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Type: Op-ed

  • Issues with school enrolment in India

    Context

    Proportion of children attending the government schools has been on the decline. This has several implications.

    Issues with school education in India

    • A quality, free and regular school education represents our most potent infrastructure of opportunity, a fundamental duty of the state.
    • Meritocracy represents the idea that people should advance based on their talents and efforts.
    • But India’s meritocracy is sabotaged by flailing government schools.
    • The proportion of India’s children attending a government school has now declined to 45 per cent.
    • This number is 85 per cent in America, 90 per cent in England, and 95 per cent in Japan.
    • India’s 100 per cent plus school enrolment masks challenges; a huge dropout ratio and poor learning outcomes.
    • We have too many schools and 4 lakh have less than 50 students (70 per cent of schools in Rajasthan, Karnataka, J&K, and Uttarakhand).
    • China has similar total student numbers with 30 per cent of our school numbers.

    It is not Government Vs. Private schools

    • Demand for better government schools is not an argument against private schools.
    • Because, without this market response to demand, the post-1947 policy errors in primary education would have been catastrophic for India’s human capital.

    Way forward

    • We need the difficult reforms of governance, performance management, and English instruction.
    • Governance must shift from control of resources to learning outcomes; learning design, responsiveness, teacher management, community relationships, integrity, fair decision making, and financial sustainability.
    • Performance management, currently equated with teacher attendance, needs evaluation of scores, skills, competence and classroom management. Scores need continuous assessments or end-of-year exams.
    • The new world of work redefines employability to include the 3Rs of reading, writing, and arithmetic and a fourth R of relationships.
    • India’s farm to non-farm transition is not happening to factories but to sales and customer services which need 4R competency and English awareness.
    • English instruction is about bilingualism, higher education pathways, and employability.
    • Employment outcomes are 50 per cent higher for kids with English familiarity because of higher geographic mobility, sector mobility, role eligibility, and entrance exam ease.
    • India’s constitution wrote Education Policy into Lists I (Centre), II (State), and III (concurrent jurisdiction); this fragmentation needs revisiting because it tends to concentrate decisions that should be made locally in Delhi or state capitals.

    Conclusion

    Government needs urgent measure to addreess the issues which has bearing on its future.

  • Need for coordinated database for tracking fugitives

    Context

    India lacks a domestic tracking system for fugitives. That makes it easier for them to evade the criminal justice system.

    Challenges at investigation and prosecution level

    • Central agencies have developed reasonable expertise in investigation and prosecution because they are focussed only on investigation and prosecution work.
    • On the other hand, State police forces (except specialised wings) are engaged in law-and-order work as well as investigations.
    • The bulk of the investigation and prosecution work happens at police stations in the States.
    • There is a tendency to close investigations once the accused have absconded.
    • Some police stations do initiate proceedings for attachment of property and declaration of the accused as proclaimed offenders, but the number of cases where coordinated efforts are made to pursue fugitives – domestically or internationally – are hardly documented.

    No system for tracking criminals domestically

    • Through Interpol Notices and the sharing of immigration databases of different countries, there exists a system of tracking criminals worldwide.
    • However, there is no coordinated system or database for tracking criminals or wanted persons domestically in India.
    • In the absence of such a system, it is relatively easy for criminals from one police station/jurisdiction to melt into the population in any other area, almost undetected.

    Way forward

    • The creation of a nationwide database of wanted persons, which could be accessible for police agencies, the public and others is needed.
    • A nation-wide system of ‘Wanted Persons Notices’, similar to Interpol Notices, is required, to help track fugitives domestically.
    • The Crime and Criminal Tracking Network and Systems and the National Intelligence Grid are efforts in the right direction/
    • Countries like the U.S. have functional inter-State extradition and fugitive tracking systems.
    • India needs to set up such dedicated ‘fugitive tracking units’.
    • There needs to be enhanced integration between immigration agencies, State police agencies, Interpol-New Delhi, the External Affairs Ministry and Home Ministry and central investigation agencies.
    • Sharing India’s ‘wanted’ database or providing access to it to foreign embassies on a reciprocal basis or through treaties or arrangements would also be helpful.
    • Signing of more bilateral and multilateral conventions on criminal matters would help plug legal infirmities.
    • Signing bilateral agreements on cooperation in policing matters would also help.
    • All relevant legal processes and requirements should be incorporated into one consolidated law on international cooperation.
    • The entire gamut of activities pertaining to fugitives, from investigation to extradition, needs to be incorporated into a specialised set-up.

    Conclusion

    In the absence of a coordinated database, criminals can go undetected. What we need is a watertight system that would deter criminals from hoodwinking the law.

    Back2Basics: Crime and Criminal Tracking Network and Systems (CCTNS)

    • CCTNS aims at creating a comprehensive and integrated system for enhancing the efficiency and effective policing at all levels and especially at the Police Station level.
    • It aism at adoption of principles of e-Governance, and creation of a nationwide networked infrastructure for evolution of IT-enabled state of- the-art tracking system around “investigation of crime and detection of criminals” in real time.
    • It is is a critical requirement in the context of the present day internal security scenario.
    • The scope of CCTNS spans all 35 States and Union Territories and covers all Police Stations (15,000+ in number) and all Higher Police Offices (6,000+ in number) in the country.
    • The CCTNS project includes vertical connectivity of police units (linking police units at various levels within the States – police stations, district police offices, state headquarters, SCRB and other police formations – and States, through state headquarters and SCRB, to NCRB at GOI level) as well as horizontal connectivity, linking police functions at State and Central level to external entities.

    National Intelligence Grid (NATGRID)

    • First conceptualised in 2009, NATGRID seeks to become the one-stop destination for security and intelligence agencies to access database related to immigration entry and exit, banking and telephone details of a suspect on a “secured platform”.
    • All State police are mandated to file First Information Reports (FIR) in the CCTNS.
    • It is only a repository and the data pertaining to FIRs of a particular police station are a State subject.

  • Collegium system’s role in protecting democracy

    Context

    Judiciary is being challenged, from within and outside. It must shield itself from further erosion of its independence and competence by scrupulously following the law, as declared by the Supreme Court (SC) itself.

    How the Collegium helped to secure the independence of judiciary

    • In 1993, the SC held the following:
    • The process of appointment of Judges to the Supreme Court and the High Courts is an integrated ‘participatory consultative process’.
    • The process aims at selecting the best and most suitable persons available for appointment.
    • The Collegium consists of the CJI and the four senior-most judges of the SC and high courts.
    • It was devised to ensure that the opinion of the Chief Justice of India is not merely his individual opinion, but an opinion formed collectively by a body of men at the apex level in the judiciary.
    • By judicial interpretation, the Supreme Court re-interpreting Article 124 and 214 of the Constitution empowered the judiciary to make appointments to the higher judiciary to secure the rule of law.

    Threat to the judicial independence

    • The framers of the Constitution were alive to the likely erosion of judicial independence.
    • On May 23, 1949, K T Shah stated that the Judiciary, which is the main bulwark of civil liberties, should be completely separate from and independent of the Executive, whether by direct or by indirect influence.
    • In  2016, the Supreme Court struck down a constitutional amendment for creating the National Judicial Appointments Commission (NJAC).
    • The SC strongly disapproved of any role for the political executive in the final selection and appointment of judges.
    • The SC said that “reciprocity and feelings of payback to the political executive” would be disastrous to the independence of the judiciary.

    Consider the question “How the Collegium system helped the Judiciary secure its independence? What are the issues with it?”

    Conclusion

    The selection of deserving judges is essential to ensure the independence of the judiciary. The Collegium must do its best in this task.

    Back2Basics: About the National Judicial Appointments Commission

    • The NJAC or National Judicial Appointments Commission sought to change the system, where judges would have been appointed by a commission where the legislative and the executive would have had a role.
    • The NJAC was supposed to comprise of the Chief Justice of India (Chairperson, ex-officio), two other senior judges of the Supreme Court, The Union Minister of Law and Justice, ex-officio and two eminent persons, to be appointed by the Chief Justice of India, Prime Minister of India, and Leader of Opposition in the Lok Sabha.
    • The bill was passed by the Lok Sabha on 13 August 2014 and by the Rajya Sabha on 14 August 2014, and became an Act.
    • The NJAC replaced the collegium system for the appointment of judges.
    • The NJAC Bill and the Constitutional Amendment Bill, was ratified by 16 of the state legislatures in India, and the President gave his assent on 31 December 2014.
    • The NJAC Act became effective from April 13, 2015.
    • The NJAC enjoyed support from the Supreme Court Bar Association and many legal luminaries but was also challenged by some lawyer associations and groups before the Supreme Court of India through Writ Petitions.
    • A three-judge bench of the Supreme Court referred the matter to a Constitution Bench that heard different arguments for over a month.
    •  Finally, on October 16, a five-judge bench of the Supreme Court declared the 99th Constitutional Amendment Act and the NJAC Act 2014 “unconstitutional and void”.

  • Centre must step up cash flow to states

    Context

    The states are borrowing less than expected in the first quarter of FY 2021-22 despite the negative impact of state-level restrictions, amidst the second Covid wave, on economic activity.

    An overview of borrowing by States

    • In 2020-21, the gross amount raised through state development loans (SDLs) or bonds had jumped to Rs 8 trillion, up from Rs 6.3 trillion in the previous year.
    • The increase was a fallout of the Covid-19 pandemic on state finances.
    • In the first quarter of the current financial year i.e. 2021-22, gross issuances of bonds stood at Rs 1.4 trillion.
    • This amount is 14 per cent lower than the bonds issued last year (Rs 1.7 trillion).
    • This is also around 20 per cent lower than what states had initially indicated they would borrow (Rs 1.8 trillion) through the indicative calendar of market borrowings released by the RBI.
    • As a result, state bond issuances have undershot expectations in the first quarter.

    Factor’s responsible for lower state borrowing

    •  Lower state borrowings were a consequence of three major factors.
    • First, an additional tax devolution of Rs 450 billion from the Centre in late March.
    • This amount was in excess of the Rs 5.5 trillion tax devolution that had been included in the revised estimates for 2020-21.
    • Second, record-high GST collections in April which doubled to Rs 1.3 trillion in the first quarter of this year, up from Rs 0.6 trillion in the same period last year.
    • Third, receipt of substantial grants from the Centre adding up to Rs 436 billion in April-May related to the recommendations of the Fifteenth Finance Commission.

    Factors that could influence the borrowing pattern in the next three quarters

    • First, the varying pace of unlocking and the consequent economic revival in states from June onwards may crucially affect state borrowings in the second quarter.
    • A faster ramp-up of vaccine administration may help some states, reducing the need to borrow.
    • Second, the eventual calendar for raising back-to-back loans by the GoI to compensate states for the loss in their GST revenues could also result in a change in the states’ borrowing schedule.
    • Third, the quantum, and timing of tax devolution will also play a role.

    Why timing of the Central tax devolution matters for States

    • Central tax devolution forms a quarter of states’ combined revenue receipts.
    • This revenue stream has contracted by 15 per cent in the first two months of the year, falling to Rs 392 billion each in April-May this year, from Rs 460 billion last year.
    • If the Centre continues to devolve to states this amount till February 2022, then a massive Rs 2.4 trillion (36 per cent of the budgeted amount) will be left for devolution in March 2022 — assuming that the devolution for the full year is not revised below the budgeted level.
    • From the states’ point of view, this would be rather inefficient from a cash flow perspective.

    Conclusion

    An early step-up in tax devolution by the central government may provide comfort to the states to accelerate expenditure during another uncertain year, without borrowings being pushed up in the next two quarters.

  • Issues with the UAPA and role of judiciary

    Context

    Father Stan Swamy passed away at a private hospital in Mumbai on July 5. Fr. Swamy was arrested by the National Investigation Agency (NIA), under the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act (UAPA).

    How Supreme Court judgment leaves the scope for misuse of UAPA

    • The Supreme Court’s April 2019 decision in National Investigation Agency vs Zahoor Ahmad Shah Watali on the interpretation of the UAPA has affected all downstream decisions involving the statute.
    • This decision has created a new doctrine.
    • According to the decision, in considering bail applications under the UAPA, courts must presume every allegation made in the First Information Report to be correct.
    • Further, bail can now be obtained only if the accused produces material to contradict the prosecution.
    • In other words, the burden rests on the accused to disprove the allegations, which is virtually impossible in most cases.
    • The decision has essentially excluded the admissibility of evidence at the stage of bail.
    • By doing so, it has effectively excluded the Evidence Act itself, which arguably makes the decision unconstitutional.
    • Due to the Supreme Court judgment, High Courts have their hands tied, and must perforce refuse bail, as disproving the case is virtually impossible.
    • The Delhi High Court recently granted bail to three young activists arrested under UAPA in a conspiracy relating to the 2020 riots in Delhi.
    • The Supreme Court reportedly expressed surprise and gave the direction that the decision will “not to be treated as precedent by any court” to give similar reliefs.

    Misuse of the UAPA

    • With such high barriers of proof, it is now impossible for an accused to obtain bail, and is in fact a convenient tool to put a person behind bars indefinitely.
    • This is being abused by the government, police and prosecution liberally: now, all dissenters are routinely implicated under charges of sedition or criminal conspiracy and under the UAPA.
    •  In multiple instances, evidence is untenable, sometimes even arguably planted, and generally weak overall.
    • But as a consequence of UAPA being applied, the accused cannot even get bail.

    Way forward

    • If we want to prevent the misuse, the decision in the Watali case must be urgently reversed or diluted, otherwise, we run the risk of personal liberties being compromised very easily.

    Conclusion

    The provision of the act leaves the scope for misuse and therefore judiciary and legislature need to take steps to provide safeguards to prevent the misuse.

  • Guidelines by the Supreme Court in the migrant labourers case

    Context

    The Supreme Court on June 29 pronounced its judgment in the migrant labourers case. The case was initiated last year after the national lockdown was announced on March 24.

    Guidelines laid down by the Supreme Court

    • Two of the most important components to protect the migrants during this time were the food and travel arrangements insisted on by the court.
    • In the orders pronounced in May this year, it laid down that dry ration be provided to migrants who want to return to their homes.
    • Further, the court said that identity proof should not be insisted upon by the governments since the labourers might not be able to furnish it.
    • Secondly, the court called upon the State governments to arrange transportation for workers who need to return to their homes.
    • The Supreme Court fixed July 31 as the deadline for the States to implement the ‘One nation One Ration Card’ scheme.
    • Apart from dry ration, the top court also directed the State governments to run community kitchens for migrant workers.
    • In the order passed on June 29, the court affirmed the Right to Food under Article 21 of the Constitution.
    • In furtherance of this, the court asked the States to formulate their own schemes and issue food grains to migrants.
    • The top court recognised the need for direct cash benefit transfer to workers in the unorganised sector.
    • But it did not issue any guidelines for the same.

    Challenges

    • The Supreme Court has given a purposive declaration in the case but the bulk of the judgment seems declaratory rather than mandatory. 
    • Under the ‘One nation One Ration Card’ scheme, the States are to complete the registration of migrant workers in order to provide dry ration to them.
    • But it is unlikely that a standardised system can be developed within the deadline prescribed by the court.
    • There are administrative problems in running community kitchens for migrant workers.
    • First, migrant workers keep moving in search of employment and it is difficult to cover them all under the scheme.
    • Second, many States do not have the necessary infrastructure to run and maintain community kitchens on such a large scale.
    • The court asked the States to formulate their own schemes and issue food grains to migrants, but there are no normative data that would allow the States to identify eligible migrants.

    Conclusion

    In order to efficaciously implement the orders of the court, the State governments need to work with the Centre closely. It is imperative to ensure that government machinery works to its full potential and robust systems are developed to withstand the challenges of the looming third covid wave.

  • Mental health care in India

    Context

    Recently, a High Court suggested that homeless persons with health conditions be branded with a permanent tattoo, when vaccinated against COVID-19.

    Issue

    • In many countries, persons with severe mental health conditions live in shackles in their homes, in overcrowded hospitals, and even in prison.
    • On the other hand, many persons with mental health issues live and even die alone on the streets.
    • Three losses dominate the mental health systems narrative: dignity, agency and personhood.
    • Issues with the laws: Far-sighted changes in policy and laws have often not taken root and many laws fail to meet international human rights standards.
    • Many also do not account for cultural, social and political contexts resulting in moral rhetoric that doesn’t change the scenario of inadequate care.
    • There is also the social legacy of the asylum, and of psychiatry and mental illness itself, that guides our imagination in how care is organised.

    Way forward: A responsive care system

    • We must understand mental health conditions for what they are and for how they are associated with disadvantage.
    • These situations are linked, but not always so, therefore, not all distress can be medicalised.
    • Adopt WHO guidelines: Follow the Guidance on Community Mental Health Services recently launched by the World Health Organization.
    • The Guidance, which includes three models from India, addresses the issue from ‘the same side’ as the mental health service user and focuses on the co-production of knowledge and on good practices.
    • Drawn from 22 countries, these models balance care and support with rights and participation.
    • Open dialogue: The practice of open dialogue, a therapeutic practice that originated in Finland, runs through many programmes in the Guidance.
    • This approach trains the therapist in de-escalation of distress and breaks power differentials that allow for free expression.
    • Increase investment: With emphasis on social care components such as work force participation, pensions and housing, increased investments in health and social care seem imperative.
    • Network of services: For those homeless and who opt not to enter mental health establishments, we can provide a network of services ranging from soup kitchens at vantage points to mobile mental health and social care clinics.
    • Small emergency care and recovery centres for those who need crisis support instead of larger hospitals, and long-term inclusive living options in an environment that values diversity and celebrates social mixing, will reframe the archaic narrative of how mental health care is to be provided.

    Conclusion

    Persons with mental health conditions need a responsive care system that inspires hope and participation without which their lives are empty. We should endeavour to provide them with such a responsive care system.

  • Fresh stirrings on federalism as a new politics

    Context

    • Several issues such as vaccine wars, debates over the Goods and Services Tax (GST), the fracas over West Bengal’s Chief Secretary, and the pushback against controversial regulations in Lakshadweep have once again brought into focus the idea of federalism.
    • The Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam, since taking office, has begun to craft an ideological narrative on State rights, by re-introducing the term Union into the public discourse and pushing back against increased fiscal centralisation

    Lack of political consensus among States for genuine federalism

    • Federalism in India has always had political relevance, but except for the States Reorganisation Act, federalism has rarely been an axis of political mobilisation.
    • Fiscal and administrative centralisation persisted despite nearly two decades of coalition governments.
    • Rather than deepen federalism, the contingencies of electoral politics have created significant impediments to creating a political consensus for genuine federalism.

    Three challenges in deepening federalism among States

    1) Tendency to equate federalism as against nationalism

    • The grammar of development and nationalism, which has mass electoral appeal is used to undermine federalism.
    • Slogans such as ‘one nation, one market’, ‘one nation, one ration card’, ‘one nation, one grid’ symbolise development and nationalism while leaving little space for federalism.
    • In this context, federalism as a principle risks being equated with regionalism and a narrow parochialism that is anti-development and anti-national.

    2) Lack of federal principles

    • Pratap Bhanu Mehta has pointed out that over the decades, federal principles have been bent in all kinds of ways to co-produce a political culture of flexible federalism.
    • Federalism in this rendition is reduced to a game of political upmanship and remains restricted to a partisan tussle.
    • Claimants of greater federalism often maintain silence on unilateral decisions that affect other States.
    • For instance, the downgrading of Jammu and Kashmir into a Union Territory, the notification of the NCT of Delhi (Amendment) Act, 2021 hardly witnessed protests by States that were not directly affected by these.

    3) Economic and governance divergence among states

    • Across all key indicators, southern (and western) States have outperformed much of northern and eastern India.
    • This has resulted in a greater divergence rather than expected convergence with growth.
    • This has created a context where collective action amongst States becomes difficult as poorer regions of India contribute far less to the economy but require greater fiscal resources to overcome their economic fragilities.
    • These emerging tensions were visible when the 15th Finance Commission (FC) was mandated to use the 2011 Census rather than the established practice of using the 1971 Census.
    • This, Southern states feared, risked penalising States that had successfully controlled population growth by reducing their share in the overall resource pool.
    •  With the impending delimitation exercise due in 2026, these tensions will only increase.

    Way forward

    • A politics for deepening federalism will need to overcome a nationalist rhetoric that pits federalism against nationalism and development.
    • Reclaim fiscal federalism:  Weak fiscal management has brought the Union government on the brink of what economist Rathin Roy has called a silent fiscal crisis.
    • The Union’s response has been to squeeze revenue from States by increasing cesses.
    • Its insistence on giving GST compensation to States as loans (after long delays) and increasing State shares in central schemes.
    • Against this backdrop, both sub-nationalist sentiments and the need to reclaim fiscal federalism create a political moment for a principled politics of federalism.
    • Sharing burden with poorer States: On the fiscal side, richer States must find a way of sharing the burden with the poorer States.
    • An inter-State platform that brings States together in a routine dialogue on matters of fiscal federalism could be the starting point for building trust and a common agenda.
    • Overcome isolationist tendency: The politics of regional identity is isolationist by its very nature.
    • An effort at collective political action for federalism based on identity concerns will have to overcome this risk.
    • Finally, beyond principles, a renewed politics of federalism is also an electoral necessity.

    Consider the question “Federalism in India has always had political relevance, but it has rarely been an axis of political mobilisation. What are the factors responsible for this? Suggest the way forward for the states to overcome these factors.” 

    Conclusion

    A renewed politics of federalism would require immense patience and maturity from regional parties. It remains to be seen whether they up to the task.

  • Crafting a unique partnership with Africa

    This op-ed analyses the future of India-Africa cooperation in agriculture amid the looming Chinese involvement in African countries.

    Agricultural significance of Africa

    • With 65% of the world’s uncultivated arable land, employing over 60% of the workforce, and accounting for almost 20% of Sub-Saharan Africa’s GDP, agriculture is critical to Africa’s economy.

    China factor behind

    • As this relationship enters the post-pandemic world, it is vital to prioritize and channel resources into augmenting partnerships in agriculture.
    • This is crucial given its unexplored potential, centrality to global food security, business prospects and to provide credible alternatives to the increasing involvement of Chinese stakeholders in the sector.

    Analyzing Chinese engagement

    Chinese corporations, small and medium-sized enterprises and entrepreneurs adopt has provided a layered perspective of the sociopolitical, economic and environmental impact of Chinese engagement.

    • Trade: China is among Africa’s largest trading partners.
    • Credit facility: It is also Africa’s single biggest creditor.
    • Infrastructure: Its corporations dominate the region’s infrastructure market and are now entering the agri-infra sector.
    • Strategic support: While access to Africa’s natural resources, its untapped markets and support for ‘One China Policy’ are primary drivers of Chinese engagement with the region, there are other factors at play.

    China is going strategic in the guise of agriculture

    • Increasingly critical to China’s global aspirations, its engagement in African agriculture is taking on a strategic quality.
    • Chinese-built industrial parks and economic zones in Africa are attracting low-cost, labour-intensive manufacturing units that are relocating from China.
    • Chinese engineers interviewed spoke of how their operations in Africa are important to accumulate global experience in management, risk and capital investments.
    • Not only are they willing to overlook short-term profits in order to build a ‘brand China’, but they want to dominate the market in the long term, which includes pushing Chinese standards in host countries.
    • Chinese tech companies are laying critical telecommunications infrastructure, venture capital funds are investing in African fintech firms, while other smaller enterprises are expanding across the region.

    Agricultural landscape

    • While many Chinese entities have been active in Africa’s agriculture for decades now, the nature, form and actors involved have undergone substantial change.
    • In Zambia, Chinese firms are introducing agri-tech to combat traditional challenges, such as using drone technology to control the fall armyworm infestation.
    • They have set up over Agricultural Technology Demonstration Centers (ATDCS) in the continent where Chinese agronomists work on developing new crop varieties and increasing crop yields.
    • This ATDCs partner with local universities, conduct workshops and classes for officials and provide training and lease equipment to small holder farmers.
    • Chinese companies with no prior experience in agriculture are setting out to build futuristic ecological parks while others are purchasing large-scale commercial farms.

    Inducing their soft power

    • The exponential growth in the China-Africa economic ties and the emergence of Beijing as an alternative to traditional western powers have motivated change in perceptions across groups.
    • Governments and heads of state are recalibrating approaches, media houses are investing more resources for on-the-ground reporting.

    Dark Side of the Sino-Africa ties

    • Simultaneously, Africa-China relations are becoming complex with a growing, insular diaspora, lopsided trade, looming debt, competition with local businesses and a negative perception accompanied by greater political and socioeconomic interlinkages.
    • On occasion, there seems to be a gap between skills transferred in China and the ground realities in Africa.
    • In some cases, the technology taught in China is not available locally and in others, there is inability to implement lessons learnt due to the absence of supporting resources.
    • Larger commercial farms run by Mandarin-speaking managers and the presence of small-scale Chinese farmers in local markets aggravates socio-cultural stresses.

    India’s agricultural engagement

    • Diverse portfolios: India-Africa agricultural cooperation currently includes institutional and individual capacity-building initiatives, an extension of soft loans, supply of machinery, acquisition of farmlands and the presence of Indian entrepreneurs in the African agricultural ecosystem.
    • Land acquisition: Indian farmers have purchased over 6,00,000 hectares of land for commercial farming in Africa.
    • States cooperation: Sub-national actors are providing another model of cooperation in agriculture. Consider the case of the Kerala government trying to meet its requirement for cashew nuts with imports from countries in Africa.
    • Civil society: Similar ideas could encourage State governments and civil society organizations to identify opportunities and invest directly.
    • Agri-business: There is also promise in incentivizing Indian industries to tap into African agri-business value chains and connecting Indian technology firms and startups with partners in Africa.
    • Investment: In the past year, despite the pandemic, the sector witnessed a record increase in investments.

    Way forward

    • A thorough impact assessment needs to be conducted of the existing capacity-building initiatives in agriculture for India to stand in good stead.
    • This could include detailed surveys of participants who have returned to their home countries.
    • Country-specific and localized curriculum can be drawn up, making skill development demand-led.
    • In all senses, India has consistently chosen well to underline the development partnership to be in line with African priorities.
    • It is pertinent, therefore, that we collectively craft a unique modern partnership with Africa.

    Conclusion

    • While India’s Africa strategy exists independently, it is important to be cognizant of China’s increasing footprint in the region.
    • Beijing’s model, if successful here, could be heralded as a replica for the larger global south.
    • It is important to note, however, that prominent African voices have emphasized that their own agency is often overlooked in the global discourse on the subject.

  • India-Turkey relations

    As a new round of geopolitical jousting begins on India’s north-western frontiers, Delhi must deal with a number of new actors that have carved out a role for themselves in the region.

    Overambitious Turkey

    • Our focus today is on Turkey’s regional ambitions (particularly in Afghanistan) and their implications for India.
    • Ankara is in negotiations with the US on taking charge of the Kabul airport which is critical for an international presence in Afghanistan that is coming under the Taliban’s control.
    • Turkey has been running Kabul airport security for a while, but doing so after the US pullout will be quite demanding.
    • Taking a longer view, though, Turkey is not a new regional actor in India’s northwest.

    Turkey and Afghanistan

    • Ankara and Kabul have recently celebrated the centennial of the establishment of diplomatic relations.
    • Through this century, Turkey has engaged purposefully with Afghanistan over a wide domain.
    • While it joined the NATO military mission in Afghanistan after the ouster of the Taliban at the end of 2001, Turkey avoided any combat role and differentiated itself from the Western powers.
    • Ankara has contributed to the training of the Afghan military and police forces.
    • It has also undertaken much independent humanitarian and developmental work.

    Affinity with Pakistan

    • Turkey’s good relations with both Afghanistan and Pakistan have also given space for Ankara to present itself as a mediator between the warring South Asian neighbours.
    • Turkey’s “Heart of Asia” conference or the Istanbul Process has been a major diplomatic vehicle for attempted Afghan reconciliation in the last few years.
    • Widespread goodwill for Turkey in Afghanistan has now come in handy for the US in managing some elements of the post-withdrawal phase.
    • In Pakistan, PM Imran Khan has rallied behind Erdogan’s ambition to seize the leadership of the Islamic world from Saudi Arabia.
    • Pakistan’s Army Chief had to step in to limit the damage with Saudi Arabia, which has long been Pakistan’s major economic benefactor.

    Challenges for India

    • Turkey’s growing role in Afghanistan opens a more difficult phase in relations between Delhi and Ankara.
    • India’s opposition to alliances and Turkey’s alignments reflected divergent international orientations of Delhi and Ankara after the Second World War.
    • And Turkey’s deepening bilateral military-security cooperation with Pakistan made it even harder for Delhi to take a positive view of Ankara.
    • Turkey and Pakistan were part of the Central Treaty Organization (CENTO) that was set up in 1955 by the British.
    • Although CENTO eventually wound up in 1979, Turkey and Pakistan remained close partners in a number of regional organizations and international forums like the Organization of Islamic Cooperation.

    Pre-Erdogan era Turkey

    • The shared secular values between Delhi and Ankara in the pre-Erdogan era were not enough to overcome the strategic differences between the two in the Cold War.
    • To make matters more complicated, the positive legacy of the Subcontinent’s solidarity with the Ottoman Empire and the Turkish Republic, emerged out of its ruins in the early 20th century, accrued mostly to Pakistan.
    • There were moments — during the tenures of PM Rajiv Gandhi and Mr Vajpayee, when India and Turkey seemed poised for a more productive relationship.
    • But those have been rather few and far between.

    Turkey’s departure from Secularism

    • Meanwhile, Turkey’s Islamist internationalism under Recep Tayyip Erdogan has inevitably led to its deeper alliance with Pakistan, greater meddling in South Asia, and a sharper contraction with India.
    • The Pakistani prism through which Delhi has long seen Ankara, however, has prevented it from fully appreciating the growing strategic salience of Turkey.
    • Erdogan’s active claim for leadership of the Islamic world has seen a more intensive Turkish political, religious, and cultural outreach to the Subcontinent’s 600 million Muslims.

    Self-goals on Kashmir

    • Turkey has become the most active international supporter of Pakistan on the Kashmir question.
    • Delhi is aware of Erdogan’s hypocrisy on minority rights.
    • While pitching for self-determination in Kashmir, Erdogan actively tramples on the rights of its Kurdish minority at home and confronts them across Turkey’s border in Syria and Iraq.

    Other ambitions in Asia

    • Erdogan was quick to condemn the Bangladesh government’s hanging of a senior extremist leader in 2016.
    • But in a reflection of his strategic suppleness, Erdogan also offered strong political support for Dhaka on the Rohingya refugee crisis.
    • As Bangladesh emerges as an attractive economy, Ankara is now stepping up its commercial cooperation with Dhaka.
    • Turkey, which hosted the Caliphate in the Ottoman era, had natural spiritual resonance among the South Asian Muslims.

    Riving the Caliphate

    • With the abolition of the Caliphate in 1924, Turkey’s Westernization under Ataturk reduced its religious significance.
    • Erdogan’s Islamist politics are about regaining that salience.
    • Erdogan’s strategy marks the declining relevance of the old antinomies — between alliances and autonomy, East and West, North and South, Islam and the West, Arabs and the Jews — that so resonate with the traditional Indian foreign policy discourse.

    Stance on Israel

    • Turkey was the first Muslim-majority nation that established full diplomatic relations with Israel.
    • Erdogan now actively mobilizes the Arab and Islamic world against Israel without breaking relations with Tel Aviv.
    • Erdogan’s outrage on Israel is about presenting himself as a better champion of Palestine than his Arab rivals.

    India’s option against Turkey

    • India, which has been at the receiving end of Erdogan’s internationalism, has multiple options in pushing back.
    • The recent naval exercise between India and Greece in the Mediterranean offers a small hint of India’s possibilities in Turkey’s neighbourhood.
    • Many Arab leaders reject Erdogan’s policies that remind them of Ottoman imperialism.
    • They resent Erdogan’s support of groups like the Muslim Brotherhood that seek to overthrow moderate governments in the Middle East.
    • There is much that India can do to up its game in the Arab world.

    Lessons for India

    • The new fluidity in geopolitics in India’s extended neighbourhood to the west.
    • Agency for regional powers is growing as the influence of great power weakens.
    • Religious ideology, like the more secular ones, is a cover for the pursuit of power.
    • Finally, Erdogan has carefully modulated his confrontation with major powers by avoiding a breakdown in relations.

    Conclusion

    • For Erdogan, the choices are not between black and white. That should be a good guide for India’s own relations with Turkey.
    • Delhi needs to vigorously challenge Turkey’s positions where it must, seize the opportunities opened by regional resentments against Erdogan’s adventurism, and at the same time prepare for a more intensive bilateral engagement with Ankara.