💥Mains Ready By December. Smash Mains & Smash PYQ Admissions Open

GS Paper: GS3

  • Terror’s changing face, India’s counter-terror strategy

    Terror’s changing face, India’s counter-terror strategy

    Why in the News

    India has unveiled PRAHAAR, its first comprehensive National Counter Terrorism Policy and Strategy, which sets a national framework for preventing and responding to terrorist activity and radicalisation through coordinated “whole of government” and “whole of society” approaches. The policy follows Operation Sindoor, the strikes of 6 and 7 May on the Pakistan based terror network launched after the Pahalgam attack of 22 April 2025, and follows the three declarations India issued immediately after that operation. The first of those declarations ended the stated era of restraint, the second classified any future act of cross border terrorism emanating from Pakistan as an “act of war”, and the third removed Pakistani nuclear blackmail as a restraining factor. The tension is that the doctrine India has hardened is built for a state sponsor with a return address, while the threat itself has fragmented into lone wolf attackers, autonomous cells and drone, cyber and artificial intelligence enabled methods that a retaliatory strike does not reach.

    What is PRAHAAR?

    1. PRAHAAR as a national policy: PRAHAAR is India’s first comprehensive National Counter Terrorism Policy and Strategy, unveiled on 23 February 2026.
    2. Scope of the framework: It sets out a national counter terrorism framework for preventing and responding to terrorist activities and to radicalisation.
    3. Whole of government and whole of society approach: It works through coordinated “whole of government” and “whole of society” approaches, so prevention is not left to security agencies alone.

    How has the form of terrorism changed in 25 years?

    1. The organisational form has fragmented: Large terror groups run by single leaders, such as al-Qaeda under Osama bin Laden or the Islamic State under Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi with its call for an Islamic Caliphate, have given way to smaller and more autonomous entities.
    2. The attacker is now often solitary: Lone wolf attacks are becoming the norm, which removes the network that intelligence collection is designed to detect.
    3. Drones, cyber capability and artificial intelligence: Drones, cyber capabilities and artificial intelligence are now used to perpetrate terror.
    4. Counter terrorism use of the same technologies: Those technologies are used by the nations combating terrorism as well, so capability advantage is contested rather than assured.

    What is a lone wolf attack?

    1. The definition: A lone wolf attack is an attack planned and executed by a single individual, or by a pair acting alone, who belongs to no organisation and takes no operational direction from one.
    2. How the attacker is produced: Radicalisation runs through online propaganda rather than through recruitment by a handler, so the individual adopts a group’s cause without ever joining its structure. Eg. Self radicalised modules assembled around professionals, rather than around infiltrators, in recent hinterland cases.
    3. Why detection fails: Intelligence collection works by intercepting communication between conspirators and by penetrating networks, and an attacker who communicates with nobody generates neither signal.
    4. Why a retaliation doctrine does not reach it: A cross border response needs attribution to a sponsoring state, and an individual acting alone offers no camp, handler or command node to strike.

    Why did the early Indian response stay passive, and which attacks fell inside that period?

    1. Assassination of a former Prime Minister, 1991: The assassination of former Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi by the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam on 21 May 1991 at Sriperumbudur in Tamil Nadu came while cross border terror was only beginning in Kashmir.
    2. Internal detection failed repeatedly: The March 1993 Mumbai serial blasts killed over 250 people in 13 coordinated blasts, and the synchronised blasts across Coimbatore in February 1998 exposed the inadequacy of internal security mechanisms.
    3. Pakistan’s direct role was first exposed by a hijack: The hijack of Indian Airlines flight IC-814 on 24 December 1999 forced India to release the Pakistan based terrorists Ahmed Omar Sheikh and Masood Azhar in exchange for more than 160 civilian hostages.
    4. Operation Parakram and its outcome: The Jaish-e-Mohammed (JeM) attack on Parliament on 13 December 2001 triggered a large scale military mobilisation under Operation Parakram, and after almost two years of standoff the disengagement took place with no direct punishment on Pakistan.
    5. Nuclear parity was the restraint: With both countries holding nuclear weapons, the threat of escalation drew the international community in to cool tempers each time.
    6. The 26/11 Mumbai attacks and the absence of retaliation: The 26/11 Mumbai attacks of November 2008, which brought the world’s solidarity with India’s fight against cross border terrorism, produced no military action against Pakistan.
    7. The Red Fort attack of 2000: An Army garrison within the Red Fort was targeted on 22 December 2000 by Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) terrorists, killing three soldiers.
    8. Delhi market blasts of 2005: Over 60 people were killed in serial blasts across Delhi markets including Sarojini Nagar and Paharganj in October 2005.
    9. Delhi commercial district blasts of 2008: Multiple blasts hit Connaught Place, Greater Kailash and Karol Bagh in September 2008, months before the Mumbai attacks.
    10. The Delhi High Court blast of 2011: A briefcase bomb outside the Delhi High Court on 7 September 2011 killed 15 people, claimed by Harkat-ul-Jihad Islami (HUJI), an al-Qaeda affiliated group largely based in Pakistan.
    11. Akshardham, Varanasi and Pune attacks: The 2002 Akshardham Temple attack, the 2006 Varanasi serial blasts and the 2010 German Bakery blast in Pune are part of the same record.
    12. Proof did not produce a response: In each of these cases India chose not to respond directly and decisively, even after conclusive proof of Pakistan’s support.

    What changed when the fight moved across the border?

    1. The Uri attack and the 2016 surgical strikes: The JeM attack on an Army camp at Uri in Kashmir on 18 September 2016 led to the first cross border surgical strikes on 28 and 29 September.
    2. Message conveyed by the surgical strikes: They sent a message and served as a statement of intent that terror would not go unpunished.
    3. The Balakot air strike of 2019: After the attack on a Central Reserve Police Force convoy at Pulwama on 14 February 2019, the Indian Air Force struck a JeM terror camp at Balakot, the first time it had crossed into Pakistani airspace to hit a terror target.
    4. Operation Sindoor, 2025: Operation Sindoor was launched on 6 and 7 May after the Pahalgam attack, and in 96 hours the leaders and headquarters of the LeT and JeM networks were destroyed and Pakistani military assets were hit.

    What is the four fold strategy proposed from here?

    1. Elimination of the residual network: Continue to hunt down and eliminate the remnants of the terror network inside the country, particularly in Kashmir.
    2. Pre emptive action across the Line of Control: Take pre emptive military action against any potential terror threat building across the Line of Control (LoC), including at terrorist launch pads, which years of experience and an embedded intelligence network make possible.
    3. The de radicalisation programme: Run an exhaustive de radicalisation programme that motivates young people towards the mainstream and makes joining or supporting a terror outfit unattractive and prohibitively costly.
    4. Terror financing: Take all necessary steps to cut off terror financing, in close coordination with friendly countries.

    What is India pressing for at the multilateral level?

    1. The charge of double standards: At the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation Summit in Bishkek on 1 September the Prime Minister said, “We must send a strong message to countries that use terrorism as an instrument of policy and provide safe haven and support to terrorists that terrorism can never be a strategic asset for anyone.”
    2. A named attack entered a group declaration: The 18th BRICS Summit in New Delhi included an exclusive paragraph on the Pahalgam attack in the Delhi Declaration.
    3. Effect of a grievance carried in multilateral text: A specific Indian grievance is now carried in the text of a multi country declaration rather than only in national statements.

    Challenges to India’s counter terrorism strategy

    1. A retaliation doctrine has no target in a lone wolf attack: An “act of war” classification presumes an attributable state sponsor, and a self radicalised individual acting alone gives no address to strike. Eg. Self radicalised modules assembled around professionals, rather than infiltrators, in recent hinterland cases.
      The Fix: Pair the declaratory doctrine with a published attribution standard, so the threshold of evidence that triggers a cross border response is fixed in advance rather than argued after each attack.
    2. Police and public order are State subjects: A national policy has to be executed through State police forces that the Union does not control, which is where coordination breaks down. Eg. The delay in National Security Guard deployment during the 26/11 Mumbai attacks.
      The Fix: Route PRAHAAR’s obligations through a standing Centre State counter terrorism council with State specific implementation timelines, rather than through advisories.
    3. Intelligence remains fragmented across agencies: Multiple collection agencies without seamless real time sharing means a warning held by one is not actionable by another. Eg. Intelligence fusion is attempted through the Multi Agency Centre and the National Intelligence Grid, which depend on voluntary feeds from database holding agencies.
      The Fix: Give a single fusion centre statutory authority to task and receive feeds, on the model of a national counter terrorism centre, so sharing is an obligation rather than a courtesy.
    4. De radicalisation has no measurable output: A programme aimed at intent rather than at incidents cannot be judged by attack counts, and India runs no published evaluation of one. Eg. Online influence of the kind that drove youth radicalisation in Kashmir operates outside any programme’s reach.
      The Fix: Fix published indicators for the programme, such as recruitment attempts intercepted and cases of disengagement sustained over a stated period, and report them annually.
    5. Terror financing has moved to channels outside the banking system: Hawala, counterfeit currency and cryptocurrency route funds without touching a reportable transaction. Eg. Informal channel financing was traced in the ISIS linked Padgha module.
      The Fix: Bring virtual digital asset service providers fully under reporting obligations to the Financial Intelligence Unit India, so the fastest growing channel is monitored on the same terms as banks.
    6. There is no agreed international definition of terrorism: The absence of one lets states label selectively and refuse cooperation on legal grounds. Eg. Repeated holds placed on listings under the United Nations Security Council 1267 sanctions committee.
      The Fix: Press the Comprehensive Convention on International Terrorism, which India first proposed in 1996, to a vote rather than leaving it in open ended negotiation.

    Conclusion

    The doctrine India adopted after Operation Sindoor answers one form of the threat well and leaves the other untouched. A declared willingness to retaliate raises the cost of sponsoring an attack from across the border; it does nothing about an attacker who was recruited online and never crossed anything. PRAHAAR is the first instrument that addresses the second half, which is why its prevention and radicalisation components, rather than its enforcement components, are the part worth watching. The marker is whether the policy produces named nodal responsibilities and reported outcomes, or remains a framework document that the next attack is measured against.

    Terrorism in India

    1. Definition of terrorism: Terrorism is the deliberate use of violence, or the threat of violence, to instil fear and achieve political, ideological or religious goals.
    2. The statutory definition: Under Section 15 of the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967, a terrorist act is any act intended to threaten India’s sovereignty, security or unity, or to create terror through violence, explosives or disruption of essential services.
    3. The four recognised strands in the Indian context: Cross border terrorism driven by Pakistan based groups in Jammu and Kashmir and by Khalistani networks, North East insurgencies run by ethno nationalist groups such as NSCN and ULFA, Left Wing Extremism across the Red Corridor, and hinterland terrorism by modules operating outside traditional conflict zones.
    4. The direction of change: The terror and organised crime nexus supplies funding, arms and logistics, and technology acts as a force multiplier through drones, encrypted platforms and 3D printing. Eg. The Houthi drone attack on Saudi Aramco in 2019.

    Institutional Architecture and Initiatives Against Terrorism

    1. Multi Agency Centre and Cyber Multi Agency Centre: Fuse intelligence inputs across central and State agencies.
    2. National Intelligence Grid: Networks databases held by different departments to give agencies real time access.
    3. Indian Cyber Crime Coordination Centre: Acts as the nodal point against cybercrime with a citizen reporting route. Eg. The 1930 helpline.
    4. Border management systems: Smart fencing under the Comprehensive Integrated Border Management System plugs infiltration gaps, backed by a layered coastal security grid.
    5. Surrender and rehabilitation policies: Pull cadres out of insurgency through reintegration rather than through prosecution alone.

    Matching Previous Year Question

    “[2025, GS3, 10 marks] Terrorism is a global scourge. How has it manifested in India? Elaborate with contemporary examples. What are the counter measures adopted by the State? Explain.”

  • CAZRI moth bean varieties show resilience in an El Niño year [MENTION]

    Why in News

    Moth bean varieties developed by the Central Arid Zone Research Institute (CAZRI) performed with resilience during an El Niño year. El Niño is the warm phase of the Pacific ocean and atmosphere cycle that often suppresses the Indian monsoon.

    Static Context

    CAZRI is an ICAR institute at Jodhpur, Rajasthan, focused on arid zone agriculture and desertification research. Moth bean is a hardy arid legume grown in the rainfed drylands of western Rajasthan and Gujarat. It tolerates drought and poor soils, which makes it valuable for climate resilient cropping. Release specific yield figures could not be verified, as the PIB detail page did not resolve this run. The exam value here is the institute and the crop, not the unverified numbers.

    Prelims angle

    Place CAZRI at Jodhpur under ICAR. Recognise moth bean as a drought tolerant arid pulse. Recall that El Niño tends to weaken the southwest monsoon.

    Mains angle

    GS3, dryland agriculture and climate resilience. A supporting example for answers on drought resistant crops and rainfed farming.

    Matching Previous Year Question

    “[2012] Consider the following crops of India: 1. Groundnut 2. Sesamum 3. Pearl millet Which of the above is / are predominantly rainfed crop/crops?
    (a) 1 and 2 only
    (b) 2 and 3 only
    (c) 3 only
    (d) 1, 2 and 3
    Answer: (d)”

    PIB Link

    https://www.pib.gov.in/PressReleasePage.aspx?PRID=2309690&reg=3&lang=1

  • Dryland Congress 2026 concludes with the Delhi Declaration on Drylands

    Why in News

    The Dryland Congress 2026 concluded in New Delhi with the adoption of the Delhi Declaration on Dryland, also styled the 3D. The Congress ran from 10 to 12 September 2026 at the National Agricultural Science Complex, New Delhi.

    Core facts

    The Congress was organised by the Indian Council of Agricultural Research (ICAR) and the International Crops Research Institute for the Semi Arid Tropics (ICRISAT). It gathered over 800 experts from Asia, Africa and the Americas. The event marked 50 years of the ICAR and ICRISAT partnership. It deliberated on six themes: breeding, climate resilience, nutrition and markets, farming systems, seed systems, and gender and youth inclusion. Drylands span about 45% of the world’s land surface and support over two billion people.

    Static Context

    ICRISAT is a research centre headquartered at Hyderabad, working on crops of the semi arid tropics such as sorghum, pearl millet, chickpea, pigeonpea and groundnut. ICAR is the apex body for coordinating agricultural research and education in India, under the Ministry of Agriculture & Farmers Welfare. Dryland and rainfed farming is supported through the Rainfed Area Development (RAD) programme under the National Mission for Sustainable Agriculture (NMSA), which promotes Integrated Farming Systems (IFS). Land degradation in drylands connects to the United Nations Convention to Combat Desertification (UNCCD).

    Prelims angle

    Distinguish ICAR (Indian apex research body) from ICRISAT (international centre at Hyderabad). Link RAD and IFS to the NMSA. Associate desertification with the UNCCD. Know the semi arid tropic crops.

    Mains angle

    GS3, agriculture and cropping systems. Frame dryland and rainfed agriculture as central to crop diversification, climate resilience and farmer incomes, and the value of cooperation among developing countries in seed and breeding research.

    Matching Previous Year Question

    “[2026] Which among the following is/are the objective(s) of the Rainfed Area Development (RAD) initiative under the National Mission for Sustainable Agriculture (NMSA)?
    1. Encouraging monoculture in rainfed areas
    2. Increasing rice cultivation in irrigated regions
    3. Enhancing productivity and minimising climatic risks through Integrated Farming Systems (IFS)
    (a) 1 only
    (b) 1 and 2
    (c) 2 and 3
    (d) 3 only
    Answer: (d)”

    “[2021, GS3, 15 marks] What are the present challenges before crop diversification? How do emerging technologies provide an opportunity for crop diversification?”

    PIB Link

    https://www.pib.gov.in/PressReleasePage.aspx?PRID=2309628&reg=3&lang=1

  • India to host the World Circular Economy Forum 2026 [MENTION]

    Why in News

    India will host the World Circular Economy Forum (WCEF) 2026 at Gandhinagar from 15 to 18 September 2026. The theme is “Circular Economy: Transition for People and Prosperity”.

    Static Context

    A circular economy keeps materials in use through reuse, repair, refurbishment and recycling, which cuts raw material inputs, waste and greenhouse gas emissions. The WCEF is convened by the Finnish Innovation Fund (Sitra) with partners. The Indian host is the Ministry of Environment, Forest and Climate Change (MoEFCC). India’s related domestic instruments include Extended Producer Responsibility (EPR) rules for plastic, electronic and battery waste, and the mission on resource efficiency. This item is a MENTION because the forum begins after this run. Its exam value is the circular economy concept and the fact that India hosts the WCEF.

    Prelims angle

    Link the circular economy to reduced raw material use, reduced waste and lower emissions. Associate EPR with waste categories. Note India as the WCEF 2026 host at Gandhinagar.

    Mains angle

    GS3, environment and resource efficiency. Frame the circular economy as a route to decoupling growth from material and emission intensity, and India’s positioning as a convening venue on sustainability.

    Matching Previous Year Question

    “[2025] Consider the following statements:
    Statement I: Circular economy reduces the emissions of greenhouse gases.
    Statement II: Circular economy reduces the use of raw materials as inputs.
    Statement III: Circular economy reduces wastage in the production process.
    Which one of the following is correct in respect of the above statements?
    (a) Both Statement II and Statement III are correct and both of them explain Statement I
    (b) Both Statement I and Statement II are correct and Statement I explains Statement II
    (c) Only one of the Statements II and III is correct and that explains Statement I
    (d) Neither Statement II nor Statement III is correct
    Answer: (a)”

    PIB Link

    https://www.pib.gov.in/PressReleasePage.aspx?PRID=2309702&reg=3&lang=1

  • Incentive Scheme for Promotion of Domestic PNG Connections

    Why in News

    The Press Information Bureau (PIB) issued a PIB Backgrounder on the Incentive Scheme for Promotion of Domestic Piped Natural Gas (PNG) Connections. Piped Natural Gas (PNG) is cooking gas supplied to homes through a pipeline network rather than in cylinders.

    Core facts

    The scheme incentivises City Gas Distribution (CGD) entities to expand domestic PNG connections. City Gas Distribution (CGD) is the network that retails natural gas to households, commercial units and vehicles in a defined geographical area. The nodal ministry is the Ministry of Petroleum and Natural Gas. Release specific outlay and connection figures could not be verified, as the PIB detail page did not resolve this run.

    Static Context

    The Petroleum and Natural Gas Regulatory Board (PNGRB) authorises and regulates CGD networks. The PNGRB was set up under the Petroleum and Natural Gas Regulatory Board Act, 2006. It regulates refining, storage, transport, distribution and marketing of petroleum products and natural gas, and grants CGD authorisations through competitive bidding rounds. Domestic PNG and Compressed Natural Gas (CNG) together form the priority segment for gas supply, which receives domestic gas allocation on a priority basis. The scheme sits alongside the clean cooking access agenda pursued earlier through the Pradhan Mantri Ujjwala Yojana (PMUY), which provided Liquefied Petroleum Gas (LPG) connections to poor households.

    Prelims angle

    The regulator to remember is the PNGRB and the range of activities it regulates. Distinguish PNG (piped, network based) from LPG (cylinder based) and CNG (vehicle fuel). Note the priority allocation of domestic natural gas to the CGD household segment.

    Mains angle

    GS3, energy and infrastructure. A question can frame domestic gas access as a clean energy transition and last mile infrastructure issue. The scheme links to energy security, import dependence on natural gas, and household air quality gains from switching away from solid fuels.

    Matching Previous Year Question

    “[2025] Consider the following activities:
    I. Production of crude oil
    II. Refining, storage and distribution of petroleum
    III. Marketing and sale of petroleum products
    IV. Production of natural gas
    How many of the above activities are regulated by the Petroleum and Natural Gas Regulatory Board in our country?
    (a) Only one
    (b) Only two
    (c) Only three
    (d) All the four
    Answer: (b)”

    PIB Link

    https://www.pib.gov.in/PressReleasePage.aspx?PRID=2309647&reg=3&lang=1

  • The choice is between AI applications and AI frontiers

    Why in the News

    India has no competitive frontier artificial intelligence (AI) model and no realistic prospect of producing one without significant policy shifts, at a time when United States and Chinese firms have released a parade of increasingly capable models through the year. The advice India has received from United States industry leaders and academics, supported by sections of the Indian information technology industry, is to concentrate on applications built on foundation models rather than on the frontier itself. The position advanced against that advice is that countries falling behind in frontier AI risk the fate of those that missed the Industrial Revolution, where a small business elite found a niche and prospered while ordinary people were disempowered. The binding constraint identified is not talent or algorithms but computing power, since the IndiaAI mission’s pool of 45,000 graphics processing units (GPUs) is a fraction of what a single United States frontier laboratory controls. The proposal put forward is a compute tax requiring any data centre established in India to reserve a share of its capacity for a publicly administered national pool.

    What is a frontier AI model?

    1. Frontier model: A frontier model is a foundation model at the leading edge of capability, from which industry specific applications are then built.
    2. Scaling laws: The industry has exploited “scaling laws”, which predict how a model’s performance improves with its size and with the computing power used for its training.
    3. Compute and data as the decisive input: The algorithms underlying modern AI models are widely understood, so better algorithms improve efficiency while the basic formula for producing a frontier model remains scaling compute and data.

    What are the two channels through which AI will matter?

    1. Diffusion through the economy: AI will spread by automating some routine jobs, with each industry requiring specialised applications built on foundation models.
    2. India’s application start up ecosystem: India has an active start up ecosystem devoted to building such applications, and businesses have rapidly adopted AI tools.
    3. The strategic channel is separate: AI will also have a strategic impact on research, cybersecurity and defence, which is not reached by application building.
    4. Mathematics and cybersecurity results: AI models have been used to solve some of the most important open problems in mathematics, and Anthropic’s Mythos model has formidable cybersecurity capabilities.

    Why is access to foreign frontier models not a durable substitute?

    1. Access today is real but conditional: Consumers currently have access to other frontier models, including Chinese open weight models.
    2. The most capable model is already withheld: Mythos has not been released publicly and is available only to selected organisations.
    3. Export control has already been applied: The United States temporarily imposed export restrictions on Mythos and on a version of Mythos with guardrails called Fable.
    4. The stated direction of policy: The United States is likely to restrict and regulate AI to “achieve global dominance”, so present availability cannot be expected to continue indefinitely.

    Why is compute the binding constraint for India?

    1. The national pool is small: The IndiaAI mission has a pool of 45,000 GPUs, which is only a fraction of the capacity controlled by a single United States frontier laboratory.
    2. The flagship allocation is smaller still: The mission allocated 4,096 GPUs to Sarvam AI to train India’s flagship model.
    3. The gap is an order of magnitude: That allocation is about 50 times smaller than what is used to train frontier models.
    4. Ingenuity does not close it: No amount of ingenuity can compensate for a resource gap of that size, which is why lack of computing power has bottlenecked sovereign Indian model development.

    What do the new data centres actually deliver to India?

    1. Data centre build out across States: A number of data centres with significant computing capacity are coming up in various States.
    2. Capacity reserved for multinational clients: These will primarily serve multinational corporations, and their location in India offers no tangible benefits.
    3. The investment goes into equipment: Most of the announced capital investment will be directed to electronic equipment.
    4. The employment effect is thin: The employment they create will be limited to a few construction and maintenance jobs.
    5. The environmental cost is local: Large data centres have a significant environmental impact, and in India that impact will be borne disproportionately by local communities.

    How would a compute tax work?

    1. The obligation: Any data centre established in India would be required to reserve a stated share, suggested at 25 per cent, of its computing capacity for a publicly administered national compute pool.
    2. The hardware does not move: That capacity would remain physically within the data centre.
    3. Allocation is centralised: The reserved capacity would be allocated by a central scheduler to Indian institutions.
    4. The bargaining position favours India: Multinational corporations are likely to resist, and their bargaining position is weak given the growing hostility to these installations elsewhere.
    5. Limits of the compute tax: Such a tax would not obviate the other data centre concerns, and only together with environmental safeguards and welfare measures would it open a narrow route to building a frontier model in India.

    Challenges to a compute tax on data centres

    1. Reserved capacity is not the same as usable capacity: Frontier training needs thousands of GPUs interconnected as one cluster, and a quarter of each site’s capacity scattered across many sites does not assemble into that. Eg. The flagship national allocation of 4,096 GPUs already sits far below frontier training scale despite being a single block.
      The Fix: Write the reservation as a contiguous interconnected block within each site, with a minimum cluster size, rather than as a percentage of total capacity.
    2. A capacity levy raises the cost of hosting in India: An operator prices the reserved share into its India investment case and can site the facility in a neighbouring jurisdiction instead. Eg. Data centre investment is mobile across countries in a way that manufacturing capacity is not.
      The Fix: Offset the reservation against power tariff and land concessions already given to data centres, so the obligation is priced as a condition of the incentive rather than as an additional charge.
    3. A public pool needs an allocation rule it does not yet have: Deciding which institution gets scarce compute, for how long and on what merit is a governance problem that no existing Indian body performs. Eg. The single largest allocation so far went to one start up for the flagship model.
      The Fix: Publish the scheduler’s allocation criteria and a usage register, so grants of compute are contestable in the way research grants are.
    4. Compute alone does not produce a model: Frontier training also needs large curated datasets and a small pool of researchers who have trained models at scale, both of which are internationally mobile. Eg. Indian language data is thin compared with the English language corpora frontier models are trained on.
      The Fix: Tie the compute grant to a data contribution obligation, so a recipient returns curated Indian language datasets into the national repository as a condition of access.
    5. The environmental burden stays where it was: Reserving capacity changes who uses the machines and not their power draw, water use or siting. Eg. The impact of large installations falls disproportionately on the communities around them.
      The Fix: Attach site level water and power disclosure and a local benefit sharing requirement to the same instrument that creates the reservation.

    Conclusion

    The question the argument forces is not whether India should build applications, which it already does well, but whether an applications only position is a strategy or a description of the constraint. The claim on the other side is that capability at the frontier has a strategic use in research, security and defence that no amount of downstream product building substitutes for. The compute tax is the first concrete instrument proposed to convert privately owned capacity sited in India into publicly directed capacity, and it is testable against a single question: whether the reserved share can be assembled into a cluster large enough to train anything. The marker to watch is whether any Indian allocation moves from the thousands of GPUs to the tens of thousands, since that is the threshold the gap is actually measured at.

    Artificial Intelligence in India

    1. AI as a public good: India treats AI as a public good rather than a proprietary luxury, anchored in shared compute infrastructure, open and locally relevant datasets and decentralised talent development.
    2. The scale of the ecosystem: Over 6 million people are employed in the technology and AI ecosystem, with more than 1,800 Global Capability Centres of which over 500 are AI focused.
    3. Adoption is broad: 87 per cent of enterprises are actively deploying AI solutions, led by industrial and automotive, consumer goods and retail, banking and financial services, and healthcare.
    4. The projected economic weight: AI is projected to contribute USD 500 to 600 billion to India’s Gross Domestic Product by 2030.

    Government Initiatives for Artificial Intelligence

    1. IndiaAI Mission, 2024: Implemented by IndiaAI under the Ministry of Electronics and Information Technology with an outlay of Rs 10,371 crore, on the stated vision of making AI in India and making AI work for India.
    2. AIKosh: The national AI dataset repository, carrying over 3,000 datasets and 243 models across 20 sectors.
    3. BharatGen: A government funded multimodal large language model initiative designed for AI powered public services and Indian use cases.
    4. Digital India Bhashini and Project Vaani: Speech and translation tools across the 22 Scheduled Languages, supported by a 150,000 hour Indian speech dataset.
    5. IndiaAI FutureSkills and YUVAi: Fellowships and AI labs concentrated in Tier 2 and Tier 3 cities, and an AI skills initiative for school students in Classes 8 to 12.
    6. IndiaAI Safety Institute: The national trust framework covering bias mitigation, privacy, explainability and AI governance.

    Matching Previous Year Question

    “[2026, GS3, 15 marks] What is agentic Artificial Intelligence (AI)? Explain its working. Describe its applications with suitable examples. Discuss the advantages, risks and challenges associated with agentic AI systems.”

  • Kottayam residents mobilise against Centre’s ESA proposal

    Why in the News

    The Centre’s seventh draft notification on Ecologically Sensitive Areas (ESAs) in the Western Ghats, issued on 27 July, has entered the closing fortnight of its 60 day objection window, with two weeks left for filing objections and suggestions. Four villages in the high ranges of Kottayam district in Kerala, Koottikkal, Melukavu, Poonjar Thekkekkara and Teekoy, all in the Poonjar Assembly constituency, are on the proposed ESA map, and the proposal is estimated to affect around 70,000 people. Opposition has already moved past petitions, with the Koottikkal local body convening special grama sabhas in all 14 wards and passing a council resolution detailing its objections. The contest is between a conservation boundary drawn at the level of the Ghats as a whole and settler households whose plantations sit inside it.

    What is an Ecologically Sensitive Area?

    1. Ecologically Sensitive Area: An Ecologically Sensitive Area is a zone notified by the Union government in which specified activities are prohibited or regulated because of the area’s ecological value.
    2. Environment (Protection) Act, 1986: The notification is issued under the Environment (Protection) Act, 1986, which lets the Centre restrict industries, operations and processes in an area on environmental grounds.
    3. What notification changes on the ground: Land inside the zone continues in private ownership, and it is the permissible use of that land that is narrowed.
    4. Why a draft matters procedurally: A draft notification opens a statutory window for objections and suggestions before the final notification is issued, and the boundary can move in that window.

    Which areas are proposed and who does the boundary affect?

    1. The four villages named: Koottikkal, Melukavu, Poonjar Thekkekkara and Teekoy have been included in the draft notification.
    2. Poonjar Assembly constituency: All four are in the Poonjar Assembly constituency in Kottayam district.
    3. The population estimate: The proposal is estimated to affect around 70,000 people, mostly settler families in the high ranges.
    4. Seventh draft notification in the series: This is the seventh draft notification on Western Ghats ESAs, so the boundary has been redrawn repeatedly without a final settlement.

    Why does the boundary matter to these villages?

    1. Agriculture is the economic base: Agriculture is the backbone of these high range villages, with rubber, cardamom, coffee, pepper, coconut and banana among the major crops.
    2. The fear is about permissible use: Residents hold that bringing their land under the ESA could impose restrictions on plantations.
    3. Development works in the villages: Residents also fear that essential development activities in the villages would be hampered.

    How has the objection been organised?

    1. The local body went beyond petitions: The Koottikkal local body convened special grama sabhas in all 14 wards and held an urgent council meeting.
    2. A formal resolution was passed: The council passed a resolution detailing its objections, and the resolution will be forwarded to the State and Union governments.
    3. The campaign is broad based: Residents, local bodies and various organisations including the Catholic church have stepped up the campaign against the move.
    4. The political channel is in use: The Government Chief Whip has stated that all possible steps would be taken to secure the exclusion of the villages, that the settlers’ concerns have been presented to the Chief Minister, and that interactions continue to mobilise observations of farmer collectives.

    Challenges to the Western Ghats Ecologically Sensitive Area notification

    1. The boundary has never been settled: Seven draft notifications over more than a decade mean no final legal position exists, so neither conservation nor land use planning can proceed on a fixed map. Eg. The present draft was issued on 27 July and is the seventh in the series.
      The Fix: Fix a statutory outer date for finalisation after the objection window closes, so a draft cannot be reissued indefinitely in place of a decision.
    2. The unit of demarcation is the village, not the forest: Drawing the zone on revenue village boundaries pulls in cultivated and settled land along with the ecologically sensitive tract. Eg. The four Kottayam villages carry rubber, cardamom and coffee plantations inside the proposed zone.
      The Fix: Demarcate on satellite verified land use at the survey plot level, so plantations and habitations are separated from natural forest before the boundary is drawn.
    3. Objections are filed individually against a technical map: A settler household is asked to contest a boundary drawn from remote sensing data without access to the underlying basis. Eg. The Koottikkal local body had to convene grama sabhas in all 14 wards to assemble its objections.
      The Fix: Publish the plot level basis for each village’s inclusion alongside the draft, so an objection can be argued on the record rather than as a general protest.
    4. Restriction is announced without a compensation route: A notification narrows permissible use of privately held land and carries no attached payment for the value foregone. Eg. Plantation crops in the high ranges are the single income source for settler households in the proposed zone.
      The Fix: Attach an ecosystem services payment schedule to the final notification, so land kept under restricted use earns a recurring transfer rather than only a prohibition.
    5. The zone is notified by the Centre and administered by the State: Enforcement, land records and local body consent all sit with the State, while the boundary is a Union decision. Eg. The Koottikkal resolution is being forwarded to both the State and the Union governments because neither alone can settle it.
      The Fix: Require a recorded State government response on each local body resolution before the final notification issues, so the objection is disposed of rather than absorbed.

    Conclusion

    The window closes in two weeks and the boundary in the draft is still the operative proposal. What the Kottayam mobilisation establishes is that the objection is now institutional rather than individual, since a local body resolution carries a claim that the Union government has to dispose of on the record. The status is that four villages remain on the map, the resolution is on its way to both governments, and the next milestone is the close of the objection window followed by the Centre’s decision on whether an eighth draft or a final notification issues.

    Back2Basics: Western Ghats

    1. Mountain chain along the western coast: A mountain chain running roughly parallel to India’s western coast, older than the Himalaya, spanning Gujarat, Maharashtra, Goa, Karnataka, Kerala and Tamil Nadu.
    2. Biodiversity hotspot status: It is one of the world’s recognised biodiversity hotspots and a UNESCO World Heritage Site, with high levels of endemic species.
    3. Monsoon interception and peninsular rivers: It intercepts the southwest monsoon and feeds the peninsular river systems that the southern States depend on.
    4. Overlap with settlement and plantations: Large parts of the range carry dense human settlement, plantations and mining, so ecological demarcation and existing land use overlap directly.

    Matching Previous Year Question

    “[2022] Which one of the following has been constituted under the Environment (Protection) Act, 1986 ? (a) Central Water Commission (b) Central Ground Water Board (c) Central Ground Water Authority (d) National Water Development Agency ANSWER: (c)”

  • Limits to supply, rising demand: Behind Keralam’s electricity crisis

    Why in the News

    The Keralam State Electricity Board (KSEB) has instituted power cuts lasting between 30 minutes and an hour to manage peak hour demand, including cuts at night. Average daily demand in September 2026 reached about 5,000 MW against 3,794 MW in September 2025, and only 4,200 MW has been met. The shortfall arrives at the hour when the state’s largest renewable asset stops producing, because rooftop solar output ends at dusk and the state has no storage in service. The tension is that a state that leads the country in rooftop solar cannot use any of it against the demand peak that is actually breaking its system.

    How does a State draw power from the Central pool?

    1. What a Central Generating Station is: Central Generating Stations (CGS) are large power generating stations owned centrally rather than by a state utility.
    2. How allocation works: The Union Ministry of Power periodically allocates generation capacity to states from its pool of unallocated quota in those stations.
    3. Who has jurisdiction over electricity: Electricity is a subject on the Concurrent List of the Constitution, so both the Centre and the states have jurisdiction over it.

    How large is the shortfall?

    1. Demand has risen sharply in a year: Average daily demand in September 2026 was about 5,000 MW, against 3,794 MW in September 2025.
    2. Supply has not kept pace: The state has met only 4,200 MW, leaving a daily shortage.
    3. Own generation and the Central pool draw: Keralam produces only 1,650 MW and draws 1,500 MW from the Central pool.
    4. The structural position: The state generates only 25 per cent of its actual requirement from all sources including hydel, solar and wind, against 86 per cent for Andhra Pradesh and 50 per cent for Tamil Nadu.

    Why has hydropower been throttled?

    1. The monsoon failed: The southwest monsoon was weak through the June to September period, with Keralam recording a 26 per cent deficit in seasonal rainfall till 11 September.
    2. The El Nino effect: The El Nino effect, meaning the abnormal warming of surface waters in the equatorial Pacific Ocean that can suppress the Indian monsoon, has been witnessed this year.
    3. Reservoir water storage: Water storage across all KSEB reservoirs stood at only 63.75 per cent of the maximum storage level as of 10 September.
    4. The Board is rationing water, not power alone: KSEB has throttled down hydropower generation deliberately, holding storage against the withdrawal of the monsoon and higher temperatures in the weeks ahead.

    Why does rooftop solar not close the night gap?

    1. The state leads on rooftop capacity: Keralam’s solar production hit 2,508 MW by the end of May, with the vast majority of it rooftop panels.
    2. The scheme behind the build: Under PM Surya Ghar, Keralam has 2.96 lakh installations covering 3,03,531 households.
    3. The output arrives at the wrong hour: Solar power does not help meet the nighttime demand, because the state has no options to store it.
    4. The storage is contracted but not running: KSEB has lined up a slew of Battery Energy Storage Systems (BESS) that are yet to become operational.

    What is a Battery Energy Storage System?

    1. The battery and its grid electronics: A bank of rechargeable cells with power electronics attached to the grid. It charges when generation exceeds demand and discharges when demand exceeds generation, so energy produced in one hour is delivered in another.
    2. Time shifting of solar output: Solar output peaks near midday and ends at dusk, while the demand peak sits in the evening. A battery moves the midday surplus into the evening block, which is the only route by which a daytime resource serves a night peak.
    3. Ramping, not only energy: A battery responds within seconds, so it also covers the sunset ramp, the period when solar falls away faster than thermal or hydro plants can raise their output.
    4. The limits of stored duration: A battery holds a fixed quantity of energy and delivers it for a defined duration, commonly a few hours. It shifts a peak rather than adding generating capacity, and it supplies nothing that was not generated and stored first.

    Why is night demand rising?

    1. The consumer mix loads the evening: Domestic consumers make up 75 per cent of the state’s power connections, so demand rises at night rather than during working hours.
    2. Temperatures are abnormally high: The state disaster management authority has put Keralam on alert for an unusual rise in temperature, with a departure of up to 4 degrees Celsius from normal.
    3. Cooling load runs longer: Rising night temperatures are driving long duration air conditioner usage.
    4. Electric vehicle charging: KSEB has found that nighttime demand is also rising owing to the charging of electric vehicles.

    Challenges to Keralam’s power supply security

    1. Buying from the exchange fails when the scarcity is national: A deficit state can outbid others only when surplus exists somewhere, and this September the shortage is countrywide. Eg. India is witnessing an unusual surge in electricity demand this September, with peak power demand nearing the level recorded during peak summer, driven by a poor monsoon and low coal stock at power plants.
      The Fix: Contract firm capacity ahead of the season under medium term agreements, so the state is not bidding into a national spot market at the moment of scarcity.
    2. The coal fleet has no headroom to absorb the gap: Thermal plants are the swing capacity a deficit state usually leans on, and they are already running close to their limits. Eg. The plant load factor of most imported coal based plants is around 70 per cent or above, leaving no thermal plant that can be asked to raise generation.
      The Fix: Shift a defined share of the evening block onto demand response contracts with large consumers, so the peak is reduced rather than sourced.
    3. Nothing firm replaces solar at the evening ramp: The system loses its entire solar output within an hour of sunset, which is also the hour demand rises, and only fast ramping capacity can bridge that. Eg. Nationally, generation from gas based plants rose 80.3 per cent during 1 to 9 September over the same period last year, with the Centre relying on 4.5 to 5.5 GW of gas based capacity to meet the evening shortfall.
      The Fix: Bring the Board’s contracted battery systems into service against a dated commissioning schedule, since they are the only asset that can move midday solar into the evening block.
    4. Distributed solar weakens the utility that must still serve the peak: A rooftop consumer exports at midday and draws at night, so the utility recovers less revenue while carrying the same obligation to supply at the peak. Eg. Keralam’s rooftop capacity is concentrated in domestic connections, which are the same consumers driving the night peak.
      The Fix: Move rooftop settlement from net metering to net billing with a time of day price, so midday export and evening drawal are valued at what each is actually worth to the system.

    Conclusion

    The immediate crisis will ease when the monsoon withdrawal passes and temperatures fall, and the Board’s rationing is calibrated to hold storage until then. What will not change on its own is the structural position, because a state generating a quarter of its own requirement is buying the rest in a market that tightens in exactly the months it needs power most. The measurable marker is the commissioning of the contracted battery systems, since until they run, every additional megawatt of rooftop solar adds to the state’s daytime surplus and nothing to its evening deficit.

    Back2Basics: PM Surya Ghar Muft Bijli Yojana

    1. PM Surya Ghar: Muft Bijli Yojana: A central scheme under the Ministry of New and Renewable Energy to install rooftop solar systems on residential buildings.
    2. Coverage target: One crore households, with free electricity of up to 300 units a month for the households that install under it.
    3. Household financing route: Central financial assistance is credited directly to the beneficiary’s bank account, alongside access to collateral free low interest loans for the balance cost.
    4. Capacity building component: The scheme carries a capacity building component covering training in installation, operation, maintenance and repair of rooftop systems at the local level.

    Matching Previous Year Question

    “[2025] Consider the following statements about ‘PM Surya Ghar Muft Bijli Yojana’: I. It targets installation of one crore solar rooftop panels in the residential sector. II. The Ministry of New and Renewable Energy aims to impart training on installation, operation, maintenance and repairs of solar rooftop systems at grassroot levels. III. It aims to create more than three lakhs skilled manpower through fresh skilling and up-skilling, under scheme component of capacity building. Which of the statements given above are correct? (a) I and II only (b) I and III only (c) II and III only (d) I, II and III ANSWER: (d)”

  • A blueprint to create productive jobs, a lesson from Tiruppur

    Why in the News

    The Prime Minister’s Independence Day address placed manufacturing power first among the seven Saptadhara streams meant to carry India towards a Viksit Bharat, and tied that effort to harnessing the potential of India’s youth. Research at the Indian Council for Research on International Economic Relations (ICRIER) answers the question that follows, which is which manufacturing sector can actually deliver jobs at the scale India needs, and its answer is textiles and apparel. The evidence offered is the Tiruppur knitwear cluster, an organically grown ecosystem that supports over a million livelihoods, set against the PM MITRA parks announced in 2021 to replicate it, of which only one appears operational. The tension is that India has closed its tariff gaps with competitors and still cannot convert that access into exports, because the binding constraint is not market access but the absence of the cluster ecosystem around the factory.

    Why is India’s job problem one of composition and of job quality?

    1. The size of the workforce: India had 61.6 crore employed persons aged more than 15 years in 2025.
    2. Agriculture’s share of employment: Agriculture still accounted for 43 per cent of employment against 12.1 per cent in manufacturing, per PLFS 2025.
    3. The arithmetic of any shift: Even a 1 percentage point shift in employment from agriculture to manufacturing would involve moving a large number of workers.
    4. The stated target has not been met: The governing alliance had promised to create 2 crore jobs every year, and the outcome is nowhere near that.
    5. Youth unemployment: Unemployment among those aged 15 to 29 was 9.9 per cent, rising to 13.6 per cent in urban areas, per PLFS 2025.
    6. Youth outside employment, education and training: 25 per cent of that age group were neither in employment nor in education or training.
    7. The gender gap in participation: Female labour force participation was 40 per cent, against 79.1 per cent for men.
    8. Student agitations over paper leaks: The recent student agitations over paper leaks reflected the underlying position that respectable formal sector jobs remain scarce even after a basic education.
    9. The PLFS usual status measure: The PLFS usual status measure counts people who worked for a long part of the year and also those who undertook economic activity for at least 30 days during the year.
    10. The limit of the employment count: Being counted as employed does not mean holding a regular or formal job.
    11. Regular formal employment with social security: Economic security requires regular formal employment carrying social security benefits such as the Employees’ Provident Fund (EPF) and Employees’ State Insurance (ESI).

    Why does apparel fit the gap better than the frontier sectors?

    1. Labour absorption in apparel: The apparel sector is labour intensive and employs women in large numbers.
    2. Training time for production roles: Workers can be trained in short periods, about 60 days for specific production roles, which is what allows a cluster to scale its workforce quickly.
    3. Fit with India’s skill distribution: Chip making, artificial intelligence and other advanced technologies serve a highly skilled workforce, while the majority of India’s labour force is at the bottom end of the skill distribution.
    4. The cost of a job is lower: Textiles and apparel offer higher employment intensity at relatively low cost, which is the path China, Bangladesh and Vietnam followed.

    Is the $100 billion export target achievable, and what do the international comparisons show about market access?

    1. The headline target: India has set a target of $100 billion in textiles and apparel exports by 2030, from $36 billion today.
    2. The apparel share of the target: $40 billion of that is for apparel exports specifically, from $15.7 billion today.
    3. Exporters do not accept the date: Interactions with exporters suggest the targets are not grounded in current realities and are more likely to be achieved by 2035, not 2030.
    4. The capacity gap behind the target: Closing it means building capacity of a scale that does not exist, not raising utilisation at existing units.
    5. The tariff gap has already closed: India has recently closed the tariff gaps with competitors such as Bangladesh and Vietnam in major markets including the EU and the UK.
    6. The India Japan agreement of 2011: Under the India Japan agreement of 2011, India’s apparel exports to Japan fell from $229 million in 2013 to $203 million in 2024.
    7. Market access without capacity: Market access alone does not ensure exports, and India needs the scale and capacity to tap free trade agreements before a concession converts into shipments.

    What made Tiruppur work, and what did its environmental crisis show about collective capacity?

    1. Tiruppur’s knitwear exports: Tiruppur’s knitwear exports rose from $3.3 billion in 2020-21 to $5.3 billion in 2024-25, per the Tiruppur Exporters Association in 2026.
    2. Share of India’s knitwear exports: The cluster accounts for about 68 per cent of India’s knitwear exports.
    3. The cluster’s employment base: It supports the livelihoods of more than a million workers, around 70 per cent of them women.
    4. The whole chain sits in one place: Within roughly 20 km, yarn, knitting, dyeing, printing, stitching, finishing, packaging and dispatch are woven into one production ecosystem, with nearly 20,000 units operating across the different stages.
    5. The ecosystem effect of density: Firms specialise, workers specialise, and thousands of jobs are created around a common market, which is the ecosystem effect the argument rests on.
    6. Institutions and common infrastructure built over decades: Entrepreneurs, industry associations and government built the institutions and common infrastructure over decades. The Tiruppur Exporters Association and the South India Hosiery Manufacturers Association built collective capabilities, and infrastructure such as the Netaji Apparel Park supported expansion.
    7. The Madras High Court’s 2011 zero liquid discharge order: The Madras High Court’s 2011 order applied to units failing to meet zero liquid discharge (ZLD) norms, meaning norms requiring that no effluent leave the unit as liquid waste.
    8. The response was collective, not firm by firm: The cluster invested more than Rs 850 crore in common effluent treatment infrastructure.
    9. Collective financing of the effluent plant: A single firm could not have financed that plant, which is the clearest demonstration that the cluster’s value lies in what its firms can do jointly.

    What is a cluster ecosystem?

    1. The cluster ecosystem: A concentration of firms in one trade inside a small geography, together with the suppliers, contractors, traders and service providers each of them draws on. A single factory then operates inside a supply chain it does not have to own.
    2. Why proximity lowers cost: Each stage of production is bought from a neighbouring specialist rather than built in house, so a firm carries only the stage it is good at. The cost and the time of moving material between stages fall close to nil.
    3. The shared labour pool: A workforce trained in that trade accumulates in one place, so a unit can add or shed capacity without training workers from scratch, and a worker can change employer without changing town.
    4. Collective capability: Facilities no single firm could finance become viable once the cost is spread across thousands of units. Eg. Tiruppur’s common effluent treatment infrastructure, built by the cluster after a court order.

    What still constrains Tiruppur?

    1. Dependence on migrant labour: The cluster depends heavily on migrant workers from Odisha, Jharkhand, Bihar and elsewhere.
    2. Housing is the retention problem: Worker housing and retention are named as the important challenges in taking the cluster to its next million jobs.
    3. The cluster’s planned upgrade path: The cluster plans to move into man made fibres, technical textiles and high value sustainable manufacturing to expand both exports and employment.

    Why has the national attempt to replicate it stalled?

    1. The seven PM MITRA parks announced in 2021: The government announced seven PM MITRA parks in 2021 as the instrument for creating more such clusters.
    2. Operational status of the parks: Only one park appears operational, at Warangal, and the others are still in the planning stages.
    3. The execution pace against the export target: Such a pace in the execution of even good ideas does not inspire confidence that the $100 billion export target can be reached, and it limits the speed at which jobs can be created.
    4. One cluster cannot carry a national target: Tiruppur alone cannot deliver the target, and India needs many more clusters of the same kind.

    Challenges to the PM MITRA parks model

    1. A greenfield park has to create the ecosystem a cluster inherits: Tiruppur’s advantage is the density of specialised units around a common market, and a new park begins with land and utilities alone. Eg. Nearly 20,000 specialised units in one cluster took decades to assemble.
      The Fix: Anchor each park on an existing textile concentration so tenants arrive with supplier relationships already in place, rather than siting parks to distribute them across states.
    2. Land and clearances drive the timeline more than the incentive does: The scheme’s outlay is committed at announcement while state level land transfer, environmental clearance and utility connection decide the commissioning date. Eg. Roughly 70 per cent of infrastructure project delays in India stem from complex land acquisition processes.
      The Fix: Make the release of central assistance conditional on dated state milestones for land handover and clearances, so delay has a financial consequence.
    3. Common effluent capacity is the binding utility for textiles: Dyeing and processing are the stages that cannot start without treatment capacity, and they are also the stages that create the most jobs per unit of investment. Eg. Tiruppur had to build more than Rs 850 crore of common effluent treatment infrastructure after a court order, long after the cluster had grown.
      The Fix: Commission the zero liquid discharge plant before tenant allotment rather than after, so processing units can begin operating from the first year.
    4. Worker housing is treated as outside the park: A labour intensive park draws migrant workers who need housing at the same moment the units need staff, and housing is rarely part of the industrial park’s own scope. Eg. Worker housing and retention are the named constraints on Tiruppur’s next million jobs.
      The Fix: Include rental worker housing within the park’s own master plan and viability gap funding, treating it as production infrastructure rather than welfare.

    Conclusion

    The evidence assembled here says the binding constraint on labour absorbing manufacturing is executional rather than strategic. India already has a demonstrated model, a closed tariff gap with its competitors and a stated national target, and the one instrument built to convert all three into jobs has produced a single operating park in five years. Whether the remaining six parks reach commissioning, and on what dated schedule, is the marker that will decide whether the $100 billion target slips to the exporters’ 2035 or fails altogether.

    Manufacturing Sector in India

    1. Share of GDP: Manufacturing contributes around 17 per cent of GDP, against a policy target of 25 per cent.
    2. Share of global manufacturing output: India holds about 2.8 per cent of global manufacturing output, compared with China’s roughly 29 per cent.
    3. The size of output: Manufacturing output is projected to reach approximately $1 trillion in FY 2025-26.
    4. What incentives have drawn: The Production Linked Incentive (PLI) scheme had drawn over Rs 1.76 lakh crore across 14 sectors as of March 2025.

    Government Initiatives for Manufacturing

    1. Make in India (2014): Seeks to raise manufacturing’s share of GDP from around 17 per cent toward 25 per cent through ease of doing business reforms.
    2. Atmanirbhar Bharat (2020): Promotes self sufficiency, local industry and reduced import dependence without closing the economy off to the world.
    3. Production Linked Incentive Scheme (2020): Covers 14 sunrise and strategic sectors, including textiles, with outcome linked financial incentives paid on incremental production.
    4. National Manufacturing Mission: A Budget mission targeting a 25 per cent GDP share and 143 million jobs by 2035, unifying policy across clean and sustainable manufacturing.
    5. National Logistics Policy: Aims to cut logistics costs and improve supply chain efficiency, which is a direct input into export competitiveness.
    6. Industrial corridors: Eleven approved corridors bundle infrastructure to support clustered industrial development, with 12 new industrial nodes approved in 2024.

    Back2Basics: PM MITRA Parks

    1. What the name stands for: Pradhan Mantri Mega Integrated Textile Region and Apparel parks, administered by the Ministry of Textiles.
    2. The design idea: Each park brings spinning, weaving, processing, dyeing, printing and garmenting onto a single site, so a garment can be produced end to end within one location.
    3. The vision it implements: The 5F vision, meaning Farm to Fibre to Factory to Fashion to Foreign, which treats the textile value chain as a single continuum from cotton to export.
    4. How they are built: Each park is developed by a Special Purpose Vehicle owned jointly by the central and the concerned state government, with central support for development capital and for the first units to begin production.

    Matching Previous Year Question

    “[2025, GS3, 15 marks] Discuss the rationale of the Production Linked Incentive (PLI) scheme. What are its achievements? In what way can the functioning and outcomes of the scheme be improved?”

  • MoSPI Secy: Nominal GDP revised down as informal sector data has improved

    Why in the News

    The Ministry of Statistics and Programme Implementation (MoSPI) has stated that the downward revision of nominal Gross Domestic Product (GDP) under the new base year series follows a change in how the informal sector is measured, not a correction of an earlier overstatement. The revision runs across every overlapping year of the two series and was driven by the replacement of proxy based estimates with direct annual surveys. The new series moves the base year to 2022-23 from 2011-12 and was released in February. Two separate criticisms have been put to the Ministry, one that the informal economy is still being read off the performance of listed companies, and the other that the price data used for deflation is the wrong kind. The contest is therefore not about the growth rate but about whether the measurement itself can be trusted.

    What changed in the new base year GDP series?

    1. The base moved: The series shifts its base year from 2011-12 to 2022-23, and was released in February.
    2. The estimation method changed with it: The informal sector is now estimated from direct, empirical annual surveys rather than from proxies carried forward from a base year.
    3. The revision is systematic, not a one year correction: Nominal GDP has been revised lower across all overlapping years, meaning 2022-23 to 2024-25 and the subsequent quarters.

    Why did nominal GDP fall in the revised series?

    1. The old series had no regular unorganised sector survey: MoSPI calculated Gross Value Added (GVA), meaning output net of the cost of inputs used up in producing it, for the unorganised sector by multiplying estimated workforce counts by the Value Added per Worker derived from decadal surveys.
    2. Forward projection of the base year figure: The projection used proxies such as formal corporate growth rates, inter survey growth rates and historical tax collections, because no regular data was available.
    3. Survey evidence changed the picture: Annual survey evidence made it possible to capture the distinct growth patterns of the informal sector, which had been running on the formal sector’s growth rate by assumption.
    4. Informal services, the largest single driver: The single largest driver of the revision is the improved measurement of India’s informal services sector.

    How do the new surveys change the measurement?

    1. Two surveys replaced the proxies: The Annual Survey of Unincorporated Sector Enterprises (ASUSE), which enumerates unincorporated non agricultural businesses, and the Periodic Labour Force Survey (PLFS), which measures employment and workforce size, now supply the inputs directly.
    2. Survey frequency: ASUSE is now available on a quarterly basis and PLFS on a monthly basis, so quarterly GDP no longer waits on a survey that ran once every five years.
    3. What is now measured directly: Unorganised sector productivity and workforce size are measured rather than inferred from corporate results.

    What is the Annual Survey of Unincorporated Sector Enterprises?

    1. What an unincorporated enterprise is: A business run as a proprietorship or a partnership rather than as a registered company. Its accounts are never filed with a corporate registry, so its output cannot be read off company results and has to be counted directly.
    2. What ASUSE enumerates: Non agricultural businesses in manufacturing, trade and other services. It covers both establishments that hire workers and own account enterprises run by the proprietor without hired labour.
    3. How the units are reached: The survey draws a sample against an area based frame rather than against a registration list, which is what allows it to reach units that appear on no register.
    4. Why the frequency changes the estimate: Its predecessor ran roughly once in five years, so every intervening year was filled in by projection. A survey running annually and now quarterly supplies measured values for the same periods the national accounts are compiled for.

    Where does the contest over the new series lie?

    1. The listed company charge: A former Chief Economic Adviser has argued that the GDP data does not capture the informal economy properly and extrapolates the performance of listed companies. The Ministry’s stated position is that ASUSE is being used for quarterly GDP and proxies are not.
    2. The proxies were always bounded: Even in the earlier series proxies were used only between the quinquennial surveys, carried forward from previous base years, which is how the overhang continued.
    3. Overestimation is rejected as a framing: The Ministry holds that GDP is an estimation built on the best data available at the time, and that calling the old series an overestimate implies a systematic bias that was not there.
    4. The price data objection: A separate criticism concerns the use of producer price data. The Ministry’s answer is that the method of calculation was shifted to producers in the 2011-12 series of the Wholesale Price Index (WPI) itself, and that data for the past 10 years has been collected from industry.
    5. What separates the two indices: The WPI excludes exports and imports and includes taxes and trade margins to some extent, while a Producer Price Index (PPI) does not, and the Ministry states those corrections have since been made.
    6. The growth is not felt on the ground: The Ministry treats this as a larger question shaped by other factors, uncertainties and the global situation, comparable to how an individual’s experience of prices differs from an inflation rate aggregated across the country.

    What is a Producer Price Index?

    1. Prices received at the factory gate: A Producer Price Index tracks the change in prices received by domestic producers for their own output at the factory gate. It reads the price at the point of production rather than the price at any later point in the chain.
    2. Why the deflator has to match the output: Real output is nominal output divided by a price index, so the index must track the prices of the goods and services being deflated. A mismatch between the output being measured and the prices used to deflate it moves the real growth rate without anything happening in the economy.
    3. The services gap: A wholesale price index is built on goods traded in bulk and carries no services. An economy whose output is majority services therefore has no matching price series for its largest component, which is why the deflator is the contested instrument.

    Challenges to a base year revision of the national accounts

    1. A long gap between base years builds in drift: Holding a base year for more than a decade lets the structure of the economy move away from the weights the series is built on. Eg. The 2011-12 base was carried forward for over a decade on proxies before the present revision replaced it.
      The Fix: Fix a statutory base year revision cycle with a published date, so the revision is a scheduled operation rather than an event that invites suspicion.
    2. A revision breaks the comparable series users rely on: Analysts, ratings and fiscal ratios are all computed on a level that has now moved, and back series construction is where most disputes about Indian GDP have historically landed. Eg. The dispute over the back series of the 2011-12 base ran for years after that series was introduced.
      The Fix: Release a fully documented back series alongside the new base, with the method for each sector stated, rather than issuing the levels first and the method later.
    3. Deflation remains the weakest link: Converting nominal values to real ones requires price indices that match the output being deflated, and India has no full producer price index for services. Eg. Services form the largest share of output and are deflated using indices built for goods.
      The Fix: Complete and publish a services producer price index so that the largest part of output is deflated on prices collected from services producers.
    4. Survey coverage of the informal sector is thin at the edges: An enterprise survey reaches businesses with a recognisable place of operation more easily than it reaches itinerant and home based work. Eg. Home based and own account work is concentrated among women, which is also where labour force measurement is weakest.
      The Fix: Link the enterprise survey to the labour force survey at the household level, so an activity missed as an enterprise is still captured through the worker reporting it.

    Conclusion

    The disagreement now on record is about method rather than about the growth rate, and the Ministry has taken the position that the new series is the best available and that no obvious correction has been put to it for the next one. That claim is testable, since a statistical system is judged on whether its next revision moves the numbers again in the same direction. The marker to watch is the deflator, because the informal sector question has now been answered with direct surveys while the price side has not been given an equivalent instrument.

    Matching Previous Year Question

    “[2021, GS3, 10 marks] Explain the difference between computing methodology of India’s Gross Domestic Product(GDP) before the year 2015 and after the year 2015.”