Police must protect individual rights, not political interests

Why in the News

Delhi saw an extraordinary mobilisation of state power to stop a protest demanding the removal of the Chief Election Commissioner, with over 7,000 people reportedly detained and 45 Metro stations shut. No reasons were disclosed for curbs on the whole Capital, reviving the question of whether police act on professional assessment or political wishes.

What should decide whether a protest is stopped?

1. Professional assessment: A restriction should follow the police’s own assessment of the actual risk, not the displeasure of those in power. It is like a referee applying the rulebook whichever team complains.
2. Constitutional basis: Article 19(1)(b) guarantees the right to assemble peaceably and without arms. Article 19(3) permits reasonable restrictions, including for public order.
3. Dialogue before force: Police absorb anger meant for governments. They should first open dialogue, assess risks and negotiate workable arrangements.
4. Legitimate versus violent protest: Jumping barricades, forming human chains and lying down to resist arrest are routine democratic protest. Stone pelting, assault and destruction demand lawful action.
5. The takeaway: Police are meant to be facilitators who protect rights and enforce reasonable limits, not agents of the ruling party.

What made the Delhi response disproportionate?

1. Emergency scale: More than 250 railway services were cancelled, a measure fit for a grave public order emergency, yet no specific threat was disclosed.
2. Message magnified: The spectacle handed the Cockroach Janta Party, the organiser, a publicity victory. The state prevented the gathering but magnified its message.
3. Short notice argument: The stated reason, that the application arrived only three days before, is insufficient. Police deployed tens of thousands of personnel, so negotiation was possible too.
4. Political suspicion: Sweeping restrictions without disclosed reasons invite the suspicion that professional judgement yielded to political wishes conveyed by a compliant bureaucracy.

What does London’s handling of a contested march show?

1. Armistice Day march: In November 2023, London’s Metropolitan Police Commissioner resisted political pressure to ban a pro Palestinian march on Armistice Day.
2. Legal threshold: Under Section 13 of the UK’s Public Order Act, 1986, a march may be banned only for serious public disorder that lesser measures cannot prevent. The intelligence did not meet that test.
3. Professional over political judgement: Political displeasure cannot substitute for a professional assessment.

Why does police reform stall, and what would insulate policing?

1. Opposition only accountability: Parties discover police accountability when in Opposition. Few press for the Supreme Court’s police reform directions in Prakash Singh v. Union of India (2006).
2. State Security Commission: A credible State Security Commission would set policing policy, evaluate performance and curb unwarranted political interference.
3. Autonomy with accountability: Operational autonomy must come with recorded reasons, independent scrutiny of excessive force and transparent review of restrictions.
4. Home Ministry layer: The Union Home Ministry should test whether extraordinary restrictions are necessary and advise ministers candidly. Merely transmitting political messages adds hierarchy without judgement.

Challenges

1. Training deficit: Negotiation, de-escalation and proportionate use of force cannot be improvised at a barricade, and constant deployment leaves little time to learn them.
2. Divided control in Delhi: Delhi Police answers to the Union Ministry of Home Affairs, not the elected Delhi government.
3. Grievance displaced: Heavy curbs shifted attention from the original grievance to police conduct.

Way Forward

1. Negotiated protest plan: Agree a designated site, limited hours, attendance, volunteer marshals and conditions against violence, making organisers answerable.
2. Evidence on both sides: Use body cameras, videography and liaison officers to document misconduct by protesters and police alike, enabling targeted action.
3. Professional Home Secretary: Appoint an experienced internal security professional as Union Home Secretary to explain operational realities to ministers.
4. Disclosed reasons: The government should explain why restrictions of this scale were necessary.

Conclusion

Shutting down the Capital to stop one protest does not show that democracy is secure. With another protest expected, the ruling establishment must weigh the cost of keeping a contested Chief Election Commissioner through mass deployment against restrictions it can justify.

Police Reforms in India

1. Colonial law: Policing in most States still rests on the Police Act, 1861, designed for colonial control.
2. State subject: Police falls under Entry 2 of the State List, so each State must legislate its own reform.
3. Other Prakash Singh directives: Two year tenure for the Director General of Police and key officers, separate investigation wings, a Police Establishment Board for transfers, and Police Complaints Authorities.
4. Diluted compliance: The Justice K.T. Thomas Committee found that 17 of 18 States passing new police laws diluted the Court’s directions.

Matching Previous Year Question

“[2023, GS3, 15 marks] What are the internal security challenges being faced by India? Give out the role of Central Intelligence and Investigative Agencies tasked to counter such threats.”