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GS Paper: Federalism

  • One nation, one police is a reform that is long overdue

    Context

    Police reforms are still an unfinished task, fifteen years after the Supreme Court gave directives in the Prakash Singh case in 2006.

    Integrated schemes in different facilities

    • The Government of India has lately been talking of “One Nation, One Ration Card”, “One Nation, One Registry”, “One Nation, One Gas Grid”, and even “One Nation, One Election”.
    • These ideas would contribute to an integrated scheme in different facilities and networks across the country.
    • The attempt at uniformity should, however, take cognisance of local factors and special features.

    Issue of different states passing different Police Act

    • Every state is legislating a different Police Act, purportedly in compliance with the Supreme Court’s directions on police reforms given on September 22, 2006.
    • We are in the process of having “one nation, many police acts”.
    • Circumventing the Prakash Singh judgement: The objective behind these laws is to give legislative cover to the existing arrangement and thereby circumvent the judicial directions given in the Prakash Singh judgement in 2006.
    •  Eighteen states have already passed Police Acts.
    • Absence of central guidelines: Several states have, in the absence of any central guidance or directive, passed their own Police Acts, blatantly violating the Supreme Court’s directions.
    • No action by judiciary: The Supreme Court has, for inexplicable reasons, not issued a contempt notice to any of the states for non-compliance of its directions on police reforms.

    Way forward

    1) The Centre should legislate a Model Police Act

    • Article 252 of the Constitution gives Parliament the power to legislate for two or more states by consent.
    • Soon after the Supreme Court’s directions on police reforms, the Police Act Drafting Committee of the Ministry of Home Affairs came out with the Model Police Act, 2006.
    • The Government of India should have enacted a law based on this Model Police Act with such changes as it may have found necessary, and the states should have mutatis mutandis ( making necessary alterations while not affecting the main point at issue) adopted it.
    • The least that the Government of India could have done was to legislate for the UTs and then prevailed upon the states to pass similar legislation.
    • Enacting a law in the states could have been incentivised by linking their passage with the modernisation grants made available to the states.

    2) Need for the spirit of cooperative federalism

    • In recent times, we saw the unseemly spectacle of the Mumbai police commissioner accusing the state home minister of using the police as an instrument for extortion.
    • In West Bengal, the police have been a mute spectator to the post-election violence.
    • The Centre, through a fiat, gave protection to all the MLAs of the BJP.
    • Normally, any such arrangement should have been in consultation and with the involvement of the state government. 
    • Cooperative federalism: The best option would be for the central and state governments to respect each other’s turf in a spirit of cooperative federalism.

    3)Need for a fresh look at the distribution of power

    • If the central and state governments cannot respect each other’s turf, it would perhaps be necessary to have a fresh look at the distribution of powers in the seventh schedule of the Constitution.

    Conclusion

    Police reforms on the lines of judicial directives given by the Supreme Court is the need of the hour. The centre needs to act first and nudge the states toward a uniform police structure throughout the country.

    Back2Basics: Supreme Court Directive on Police Reforms

    1) Limit political control

    • Constitute a State Security Commission to:
    • Ensure that the state government does not exercise unwarranted influence or pressure on the police.
    • Lay down broad policy guidelines.
    • Evaluate the performance of the state police.

    2. Appointments based on merit

    • Ensure that the Director-General of Police is appointed through a merit–based, transparent process, and secures a minimum tenure of 2 years.

    3. Fix minimum tenure

    • Ensure that other police officers on operational duties (including Superintendents of Police in charge of a district and Station House Officers in charge of a police station) are also provided a minimum tenure of 2 years.

    4. Separate police functions

    • Separate the functions of investigation and maintaining law and order.

    5. Set up fair and transparent systems

    • Set up a Police Establishment Board to decide and make recommendations on transfers, postings, promotions and other service-related matters of police officers of and below the rank of Deputy Superintendent of Police.

    6. Establish a Police Complaints Authority in each state

    • At the state level, there should be a Police Complaints Authority to look into public complaints against police officers of and above the rank of Superintendent of Police in cases of serious misconduct, including custodial death, grievous hurt or rape in police custody.
    • At the district level, the Police Complaints Authority should be set up to inquire into public complaints against the police personnel of and up to the rank of Deputy Superintendent of Police in cases of serious misconduct.

    7. Set up a selection commission

    • A National Security Commission needs to be set up at the union level to prepare a panel for selection and placement of chiefs of the Central Police Organizations with a minimum tenure of 2 years.

  • Promoting fiscal federalism

    Context

    States are facing financial constraints in the backdrop of lockdown and consequent dwindling revenue collection. The situation also highlights the issues of fiscal federalism in India.

    Issues facing fiscal federalism in India

    1) Issue of 14% compensation

    • As per the Constitution (One Hundred and First Amendment) Act, compensation on account of the implementation of GST will be available for a period of five years.
    • 14% increment assurance: At the time of introducing the Goods and Services Tax (GST) law assured States a 14% increase in their annual revenue for five years (up to July 1, 2020).
    • But the Union government has deviated from the statutory promise and has been insisting that States avail themselves of loans.
    • The future interest liability of these loans should not be placed on the shoulders of the States.
    • Borrowing limits built into loan: Moreover, the borrowing limit of States, as per the Fiscal Responsibility and Budget Management Act, should not be built into these loans.

    2) Conditional increase in borrowing limit

    • Last year, the Union government increased the borrowing ceiling of the States from 3% to 5% for FY 2020-21.
    • But conditions are attached to 1.5% of the 2% of increased ceiling.
    • Attaching conditions for expenditure out of the borrowed amount would clip the wings of the States and goes against the principle of cooperative federalism.

    Way forward

    • Introduce special rate: A special rate could be levied for a specified period in order to raise additional resources to meet the challenges posed by COVID-19 with the approval of the GST Council.
    • As per Section 4(f) of Article 279A, the Union government can consider introducing any special rate to raise additional resources during the pandemic (any natural calamity or disaster).
    • The present GST compensation period will end in 2021-22.
    • Increase the period beyond five years:  Compensation beyond five years requires a constitutional amendment.
    • If this period is not increased, it will create serious financial stress to the States, especially to those which require higher compensation.

    Conclusion

    There is a need for measures on part of the Central government to consolidate fiscal federalism in the aftermath of pandemic and implementation of the GST regime in India.

  • Supreme Court strikes down part of Constitution Amendment on cooperative societies

    Context

    In Union of India vs Rajendra N. Shah, the Supreme Court of India partially struck down the 97th Constitutional Amendment.

    Background of the 97th Constitutional Amendment

    • The 97th Constitutional Amendment came into effect from February 15 2012.
    • The amendment added “cooperative societies” to the protected forms of association under Article 19(1)(c), elevating it to a fundamental right.
    • It also inserted Part IXB in the Constitution which laid down the terms by which cooperative societies would be governed, in more granular detail than was palatable.

    Why was the Amendment struck down?

    • The Constitution can be amended only by the procedure provided in Article 368.
    • The amendment procedure requires a majority of the total strength of each of the Houses of Parliament and two-thirds majority of those present and voting.
    • A proviso to the Article lists out some articles and chapters of the Constitution, which can be amended only by a special procedure.
    • The special procedure requires that the amendment will also have to be ratified by the legislatures of half of the States.
    • It is precisely on the grounds of violation of this additional requirement that the 97th Constitutional Amendment was challenged.
    • The Gujarat High Court struck down the amendment in 2013 on the grounds that it had failed to comply with the requirements under Article 368(2) by virtue of not having been ratified by the States and had also given an additional finding that the 97th Amendment violated the basic structure of the Constitution.
    • The Union Government challenged the Gujarat High Court judgment before the Supreme Court, arguing that the amendment neither directly nor effectively changed the scheme of distribution of powers between the Centre and the States.
    • The court took the example of the 73rd and 74th Amendments which were similar in impact on the legislative power of the States, had been passed by the special procedure involving ratification by State legislatures.
    • Procedural lacuna: The court noted that the procedure had not been followed in this case.
    • The Supreme Court clarified that the does not go into the question of the amendment being violative of the basic structure of the Constitution.
    • The judgment makes a distinction between cooperative societies operating in one State and multi-State cooperative societies and holds that while a ratification by half the State legislatures would have been necessary insofar as it applies to cooperative societies in one State.

    Increasing control of the Union government

    • Union government has been acquiring incrementally greater control of cooperative societies over the years.
    • Cooperative banks have been brought under the purview of the Reserve Bank of India.
    • Union Government recently established Union Ministry for Cooperation.

    Issues with Central control over cooperative sector

    • Domain of States: The idea that the cooperative sector ought to be controlled at the State level and not at the central or Union level goes back all the way to the Government of India Act, 1919 which placed cooperatives in the provincial list.
    • Part of State list: Entry 32 of the State List in the Seventh Schedule of the Constitution confer power on the State legislatures to make laws pertaining to incorporation, regulation and the winding up of cooperative societies.
    • The cooperative sector has always been in the domain of the States or provinces.
    • Different organising principles: The organising principles and mechanism of these cooperatives differ from area to area and depend on the industry or crop which forms the fulcrum of the cooperative.
    • Homogeneity nor require: Homogeneity in this area would only result in the creation of round holes in which square pegs no longer fit.
    • They also would not really serve to break the control some political interests have taken over cooperatives.

    Conclusion

    It is best that the Government takes this judgment in the right spirit and stays away from further meddling in the cooperative sector, notwithstanding the creation of the new Ministry.

  • Assam-Mizoram Boundary Dispute

    Five Assam police personnel were killed in an exchange of fire with the Mizoram Police after the protracted border row between the two northeastern States took a violent turn.

    Assam-Mizoram Boundary Dispute

    • At the heart of the dispute over the 165-km Assam-Mizoram boundary are two border demarcations that go back to the days of British colonial rule, and disagreement over which demarcation to follow.
    • British tea plantations surfaced in the Cachar plains – the Barak Valley that now comprises the districts of Cachar, Hailakandi and Karimganj — during the mid-19th century.
    • Their expansion led to problems with the Mizos whose home was the Lushai Hills.
    • In August 1875, the southern boundary of Cachar district was issued in the Assam Gazette.
    • The Mizos say this was the fifth time the British had drawn the boundary between the Lushai Hills and the Cachar plains, and the only time when it was done in consultation with Mizo chiefs.

    Creation of new states

    • But in 1933, the boundary between Lushai Hills and the then princely state of Manipur was demarcated – it said the Manipur boundary began from the trijunction of Lushai Hills, Cachar district of Assam and Manipur state.
    • The Mizos do not accept this demarcation, and point to the 1875 boundary which was drawn in consultation with their chiefs.
    • In the decades after Independence, states and UTs were carved out of Assam – Nagaland (1963), Arunachal Pradesh (UT 1972, formerly NEFA), Meghalaya (UT 1972), Mizoram (UT 1972).

    A matter of perception

    • Mizoram says Assam has been pushing its people 10-12 km inside their territory.
    • Mizoram’s official stand is that the boundary should be demarcated on the basis of notification in 1875 that distinguished the Lushai Hills (erstwhile district of Assam that became Mizoram) from the plains of Cachar.
    • The notification is based on the Bengal Eastern Frontier Regulation Act, 1873, which makes it obligatory for Indians beyond to possess a travel document to enter Mizoram.
    • Assam also has border disputes with Arunachal Pradesh, Meghalaya, and Nagaland.

  • The upcoming challenges to Indian federalism

    Context

    In 2026, there will be the challenge of addressing the conflict between the democratic principles and the federal principles, when there will be a reallocation of Lok Sabha seats. India needs to reimagine the current federal compact to address the challenges to federalism.

    Population freeze for Lok Sabha seats

    • Since 1976, seats in the Lok Sabha have reflected the 1971 census and have not taken into account changes in the population.
    • The primary reason for this has been unequal population growth among States.
    • India’s most highly developed and prosperous States have been successful at family planning, while the poorer States continue to expand.
    • The freeze was thus a chance to ensure that India’s most successful States are not punished politically for their success.
    • Therefore, the Indian Constitution may face an unprecedented crisis in 2026 when there will be a dramatic change in the composition of the Lok Sabha.

    Challenge of balancing the principle of democracy and federalism

    • As Article 1 of the Indian Constitution says, India is a Union of States.
    • However, the history of the linguistic reorganisation of States in 1956, and subsequent movements for Statehood afterwards demonstrates that States are distinct associative communities, within the federal structure of the Indian Union.
    • In a democratic set-up, all citizens are equal and are thus entitled to equal representation in governance.
    • But this would imply that bigger States are likely to dominate the national conversation over smaller States.
    • This leads us to an inherent contradiction between the principles of democracy and federalism when federal units are unequal in size, population and economics. 
    • The small States fear that they would get a smaller share of the pie economically, a much reduced say in national issues, and be irrelevant in the political governance of the country.

    How the US Constitution addresses the concerns of small states

    • When the Americans adopted their Constitution, they protected smaller States in four ways.
    • First, national powers over the States were limited.
    • Second, each State regardless of size had two seats in the Senate, giving smaller States an outsized role in national governance.
    • Third, Presidents are elected by electoral votes, which means they must win States rather than the total national population.
    • Fourth, the slave-owning states were allowed to count the slaves for purposes of representation, with each slave being counted as three-fifths of a person.
    • This essential structure remains the bedrock of the American Constitution today.

    How Indian Constitution deals with the issue?

    • India’s quasi-federal structure has always been sui generis.
    • Our founders knew that India’s diversity made federalism inevitable, but, fearing separatist tendencies among States that had never been a single political unit, they also created a strong centre.
    • However, the 1956 reorganisation of States on linguistic lines was a popular recognition of federal principles and yet did not result in separatist tendencies.
    • Since then, new States within the Union have been created in response to the demands of people for greater autonomy.

    Way forward on addressing the challenges to federalism

    • There is an urgent need to reimagine our national compact.
    • Following are the components of such a new balance that need to be fine-tuned to Indian realities.
    • Give more powers to States: The powers of States vis-à-vis the Centre contained in the Lists and in the provisions dealing with altering boundaries of States must be increased to assuage the fear of smaller States that they will be dominated by bigger ones.
    • More localised decision-making is bound to increase national prosperity.
    • Indeed, this was the entire goal of the creation of Panchayat governance through the 73rd and 74th Amendments to the Constitution.
    • Expand the role of Rajya Sabha: The role and composition of the Rajya Sabha, our House of States, must be expanded.
    • This would allow smaller States a kind of brake over national majoritarian politics that adversely impact them.
    • Consent of all states on financial redistribution: Constitutional change and the change in financial redistribution between the States must require the consent of all or nearly all States.
    • Constitutional provisions dealing with language and religion must also be inviolate.
    • Break the bigger States: Serious thought must be given to breaking up the biggest States into smaller units that will not by themselves dominate the national conversation.

    Conclusion

    The unity of India is, of course, the fundamental premise underlying this discussion; but this unity does not depend on an overbearing Centre for its survival.

  • Mekedatu Dam Project

    Karnataka and Tamil Nadu are again at the crossroads against the Mekedatu dam project in the Cauvery River Basin.

    What is the Mekedatu Project?

    • Mekedatu, meaning goat’s leap, is a deep gorge situated at the confluence of the rivers Cauvery and Arkavathi, about 100 km from Bengaluru, at the Kanakapura taluk in Karnataka’s Ramanagara district.
    • In 2013, then Karnataka announced the construction of a multi-purpose balancing reservoir project.
    • The project aimed to alleviate the drinking water problems of the Bengaluru and Ramanagara districts.
    • It was also expected to generate hydroelectricity to meet the power needs of the state.

    Issues with the project

    • Soon after the project was announced TN has objected over granting of permission or environmental clearance.
    • Explaining the potential for damage to the lower riparian state of TN, it said that the project was in violation of the final award of the Cauvery Water Disputes Tribunal.
    • It stated that the project will affect the natural flow of the river Cauvery considerably and will severely affect the irrigation in TN.

    What do the Cauvery Water Disputes Tribunal and the Supreme Court say?

    • The Cauvery Water Disputes Tribunal, in its final order on February 2007, made allocations to all the riparian States — Karnataka, Kerala and Tamil Nadu, apart from the Union Territory of Puducherry.
    • It also stipulated “tentative monthly deliveries during a normal year” to be made available by Karnataka to Tamil Nadu.
    • Aggrieved over the final order for different reasons, the States had appealed to the Supreme Court.
    • In February 2018, the court, in its judgment, revised the water allocation and increased the share of Karnataka by 14.75 thousand million cubic feet (tmc ft) at the cost of Tamil Nadu.
    • The enhanced quantum comprised 4.75 tmc ft for meeting drinking water and domestic requirements of Bengaluru and surrounding areas.

    What is Karnataka planning?

    • Encouraged by the Supreme Court verdict, Karnataka, which sees the order as an endorsement of its stand, has set out to pursue the Mekedatu project.
    • Originally proposed as a hydropower project, the revised Mekedatu dam project has more than one purpose to serve.
    • A hydropower plant of nearly 400 MW has also been proposed.
    • The Karnataka government has argued that the proposed reservoir will regulate the flow to Tamil Nadu on a monthly basis, as stipulated by the Tribunal and the Supreme Court.
    • This is why Karnataka has contended that the project will not affect the interests of Tamil Nadu farmers.

  • Delimitation of Jammu and Kashmir

    The Jammu and Kashmir Delimitation Commission has completed its consultation with various and stated that it would base its final report on the 2011 Census to add at least seven more seats to the 83-member Assembly of the erstwhile state.

    Agenda for delimitation

    • Delimitation will be conducted on the basis of the 2011 census report. This assumes significance because the last delimitation exercise was conducted 26 years ago in 1995, and that too was based on the census of 1981.
    • Apart from the demographics indicated in the Census, the commission will also take into account practicality, geographical compatibility, topography, physical features, means of communication and convenience available.
    • Twenty-four seats that are reserved for Pakistan-occupied Jammu and Kashmir (PoJK) would not be delimited in this process. This further makes the delimitation exercise relevant because some political parties argue, that this freeze has created inequity for the Jammu region.
    • The commission will also specify the number of seats to be reserved for the SC and the ST communities in the UT. This is important because despite having a sizeable tribal population, no seats had ever been reserved in the past for the Scheduled Tribes in Jammu and Kashmir.
    • A draft report will be prepared and put in the public domain for consensus and feedback. Only after the fresh comments, the final draft will be prepared.

    What is Delimitation and why is it needed?

    • Delimitation is the act of redrawing boundaries of an Assembly or Lok Sabha seat to represent changes in population over time.
    • This exercise is carried out by a Delimitation Commission, whose orders have the force of law and cannot be questioned before any court.
    • The objective is to redraw boundaries (based on the data of the last Census) in a way so that the population of all seats, as far as practicable, be the same throughout the State.
    • Aside from changing the limits of a constituency, the process may result in a change in the number of seats in a state.

    How often has delimitation been carried out in J&K?

    • Delimitation exercises in J&K in the past have been slightly different from those in the rest of the country because of the region’s special status — which was scrapped by the Centre in August 2019.
    • Until then, the delimitation of Lok Sabha seats in J&K was governed by the Constitution of India, but the delimitation of the state’s Assembly was governed by the J&K Constitution and J&K Representation of the People Act, 1957.
    • Assembly seats in J&K were delimited in 1963, 1973 and 1995.
    • The last exercise was conducted by the Justice (retired) K K Gupta Commission when the state was under President’s Rule and was based on the 1981 census, which formed the basis of the state elections in 1996.
    • There was no census in the state in 1991 and no Delimitation Commission was set up by the state government after the 2001 census as the J&K Assembly passed a law putting a freeze until 2026.

    Why is it in the news again?

    • After the abrogation of J&K’s special status in 2019, the delimitation of Lok Sabha and Assembly seats in the newly-created UT would be as per the provisions of the Indian Constitution.
    • On March 6, 2020, the government set up the Delimitation Commission, headed by retired Supreme Court judge Ranjana Prakash Desai, which was tasked with winding up delimitation in J&K in a year.
    • As per the J&K Reorganization Bill, the number of Assembly seats in J&K would increase from 107 to 114, which is expected to benefit the Jammu region.

  • Fresh stirrings on federalism as a new politics

    Context

    • Several issues such as vaccine wars, debates over the Goods and Services Tax (GST), the fracas over West Bengal’s Chief Secretary, and the pushback against controversial regulations in Lakshadweep have once again brought into focus the idea of federalism.
    • The Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam, since taking office, has begun to craft an ideological narrative on State rights, by re-introducing the term Union into the public discourse and pushing back against increased fiscal centralisation

    Lack of political consensus among States for genuine federalism

    • Federalism in India has always had political relevance, but except for the States Reorganisation Act, federalism has rarely been an axis of political mobilisation.
    • Fiscal and administrative centralisation persisted despite nearly two decades of coalition governments.
    • Rather than deepen federalism, the contingencies of electoral politics have created significant impediments to creating a political consensus for genuine federalism.

    Three challenges in deepening federalism among States

    1) Tendency to equate federalism as against nationalism

    • The grammar of development and nationalism, which has mass electoral appeal is used to undermine federalism.
    • Slogans such as ‘one nation, one market’, ‘one nation, one ration card’, ‘one nation, one grid’ symbolise development and nationalism while leaving little space for federalism.
    • In this context, federalism as a principle risks being equated with regionalism and a narrow parochialism that is anti-development and anti-national.

    2) Lack of federal principles

    • Pratap Bhanu Mehta has pointed out that over the decades, federal principles have been bent in all kinds of ways to co-produce a political culture of flexible federalism.
    • Federalism in this rendition is reduced to a game of political upmanship and remains restricted to a partisan tussle.
    • Claimants of greater federalism often maintain silence on unilateral decisions that affect other States.
    • For instance, the downgrading of Jammu and Kashmir into a Union Territory, the notification of the NCT of Delhi (Amendment) Act, 2021 hardly witnessed protests by States that were not directly affected by these.

    3) Economic and governance divergence among states

    • Across all key indicators, southern (and western) States have outperformed much of northern and eastern India.
    • This has resulted in a greater divergence rather than expected convergence with growth.
    • This has created a context where collective action amongst States becomes difficult as poorer regions of India contribute far less to the economy but require greater fiscal resources to overcome their economic fragilities.
    • These emerging tensions were visible when the 15th Finance Commission (FC) was mandated to use the 2011 Census rather than the established practice of using the 1971 Census.
    • This, Southern states feared, risked penalising States that had successfully controlled population growth by reducing their share in the overall resource pool.
    •  With the impending delimitation exercise due in 2026, these tensions will only increase.

    Way forward

    • A politics for deepening federalism will need to overcome a nationalist rhetoric that pits federalism against nationalism and development.
    • Reclaim fiscal federalism:  Weak fiscal management has brought the Union government on the brink of what economist Rathin Roy has called a silent fiscal crisis.
    • The Union’s response has been to squeeze revenue from States by increasing cesses.
    • Its insistence on giving GST compensation to States as loans (after long delays) and increasing State shares in central schemes.
    • Against this backdrop, both sub-nationalist sentiments and the need to reclaim fiscal federalism create a political moment for a principled politics of federalism.
    • Sharing burden with poorer States: On the fiscal side, richer States must find a way of sharing the burden with the poorer States.
    • An inter-State platform that brings States together in a routine dialogue on matters of fiscal federalism could be the starting point for building trust and a common agenda.
    • Overcome isolationist tendency: The politics of regional identity is isolationist by its very nature.
    • An effort at collective political action for federalism based on identity concerns will have to overcome this risk.
    • Finally, beyond principles, a renewed politics of federalism is also an electoral necessity.

    Consider the question “Federalism in India has always had political relevance, but it has rarely been an axis of political mobilisation. What are the factors responsible for this? Suggest the way forward for the states to overcome these factors.” 

    Conclusion

    A renewed politics of federalism would require immense patience and maturity from regional parties. It remains to be seen whether they up to the task.

  • Water wars of Andhra Pradesh and Telangana

    An ongoing jala jagadam (fight over water resources), as it has been described by regional media, once again drew the police forces of Andhra Pradesh and Telangana into a tense standoff over release of water from the Nagarjuna Sagar reservoir.

    Krishna River Dispute

    • Both states have disagreements over the sharing of the Krishna River water continue to shape politics in the region.
    • AP alleges that Telangana has been drawing Krishna water from four projects — Jurala, Srisailam, Nagarjuna Sagar, and Pulichintala without approvals from the Krishna River Management Board (KRMB).
    • The KRMB an autonomous body that was set up after the bifurcation of the state, to manage and regulate the waters in the Krishna basin.

    What is the issue?

    • The water that is used for power generation, Andhra says, is being wasted by releasing it into the Bay of Bengal, even as farmers in the Krishna delta ayacut are yet to begin sowing of the kharif crop.
    • Telangana says it would continue with the hydropower generation to meet its requirements of power.
    • At the same time, it has taken strong exception to the irrigation projects of the Andhra Pradesh government, especially the Rayalaseema Lift Irrigation Project (RLIP), which it claims is illegal.
    • Telangana has called for a 50:50 allocation of water from the Krishna River.

    How is the water split between the states currently?

    • After Telangana was carved out of Andhra Pradesh, the two states agreed to split the water share 66:34 on an ad hoc basis until the Krishna Water Disputes Tribunal-2 decided the final allocation.

    Why is Telangana making the big hydel push?

    • The Kaleshwaram lift irrigation project that was inaugurated in 2019 requires a huge amount of power to draw water from the Godavari River.
    • Also, the Telangana government says that it needs hydel energy to power its Nettempadu, Bheema, Koilsagar and Kalwakurthy lift irrigation projects.
    • Despite protests by Andhra, the Telangana CM has chosen to operate all hydel power stations at full capacity because hydel power is cheaper, and imposes a smaller burden on the already stretched state budget.

    What is the solution to the disagreement, then?

    • Telangana wants the Krishna Water Disputes Tribunal-2 to permanently settle the water dispute.
    • In the meantime, it wants the KRMB to convene a full-fledged board meeting on a mutually agreed date this month to address its grievances against Andhra Pradesh.

    What political factors are at play behind the dispute?

    • The two CMs have maintained cordial relations and have even met on several occasions to discuss long-standing issues arising out of the bifurcation of the erstwhile state of Andhra Pradesh.
    • Critics have, however, alleged that the two CMs are fanning regional sentiments purely for political gains.

    Back2Basics: Interstate (River) Water Disputes (ISWDs)

    • These are a continuing challenge to federal water governance in India.
    • Rooted in constitutional, historico-geographical, and institutional ambiguities, they tend to become prolonged conflicts between the states that share river basins.
    • India has 25 major river basins, with most rivers flowing across states.
    • As river basins are shared resources, a coordinated approach between the states, with adequate involvement of the Centre, is necessary for the preservation, equitable distribution and sustainable utilization of river water.
    • Within India’s federal political structure, inter-state disputes require the involvement of the Union government for a federal solution at two levels: between the states involved, and between the Centre and the states.
    • The Interstate River Water Disputes Act, 1956 (IRWD Act) was enacted under Article 262 of the Constitution of India on the eve of reorganization of states to resolve the water disputes that would arise in the use, control and distribution of an interstate river or river valley.
    • Article 262 of the Indian Constitution provides a role for the Central government in adjudicating conflicts surrounding inter-state rivers that arise among the state/regional governments.

  • How the GNCTD (Amendment) Act affects functioning of Delhi Assembly

    The article highlights the implications of the Government of National Capital Territory of Delhi (GNCTD)(Amendment) Act, 2021 on functioning of Assembly and its committees.

    Context

    The Government of National Capital Territory of Delhi (GNCTD)(Amendment) Act, 2021 has been criticised as a retrograde law. However, what deserves equal attention is the Act’s assault on the functioning of Delhi’s Legislative Assembly.

    Background of GNCTD Act

    • The GNCTD Act was enacted in 1992.
    • Under the Act, Delhi Legislative Assembly was given the power to regulate its own procedure, as well as the conduct of its business.
    • This sought to realise a delicate balance reflecting Delhi’s unique constitutional position: neither full state nor a centrally governed Union Territory.

    How amendment affects functioning of Assembly

    • Its standards of procedure and conduct of business have been firmly tethered to that of the Lok Sabha, depriving Delhi’s elected MLAs of an effective say in how their Assembly should be run.
    • The Amending Act prohibits the Assembly from making any rule enabling either itself or its committees to consider any issue concerned with “the day-to-day administration of the capital” or “conduct inquiries in relation to administrative decisions”.
    • The most significant impact of this shall be on the exercise of free speech in the Assembly and its committees.
    • The amendment impeded the Assembly from performing its most basic legislative function — that of holding the executive to account by restricting its ability to freely discuss matters happening in the capital.

    Impact on committees

    • The deliberations and inputs of committees often pave the way for intelligent legislative action.
    • In a way, they act as the eyes and ears for the whole House, which has neither the time nor the expertise to scrutinise issues in depth.
    • It would be impossible for committees to perform this function without the power to conduct inquiries.
    • Pre-emptively injunct a committee from conducting an inquiry “in relation to the administrative decisions” (an extremely broad exception) completely negates the ability of committees to function effectively as the Assembly’s advisors and agents.
    • The quality of legislative work emanating from the Assembly is thus ultimately bound to suffer.

    Consider the question “What are the reasons for frequent disputes between Delhi government and the Lt. Governor? Would the Government of National Capital Territory of Delhi (GNCTD)(Amendment) Act, 2021 succeed in ending that trend?” 

    Conclusion

    The amendment deprive the Delhi Assmbly of its very basic functions and render it a ‘legislature’ in name only. Surely, Delhi’s voters deserve better than that. The Government need to reconsider the provisions of the amendment act.