💥Join UPSC 2027,2028 Mentorship (August Batch) + XFactor Notes & Microthemes PDF
Talk to Mentor

Civilsdaily

Login

GS Paper: Panchayats & Local Bodies

  • Still no recognition of the third tier

    The article highlights the issues with the Fifteenth Finance Commission recommendations with regard to the third tier of the local governments.

    Significance of Finance Commission recommendations for local government

    • The primary task of the Union Finance Commission is to rectify the vertical and horizontal imbalances in resources and expenditure responsibilities between Union and States including the third tier of local governments.
    • Part IX and Part IX-A were incorporated into the Constitution by the 73rd and 74th Constitutional Amendment.
    • Part IX and Part IX-A mandate the Union Finance Commission to supplement the resources of panchayats and municipalities on the basis of the recommendations of the State Finance Commission.
    • Now, nearly 2.5 lakh local governments and over 3.4 million elected representatives form the real democratic base of the Indian federal polity.

    Increase in vertical devolution

    • The Fifteenth Finance Commission has raised the vertical devolution recommended to local governments to 4.23% with a reasonably estimated amount of ₹4,36,361 crore.
    • Compared with the Fourteenth Finance Commission there is a 52% increase in the vertical share.
    • Even if we deduct the grant of ₹70,051 crore earmarked for improving primary health centres, the share is still an all-time high of 4.19%.
    • All the Commissions since the Eleventh Commission have tied specific items of expenditure to local grants and the Fifteenth Finance Commission has raised this share to 60% and linked them to drinking water, rainwater harvesting, sanitation and other national priorities in the spirit of cooperative federalism.

    Reduction in performance-based  grants

    • The Fifteenth Finance Commission has reduced the performance-based grant to just ₹8,000 crore — and that too for building new cities, leaving out the Panchayati Raj Institutions (PRIs) altogether.
    • The performance-linked grants were introduced by the Thirteenth Finance Commission and covered a wide range of reforms.
    • The transformative potential in designing performance-linked conditionalities for improving the quality of decentralised governance in the context of indifferent states is missed.

    Encouraging standardisation of accounting system

    • An important recommendation of the Fifteenth Finance Commission is the entry-level criterion to avail the union local grant (except health grant) by local governments.
    • For panchayats, the condition is the online submission of annual accounts for the previous year and audited accounts for the year before.
    • For urban local governments, two more conditions are specified: fixation of the minimum floor for property tax and improvement in its collection.
    •  It is not clear why gram panchayats are left out from this.
    • Although Finance Commissions, from the Eleventh to the Fourteenth, have recommended measures to standardise the accounting system and update the auditing of accounts, the progress made has been halting.
    • Therefore, the entry-level criteria of the Fifteenth Finance Commission are timely.

    Missed opportunity to ensure minimum public services

    • The Fifteenth Finance Commission failed to carry policy choices forward systematically.
    • Articles 243G, 243W and 243ZD read along with the functional decentralisation of basic services like drinking water, public health care, etc., mandated in the Eleventh and Twelfth schedules demand better public services and delivery of ‘economic development and social justice’ at the local level.
    • A good opportunity to ensure comparable minimum public services to every citizen irrespective of her choice of residential location has not been taken forward in an integrated manner.

    Missing equalisation principle for the local government

    • The Fifteenth Finance Commission claims that it seeks to achieve the “desirable objective of evenly balancing the union and the states”.
    • It is not clear why there is no recognition of the third tier in this balancing act.
    • It may be relevant to recall that the Alma-Ata declaration of the World Health Organization (1978) which outlined an integrated, local government-centric approach with a simultaneous focus on access to water, sanitation, shelter and the like.
    • There is no integrated approach in the recommendations of the Fifteenth Finance Commission about the local governments (in contrast to the recommendations of the Thirteenth Finance Commission).
    • Although the Fifteenth Finance Commission stresses the need to implement the equalisation principle, it is virtually silent when it comes to the local governments.

    Equity and efficiency sidelined

    • The Fifteenth Finance Commission employed population (2011 Census) with 90% and area 10% weightage for determining the distribution of grant to States for local governments.
    • The same criteria were followed by the Fourteenth Finance Commission.
    • While this ensures continuity, equity and efficiency criteria are sidelined.
    • Abandoning tax effort criterion incentivises dependency, inefficiency and non-accountability.

    Consider the question “Discuss the various aspects of the Fifteenth Finance Commission’s recommendations with regard to local governments.”

    Conclusion

    In sum, if decentralisation is meant to empower local people, the primary task is to fiscally empower local governments to deliver territorial equity. We are far from this goal.

  • Federalism and India’s human capital

    The article argues for recognising the correlation between human capital and decentralisation in India.

    Low human capital indicators

    • In the World Bank’s Human Capital Index, the country ranked 116th.
    • The National Family Health Survey-5 for 2019-20 shows that malnutrition indicators stagnated or declined in most States.
    • The National Achievement Survey 2017 and the Annual Status of Education Report 2018 show poor learning outcomes.
    • In addition, there is little convergence across States.
    • India spends just 4% of its GDP as public expenditure on human capital:1% and 3% on health and education respectively— one of the lowest among its peers.

    Initiatives to address these issues

    • Investing in human capital through interventions in nutrition, health, and education is critical for sustainable growth.
    • The National Health Policy of 2017 highlighted the need for interventions to address malnutrition.
    • On the basis of NITI Aayog’s National Nutrition Strategy, the Poshan Abhiyaan was launched, as part of the Umbrella Integrated Child Development Scheme.
    • The latest Union Budget has announced a ‘Mission Poshan 2.0’ and the Samagra Shiksha Abhiyan has been the Centre’s flagship education scheme since 2018.

    Relation between decentralisation and human capital

    • International experience suggests that one reason why these interventions are not leading to better outcomes may be India’s record with decentralisation.
    • Globally, there has been a gradual shift in the distribution of expenditures and revenue towards sub-national governments.
    • These trends are backed by studies demonstrating a positive correlation between decentralisation and human capital.

    Issues with decentralisation in India

    1) Letting states decide the way of empowerment

    • The 73rd and 74th Amendments bolstered decentralisation by constitutionally recognising panchayats and municipalities as the third tier.
    • The Amendment also added the Eleventh and Twelfth schedules containing the functions of panchayats and municipalities.
    • These include education, health and sanitation, and social welfare for panchayats, and public health and socio-economic development planning for municipalities.
    • However, the Constitution lets States determine how they are empowered.
    • In effect, three tiers of government are envisaged in the Constitution it divides powers between the first two tiers — the Centre and the States
    • This has resulted in vast disparities in the roles played by third-tier governments.

    2) Centralised nature of fiscal architecture

    • While the Constitution assigns the bulk of expenditure responsibilities to States, the Centre has major revenue sources.
    • To address this vertical imbalance, the Constitution provides for fiscal transfers through tax devolution and grants-in-aid.
    • In addition, the Centre can make ‘grants for any public purpose’ under Article 282 of the Constitution.
    • While fiscal transfers that are part of tax devolution are unconditional, transfers under grants-in-aid or Centrally Sponsored Schemes (CSSs) can be conditional.
    • Therefore, the increase in the States’ share of tax devolution represents more meaningful decentralisation.
    • Despite some shifts towards greater State autonomy in many spheres, the centralised nature of India’s fiscal architecture has persisted. 
    • Centrally Sponsored Schemes (CSS) have formed a sizeable chunk of intergovernmental fiscal transfers over the years, comprising almost 23% of transfers to States in 2021-22.
    • But its outsized role strays from the intentions of the Constitution.
    • There are issues in the design of CSSs as well, with the conditions being overly prescriptive and, typically, input-based.
    • Against this, international experience reveals that schemes with output-based conditions are more effective.
    • Moreover, CSSs typically have a cost-sharing model, thereby pre-empting the States’ fiscal space.

    3) Lack of fiscal empowerment

    • Third-tier governments are not fiscally empowered.
    • The collection of property tax, a major source of revenue for third-tier governments, is under 0.2% of GDP in India, compared to 3% of GDP in some other nations.
    • The Constitution envisages State Finance Commissions (SFCs) to make recommendations for matters such as tax devolution and grants-in-aid to the third tier.
    • However, many States have not constituted or completed these commissions on time.

    Solution

    • The Centre should play an enabling role, for instance, encouraging knowledge-sharing between States.
    • For States to play a bigger role in human capital interventions, they need adequate fiscal resources.
    • To this end, States should rationalise their priorities to focus on human capital development.
    • The Centre should refrain from offsetting tax devolution by altering cost-sharing ratios of CSSs and increasing cesses.
    • Concomitantly, the heavy reliance on CSSs should be reduced, and tax devolution and grants-in-aid should be the primary sources of vertical fiscal transfers.
    • Panchayats and municipalities need to be vested with the functions listed in the Eleventh and Twelfth Schedules.

    Consider the question “There is a positive correlation between decentralisation and human capital. This in part explains India’s low human capital indicators. In light of this, examine the issues with the decentralisation in India and suggest the measures to deal with it.”

    Conclusion

    Leveraging the true potential of our multi-level federal system represents the best way forward towards developing human capital.

     

     

  • [pib]Rajasthan becomes the 5th State to complete ULB reforms

    Rajasthan has become the 5thState in the country to successfully undertake Urban Local Bodies (ULB) reforms stipulated by the Department of Expenditure, Ministry of Finance and has thus become eligible for additional reform linked to borrowing.

    Which are the four other States?

    : They are Andhra Pradesh, Madhya Pradesh, Manipur and Telangana, who have completed ULB reforms.

    Now try this PYQ:

    Q.The Constitution (Seventy-Third Amendment) Act, 1992, which aims at promoting the Panchayati Raj Institutions in the country, provides for which of the following?

    1. Constitution of District Planning Committees.
    2. State Election Commissions to conduct all panchayat elections.
    3. Establishment of State Finance Commissions.

    Select the correct answer using the codes given below:

    (a) Only 1

    (b) 1 and 2 only

    (c) 2 and 3 only

    (d) 1, 2 and 3

    What are the ULB reforms?

    The four citizen-centric areas identified for reforms are:

    1. Implementation of One Nation One Ration Card System
    2. Ease of doing business reform
    3. Urban Local body/ utility reforms
    4. Power Sector reforms.

    The set of reforms stipulated by the Department of Expenditure are:

    (a) The State will notify:

    • Floor rates of property tax in ULBs which are in consonance with the prevailing circle rates (i.e. guideline rates for property transactions) and;
    • Floor rates of user charges in respect of the provision of water supply, drainage, and sewerage which reflect current costs/past inflation.

    (b)   The State will put in place a system of periodic increases in floor rates of property tax/ user charges in line with price increases.

    Why need such reforms?

    • Reforms in ULBs and the urban utility reforms are aimed at the financial strengthening of ULBs to enable them to provide better public health and sanitation services to citizens.
    • Economically rejuvenated ULBs will also be able to create good civic infrastructure.

    Back2Basics: Municipal Governance in India

    • Municipal or local governance refers to the third tier of governance in India, at the level of the municipality or urban local body.
    • Urban Local Bodies (ULBs) are small local bodies that administer or govern a city or a town of a specified population.
    • They are vested with a long list of functions delegated to them by the state governments.
    • These functions broadly relate to public health, welfare, regulatory functions, public safety, public infrastructure works, and development activities.
    • There are several types of Urban Local Bodies in India such as Municipal Corporation, Municipality, Notified Area Committee, Town Area Committee, Special Purpose Agency, Township, Port Trust, Cantonment Board, etc.

    Development through history

    • It has existed since the year 1687, with the formation of Madras Municipal Corporation, and then Calcutta and Bombay Municipal Corporation in 1726.
    • In the early part of the nineteenth century, almost all towns in India had experienced some form of municipal governance.
    • In 1882 the then Viceroy of India, Lord Ripon, known as the Father of Local Self Government, passed a resolution of local self-government which lead to the democratic forms of municipal governance in India.
    • In 1919, a Government of India Act incorporated the need of the resolution and the powers of democratically elected government were formulated.
    • In 1935 another Government of India act brought local government under the preview of the state or provincial government and specific powers were given.

    Changes after the 74th Amendment (1992)

    • It was the 74th amendment to the Constitution that brought constitutional validity to municipal or local governments.
    • Until amendments were made in respective state legislation on an ultra vires (beyond the authority) basis and the state governments were free to extend or control the functional sphere.

  • Issues related to Urban local bodies

    The inability of ULBs’ to raise revenue

    • Although it is envisaged that municipal revenue should be 1% of GDP, between 2010 and 2018 revenues declined from 0.48% to 0.43%.
    • As against the municipal revenue of Rs 4,624 per capita, own-source revenue was only Rs 1,975 in 2018 (ICRIER, 2019).
    • This affects the low-levels of municipal services and translates into salary delays for employees.

    8-way strategy to increase the revenue of ULBs

    1) Increasing the property tax base

    • In India, property taxes only account for 0.15% of GDP, whereas in developing economies they account for 0.6% and the global average is 1.04%.
    • To double the property tax collection the property tax base needs to be expanded using GIS mapping, cross-checking with building licenses, ration cards, mutations, electricity/gas accounts, and review of exemptions.
    • This also needs to cover government properties as per GoI circular 2009 and the SC judgment in Rajkot Corporation vs Railways.
    • Similarly, rates need revision in the guiding value for rent or unit area; for instance, in Delhi, rates are fairly low.
    • The collection process needs to be automated too.
    • ABC (Always best Control) analysis should be done to target the top 10-20% properties, and measures such as attaching bank accounts must be implemented.

    2) Upward revision of various fees

    • The value capture taxes need to include upward revision of building license fee and new sources like impact fee, as imposed in Telangana, exactions, and betterment levy like the one imposed in Gujarat.

    3) Levy advertisement fee

    • An advertisement fee needs to be levied.
    • Thiruvananthapuram listed the sites and plugged leakages for 33,170 unauthorized boards to double its income from 2018 to 2019.
    • South Delhi MC has achieved a three-time increase with revision of rates in a ratio of 1:8 as per location and by dividing the city into clusters.

    4) Local fee

    • Local fee/charges also have immense potential such as (i) recovery on user charges (water, etc) which is only 20% (ii) right of way from gas/electricity and fiber optic lines, (ii) cell tower, (iii) leasing electricity poles, etc.

    5) Participatory funding

    • The potential of participatory funding (private sector, CSR, and local community) needs to be tapped.
    • This has been done by Bengaluru, Ahmedabad, Mathura (Hybrid Annuity project), Indore, and Pune.

    6) Special attention for assigning and activating the fiscal instrument

    • Sixth, small and medium-sized municipal bodies need special attention for assigning and activating fiscal instruments.
    • Better mobilization of own sources may also lead to revenue account surplus.
    • This has been achieved in Ahmedabad, Pune, etc and it also enables access to the capital market.

    7) Revision of Article 243X

    • Article 243X needs suitable revision to allow larger inclusion of fiscal instruments above within the scope of a municipality’s own sources.

    8) Creating ULBs as per MoHUA’s advisory

    • Over 3,000 census towns not having city government need special attention to create ULBs in line with MoHUA’s advisory in 2016.
    • It will create an innovative and effective financing framework for sustainable urban development.

    Conclusion

    Financially strong local bodies hold the key to the development of the country. The steps mentioned here needs to be implemented effectively to make the ULBs financially strong.

    Source:-

    https://www.financialexpress.com/opinion/bolster-ulbs-capacity-to-raise-revenue/2157171/

  • What are District Development Councils (DDCs)?

    The Centre has amended the Jammu and Kashmir Panchayati Raj Act, 1989, to facilitate the setting up of District Development Councils (DDC).

    Tap to read more about: Reorganization of J&K

    What are DDCs?

    • DDCs structure will include a DDC and a District Planning Committee (DPC).
    • The J&K administration has also amended the J&K Panchayati Raj Rules, 1996, to provide for establishment of elected District Development Councils in J&K.
    • This system effectively replaces the District Planning and Development Boards in all districts, and will prepare and approve district plans and capital expenditure.

    Composition of DDCs

    • Their key feature, however, is that the DDCs will have elected representatives from each district.
    • Their number has been specified at 14 elected members per district representing its rural areas, alongside the Members of
    • Legislative Assembly chairpersons of all Block Development Councils within the district.

    Term of reference

    • The term of the DDC will be five years, and the electoral process will allow for reservations for Scheduled Castes, Scheduled Tribes and women.
    • The Additional District Development Commissioner (or the Additional DC) of the district shall be the Chief Executive Officer of the District Development Council.
    • The council, as stated in the Act, will hold at least four “general meetings” in a year, one in each quarter.

    What will be the process here onward?

    • The 14 constituencies for electing representatives to the DDC will have to be delimited.
    • These constituencies will be carved out of the rural areas of the district, and elected members will subsequently elect a chairperson and a vice-chairperson of the DDC from among themselves.

    Within the third tier, where do the DDCs fit in?

    • The DDCs replace the District Planning and Development Boards (DDBs) that were headed by a cabinet minister of the erstwhile state of Jammu and Kashmir.
    • For Jammu and Srinagar districts, as winter and summer capitals, the DDBs were headed by the Chief Minister.

    However, for Leh and Kargil districts, the Autonomous Hill Development Councils performed the functions designated for the DDBs.

    How will DPC work, then?

    • For every district there will be DPC comprising MPs representing the area, Members of the State Legislature representing the areas within the District etc. among others.
    • The MP will function as the chairperson of this committee.
    • The committee will “consider and guide” the formulation of development programmes for the district.
    • It would indicate priorities for various schemes and consider issues relating to the speedy development and economic uplift of the district.
    • It would function as a working group for formulation of periodic and annual plans for the district; and formulate and finalise the plan and non-plan budget for the district.

    Centre’s objective behind this new structure

    • The J&K administration in a statement said that the move to have an elected third tier of the Panchayati Raj institution marks the implementation of the entire 73rd Amendment Act in J&K.
    • The idea is that systems that had been made defunct by earlier J&K governments such as the panchayati raj system are being revived under the Centre’s rule in the state through the Lieutenant Governor’s administration.
    • In the absence of elected representatives in the UT, senior government officials argue that DDCs will effectively become representative bodies for development at the grassroots in the 20 districts of the UT.
    • They hope that this may draw some former legislators in as well.

  • Taking care of finances of local governments

    This article makes some suggestions to improve local finance and argues that the extant fiscal illusion is a great deterrent to mobilisation.

    Advantageous position in handling disasters

    • In terms of information, monitoring and immediate action, local governments are at an advantage, and eminently, to meet any disaster such as COVID-19.
    • While increasing the borrowing limits of the state form 3.5% of GDP to 5%, there was a recognition that local governments should be fiscally empowered immediately.
    • This is a valid signal for the future of local governance.

    4 challenges posed by Covid and addressing them collectively

    • COVID-19 has raised home four major challenges:1) economic, 2) health, 3) welfare/livelihood 4) resource mobilisation.
    • These challenges have to be addressed by all tiers of government in the federal polity, jointly and severally.

    Local government empowerment: 5 critical areas

    • 1) Own revenue is the critical lever of local government empowerment.
    • But the several lacunae that continue to bedevil local governance have to be simultaneously addressed.
    • 2) The new normal demands a paradigm shift in the delivery of health care at the cutting edge level.
    • 3) The parallel bodies that have come up after the 73rd/74th Constitutional Amendments have considerably distorted the functions-fund flow matrix at the lower level of governance.
    • 4) There is yet no clarity in the assignment of functions, functionaries and financial responsibilities to local governments.
    • Functional mapping and responsibilities continue to be ambiguous in many States.
    • Instructively, Kerala attempted even responsibility mapping besides activity mapping.
    • 5) The critical role of local governments will have to be recognised by all.

    Let’s look into resource mobilisation issue: 3 Heads

    • A few suggestions for resource mobilisation are given under three heads: 1) local finance, 2) Members of Parliament Local Area Development Scheme-MPLADs, 3) the Fifteenth Finance Commission (FFC).

    1. Local finance

    • Property tax collection with appropriate exemptions should be a compulsory levy and preferably must cover land.
    • The Economic Survey 2017-18 points out that urban local governments, or ULGs, generate about 44% of their revenue from own sources as against only 5% by rural local governments, or RLGs.
    • Per capita own revenue collected by ULGs is about 3% of urban per capita income while the corresponding figure is only 0.1% for RLGs.
    • There is a yawning gap between tax potential and actual collection, resulting in colossal underperformance.
    • When they are not taxed, people remain indifferent.
    • LGs, States and people seem to labour under a fiscal illusion.
    • In States such as Uttar Pradesh, Bihar and Jharkhand, local tax collection at the panchayat level is next to nil.
    • Property tax forms the major source of local revenue throughout the world.
    • All States should take steps to enhance and rationalise property tax regime.
    • A recent study by Professor O.P. Mathur shows that the share of property tax in GDP has been declining since 2002-03.
    •  The share of property tax in India in 2017-18 is only 0.14% of GDP as against 2.1% in the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) countries.
    • If property tax covers land, that will hugely enhance the yield from this source even without any increase in rates.

    Other 2 options for raising finances

    • 1) Land monetisation and betterment levy may be tried in the context of COVID-19 in India. To be sure, land values have to be unbundled for socially relevant purposes.
    • 2) Municipalities and even suburban panchayats can issue a corona containment bond for a period of say 10 years.
    • We are appealing to the patriotic sentiments of non-resident Indians and rich citizens.
    • Needless to say, credit rating is not to be the weighing consideration.
    • That the Resurgent India Bond of 1998 could mobilise over $4 billion in a few days encourages us to try this option.

    2) MPLADS

    • The suspension of MPLADS by the Union government for two years is a welcome measure. The annual budget was around ₹4,000 crore.
    • The Union government has appropriated the entire allocation along with the huge non-lapseable arrears.
    • MPLADs, which was avowedly earmarked for local area development, must be assigned to local governments, preferably to panchayats on the basis of well-defined criteria.

    3) Fifteenth finance commission-FFC

    • A special COVID-19 containment grant to the LGs by the FFC to be distributed on the basis of SFC-laid criteria is the need of the hour.
    • The commission may do well to consider this.
    • The local government grant of ₹90,000 crore for 2020-2021 by the FFC is only 3% higher than that recommended by the Fourteenth Finance Commission.
    • Building health infrastructure and disease control strategies at the local level find no mention in the five tranches of the packages announced by the Union Finance Minister.

    Suggestions related to grants

    • The ratio of basic (i.e. with no conditions) to tied (with condition)grant is fixed at 50:50 by the commission.
    • In the context of the crisis under way, all grants must be untied  for freely evolving proper COVID-19 containment strategies locally.
    • The 13th Finance Commission’s recommendation to tie local grants to the union divisible pool of taxes to ensure a buoyant and predictable source of revenue to LGs (accepted by the then Union government) must be restored by the commission.

    Consider the question “The stable source of revenue for the local government bodies whether from their own sources or in the form of grants should lie at the heart of efforts to empower them. Comment.”

     Conclusion

    COVID-19 has woken us up to the reality that local governments must be equipped and empowered. Relevant action is the critical need.

    B2BASICS:

    73rd and 74th Amendment Acts, 1993

    • It’s been 25 years since decentralized democratic governance was introduced in India by the 73rd and 74th Constitution Amendments, which came into force on April 24 and June 1, 1993, respectively.
    • The 73rd Amendment to the Constitution (Part IX) has given constitutional status to the Panchayats, and has provided it with a substantial framework. It envisions the Panchayats as the institutions of local self-governance and also the universal platforms for planning and implementing programmes for economic
      development and social justice.
    • The creation of lakhs of “self-governing” village panchayats and gram sabhas, with over three million elected representatives mandated to manage local development, was a unique democratic experiment.
    • Article 243A gives constitutional recognition to the Gram Sabha as a body consisting of persons registered in the electoral rolls relating to a village comprised within the area of the Panchayat at the village level.
    • The 74th Amendment Act provided for the constitution (Part IXA) of three types of municipalities in urban areas depending upon the size and area.
    • The Constitution provides for a complete institutional mechanism including reservation for women and formation of State Finance Commissions (SFCs) for local democracy.

  • Removal of AP State Election Commissioner by ordinance route

    The removal of the SEC by the ordinance route raises the question over the legality of the move. And if it passes the judicial scrutiny it would harm the independence of the body.

    The legality of the removal and its implication for free and fair elections

    • The fact that it was the culmination of an open conflict between the Election Commissioner and Chief Minister makes it a glaring instance of misuse of power.
    • The State government got the Governor to issue an ordinance to cut the SEC’s tenure from five to three years.
    • The ordinance also amended the criterion for holding that office from being an officer of the rank of Principal Secretary and above to one who had served as a High Court judge.
    • This automatically rendered the SEC’s continuance invalid.
    • Last month, just days before the local body polls were to be held, the SEC postponed the elections, citing the COVID-19 outbreak.
    • The State government approached the Supreme Court, but the court declined to interfere.
    • Having exhausted its legal remedy, the government should have waited for the ongoing fight against the disease to be over.
    • The Chief Minister has no legal right to terminate the SEC’s tenure.
    • The Constitution makes the holder of that post removable only in the same manner as a High Court judge.
    • If courts uphold this means of dislodging the head of an independent election body, it would mark the end of free and fair elections.

    Past judgements on the issue

    • The State government seems to have gone by legal opinion that citedAparmita Prasad Singh vs. State of U.P. (2007).
    • Cessation of term vs. removal: In that judgement the Allahabad High Court ruled that cessation of tenure does not amount to removal, and upheld the State Election Commissioner’s term being cut short.
    • The Supreme Court, while dismissing an appeal against the order, kept open the legal questions arising from the case.

    UPSC can frame the question based on the judgement in case by the SC and its implication for the independence of the body in conducting the fair, free and impartial election.

    Issues arising out of the past judgements

    • The judgment seems erroneous, as it gives freedom to the State government to remove an inconvenient election authority by merely changing the tenure or retirement age.
    • This was surely not what was envisioned by Parliament, which wrote into the Constitution provisions to safeguard the independence of the State Election Commission.
    • It is a well-settled principle in law that what cannot be done directly cannot be done indirectly.
    • Therefore, the removal of an incumbent SEC through the subterfuge of changing the eligibility norms for an appointment may not survive judicial scrutiny.
    • Prohibition on the variation of condition of service: Further, the Constitution, under Article 243K, prohibits the variation of any condition of service to the detriment of any incumbent.
    • Even if the State government argues that a change of tenure does not amount to varying the conditions of service, the new norm can only apply to the successor SEC, and not the one holding the office now.

    Conclusion

    In order to ensure the independence of the SEC and free and fair elections, legality of the move should not pass the legal scrutiny. Even if it passes the legal scrutiny the government should amend this provision avoid such instances in the future.

     

  • Let no one go hungry

    Context

    The impact of the lockdown, effected from midnight of March 24, has been particularly severe on migrant workers. The state must utilise FCI stock for those who have ration cards and those who don’t.

    India’s labour force and impact of lockdown on it

    • Nearly one-fifth of India’s labour force consists of internal migrants.
    • As per the 2011 census, a quarter of the urban population consists of migrants.
    • These tend to be predominantly male, from the less developed northern states, in the lower-income strata, and dependent on daily wages or precarious livelihoods.
    • The impact of the lockdown has been particularly severe on migrant workers.
    • Uncertainty and reverse migration: Due to uncertainty over the duration of the lockdown, and about their own livelihoods and food security, the lockdown has led to massive reverse migration from cities back to villages.
    • Further, due to the absence of train and bus services, many of these workers took to simply walking back.
    • The ground reality of inadequate preparation or insufficient provision means that neither their anxiety nor plight is assuaged.
    • Migrant workers tend to depend on public eating places or community arrangements for food.
    • Under a lockdown, there is simply no choice for them, except to depend on the government’s efforts or charitable organisations.

    Utilising the grain stocks with the FCI

    • The government has a large stock of wheat and rice procured over the last three years.
    • Stock in excess of buffer norm: The buffer norm for April 1 is 21.4 million tonnes, against which the country had about 7 million tonnes on March 1: This comprises 27.5 million tonnes of wheat and 50.2 million tonnes of rice.
    • In most districts of India, the Food Corporation of India and state agencies have a storage capacity of more than the three months requirement of the public distribution system.
    • The warehouses are spread across all the districts in every state.
    • The government has already announced that an additional quantity of five kg of foodgrains will be provided, free of cost, to all ration card holders for the next three months.
    • Most of the unorganised labour and families migrating back from their place of work will probably have their ration cards in the villages itself.
    • So, it should not be much of a problem for them to find food during the period of lockdown.

    What should the state do to feed those who do not have ration cards

    • For those who do not have ration cards in the villages, it is the right time to use this extra stock of foodgrains.
    • Using school and Anganwadi infrastructure: In villages, primary schools have facilities for cooking mid-day meals for children. Some Anganwadi also have this facility. This infrastructure can be used to provide cooked meals to those who do not have ration cards in the villages.
    • The government can easily offer to meet their requirement of wheat and rice over the next three weeks and panchayats can be asked to meet a part of the expenditure required to purchase vegetables, spices and cooking oil.
    • The village panchayats which take up such a feeding programme must be provided Rs 20 per person per day from State Disaster Relief Fund for the expenditure on vegetables, cooking oil, spices, which are not covered by the PDS.
    • In some villages, the local community may also be willing to help the panchayats to feed such people.
    • Efforts must also be made by the panchayats to raise donations in kind from the local community for rabi pulses like chana (chickpea), masoor (lentil), matar (field pea) which are available in plenty in pulse-growing states.

    How to feed those who are stuck in the cities

    • A number of labourers and self-employed: In urban areas, as per the Periodic Labour Force Survey, there were about 6 crore casual labourers and four crore self-employed persons in 2017-18.
    • Even after the reverse migration to villages, there would still be millions of them who are stuck in cities at their place of work.
    • These are people who do not have any savings or source of income which can sustain them during the period of the lockdown. These people living in slums, in the poorer areas of cities, are in need of urgent assistance for food, at least for the next three weeks.
    • The most distressed at present are those stuck in the cities, or who have been walking hundreds of kilometres to reach their homes in small towns and villages.
    • Allocating funds form relief funds: The district collectors should be allocated funds from the State Disaster Relief Fund to provide them with food and open all community buildings en route for them.
    • Engaging various players: The states must engage NGOs, factories and charities including religious organisations to raise funds for meeting the expenditure on milk, eggs, cooking oil and vegetables, and even soaps and sanitisers.
    • More than 67,000 NGOs are registered with the Niti Aayog on their NGO Darpan platform — which was created to bring about a greater partnership between the government and the voluntary sector and to foster transparency, efficiency and accountability.
    • This is the time to use such a platform.
    • The Centre can easily provide free rice and wheat to the NGOs from its stock and the NGOs can provide cooked meals in urban areas for the next three weeks.
    • For one crore individuals, for three weeks, the government needs to provide just about 75,000 tonnes of rice. Since the milling of wheat would be difficult due to the closure of flour mills, only rice can be provided at this stage.

    Conclusion

    The rabi harvest is expected to be a bumper one. The utilisation of the FCI stock — for not only the ration card holders but also the non-ration cardholders, and for providing food to the poor stuck in urban areas — is the most appropriate use of the foodgrain stock with the government. This is urgent and must be done.

  • [pib] Bhuvan Panchayat V 3.0

    The Bhuvan Panchayat V 3.0 web portal was recently launched.

    Bhuvan Panchayat Version 3.0

    • For better planning and monitoring of government projects, the ISRO has launched the Bhuvan Panchayat web portal’s version 3.0.
    • For the first time, a thematic data base on a 1:1000 scale for the entire country is available with integrated high resolution satellite data for planning.
    • In the project that will last for at least two years, ISRO will collaborate with the gram panchayat members and stakeholders to understand their data requirements.
    • The third version of the portal will provide database visualisation and services for the benefit of panchayat members, among others.
    • The project is meant to provide geo-spatial services to aid gram panchayat development planning process of the Ministry of Panchayati Raj.
    • The targeted audiences for this portal are Public, PRIs and different stakeholders belonging to the gram panchayats.

    About SISDP Project

    • Space based Information Support for Decentralised Planning at Panchyayat level (SIS-DP) is a national initiative of preparing basic spatial layers useful in planning process for local self governance.
    • ISRO launched SISDP project to assist Gram Panchayats at grassroot level with basic planning inputs derived from satellite data for preparing developmental plans, its implementation and monitoring the activities.
    • The National Remote Sensing Centre (NRSC) is the lead centre to execute the project in collaboration with various State Remote Sensing Centres.
    • SISDP phase I Project was successfully concluded in the year 2016-17.
    • Under Phase II, this project shall be implemented shortly with a enhanced scope of updating geodatabase with latest high resolution remote sensing data and spatial data analytics.
    • For the first time, thematic database on 1:10,000 scale for the entire country is available with high integrated High Resolution satellite data for planning.

  • Rural Infrastructure Schemes

    Has 2 departments under it – Dept. of Rural Development and Dept. of Land Resources. National level schemes under them – Pradhan Mantri Gram Sadak Yojana (PMGSY) for rural roads development, Swarnajayanti Gram Swarozgar Yojana (SGSY) rural emploment and for rural housing, Indira Awaas Yojana (IAY) & Integrated Watershed Management Programme (IWMP).