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GS Paper: Federalism

  • New rules for Transaction of Business of the Govt. of UT of J&K Rules, 2019

    The Ministry of Home Affairs (MHA) has notified new rules for administration in the UT of Jammu and Kashmir that specify the functions of the Lieutenant Governor (LG) and the Council of Ministers.

    Tap to read more about: Reorganization of J&K

    New Rules for J&K

    • The new rules have been defined under Section 55 of the Jammu and Kashmir Reorganization Act, 2019.

    What are they?

    (1)Executive functions of the L-G

    • According to the rules the “police, public order, All India Services and anti-corruption” will fall under the executive functions of the L-G.
    • Chief Minister or the Council of Ministers will have no say in their functioning.

    (2)Minority Community interests

    • The proposals or matters which affect or are likely to affect peace and tranquillity or the interest of any minority community, the SCs, the STs and the Backward Classes shall essentially be submitted to the LG through the Chief Secretary, under intimation to the CM, before issuing any orders.

    (3)Service Matters

    • The Council of Ministers, led by the CM, will decide service matters of non-All India Services officers, proposal to impose a new tax, land revenue, sale grant or lease of government property, reconstituting departments or offices and draft legislation.

    (4)Difference of Opinion

    • In case of difference of opinion between the L-G and a Minister when no agreement could be reached even after a month, the “decision of the Lieutenant Governor shall be deemed to have been accepted by the Council of Ministers”.

    (5)Relation with the Centre

    • According to the rules, “any matter which is likely to bring the Government of the UT into controversy with the Central Government or with any State Government” shall be brought to the notice of the L-G and the CM by the Secretary concerned through the Chief Secretary.
    • All communications received from the Centre, including those from the PM and other Ministers, shall be submitted by the Secretary to the Chief Secretary, the Minister in charge, the CM and the L-G for information after their receipt.

    (6)Various departments

    • Under the rules, there will be 39 departments in the UT, such as school education, agriculture, higher education, horticulture, election, general administration, home, mining, power, Public Works Department, tribal affairs and transport.

  • India needs a Fiscal Council

    The newscard highlights the need of bipartisan, independent Fiscal Council to report and analyse FRBM discrepancies by the Government.

    Try this question for mains:
    Q.Fiscal Council is an important institution needed to complement the rule-based fiscal policy. Discuss.

    What is a Fiscal Council?

    • A Fiscal Council is an independent fiscal institution (IFI) with a mandate to promote stable and sustainable public finances.
    • They aim to provide nonpartisan oversight of fiscal performance and/or advice and guidance — from either a positive or normative perspective — on key aspects of fiscal policy.
    • These institutions assist in calibrating sustainable fiscal policy by making an objective and scientific analysis.

    Voices for a Fiscal Council

    • The 13th Finance Commission recommended that a committee be appointed by the Ministry of Finance which should eventually transform itself into a Fiscal Council.
    • The FC expected it to conduct an annual independent public review of FRBM compliance, including a review of the fiscal impact of policy decisions.
    • The FRBM Review Committee too made a similar recommendation underlining the need for an independent review by the Finance Ministry appointing the Council.

    Why need a fiscal council?

    (1)Burgeoning deficits

    • For the current year, even without any additional fiscal stimulus, the deficit is estimated at about 7% of GDP as against 3.5% estimated in the Budget due to a sharp decline in revenues.
    • The consolidated deficit of the Union and States could be as high as 12% of GDP and the overall debt could go up to 85%.
    • Thus it is necessary that the government must return to a credible fiscal consolidation path once the crisis gets over.

    (2)Transparency issues

    • Besides large deficits and debt, there are questions of comprehensiveness, transparency and accountability in the Budgets.
    • The practice of repeated postponement of targets, timely non-settlement of bill payments and off Budget financing to show lower deficits has been common.
    • The report of the CAG of India in 2018 has highlighted various advances done to keep the liabilities hidden.

    Fiscal Council can be a game changer. How?

    • First, an unbiased report to Parliament helps to raise the level of debate and brings in greater transparency and accountability.
    • Secondly, costing of various policies and programmes can help to promote transparency over the political cycle to discourage populist shifts in fiscal policy and improve accountability.
    • Third, scientific estimates of the cost of programmes and assessment of forecasts could help in raising public awareness about their fiscal implications and make people understand the nature of budgetary constraint.
    • Finally, the Council will work as a conscience keeper in monitoring rule-based policies, and in raising awareness and the level of debate within and outside Parliament.

    Issues meddling between

    • The problem is that a Council created by the Finance Ministry and reporting to it can hardly be expected to be independent.

    Diverse role to play ahead

    • According to the IMF, there were 36 countries with IFIs in 2014 and more have been established since.
    • While most of the IFIs are in advanced countries, emerging economies too have also shown growing interest in them.
    • Although their common agenda has been to function as watchdogs, there is considerable diversity in their structure and functions.
    • Over the years, monitoring compliance with fiscal rules and costing policies and programmes have become major tasks of these councils.

    Way forward

    • When the markets fail, governments have to intervene.
    • Whenever governments seem obstructed, it is here that we need systems and institutions to ensure checks and balances.
    • In that respect, a Fiscal Council is an important institution needed to complement the rule-based fiscal policy.

    Conclusion

    • Of course, it is not a ‘silver bullet’; if there is no political will, the institution would be less effective, and if there is political will, there is no need for such an institution.
    • That is also true of the FRBM Act. While we cannot state that the FRBM Act has been an unqualified success, it has also not been an abject failure either.

  • Naga peace process

    The article analyses the issue of Naga peace process and the problem of identifying the stakeholders in the process.

    Naga Polity and aspirations

    • The  Nagas family comprises over 25 tribes.
    • Each of these is a proud owner and inheritor of a distinct culture, language, tradition and geography, supporting a distinct world view.
    • However, many Nagas aspire to Naga unity, and they view those tribal loyalties as residues of a premodern past and an obstacle to Naga solidarity.
    • Naga nationalism is connected with the idea Naga homeland  that includes contiguous areas in a number of Northeastern states, and even parts of Myanmar.

    “Unique history” formulation

    • The source of the phrase can be traced back to a joint communiqué that NSCN-IM General Secretary Thuingaleng Muivah and former Home Secretary K Padmanabhaiah signed in Amsterdam on July 11, 2002.
    • Meaning of the phrase “unique history” is not self-explanatory.
    • Despite the lack of clarity, it is adopted by officials and political leaders intended to accept two things-
    • (a) the characterisations long favoured by security bureaucrats of the Naga political struggle as a separatist insurgency or a terrorist movement that makes false claims to Naga unity, are inaccurate and
    • (b) rejecting those labels [ such as separatist insurgency or terrorist movement] is a necessary condition for negotiations based on mutual respect.
    • Those are significant achievements that should not be allowed to wither away.

    Negotiating with NSCN-IM and issues with it

    • NSCN-IM had declared the Shillong Accord of 1975 a sellout, and a betrayal of the Naga cause.
    • But it emerged as a serious political force precisely because it stood for Naga unity.
    • However, it is argued that NSCN-IM’s appeal is limited to the Tangkhul tribes of Manipur only.

    Consider the question “The issues of identifying the stakeholders in the Naga peace process is at the root of the solution to the peace problem. Also, examine the other factors which make the resolution elusive. Suggest the measures to resolve the issue.”

    Conclusion

    That a more nuanced negotiating strategy is now emerging is a positive development. But the fundamental question about who all the stakeholders in the Naga conflict are, still needs a satisfactory answer, one that is based on an in-depth mapping of the conflict. Only then can we expect peaceful dialogue and patient negotiations to end the conflict and bring about a durable peace.

  • Sutlej-Yamuna Link (SYL) Canal Project

    Opposing the Sutlej-Yamuna Link (SYL) canal project and staking claim to Yamuna’s waters, Punjab CM warned about the repercussions. Here is a look at the decades-old issue and why it has come up again now.

    Try this PYQ:

    Q. Which one of the following pairs is not correctly matched? (CSP 2017)

    Dam/Lake River

    (a) Govind Sagar: Satluj

    (b) Kolleru Lake: Krishna

    (c) Ukai Reservoir: Tapi

    (d) Wular Lake: Jhelum

    What is the SYL canal issue?

    • At the time of reorganization of Punjab in 1966, the issue of sharing of river waters between both the states emerged.
    • Punjab refused to share waters of Ravi and Beas with Haryana stating it was against the riparian principle.
    • Before the reorganization, in 1955, out of 15.85 MAF of Ravi and Beas, the Centre had allocated 8 MAF to Rajasthan, 7.20 MAF to undivided Punjab, 0.65MAF to Jammu and Kashmir.
    • Out of 7.20 MAF allocated, Punjab did not want to share any water with Haryana.
    • In March 1976, when the Punjab Reorganization Act was implemented, the Centre notified fresh allocations, providing 3.5 MAF To Haryana.

    Inception of the canal project

    • Later, in 1981, the water flowing down Beas and Ravi was revised and pegged at 17.17 MAF, out of which 4.22 MAF was allocated to Punjab, 3.5 MAF to Haryana, and 8.6 MAF to Rajasthan.
    • Finally, to provide this allocated share of water to southern parts of Haryana, a canal linking the Sutlej with the Yamuna, cutting across the state, was planned.
    • Finally, the construction of 214-km SYL was started in April 1982, 122 km of which was to run through Punjab and the rest through Haryana.
    • Haryana has completed its side of the canal, but work in Punjab has been hanging fire for over three decades.

    Why has the SYL canal come up again now?

    • The issue is back on centre stage after the Supreme Court directed the CMs of Punjab and Haryana to negotiate and settle the SYL canal issue.
    • The apex court asked for a meeting at the highest political level to be mediated by the Centre so that the states reach a consensus over the completion of the SYL canal.
    • The meeting remained inconclusive with the Centre expressing the view that the construction of the SYL canal should be completed. But Punjab CM refused categorically.

    Punjab’s resentment with the project

    • The dispute is based on the bloody history around the SYL canal. The trouble-torn days of terrorism in Punjab started in the early 1980s when work on the SYL started.
    • Punjab feels it utilized its precious groundwater resources to grow the crop for the entire country and should not be forced to share its waters as it faces desertification.
    • It is feared that once the construction of the canal restarts, the youth may start feeling that the state has been discriminated against.
    • The Punjab CM fears Pakistan and secessionist organisations could exploit this and foment trouble in the state.

    Water crisis in Punjab

    • Punjab is facing severe water crisis due to over-exploitation of its underground aquifers for the wheat/paddy monocycle.
    • According to the Central Underground Water Authority’s report, its underground water is over-exploited to meet the agriculture requirements in about 79 per cent area of the state.
    • Out of 138 blocks, 109 are “over-exploited”, two are “critical” five are “semi-critical” and only 22 blocks are in “safe” category.

    Punjab expects a new tribunal

    • The state wants a tribunal seeking a fresh time-bound assessment of the water availability.
    • The state has been saying that till date there has been no adjudication or scientific assessment of Punjab river waters.

  • Jurisdictional conflict in the running of Delhi Government

    The article analyses the tussle between the Delhi Government and the Lt. Governor.

    What the 2018 SC judgement was about

    • The Supreme Court in Government of NCT of Delhi vs. Union of India (2018) decided on the conflicts between the government of NCT and the Union Government and its representative, the Lieutenant Governor.
    • It reminds the Lt. Governor what his real functions are.
    •  It tells the State government that it should remember that Delhi is a special category Union Territory.
    • It lays down the parameters to enabling the harmonious functioning of the government and the Lt. Governor.
    • It did not very clearly delineate the issues in respect of which the Lt. Governor can refer a decision taken by the Council of Ministers to the President in the event of a difference of opinion between the Lt. Governor and the State government.

    Settled issues and clarifications

    • The Supreme Court affirming that the Lt. Governor is bound to act on the aid and advice of council of ministers except in respect of ‘Land’, ‘Public Order’ and the ‘Police’.
    • The Court has also made it clear that there is no requirement of the concurrence of the Lt. Governor and that he has no power to overrule the decisions of the State government.
    • However, Article 239AA (4) (proviso) which says that in the case of a difference of opinion between the Lt. Governor and his Ministers on any matter, the Lt. Governor shall refer it to the President for decision and act according to that decision.
    • If the Lt. Governor thinks that the matter is urgent he can take immediate action on his own.

    How Article 239 AA(4) matters

    •  Lt. Governor can frustrate the efforts of the government, by declaring that there is a difference of opinion on any issue and refer it to the President.
    • Refering matter to the President in reality means the Union Home Ministry.
    • The Lt. Governor being its representative, it is easier for him to secure a decision in his favour.
    • The State government will be totally helpless in such a situation.
    • The recent appointment of prosecutors for conducting the Delhi riot cases in the High Court is a case in point.
    •  When the government decided to appoint them, the Lt. Governor referred it under proviso to Article 239AA (4) to the President stating that there is a difference of opinion.
    • This episode clearly points to the fault lines which still exist in the power equations in the capital’s administrative structure.

    But, can Lt. Governor refer routine administrative matter to the President?

    • A close reading of the Supreme Court judgment in the NCT Delhi case (supra) would reveal that he cannot.
    • The Supreme Court says “The words ‘any matter’ employed in the proviso to Article 239AA (4) cannot be inferred to mean ‘every matter’.
    • Court also says that “The power of the Lieutenant Governor under the said proviso represents the exception and not the general rule”.
    • The President is the highest Constitutional authority and his decision should be sought only on constitutionally important issues.

    Executive powers and legislative powers

    • Parliament can legislate for Delhi on any matter in the State List and the Concurrent List.
    • But the executive power in relation to Delhi except the ‘Police’, ‘Land’ and ‘Public Orders’ vests only in the State government headed by the Chief Minister.
    • The executive power of the Union does not extend to any of the matters which come within the jurisdiction of the Delhi Assembly.
    • The only occasion when the Union Government can overrule the decision of the State government is when the Lt. Governor refers a matter to the President under the proviso to clause (4).

    Consider the question “What are the parameters laid down by the Supreme Court in the Government of NCT of Delhi vs. Union of India (2018) to avoid the conflict between Lt. Governor and the Delhi Government? Also examine the scope of referring any matter to the consideration of the President by the Lt. Governor.”

    Conclusion

    In the Constitutional scheme adopted for the NCT of Delhi Lt. Governor should not emerge as an adversary having a hostile attitude towards the Council of Ministers of Delhi; rather, he should act as a facilitator.

  • Clause 6 of the Assam Accord

    In February, a government-appointed committee had submitted its recommendations for implementation of Clause 6 of the Assam Accord, a key provision that has been contentious for decades.

    Must read:

    https://www.civilsdaily.com/burning-issue-assam-nrc/

    What is Clause 6?

    • It is a part of the Assam Accord which came at the culmination of a movement against immigration from Bangladesh.
    • It reads: “Constitutional, legislative and administrative safeguards, as may be appropriate, shall be provided to protect, preserve and promote the cultural, social, linguistic identity and heritage of the Assamese people.”
    • For recognition as citizens, the Accord sets March 24, 1971, as the cutoff.
    • As immigrants up to the cutoff date would get all rights as Indian citizens, so Clause 6 was inserted to safeguard the socio-political rights and culture of the “indigenous people of Assam”.

    What has happened since?

    • Several committees have been set up over the years to make recommendations on the implementation of Clause 6.
    • None of them made headway on the provision’s contentious issues, however, until the latest CAA move.
    • Following widespread protests against the CAA, the government gave an urgent push to Clause 6 to pacify the Assamese community.

    Recommendations of the recent report

    • Headed by retired High Court judge Biplab Kumar Sarma the committee was asked to fast-track its report.
    • It submitted its report in Feb but the government did not make its contents public.
    • But some Assamese activists independently made the contents public.
    • Its brief was to define the “Assamese people” and suggest measures for the safeguard of their rights. The definition of “Assamese people” has been a subject of discussion for decades.

    Key propositions

    The committee has proposed that the following be considered Assamese people for the purpose of Clause 6. All citizens of India who are part of:

    • Assamese community, residing in the Territory of Assam on or before January 1, 1951; or
    • Any indigenous tribal community of Assam residing in the territory of Assam on or before January 1, 1951; or
    • Any other indigenous community of Assam residing in the territory of Assam on or before January 1, 1951; or
    • All other citizens of India residing in the territory of Assam on or before January 1, 1951; and
    • Descendants of the above categories

    Why 1951?

    • During the Assam agitation, the demand was for detection and deportation of migrants who had illegally entered Assam after 1951.
    • The Assam Accord, however, set the cutoff on March 24, 1971. The National Register of Citizens (NRC) was updated based on this cutoff.
    • Clause 6 is meant to give the Assamese people certain safeguards, which would not be available to migrants between 1951 and 1971.
    • If the recommendation is accepted, those who migrated between 1951 and 1971 would be Indian citizens, but they won’t be eligible for safeguards meant for Assamese people”.

    What are these safeguards?

    Among various recommendations, the key is the reservation of seats in Parliament, Assembly and local bodies; reservation in jobs; and land rights. The panel recommends the Assamese people be given:

    • 80 to 100% reservation in the parliamentary seats of Assam, Assembly seats and local body seats be reserved for the “Assamese people”.
    • 80 to 100% of Group C and D level posts (in Assam) in central government/semi-central government/central PSUs/private sector
    • 80 to 100% of jobs under Government of Assam and state government undertakings; and 70 to 100% of vacancies arising in private partnerships
    • Land rights, with restrictions imposed on transferring land by any means to persons other than “Assamese people”.

    Several other recommendations deal with language and cultural and social rights. On language, it recommends:

    • Assamese language shall continue to be official language throughout the state with provisions for use of local languages in Barak Valley, Hill Districts and the Bodoland Territorial Area Districts.
    • Mandatory provision of an Assamese language paper for recruitment in state government services with alternatives for Barak Valley districts, BTAD and Hills Districts.
    • To set up Academies for all-round development of each of the indigenous tribal languages including, Bodo, Mishing, Karbi, Dimasa, Koch-Rajbongshi, Rabha, Deuri, Tiwa, Tai and other indigenous languages.

  • Appointment of new Lt. Governor of the UT of J&K

    A veteran politician has been appointed as Lieutenant Governor of the Union Territory of Jammu and Kashmir.

    Try this PYQ:

    Q.Which one of the following suggested that the Governor should be an eminent person from outside the State and should be a detached figure without intense political links or should not have taken part in politics in the recent past? (CSP 2019)

    (a) First Administrative Reforms Commission (1966)

    (b) Rajamannar Committee (1969)

    (c) Sarkaria Commission (1983)

    (d) National Commission to Review the Working of the Constitution (2000)

    Office of the Lt. Governor

    • A Lt. Governor is the constitutional head of the union territories in India.
    • She/he is appointed by the President of India for a term of five years and holds office at the President’s pleasure.
    • Since the union territories of Delhi, J&K and Puducherry have a measure of self-government with an elected legislature and council of ministers, the role of the lieutenant governor there is mostly a ceremonial one, akin to that of a state’s governor.
    • In Andaman and Nicobar Islands and Ladakh however, the lieutenant governor holds more power, being both the head of state and head of government.
    • The other three UTs—Chandigarh; Dadra and Nagar Haveli and Daman and Diu; and Lakshadweep—are governed by an administrator.

    Some related facts

    • Unlike the lieutenant governors of other territories, they are usually drawn from the IAS or IPS.
    • Lieutenant governors do not hold the same rank as a governor of a state in the list of precedence.
    • Since 1985 the Governor of Punjab has also been the ex-officio Administrator of Chandigarh.

  • Mythmaking and Article 370

    The articles talk about various myths that have been building around the issues of Jammu and Kashmir. Not only does these myths affect the political outlook towards the state but is also responsible for people’s perspective on this whole story. Go on and read to understand further..

    The myths

    Kashmir has been a favourite site of our national mythmaking; myths that have over the years assumed larger-than-life manifestations in our collective psyche.

    #Myth1

    • Article 370 is considered as the root cause of terrorism in Jammu and Kashmir.
    • But there is a little material basis to it — neither Article 370 can be considered as responsible for terrorism in the Valley nor has its removal ensured a reduction in terrorism.

    #Myth2

    • Article 370 is also held responsible for ruining J&K, stalling its development, preventing proper health care and blocking industries. Once again, these arguments also lack merit and evidence.
    • J&K, as a matter of fact, has been doing much better than most other Indian States and one of the reasons for this was the land reforms carried out in the State in the early 1950s which was possible precisely because of the presence of Article 370.
    • Also, private investors do not set up shop in Kashmir due to militancy which is a product of an existing conflict; not because of Articles 370 or 35A.

    #Myth3

    • If J&K is doing better than the other Indian States, it is because of the massive amounts of funds provided by New Delhi.
    • The real argument here is not whether Kashmir received funding from New Delhi but massive funding as it is often made out to be.
    • Funds from the center can be divided as:
    • Funds to take care of J&K government’s revenue deficit: J&K, for historical reasons, has had a bloated bureaucracy in comparison to other States and their salaries and pensions have been financed by the central government. But these funds do little for the State’s economy or the general population.
    • Then there are routine transfers of funds from the Centre to J&K just as transfers take place from New Delhi to other States.
    • Finally, J&K also received funds due to its special category State status which again is a case with several other Indian States.
    • Put differently, J&K’s better performance in comparison to most other Indian States is at least partly because of Article 370, and its well-being is not necessarily a result of New Delhi’s economic packages.

    #Myth4

    • Development can defeat militancy and insurgency.
    • The reality is that development may not lead to the pacification of the conflict in Kashmir.
    • The Kashmir conflict is a function of complex historical grievances, politico-ethnic demands, increasing religious radicalisation, and Pakistan’s unrelenting interference in the Kashmir Valley.
    • It would be simplistic to imagine that such a multi-layered and complex conflict can be resolved by development alone.
    The deep impact of mythmaking
    • Changed the way how common people understand and treat Kashmir and Kashmiris.
    • Ideas like “Kashmir needs to be reunited with the rest of India” have become a powerful claim made by such representations and political articulations.
    • Yet another popular perception about ‘Kashmiris as troublemakers and sympathisers of terror’ has led to a noticeable increase in the mistreatment of Kashmiri Muslims in the rest of the country.
    Conclusion

    The way forward here is not in celebrating the scrapping of Article 370. It lies in critically examining various outcomes of this process. It is essential that New Delhi work the local people and leaders to reduce the trust and legitimacy deficit that we see today.

  • Issues metropolitan cities face

    Metropolitan cities of India suffers from various issues. This article analyses such issues and suggests some steps to deal with them.

    Inadequate public health infrastructure

    • India’s public health expenditure in 2018 was a mere 1.28% of GDP.
    • According to the World Bank, India’s out-of-pocket health expenditure was 62.4% in 2017, against the world average of 18.2%.
    • Manpower in the health sector is low with India’s doctor-population ratio being 1:1,457  against WHO norm of 1:1,000.

    Governance issues

    • Factors underlying city governance include spatial planning, municipal capacities, empowered mayors and councils and inter-agency coordination, and ward-level citizen participation.
    • Twenty-seven after the 74th Constitutional Amendment Act, these reform agendas continue to be slow in implementation.
    • India’s metropolitan cities have weak capacities in finance and staffing.
    • Bengaluru’s average percentage of own revenue to total expenditure is 47.9%, Chennai 30.5%, Mumbai 36.1% and Kolkata at 48.4%.
    • According to ASICS 2017, Mumbai has the highest number of officers per lakh population at 938 in the country.
    • Yet it is abysmally low compared to global cities such as Johannesburg with 2,922 and New York with 5,446 officers per lakh population

    Limited powers of mayors

    • The leaders steering India’s metropolitan cities are toothless.
    • No big metropolitan cities with 10 million-plus population has a directly-elected Mayor.
    • Mumbai’s Mayor has a tenure of 2.5 years, Delhi and Bengaluru, a mere one year.
    • Mayors do not have full decision-making authority over critical functions of planning, housing, water, environment, fire and emergency services in most cases.
    • Our metropolitan cities are far from being local self-governments.
    • Parastatal agencies for planning, water and public transport report directly to State governments.
    • The State government also largely controls public works and police.
    • Globally, metropolitan cities are steered by a directly-elected leader.
    • Evolved examples include the Tokyo metropolitan government and recent experimental models such as combined authorities in the United Kingdom and Australia.

    Suggestions

    • India needs home-grown solutions suited to its context and political realities while imbibing lessons on institutional design from global examples.
    • It is time the Central and State governments lead efforts towards a metropolitan governance paradigm.
    • The first steps should include empowered Mayors with five-year tenure, decentralised ward level governance, and inter-agency coordination anchored by the city government.

    Lack of transparency, accountability and citizen participation

    • Transparent cities with institutional platforms encouraging citizen participation improve urban democracy.
    • No metropolitan has functional ward committees and area sabhas.
    • An absence of citizen participation is worsened by poor transparency in finance and operations.
    • As per ASICS 2017, India’s big metropolitan cities on average score 3.04/10 in transparency, accountability and participation.

    Significance of smaller cities

    • A World Bank report notes that despite the emergence of smaller towns, the underlying character of India’s urbanisation is “metropolitan”.
    • Under this metropolitan character, new towns emerge around existing large cities.
    • According to a McKinsey report, in 2012, 54 metropolitan cities and their hinterlands accounted for 40% of India’s GDP.
    • The report also estimates that by 2025, 69 metropolitan cities, combined with their hinterlands, will generate over half of India’s incremental GDP between 2012 and 2025.
    • Despite this, India is yet to begin an active discourse on cohesive metropolitan governance frameworks.
    •  Studies by the Centre for Policy Research point that India’s spatial feature exhibits the growth of small towns beyond the economics of large agglomerations.
    • This indicates that while India’s urban vision should focus on its metropolitan cities to reap the benefit of scale, it shouldn’t ignore smaller cities.

    Consider the question “Examine the issues in the governance of metropolitan cities. To what extent the limited power of mayors contributes to the issues of the metropolitan cities in India?”

    Conclusion

    India should use the current pandemic as an opportunity to introspect and reform the way its metropolises are governed.

    Back2Basics: ASICS 2017

    • The Annual Survey of India’s City-Systems (ASICS) 2017 evaluates quality of governance in cities, covering 23 major cities in India across 20 states based on 89 questions.
    • Indian cities scored between 3.0 and 5.1 on 10, with Pune topping the charts for the first time.
    • Other cities that came in the top five include Kolkata, Thiruvananthapuram, Bhubaneswar and Surat, with scores in the range of 4.6 to 4.5.

  • Merger of political parties under Tenth schedule

    A political party is trying to win back its defected MLAs in Rajasthan. This has raised a new question- “Does the anti-defection law apply here?”

    Try this question for mains:

    Q.“Time and again, the courts have spoken out against the Governor acting in the capacity of an all-pervading super-constitutional authority.” Analyse.

    What does “merger” mean a/c to Tenth Schedule?

    • The Tenth Schedule of the Constitution prohibits defection to protect the stability of governments but does not prohibit mergers.
    • Paragraph 4(2) of the Tenth Schedule, dealing with mergers, says that only when two-thirds of the members agree to “merge” the party would they be exempt from disqualification.
    • The “merger” referred to in Paragraph 4(2) is seen as a legal fiction, where members are deemed to have merged for the purposes of being exempt from disqualification, rather than a merger in the true sense.

    The ‘merger’ Politics

    • The political party is arguing that a state unit of a national party cannot be merged without the party being merged at the national level.
    • However, the Tenth Schedule identifies this dichotomy between state units and national units.
    • As per Paragraph 4(2), “merger” of a party means merger of a legislative party of that House.
    • In this case, it would be the Rajasthan Legislative unit of the BSP and not the BSP at the national level.
    • Paragraph 1 of the Tenth Schedule which defines terms specified in the context of the anti-defection law states this clearly.
    • “Legislature Party” for the purposes of Paragraph 4 (which deals with mergers) means the group consisting of all the members of that House for the time being belonging to that political party in accordance with the said provisions.

    Role of Whip

    • Every legislative party identifies the party’s whip at the beginning of the Assembly’s term and conveys this to the Speaker.
    • A national leader’s direction cannot be considered a whip in the context of the anti-defection law.

    On what grounds is the case-based?

    • The contention is that the merger is illegal and unconstitutional because, for a national party, such merger has to take place at the national level.
    • Supporting this argument, there are two decisions of the Supreme Court: the 2006 Jagjit Singh v State of Haryana, and the 2007 ruling in Rajendra Singh Rana and Ors vs Swami Prasad Maurya.
    • In these cases, the SC ruled that the split cannot be recognised primarily because not all these MLAs split at once.
    • The key aspect is that these cases deal with splits where when one-third of the members of a legislative party split; they could not attract disqualification as per Paragraph 3 of the Tenth Schedule.

    Row over one-third

    • In 2003, through the 91st Constitutional Amendment, Paragraph 3 was deleted from the Tenth Schedule.
    • The amendment was made as the one-third split rule was grossly misused by parties to engineer divisions and indulge in horse-trading.
    • One-third was regarded as an easy target to achieve and the law now exempts defection only when it is at two-thirds (in a merger).

    Are there any such precedents?

    • In July 2019, 10 of the 15 one party’s MLAs in Goa joined the other taking the ruling party’s tally to 27 in the 40 member House.
    • Since they formed two-thirds of the strength of the legislative party unit, they are exempt from disqualification.
    • However, the Speaker’s decision not to disqualify them is under challenge before the Supreme Court.
    • Similarly in Telangana in 2016, two years after the 12 out of 15 of MLAs joined the ruling party.
    • The Speaker recognised the defection as a merger since more than two-thirds had moved.