per cent in 2022-23, against 29.17 per cent in 2013-14. The methodology is contested, the improvement in delivery is not.
    5. Political containment: The order contained the undue proliferation of regional politics to some degree.
    6. Source of appeal: The order speaks in the language of aspiration, national confidence and civilisational recovery. Citizens long frustrated by delay, indecision and fragmented authority respond to a government promising speed and scale.

    Why is effectiveness not a sufficient test of democratic government?

    1. The five charges: Critics allege that the order seeks to weaken pluralism, dilute socialism, replace rights with governmental charity, capture institutions and ultimately alter the Constitution.
    2. The counter position: Supporters dismiss these charges as partisan hostility or as resistance to India’s cultural resurgence. Both positions are too absolute, since constitutional character must be judged through the actual exercise of power rather than through slogans.
    3. Evidence against dismantling: Elections remain fiercely competitive, governments change in the States, Opposition parties govern substantial parts of the country, and courts continue to examine executive action and enforce fundamental rights.
    4. The Preamble ruling: In November 2024 the Supreme Court rejected petitions challenging the inclusion of the words socialist and secular in the Preamble.
    5. The real risk: A Constitution can be weakened without its words being formally deleted. Institutions may remain intact on paper as their independence, credibility and conventions erode.
    6. What sustains democracy: Democracy rests on five supports beyond periodic elections: restraints on power, respect for dissent, parliamentary accountability, federal balance and equal citizenship.

    What do the pluralism and socialism debates actually turn on?

    1. Pluralism: Religious freedom has not been legally abolished. Majoritarian mobilisation and inflammatory language make minorities feel conditionally accepted.
    2. The distinction drawn: Cultural nationalism is constitutionally legitimate. Cultural supremacy is not.
    3. Equal citizenship: The republic belongs without qualification to every citizen. Equal citizenship cannot depend on religion, political loyalty or conformity with a preferred account of national identity.
    4. What socialism does not mean: Constitutional socialism does not demand a return to the licence-permit raj, hostility to private enterprise or indiscriminate state ownership.
    5. What socialism does mean: It requires social and economic justice, equality of opportunity and protection against degrading deprivation.

    Why must welfare reach a citizen as a right rather than as a gift?

    1. The presentation problem: Statutory entitlements are politically presented as personal gifts from a leader. Food support, employment guarantees, housing, scholarships and social security are public obligations financed by citizens and delivered under law.
    2. The ordering principle: Rights-based governance must complement beneficiary politics rather than be displaced by it. A citizen must remain a rights-holder rather than a grateful beneficiary.
    3. What technology fixes: Technology reduces leakage and accelerates delivery.
    4. What technology creates: Citizens excluded by failed authentication, inaccurate databases or administrative discretion need accessible remedies.
    5. The four safeguards: Welfare requires enforceable standards, grievance redress, social audits and legislative scrutiny.

    What does the record on Parliament and appointments show?

    1. Speed of legislation: During the seventeenth Lok Sabha, 58 per cent of bills were passed within two weeks of introduction.
    2. Committee referral: Only 16 per cent of bills were referred to parliamentary committees.
    3. Budget scrutiny: Around 80 per cent of the Union Budget was voted without discussion between 2019 and 2023.
    4. Political funding: The Supreme Court decision striking down the electoral bond scheme established that secrecy in political funding had crossed a constitutional boundary.
    5. Election commissioner appointments: The law governing the appointment of election commissioners gives the executive a majority on the selection committee, which has raised concerns about perceived independence.
    6. The test for autonomy: Institutional autonomy depends on more than technical legality. It requires transparent appointments, procedural fairness and visible distance from partisan command, so independence is protected in public perception as well as in fact.

    What corrections would a shift to institution-centred nation-building require?

    1. Parliament: Parliament must recover serious deliberation, committee scrutiny and control over public expenditure.
    2. Federalism: Federal consultation must precede major decisions affecting the States.
    3. Appointments and agencies: Appointments to constitutional and regulatory bodies should command cross-party credibility. Investigative agencies must be demonstrably even-handed.
    4. Welfare and discourse: Welfare delivery must be joined to enforceable rights, and political discourse must replace habitual polarisation with constitutional fraternity.
    5. The next development phase: The eight stated goals are productive employment, competitive manufacturing, stronger small enterprises, higher farm incomes, quality public education, accessible healthcare, liveable cities and climate resilience.
    6. Party institutionalisation: No durable national party can remain indefinitely dependent on one personality. It needs empowered ministers, credible regional leaders, internal debate and an orderly culture of succession.

    Challenges to Institution-Centred Nation-Building

    1. Executive control of the legislative calendar: A ruling coalition can clear the chamber of dissent before a contested bill is taken up. Eg. In December 2023, 146 members were suspended across both Houses, the largest mass suspension since Independence, and the Telecommunications Bill, 2023 was passed with the near entire opposition absent.
    2. A vacant Deputy Speaker’s chair: Article 93 mandates the election of a Deputy Speaker, and the post has been left unfilled for years. Eg. The post lay vacant through the entire seventeenth Lok Sabha and into the eighteenth, so a member from the Speaker’s own panel of chairpersons presided over the no-confidence motion against the Speaker in March 2026.
    3. Discretionary gatekeeping on removal motions: Section 3 of the Judges (Inquiry) Act, 1968 uses the word may, so the presiding officer may refuse a removal motion even when the numerical threshold is met. Eg. In April 2026 a notice signed by 193 opposition members seeking removal of the Chief Election Commissioner was refused admission in both Houses without stated reasons.
    4. The Money Bill route: Certifying a bill as a Money Bill removes the Rajya Sabha’s power to amend it and places the certification beyond ordinary challenge. Eg. The Aadhaar (Targeted Delivery of Financial and Other Subsidies, Benefits and Services) Act, 2016 was passed as a Money Bill, and the correctness of that certification remains before a larger bench of the Supreme Court.
    5. Bypassed pre-legislative consultation: Draft legislation is often introduced without the public comment period the executive’s own policy prescribes. Eg. The Pre-Legislative Consultation Policy of 2014 requires draft bills to be placed in the public domain for thirty days, and this step is routinely skipped.
    6. Federal consultation deficit: Consultative federal forums exist on paper and meet rarely. Eg. The Inter-State Council, constituted under Article 263, met only once between 2016 and 2024.

    Conclusion

    Effectiveness alone cannot settle the constitutional character of a government, and a Constitution can be hollowed out without a word of its text being altered. The productive core of the order, decisive leadership, infrastructure, digital innovation, credible defence capability and measurable delivery, should continue. What must change is the shift from leader-centred mobilisation to institution-centred nation-building, carried by parliamentary deliberation, federal consultation, cross-party credibility in appointments and welfare delivered as enforceable right. The choice is between an order disciplined by the Constitution and one that seeks to rise above it.

  • An institution in freefall: Parliament is all dressed up with nowhere to go

    Why in the News

    The recently concluded session of Parliament ended in sustained disruption rather than debate, with sitting time, public money and scrutiny all lost. The deadlock has exposed a single conflict: disruption is now the Opposition’s only means of being heard, and it is also what is emptying the institution of purpose.

    Which parliamentary instruments does disruption trade away, and what replaces them?

    1. Question Hour: The first hour of a sitting is set aside for members to question ministers on the working of their departments. Supplementary questions asked on the floor are the point of pressure, since the minister cannot prepare for them in advance.
    2. Zero Hour: The period immediately after Question Hour allows a member to raise a constituency or local matter without prior notice. It is an Indian innovation and finds no mention in the Rules of Procedure and Conduct of Business in Lok Sabha.
    3. Rule 377: Rule 377 lets a member place on record a matter of public importance that no other procedural device covers. The member reads a short submission, no discussion follows, and the concerned ministry responds separately.
    4. Debate on a bill: Members place their views on a bill on record before the House votes on it. A bill passed amid noise goes through without that record ever being created.
    5. Calling attention motion: Under Rule 197 a member draws a minister’s attention to a matter of urgent public importance, and the minister must make a statement in reply. It is a one member device and needs no supporting members.
    6. Adjournment motion: Under Rule 56 a member seeks to set aside the entire day’s listed business to discuss a definite matter of urgent public importance. Fifty members must rise when the Chair reads the notice, and the motion ends in a vote.
    7. Short duration discussion: Under Rule 193 a member with two supporters seeks a discussion on an urgent matter of public importance, running to no more than two and a half hours. It concludes without a vote.
    8. No confidence motion: Under Rule 198 a member of the Lok Sabha moves against the entire Council of Ministers, and fifty members must rise for leave to be granted. It states no reasons and is decided by a simple majority of members present and voting.
    9. Rule 373 and Rule 374: Under Rule 373 the Speaker directs a grossly disorderly member to withdraw for the remainder of the day’s sitting. Under Rule 374 the Speaker names a member who persistently obstructs business, and the House then votes on suspension.
    10. Rule 374A: Inserted in 2001, it suspends a member automatically for five consecutive sittings or the remainder of the session, whichever is less, for entering the well or persisting in disorder after a warning. No motion is moved and no vote is taken.

    Why has the working relationship between government and Opposition broken down?

    1. Courtesy across the benches: Atal Bihari Vajpayee recounted the courtesy shown to him by the first Prime Minister, Jawaharlal Nehru, when he sat as a young Opposition backbencher. That civility operated independently of political disagreement.
    2. Care extended to a political rival: Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi arranged for the same Opposition member to receive medical treatment in the United States.
    3. An Opposition member sent to represent India: Prime Minister P V Narasimha Rao despatched that Opposition member to Geneva to represent India at a critical United Nations (UN) summit on Kashmir.
    4. Mutual demonisation: Each side now claims sole possession of virtue and writes the other off as beyond redemption. Dissent is branded anti national by the ruling side.
    5. The Opposition’s self image: The Opposition presents itself as an outnumbered force fighting a ruthless and better resourced establishment, using the Mahabharata’s image of the Pandavas ranged against the Kauravas.
    6. The presumption of good faith: Democratic functioning rests on the belief that a rival cares about national welfare even where it disagrees profoundly on method. Treating adversaries as existential enemies removes the common ground that governance requires.

    Is disruption the Opposition’s last instrument of accountability or the thing destroying Parliament?

    1. Disruption as the only remaining lever: An Opposition refused a hearing on the issues it names has no procedural route left, so it withholds the House’s ability to function at all. The tactic is defended as the enforcement of executive accountability.
    2. The same tactic as the injury: Every sitting lost to organised shouting removes the scrutiny the Opposition claims to be defending. The instrument and the damage are the same act.
    3. The case argued from the Opposition benches: The charge that disruption is hollowing out Parliament is pressed by a fourth term Opposition member of the Lok Sabha, not from the treasury benches. It places the Opposition’s own tactic under scrutiny by someone who depends on it.
    4. Reciprocal hypocrisy: Leaders who championed parliamentary obstruction as a vital accountability tool in Opposition treated it as an unpardonable sin once in office. The Opposition, having suffered those tactics for years, rejects the argument now made against them.
    5. The operating code: The reciprocity of the traditional golden rule has been replaced by a rule of retaliation, doing to the other side what was done to one’s own.
    6. A collective failure: The breakdown of democratic trust cannot be assigned to one side. Both have used the same instrument and both have condemned it from the opposite bench.

    Why does poor parliamentary performance carry no electoral cost?

    1. Re-election turns on other things: Members are elected and re-elected for reasons that have almost nothing to do with their performance in the House. Voters judge them on constituency services rendered and on raw local political strength.
    2. Debating skill has no electoral value: The ability to press a minister during Question Hour or to take apart a flawed bill does not convert into votes. That removes any incentive to acquire the skill.
    3. Talent has moved to the studio: The debating ability that would once have been displayed on the floor of the House is now displayed in television studios. The audience that rewards it is not in the chamber.
    4. Party whips direct the disruption: Members are corralled into the well of the House to disrupt proceedings through organised shouting rather than reasoned debate. The instruction comes from the party, not from the individual member.
    5. Parties reward aggression over excellence: By issuing that instruction, party leaderships signal that partisan aggression is valued far above parliamentary skill. The signal then shapes who rises within the party.

    What is lost when the politics of the street occupies the space of parliamentary politics?

    1. Two distinct political skills: Parties once valued mass mobilisation, the politics of the street, and debating prowess, the politics of Parliament, as separate competences. Leaders were assessed on both.
    2. One has displaced the other: The politics of the street has moved inside the chamber, leaving the politics of Parliament with no place to operate.
    3. Consequence for national consensus: Democratic discourse is impoverished and agreement across parties on any question of national progress becomes unattainable.
    4. Committees still function: Substantive work continues in parliamentary committees, which meet away from the media glare and without cameras. The absence of cameras removes the premium that disruptive grandstanding otherwise carries.
    5. What the public actually sees: The visible record is disruption, the absence of dialogue and a complete breakdown in communication. Disillusionment with the functioning of Parliament is rife across the country.

    How has the executive reduced Parliament’s place in the constitutional scheme?

    1. Contempt for the legislature: The government prefers to ride roughshod over the Opposition rather than engage it, and treats accommodation of even some of its demands as unnecessary.
    2. Attendance of the head of government: The first Prime Minister attended Parliament daily and treated it as the beating heart of Indian democracy. The current Prime Minister is rarely present in the House.
    3. From consultative chamber to noticeboard: Parliament’s function has shifted from deliberation to the announcement of decisions the executive has already taken.
    4. From scrutiny to legalisation: The House is used to give legal form to those decisions rather than to test them. That converts the vote into a formality.
    5. Custodians permitting the hollowing out: The institution is being emptied of purpose by the very people responsible for protecting it. The end point is a public that no longer misses it once it is rendered meaningless.

    Do other parliamentary democracies show that guaranteed Opposition time is workable?

    1. The comparative reference is general: The proposal of dedicated Opposition time is described only as successfully used elsewhere, with no country named and no design detail supplied. The comparative case therefore rests on the standing practice of other Westminster legislatures.
    2. United Kingdom, Opposition Days: Standing Order No. 14 of the House of Commons reserves twenty days in each session for Opposition business. Seventeen are at the disposal of the Leader of the Opposition and three at the disposal of the second largest Opposition party.
    3. Canada, allotted days: The House of Commons sets aside a fixed number of allotted days in each supply period on which an Opposition party chooses the subject of debate. A motion moved on such a day may be made votable.
    4. Australia, Matter of Public Importance: The House of Representatives sets aside time on sitting days for a Matter of Public Importance proposed in writing to the Speaker. The discussion is time limited and ends without a vote.
    5. The common design feature: In each case the time is fixed by standing order rather than negotiated session by session. The Opposition’s access does not depend on the government’s willingness in a given week.

    What would restore the balance between contestation and cooperation?

    1. Conviction during elections, cooperation after: Democratic functioning requires fierce ideological conviction at the time of an election and active cooperation once the ballots are cast.
    2. National interest above partisan rivalry: Where both sides concur that national interests outrank party rivalries, governance shifts from zero sum obstructionism to constructive collaboration.
    3. Not an abandonment of ideology: The approach requires no party to give up its ideology or its principles. Parties offer different routes to the same destination of national welfare, safety and prosperity.
    4. A fixed slot for the Opposition: Granting the Opposition one day a week, or two hours a day, to raise any issue it deems essential would let the rest of Parliament’s business proceed undisturbed.
    5. The missing ingredient is willingness: The compromise needs no constitutional amendment and no new institution. It needs a government prepared to imagine and concede the time.

    Conclusion

    Parliament’s decline is a failure of the presumption of good faith between government and Opposition, not a failure of procedure, and disruption has become both the Opposition’s only instrument and the agent of the institution’s hollowing out. The remedy identified is small and does not require a constitutional change. It requires guaranteed time in which the Opposition can be heard, and a government willing to concede it. Without that concession the House will continue to meet, pass bills and adjourn, and the deliberative function that gives it authority will not survive.

    Matching Previous Year Question

    “[2017] The Parliament of India exercises control over the functions of the Council of Ministers through 1. Adjournment motion 2. Question hour 3. Supplementary questions Select the correct answer using the code given below: (a) 1 only (b) 2 and 3 only (c) 1 and 3 only (d) 1, 2 and 3 Answer: (d)”

    “[2020] Consider the following statements: 1. The President of India can summon a session of the Parliament at such place as he/she thinks fit. 2. The Constitution of India provides for three sessions of the Parliament in a year, but it is not mandatory to conduct all three sessions. 3. There is no minimum number of days of that the Parliament is required to meet in a year. Which of the statements given above is/are correct? (a) 1 only (b) 2 only (c) 1 and 3 only (d) 2 and 3 only Answer: (c)”

    “[2014] Consider the following statements regarding a No-Confidence Motion in India: 1. There is no mention of a No-Confidence Motion in the Constitution of India. 2. A motion of No-Confidence can be introduced in the Lok Sabha only. Which of the statements given above is/are correct? (a) 1 only (b) 2 only (c) Both 1 and 2 (d) Neither 1 nor 2 Answer: (c)”

    “[2021, GS2, 10 marks] To what extent, in your view, the Parliament is able to ensure accountability of the executive in India?”

    “[2019, GS2, 15 marks] Individual Parliamentarian’s role as the national lawmaker is on a decline, which in turn, has adversely impacted the quality of debates and their outcome. Discuss.”

    “[2024, GS2, 10 marks] “The growth of cabinet system has practically resulted in the marginalisation of the parliamentary supremacy.” Elucidate.”

    “[2013, GS2, 10 marks] The role of individual MPs (Members of Parliament) has diminished over the years and as a result healthy constructive debates on policy issues are not usually witnessed. How far can this be attributed to the anti-defection law, which was legislated but with a different intention?”

  • Monsoon session passes Bills with minimal deliberation as legislative scrutiny weakens

    Why in the news?

    The monsoon session that began on 20 July passed nine of its eleven Bills with only the minister in charge speaking, and recorded a productivity rate of 15 per cent. Legislation that redraws Centre State powers over minerals therefore cleared Parliament without the examination the House exists to provide. Two further proposals, on delimitation and on foreign contributions, were stalled rather than scrutinised, and both remain alive.

    What is the Pre-Legislative Consultation Policy, 2014?

    1. About: It is a policy of the Department of Legal Affairs requiring every department to place a draft Bill in the public domain before it is introduced in Parliament.
    2. What must be disclosed: The draft, an explanatory note in simple language, the financial implications, and an estimate of the impact on the environment, fundamental rights and livelihoods.
    3. Consultation period: A minimum of thirty days is to be given for public feedback, and a summary of the responses received is to be published.
    4. Link to the House: The summary of feedback is to be placed before the departmentally related standing committee that examines the Bill.
    5. Status: The policy is executive and not statutory, so it carries no enforcement mechanism and departments comply selectively.

    What is a Joint Parliamentary Committee?

    1. About: It is an ad hoc committee constituted by a motion adopted in one House and concurred in by the other, carrying members from both Houses.
    2. Function: It examines a specific Bill or subject, takes evidence from officials, experts and the public, and reports its recommendations to Parliament.
    3. Composition: Membership is proportional to party strength, which gives the ruling party a majority within the committee.
    4. Binding force: Its recommendations are advisory, and the government may accept or reject them when the Bill returns to the House.

    What is delimitation?

    1. About: It is the redrawing of the boundaries and the allocation of parliamentary and Assembly constituencies to reflect population change.
    2. Machinery: A Delimitation Commission constituted under a law made by Parliament carries it out, and its orders cannot be called in question in any court.
    3. The freeze: The 42nd Amendment froze seat allocation on the 1971 Census, and the 84th Amendment, 2001 extended that freeze until the first Census taken after 2026.
    4. Why it is contested: States that reduced fertility fastest stand to lose relative weight in the Lok Sabha once the freeze lapses, which makes the design of the exercise a federal question.

    What is the Foreign Contribution (Regulation) Act, 2010?

    1. About: It regulates the acceptance and use of foreign contributions and foreign hospitality by persons, associations and companies in India.
    2. Mechanism: It requires registration or prior permission from the Ministry of Home Affairs, and after the 2020 amendment every contribution must first be received in a designated State Bank of India, New Delhi account.
    3. Restrictions: The 2020 amendment barred the transfer of foreign contributions to any other person and capped administrative expenses at 20 per cent.
    4. Why it recurs: Cancellations and refusals of renewal have repeatedly been challenged as a control on civil society rather than a check on funding.

    How is parliamentary productivity measured?

    1. About: It is the ratio of the time a House actually transacts its listed business to the time for which it was scheduled to sit.
    2. What lowers it: Adjournments caused by disruption, sittings cut short, and business dropped without being taken up.
    3. What it does not capture: A Bill passed in minutes without discussion raises legislative output while reducing scrutiny, so productivity and deliberation can move in opposite directions.

    What did the monsoon session pass and what did it leave pending?

    1. Session dates: The session began on 20 July.
    2. Volume and debate: Nine of the eleven Bills passed had only the minister concerned speaking on them.
    3. Productivity: The session recorded a productivity rate of 15 per cent.
    4. National song Bill: A Bill was passed facilitating the operation of a February guideline of the Ministry of Home Affairs on mandatory singing of the full version of Vande Mataram, the national song, at state functions.
    5. Mines and minerals: The Mines and Minerals (Development and Regulation) Amendment Bill was passed amid Opposition protests.
    6. Examinations: The session legislated stronger measures against malpractices in examinations, in an effort to address student anger.
    7. Delimitation: An attempt to rush through a new architecture for the delimitation process did not entirely materialise.
    8. Foreign contributions: The Bill to amend the law on foreign contributions was not passed and stands referred to a Joint Parliamentary Committee.
    9. Both alive: Neither the delimitation proposal nor the foreign contribution amendments have lapsed, and both can be brought back.

    Why did the session’s political context override its legislative function?

    1. The trigger: The student protest demanding the resignation of the Union Education Minister gathered momentum just as the session began.
    2. The governing party’s expectation: The ruling party entered the session with the context and the confidence to make it a theatre of triumph, powered by its victory in the West Bengal Assembly election.
    3. What reversed it: Public reaction to the crackdown on the protesting students by the Delhi Police, with police personnel filmed assaulting and attempting to sexually abuse young people.
    4. Accountability gap: No accountability has yet been fixed for those blatant violations of the law by police personnel.
    5. Absent leadership: The Prime Minister and the Union Home Minister barely attended the proceedings.
    6. The one resolution: The Union Education Minister eventually resigned during the session.

    What does hurried lawmaking do to federalism?

    1. The specific Bill: The mineral law amendment was passed without addressing its potential to undermine federalism.
    2. Whose rights were skipped: The concerns of those living on resource rich land were not examined during its passage.
    3. The pattern: Hurried lawmaking has accompanied a continuing expansion of the powers of the central government at the cost of States and local communities.
    4. Why deliberation matters here: A Bill that redistributes power between the Union and the States requires the States to be heard, which only committee examination provides.
    5. The missing step: No all party meeting and no consultation with State Chief Ministers preceded either this Bill or the delimitation proposal.

    Why does a single minister speaking on a Bill amount to a scrutiny failure?

    1. What passage then means: The House records its assent without testing the Bill against any competing view or amendment.
    2. Whose loss it is: The electorate is deprived of its representatives’ scrutiny, which is the service a legislature exists to deliver.
    3. Disruption as an alibi: Disruption is routinely blamed, but a 15 per cent productivity rate points to a structural failure rather than an episodic one.
    4. Committee substitution: Referral to a committee is the standard remedy for a truncated floor debate, and it was used for only one of these Bills.
    5. Consequence for the statute: A Bill passed without debate leaves no legislative record from which courts can read its purpose when it is later challenged.

    Is a stalled Bill a win for parliamentary scrutiny?

    1. The case for the Opposition: It prevented passage of the delimitation architecture and the foreign contribution amendments without examination.
    2. The case against triumph: Blocking a Bill is not the same as examining it, and both proposals remain alive for reintroduction on the same terms.
    3. The committee risk: The Joint Parliamentary Committee on the foreign contribution Bill can be reduced to a mere numbers game in which the majority records its own view.
    4. The reversibility point: Political circumstances turn rapidly, as the governing party discovered within this very session.
    5. What is actually needed: An all party meeting, circulation of draft legislation and consultation with State Chief Ministers, none of which a stalling tactic delivers.
    6. The framing error: Treating the House as a gladiatorial arena where one side vanquishes the other removes the possibility of a collective solution.

    What would genuine consultation on these two proposals look like?

    1. All party meeting: The Centre convening a meeting of all parties before introducing the delimitation architecture.
    2. Draft in the public domain: Circulation of the draft legislation so that affected parties can respond before introduction rather than after passage.
    3. Consulting the States: Consultation with State Chief Ministers, since delimitation redistributes representation between States.
    4. Substance in committee: The Joint Parliamentary Committee on the foreign contribution Bill taking evidence from affected organisations rather than voting on party lines.
    5. Transparency of feedback: Publication of the responses received and the reasons for accepting or rejecting each substantive objection.

    Challenges to Parliamentary Scrutiny of Legislation

    1. Falling committee referrals: The share of Bills sent to departmentally related standing committees has collapsed, e.g. about 16 per cent of Bills were referred in the 16th Lok Sabha against 71 per cent in the 15th.
    2. Passage without debate: Bills clear the House in minutes when it is in disorder, e.g. nine of the eleven Bills of this monsoon session were passed with only the minister in charge speaking.
    3. The Money Bill route: Certifying a Bill as a Money Bill removes the Rajya Sabha’s power to amend it, e.g. the Aadhaar Act, 2016, whose certification was referred to a larger Bench in Rojer Mathew v. South Indian Bank (2019).
    4. Ordinance dependence: The executive legislates between sessions and seeks ratification later, e.g. the Supreme Court in Krishna Kumar Singh v. State of Bihar (2017) held that repeated re promulgation of ordinances is a fraud on the Constitution.
    5. Shrinking sitting days: The House now sits far fewer days than in its early decades, e.g. average annual sittings have fallen from over 120 days in the 1950s to around 60 days in recent years.
    6. Anti defection chill: The Tenth Schedule ties a member’s vote to the party whip, which removes the incentive to argue a case on the floor, e.g. a member voting against a party direction on a Bill faces disqualification.
    7. No review after enactment: No standing mechanism examines whether an enacted law achieved its stated purpose, e.g. the Pre-Legislative Consultation Policy, 2014 carries no compliance audit and is bypassed routinely.

    Conclusion

    A session that passed nine of eleven Bills with a single speaker each and closed at 15 per cent productivity did not fail merely because of disruption; it failed because passage was decoupled from examination. Blocking two proposals gave the Opposition a tactical result without restoring scrutiny, since both remain available for reintroduction unchanged. What must change is procedure rather than temper: mandatory committee referral, circulation of draft legislation, and consultation with the States before any Bill that alters their powers is introduced.

    What is Executive Accountability to the Legislature?

    1. About: It is the principle that the council of ministers holds office only while it retains the confidence of the popularly elected House and must answer to it for every executive act.
    2. Rationale: In a parliamentary system the executive is drawn from the legislature, so scrutiny by the House is the only continuous check between two elections.
    3. Collective responsibility: Article 75(3) makes the council of ministers collectively responsible to the Lok Sabha, which is the constitutional root of the principle.
    4. Question Hour and Zero Hour: Members question ministers on administrative action, and raise urgent matters without prior notice.
    5. Motions: Adjournment motions, calling attention notices, censure motions and the no confidence motion allow the House to force a discussion or remove the government.
    6. Financial control: Cut motions, the demands for grants, and the Comptroller and Auditor General’s reports examined by the Public Accounts Committee control the executive’s use of money.
    7. Committee scrutiny: Departmentally related standing committees, joint committees and select committees examine Bills, budgets and departmental performance away from the floor.

    Key Concerns Regarding Legislative Oversight

    1. Guillotine on budget scrutiny: Most demands for grants are voted without discussion when the guillotine is applied at the end of the budget session.
    2. Truncated Question Hour: Question Hour is frequently lost to disruption or curtailed by the presiding officer, which removes the routine accountability mechanism.
    3. Committee reports without follow up: Recommendations are advisory, and no mechanism tracks whether the government acted on them.
    4. Weak research support: Individual members lack dedicated legislative research staff to interrogate a technical Bill.
    5. Party control over speech: The whip system converts a member’s vote into a party decision, which removes the incentive to examine a Bill independently.
    6. Declining sittings: Fewer sitting days compress every function of oversight into a shorter window each year.

    Constitutional Framework Governing Parliamentary Lawmaking and Oversight

    1. Article 75(3): Makes the council of ministers collectively responsible to the House of the People.
    2. Article 79: Constitutes Parliament as the President, the Council of States and the House of the People.
    3. Article 85: Requires that six months not elapse between two sittings, and governs prorogation and dissolution.
    4. Article 93: Provides for the Speaker and Deputy Speaker of the House of the People.
    5. Article 100: Governs voting, the quorum of one tenth of the total membership, and the effect of vacancies.
    6. Article 105: Confers freedom of speech in Parliament and the privileges of the Houses and their members.
    7. Article 107: Governs the introduction and passing of Bills in both Houses.
    8. Article 108: Provides for a joint sitting of both Houses to resolve a deadlock over a Bill.
    9. Articles 109 and 110: Define a Money Bill and confine the Rajya Sabha to recommendations on it.
    10. Article 111: Governs assent, withholding of assent and the return of a Bill by the President.
    11. Article 117: Requires the President’s recommendation for financial Bills.
    12. Article 118: Empowers each House to make rules of procedure for the conduct of its business.
    13. Article 122: Bars courts from inquiring into proceedings of Parliament on the ground of irregularity of procedure.
    14. Article 82: Requires readjustment of seats and constituencies after every Census, which is the basis of delimitation.
    15. Article 148: Establishes the Comptroller and Auditor General, whose reports anchor financial oversight.
    16. Tenth Schedule: Provides for disqualification on the ground of defection, which binds a member to the party whip.

    Back2Basics: Parliamentary Committees in India

    1. Constitutional basis: Article 105 and Article 118 supply the privileges and the rule making power under which committees function.
    2. Two broad types: Standing committees, which are permanent and reconstituted every year, and ad hoc committees, which cease to exist once they report.
    3. Financial committees: The Public Accounts Committee, the Estimates Committee and the Committee on Public Undertakings.
    4. Public Accounts Committee: Constituted in 1921, it has 22 members and is chaired by convention by a member of the Opposition.
    5. Departmentally related standing committees: Introduced in 1993, now 24 in number, each with 31 members drawn from both Houses.
    6. Ad hoc committees: Select committees of one House and joint committees of both Houses, constituted to examine a particular Bill or subject.
    7. Nature of reports: Committee recommendations are recommendatory and do not bind the government.
    8. Value of the forum: Committees work outside the glare of the House, which allows cross party agreement that floor debate rarely produces.

    Government Initiatives for Legislative Process and Transparency

    1. Pre-Legislative Consultation Policy, 2014: Requires publication of draft Bills with an explanatory note and a minimum thirty day window for public feedback.
    2. National e-Vidhan Application (NeVA): Makes legislatures paperless by digitising notices, questions, bulletins and Bills for members.
    3. One Nation One Application initiative: Brings all State legislatures and Parliament onto a common digital platform for legislative business.
    4. Digital Sansad: Provides public access to debates, member profiles, questions and legislative documents in searchable form.
    5. Parliamentary Research and Information Support to Members (PRISM): Supplies research responses to members on subjects of their choice through the Parliament Library.
    6. Parliamentary Research and Training Institute for Democracies (PRIDE): Trains members and legislature staff in parliamentary procedure and legislative drafting.

    Key Facts about the Parliament of India

    1. Composition: The President, the Rajya Sabha with a maximum of 250 members and the Lok Sabha with a maximum of 550 members drawn from States and Union Territories.
    2. Sessions: Three sessions each year by convention, namely budget, monsoon and winter, with the six month rule set by Article 85.
    3. Quorum: One tenth of the total membership of the House, under Article 100.
    4. Joint sitting: Provided by Article 108 and used three times, for the Dowry Prohibition Bill in 1961, the Banking Service Commission Repeal Bill in 1978 and the Prevention of Terrorism Bill in 2002.
    5. Departmentally related standing committees: Introduced in 1993 and now numbering 24.
    6. Anti defection law: Introduced by the 52nd Amendment, 1985 through the Tenth Schedule, and amended in 2003 to remove the split exemption.
    7. New building: Parliament shifted to the new building in September 2023, with the Lok Sabha chamber seating 888 members.

    Challenges in Ensuring Legislative Scrutiny in India

    1. Disruption as a strategy: Both sides use disorder to avoid a debate they expect to lose, e.g. the monsoon session of 2026 closed at 15 per cent productivity with the presiding officers unable to restore order.
    2. Budget passed without discussion: The guillotine forces demands for grants through in a single vote, e.g. most ministry demands are guillotined every year with only a handful discussed on the floor.
    3. Weak private member legislation: Private member Bills are rarely taken up and almost never passed, e.g. only fourteen private member Bills have become law since 1952.
    4. Vacancy in the Deputy Speaker’s office: Article 93 requires the post to be filled, and prolonged vacancies weaken the presiding structure, e.g. the office remained vacant through the entire 17th Lok Sabha.
    5. Thin State legislature calendars: Many State Assemblies sit for a fraction of the days Parliament sits, e.g. several State Assemblies have recorded fewer than twenty sitting days in a year.
    6. Limited member capacity: Members lack dedicated legislative staff to examine technical Bills, e.g. a data protection or nuclear liability Bill reaches the floor with no independent member analysis available.
    7. Delayed committee constitution: Committees are reconstituted late in the parliamentary year, which shortens the time available to examine Bills referred to them.

    Way Forward

    1. Mandatory referral rule: Amend the rules of procedure so that every Bill stands referred to a committee unless the House expressly resolves otherwise, with reasons recorded.
    2. Statutory pre legislative consultation: Convert the 2014 policy into a binding requirement, with introduction barred until the consultation summary is tabled.
    3. Fixed legislative calendar: Adopt a minimum number of sitting days each year, fixed in advance, so that the executive cannot compress the session.
    4. Independent scheduling authority: Vest the power to convene sittings in a business advisory committee rather than in the executive alone.
    5. Automatic budget scrutiny: Require at least a fixed number of ministries’ demands to be discussed before the guillotine can be applied.
    6. Action taken discipline: Require the government to table a reasoned response to every committee recommendation within a fixed period.
    7. Strengthen member research: Fund dedicated legislative research staff for members and expand the Parliament Library’s analytical output on pending Bills.
    8. Federal consultation before federal Bills: Institutionalise consultation with State Chief Ministers through the Inter State Council before any Bill that alters State powers is introduced.

    “[2021, GS2, 10 marks] To what extent, in your view, the Parliament is able to ensure accountability of the executive in India?”

  • Seven-judge Bench to weigh privileges against free speech

    Why in the News

    A seven-judge Constitution Bench will hear from 6 October 2026 whether legislative privileges override the freedom of speech. The reference revives a dispute from the 2003 attempt by the Tamil Nadu Assembly to arrest journalists over a critical editorial.

    What is the constitutional question?

    1. Privilege versus speech: Whether privileges under Article 194 can override Article 19(1)(a) free speech.
    2. Interplay of Articles: The case engages Articles 194(3), 19, and 21 together.
    3. Origin: It stems from a 2003 Assembly resolution to arrest newspaper journalists.

    What are legislative privileges?

    1. Definition: Special rights of a legislature and its members to function without external interference.
    2. Article 194: Grants privileges to state legislatures, mirroring Article 105 for Parliament.
    3. Uncodified: Privileges remain largely uncodified, drawing on British parliamentary practice.

    Why is the tension unresolved?

    1. Two rights collide: A legislature’s authority to punish for contempt sits against a citizen’s free speech.
    2. Judicial review scope: Whether courts can review a House’s exercise of privilege is itself disputed.
    3. Chilling effect: Broad privilege can deter press criticism of legislatures.

    “[2023, GS2, 10] Discuss the role of Presiding Officers of state legislatures in maintaining order and impartiality in conducting legislative work and in facilitating best democratic practices.”

    [2017] Which one of the following statements is correct?

    [A] Rights are absolute and can never be restricted by the State.

    [B] Rights are legally enforceable claims that individuals have against the State

    [C] Rights are privileges granted by the government that can be revoked at any time.

    [D] Rights are moral values that do not require legal protection.