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Subject: Internal Security

  • The tussle over top posts in Central Armed Police Forces and IPS deputation

    Why in the News

    The Supreme Court’s 2025 direction to progressively reduce Indian Police Service (IPS) deputation in the Central Armed Police Forces (CAPFs) now runs against a new law that keeps most top posts for deputationists. Contempt petitions alleging non-compliance with that judgment will now be heard alongside the challenge to the Central Armed Police Forces (General Administration) Act, 2026.

    What are the CAPFs, and why are their top posts contested?

    1. Five forces: The CAPFs are the Central Reserve Police Force (CRPF), Border Security Force (BSF), Central Industrial Security Force (CISF), Indo-Tibetan Border Police (ITBP) and Sashastra Seema Bal (SSB).
    2. Cadre officers: Each force has its own cadre of Group A executive officers, generally recruited as Assistant Commandants, who can rise to senior command posts.
    3. Deputation route: IPS officers are also lent to the forces, like managers sent from head office. Earlier rules filled 20% of Deputy Inspector General (DIG) and 50% of Inspector General (IG) posts this way.
    4. Cadre grievance: With few posts at the top, every deputation slot cuts promotion chances for career officers of the forces.
    5. The takeaway: The dispute is about who commands the forces: career insiders or IPS officers on deputation.

    Why did stagnation persist after court rulings?

    1. Non-Functional Financial Upgradation (NFFU): NFFU pays a higher grade’s salary when no promotion vacancy exists. The Delhi High Court granted it in 2015, and the Supreme Court upheld it in 2019.
    2. Partial relief: NFFU follows the existing Recruitment Rules, which require a fixed number of years in each rank. The count for the next upgrade restarts only on an actual promotion, so stagnation continues.
    3. Officers’ demand: Cadre officers want Service Rules that base their progression on total qualifying service, not on years spent in each rank.
    4. 2025 judgment: In May 2025 the Supreme Court ruled on cadre career progression and directed a progressive reduction of IPS deputation.
    5. Alleged non-compliance: The Ministry of Home Affairs (MHA) has since brought 46 IPS officers into the forces, which the contempt petitions challenge.

    What does the CAPF Act, 2026 change?

    1. Umbrella framework: The Act, introduced as a Bill in March, creates one framework for Group A officers of all five CAPFs. The Centre frames rules on recruitment, promotion and service conditions.
    2. Override clause: This rule-making power operates notwithstanding any inconsistent judgment, decree or order of a court, so the rules stand even against a contrary court ruling. They also prevail over inconsistent rules or government orders.
    3. Deputation quotas: The Act reserves 50% of IG and at least 67% of Additional Director General (ADG) posts for deputation.
    4. Top posts: All Special Director General and Director General posts go to deputationists.
    5. Opposition objection: Opposition MPs argued that the law sets aside the Supreme Court’s judgment in effect.

    What is the Centre’s case, and why is the hearing itself disputed?

    1. Operational role: The Ministry of Home Affairs (MHA) argues that CAPFs, given their operational role, cannot be treated on a par with civilian Group A services.
    2. Centre-State link: IPS officers, the MHA says, connect the Centre with State police when the forces deploy in States.
    3. Deputation paradox: The Centre itself struggles to fill IPS-reserved posts because States are reluctant to release officers on central deputation.
    4. Listing controversy: The contempt cases were listed before Justices Ujjal Bhuyan and A S Chandurkar, then struck off. They went to a special Bench of Justices Manoj Misra and Bhuyan after the Centre asked the Chief Justice of India to club the two cases.
    5. Officers’ objection: CAPF officers’ lawyers argued that the two cases are distinct.

    Challenges

    1. Legislative override: Parliament may change the law a judgment rests on but cannot simply overrule the judgment, so the override clause invites a court challenge.
    2. Blocked promotions: Fixed top-level quotas keep cadre officers stagnating in middle ranks, hurting morale.
    3. Listing transparency: Striking a listed case off without stated reasons weakens confidence in the Registry.

    Way Forward

    1. Cadre review: The MHA should run a time-bound cadre review to add senior posts.
    2. Service-based progression: Frame Service Rules linking financial upgrades to total qualifying service, as cadre officers seek.
    3. Calibrated deputation: Restrict deputation to posts needing Centre-State coordination, with a published reduction schedule.
    4. Reasoned listing orders: The Registry should record reasons whenever a listed case is removed or a Bench reconstituted.

    Conclusion

    The contest has moved from service rules to whether Parliament can legislate around a judicial direction on who commands the forces. The joint hearing before one Bench will decide whether the Court’s earlier judgment survives.

    Matching Previous Year Question

    “[2023, GS3, 15 marks] What are the internal security challenges being faced by India? Give out the role of Central Intelligence and Investigative Agencies tasked to counter such threats.”

  • What does it take to obtain justice for cybercrime?

    Why in the News

    For many cybercrime victims, getting the police to act takes a bribe or a personal contact rather than procedure, and these informal channels are used most by women, poor and rural victims. The Status of Policing in India Report (SPIR) 2026, by Lokniti-Centre for the Study of Developing Societies (Lokniti-CSDS) and Common Cause, finds that both channels also work best for them, so recovering lost money depends on influence.

    What does the survey measure, and how many victims go to the police?

    1. What it is: The SPIR 2026 surveyed 8,306 citizens across 16 States on their experience of policing. It asks what makes police act on a cybercrime complaint.
    2. Why it matters: As digital payments and online services enter daily life, cybercrime has become a serious security threat to citizens.
    3. Burden beyond delay: Besides procedural delays and repeated station visits, how police personnel treat a victim decides whether the case moves.
    4. Who complains: Nearly half of victims (49 per cent) complained to the police, and 39 per cent never complained.
    5. The takeaway: Filing a complaint is only the first hurdle, and what follows often turns on money or connections.

    How does bribery decide whose case moves?

    1. Paying to be heard: More than a quarter (27 per cent) of complainants paid the police at some point to get their case handled.
    2. Unequal burden: Payment rates differ sharply, most of all by class:
      • women 35 per cent, against 22 per cent of men;
      • rural victims 36 per cent, against 24 per cent of urban victims;
      • poor victims 51 per cent, against 12 per cent of affluent victims.
    3. Bribes linked to recovery: Of those who paid, 41 per cent recovered the full amount lost, against 12 per cent of those who did not pay.

    How do personal networks stand in for procedure?

    1. Network of influence: More than a third (37 per cent) of victims asked a personal contact, such as a senior police officer, official or local politician, to press the police.
    2. Who uses contacts: Reliance on contacts is higher among the disadvantaged:
      • women 41 per cent, against 35 per cent of men;
      • rural victims 44 per cent, against 35 per cent of urban victims;
      • poor victims 55 per cent, against 30 per cent of the rich.
    3. Contacts and recovery: Of victims who used a contact, 32 per cent recovered their full loss, against 13 per cent of those who did not, roughly tripling the odds.

    Why do the most vulnerable depend most on informal channels?

    1. Fewer formal options: Women, poor and rural victims use these channels not because they have more money or contacts, but because they have fewer other ways to make the system work.
    2. Parallel unofficial system: Bribery and personal influence work as unofficial channels to secure police action, so formal procedure alone fails a large share of victims.
    3. Enforceable procedure: Victims cannot enforce First Information Report (FIR) registration or joint bank and police action on cyber fraud, so a bribe or a call stays their only reliable route.

    Challenges

    1. Discretionary FIRs: Police often delay cyber fraud FIRs. Lalita Kumari v. Government of Uttar Pradesh (2013) made registration mandatory for cognisable offences, crimes police can act on without a court order.
    2. Slow fund freezes: Stolen money passes within hours through mule accounts, bank accounts used to route stolen funds, faster than police and banks can coordinate a freeze.
    3. Corruption rewarded: When bribes raise recovery rates, victims gain a reason to pay, which entrenches police corruption.

    Way Forward

    1. Time-bound FIRs: State police should register cyber fraud FIRs within a fixed time, with supervisory review of every refusal.
    2. Binding freeze timelines: The Reserve Bank of India (RBI) should set mandatory timelines for banks to freeze and return defrauded funds on police request.
    3. Single reporting channel: Victims should be routed through the 1930 helpline and the National Cyber Crime Reporting Portal, which send complaints directly to banks.

    Conclusion

    Recovering cyber fraud losses in India now rests on informal leverage, and the weakest victims pay the most for it. The test is whether State police and banks accept time-bound duties that victims can enforce without paying or calling anyone.

    Key numbers

    1. Complaints abandoned: 9 per cent of victims went to the police but did not pursue the case.
    2. No recovery: 35 per cent of bribe payers recovered nothing, against 68 per cent of those who did not pay.
    3. Contacts by class: 31 per cent of middle-class victims used a personal contact.

    Matching Previous Year Question

    “[2022, GS3, 10 marks] What are the different elements of cyber security? Keeping in view the challenges in cyber security, examine the extent to which India has successfully developed a comprehensive National Cyber Security Strategy.”

  • Amid ecological concerns, rail line set to connect Uri with Baramulla shelved

    Why in the News

    The planned rail extension from Baramulla to Uri, towards the Line of Control (LoC), is off: Indian Railways has shelved the proposed 40 km new line over concerns about its ecological impact. The decision puts the safety of a fragile, earthquake prone valley and its main town ahead of a strategic border link.

    What was the Uri line meant to do?

    1. What it is: The line would have extended the Udhampur-Baramulla rail line from Baramulla, the last point of the Valley’s railway, to the border region of Uri.
    2. Strategic purpose: It was viewed as a strategic link towards the LoC, giving faster movement of troops, equipment and military logistics to forward areas.
    3. Civilian and logistical value: The line would also have carried civilian passengers, and was expected to strengthen logistics in a sensitive border region.
    4. The takeaway: Without the line, supply to forward posts near Uri stays tied to roads that weather and terrain can close.

    Why was the line dropped?

    1. Cutting through the town: The alignment would have bisected Baramulla town and several village habitations, and run through orchards.
    2. Fragile terrain: It would have crossed fragile highland and mountains in seismic zone 5, the category of highest earthquake risk, along a corridor vulnerable to extreme weather.
    3. Local opposition: The Baramulla legislator argued the town cannot afford a project that cuts through its heart, and that development must protect its heritage, environment and land.
    4. Assembly resolution: The legislator moved a resolution in the ongoing Assembly session to keep the project on hold until a “comprehensive and independent geological, geotechnical and seismic assessment” is done.

    What else has been dropped in Kashmir’s rail plan?

    1. Formal return: The Railway Board has informed Northern Railway that the Uri line and a second project were returned by the Cabinet Secretariat and are no longer under consideration.
    2. Doubling shelved: The second project, doubling the existing 74 km Qazigund-Srinagar-Budgam stretch, has been shelved alongside the Uri line.
    3. Earlier pauses: Six months ago, the rail ministry put the proposed Anantnag-Pahalgam and Anantnag-Shopian links on hold after farmers’ protests.

    Challenges

    1. Security versus ecology: A strategic border link and a fragile, quake prone valley pull in opposite directions, and no framework exists to weigh them.
    2. Orchard land: Orchards anchor the Valley’s rural economy, so any new alignment through them meets farmer resistance.
    3. Road dependence: Forward areas stay reliant on a single highway exposed to landslides and snow. Eg. The Srinagar-Baramulla-Uri road.
    4. Single line capacity: Without doubling, the one track to Srinagar limits train frequency as traffic into the Valley grows.

    Way Forward

    1. Assessment before alignment: Commission the independent terrain study before any new route to Uri is drawn.
    2. Bypass the town: Railways should examine tunnelled or bypass alignments that skirt Baramulla town and its orchards.
    3. Consult before sanction: Hold public consultations with farmers and local bodies before a project is sanctioned, not after protests.
    4. Harden the road: The Border Roads Organisation should strengthen the Uri road against landslides and snow to sustain military logistics.

    Conclusion

    Kashmir’s rail expansion beyond its trunk line is now being checked by land and ecological objections rather than by engineering limits. Whether the Railways returns with a realigned, independently assessed route to Uri is the next development to watch.

    Back2Basics: Udhampur-Srinagar-Baramulla Rail Link (USBRL)

    1. What it is: A 272 km railway linking Udhampur to Baramulla through Srinagar, which joins the Kashmir Valley to the national rail network.
    2. National project: Declared a national project in 2002, it was completed when the full link opened in June 2025.
    3. Engineering landmarks: It carries the Chenab bridge, the world’s highest railway arch bridge, and the Anji Khad bridge, India’s first cable stayed rail bridge.

    Matching Previous Year Question

    “[2026, GS3, 10 marks] Ladakh is strategically located between China and Pakistan. As a measure to win hearts and minds of locals, discuss the Border Area Development Programmes (BADP) by the Central Government and civic actions by the Army. Also discuss demand of promulgation of provision of the Sixth Schedule of constitution for Ladakh.”

  • Naga leaders agree to open key Manipur highway after talks with Centre in Assam

    Why in the News

    The United Naga Council has agreed to lift its economic blockade of Manipur’s national highways temporarily, after tripartite talks with the Centre and the State government in Assam. The lifting rests only on a promise that its demands will be addressed, after more than three months of cut supplies.

    What is an economic blockade, and why does it bite in Manipur?

    1. What it is: An economic blockade is an obstruction of road traffic by a community body, not the State, so there is no order to revoke.
    2. Why Manipur is exposed: The State is landlocked and almost everything it consumes arrives by road, mainly National Highway 2 from Imphal to Dimapur.
    3. Which roads were closed: Goods traffic stopped on National Highways 2, 37, 202 and 102A.
    4. How it escalated: The blockade began on 11 June and the Council made it indefinite on 9 September.
    5. The takeaway: A blockade on a State with one supply corridor pressures the government by cutting off the population first, the protesters’ neighbours included.

    What is the United Naga Council demanding?

    1. Killing of six civilians: Six Naga civilians from Leilon Vaiphei village were abducted and killed in May, which set off the blockade.
    2. Revoke the ceasefire: The Council wants the Suspension of Operations ceasefire with Kuki armed groups revoked. That arrangement has held through the ethnic conflict since May 2023.
    3. Removal of a minister and prosecution: The Council also wants Deputy Chief Minister Nemcha Kipgen removed and justice for the six men killed, with every demand met first.
    4. Kamjong killings raised: The Council raised the recent killing of four Naga civilians in Kamjong district. The government promised to maintain law and order.

    What did the blockade do to the State?

    1. Shortages in the Imphal Valley: The Imphal Valley ran short of medicines, baby food, fresh produce and fuel as consignments stopped moving.
    2. Black market prices: Petrol sold for as much as Rs 250 a litre in the black market and a cooking gas cylinder for up to Rs 5,000.
    3. Hill districts also cut off: Kuki Zo districts depend on routes through Naga areas, so Kangpokpi, Churachandpur, Tengnoupal and Pherzawl ran short of goods and medical supplies.

    Why did the talks move now?

    1. Tripartite talks in Assam: The Council met the Union Ministry of Home Affairs and the State government at the Border Security Force frontier headquarters in Garbhanga, Assam.
    2. Earlier rounds had failed: Talks with the Chief Minister at Senapati broke down on 8 July. A round on 10 August produced only an agreement to keep talking.
    3. Concession in the parallel talks: The Centre agreed to Union Minister level participation in the Naga Peace Process, the separate Naga settlement talks long sought by the National Socialist Council of Nagaland (Isak Muivah).
    4. No official word yet: Neither the Centre nor the State government has confirmed what was agreed.

    Challenges

    1. No enforceable end: The lifting is temporary and rests only on a promise, so goods traffic can be stopped again at any time.
    2. Revocation would remove a restraint: Ending the Suspension of Operations would free Kuki armed groups from camp confinement.
    3. Justice remains a demand: The killings that triggered the blockade have produced no announced outcome.

    Way Forward

    1. Put the demands on dates: The Union Ministry of Home Affairs should record each demand against a named authority and a response date.
    2. Prosecute the killings: Hand the May abductions to a court monitored investigation with a deadline for filing charges.
    3. Protect the supply line: Notify the highways feeding Manipur as essential supply routes, with a State plan to escort convoys.
    4. Widen the table: Bring Kuki Zo and Meitei bodies into the same format, since settling with one community shifts the blockade.

    Conclusion

    Trucks will move again, but every demand that stopped them stays open, so the State has bought supplies with a promise. Watch whether those demands are recorded against dates, because nothing else stands between Manipur and the next blockade.

    Back2Basics: Suspension of Operations agreement

    1. What it is: A tripartite ceasefire signed by the Centre, the State government and an armed group that gives up violence and accepts the Constitution.
    2. What it obliges: Cadres stay in designated camps, weapons are held in monitored storage, and the agreement runs for fixed terms.
    3. When it began in Manipur: The arrangement with Kuki Zo armed groups was first signed in 2008 and has been extended since.

    Matching Previous Year Question

    “[2025, GS3, 15 marks] What are the major challenges to internal security and peace process in the North-Eastern States? Map the various peace accords and agreements initiated by the government in the past decade.”

  • Union Minister to join Naga peace negotiations; encouraging: NSCN (IM)

    Why in the News

    The Centre has agreed to include a Union Minister or a group of Union level Ministers in the Naga peace talks. The step meets a longstanding demand of the National Socialist Council of Nagalim (Isak Muivah), or NSCN (IM), for political representation in the negotiations. It follows the appointment of Ajit Lal, a former Joint Intelligence Committee chief, as the Centre’s pointsman for the talks seven months ago. The talks have run since 1997 and produced a Framework Agreement in 2015 that was never converted into a settlement. A day after welcoming the new format, the group’s External Publicity Wing described a Nagalim national flag and a Nagalim national constitution as non negotiable, two demands the Centre has said will not be met.

    What is the Naga peace process?

    1. The negotiating track: The Union government has been holding talks with the NSCN (IM) since 1997 to resolve the decades long insurgency in the Naga hills through a peace accord.
    2. The Framework Agreement: A Framework Agreement between the government and the NSCN (IM) was signed on 3 August 2015. Little was achieved after it.
    3. The interlocutor mechanism: The Centre negotiates through an appointed pointsman rather than through a minister. The post has passed from a former Indian Police Service officer to a former Additional Director of the Intelligence Bureau and now to a former Joint Intelligence Committee chief, who holds the post of Adviser (North East) in the Ministry of Home Affairs.
    4. The ceasefire boundary: Participation in the talks runs alongside a ceasefire, and a Naga armed group outside that ceasefire is outside the negotiation as well.

    What does political level representation change in the talks?

    1. The concession on format: The Centre has agreed to bring a Union Minister, or a group of Union level Ministers, into the negotiation framework. The talks so far have been conducted by an appointed official.
    2. The group’s stated expectation: The NSCN (IM) said the decision will “expedite the political process” and create the momentum for “an honourable and enduring political settlement”.
    3. The demand behind it: The security establishment’s reading is that the NSCN (IM) has always wanted the negotiations to be political, with political representatives involved, rather than conducted at the official level.

    Why did the talks stall after the Framework Agreement was signed?

    1. Disagreement over the 2015 text: The parties fell out over the Framework Agreement itself, and the dispute over what it committed either side to hardened the group’s position.
    2. Public accusations on both sides: The NSCN (IM) accused the then interlocutor of “mischief” and of attempts to “segregate Naga society”. The interlocutor called the NSCN an “armed gang” and accused it of running a “parallel government” engaged in extortion.
    3. A stalemate rather than a rupture: The exchanges virtually pushed the talks into a stalemate without ending them, and the public altercations of the early 2020s made a settlement appear more distant.
    4. A change of interlocutor did not help: The post passed to a former Additional Director of the Intelligence Bureau and the talks still failed to make much headway.

    What explains the change in the NSCN (IM)’s tone?

    1. First acceptance of the interlocutor: The group welcomed the current pointsman’s appointment as “interlocutor” for the first time, calling it a “significant and encouraging development that reflects the GoI’s renewed resolve to advance the peace process with seriousness and urgency”. He was appointed Adviser (North East) in February.
    2. Prior standing with the Nagas: He had officiated as interlocutor for five months in 2014, and his relations with the Nagas are cited as one reason the present step became possible.
    3. A State government kept inside the process: The NSCN (IM) thanked the Nagaland government for its “sincere participation and active facilitation”, and said its engagement has been instrumental in sustaining the peace process.

    How does the breakaway Eastern Flank constrain the NSCN (IM)?

    1. A rebel faction outside the ceasefire: The Eastern Flank, based in Myanmar, is a hardline faction that has refused negotiations with the government and is not under any ceasefire agreement.
    2. The defection that gave it standing: In 2024 Ikato, son of NSCN co founder Isak Chishi Swu, joined the faction, accusing the NSCN (IM) leadership of being “corrupt” and of “compromising the (Naga) national interest for their own selfish gain”. He was appointed its chairman in July this year.
    3. The legitimacy problem it creates: The chairmanship confers legitimacy because he is Isak’s son and a Naga from Nagaland. The NSCN (IM) is led by Muivah, a Tangkhul from Manipur.
    4. Popular impatience adds to it: Patience in Nagaland has been wearing thin over the delay in concluding the peace process, which builds further pressure on the NSCN (IM).

    Can a political upgrade survive the demands the Centre has ruled out?

    1. The two non negotiables: The External Publicity Wing of the NSCN (IM) asserted that the ongoing political negotiations rest on “sovereignty” between the government and the NSCN, and described the “Nagalim national flag and Nagalim national constitution” as “non negotiable”.
    2. The Centre’s stated limit: Delhi has said a Naga flag and a separate Naga constitution will not be conceded. The same two items are the group’s core demands.
    3. Hardliners narrow the room to compromise: The Eastern Flank’s position makes it costlier for the NSCN (IM) to soften on either demand, because any concession would be read against a faction that has refused to negotiate at all.

    Conclusion

    The talks have changed their format without changing their content. Ministerial participation answers a question about who sits at the table. It does not touch the two demands the Centre has ruled out, and the group restated both within a day of welcoming the new arrangement. What to watch is whether a ministerial round is actually convened, and whether the faction sitting outside the ceasefire is brought into one.

    Matching Previous Year Question

    “[2025, GS3, 15 marks] What are the major challenges to internal security and peace process in the North-Eastern States? Map the various peace accords and agreements initiated by the government in the past decade.”

  • Punjab’s drug scourge needs policy, not slogans

    Why in the News

    The Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) has flagged off the first of four “Nasha Mukt Punjab” yatras, a campaign that will cover nearly 4,000 km before culminating at Jalandhar on 30 September. The party has said it will contest all 117 seats in Punjab on its own, and the Union Home Minister is expected to address the closing rally. The campaign follows the Aam Aadmi Party (AAP) government’s “Yudh Nasheyan Viruddh” drive, launched in March 2025. That drive has produced arrests and seizure figures in abundance. It has not produced any visible slowdown in the flow of contraband. The tension is that a problem which has outlived a dozen crackdowns and three governments is being contested as an electoral idiom rather than a policy question, so the state keeps publishing enforcement output while the money, the supply routes and the treatment capacity behind the trade stay untouched.

    Why has the drug question returned to the centre of Punjab’s politics?

    1. A recurring electoral peg: The drug question returns to the centre of the state’s politics before successive elections, and it has returned again as the next Assembly election approaches.
    2. The BJP’s framing: The yatras run under the slogan “Bhajpa Da Naara, Nasha Mukauna Saara”, which states the objective of ending drug use without naming a measure that would deliver it.
    3. The Congress response: The party’s Punjab in charge led a protest at Chandigarh over the death of a labourer who had publicly questioned the state Finance Minister about the availability of drugs.
    4. The Akali Dal position: Leaders of the Akali Dal (Waris Punjab De) made drugs the centrepiece of their campaign at the Rakhar Puniya rally and promised a white paper on the scourge.
    5. The common shape of all three: Each response is a yatra, a protest or a promised document, and none of them carries a stated measure on financing, supply routes or treatment capacity.

    Why has the border explanation stopped explaining the trade?

    1. Position on the supply route: Punjab sits at the edge of the Golden Crescent and shares a border of roughly 550 km with Pakistan, which is the reason most often cited for the scale of the problem.
    2. Drone delivery: Drones now ferry consignments across the line, which removes the physical crossing that a fenced and patrolled border is designed to intercept.
    3. Relay points in other States: Other States have become relay points in the chain, so a consignment no longer has to reach Punjab directly from the border at all.
    4. Diverted pharmaceutical drugs: Pharmaceutical drugs are cheaper, more accessible and harder to trace, and they have become an important part of the trade.
    5. The consequence for strategy: A trade that has outgrown the border cannot be contained by a response built around the border.

    Why have arrests and seizures not slowed supply?

    1. Output without outcome: The campaign launched in March 2025 has generated arrests and seizure figures in abundance with no corresponding fall in the contraband reaching users.
    2. Enforcement reaches the wrong end of the chain: Arrests fall on carriers and users at the retail end, while those who finance and supply the trade are not prosecuted.
    3. The money trail is unexamined: A serious response has to trace the money moving through the trade, and no campaign so far has produced that examination.
    4. Institutional failures are unnamed: The trade survives because of institutional failures that allow it to operate, and no crackdown has identified or acted on them.
    5. The cost the seizure count does not record: Families are destroyed and many young Punjabis leave the state in search of a future abroad, which is the outcome no enforcement statistic captures.

    What must a policy response do that a campaign cannot?

    1. Dismantle the networks: The state has to dismantle the networks controlling the trade rather than only intercept the consignments those networks move.
    2. Prosecute financiers and suppliers: Prosecution has to reach those who finance and supply the trade, because that is where the incentive to continue actually sits.
    3. Build treatment capacity: Accessible treatment and sustained rehabilitation are required for those caught in addiction, and both are capacity questions rather than campaign questions.
    4. Provide an alternative occupation: Young people need opportunities to rebuild their lives, since recovery without an occupation returns a person to the same market.
    5. The family cannot substitute for the state: Families matter in prevention and recovery, and that role does not allow the state to abdicate its own responsibility.

    Challenges to Punjab’s anti drug policy

    1. Prosecution stops at the carrier: Enforcement records the quantity seized rather than the ownership of the consignment, so the chain above the carrier survives every recovery. Eg. The Special Task Force report on Punjab’s drug trade, submitted to the Punjab and Haryana High Court in a sealed cover in 2018, was never made public.
      The Fix: Require every commercial quantity case to carry a financial investigation report naming the funder before the chargesheet is filed.
    2. Diverted pharmaceutical supply is a licensing failure: Prescription opioids leave the legal chain at the chemist and the manufacturer, which is a regulatory lapse that no border deployment can reach. Eg. Tramadol was brought under the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 by notification in 2018 after it displaced heroin in parts of the state.
      The Fix: Link every Schedule H1 opioid sale to a prescription number in a State drug database and audit the outlier chemists monthly.
    3. Treatment is counted in registrations, not in completions: Outpatient opioid assisted treatment centres report enrolment while relapse after discontinuation goes untracked, so the system cannot say what treatment achieved. Eg. Punjab runs Outpatient Opioid Assisted Treatment centres across its districts alongside government de addiction centres.
      The Fix: Publish a retention at six months figure for each centre, so capacity is measured by completed treatment rather than by registrations.
    4. Interdiction lags the delivery method: A small drone crosses in minutes and its payload is recovered only after it has landed, so the seizure confirms the delivery rather than preventing it. Eg. The Border Security Force has recovered drones and dropped consignments along the Punjab frontier in rising numbers each year since 2020.
      The Fix: Fund a counter drone detection grid along the Punjab frontier and tie each recovery to the ground receiver traced from it.

    Conclusion

    Punjab has heard the promise of a drug free state from three governments and is hearing it again from four parties. The state does not lack a diagnosis of the trade; it lacks a policy that outlasts the campaign that announced it. What remains unresolved is that enforcement produces a number a government can publish within weeks, while financial investigation, prosecution of financiers and treatment capacity produce results only across a full term. The 2027 Assembly election is where that record gets tested, and the test is for Punjab’s political class as a whole rather than for one party in office.

    Back2Basics: Golden Crescent

    1. What it is: The Golden Crescent is the illicit opium producing region of South West Asia, covering Afghanistan, Iran and Pakistan.
    2. Why it reaches India: Afghanistan has historically been the largest single source of the region’s opium, and the output moves outward through Pakistani and Iranian routes.
    3. The other producing region: The Golden Triangle, covering Myanmar, Laos and Thailand, is the second major illicit opium region and feeds India’s eastern land routes.
    4. India’s position between them: India lies between the two regions, which is the basis for its classification as a transit country as well as a consuming one.

    Matching Previous Year Question

    “India’s proximity to two of the world’s biggest illicit opium-growing states has enhanced her internal security concerns. Explain the linkages between drug trafficking and other illicit activities such as gunrunning, money laundering and human trafficking. What counter-measures should be taken to prevent the same?”

  • Forces comb Pir Panjal to stop terrorist movement between Jammu, Kashmir

    Why in the News

    Security forces have adopted a sustained deployment across the Pir Panjal range, operating from Temporary Operational Bases (TOBs) instead of withdrawing after each operation. The change was visible in an operation in which a Lashkar-e-Toiba (LeT) terrorist was killed at Ashdar Gali in the upper reaches, after a four month joint effort by the Army, its para forces, the Jammu and Kashmir Police and paramilitary forces. Terrorists had for four years used the high altitude transit routes through the dense forests to move between the Kashmir Valley and the Jammu region. Pressure applied on one side of the range simply moved them to the other. The tension is that a terrain which gave observation and concealment to small armed groups is now being answered by keeping troops inside it through the season, at a cost in exposure and logistics that a raid never carried.

    What is a Temporary Operational Base?

    1. What it is: A Temporary Operational Base is a forward position from which a joint team stays deployed in the mountains for an extended period, rather than returning to a garrison once an operation ends.
    2. Duration: Deployments run from more than ten days to several months, decided by the security situation and intelligence inputs.
    3. Shelter: Where a natural shelter exists, such as a Gujjar dhok, a herder’s seasonal shack, or a cave, it is used as the base. Otherwise the team operates in the dense forest without shelter.
    4. Siting: The bases are scattered across the range on intelligence inputs and ground situation analysis, and the one above the Doodhpathri meadow at Ashdar Gali has been held for several months.

    Why is the Pir Panjal strategically decisive?

    1. What the range divides: The Pir Panjal separates the Jammu region from the Kashmir Valley.
    2. Southern approaches: To its south lie the Poonch and Rajouri districts, which run up to the Line of Control (LoC).
    3. The two corridors: The range connects Kashmir to Poonch and Rajouri on one side, and to the Chenab Valley districts of Doda, Kishtwar and Ramban on the other.
    4. The northern stretch: Inside Kashmir the range extends to Gulmarg and Baramulla, connecting the Valley back to the Line of Control.
    5. Why that matters operationally: A single mountain system linking the infiltration frontier to both halves of the Union Territory makes the range a transit corridor rather than a destination.

    How is the deployment organised across the range?

    1. Three zones: The mountains are divided into the upper reaches, the middle range and the lower reaches.
    2. Upper reaches: The Army’s paratroopers hold the highest ground, trained and equipped for high altitude warfare, and are stationed at mountain tops from where drones monitor large stretches of terrain.
    3. Middle range: The middle range is manned either by the Rashtriya Rifles, the Army’s counter insurgency force, or by joint teams of the Jammu and Kashmir Police and paramilitary forces, depending on the requirement.
    4. Lower reaches: The lower ranges are usually held by the Jammu and Kashmir Police and paramilitary forces.
    5. Closing the weapons gap: Militants at height held stationary positions from which they could watch soldiers, and carried weapons such as the American M4 carbine, efficient in close combat. Special troops now carry comparable weapons and night vision devices for patrolling after dark.

    What new units has the Jammu and Kashmir Police raised?

    1. The trigger: The Pahalgam attack on tourists in April last year killed twenty five tourists and one local.
    2. A new elite tier: The Jammu and Kashmir Police raised a new elite unit within its Special Operations Group (SOG) to strengthen operations in challenging terrain.
    3. Snow Leopards: The Snow Leopards unit is trained for high altitude warfare in rough terrain during the winter.
    4. Markhor: The Markhor unit is trained for gunfights in dense forest.

    What does the earlier record in Poonch and Rajouri show?

    1. A former hotbed: The Poonch and Rajouri axis carried a large number of militants, mostly foreigners, moving openly through the forests.
    2. Operation Sarp Vinash: The Indian Army launched Operation Sarp Vinash in 2003, with the help of local residents, to flush militants out of the area.
    3. The clearance held for a decade: The region was declared militant free in 2012.
    4. The return: The forested mountains have become a major challenge again over the last few years, with a series of setbacks recorded in the last three.

    Challenges to the Pir Panjal deployment model

    1. Support networks reconstitute faster than they are mapped: Overground worker networks change composition and new hideouts appear, so intelligence on a valley goes stale between operations. Eg. Officials record newer terrorist hideouts in the same forest belts that earlier operations had cleared.
      The Fix: Tie the base siting cycle to a rolling review of the support network in each valley, rather than to the location of the last contact.
    2. Winter attrition falls on the force: Holding high ground through a Himalayan winter produces cold injury and altitude illness that no contact with an adversary causes. Eg. Non battle casualties have historically exceeded combat casualties on India’s high altitude deployments.
      The Fix: Rotate upper reach detachments on a fixed acclimatisation cycle and pre position winter stores before the passes close.
    3. The herding population uses the same routes: A standing armed presence in grazing areas cuts across the seasonal movement of the Gujjar and Bakarwal communities. Eg. The dhoks used as temporary bases are the herders’ own seasonal shelters.
      The Fix: Compensate the use of private dhoks and issue transit passes to registered herders, so ordinary seasonal movement is not read as suspicious.
    4. Infiltration sits upstream of the model: Sustained presence inside the range does not change the supply of armed entrants crossing into it. Eg. Foreign militants moving through these forests enter from launch pads across the Line of Control.
      The Fix: Pair the deployment with counter infiltration grid upgrades on the Line of Control, so the corridor is contested at entry and not only in transit.
    5. Aerial observation fails where it is most needed: Drone surveillance from mountain tops loses effect under forest canopy and in cloud, which is when movement is attempted. Eg. Dense deodar and pine cover in the Poonch forests blocks overhead observation for most of the day.
      The Fix: Combine aerial observation with ground sensors and human sources in the canopy belts, rather than relying on the aerial picture alone.

    Conclusion

    The range’s value to an armed group was never its height. It was the ability to leave one side the moment pressure arrived on the other, and a standing presence is what removes that option. The deployment answers movement. It does not answer entry, and the supply of armed entrants is decided at the frontier rather than in the forest. What to watch is whether the bases are held through the coming winter, since a presence that thins with the snow restores the very transit option it was raised to deny.

    Back2Basics: Overground Worker (OGW)

    1. What the term means: An overground worker is a person who supports an armed group without taking part in armed action.
    2. What the support covers: Shelter, food, movement of weapons and money, and reconnaissance of security force movement.
    3. Why the category matters: An infiltrated group cannot sustain itself between operations without a local support layer, so dismantling the network is treated as equivalent to an operational success.
    4. How it is handled: Police in Jammu and Kashmir maintain lists of suspected overground workers and periodically detain and prosecute them under criminal and preventive detention law.

    Matching Previous Year Question

    “Winning of ‘Hearts and Minds’ in terrorism-affected areas is an essential step in restoring the trust of the population. Discuss the measures adopted by the Government in this respect as part of the conflict resolution in Jammu and Kashmir.”

  • Six high-tech Army labs to weed out foreign bugs from drones, cameras

    Why in the News

    The Indian Army will operate six AASHVAST laboratories, at which all its drones will undergo mandatory inspection for firmware level vulnerabilities before use. One laboratory is already running in Delhi, with at least five more planned in the coming months. Drones procured by the Army until now were never checked at the firmware level, and their origin was established from the purchase invoice alone. The tension is that an invoice records where a component was bought, not what is embedded inside the silicon. A component sourced from China can be presented as made in India with no test contradicting the claim.

    What is AASHVAST?

    1. The name: AASHVAST stands for Assessment and Analysis of Electronic Systems Hardware for Vulnerabilities and Security Threats.
    2. What it is: It is a firmware analysis and validation suite, built by a private developer for the Directorate General of Electronics and Mechanical Engineering (DG EME).
    3. What it inspects: It examines the software that operates an unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV), rather than physically inspecting the airframe alone.
    4. Procurement route: The Army issued a Request for Proposal in April 2026 for customised licensed software to validate firmware and embedded systems in electronic components, including UAV components.

    What vulnerabilities can the laboratories detect?

    1. Scale of the screen: About fourteen types of vulnerability can be detected by the suite.
    2. Geospatial faults: A malfunction triggered when the aircraft flies over a particular location, or a fault that stops it reaching a preset destination.
    3. Hidden and unused code: Code left in the firmware that can make a drone terminate its flight before reaching its target.
    4. Time and location bugs: Instructions that let a drone operate normally except at specific times or in specific places.
    5. Access and identity artefacts: Hidden passwords, embedded keys, remote access tools and location based security controls.
    6. Foreign origin components: Chinese or other foreign origin active components sitting inside the airframe’s electronics.
    7. How a vulnerability enters: It can be introduced during the manufacturing stage of a component or during a later upgrade process.

    Why does the invoice not establish origin?

    1. What the invoice shows: A purchase invoice records the point at which a component was bought, not the origin of what is inside it.
    2. No test at the silicon level: No mechanism in the procurement chain determines what is embedded within the silicon itself.
    3. The misrepresentation risk: Active components sourced from China can be presented as made in India or in a third country on the strength of that invoice.
    4. The existing prohibition: Domestic military drone manufacturers have already been barred from using parts made in China.
    5. The framework in progress: The Army Design Bureau submitted a detailed framework to the Ministry of Defence in 2025 aimed at eliminating Chinese origin components from UAVs.

    Why does the screen matter now?

    1. Procurement volume: The Army is acquiring drones at scale through the emergency procurement route, which compresses the time available for technical scrutiny.
    2. Where the drones fly: Many of these drones are used in operations along the eastern borders, where the supplier concern and the adversary are the same state.
    3. The gap being closed: Firmware level checks were absent from Army drone procurement until now, so the suite covers a stage that no other test reached.
    4. Operational purpose: The stated aim is to neutralise enemy interference that would stop a drone performing its designated task in a contested area.
    5. Cameras next: CCTV cameras procured by the Army in future will also be inspected, for Chinese proprietary protocols or their equivalent.
    6. The declared frame: The Army has placed the facility under the Atmanirbhar Bharat vision, presenting it as raising cyber resilience and growing the domestic defence electronics ecosystem.

    Challenges to firmware screening of military drones

    1. Screening capacity against procurement volume: Six laboratories testing every drone and later every camera create a throughput bottleneck at the point of induction. Eg. Emergency procurement contracts run on delivery timelines measured in months rather than years.
      The Fix: Set a risk tier so that only new firmware builds and new component sources take full analysis, with repeat builds cleared on a cryptographic hash comparison.
    2. Firmware changes after clearance: A drone cleared at induction can be altered through a later update pushed by the supplier. Eg. Commercial drone platforms routinely push updates that change flight envelope and geofencing behaviour.
      The Fix: Require signed firmware with a key held by the Army, and revalidate any build before it is loaded onto a fielded aircraft.
    3. Hardware implants escape a software test: A malicious function fabricated into the chip itself is not visible to firmware analysis. Eg. Counterfeit and re-marked integrated circuits are a recurring finding in defence supply chain audits worldwide.
      The Fix: Pair the firmware suite with hardware level testing, such as X ray and die level inspection, on a sampled share of every batch.
    4. Supply chain depth beyond the first tier: A vendor can certify an Indian assembly while its own sub suppliers buy from the restricted origin. Eg. Restrictions on direct imports have historically shifted sourcing to intermediaries in third countries rather than changing the component.
      The Fix: Require a component level bill of materials with origin declarations down to the sub tier, verified against the laboratory’s own findings.
    5. Substitutes must exist before a ban works: Removing a restricted component only helps where a qualified domestic or allied alternative exists at the same performance and price. Eg. Motors, flight controllers and imaging sensors for small drones are concentrated in a few overseas suppliers.
      The Fix: Fund qualification of domestic alternatives for the specific component classes the laboratories flag most often, rather than relying on a blanket origin ban.

    Conclusion

    Procurement has until now verified where a component was bought. The laboratories move verification to what the component actually does, which is the only level at which a concealed function can be found. The gap that remains sits between a one time clearance at induction and a fleet that keeps receiving software through its service life. The marker to watch is whether the screen is applied to the drone and camera stock already in service, or only to what is bought next.

    Back2Basics: Directorate General of Electronics and Mechanical Engineering (DG EME)

    1. What it heads: DG EME heads the Corps of Electronics and Mechanical Engineers, the Indian Army’s technical corps, from Army Headquarters.
    2. Mandate: The Corps maintains, repairs and upgrades the Army’s equipment, covering vehicles, weapon systems, electronics and instrumentation.
    3. Origin: The Corps was raised in 1943 and took its present form after Independence.
    4. Indigenisation role: DG EME sponsors development and validation projects with Indian industry for equipment support, testing and life extension.

    Matching Previous Year Question

    “Keeping in view India’s internal security, analyse the impact of cross-border cyber attacks. Also, discuss defensive measures against these sophisticated attacks.”

  • INS Kolkata was on routine patrol, Pak vessel conduct wrong: MEA

    Why in the News

    The Ministry of External Affairs has identified INS Kolkata as the Indian Navy warship involved in a collision with a Pakistani naval vessel in the North Arabian Sea, and has said that PNS Hunain conducted itself in an unacceptable and unprofessional manner at sea. India’s stated position is that the Pakistani ship’s overtaking manoeuvre grossly violated Article 10 of the Agreement between India and Pakistan on Advance Notice on Military Exercises, Manoeuvres and Troops Movements, 1991. That article bars naval units of the two countries from closing to less than three nautical miles of each other in international waters. Pakistan rejects the account, says its Navy was conducting its biennial exercise SEASPARK-26, and places the incident inside its own Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ). The tension is over where the collision happened and which rule governed it.

    What does the 1991 Agreement on Advance Notice require?

    1. What the agreement covers: It obliges each country to give the other advance notice of military exercises, manoeuvres and troop movements above specified levels, so routine activity is not read as preparation for attack.
    2. The naval separation rule: Article 10 states that naval ships and submarines of the two countries are not to close to less than three nautical miles of each other while operating in international waters, in order to avoid an accident.
    3. When it was concluded: The agreement was signed in April 1991, as part of the set of confidence building measures built between the two countries after the military standoffs of the 1980s.
    4. What it is not: It is a risk reduction instrument rather than a dispute settlement one, and it carries no verification machinery and no penalty for breach.

    What happened at sea on 15 September?

    1. India’s account of the deployment: INS Kolkata was on a routine deployment in the western Arabian Sea when the collision occurred.
    2. The manoeuvre: The Pakistani vessel closed in on the Indian warship at high speed and attempted an overtaking manoeuvre, which resulted in contact between the two ships.
    3. Where it happened: The incident took place about 120 nautical miles from the Gulf of Oman.
    4. The ships involved: INS Kolkata is a frontline guided missile destroyer of the Indian Navy. PNS Hunain is an offshore patrol vessel, often listed as a Yarmook class corvette because of its combat suite.
    5. The damage: No major damage was caused to INS Kolkata and the ship remains at sea.

    What are the two sides’ competing claims?

    1. India’s legal case: India places the incident in international waters and cites a breach of Article 10 of the 1991 agreement and of the International Regulations for Preventing Collisions at Sea (COLREGs).
    2. Pakistan’s account: Pakistan says its Navy was undertaking the biennial exercise SEASPARK-26, and that the Indian vessel carried out aggressive manoeuvres in dangerously close proximity to a Pakistani naval ship.
    3. Pakistan’s jurisdictional claim: Islamabad describes the incident as a highly provocative and unacceptable action by an Indian Navy vessel inside Pakistan’s Exclusive Economic Zone.
    4. India’s response to that claim: India has rejected the allegations and insinuations in the Pakistani statement, and describes the response as prevarication.

    Does an Exclusive Economic Zone claim change the legal position?

    1. What an EEZ is: Under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), 1982, a coastal State’s Exclusive Economic Zone extends up to 200 nautical miles from its baselines.
    2. What rights it confers: The rights in an EEZ are over resources, meaning fisheries, seabed minerals and energy, together with jurisdiction over artificial islands and marine scientific research.
    3. What it does not confer: An EEZ is not territorial sea and carries no sovereignty over the water column for navigation, so warships of other States retain freedom of navigation there.
    4. Why the location argument still matters politically: Placing the collision inside its own EEZ lets Pakistan frame an Indian deployment as an intrusion, even where the navigation itself is lawful.
    5. The rule that applies either way: COLREGs bind all vessels on the high seas and connected waters regardless of zone, and they place the duty to keep clear on the overtaking vessel.

    How did the two governments escalate this diplomatically?

    1. India’s protest: India summoned Pakistan’s Charge d’Affaires and lodged a strong protest over the incident.
    2. Pakistan’s counter protest: Pakistan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs summoned the Charge d’Affaires of the Indian High Commission in Islamabad and lodged its own protest.
    3. India’s advisory: Pakistan has been advised of the need for all military units to observe due care and to respect the provisions of the relevant agreements, so that such incidents are not repeated.
    4. What the exchange settled: Neither side accepted the other’s account, so the episode closes with two contradictory official records and no joint inquiry.

    Challenges to India and Pakistan maritime risk management

    1. No incidents at sea agreement exists: The two countries have no bilateral instrument setting out communication procedures and manoeuvring rules for close naval encounters. Eg. The United States and the then Soviet Union concluded an Incidents at Sea Agreement in 1972 covering exactly these situations.
      The Fix: Negotiate a dedicated incidents at sea agreement with mandatory radio contact procedures and a joint fact finding mechanism for collisions.
    2. The 1991 agreement has no verification arm: Article 10 states a separation distance with no means of establishing after the event where two ships actually were. Eg. Each side in this incident places the collision in a different legal zone, and neither account can be tested.
      The Fix: Agree to exchange navigation track and automatic identification system data for any reported incident within a fixed period.
    3. Naval communication runs only through diplomatic channels: An encounter at sea reaches the two foreign ministries before it reaches the two navies, so escalation precedes de escalation. Eg. The standing hotline between the Directors General of Military Operations covers the land border rather than naval units at sea.
      The Fix: Establish a direct maritime operations hotline between the two navies’ operational headquarters with a standing duty officer.
    4. Notification obligations do not cover sea areas: Advance notice focuses on land based exercises and troop movements, so a naval exercise can run without a notified area other vessels are expected to keep clear of. Eg. The Pakistani exercise was under way in the same waters where the collision occurred.
      The Fix: Extend the advance notice regime to naval exercise areas and dates, with a notified exclusion zone for the duration of the exercise.
    5. The North Arabian Sea is a crowded operating area: Warships of many navies operate alongside heavy commercial traffic on the approaches to the Gulf, so the margin for a manoeuvring error is small. Eg. Indian Navy destroyers and frigates have been deployed on sustained missions in these waters for several months.
      The Fix: Coordinate published deconfliction lanes for warship transits in the northern Arabian Sea through the existing multinational maritime coordination arrangements.

    Conclusion

    Two navies operating in the same waters now hold two irreconcilable accounts of one collision, and have no mechanism to reconcile them. The instrument each side reaches for was written for a different problem, since a notification agreement cannot establish what happened once contact has already occurred. Both protests have been lodged and both rejected, and the Indian warship has returned to its deployment. The step that would change the pattern is a navy to navy communication and fact finding arrangement, because the next encounter will otherwise be handled exactly as this one was.

    Back2Basics: International Regulations for Preventing Collisions at Sea (COLREGs)

    1. What they are: COLREGs are the international rules of the road at sea, adopted through the International Maritime Organization (IMO) in 1972 and in force since 1977.
    2. What they govern: They set the steering and sailing rules, including which vessel gives way in crossing, overtaking and head on situations, along with lights, shapes and sound signals.
    3. Who they bind: They apply to all vessels on the high seas and in connected waters navigable by seagoing vessels, warships included.
    4. The overtaking rule: A vessel overtaking another must keep out of its way, and that duty stays with the overtaking vessel until it is finally past and clear.

    Matching Previous Year Question

    “[2025, GS3, 15] Why is maritime security vital to protect India’s sea trade? Discuss maritime and coastal security challenges and the way forward.”

  • The Greyhounds last leap

    Why in the News

    The Greyhounds, the counter insurgency force raised in 1989 to fight Maoists in the forests of undivided Andhra Pradesh, is being repurposed after the Union Home Minister’s declaration in May that the country is free of Naxal activity. The force’s strength has fallen to 650 personnel from a peak of over 2,000. Telangana was earlier declared totally free of Maoist armed formations, after a surrender driven strategy that brought in 817 rebels between December 2023 and April this year. The tension is over mandate. A unit built for jungle warfare against an armed insurgency is now being pointed at marijuana cultivation in the same remote hills, an activity the State Security Adviser warns could evolve into a violent crime syndicate.

    What is the Greyhounds force and how is it manned?

    1. Origin and purpose: It was created in 1989 by Indian Police Service (IPS) officer K.S. Vyas, after conventional policing proved inadequate against the growing armed strength of the Maoists in undivided Andhra Pradesh.
    2. A deputation unit, not a recruited one: There is no separate recruitment for the force. Personnel volunteer from the Special Police, the Armed Reserve and the Civil Police, and are screened for physical fitness, mental resilience and determination.
    3. The service incentive: Personnel deputed to the force receive an additional 60 percent of their basic pay and dearness allowance for the duration of the posting.
    4. Unit structure and composition: In erstwhile Andhra Pradesh the force ran 41 units of 35 personnel each, with a Deputy Superintendent of Police, an inspector and three sub inspectors in every unit. No woman has ever headed the force or served in any of its operational units.

    How did the Greyhounds become a model for other forces?

    1. The training design: Narayan Singh Bhati, a former Deputy Inspector General of the Special Security Bureau, now the Sashastra Seema Bal, built the training programme and stayed on as a consultant for nearly four decades. He was awarded the Padma Shri and died in June 2023 at the age of 92.
    2. State forces modelled on it: Odisha raised its Special Operations Group, Maharashtra its C-60, West Bengal its Counter-Insurgency Force and Chhattisgarh its District Reserve Guard on the same design.
    3. The central force it shaped: The Central Reserve Police Force (CRPF) drew on the Greyhounds model for its Commando Battalion for Resolute Action (CoBRA), its own jungle warfare unit.
    4. Embedded in police training: An attachment with the Greyhounds is mandatory for IPS officers under training at the National Police Academy. Officers allotted to the Telugu States serve a separate posting with the force.
    5. The intelligence backbone: The Special Intelligence Branch (SIB), raised alongside the force, tracked the movement and activities of the rebels and supplied the targeting that operations depended on.

    What does the operational record show?

    1. The tally in undivided Andhra Pradesh: The force neutralised 693 rebels and seized 1,250 firearms.
    2. The tally after bifurcation: Since the formation of Telangana on 2 June 2014, it has killed 92 Naxals and recovered 360 weapons.
    3. The targeting rule: A person in olive green uniform carrying a weapon was not by itself treated as a target, since a hunter or a village resident could fit that description. Identification required a self loading rifle, an AK series rifle or a .303 rifle in hand.
    4. Cross border operations: Teams crossed into neighbouring Maharashtra and Chhattisgarh to strike targets operating from across State borders.
    5. What operations turned on: An operation at Manala in Nizamabad in March 2005 located a concealed group only after an officer spotted a glint of metal on a hilltop, and ten rebels were killed there.

    What did the force lose?

    1. Personnel killed: The Greyhounds lost over 60 men over the years, including six after the formation of Telangana.
    2. The Balimela ambush: On 29 June 2008, Maoists ambushed a returning team on the Balimela reservoir in Odisha and sank its boat, killing 37 people including 32 commandos.
    3. The founder killed: K.S. Vyas was shot dead on 27 January 1993 while jogging at a stadium in Hyderabad, by five members of the CPI (ML) People’s War Group.
    4. Officers targeted as policy: Vyas was one of three IPS officers killed by the rebels in Andhra Pradesh, alongside G. Pardesi Naidu in November 1993 and C. Umesh Chandra in September 1999.

    Why did surrenders rather than encounters end the insurgency in Telangana?

    1. The surrender policy: A surrender policy announced by the Chief Minister of Telangana was the operative instrument, with the Special Intelligence Branch working the approaches to cadre.
    2. The numbers it produced: Between December 2023 and 30 April this year, 817 rebels surrendered, including four central committee members and 22 State committee members. A further 138 were arrested and 325 weapons were seized, including 56 AK-47 rifles.
    3. What it did to the organisation: The CPI (Maoist) was left headless, leaderless and rudderless once its leadership tier came out.
    4. Why the method mattered: Encounters and arrests can turn rebels into martyrs within sections of society. A surrender removes that status and demoralises the cadre left behind.
    5. The declaration that followed: The State was declared totally free of Maoist armed formations.

    What is the force’s mandate after the Naxal free declaration?

    1. The new target: Intelligence inputs are to be used to detect marijuana cultivation in the same remote hills that were insurgent strongholds.
    2. Why the pivot is being made now: Roads and development are reaching those areas. That opens them to cultivation as much as to administration.
    3. The precedent being cited: Marijuana cultivation is rampant along the Andhra Odisha Border, and the stated concern is that such cultivation evolves into a violent crime syndicate over time.
    4. How the two units divide the work: The Special Intelligence Branch identifies the activity, and the Greyhounds are then deployed to ensure cultivation does not take hold.

    Challenges to the Greyhounds after the Naxal free declaration

    1. A specialised skill decays without use: Jungle warfare proficiency is perishable and depends on continuous operations, so a force held in reserve loses the capability it was built for. Eg. The unit has no recruitment of its own, so its capability rests entirely on the officers deputed in at any given time.
      The Fix: Fix a minimum annual field exercise and cross deployment schedule with other jungle warfare units, so proficiency survives the absence of an active insurgency.
    2. Declaring an insurgency over invites premature withdrawal: A formal end date creates pressure to cut force levels and budgets before the conditions that produced the insurgency are addressed. Eg. Maoist activity in Andhra Pradesh revived after the collapse of the 2004 peace talks with the State government.
      The Fix: Tie any reduction in counter insurgency deployment to measured delivery of the development and land administration commitments in the affected districts.
    3. Narcotics enforcement is a different discipline: Detecting and prosecuting cultivation needs financial investigation, revenue records and forensic chain of custody, not assault capability. Eg. Cannabis moving out of the Andhra Odisha Border area travels through transport and financing networks that sit outside a strike force’s remit.
      The Fix: Pair every deployment against cultivation with a narcotics investigation team empowered to pursue the trafficking and financing chain.
    4. Surrender without rehabilitation produces returnees: A surrendered cadre with no livelihood and no protection has a route back to the organisation or into organised crime. Eg. Surrender and rehabilitation packages across Left Wing Extremism affected States differ widely in cash, housing and skilling terms.
      The Fix: Standardise a surrender and rehabilitation entitlement across the affected States, with a named district officer accountable for each case for a fixed period.
    5. A deputation model limits institutional memory: Personnel rotate back to their parent units, so operational learning leaves with them unless it is written down. Eg. The training programme rested for nearly four decades on a single external consultant rather than on a standing doctrine cell.
      The Fix: Establish a permanent doctrine and after action review cell inside the force, staffed independently of the operational rotation.

    Conclusion

    The Greyhounds reaches the end of its founding mission with the insurgency it was raised against declared finished and no equivalent adversary in view. The decision in front of the State is whether a force built for armed contact is the right instrument for narcotics enforcement, or whether it is being retained because it exists. The deployment has already been committed to the former strongholds as roads reach them. The thing to watch is whether that deployment is paired with investigative and prosecutorial capacity, since cultivation is broken by cases rather than by operations.

    Back2Basics: CPI (Maoist)

    1. Formation: The Communist Party of India (Maoist) was formed in 2004 by the merger of the People’s War Group and the Maoist Communist Centre of India.
    2. Legal status: It is banned as a terrorist organisation under the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967, along with its front organisations.
    3. Structure: It runs through a politburo and a central committee, with State committees below them, and its armed wing is the People’s Liberation Guerrilla Army.
    4. Area of operation: Its strength lay in the forested districts of central and eastern India, the belt security agencies describe as the Red Corridor.

    Matching Previous Year Question

    “[2025, GS3, 10] The Government of India recently stated that Left Wing Extremism (LWE) will be eliminated by 2026. What do you understand by LWE and how are the people affected by it? What measures have been taken by the government to eliminate LWE?”