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GS Paper: GS3-21.Role of External State and Non-state Actors in creating challenges to Internal Security.

  • Remembering Niketu Iralu: Peace activist, bridge between Nagas, mainland India

    Remembering Niketu Iralu: Peace activist, bridge between Nagas, mainland India

    Why in the News

    Niketu Iralu, a Naga peace activist, died in a Delhi hospital on 18 August 2026 at the age of 91. He spent six decades on reconciliation between Naga factions and between the Naga people and the rest of India, outside every formal negotiating channel. His maternal uncle, Angami Zapu Phizo, led the Naga National Council (NNC), which declared Naga independence on 14 August 1947. The Centre constituted a new ministerial panel last week to carry forward the stalled talks on a final Naga settlement. The conflict has found no solution in the nearly eight decades since that declaration. One position holds that a final text can now be signed. The competing position is that the reconciliation work behind six decades of talks has no institutional successor.

    What is the Naga peace process?

    1. A ceasefire came before any accord: A peace camp at Chedema, on a hilltop near Kohima, negotiated a ceasefire in 1964 between the rebel Naga Federal Government and the Government of India. It was the first suspension of hostilities after more than a decade of armed insurgency.
    2. The Shillong Accord split the movement: NNC representatives signed the Shillong Accord in 1975, accepting the Constitution of India. A faction rejected it and formed the National Socialist Council of Nagaland (NSCN) in 1980.
    3. The current track opened with the 1997 ceasefire: The Centre signed a ceasefire with the NSCN (Isak-Muivah) faction in 1997. Talks under it have run for close to three decades without a final agreement.
    4. The Framework Agreement fixed the terms in 2015: The Centre and the NSCN (Isak-Muivah) signed a Framework Agreement on 3 August 2015 recognising the “unique history” of the Nagas. Its contents have never been published.

    Why did a family at the centre of the sovereignty claim produce its leading peace advocate?

    1. The lineage ran through the sovereignty movement: His father, Sevilie Iralu, was among the first Naga doctors. His maternal uncle led the council that made the 1947 declaration.
    2. He chose a different method: He committed himself to non-violence, dialogue and reconciliation rather than armed struggle. He became known across the Northeast as a peace activist rather than a political negotiator.
    3. Initiatives of Change shaped that method: He worked in Initiatives of Change, an organisation that pursues social transformation through “personal change”. Its premise is that a political conflict is resolved by first changing the people inside it.
    4. Mainland India was a discovery, not an inheritance: He left for Madras Christian College in the 1950s, his first encounter with mainland India. He described the crowds boarding trains at Kolkata as a scale of population that felt unsurvivable.
    5. His house was named for the method: His home at Sechu Zubza in Kohima district was called Kerunyu Ki, “The House of Listening”. People travelled to it for counsel rather than to a party office or a negotiating table.
    6. Recognition came as a bridge builder: He received the Bhupen Hazarika Integration Award among other honours. Hundreds gathered at Dimapur airport when his body arrived from Delhi.

    How does the Second World War figure in Naga political memory?

    1. The war reached Naga villages: The Japanese Army invaded Nagaland in 1944 during the Second World War. His village, Khonoma, was overrun and families fled into the forest.
    2. The battle of Kohima was the turning point: The Japanese retreated after the battle of Kohima. An advance past it would have taken them to the Brahmaputra valley and into mainland India.
    3. The cemetery fixed the memory: The Kohima War Cemetery carries the epitaph, “When you go home, tell them of us and say, for their tomorrow, we gave our today.”
    4. The war left a habit of seeing the enemy as human: His sister slapped a Japanese soldier helping himself to a Naga shawl, and the soldier bowed and left. He read that restraint as evidence that the soldier also had a sister at home.

    What did the 1990 repatriation of Phizo’s body show about informal mediation?

    1. The leader died in exile: Angami Zapu Phizo died in London in April 1990. He had been in exile since 1960, when he left for the United Kingdom to mobilise world opinion for the Naga cause.
    2. The request came from the insurgent side: NNC leaders asked him to help bring the body back to India. No working channel existed between the NNC and the Government of India at that point.
    3. The government feared a funeral would trigger violence: The Janata Dal led government judged that returning the body might set off violence in Nagaland. A Janata Dal member of the Rajya Sabha, who had worked with him in Initiatives of Change for three decades, argued that denying the Nagas the right to grieve was the greater risk.
    4. The ask was procedural, not financial: He told the then Finance Minister at a 5 a.m. meeting that the Nagas had collected the money themselves. He asked only for foreign exchange clearance.
    5. The state supplied the logistics: The remains were received at the technical area of Palam airport. A Home Ministry aircraft then carried the casket to Kohima for the funeral.

    Does reconciliation require a community to confront its own failures?

    1. The demand was turned inward, not outward: A tribute in Ukhrul Times described him as a man who spent decades asking Nagas to confront their failures, resist hatred and recover the courage to listen. The demand was addressed to Naga society, not to the Indian state.
    2. Moral courage was defined as internal criticism: He held that moral courage involves “telling one’s own side what it does not want to hear”. He did not treat reconciliation as a concession or as weakness.
    3. Factional politics penalises exactly that: Naga groups have fought each other as often as they have fought the state, and internal criticism reads as disloyalty inside a faction. Eg. The NSCN split of 1988 into the Isak-Muivah and Khaplang factions produced years of inter-factional killing.
    4. The obstacle is not an administrative clause: The unresolved items are a separate Naga flag and a separate Naga constitution, which are claims about identity rather than about administration. A negotiator can concede an administrative arrangement, and only the community can revise a claim about who it is.

    Challenges to the Naga peace settlement

    1. The flag and constitution demand is unresolved: The NSCN (Isak-Muivah) insists on a separate Naga flag and a separate constitution, the Yehzabo, rejected by the Centre as incompatible with Indian sovereignty. Eg. The talks declared concluded in October 2019 ended without agreement on either demand. Fix. Settle the symbolic claim as a cultural flag protected under Article 371A’s guarantee for Naga customary practice, separated from any constitutional status.
    2. The territorial claim crosses three other States: The “Greater Nagalim” demand would merge Naga inhabited areas of Manipur, Assam and Arunachal Pradesh into one unit. Eg. The Manipur Assembly has repeatedly resolved against any settlement altering the State’s boundaries. Fix. Use non-territorial autonomy, giving Naga councils outside Nagaland cultural and development powers without redrawing State boundaries.
    3. The negotiation has two competing counterparties: The Centre talks in parallel to the NSCN (Isak-Muivah) and to the Naga National Political Groups, and each rejects a settlement signed only with the other. Eg. The Working Committee of the Naga National Political Groups signed a separate Agreed Position in 2017. Fix. Convene one joint negotiating forum so a single signed text binds every group.
    4. Ceasefire ground rules are routinely breached: Cadres under ceasefire run parallel taxation in Nagaland and in Naga areas of Manipur, which keeps an armed economy alive through the negotiation. Eg. Traders and salaried employees in Dimapur pay levies to more than one faction. Fix. Publish the ceasefire monitoring group’s findings with a fixed penalty schedule for each verified breach.
    5. A text kept secret cannot be ratified: The 2015 Framework Agreement has never been published, so no legislature or public body has examined what was agreed. Eg. Nagaland’s own legislators have sought disclosure of the text on the floor of the Assembly. Fix. Table the agreed text in Parliament and in the Nagaland Assembly before signature, so ratification precedes implementation.
    6. Security law feeds the grievance the talks address: The Armed Forces (Special Powers) Act, 1958 remains in force across parts of Nagaland, sustaining the alienation a settlement is meant to end. Eg. The Oting killings of December 2021 in Mon district led the Assembly to demand repeal. Fix. Complete the district by district withdrawal already begun and move residual powers to a civil authority subject to judicial review.

    Conclusion

    The Naga settlement is stalled on claims about identity, not on administrative detail, and identity claims are revised by a community rather than conceded by a negotiator. The reconciliation work that kept six decades of talks survivable was carried by individuals with no official standing, and it has no institutional successor. A ministerial panel can reopen the file. It cannot by itself rebuild the trust that would let a signed text hold.

    “[2025, GS3, 15 marks] What are the major challenges to internal security and peace process in the North-Eastern States? Map the various peace accords and agreements initiated by the government in the past decade.”

  • In J&K, a facade of normalcy cannot substitute for peace

    Why in the News

    An administrative order circulating in Anantnag directed government employees to take part in a Tiranga Rally, making attendance at a State sponsored event an official obligation. The order brings out the central tension in the governance of Jammu and Kashmir since August 2019, between an official account of restored normalcy and a security regime of raids, dismissals, detentions and attachments that continues without pause. Whether participation of this kind reflects public enthusiasm or administrative compulsion is the question the order leaves unanswered.

    What is Article 370 of the Constitution?

    1. What it provided: A temporary provision under Part XXI that limited Parliament’s legislative power over Jammu and Kashmir to defence, foreign affairs and communications, with other laws requiring the State government’s concurrence.
    2. The linked provision: Article 35A, added by a 1954 Presidential Order, allowed the State to define permanent residents and reserve rights in employment and property for them.
    3. What changed in 2019: Presidential Orders of August 2019 applied the whole Constitution to the State and rendered Article 370 inoperative, and Article 35A ceased to apply.
    4. The statutory change: The Jammu and Kashmir Reorganisation Act, 2019 split the State into two Union Territories, Jammu and Kashmir with a legislature, and Ladakh without one.
    5. The judicial outcome: The Supreme Court upheld the 2019 measures in In re Article 370 of the Constitution (2023) and directed that statehood be restored and elections held.
    6. The contested question: The argument advanced in this piece treats the 2019 change as an abrogation imposed without consent, and reads subsequent governance as its continuation.

    Who is an overground worker?

    1. The term: A person alleged to provide logistical support to militants, such as shelter, transport, money or information, without taking part in armed action.
    2. Why the term matters: It is not defined in statute, so the label carries no fixed evidentiary threshold and can be applied to large numbers after a single incident.

    What is preventive detention?

    1. What it is: Detention ordered by the executive to prevent an anticipated act, without any charge, trial or conviction.
    2. Its basis: Article 22(3) to 22(7) carve preventive detention out of the ordinary protections against arrest, and permit detention up to three months before an Advisory Board must review it.

    What is the United Liberation Council?

    1. What it is: The name attached to a purported threat letter reported on 12 August, described by authorities and sections of the media as an affiliate of Lashkar e Taiba.
    2. What the letter did: It reportedly named several Kashmiri Pandit government employees and carried their telephone numbers.

    Why is the Tiranga Rally order treated as symptomatic rather than isolated?

    1. The object is not the issue: The objection is not to the national flag but to the coercive form of the instruction.
    2. Obligation replaces participation: When attendance at a government event becomes an administrative duty, the resulting turnout cannot be read as evidence of public sentiment.
    3. A pattern of governance: The order fits a style of administration that has defined the region since the Union government took direct control in August 2019.
    4. Display as policy output: A visible ceremony is treated as the deliverable, so the appearance of normalcy substitutes for the conditions that would produce it.
    5. Self defeating measurement: A government that compels attendance loses the only instrument that could have told it whether sentiment had actually changed.

    What measures define administration in the Valley since 2019?

    1. Raids and investigations: Searches and investigations by multiple central and State agencies have become a recurring feature of life in the Valley.
    2. Dismissals from service: Government employees have been dismissed over alleged links with militancy or with militant sympathisers, without the ordinary departmental process.
    3. Mass detention: Thousands have been detained after militant incidents, at times under broad allegations of being overground workers.
    4. Institutional closure: Educational and charitable institutions have faced closure or restriction over alleged links with banned organisations.
    5. Property attachment: Properties worth hundreds of crores of rupees have been attached under various laws.
    6. House demolition: Homes have been demolished where a member of the family stands accused of militancy.
    7. Post incident crackdowns: Thousands were reportedly detained after the killing of a police constable in south Kashmir, and the cycle of raids, detentions and suspicion followed the killing of migrant workers.

    What does the record on the Kashmiri Pandit community show?

    1. The threat letter: Reports on 12 August described a purported threat letter naming several Kashmiri Pandit government employees along with their telephone numbers.
    2. The attributed source: The letter was attributed to the United Liberation Council, described as an affiliate of Lashkar e Taiba.
    3. The casualty count: 25 members of the community have been targeted and killed since 2019.
    4. The named victims: They include Ajay Pandita Bharti, Rakesh Pandita, Makhan Lal Bindroo, Rahul Bhat, Rajni Bala, Puran Krishan Bhat and Sanjay Sharma.
    5. Why the memory matters: For a community displaced in the 1990s, each such threat revives the circumstances of that displacement rather than reading as an isolated crime.
    6. The return condition: Return has to rest on an environment in which the community feels safe, not on participation in official ceremonies designed to demonstrate that everything is normal.

    Why do the claim of normalcy and the continuing security regime contradict each other?

    1. The official account: The government tells the rest of India that Kashmir has entered a new era of peace and normalcy.
    2. The parallel reality: Extraordinary security measures, raids, detentions, dismissals and restrictions continue to shape the everyday lives of ordinary people.
    3. Both cannot be operative: A settled peace does not require a standing apparatus of preventive detention and property attachment to maintain it.
    4. The tourist test fails: Busy markets, full hotels and traffic on the roads are what a visitor sees in a few days. They measure commerce, not security of person.
    5. What each side gains: The government gains a demonstrable output in the display. The population gains nothing it can rely on when the display ends.
    6. The unresolved reminder: The threat letter of 12 August is the demonstration that the underlying problem has not closed, whatever the ceremonies record.

    How should normalcy actually be measured?

    1. Freedom to speak: Whether ordinary people feel secure enough to speak freely without anticipating consequences.
    2. Law as protection: Whether families believe the law will protect them rather than intimidate them.
    3. A visible future: Whether young people see a future for themselves in the region.
    4. Safe return: Whether communities that have suffered displacement and violence feel safe enough to return and rebuild their lives.

    What does the security regime do to a generation born after the conflict?

    1. Who they are: Those in their teens and twenties in Kashmir were born decades after the worst years of the conflict and bear no responsibility for the violence of the 1990s.
    2. What they observe: Many grow up watching fathers, brothers, relatives and neighbours being summoned, detained or questioned.
    3. Collective punishment: Large scale detentions and punitive measures after militant attacks deepen the perception that a whole community is being punished for the acts of individuals.
    4. The asymmetry they learn: One section of society is repeatedly assured that everything is normal while another is continually asked to prove that it is not a threat.
    5. The outcome: This produces bruised memory rather than reconciliation, and bruised memory does not disappear because officials are instructed to display flags.
    6. The time horizon: Brute force can silence a street for a period. It cannot silence a generation’s memory.

    What distinctions must the state draw?

    1. Militant and citizen: The State must distinguish between a militant and an ordinary citizen, which mass categorisation after an incident destroys.
    2. Accused and convicted: It must distinguish between an accused person and a convicted person, which dismissal, attachment and demolition before trial collapse.
    3. Family member and accused: It must distinguish between a family member and the person accused of committing a crime, which punitive action against a household erases.

    Challenges to restoring political normalcy in Jammu and Kashmir

    1. Punitive measures before adjudication: Attachment and demolition operate before a court has decided guilt, so the penalty precedes the finding. e.g. property attachments running to hundreds of crores of rupees under various laws since 2019.
    2. Undefined categories in enforcement: Terms such as overground worker carry no statutory definition, so detention scales with suspicion rather than evidence. e.g. thousands reportedly detained after the killing of a police constable in south Kashmir.
    3. Employment as a security instrument: Dismissal without departmental inquiry converts government service into a lever of security policy. e.g. dismissals of employees over alleged links with militancy since 2019.
    4. Targeted killings of minorities: The safety of returning and resident minority employees remains unsecured. e.g. 25 members of the Kashmiri Pandit community killed since 2019 and a threat letter naming employees on 12 August 2026.
    5. Statehood still pending: Restoration of full statehood remains incomplete, leaving an elected government without control over police and public order. e.g. the Supreme Court’s 2023 direction to restore statehood at the earliest.
    6. Space for civil society: Closure of educational and charitable institutions removes the mediating layer between the State and the population. e.g. restrictions on institutions over alleged links with banned organisations.
    7. Cross border sponsorship: Infiltration and external support keep the security justification alive irrespective of local political settlement. e.g. attacks on migrant workers in the Valley followed by area wide crackdowns.
    8. Economic dependence on tourism: A single security incident removes the region’s main visible income source. e.g. the collapse of bookings in the Valley after major attacks on visitors.

    Conclusion

    The administrative order in Anantnag is a small instrument, and its significance lies in what it substitutes for. Kashmir needs healing built on dignity, justice, security and dialogue, and healing cannot be produced by an order requiring attendance. A facade of normalcy may impress visitors, and it cannot substitute for real peace. The measure of whether the situation has changed is whether the State begins to distinguish the militant from the citizen and the accused from the convict, not whether the flag is displayed on schedule.

    Jammu and Kashmir after 2019

    1. Constitutional status: The former State was reorganised on 31 October 2019 into the Union Territory of Jammu and Kashmir, with a legislature, and the Union Territory of Ladakh, without one.
    2. Political timeline: Assembly elections were held in 2024, the first since 2014, restoring an elected government to the Union Territory.
    3. Statehood question: Full statehood has not been restored. Public order and police remain with the Union government under the Reorganisation Act.
    4. Security geography: The region has a Line of Control of about 740 km with Pakistan and a Line of Actual Control segment with China in Ladakh.
    5. Displacement history: Large scale displacement of the Kashmiri Pandit community occurred from 1990, and return and rehabilitation remains an unfinished policy objective.
    6. Economy: Horticulture, handicrafts and tourism dominate the economy, all of which are directly sensitive to security incidents.

    Constitutional Framework Governing Jammu and Kashmir and Security Measures

    1. Article 1: Declares India a Union of States and makes the territories in the First Schedule part of that Union.
    2. Article 3: Empowers Parliament to form new States and Union Territories and to alter boundaries, the provision used for the 2019 reorganisation.
    3. Article 370: The temporary provision governing the State’s relationship with the Union, rendered inoperative by the Presidential Orders of August 2019.
    4. Article 14: Requires equality before the law, which limits arbitrary classification of persons or communities in security administration.
    5. Article 19: Guarantees freedom of speech, assembly, association and movement, subject to reasonable restrictions on the specified grounds.
    6. Article 21: Protects life and personal liberty, and requires that any deprivation follow a procedure that is fair, just and reasonable.
    7. Article 22: Provides protections on arrest, and separately permits preventive detention with an Advisory Board review after three months.
    8. Article 239A read with the Reorganisation Act: Provides the framework for a legislature in a Union Territory, with police and public order reserved to the Union in the case of Jammu and Kashmir.
    9. Article 355: Places a duty on the Union to protect every State against external aggression and internal disturbance.

    Laws and Rules Governing Security Administration in Jammu and Kashmir

    1. Jammu and Kashmir Reorganisation Act, 2019: Created the two Union Territories and set out the distribution of legislative and executive power between them and the Union.
    2. Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967: The principal anti terrorism statute, providing for banning organisations, designating individuals and attaching proceeds of terrorism.
    3. Jammu and Kashmir Public Safety Act, 1978: Permits preventive detention for up to two years on grounds of security of the State or maintenance of public order.
    4. Armed Forces (Jammu and Kashmir) Special Powers Act, 1990: Confers search, arrest and use of force powers on the armed forces in areas declared disturbed, with prior sanction required for prosecution.
    5. National Investigation Agency Act, 2008: Establishes the central counter terrorism investigation agency and defines the scheduled offences it can take over.
    6. Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002: Provides for provisional attachment of property representing proceeds of crime, used in terror financing investigations.
    7. Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023: Replaces the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 and carries the powers to issue prohibitory orders and regulate assemblies.

    Back2Basics: In re Article 370 of the Constitution (2023)

    1. What it was: A Constitution Bench judgment of the Supreme Court on the validity of the Presidential Orders of August 2019 and the Jammu and Kashmir Reorganisation Act, 2019.
    2. Holding on sovereignty: The Court held that Jammu and Kashmir retained no element of internal sovereignty after its accession and the adoption of the Constitution.
    3. Holding on Article 370: Article 370 was held to be a temporary provision, and the President’s power to declare it inoperative was held to survive the dissolution of the Constituent Assembly of the State.
    4. Holding on Article 35A: The Court held that the removal of Article 35A did not violate the fundamental rights framework.
    5. Direction on statehood: The Court directed that the statehood of Jammu and Kashmir be restored at the earliest, while upholding the carving out of Ladakh.
    6. Direction on elections: The Election Commission was directed to hold Assembly elections by 30 September 2024.
    7. Additional direction: The Court recommended a truth and reconciliation commission to examine human rights violations in the region since the 1980s.

    Government Initiatives

    1. Prime Minister’s Development Package, 2015: An outlay of about Rs 80,068 crore covering road, power, health, tourism and rehabilitation projects in the region.
    2. Prime Minister’s Package for Kashmiri Migrants: Provides government jobs and transit accommodation to support the return of displaced Kashmiri Pandit families to the Valley.
    3. Udaan and Himayat: Skill development and placement schemes for youth of the region, run through the National Skill Development Corporation and the rural livelihoods mission.
    4. Prime Minister’s Special Scholarship Scheme: Funds higher education outside the region for students from Jammu and Kashmir and Ladakh.
    5. Security Related Expenditure scheme: Reimburses the Union Territory for expenditure on security, relief and rehabilitation of surrendered militants and civilian victims.
    6. Operation Sadbhavana and the Civic Action Programme: Army and central armed police force programmes that fund schools, medical camps and community infrastructure in border and affected areas.
    7. New Central Sector Scheme for Industrial Development, 2021: An outlay of about Rs 28,400 crore of capital and interest incentives to attract manufacturing investment to the Union Territory.

    Key Facts about Jammu and Kashmir

    1. Reorganisation date: The two Union Territories came into existence on 31 October 2019, observed as National Unity Day.
    2. Representation: The Union Territory of Jammu and Kashmir returns five members to the Lok Sabha and Ladakh returns one.
    3. Delimitation: The 2022 delimitation raised Assembly seats to 90, with 43 in the Jammu division and 47 in the Kashmir division, besides seats reserved for Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes for the first time.
    4. Reservation extension: Central laws on reservation, including for Scheduled Tribes such as the Gujjar, Bakarwal, Gaddi and Sippi communities, now apply to the Union Territory.
    5. Boundaries: The region borders Pakistan along the Line of Control and China along the Line of Actual Control in Ladakh.
    6. Geography: The Pir Panjal range separates the Jammu division from the Kashmir Valley, and the Jhelum, Chenab and Indus are the principal rivers.
    7. Treaty link: The Indus Waters Treaty of 1960 governs the use of the western rivers that flow through the region, and India placed it in abeyance in 2025.

    Challenges in Internal Security Management

    1. Balancing force and consent: Security operations that succeed tactically can widen alienation and cost the political objective. e.g. area wide cordon and search operations following a single militant incident.
    2. Preventive detention without adjudication: Detention laws allow long custody without trial, which produces grievance even where the intelligence is sound. e.g. detention up to two years permitted under the Jammu and Kashmir Public Safety Act, 1978.
    3. Radicalisation through digital channels: Recruitment and propaganda have moved online, beyond the reach of physical area domination. e.g. encrypted messaging used for handler communication in recent militancy cases.
    4. Terror financing: Funding routes through hawala, cryptocurrency and front organisations are hard to interdict. e.g. investigations into non governmental organisations and trusts by central agencies since 2017.
    5. Rehabilitation of surrendered cadre: Without livelihood and social acceptance, surrendered militants relapse. e.g. surrender and rehabilitation policies across the Northeast and Left Wing Extremism affected districts.
    6. Centre and State coordination: Multiple agencies operating in the same theatre create gaps in intelligence handover. e.g. the multi agency centre framework created after the 2008 Mumbai attacks.
    7. Human rights accountability: Sanction requirements delay prosecution in cases of alleged excess, which erodes trust in the process. e.g. the prior sanction requirement for prosecuting armed forces personnel.
    8. Border management technology: Infiltration continues where terrain defeats physical fencing. e.g. tunnels detected along the international boundary in the Jammu sector.

    Way Forward

    1. Restore statehood on a stated timeline: Give the elected government responsibility for public order so accountability for security decisions is politically located.
    2. Individualise security action: Confine dismissal, attachment and demolition to persons against whom a case is established, with reasons recorded and an appeal available.
    3. Institutionalise dialogue: Create a standing channel with elected representatives, civil society and displaced communities rather than event driven engagement.
    4. Secure minority employees: Provide verified protection and posting choices to Kashmiri Pandit employees rather than requiring presence at ceremonial events.
    5. Time bound trials: Expand special court capacity so that persons in preventive detention are either charged and tried or released.
    6. Youth employment at scale: Convert skill schemes into placement linked outcomes so that the young have a visible economic route.
    7. Independent grievance mechanism: Set up an accessible body to examine complaints of excess, following the reconciliation mechanism the Supreme Court recommended in 2023.

    “[2023, GS3, 10 marks] Winning of ‘Hearts and Minds’ in terrorism-affected areas is an essential step in restoring the trust of the population. Discuss the measures adopted by the Government in this respect as part of the conflict resolution in Jammu and Kashmir.”

  • March to July, Govt sent one blocking order to social media firms every minute

    Why in the News

    Nearly 1.95 lakh state backed content blocking orders were sent to Instagram, Facebook and YouTube between March and July 2026, an average of one every 68 seconds, against a daily average of six in the preceding year. Most were routed through the Sahyog portal of the Ministry of Home Affairs and issued under Section 79(3)(b) of the Information Technology Act, 2000, the safe harbour condition, rather than the dedicated blocking power in Section 69A. The surge, combined with automated execution by the platform, converts a conditional legal duty into unconditional compliance.

    What is the Sahyog portal?

    1. What it is: A platform built by the Ministry of Home Affairs through which central and State agencies send content blocking notices to online intermediaries.
    2. Who uses it: Various central and State law enforcement and government agencies issue notices, and all three major social media companies have joined the portal.
    3. Legal hook: Notices are issued under Section 79(3)(b) of the Information Technology Act, 2000, the provision that conditions an intermediary’s legal immunity.
    4. What it replaced: It centralises what were previously scattered notices from individual police units and departments into a single automated channel.
    5. Scale of use: Between October 2024 and October 2025 the portal carried 2,312 blocking orders to 19 online platforms, a daily average of six.
    6. What one order covers: A single blocking order can cover hundreds of individual pieces of content or accounts, so the order count understates the volume removed.

    What is safe harbour under Section 79 of the Information Technology Act, 2000?

    1. The immunity: Section 79 protects an intermediary from liability for content that its users post, provided it does not initiate, select or modify that content.
    2. The condition: Section 79(3)(b) withdraws that immunity if the intermediary fails to remove unlawful material after receiving actual knowledge or a government notification.

    What is Section 69A of the Information Technology Act, 2000?

    1. The power: It allows the Union government to direct the blocking of public access to information in the interest of sovereignty, defence, security of the State, friendly relations, public order or the prevention of a cognisable offence.
    2. The safeguards: Blocking under it follows the Information Technology (Procedure and Safeguards for Blocking for Access of Information by Public) Rules, 2009, which require a committee review and reasons in writing.

    What is actual knowledge in intermediary liability?

    1. The test: Actual knowledge is the point at which an intermediary is informed of specific unlawful content and becomes obliged to act on it.
    2. Where it comes from: The Supreme Court in Shreya Singhal v. Union of India (2015) read down Section 79(3)(b) so that actual knowledge means a court order or a government notification, not a private complaint.

    What is an Application Programming Interface?

    1. What it is: A defined interface that allows one software system to send instructions directly to another without a person operating either end.
    2. Its use here: Meta has integrated its interface with the Sahyog portal, so a flagged item uploaded to the portal is removed from its platforms automatically.

    What does the scale of the blocking orders show?

    1. Total volume: Nearly 1.95 lakh blocking orders in five months, about 1,275 a day, or one every 68 seconds.
    2. Instagram: Around 1,00,000 orders, just over half of the total, and the platform on which the student protests were most visible.
    3. Facebook: Around 80,000 orders.
    4. YouTube: Nearly 15,000 orders.
    5. Concentration: Meta owned platforms received roughly nine out of every ten orders issued to the three companies.
    6. The baseline: The comparable figure for October 2024 to October 2025 was 2,312 orders across 19 platforms, a daily average of six.
    7. Official record: The Ministry of Home Affairs annual report for 2024 and 2025 recorded a little over 1.11 lakh pieces of suspicious online content blocked until March 2025 under Section 79(3)(b).
    8. Comparative removals: Meta reported removing over 23 million pieces of content in Indonesia between July and December 2025 against about 41,000 in India, which had already doubled from 28,000 in the first half of that year.
    9. User base: India has over 600 million social media users, with an estimated 10 million to 100 million posts a day.

    What changed in February 2026?

    1. The amendment: The Ministry of Electronics and Information Technology notified amendments to the Information Technology (Intermediary Guidelines and Digital Media Ethics Code) Rules, 2021.
    2. The new deadline: Content must now be removed within two to three hours, against the earlier window of 24 to 36 hours.
    3. Added conditions: The amended rule requires that an order come from an officer of a prescribed rank and state its reasons.
    4. The compliance effect: A window of two to three hours makes case by case human review commercially impossible at Indian volumes.
    5. The platform response: Meta integrated its interface with the Sahyog portal so removal happens machine to machine, without separate human review.
    6. What was removed: Automation eliminates the room for the company to review or contest a directive before complying with it.

    Why does the shift from Section 69A to Section 79(3)(b) matter?

    1. Different purpose: Section 69A is a dedicated blocking power. Section 79(3)(b) is a condition attached to an immunity, not a power to censor.
    2. Different safeguards: Section 69A orders pass through a review committee under the 2009 Rules and carry recorded reasons. Section 79(3)(b) notices carry no equivalent statutory committee.
    3. Different issuing authority: Section 69A is exercised by the Union government. Section 79(3)(b) notices come from a wide range of central and State agencies through the portal.
    4. Different subject matter: Section 69A is largely confined to national security and public order. The portal route is used for a far wider category of content.
    5. The legal consequence: The intermediary that refuses a Section 79(3)(b) notice does not face a penalty. It loses immunity for all user content, which is a far larger risk.
    6. What that produces: The threat of losing safe harbour makes refusal irrational, so the conditional structure operates as a command.

    What content was targeted?

    1. The protest period: The five month window covered the student protests against examination paper leaks at Jantar Mantar in Delhi, which began in early June and were called off on 25 July after the resignation of the Union Education Minister.
    2. Official acknowledgement: A senior government official stated that a considerable share of the orders were issued as the protests gathered momentum, particularly on Instagram.
    3. Protest content: Users reported the removal of posts supporting the student protests.
    4. Policy criticism: Posts criticising the government’s ethanol fuel blending policy were among those blocked.
    5. Electoral content: Content relating to the West Bengal Assembly elections was also removed.
    6. Synthetic media: Deepfakes formed a further category among the removals.
    7. Political speech: The national convenor of a national political party stated that some of his Instagram posts were blocked in India.

    Where does automated compliance turn against the legal design?

    1. The doctrinal problem: Actual knowledge requires that someone at the company know of the content and assess the order. An interface that executes takedowns automatically has no knowledge at all.
    2. No verification of authority: Nobody at the company checks whether the order comes from an officer of the prescribed rank or states the reasons the amended rule requires.
    3. Conditional becomes unconditional: Machine to machine execution converts a conditional legal duty into unconditional compliance, which is the substance of the objection raised by the Internet Freedom Foundation.
    4. The state interest on the other side: Coordinated disinformation, deepfakes and incitement travel faster than any human review cycle, which is the case for a short deadline.
    5. The unequal risk: The cost of over removal falls on the user, who has no notice and no appeal. The cost of under removal falls on the company as loss of immunity for all content.
    6. Notice denied: Meta informs users which State authority sent a request in most markets, but not in India, citing legal obligations and regulatory considerations.
    7. No proportionality check: One order can cover hundreds of accounts, so a single instruction can remove speech at a scale no court has examined.

    Challenges to the content blocking regime

    1. Absence of a review committee: Orders under Section 79(3)(b) carry none of the committee scrutiny that Section 69A orders pass through. e.g. the 2009 Blocking Rules committee has no counterpart for portal notices.
    2. Secrecy of orders: Blocking directions are treated as confidential, so neither the user nor the public sees the reasoning. e.g. Rule 16 of the 2009 Blocking Rules requires confidentiality of complaints and actions taken.
    3. No pre decisional hearing for the user: The person whose speech is removed is not heard before removal and often not informed after it. e.g. account holders learning of removal only from the platform’s generic notification.
    4. Chilling effect on lawful speech: Platforms over comply to protect immunity, which removes lawful criticism along with unlawful content. e.g. removal of posts criticising the ethanol blending policy during the same five month window.
    5. Federal multiplication of issuers: A wide set of central and State agencies can issue notices, so there is no single accountable authority. e.g. the portal carried orders to 19 platforms from multiple agencies in the previous year.
    6. Litigation uncertainty: Platforms that challenge the portal route face the loss of immunity while the case runs. e.g. X Corporation’s challenge to the Sahyog portal before the Karnataka High Court, dismissed in 2025.
    7. Encryption and traceability conflict: The traceability requirement in the 2021 Rules cannot be met without weakening end to end encryption. e.g. the pending challenge by WhatsApp to Rule 4(2) of the 2021 Rules.
    8. Capacity asymmetry: Smaller Indian intermediaries cannot build automated compliance systems and face the same deadlines. e.g. the two to three hour removal window applies to every significant social media intermediary.

    Conclusion

    The volume of blocking orders has risen from six a day to about 1,275 a day, and the legal route has moved from a dedicated blocking power with statutory safeguards to a safe harbour condition that carries none. Automation completes the shift, because a system that removes content without any person reading the order cannot satisfy the actual knowledge standard the Supreme Court built the provision around. The amended rules are in force and the orders continue. The unresolved question is whether Section 79(3)(b) can lawfully function as a general censorship channel when the Constitution requires every restriction on speech to be traced to a specific ground and a recorded reason.

    “[2024, GS3, 15 marks] Social media and encrypting messaging services pose a serious security challenge. What measures have been adopted at various levels to address the security implications of social media? Also suggest any other remedies to address the problem.”

  • [7th August 2026] The Hindu OpED: Stop the scam: Digital arrest menace

    Why in the News

    The Supreme Court passed an order on 4 August 2026 on the digital arrest scam. It directed banks, states and regulators toward faster action on mule accounts and cyber fraud. The scams persist because they are run largely from overseas hubs.

    What is the digital arrest scam?

    1. Definition: Fraudsters impersonate authorities and coerce victims into transferring money under threat of fake arrest. There is no legal basis or process called digital arrest.
    2. Targets: Older victims fall prey through deference to authority and fear of legal trouble.
    3. New targets: Scammers now also target youth and professionals, and senior citizens whom advisories have not reached.

    Why are digital arrests keep happening?

    1. Human Psychology & Social Engineering: Cybercriminals use social engineering tactics to manipulate people into revealing sensitive information. Fraudsters also exploit emotions like fear (threatening legal action), excitement (fake lottery wins), or urgency (fake emergency fund requests). Cybercriminals often impersonate trusted sources such as banks, government agencies, or even close friends.
    2. Weak Cybersecurity Practices: Common weaknesses include weak password and credentials use, unpatched software and system and poor security hygiene.
    3. Rapidly Evolving Cybercrime Techniques: Cybercriminals constantly evolve their methods to stay ahead of security measures.
    4. Digital Payments & Financial Fraud Risks: With the rise of digital transactions, cybercriminals have developed sophisticated methods to exploit online payment systems like fake UPI requests & QR codes, card skimming & SIM swaps and crypto & investment scams.
    5. Dark Web & Cybercrime Networks: The dark web serves as a marketplace for stolen data, malware tools, and illegal activities. Cybercrime has become an organized industry where criminals buy and sell stolen data and identity theft, organised cyber-crime syndicates and also offer Ransomware-as-a-Service (RaaS) as well.
    6. Lack of Strong Cyber Laws & Enforcement: Despite increasing cyber threats, many scams go unpunished due to slow law enforcements response, cross border crime challenges and lack of cyber crime awareness and policies.

    What did the Supreme Court order?

    1. Debit holds: It directed the Reserve Bank of India (RBI) to circulate a standard operating procedure for temporary debit holds on mule accounts.
    2. State action: States must notify cybercrime coordination centres and operationalise electronic Zero FIRs.
    3. Compensation: An inter departmental committee must examine a victim compensation framework.
    4. Data cited: Complaints on the National Cyber Crime Reporting Portal fell from 1,23,672 in 2024 to 16,377 in the first half of 2026.
    5. Recovery: Money was restored in 36,290 cases involving Rs 18.05 crore.

    What are the key terms in the response?

    1. Indian Cybercrime Coordination Centre (I4C): the nodal body coordinating action against cyber fraud and running the reporting portal.
    2. Mule account: a bank account used to receive and move fraud proceeds across states.
    3. Zero FIR: a First Information Report that can be filed at any police station regardless of jurisdiction.
    4. MuleHunter.AI: a detection system used in over 20 banks to flag mule accounts.

    Why do these scams persist despite falling complaints?

    1. Nimble methods: Fraudsters route calls through SIM boxes to mask origin and appear as Indian numbers.
    2. Deepfakes: They deploy deepfakes on video calls to dupe victims and stay untraceable.
    3. Few convictions: Convictions are rare as many schemes are run from overseas scam compounds.
    4. Overseas hubs: Compounds operate in Myanmar, the wider Golden Triangle and Cambodia, some with official patronage.
    5. Trafficking link: Indians are trafficked and coerced to run digital crimes against fellow citizens.

    Conclusion

    Detection systems and swift account freezes limit the damage even when perpetrators escape conviction. The core problem lies in overseas scam compounds beyond domestic law enforcement reach. New Delhi must use diplomatic pressure with China, the United States and ASEAN to compel host countries to act.

    Back2Basics

    Electronic-Zero FIR (e-zero FIR)

    An e-Zero FIR is an automated digital system in India that converts high-value cyber financial fraud complaints (above ₹10 lakh) filed via the National Cyber Crime Reporting Portal or the 1930 helpline directly into a Zero FIR. It eliminates jurisdictional delays during the critical “golden hour” for fund recovery

    Key Features and Workflow

    1. Automatic Registration: Eligible financial fraud reports trigger an instant e-Zero FIR without requiring an initial physical station visit.
    2. System Integration: Combines the I4C portal, state e-FIR mechanisms, and the NCRB’s Crime and Criminal Tracking Network & Systems (CCTNS).
    3. Auto-Routing: The system instantly routes the electronic document to the correct territorial cybercrime station based on the victim’s location.
    4. Mandatory Follow-Up: Complainants must visit the designated local police station within three days to sign and convert the e-Zero FIR into a regular FIR under the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita (BNSS).

    PYQ Relevance

    [UPSC 2022] What are the different elements of cyber security? Keeping in view the challenges in cyber security, examine the extent to which India has successfully developed a comprehensive National Cyber Security Strategy.

    Linkage: The PYQ tests India’s cyber security framework and response to cybercrime. The article highlights recent measures to strengthen India’s response to digital arrest scams and cyber fraud.

  • Supreme Court orders SOPs against digital arrest cyber fraud and mule accounts

    Why in the News

    The Supreme Court directed the Centre, States, and Union Territories to implement Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) within four weeks to curb digital arrest cyber fraud, including freezing mule accounts, strengthening grievance redressal, and improving cybercrime coordination.

    What is a Digital Arrest Scam?

    • A cyber fraud where scammers impersonate police or enforcement agencies through video/audio calls.
    • Victims are falsely told they are under “digital arrest” and coerced into transferring money.

    What is a Mule Account?

    • A bank account used to receive and transfer proceeds of cyber fraud.
    • Often opened by unsuspecting or paid individuals.
    • Banks can impose temporary debit holds to prevent fraudulent withdrawals.

    What is the Indian Cyber Crime Coordination Centre (I4C)?

    • A nodal agency under the Ministry of Home Affairs (MHA) for coordinating India’s response to cybercrime.
    • Operates the National Cyber Crime Reporting Portal (NCRP) and the 1930 Cyber Helpline.

    Supreme Court Directions

    • Reserve Bank of India (RBI) to issue SOPs for temporary debit holds on mule accounts.
    • States/UTs to operationalise:
      • State Cyber Crime Coordination Centres.
      • e-Zero FIR mechanism.
    • Strengthen grievance redressal, money restoration, and public awareness.

    Challenges

    • Cross-border cybercrime networks.
    • Rapid movement of funds through mule accounts and cryptocurrencies.
    • Weak inter-agency coordination.
    • SIM spoofing and fake identities.
    • Low public awareness, especially among the elderly.

    Value Addition

    e-Zero FIR

    • Enables registration of a cybercrime complaint without jurisdictional barriers.
    • The complaint is later transferred to the appropriate police station.

    Citizen Response to Financial Cyber Fraud

    • Call 1930 immediately.
    • Report the incident on the National Cyber Crime Reporting Portal (NCRP).
    • Early reporting increases the chances of freezing fraudulent transactions.

    Back2Basics: Indian Cyber Crime Coordination Centre (I4C)

    • Parent Ministry: Ministry of Home Affairs (MHA).
    • Established: 2020.
    • Key Components:
      • National Cyber Crime Reporting Portal (NCRP).
      • 1930 Financial Cyber Fraud Helpline.
    • Mandate: Coordinate law enforcement, banks, telecom operators, and other stakeholders to prevent and investigate cybercrime.

    “[2017] In India, it is legally mandatory for which of the following to report on cyber security incidents?
    1. Service providers
    2. Data Centres
    3. Body corporate
    (a) 1 only
    (b) 1 and 2 only
    (c) 3 only
    (d) 1, 2 and 3

  • The legal patchwork facing doxxing victims in India

    Why in the News?

    The online targeting of women protesters has highlighted the absence of a dedicated law against doxxing in India, forcing victims to rely on scattered legal provisions.

    What is Doxxing?

    • Doxxing is the unauthorised public disclosure of a person’s private or personal information online to harass, intimidate or threaten them.
    • It can lead to stalking, identity theft, threats and physical harm.

    Existing Legal Framework

    • Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita (BNS), 2023: Provisions relating to stalking, criminal intimidation and harassment.
    • Information Technology (IT) Act, 2000: Covers privacy violations and unauthorised disclosure of personal information.
    • Information Technology (Intermediary Guidelines and Digital Media Ethics Code) Rules, 2021: Prescribe due diligence obligations for online platforms and provide safe harbour protection.

    Challenges

    • No specific offence for doxxing under Indian law.
    • Delays in content removal and prosecution.
    • Difficulty in fixing platform liability due to safe harbour provisions.
    • Rising digital threats to privacy and safety.

    Prelims Facts

    • The Digital Personal Data Protection (DPDP) Act, 2023 governs the processing of personal digital data but does not specifically criminalise doxxing.
    • Safe Harbour under Section 79 of the Information Technology (IT) Act, 2000 protects intermediaries from liability if they comply with due diligence requirements.

    [2024] Under which of the following Articles of the Constitution of India, has the Supreme Court of India placed the Right to Privacy?

    (a) Article 15

    (b) Article 16

    (c) Article 19

    (d) Article 21

  • Centre asks states to set up exclusive NDPS courts

    Why in the News?

    The Ministry of Home Affairs (MHA) has directed States and Union Territories to establish exclusive NDPS courts to tackle the backlog of nearly 39 lakh drug-related cases. However, 22 States are yet to comply.

    What is the NDPS Act?

    • The Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances (NDPS) Act, 1985 is India’s primary law to regulate and prohibit narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances.
    • The Narcotics Control Bureau (NCB) is the apex agency for enforcement.
    • The Narco-Coordination Centre (NCORD) coordinates anti-drug efforts among Central and State agencies.

    Why Exclusive NDPS Courts?

    • Speed up disposal of nearly 39 lakh pending cases.
    • Ensure specialised and faster trials for drug offences.
    • Improve conviction rates and reduce judicial delays.

    Significance

    • Strengthens deterrence against drug trafficking.
    • Helps curb crimes linked to money laundering, organised crime and terror financing.
    • Enhances India’s internal security, especially along vulnerable border regions.

    Challenges

    • 22 States have not yet established exclusive NDPS courts.
    • Need for adequate judges, prosecutors and infrastructure.
    • Court reforms must be complemented by effective enforcement and rehabilitation.

    Is it Mandatory?

    • Legally: The NDPS Act empowers State Governments to establish Special Courts, but it does not make exclusive NDPS courts mandatory in every district.
    • Administratively: The Ministry of Home Affairs (MHA) has strongly directed States and Union Territories to establish exclusive NDPS courts due to the huge backlog. While this directive is not directly enforceable like a statute, States are expected to comply in the interest of effective criminal justice and internal security.

    Prelims Facts

    • NCORD was established in 2016 to improve inter-agency coordination against drug trafficking.
    • NDPS Act, 1985 replaced the Opium Act, 1857, the Opium Act, 1878, and the Dangerous Drugs Act, 1930.
    • The NCB functions under the Ministry of Home Affairs (MHA).

    [2018, GS3, 15 marks] India’s proximity to two of the world’s biggest illicit opium-growing states has enhanced her internal security concerns. Explain the linkages between drug trafficking and other illicit activities such as gunrunning, money laundering and human trafficking. What counter-measures should be taken to prevent the same?”

  • India Becomes Free from Left Wing Extremism (LWE)

    Why in News?

    The Ministry of Home Affairs (MHA) announced that India became free from Left Wing Extremism (LWE) in March-April 2026, following sustained implementation of the National Policy and Action Plan (2015).

    Key Highlights

    • No district is currently categorized as LWE-affected.
    • LWE-affected districts reduced from: 126 (2014) → 90 (2018) → 70 (2021) → 38 (2024) → 8 (2025) → 0 (2026).
    • 37 districts are now classified as Legacy & Thrust Districts for continued security and development support.
    • 1 district remains a District of Concern for continued surveillance.

    National Policy and Action Plan (2015)

    • Adopts a Whole-of-Government Approach focusing on: Security operations. Infrastructure and connectivity. Welfare and development. Protection of tribal rights. Good governance and financial inclusion.

    Major Government Initiatives

    Security Measures

    • Security Related Expenditure (SRE) Scheme.
    • Modernisation of Police Forces (MPF).
    • Special Infrastructure Scheme (SIS).
    • Assistance to Central Agencies for LWE Management (ACALWEMS).
    • Surrender-cum-Rehabilitation Policy for Maoist cadres.

    Development Measures

    • 15,189 km roads constructed in LWE areas.
    • 9,497 telecom towers commissioned.
    • 179 Eklavya Model Residential Schools (EMRS) functional.
    • 47 ITIs and 49 Skill Development Centres established.
    • 6,025 post offices with banking services opened.
    • Security camps are being converted into Jan Suvidha Kendras.

    Other Initiatives

    • Special Central Assistance (SCA) for infrastructure.
    • Tribal Youth Exchange Programme (TYEP).
    • Civic Action Programme (CAP) to improve community engagement.
    • Distribution of over 21 lakh Forest Rights Act title deeds.

    [2023] Consider the following statements:
    1. According to the Constitution of India, the Central Government has a duty to protect States from internal disturbances.
    2. The Constitution of India exempts the States from providing legal counsel to a person being held for preventive detention.
    3. According to the Prevention of Terrorism Act, 2002, confession of the accused before the police cannot be used as evidence.
    How many of the above statements are correct?

    [A] Only one

    [B] Only two

    [C] All three

    [D] None

  • How Serious Is the Kudankulam Data Leak

    Why in the News?

    A ransomware breach at Yotta Data Services, a third-party data-centre vendor for Reliance Infrastructure Ltd, led to the leak of 14.3 GB of operational data related to the Kudankulam Nuclear Power Plant on the dark web platform World Leaks. Nuclear Power Corporation of India Limited (NPCIL) states the breach did not touch core reactor or nuclear-security systems, but the incident exposes how strategic nuclear infrastructure remains vulnerable through third-party digital supply chains.

    What exactly happened, and how did the breach occur?

    1. Breach reported: Reports emerged that multiple gigabytes of data on Kudankulam Nuclear Power Plant operations were copied and leaked as part of a ransomware attack.
    2. Point of infiltration: The infiltration targeted Reliance Anil Dhirubhai Ambani Group’s Reliance Infrastructure Ltd, not NPCIL directly.
    3. Scale of leak: 14.3 GB of Kudankulam-related data formed part of a larger 1.2 TB dataset hosted on World Leaks.
    4. World Leaks: World Leaks is a dark web site operated by cybercriminals who infect firms with ransomware and threaten to publish stolen data if a ransom is not paid.
    5. Trigger for publication: The site claims the ransom was not paid, resulting in the data being leaked publicly.

    Was the reactor or nuclear-safety systems compromised?

    1. NPCIL’s position: NPCIL states the leaked files pertain only to Balance of Plant (BOP: conventional common service facilities of a power plant, distinct from the reactor core) and not to nuclear safety or security-related systems.
    2. Reliance’s position: Reliance states no ransomware execution, data loss, or lateral movement occurred, despite confirming a partial breach of data hosted on Yotta’s servers.
    3. Nature of leaked files: The files reportedly include equipment blueprints, supplier details, meeting and inspection records, and equipment reviews.
    4. Insurance detail exposed: A $112 million insurance policy against terrorist attacks was among the leaked details, with the premium amount undisclosed.

    Why does the official reassurance not fully resolve the concern?

    1. Narrow definition of harm: Restricting concern to “core reactor systems” ignores that BOP data such as blueprints and inspection records can still aid reconnaissance or attack planning against a strategic facility.
    2. Layered outsourcing risk: Reliance itself depends on a third-party vendor, Yotta, for data hosting, showing that critical infrastructure security depends on vendors several steps removed from NPCIL.
    3. Self-assessment, not independent audit: Both Reliance and Yotta’s claims that no ransomware execution or lateral movement occurred rest on the vendor’s own internal forensic assessment, not an independent verification.
    4. Transparency gap: The premium amount for the $112 million terrorism insurance policy remains undisclosed even after the leak, showing incomplete disclosure despite the reassurances offered.

    What does the incident reveal about the plant’s strategic significance going forward?

    1. Current capacity: Kudankulam has commissioned two 1,000 MWe VVER (a Russian-designed pressurised water reactor type) units, supplying up to two gigawatts, built in partnership with Russian firm Rosatom.
    2. Expansion underway: The government plans four more units at the site, which would triple installed capacity, expanding the facility’s strategic value and its digital attack surface.
    3. Gap between messaging and internal concern: The revelations have caused “absolute commotion” among plant officials internally, even as public statements downplay the breach’s significance.

    Conclusion

    The Kudankulam leak shows that reassurances confined to “core reactor safety systems” do not address the full risk profile of a strategic nuclear facility. This is because non-core operational data hosted through layered third-party vendors remains commercially and strategically sensitive. As Kudankulam’s capacity is set to triple, critical infrastructure protection frameworks need to extend cybersecurity accountability across the entire vendor supply chain, not the reactor core alone. Additionally this requires independent verification rather than self-reported vendor assessments.

    PYQ Relevance

    [UPSC 2023] What are the different elements of cybersecurity? Keeping in view the challenges in cybersecurity, examine India’s preparedness in preventing cyber attacks.

    Linkage: The article highlights cybersecurity challenges in protecting India’s critical infrastructure from ransomware and third-party data breaches. The Kudankulam data leak underscores the need to strengthen cyber resilience, vendor security, and protection of critical infrastructure despite no compromise of reactor systems.

  • India’s eastern border affected by flow of opium from Myanmar

    Why in the News?

    The Narcotics Control Bureau (NCB) released its 2026 annual report on 27 June 2026, tabled by Home Minister Amit Shah. The report documents Myanmar’s emergence as the primary global opium source following the Taliban’s 2022 ban on drug cultivation in Afghanistan. Infact, India’s northeastern border corridor is identified as the most direct and porous entry point for this expanding production base. 

    What change in the global narcotics supply chain has created new pressure on India’s northeastern borders?

    1. Taliban-imposed ban: The Taliban government’s 2022 ban on drug cultivation in Afghanistan eliminated the world’s largest opium producer from the supply chain, creating a vacuum in global opium supply.
    2. Myanmar’s replacement role: Myanmar filled this vacuum rapidly. The NCB’s 2026 annual report identifies Myanmar as the alternative global opium source, with consequences already visible along India’s eastern borders.
    3. Scale of cultivation expansion: Myanmar’s illicit opium cultivation expanded by approximately 56% between 2021 and 2023. The area under poppy cultivation reached 45,200 hectares.
    4. Golden Triangle transformation: Myanmar’s Golden Triangle has expanded beyond its traditional opiate role. Shan State now produces both opium and methamphetamine (Yaba), making it a major poly-drug hub.
    5. Manipur corridor as primary entry point: National Highway-102 through Manipur is the main land route for heroin and methamphetamine into India.
    6. Secondary corridor via Mizoram: Champhai in Mizoram provides the second major trafficking route via Myanmar’s Chin State. Drugs are routed through Assam’s Barak Valley via Aizawl and adjoining road networks.

    How have India’s northeastern states been transformed from transit zones into active narcotics staging grounds?

    1. Porous border mechanisms: The Free Movement Regime (FMR) along the India-Myanmar border and unfenced border stretches have converted the Northeast from a transit route into a distribution hub.
    2. States bearing frontline exposure: The NCB report specifically identifies that Manipur, Mizoram and Nagaland face the highest exposure due to increased drug production in Myanmar.
    3. Mizoram’s seizure data: Mizoram seized 1,477 kg of amphetamine-type stimulants (ATS) in 2025 out of the national total of 3,485 kg.
    4. Manipur’s seizure data: Manipur accounted for 535 kg in recoveries from other reported states. Delhi (454 kg), Gujarat (308 kg), and Karnataka (164 kg) reported significant quantities, demonstrating that narcotics originating from the northeast are penetrating deep into the hinterland.
    5. Distribution geography: Drugs move through the Barak Valley to Punjab, Gujarat and Maharashtra, making the Northeast a distribution node rather than a consumption centre.

    What does the drone-based trafficking data reveal about the operational maturity of trafficking networks?

    1. Five-fold increase from Pakistan border: Drone-based drug trafficking from across the Pakistan border into India has increased five-fold over the past five years, particularly in Punjab, demonstrating aerial circumvention of border controls.
    2. Incident trajectory (NCB data): Drone trafficking incidents surged from 3 in 2021 to 35 in 2022, 28 in 2023, 178 in 2024, and 305 in 2025, This is a 100-fold increase in incident count over five years.
    3. Seizure volume in 2025: In 2025, drone-related cases resulted in the seizure of 468 kg of narcotics, a 96% increase in quantity over 2024. Punjab recorded 298 cases and 461 kg seized.
    4. UAV sophistication: Trafficking networks are using unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) to circumvent traditional border controls, the NCB stated.
    5. Additional reporting states: Geographical spread: Rajasthan and Jammu & Kashmir also reported drone-related trafficking incidents.

    Where does the structural vulnerability in India’s border architecture lie and why cannot existing mechanisms address it?

    1. The FMR design conflict: The FMR facilitates movement of border communities. This objective conflicts with effective narcotics interdiction.
    2. Unfenced stretches: Drugs are smuggled through unfenced and porous stretches of the border.
    3. Geographic chokepoint: National Highway No. 102 through the Manipur corridor, the Champhai route in Mizoram carry both legal trade and illicit narcotics, making interception difficult.
    4. Ethnic armed group control: The poly-drug production in Myanmar is primarily concentrated in areas controlled by ethnic armed groups in Shan State. These groups operate outside the reach of both the Myanmar state and Indian border enforcement, making source-side interdiction impossible.
    5. South Asian arm of Afghan trade: The NCB specifically identifies that the South Asian arm of the Afghan drug trade flows through Pakistan into India via both the land frontier (Punjab, Rajasthan) and the maritime frontier (Gujarat, Maharashtra coastlines).

    Conclusion

    Myanmar’s rise as the world’s alternative opium supplier has created a structural narcotics challenge for India. The Northeast has become an active distribution hub rather than merely a transit corridor. Drone-enabled trafficking further weakens conventional border controls. Addressing the challenge requires technology-driven surveillance, calibrated reforms to the FMR and stronger cooperation with Myanmar.

    PYQ Relevance

    [UPSC 2018] India’s proximity to two of the world’s biggest illicit opium-growing states has enhanced its internal security concerns. Explain the linkages between drug trafficking and other illicit activities such as gunrunning, money laundering, and human trafficking. What countermeasures should be taken to prevent the same?

    Linkage: The PYQ examines the internal security implications of cross-border drug trafficking and its nexus with organised crime. The article explains how Myanmar-origin narcotics trafficking through India’s northeastern border has become a major cross-border security challenge.