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GS Paper: GS3-21.Role of External State and Non-state Actors in creating challenges to Internal Security.

  • How Serious Is the Kudankulam Data Leak

    Why in the News?

    A ransomware breach at Yotta Data Services, a third-party data-centre vendor for Reliance Infrastructure Ltd, led to the leak of 14.3 GB of operational data related to the Kudankulam Nuclear Power Plant on the dark web platform World Leaks. Nuclear Power Corporation of India Limited (NPCIL) states the breach did not touch core reactor or nuclear-security systems, but the incident exposes how strategic nuclear infrastructure remains vulnerable through third-party digital supply chains.

    What exactly happened, and how did the breach occur?

    1. Breach reported: Reports emerged that multiple gigabytes of data on Kudankulam Nuclear Power Plant operations were copied and leaked as part of a ransomware attack.
    2. Point of infiltration: The infiltration targeted Reliance Anil Dhirubhai Ambani Group’s Reliance Infrastructure Ltd, not NPCIL directly.
    3. Scale of leak: 14.3 GB of Kudankulam-related data formed part of a larger 1.2 TB dataset hosted on World Leaks.
    4. World Leaks: World Leaks is a dark web site operated by cybercriminals who infect firms with ransomware and threaten to publish stolen data if a ransom is not paid.
    5. Trigger for publication: The site claims the ransom was not paid, resulting in the data being leaked publicly.

    Was the reactor or nuclear-safety systems compromised?

    1. NPCIL’s position: NPCIL states the leaked files pertain only to Balance of Plant (BOP: conventional common service facilities of a power plant, distinct from the reactor core) and not to nuclear safety or security-related systems.
    2. Reliance’s position: Reliance states no ransomware execution, data loss, or lateral movement occurred, despite confirming a partial breach of data hosted on Yotta’s servers.
    3. Nature of leaked files: The files reportedly include equipment blueprints, supplier details, meeting and inspection records, and equipment reviews.
    4. Insurance detail exposed: A $112 million insurance policy against terrorist attacks was among the leaked details, with the premium amount undisclosed.

    Why does the official reassurance not fully resolve the concern?

    1. Narrow definition of harm: Restricting concern to “core reactor systems” ignores that BOP data such as blueprints and inspection records can still aid reconnaissance or attack planning against a strategic facility.
    2. Layered outsourcing risk: Reliance itself depends on a third-party vendor, Yotta, for data hosting, showing that critical infrastructure security depends on vendors several steps removed from NPCIL.
    3. Self-assessment, not independent audit: Both Reliance and Yotta’s claims that no ransomware execution or lateral movement occurred rest on the vendor’s own internal forensic assessment, not an independent verification.
    4. Transparency gap: The premium amount for the $112 million terrorism insurance policy remains undisclosed even after the leak, showing incomplete disclosure despite the reassurances offered.

    What does the incident reveal about the plant’s strategic significance going forward?

    1. Current capacity: Kudankulam has commissioned two 1,000 MWe VVER (a Russian-designed pressurised water reactor type) units, supplying up to two gigawatts, built in partnership with Russian firm Rosatom.
    2. Expansion underway: The government plans four more units at the site, which would triple installed capacity, expanding the facility’s strategic value and its digital attack surface.
    3. Gap between messaging and internal concern: The revelations have caused “absolute commotion” among plant officials internally, even as public statements downplay the breach’s significance.

    Conclusion

    The Kudankulam leak shows that reassurances confined to “core reactor safety systems” do not address the full risk profile of a strategic nuclear facility. This is because non-core operational data hosted through layered third-party vendors remains commercially and strategically sensitive. As Kudankulam’s capacity is set to triple, critical infrastructure protection frameworks need to extend cybersecurity accountability across the entire vendor supply chain, not the reactor core alone. Additionally this requires independent verification rather than self-reported vendor assessments.

    PYQ Relevance

    [UPSC 2023] What are the different elements of cybersecurity? Keeping in view the challenges in cybersecurity, examine India’s preparedness in preventing cyber attacks.

    Linkage: The article highlights cybersecurity challenges in protecting India’s critical infrastructure from ransomware and third-party data breaches. The Kudankulam data leak underscores the need to strengthen cyber resilience, vendor security, and protection of critical infrastructure despite no compromise of reactor systems.

  • India’s eastern border affected by flow of opium from Myanmar

    Why in the News?

    The Narcotics Control Bureau (NCB) released its 2026 annual report on 27 June 2026, tabled by Home Minister Amit Shah. The report documents Myanmar’s emergence as the primary global opium source following the Taliban’s 2022 ban on drug cultivation in Afghanistan. Infact, India’s northeastern border corridor is identified as the most direct and porous entry point for this expanding production base. 

    What change in the global narcotics supply chain has created new pressure on India’s northeastern borders?

    1. Taliban-imposed ban: The Taliban government’s 2022 ban on drug cultivation in Afghanistan eliminated the world’s largest opium producer from the supply chain, creating a vacuum in global opium supply.
    2. Myanmar’s replacement role: Myanmar filled this vacuum rapidly. The NCB’s 2026 annual report identifies Myanmar as the alternative global opium source, with consequences already visible along India’s eastern borders.
    3. Scale of cultivation expansion: Myanmar’s illicit opium cultivation expanded by approximately 56% between 2021 and 2023. The area under poppy cultivation reached 45,200 hectares.
    4. Golden Triangle transformation: Myanmar’s Golden Triangle has expanded beyond its traditional opiate role. Shan State now produces both opium and methamphetamine (Yaba), making it a major poly-drug hub.
    5. Manipur corridor as primary entry point: National Highway-102 through Manipur is the main land route for heroin and methamphetamine into India.
    6. Secondary corridor via Mizoram: Champhai in Mizoram provides the second major trafficking route via Myanmar’s Chin State. Drugs are routed through Assam’s Barak Valley via Aizawl and adjoining road networks.

    How have India’s northeastern states been transformed from transit zones into active narcotics staging grounds?

    1. Porous border mechanisms: The Free Movement Regime (FMR) along the India-Myanmar border and unfenced border stretches have converted the Northeast from a transit route into a distribution hub.
    2. States bearing frontline exposure: The NCB report specifically identifies that Manipur, Mizoram and Nagaland face the highest exposure due to increased drug production in Myanmar.
    3. Mizoram’s seizure data: Mizoram seized 1,477 kg of amphetamine-type stimulants (ATS) in 2025 out of the national total of 3,485 kg.
    4. Manipur’s seizure data: Manipur accounted for 535 kg in recoveries from other reported states. Delhi (454 kg), Gujarat (308 kg), and Karnataka (164 kg) reported significant quantities, demonstrating that narcotics originating from the northeast are penetrating deep into the hinterland.
    5. Distribution geography: Drugs move through the Barak Valley to Punjab, Gujarat and Maharashtra, making the Northeast a distribution node rather than a consumption centre.

    What does the drone-based trafficking data reveal about the operational maturity of trafficking networks?

    1. Five-fold increase from Pakistan border: Drone-based drug trafficking from across the Pakistan border into India has increased five-fold over the past five years, particularly in Punjab, demonstrating aerial circumvention of border controls.
    2. Incident trajectory (NCB data): Drone trafficking incidents surged from 3 in 2021 to 35 in 2022, 28 in 2023, 178 in 2024, and 305 in 2025, This is a 100-fold increase in incident count over five years.
    3. Seizure volume in 2025: In 2025, drone-related cases resulted in the seizure of 468 kg of narcotics, a 96% increase in quantity over 2024. Punjab recorded 298 cases and 461 kg seized.
    4. UAV sophistication: Trafficking networks are using unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) to circumvent traditional border controls, the NCB stated.
    5. Additional reporting states: Geographical spread: Rajasthan and Jammu & Kashmir also reported drone-related trafficking incidents.

    Where does the structural vulnerability in India’s border architecture lie and why cannot existing mechanisms address it?

    1. The FMR design conflict: The FMR facilitates movement of border communities. This objective conflicts with effective narcotics interdiction.
    2. Unfenced stretches: Drugs are smuggled through unfenced and porous stretches of the border.
    3. Geographic chokepoint: National Highway No. 102 through the Manipur corridor, the Champhai route in Mizoram carry both legal trade and illicit narcotics, making interception difficult.
    4. Ethnic armed group control: The poly-drug production in Myanmar is primarily concentrated in areas controlled by ethnic armed groups in Shan State. These groups operate outside the reach of both the Myanmar state and Indian border enforcement, making source-side interdiction impossible.
    5. South Asian arm of Afghan trade: The NCB specifically identifies that the South Asian arm of the Afghan drug trade flows through Pakistan into India via both the land frontier (Punjab, Rajasthan) and the maritime frontier (Gujarat, Maharashtra coastlines).

    Conclusion

    Myanmar’s rise as the world’s alternative opium supplier has created a structural narcotics challenge for India. The Northeast has become an active distribution hub rather than merely a transit corridor. Drone-enabled trafficking further weakens conventional border controls. Addressing the challenge requires technology-driven surveillance, calibrated reforms to the FMR and stronger cooperation with Myanmar.

    PYQ Relevance

    [UPSC 2018] India’s proximity to two of the world’s biggest illicit opium-growing states has enhanced its internal security concerns. Explain the linkages between drug trafficking and other illicit activities such as gunrunning, money laundering, and human trafficking. What countermeasures should be taken to prevent the same?

    Linkage: The PYQ examines the internal security implications of cross-border drug trafficking and its nexus with organised crime. The article explains how Myanmar-origin narcotics trafficking through India’s northeastern border has become a major cross-border security challenge.

  • Myanmar Replaces Afghanistan as Major Opium Source

    Why in News?

    The NCB Annual Report 2026 states that after the Taliban’s 2022 ban on opium cultivation in Afghanistan, Myanmar has become a major global opium source, increasing drug trafficking along India’s eastern borders.

    Key Highlights

    • Myanmar’s illicit opium cultivation increased by 56% (2021 to 2023), reaching 45,200 hectares.
    • The Manipur corridor (NH-102) is the primary route for heroin and methamphetamine entering India.
    • Champhai (Mizoram) is another major trafficking route via Myanmar’s Chin State.
    • The Golden Triangle (Myanmar, Laos, Thailand) has become a major hub for opium and methamphetamine (Yaba) production.

    Border Security Concerns

    • Porous India-Myanmar border and the Free Movement Regime (FMR) facilitate cross-border trafficking.
    • Northeastern states, especially Manipur, Mizoram and Nagaland, are increasingly used as transit and distribution hubs.

    Drone-Based Trafficking

    • Drone smuggling from Pakistan rose from 3 incidents (2021) to 305 incidents (2025).
    • In 2025, 468 kg of narcotics were seized through drones, with Punjab accounting for 298 cases.

    Other Trafficking Routes

    • Eastern Route: Myanmar → Manipur/Mizoram → Assam → Rest of India.
    • Western Route: Afghanistan → Pakistan → Punjab/Rajasthan.
    • Maritime Route: Pakistan → Gujarat/Maharashtra via fishing vessels.

    Government Response

    • Enhanced border surveillance and drone detection.
    • Intelligence-led operations by the Narcotics Control Bureau (NCB).
    • Increased international cooperation against cross-border narcotics trafficking.

    Prelims Facts

    • Golden Triangle: Myanmar, Laos, Thailand.
    • Golden Crescent: Afghanistan, Pakistan, Iran.
    • Yaba: Methamphetamine + caffeine tablets.
    • FMR: Allows border residents to cross the India-Myanmar border without a visa within prescribed limits.
  • The China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) is viewed as a cardinal subset of China’s larger ‘One Belt One Road’ initiative. Give a brief description of CPEC and enumerate the reasons why India has distanced itself from the same.

    The CPEC is a flagship connectivity and infrastructure project linking China’s Xinjiang province to Pakistan’s Gwadar port through roads, railways, pipelines and industrial zones.

    Description of CPEC

    Around 3,000 km corridor from Kashgar (China) to Gwadar (Pakistan).

    Investment Scale – over USD 60 billion across energy, transport and industrial sectors.

    Infrastructure Focus – Roads, railways, ports, power plants and Special Economic Zones.

    Solves ‘Malacca Dilemma’ of China – Provides access to the Arabian Sea, bypassing the Malacca Strait.

    It is the link between the Silk Road Economic Belt and the Maritime Silk Road.

    Reasons behind India distanced itself from CPEC

    Strategic Encirclement Concerns (String of Pearls) – Eg- Chinese control and presence at Gwadar port.

    Military and Security Implications – Dual-use infrastructure can support Chinese naval and military operations.

    Economic Non-Viability – India has concerns regarding the “debt trap” nature of BRI projects. Eg- Sri Lanka’s Hambantota port experience.

    Lack of Transparency and Consultation – CPEC and BRI lack open, multilateral consultation and standardised norms.

    Undermines Rules-Based International Order – Projects ignore environmental, social and legal standards.

    Geo-Strategic Marginalisation – Expansion of CPEC into Afghanistan could undermine India’s alternative connectivity initiatives like Chabahar Port and the INSTC.

    Due to CPEC, China may emerge as a ‘direct party’ in the Kashmir dispute in future.

    As Robert Kaplan observes, “Geography is the canvas on which history is painted.” By opposing CPEC, India seeks to uphold a rules-based approach to regional integration.

  • Analyse the multidimensıonal challenges posed by external state and non-state actors, to the internal security of India. Also, discuss measures required to be taken to combat these threats

    Internal security can be defined as the management of security within the border of a country. It involves the maintenance of peace, law and order, upholding the sovereignty of the country and dealing with external state and non-state actors.

    Multidimensional Challenges Posed by External Actors

    Challenges from External State Actors

    Proxy Warfare by Pakistan to ‘Bleed India by thousand cuts’. Eg- Pakistan-backed LeT and JeM in Jammu & Kashmir.

    Border incursions by china. Eg- Galwan clash

    Cyber spionage targeting digital and critical systems. Eg- APT41 (China), targeted Indian telecom, power grids

    Strategic Encirclement under ‘string of pearls’. Eg- Chinese presence at Gwadar, Hambantota and Maldives.

    Disinformation Operations – Use of social media and digital platforms to spread fake news, incite communal unrest, and delegitimize democratic institutions.

    Hybrid Warfare – Eg- use of drones by Pakistan to challenge India’s air defenses during 2025 Operation Sindoor

    Illegal migration along porus border impacting demography in border states and leading to social unrest. Eg- Rohingya infiltration via Bangladesh

    Challenges from External Non-State Actors

    Terrorist Organisations – Violence to create fear and instability. Eg- Red Fort Bombings

    Organized Crime Syndicates – Terror-financing, arms & drug smuggling, extortion, money laundering etc. Eg- D-Company

    Left-Wing Extremists (Naxalites) – Guerrilla attacks on police and destruction of infrastructure. Eg- dantewada attack

    North-East Insurgent Groups – Ethnic militancy, drug and human trafficking along India-Myanmar border. Eg- NSCN (IM), ULFA

    Cyber Criminals – Data breaches, espionage, financial frauds, infrastructure sabotage etc. Eg- RedEcho group (China-linked)

    Foreign-Funded NGOs – Anti-development protests, exploitation of tribal/ethnic fault lines (loss of 2% of GDP – IB Report).

    Narco-Terrorism – Drug trade funding violence and terrorism. Eg- Heroin and arms smuggling via Punjab border.

    Measures required

    Policy measures

    Finalisation of National security doctrine

    Federal coordination through national internal security council

    Security and Intelligence Measures

    Strengthening HUMINT (Human Intelligence) and TECHINT (Technological Intelligence).

    SMART Borders (Madhukar Gupta Committee)

    Legal and Institutional Measures

    Robust Counter-Terror and AML Frameworks – Swift investigation, prosecution and conviction under UAPA and PMLA

    Cyber Security Capacity – Expansion of CERT-In, cyber commands and AI-based monitoring.

    Diplomatic Measures

    International Cooperation through intelligence sharing and financial sanctions. Eg- FATF Grey Listing

    Raising cost of terrorism for Pakistan. Eg- Operation Sindoor

    Social and developmental Measures

    De-radicalisation and Counselling of youth

    Heart and mind strategy – Eg- Operation Sadbhavana (Goodwill) of Indian Army

    Employment and Skill Development to mainstream youth. Eg- Udaan Scheme

    Technological Measures

    Use of AI, Big Data and Satellites – Predictive policing and early threat detection.

    As per Kautilya, security witthin borders is indispensible for achieving Yogakshema – security, welfare, and prosperity of citizens

  • N–SLN DIVEX 2026  

    Why in News

    • INS Nireekshak reached Colombo to participate in the 4th India–Sri Lanka Diving Exercise (IN–SLN DIVEX 2026).

    About the Exercise

    • Name: IN–SLN DIVEX 2026
    • Edition: 4th
    • Participants: Indian Navy and Sri Lankan Navy

    About INS Nireekshak

    • Type: Diving Support and Submarine Rescue Vessel
    • Role:
      • Deep-sea diving operations
      • Submarine rescue missions
      • Underwater engineering tasks
    [2024] Which of the following statements about ‘Exercise Mitra Shakti-2023’ are correct? 
    1. This was a joint military exercise between India and Bangladesh. 
    2. It commenced in Aundh (Pune). 
    3. Joint response during counter-terrorism operation was a goal of this operation. 
    4. Indian Air Force was a part of this exercise. 
    Select the answer using the code given below : 
    [A] 1, 2 and 3 [B] 1, 2 and 4 [C] 1, 3 and 4 [D] 2, 3 and 4
  • Maoist operations: What after March 31 milestone

    Why in the News?

    India’s anti-Maoist operations have reached a historic turning point with a government-set March 31 deadline, signaling near-elimination of Left Wing Extremism, a sharp contrast to decades when Maoists controlled vast “Red Corridor” regions. The scale of decline is striking, with affected districts shrinking from ~200 to ~38 and deaths falling significantly, indicating a major security success. However, the bigger concern now is whether this victory can be sustained through governance, as the persistence of inequality, displacement, and weak state presence could allow extremist ideologies to re-emerge in new forms.

    How has the State gained the upper hand over Maoists?

    1. Leadership decapitation: Neutralization of top CPI (Maoist) leadership weakened command structure; example, central committee disruption and fragmented local units
    2. Security operations intensity: High-intensity operations by CRPF and state police forces reduced insurgent mobility
    3. Infrastructure expansion: Construction of 15,000+ km roads and 9,000+ mobile towers improved state reach in remote areas
    4. Forward deployment: Establishment of 650+ fortified camps enabled continuous presence in core insurgency zones
    5. Decline in affected districts: Reduction from ~200 districts (early 2000s) to 38 districts (2025); only 7 districts remain highly affected
    6. Casualty reduction: LWE-related deaths reduced from 1000+ annually (2010 peak) to significantly lower levels

    What explains the decline of Left Wing Extremism?

    1. Integrated strategy: Combination of “clear, hold, develop” approach ensured security followed by governance penetration
    2. Policy continuity: Successive governments continued LWE strategy with refinements rather than abrupt changes
    3. Financial choking: Disruption of Maoist funding networks reduced operational capability
    4. Loss of ideological appeal: Declining resonance of violent revolution among tribal youth due to increased exposure and mobility
    5. Localized resistance: Weakening of traditional support base as local populations disengaged from Maoist networks

    Why is security success not sufficient for long-term stability?

    1. Legitimacy deficit: Military victory does not automatically translate into trust in state institutions
    2. Governance gaps: Weak delivery of welfare services in tribal areas risks renewed alienation
    3. Development paradox: Infrastructure expansion without inclusive growth may deepen inequalities
    4. Historical grievances: Issues like land alienation, displacement due to mining, and lack of forest rights remain unresolved
    5. Risk of relapse: Absence of state legitimacy may allow extremist ideologies to re-emerge in altered forms

    What structural issues continue to fuel Maoist ideology?

    1. Land inequality: Persistence of semi-feudal land relations in tribal belts
    2. Displacement: Large-scale displacement due to mining and industrial projects without adequate rehabilitation
    3. Governance exclusion: Limited participation of tribal communities in decision-making processes
    4. Social injustice: Continued marginalization of Adivasis in access to education, healthcare, and livelihoods
    5. State absence: In remote areas, Maoists previously acted as parallel governance structures, filling administrative gaps

    What is the risk of a new phase of radicalism?

    1. Ideological transformation: Shift from armed insurgency to non-violent but radical mobilizations
    2. Urban networks: Potential expansion into urban activism focusing on environmental justice, labor rights
    3. Fragmented resistance: Emergence of localized, issue-based protests rather than centralized insurgency
    4. Youth discontent: Educated but unemployed youth may become new carriers of dissent
    5. Digital mobilization: Increased use of social media for ideological propagation

    What policy shift is required after the March 31 milestone?

    1. Governance consolidation: Ensures sustained delivery of welfare schemes in LWE-affected areas
    2. Administrative reform: Strengthens bureaucratic responsiveness in remote regions
    3. Inclusive development: Prioritizes tribal rights, land reforms, and livelihood generation
    4. Community participation: Enhances local governance through Panchayati Raj institutions
    5. Preventive approach: Focuses on addressing root causes rather than reactive security measures 

    Conclusion

    India’s success in weakening Maoist insurgency represents a major internal security achievement, but it marks only the end of the first phase. The real challenge lies in transforming coercive control into consensual legitimacy. Without addressing structural inequities and governance deficits, the vacuum left by Maoists may be filled by new forms of radicalism.

    PYQ Relevance

    [UPSC 2022] Naxalism is a social, economic and developmental issue manifesting as a violent internal security threat. In this context, discuss the emerging issues and suggest a multilayered strategy to tackle the menace of Naxalism.

    Linkage: With the March 31 LWE elimination deadline nearing, the issue gains renewed significance beyond security success. The PYQ links directly to this shift, highlighting the need to address underlying socio-economic and governance causes.