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GS Paper: Parliament & State Legislatures

  • Declining importance of Parliament

    The article highlight the deterioration in the function of Parliament  and its implications.

    Declining seating of houses of Parliament

    • The current Budget session of Parliament ended on Thursday, two weeks ahead of the original plan.
    • This follows the trend of the last few sessions:
    • The Budget session of 2020 was curtailed ahead of the lockdown.
    • A short 18-day monsoon session ended after 10 days as several Members of Parliament and Parliament staff got affected by COVID-19.
    • The winter session was cancelled.
    • As a result, the fiscal year 2020-21 saw the Lok Sabha sitting for 34 days (and the Rajya Sabha for 33), the lowest ever.
    • This has implications for the proper legislative scrutiny of proposed legislation as well as government functioning and finances.
    • There is no reason why Parliament could not adopt remote working and technological solutions, as several other countries did.

    Passage of important bills without scrutiny

    • During this session, 13 Bills were introduced, and not even one of them was referred to a parliamentary committee for examination.
    • The Government of National Capital Territory of Delhi (Amendment) Bill, 2021 was passed by the Parliament.
    • This bill shifts governance from the legislature and the Chief Minister to the Lieutenant Governor.
    • The Mines and Minerals (Development and Regulation) Amendment Bill, 2021, amends the Mines and Minerals Act, 1957 to remove end-use restrictions on mines and ease conditions for captive mines.
    • This Bill was passed by both Houses within a week.
    • The National Bank for Financing Infrastructure and Development (NaBFID) Bill, 2021 — to create a new government infrastructure finance institution and permit private ones in this sector was passed within three days of introduction.
    • The Insurance (Amendment) Bill, 2021 which increases FDI in insurance companies from 49% to 74% also took just a week between introduction and passing by both Houses.
    • In all, 13 Bills were introduced in this session, and eight of them were passed within the session.
    • This quick work should be read as a sign of abdication by Parliament of its duty to scrutinise Bills, rather than as a sign of efficiency.
    • Also, the percentage of Bills referred to committees declined from 60% and 71% in the 14th Lok Sabha (2004-09) and the 15th Lok Sabha, respectively, to 27% in the 16th Lok Sabha and just 11% in the current one.

    Money Bill classification issue

    • The Finance Bills, over the last few years, have contained several unconnected items such as restructuring of tribunals, introduction of electoral bonds, and amendments to the foreign contribution act.
    • Some of the earlier Acts, including the Aadhaar Act and Finance Act, have been referred to a Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court.
    • It would be useful if the Court can give a clear interpretation of the definition of Money Bills and provide guide rails within which Bills have to stay to be termed as such.

    Passage of Budget without discussion

    • The Constitution requires the Lok Sabha to approve the expenditure Budget of each department and Ministry.
    • The Lok Sabha had listed the budget of just five Ministries for detailed discussion and discussed only three of these; 76% of the total Budget was approved without any discussion.
    • This behaviour was in line with the trend of the last 15 years.

    No Deputy Speaker

    • Article 93 of the Constitution states that “… The House of the People shall, as soon as may be, choose two members of the House to be respectively Speaker and Deputy Speaker….”
    • A striking feature of the current Lok Sabha is the absence of a Deputy Speaker.
    • By the time of the next session of Parliament, two years would have elapsed without the election of a Deputy Speaker.

    Way forward

    • In order to fulfil its constitutional mandate, it is imperative that Parliament functions effectively.
    • This will require making and following processes:
    • 1) Creating a system of research support to Members of Parliament.
    • 2) Providing sufficient time for MPs to examine issues.
    • 3 )Requiring that all Bills and budgets are examined by committees and public feedback is taken.

    Consider the question “Parliament as a representative body is expected to examine all legislative proposals, understand their nuances and implications and decide on the appropriate way forward. Yet, more and more Bills are passed without enough deliberations. What are the implications of it? Suggest the measures to deal with it.”

    Conclusion

    In sum, Parliament needs to ensure sufficient scrutiny over the proposals and actions of the government.

  • Why the MTP Bill is not progressive enough

    The article highlights key changes the Medical Termination of Pregnancy (Amendment) Bill, 2021 seeks to make in the 1971 Act and also deals with the issues with some of these changes.

    Key changes

    • The 1971 Act had moral biases against sexual relationships outside marriage, adopts an ableist approach and carries a strong eugenic emphasis.
    • In addition to preventing danger to the life or risk to physical or mental health of the woman, “eugenic grounds” were recognised as a specific category for legally permissible abortions.
    • To deal with these issues the Medical Termination of Pregnancy (Amendment) Bill, 2021 was passed by the parliament.
    • The bill is being hailed for two reasons:
    • First, the bill replaces “any married woman or her husband” with “any woman or her partner” while contemplating termination of pregnancies resulting from contraception failures, thus ostensibly destigmatising pregnancies outside marriage.
    • Second, the time limit within which pregnancies are legally terminable is increased.

    Issues with the Bill

    1) Scope for executive overreach

    • The bill raises the upper gestational limits for the two categories of permissible abortions envisioned in Section 3(2) of the 1971 Act.
    • Limit for the first category in which pregnancies are terminable subject to the opinion of one medical practitioner is raised from 12 weeks to 20 weeks.
    • The limit for the second category in which pregnancies are terminable subject to the opinion of two medical practitioners is raised to include those exceeding 20 but not exceeding 24 weeks, instead of the present category of cases exceeding 12 but not exceeding 20 weeks.
    • However, the second category is left ambiguous and open to potential executive overreach insofar as it may be further narrowed down by rules made by the executive.

    2) Rejection of the bodily autonomy of women

    • Pregnancies are allowed to be terminated only where:
    • 1) Continuance of the pregnancy would “prejudice the life of the pregnant woman.
    • 2) Or cause grave injury to her mental or physical health”
    • 3) Or “if the child were born it would suffer from any serious physical or mental abnormality.”
    • As such, the bill seeks to cater to women “who need to terminate pregnancy” as against “women who want to terminate pregnancy.”
    •  By not accounting for the right to abortion at will the Bill effectively cripples women’s bodily autonomy.

    3) Ableist approach

    • A woman’s right to terminate the pregnancy of a child likely to suffer from physical or mental anomalies or one diagnosed with foetal abnormalities, on socio-economic grounds or otherwise, merits recognition.
    • However, in treating “physical or mental disability” or “foetal abnormalities” as separate categories amounting to heightened circumstances for termination of pregnancies, the bill reveals its ableist approach.
    • This evidences a presumption that certain people are by default societally unproductive, undesirable and somehow more justifiably eliminable than others.
    • This ableism becomes stark when the said 24-week limit, which is purportedly dictated by scientific and legislative wisdom, is completely lifted where the termination of a pregnancy involves “substantial foetal abnormalities”.

    4) Dichotomy in allowing termination beyond 24 weeks

    • When read together with Section 3(2B) of the bill, a strange dichotomy emerges:
    • 1) It is either the case that medical advancement is such that a safe abortion is possible at any point in the term of pregnancy, and hence, the bill allows it in case of “substantial foetal abnormalities” .
    • Or that, a 24-week ceiling is scientifically essential and abortions beyond the said limit would pose risks to the health of the pregnant woman or the foetus.
    • If it is the former, then allowing termination only in cases of “substantial foetal abnormalities” is a fictitious and moralistic classification.
    • If it is the latter, then the secondary status of women’s safety and the dominant eugenic tenor of the bill once again becomes evident.

    Need to sensitise healthcare provider

    • Access to abortion facilities is limited not just by legislative barriers but also the fear of judgment from medical practitioners.
    • It is imperative that healthcare providers be sensitised towards being scientific, objective and compassionate in their approach to abortions notwithstanding the woman’s marital status.

    Consider the question “What are the changes the Medical Termination of Pregnancy (Amendment) Bill, 2021 seeks to make in the 1971 Act. Discuss the issues with the changed provision in the Act.

    Conclusion

    In KS Puttaswamy v Union of India, the Supreme Court recognised women’s constitutional right to “abstain from procreating” was read into the right to privacy, dignity and bodily autonomy. The MTPA Bill falls short of meeting this constitutional standard and its own stated objectives.

  • How amendment bill will affect Delhi’s administration

    The article highlights the issues with the amendment bill introduced by the Centre to clarify the term ‘Government’.

    Why Delhi was made Union Territory: Historical background

    • When the Constitution came into force, there were four kinds of States, called Parts A,B, C and D States.
    • The last two were administered by centrally appointed Chief Commissioners and Lieutenant Governors, with no locally elected Assemblies to aid and advise them.
    • First, it was felt that if Delhi became a part of any constituent State of the Union, that State would sooner or later acquire a predominant position in relation to other States.
    • Second, the need for keeping the National Capital under the control of the Union Government was deemed to be vital in the national interest.
    • Third, it was felt that if Delhi became a full State, the administration of the National Capital would be divided into rigid compartments of the State field and Union field.
    • Conflicts would likely arise in vital matters, particularly if the two governments were run by different political parties.
    • Hence, Delhi was initially made a Part C State.
    • In 1951, a Legislative Assembly was created with an elected Chief Minister.
    • In 1956, when the Constitution of India was amended to implement the provisions of the States Reorganisation Act, only two categories, namely, States and Union Territories remained in the Indian Union.
    • Delhi then became a Union Territory to be administered by an Administrator appointed by the President.
    • Ten years later, the Delhi Administration Act, 1966 provided for a limited representative Government in Delhi through a Metropolitan Council comprising 56 elected Members and five nominated Members.

    Balakrishnan Committee report

    • In 1989, the Balakrishnan Committee recommended that Delhi should continue to be a Union Territory but that there must be a Legislative Assembly and Council of Ministers responsible to the said Assembly with appropriate powers.
    • Based on this report, the Constitution (69th) Amendment Act and the Government of National Capital Territory of Delhi (GNCT) Act, 1991 were passed.
    • They roughly restored the kind of governance system that was offered to Delhi in 1952: a Union Territory with a Legislative Assembly, a Council of Ministers and an elected Chief Minister.
    • This limited reincarnation has continued to hold the field to date, despite several efforts to progress to full or near-statehood.

    LG-Delhi Government conflict

    • A Bench in 2018 ruled over the conflict and said that Parliament envisaged a representative form of Government for the NCT of Delhi.
    • The Bench also said that the Constitution has mandated a federal balance wherein independence of a certain required degree is assured to the State Governments.
    • The remaining issues of governance, especially in the matter of control over Delhi government servants, was remitted to two judges of the Court for further adjudication.
    • In 2019, there was a difference of opinion recorded in separate judgments by the two judges and the matter awaits hearing before a larger Bench. 

    Issues with the Amendment Bill

    • The central government recently introduced a Bill, namely, the Government of National Capital Territory of Delhi (Amendment) Bill, 2021 seeks, inter alia, to clarify the expression ‘Government’ in 2018 Supreme Court judgement.
    • The Bill effectively reduces the elected government to a mere vestigial organ and elevates the centrally appointed LG, to the position of a Viceroy with plenipotentiary powers.
    • It further provides that before taking any executive action to exercise powers of Government, the opinion of Lieutenant Governor shall be obtained on all such matters as may be specified by Lieutenant Governor.
    • The population of Delhi which counts among the highest in the world, will have an unrepresentative administration.
    • It is quite likely that the amendment act will end up being challenged in the constitutional courts.
    • The Supreme Court has already cautioned — “Interpretation cannot ignore the conscience of the Constitution.“

    Consider the question “Examine the issues with Government of National Capital Territory of Delhi (Amendment) Bill, 2021. Do you think that the Bill will avoid the conflict between the LG and the Delhi government?” 

    Conclusion

    The Amendment Bill should be reconsidered given its impact on the administration of the Delhi government.

  • Anti-defection law: when a nominated MP loses RS membership

    A nominated MP had to resign from Rajya Sabha before the completion of his term due to the Anti-defection law.

    The story of Nominated Members

    • During the making of the Constitution, members of the Constituent Assembly felt that Rajya Sabha should have members who might not win elections but will bring knowledge and expertise to discussions.
    • It led to Rajya Sabha having 12 nominated members from different walks of life.
    • The broad criterion for their nomination is that they should have distinguished themselves in fields like literature, science, art, and social service.
    • The President nominates such individuals as recommended by the Centre.
    • Nominated members have the same rights and privileges as elected members, with one notable difference — they cannot vote in the election of the President.

    Anti-defection law

    • In 1985 the Tenth Schedule, popularly known as the anti-defection law, was added to the Constitution.
    • But its enactment was catalyzed by the political instability after the general elections of 1967.
    • This was the time when multiple state governments were toppled after MLAs changed their political loyalties.
    • The purpose of the 1985 Constitution Amendment was to bring stability to governments by deterring MPs and MLAs from changing their political parties on whose ticket they were elected.
    • The penalty for shifting political loyalties is the loss of parliamentary membership and a bar on becoming a minister.

    Try this PYQ:

    Consider the following statements:

    1. The Chairman and the Deputy Chairman of the Rajya Sabha are not the members of that House.
    2. While the nominated members of the two Houses of the Parliament have no voting right in the presidential election, they have the right to vote in the election of the Vice President.

    Which of the statements given above is/are correct?

    (a) 1 only

    (b) 2 only

    (c) Both 1 and 2

    (d) Neither 1 nor 2

    What invites defection?

    The law covers three types of scenarios with respect to MP switching parties.

    1. The first is when a member elected on the ticket of a political party “voluntarily gives up” membership of such a party or votes in the House contrary to the wishes of the party.
    2. The second possibility is when an MP who has won his or her seat as an independent candidate after the election joins a political party. In both these instances, the MP lose the seat in the House on changing (or joining) a party.
    3. The third scenario relates to nominated MPs. In their case, the law specifies that within six months of being nominated to the House, they can choose to join a political party.

    Why is a nominated member given 6month time?

    • The time is given so that if a nominated MP is not a member of a political party, they can decide to join one if they want.
    • But if they don’t join a political party during the first six months of their tenure, and join a party thereafter, then they lose their seat in Parliament.

  • What is No-Confidence Motion?

    The no-confidence motion moved against the coalition government in Haryana was defeated.

    Motion of No-Confidence

    • If the government has to demonstrate its strength on the floor of the House, it can have a motion of confidence.
    • However, the opposition parties (or any member) can move a motion expressing want of confidence (no confidence) in the Council of Ministers.
    • The procedure is laid down under Rule 198 of the rules of procedure and conduct of the business of the Lok Sabha.
    • A no-confidence motion need not set out any grounds on which it is based.
    • Even when grounds are mentioned in the notice and read out in the House, they do not form part of the no-confidence motion.

    Try this PYQ:

    Consider the following statements regarding a No-Confidence Motion in India:

    1. There is no mention of a No-Confidence Motion in the Constitution of India.
    2. A Motion of No-Confidence can be introduced in the Lok Sabha only.

    Which of the statements given above is / are correct?

    (a) 1 only

    (b) 2 only

    (c) Both 1 and 2

    (d) Neither 1 nor 2

    Its procedure

    • A no-confidence motion can be moved by any member of the House.
    • It can be moved only in the Lok Sabha and not Rajya Sabha.
    • Rule 198 of the Rules of Procedure and conduct of Lok Sabha specifies the procedure for moving a no-confidence motion.
    • The member has to give written notice of the motion before 10 am which will be read out by the Speaker in the House.
    • A minimum of 50 members have to accept the motion and accordingly, the Speaker will announce the date for discussion for the motion.
    • The allotted date has to be within 10 days from the day the motion is accepted. Otherwise, the motion fails and the member who moved the motion will be informed about it.
    • If the government is not able to prove its majority in the House, then the government of the day has to resign.

    How is the voting done?

    These are the modes by which voting can be conducted:

    1. Voice vote: In a voice vote, the legislators respond orally.
    2. Division vote: In case of a division vote, voting is done using electronic gadgets, slips or in a ballot box.
    3. Ballot vote: The ballot box is usually a secret vote – just like how people vote during state or parliamentary elections.

    What happens if there is a tie?

    • Following the vote, the person who has the majority will be allowed to form the government.
    • In case there is a tie, the speaker can cast his vote.

  • Live Telecast of Parliament Proceedings

    Lok Sabha Television (LSTV) and Rajya Sabha Television (RSTV) have been merged into a single ‘Sansad TV’.

    Live telecast of parliament

    • Lok Sabha TV is the older of the two — it started operating on July 24, 2006.
    • The channel’s vision, according to its website, is to reach the “live proceedings of the Parliament House…to every household”.
    • This is because awareness of citizens towards the working of Member of Parliament in the Parliament House helps in bringing awareness about various efforts of various stakeholders in the governance process.
    • The information empowers the citizens to utilise their democratic rights diligently and be part of the democratic ecosystem.

    Do you know?

    The Union Budget allocates funds for the running of channels.

    Inception of the idea

    • LSTV was the brainchild of former Lok Sabha Speaker Somnath Chatterjee.
    • People familiar with the circumstances in which the channel was set up, said that then Rajya Sabha Chairman Bhairon Singh Shekhawat was not really convinced with Chatterjee’s proposal.
    • It was during his time of Shekhawat’s successor, Hamid Ansari, that the separate channel for the Upper House materialized.

    Before the channels

    • Before LSTV started functioning as a channel, select parliamentary proceedings had been televised since December 20, 198.
    • On April 18, 1994, the entire proceedings of Lok Sabha started to be filmed.
    • And in August that year, a Low Power Transmitter (LPT) was set up and made operational in Parliament House to telecast the proceedings live.
    • From December 1994, Question Hour in both Houses was telecast live on alternate weeks on Doordarshan.
    • It was arranged in such a manner that during the telecast of the Question Hour of one House by Doordarshan, the Question Hour of the other House was broadcast by All India Radio.
    • When the DD News channel was launched, Question Hour in both Houses started getting telecast simultaneously on DD channels.

    Separate channels

    • But it was only after a decade, in December 2004, that a separate dedicated satellite channel was set up for the live telecast of the proceedings of both Houses.
    • In 2006, LSTV started airing the proceedings of the Lower House live.
    • RSTV was launched in 2011. Apart from telecasting live the proceedings in Rajya Sabha, it also brings analyses of parliamentary affairs and provides a platform for knowledge-based programmes.

  • The absurdity of the anti-defection law

    The article highlights the shortcomings of the anti-defection law and its failure in ensuring the stability of the government.

    Background of anti-defection law

    • The anti-defection law was included in the Constitution as the Tenth Schedule in 1985.
    • The main purpose was to preserve the stability of governments and insulate them from defections of legislators from the treasury benches.
    • The law stated that any Member of Parliament (MP) or that of a State legislature (MLA) would be disqualified from their office if they voted on any motion contrary to the directions issued by their party.

    Issues with the anti-defection law

    1) Against the concept of representative democracy

    • The provisions of the anti-defection law is not limited to confidence motions or money bills.
    • It applies to all votes in the House, on every Bill and every other issue.
    • It even applies to the Rajya Sabha and Legislative Councils, which have no say in the stability of the government.
    • Therefore, an MP (or MLA) has absolutely no freedom to vote their judgement on any issue.
    • They have to blindly follow the direction of the party.
    • This provision goes against the concept of representative democracy.

    2) The act turns legislator to be an agent of  the party

    • There are two broadly accepted roles of a representative such as an MP.
    • One is that they are agents of the voters and are expected to vote according to the wishes and for the benefits of their constituents.
    • The other is that their duty to their constituents is to exercise their judgement on various issues towards the broader public interest.
    • In this, they deliberate with other MPs and find a reasonable way through complex issues.
    • The anti-defection law makes the MP neither a delegate of the constituency nor a national legislator but converts them to be just an agent of the party.

    3) Broken chain

    • The legislator is accountable to voters, and the government is accountable to legislators.
    • In India, this chain of accountability has been broken by making legislators accountable primarily to the party.
    • This means that anyone from the party having a majority in the legislature is unable to hold the government to account.
    • This negates the concept of them having to justify their positions on various issues to the people who elected them to the post.

    4) No incentive for MPs to understand policy choices

    • If an MP has no freedom to take decisions on policy and legislative proposals, there would be no incentive to put in the effort to understand the different policy choices and their outcomes.
    •  The MP becomes just another number to be tallied by the party on any vote that it supports or opposes.

    5) Weakening of the accountability mechanism

    • While introducing the draft Constitution, Dr. B.R. Ambedkar said that the presidential form (such as in the United States) had higher stability but lower accountability.
    • This is because the President is elected for four years, and cannot be removed except for proven misdemeanour.
    • In the parliamentary form, the government is accountable on a daily basis through questions and motions and can be removed any time it loses the support of the majority of members of the Lok Sabha.
    • The drafting committee believed that India needed a government that was accountable, even at the cost of stability.
    • The anti-defection bill weakens the accountability mechanism.

    6) The act fails to provide stability

    • The political system has found ways to topple governments by reducing the total membership through resignations.
    • In other instances, the Speaker — usually from the ruling party — has delayed taking a decision on the disqualification.
    • The Supreme Court has tried to plug this by ruling that the Speaker has to take the decision in three months, but it is not clear what would happen if a Speaker does not do so.
    • The premise that the anti-defection law is needed to punish legislators who betray the mandate given by the voters also seems to be flawed.
    • We have seen many of the defectors in States such as Karnataka and Madhya Pradesh being re-elected in the by-polls, which were held due to their disqualification.

    Way forward

    • The problem arises from the attempt to find a legal solution to what is essentially a political problem.
    • If stability of government is an issue due to people defecting from their parties, the answer is for parties to strengthen their internal systems.
    •  If parties attract members on the basis of ideology, and they have systems for people to rise within the party hierarchy on their capabilities rather than inheritance, there would be a greater exit barrier.

    Consider the question “How far has the anti-defection law succeeded in preventing the destabilisation of the governments? Give reasons in support of your argument.”

    Conclusion

    The anti-defection law has been detrimental to the functioning of our legislatures as deliberative bodies which hold the executive to account on behalf of citizens. It has turned them into fora to endorse the decision of the government on Bills and budgets. And it has not even done the job of preserving the stability of governments. The Tenth Schedule to the Constitution must be repealed.

  • structural issues with legislatures in Union Territories

    There are structural flaws in the provisions of the composition of legislature and the relationship between the council of ministers and the Administrator in the UTs.

    Pattern in the resignations of MLAs

    • Recently, the resignations of MLAs from the Puducherry Assembly led to the fall of government there.
    • The same had happened in 2019 in Karnataka.
    • Resigning from the membership of the House is every member’s right.
    • But according to Article 190 of the Constitution, the resignation should be voluntary or genuine.
    • If the Speaker has information to the contrary, he or she is not obliged to accept the resignation.
    • But there is by now a familiar pattern to the resignations of Members of the Legislative Assembly.
    • Such resignations invariably lead to the fall of the government.

    Purpose of providing legislature to UTs

    • The Constitution-makers/ Parliament provided a legislature and Council of Ministers to some of the UTs to fulfil the democratic aspirations of the people of these territories.
    • There was a realisation that the administration of these territories directly by the President through the administrators under Article 239 does not meet the democratic aspirations of the people.
    • The creation of a legislature and a Council of Ministers is logical and in consonance with the policy of the state to promote democracy.

    Structural issues with legislature in UTs

    1) Nomination of members and issues with it

    • A closer look at the relevant provisions in the Constitution reveals that this professed aim has often been sought to be defeated by the Union.
    • Article 239A was originally brought in, in 1962, to enable Parliament to create legislatures for the UTs.
    • A legislature without a Council of Ministers or a Council of Ministers without a legislature is a conceptual absurdity.
    • Similarly, a legislature that is partly elected and partly nominated is another absurdity.
    • The issue of nomination of members to the Puducherry Assembly had raised a huge controversy.
    • The Government of Union Territories Act provides for a 33-member House for Puducherry of whom three are to be nominated by the Central government.
    • So, when the Union government nominated three BJP members to the Assembly without consulting the government, it was challenged in the court.
    • Finally, the Supreme Court (K. Lakshminarayanan v. Union of India, 2019) held that the Union government is not required to consult the State government for nominating members to the Assembly and the nominated members have the same right to vote as the elected members.
    • There is provision for nomination of members to the Rajya Sabha [Article 80 (i)(a)].
    • But clause (3) of the Article specifies the fields from which they will be nominated.
    • But in the case of nomination to the Puducherry Assembly, no such qualification is laid down either in Article 239A or the Government of Union Territories Act.
    • This leaves the field open for the Union government to nominate anyone irrespective of whether he or she is suitable.
    •  As things stand, the law invites arbitrariness in dealing with the nomination of members to the UT legislature.

    2) Administrator’s powers

    • The administrator has the right to disagree with the decisions of the Council of Ministers and then refer them to the President for a final decision.
    • The President decides on the advice of the Union government.
    • So, in effect, it is the Union government which finally determines the disputed issue.
    • Although in NCT of Delhi v. Union of India (2019), the Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court had said that the administrator should not misuse this power.
    • The bench also said that the Administrator should use it after all methods have failed to reconcile the differences between him/her and the Council of Ministers.
    • As a matter of fact, such conflicts between the administrator, who is the nominee of the President, and the elected government is inherent in the constitutional arrangement created for the UTs.

    Consider the question “The conflicts between the administrator, who is the nominee of the President and the elected government is inherent in the constitutional arrangement created for the UTs. Comment.”

    Conclusion

    Experience shows that the UTs having legislatures with ultimate control vested in the central administrator are not workable. So far as the conspiratorial resignation by legislators to bring down their own government is concerned, the political class will have to get the better of the predatory instincts of political parties through constitutional or other means.

  • Voice vote as constitutional subterfuge

    The article discusses the issue of undermining of the upper house by passing the certain bills through voice vote and use of money bill route.

    Passing of the Bill by voice vote

    • The Karnataka Prevention of Slaughter and Preservation of Cattle Bill was passed by the State’s Legislative Council by voice vote without any division.
    • The law was passed by the Council despite the lack of a majority.
    • There was no division vote based on actual voting as is usual and as the Opposition members had demanded.

    A new legislative precedent

    • Similar process was followed to pass the controversial farm laws (by the Rajya Sabha) in September 2020.
    • The pandemonium in the House caused by heated interventions by the Opposition was used as a pretext to resort to a voice vote.
    • The laws passed with a voice vote seem like a new template for bypassing the constitutionally envisaged legislative process.
    • Another process repeatedly used over the last few years to bypass the Upper House of Parliament is the Money Bill route.
    • The Aadhaar Bill was passed in this manner.
    • Other controversial laws such as those pertaining to electoral bonds, retrospective validation of foreign political contributions and the overhaul of the legal regime relating to tribunals have also been carried out through the Money Bill route.

    The Rajya Sabha’s role

    • The Lok Sabha is seen as directly representing the will of the people, and the Rajya Sabha as standing in its way.
    • The countervailing function of the Upper House is rarely seen as legitimate.
    • The Rajya Sabha has historically stopped the ruling party from carrying out even more significant legal changes.
    • The Rajya Sabha is imperfect, partly because of constitutional design.
    • And partly because obviously undesirable practices, such as members representing States they have no affiliation to, have been allowed to flourish.

    Importance of bicameralism

    • The very questioning of the monopoly of the Lower House to represent the ‘people’ makes bicameralism desirable, argues legal philosopher Jeremy Waldron.
    • In India, the fact that the Rajya Sabha membership is determined by elections to State Assemblies leads to a different principle of representation, often allowing different factors to prevail than those in the Lok Sabha elections.
    • John Stuart Mill had warned about a single assembly becoming despotic and overweening, if released from the necessity of considering whether its acts will be concurred in by another constituted authority.
    • The other merit of bicameralism is significant in a Westminster system like India, where the Lower House is dominated by the executive.
    • The Rajya Sabha holds the potential of a somewhat different legislative relation to the executive, making a robust separation of powers possible.

    Consider the question “Examine the importance of bicameralism in India. Why passage of certain bills as money bill is causing controversies?”

    Conclusion

    The important role played by the upper house needs to be recognised and respected in the legislative processess.

  • What is a Money Bill?

    In a pre-emptive move, the opposition has written to Lok Sabha Speaker, urging him not to bypass the Rajya Sabha by declaring key Bills as “money bills”.

    What is a Money Bill?

    • A money bill is defined by Article 110 of the Constitution, as a draft law that contains only provisions that deal with all or any of the matters listed therein.
    • These comprise a set of seven features, broadly including items such as-
    1. Imposition, abolition, remission, alteration or regulation of any tax
    2. Regulation of the borrowing of money by the GOI
    3. Custody of the Consolidated Fund of India (CFI) or the Contingency Fund of India, the payment of money into or the withdrawal of money from any such fund
    4. Appropriation of money out of the CFI
    5. Declaration of any expenditure charged on the CFI or increasing the amount of any such expenditure
    6. Receipt of money on account of the CFI or the public account of India or the custody or issue of such money, or the audit of the accounts of the Union or of a state
    7. Any matter incidental to any of the matters specified above.

    Who controls such bills?

    • In the event proposed legislation contains other features, ones that are not merely incidental to the items specifically outlined, such a draft law cannot be classified as a money bill.
    • Article 110 further clarifies that in cases where a dispute arises over whether a bill is a money bill or not, the Lok Sabha Speaker’s decision on the issue shall be considered final.

    What surrounds the ‘Money Bill’ controversy?

    • While all Money Bills are Financial Bills, all Financial Bills are not Money Bills.
    • For example, the Finance Bill which only contains provisions related to tax proposals would be a Money Bill.
    • However, a Bill that contains some provisions related to taxation or expenditure, but also covers other matters would be considered a Financial Bill.
    • Again, the procedure for the passage of the two bills varies significantly. The Rajya Sabha (where the ruling party might not have the majority) has no power to reject or amend a Money Bill.
    • However, a Financial Bill must be passed by both Houses of Parliament.
    • The Speaker (nonetheless, a member of the ruling party) certifies a Bill as a Money Bill, and the Speaker’s decision is final.
    • Also, the Constitution states that parliamentary proceedings, as well as officers responsible for the conduct of business (such as the Speaker), may not be questioned by any Court.

    Back2Basics:

    What is Finance Bill?