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GS Paper: India & Its Neighborhood – Relations

  • India needs an internationalism that is rooted in realism

    The article analyses India’s approach towards regional integration in Asian unity and internationalism and its consequences.

    Clash between internationalism and nationalism

    • Three current developments reveal the clash between grandiose internationalism and the intractable nationalism.
    • 1) India pulled out of the military exercise of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation, which was to herald a new era of Eurasian unity.
    • Sharpening contradictions between India and China comes in the way of uniting such a large geopolitical space.
    • 2) Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s claim to leadership of the Muslim world that has run into resistance from a large section of the Arab rulers.
    • 3) The tension between the globalism of the US foreign policy establishment and Donald Trump’s “America First” nationalism.

    Internationalism and threats to it

    • Western liberalism has had more power than anyone else to promote internationalism.
    • But the liberal internationalist effort at constructing supra-national institutions now faces big setbacks.
    • The greatest resistance to the liberal internationalist vision has not come within the US.
    • Trump channelled the American resentments against the globalist excesses of the Wall Street, Washington and the Silicon Valley.

    India’s nationalism

    • Indian nationalism was inevitably influenced by liberal internationalism, socialism, communism, pan-Islamism, pan-Asianism and Third-Worldism to name a few.
    • Both the Asian Relations Conference (Delhi 1947) and the Afro-Asian Conference (Bandung 1955) showed up the deep differences among the Asian elites.
    • India then turned its back on Asianism to claim the leadership of the broader Non-Aligned Movement.
    • After the Cold War, India re-embraced Asianism in the 1990s when it unveiled the Look East Policy.
    • India also joined the Asian regional institutions led by the Association of South-East Asian Nations.

    RCEP joining issue

    • Few could have anticipated that Delhi would walk out of one of the most consequential agreements negotiated by the ASEAN — the RCEP — that sought Asia-wide economic integration.
    • Delhi believed that the contradiction between India’s domestic commercial interests and a China-led Asian economic regionalism was irreconcilable.

    India’s approach toward Asian regionalism

    • Eurasian regionalism led by Moscow and Beijing is also facing tensions and there is deepening conflict between Indian and Chinese interests.
    • India’s diplomatic finesse on the SCO has become increasingly unsustainable after Chinese aggression in eastern Ladakh.
    • India underestimated the economic and political consequences of China’s rapid rise while seeking economic regionalism in East Asia and the multi-polar world with Russia and China.
    • India took a benign view of Chinese power and has been shocked to discover otherwise in 1962 and in 2020.

    Conclusion

    India today needs more internationalism, than less, in dealing with the Chinese power. But it must be an internationalism that is rooted in realism and tethered to India’s economic and national security priorities.

  • Striving for amicable relations with Pakistan

    The article pitches for the resumption of India-Pakistan relations. But there are obstacles on both the side which come in the way of such resumption.

    Pakistan and relations over Kashmir issue

    •  In July, the Turkish president had assured Pakistan’s parliament of his country’s support for Islamabad’s Kashmir stand.
    • More recently, Malaysia’s former Prime Minister, Mahathir Mohamad, has reiterated his backing for that stand.
    • Iran’s current negotiations with China do not necessarily mean alignment with the latter’s Kashmir policy.
    • Saudi Arabia and the Gulf countries invited official criticism in Pakistan first time for their refusal to back Pakistan in its disputes with New Delhi.
    • Pakistan’s foreign minister had made a remark against Saudi Arabia over its reluctance to convene the meeting of IOC.
    • Given the long history of Saudi-Pakistani relations, such remarks suggest a high degree of frustration.

    India’s vulnerabilities and relations with Pakistan

    • An excess of confidence and an unwillingness to think things through may be India’s vulnerabilities.
    • Army’s chief of staff made the statement this year, “If Parliament wants that area [PoK] should be ours at some stage, and if we get such orders, we will definitely act on those directions.”
    • Prime Minister made the statement regarding time of a week to 10 days to defeat the neighbouring country in case of war.

    Picturing resumption of relations with Pakistan

    • In case of war, aware of the total devastation to follow, neither side in an India-Pakistan conflict will press the nuclear button.
    • On the other hand, it is also possible, before any war, to imagine negotiations that lead, not necessarily in that order, to a resumption of trade, travel and normal relations, the renunciation of terrorism, and the restoration of the democratic rights of the people of Kashmir.
    • While no realistic person today expects such talks, it is not a crime to picture them.

    Conclusion

    Amicable relations with Pakistan may seem remote but they are worth striving for.

  • Leveraging its market to force China to settle border issue

    The article charts out the plan to leverage the potential and the present size of the India markets to settle the boundary dispute with China.

    Boycott of Chinese goods: view and counterview

    • After Galwan incident, there have been calls for the boycott of Chinese goods.
    • Counter views have been expressed that the Indian economy is so dependent on China that the costs would be disproportionately higher for India.
    • Our dependence can be reduced substantially if there is a national will and resolve to do so.

    Need for mutually acceptable boundary agreement

    • China may not be willing to go back substantially from the areas they have occupied.
    • Agreeing on maintaining peace and tranquillity or clarification of the LAC has left space for the Chinese to create border incidents which have now led to casualties.
    • So India needs to get China to seriously negotiate a mutually acceptable boundary agreement.

    India could use its market as leverage

    • Size of Indian market: The size of the Indian market and its potential in the coming years provides India considerable leverage.
    • But to use this leverage, Indians, individual consumers as well as firms, have to accept that there would be a period of adjustment in which they would have to pay higher prices.
    • The Chinese have a competitive advantage and are integral to global supply chains.
    • But whatever they sell is, and can be, made elsewhere in the world.
    • Indian can produce everything imported by China: Most of what we import from China was, is and can be made in India itself.
    • With volumes and economies of scale, the cost of production in India would decline as it did in China.

    Steps need to be taken to use market as leverage

    • Focus on those imports from China which have been increasing: The initial focus should be on items which are still being made in India and where imports from China have been increasing.
    • Depriciate Rupees: If the RBI let the currency depreciate in real terms it would be equivalent to an increase in import duties of about 10 per cent.
    • China-specific safeguard duties and use of non-tariff trade barriers should be used in segments like electrical appliances to let Indian producers expand production and increase market share.
    • Government Finances for expansion: The government should also facilitate the flow of finances for expansion and provide technical support for testing, improving quality and lowering costs of production.
    • Look for other players: In critical areas such as Active Pharmaceutical Ingredients, we need a vigorous approach to procure from elsewhere and have early production in India.
    • The government could provide support for environmental compliance to bring down costs of production.This would create demand for domestic goods and services.
    • There are strategic sectors where we should reduce vulnerability: Like scrutiny of -Chinese FDI, Chinese 5G participation etc.
    • Assured government procurement: In critical areas like solar panel and grid storage batteries private investment for manufacturing in India would be triggered by assured government procurement.

    Consider the question “Size and potential of India market could be leverage by India to settle the issues it has with its neighbour. What India needs to achieve this is a strategy and its implementation. Comment.”

    Conclusion

    A sustained and graded economic response to the recent Chinese conduct on the border is needed. We should signal India’s firm resolve and willingness to bear the cost. China could choose to settle the border amicably and have full access to our market. We could then work together to make this the Asian century.

  • Seeking equilibrium with China

    The article analyses the India’s efforts to establish strategic equilibrium with assertive China and how that idea clashes with China’s desire to form an Asian order with itself at the top.

    Strategic equilibrium

    •  External Affairs Minister S Jaishankar articulated that India is seeking strategic equilibrium with an increasingly aggressive China.
    • It is hoped that with China’s growing differences with the U.S. China would pay attention to India’s sensitivities.
    • In achieving equilibrium with China, India has bravely been confronting a face-off in the Himalayas for the past several months.
    • India has been building issue-based alliances with the US and Asian majors like Japan, Korea, Vietnam and Indonesia, and Australia.
    • It has taken initiatives in the direction of economic de-coupling with China in the name of “atmanirbharata”.

    Hierarchical Asian order with China at top

    • China is not interested in equilibrium with any of its Asian neighbours, least of all with India.
    • China’s efforts are clearly to build a hierarchical Asian order, with itself at the top.
    • It is acutely conscious of India’s economic strength, military modernisation and overall capabilities.
    • It knows that India is also far behind on these counts.
    • China is ruthlessly resisting India’s access to global governance bodies, such as the UNSC and NSG.
    • To keep India tied at that level, China is objecting to India’s growing strategic proximity to the US. I
    • It is encircling India strategically and economically through its strategic and economic corridors — BCIM (Bangladesh, China, India and Myanmar), CPEC and the Trans-Himalayan Connectivity Network.
    • It is raising issues like Kashmir at the UN and establishing footprints in the Indian Ocean.

    What should India do

    1. Adjust with China, at least tactically.

    • Such an adjustment could be based on mutual give and take.
    • For India, our first priority could be the resolution of the border dispute.
    • Secondly, since China has offered to mediate between India and Pakistan, it should be asked to prevail over Pakistan to resolve the Kashmir issue.
    • In return for these “takes” India could offer access to Chinese commercial cargos to sea, through the Nathula pass.
    • India could also join China’s BRI on mutually acceptable terms.
    • India may also show its willingness, at least tactically, to join CPEC as both Pakistan and China have asked for, provided, India is allowed to undertake projects in PoK and Balochistan.

    2.India should revisit its Tibet policy, which is a core irritant for China.

    Consider the question “China seeking to establish an Asian order with itself at the top comes in the way of India establishing strategic equilibrium with China. Comment.”

    Conclusion

    It is possible that this “give” and “take” may not be acceptable to China. Even if it does not work out as planned, India would have made a bold diplomatic initiative and a huge tactical move towards thinking through out-of-the-box solutions and displaying that it can undertake risks to pursue its long-term national interests.

  • Thinking through the Nepal policy

    Unilateral actions by Nepal

    • Minor dispute involving territory around the Kalapani springs, was expanded to claim a large wedge of Indian territory towards the east, measuring nearly 400 square kilometres.
    • The expanded claim was incorporated into Nepal through a constitutional amendment and a revised official map.

    Future course of action

    • India should be willing to engage in talks with Nepal on all aspects of India-Nepal relations.
    • But any talks on the Kalapani issue should be limited to the area which was the original subject for negotiations and Susta.
    • Borders which have been accepted by both sides for more than 100 years and which have also been reflected on their official maps cannot be unilaterally altered by one side coming up with archival material which has surfaced in the meantime.
    • This would make national boundaries unstable and shifting, and create avoidable controversies between countries as is the case now between India and Nepal.

    Some historical background

    • The Treaty of Sugauli of 1816 sets the Kali river as the boundary between the two countries.
    • There was no map attached to the treaty.
    • Nepal is now claiming that the main tributary of the Kalapani river rises east of the Lipu Lekh pass from the Limpiyadhura ridgeline and hence should serve as the border.
    • Even if the lengthiest tributary may be one principle for a riverine boundary, it is not the only one.
    • There are many boundaries which do not follow any geographical principle at all but are the result of historical circumstances, mutual agreement and legal recognition.
    • British surveys of the region consistently showed the India-Nepal border heading due north of Kalapani springs.
    • This alignment never changed in subsequent years and was also reflected in Nepali official maps.
    • It has been argued by Nepal that it was the East India Company and successor governments “cartographic chicanery” to shift the source of the Kali river towards the east.
    • But Nepali government never contested such actions.
    • In 1969, the then Prime Minister of Nepal demanded that India military personnel manning 17 villages along the Nepal-Tibet border since the early 1950s be withdrawn.
    • If Lipu Lekh and Kalapani were on Nepali territory then why were they omitted from the list?
    • The Chinese, at least since 1954, have accepted Lipu Lekh Pass as being in Indian territory.
    • In the Nepal-China boundary agreement of 1960, the starting point of the boundary is clearly designated at a point just west of the Tinker Pass.

    Consider the question “Nepal’s newfound aspiration has led to the introduction of friction in India-Nepal ties, what is needed is recognition of each others’ concerns. Comment.”

    Conclusion

    For India, more than the exemplary inter-state relationship, it is the unique people-to-people relations between India and Nepal; and, fortunately, inter-state relations have been unable to undermine the dense affinities that bind our peoples together. While India should reject the Nepali state’s ill-conceived territorial claims, it should do everything to nurture the invaluable asset it has in the goodwill of the people of Nepal.

  • China twist in Teesta Challenge

    Bangladesh is discussing an almost $1 billion loan from China for a comprehensive management and restoration project on the Teesta river. These discussions with China come at a time when India is particularly wary about China following the standoff in Ladakh.

    Try this question from our AWE initiative:

    Teesta River has become an important factor in India – Bangladesh relations. What are the hindrances in successful implementation of river water sharing agreement and what are its possible implications on India-Bangladesh relations? What could be the possible solutions?

    Teesta Project

    • The project is aimed at managing the river basin efficiently, controlling floods, and tackling the water crisis in summers.
    • India and Bangladesh have been engaged in a long-standing dispute over water-sharing in the Teesta.

    How has the Teesta dispute progressed?

    • The two countries were on the verge of signing a water-sharing pact in September 2011, when PM Manmohan Singh was going to visit Bangladesh.
    • But, West Bengal CM objected to it, and the deal was scuttled.
    • After the regime change in 2014, the government hoped that it could reach a “fair solution” on the Teesta through cooperation between central and state governments.
    • Five years later, the Teesta issue remains unresolved.

    Trends in India’s relationship with Bangladesh

    • New Delhi has had a robust relationship with Dhaka, carefully cultivated since 2008, especially with the Sheikh Hasina government at the helm.
    • Security: India has benefited from its security ties with Bangladesh, whose crackdown against anti-India outfits has helped the Indian government maintain peace in the eastern and Northeast states.
    • Trade: Bangladesh has benefited from its economic and development partnership. Bangladesh is India’s biggest trade partner in South Asia.
    • Bilateral trade has grown steadily over the last decade: India’s exports to Bangladesh in 2018-19 stood at $9.21 billion, and imports from Bangladesh at $1.04 billion.
    • Visas:India also grants 15 to 20 lakh visas every year to Bangladesh nationals for medical treatment, tourism, work, and just entertainment.

    Recent irritants in ties

    • There have been recent irritants in the relationship.
    • These include the proposed countrywide National Register of Citizens (NRC) and the Citizenship Amendment Act (CAA) passed in December last year.
    • Bangladesh had insisted that while the CAA and the proposed nationwide NRC were “internal matters” of India, the CAA move were “not necessary”.

    Chinese affinity with Bangladesh

    • China is the biggest trading partner of Bangladesh and is the foremost source of imports.
    • In 2019, the trade between the two countries was $18 billion and the imports from China commanded the lion’s share. The trade is heavily in favour of China.
    • Recently, China declared zero duty on 97% of imports from Bangladesh. The concession flowed from China’s duty-free, quota-free programme for the Least Developed Countries.
    • This move has been widely welcomed in Bangladesh, with the expectation that Bangladesh exports to China will increase.
    • China has promised around $30 billion worth of financial assistance to Bangladesh.
    • Additionally, Bangladesh’s strong defence ties with China make the situation complicated. China is the biggest arms supplier to Bangladesh and it has been a legacy issue — after its liberation.
    • Recently, Bangladesh purchased two Ming class submarines from China.

    India’s engagement post CAA

    • Over the last five months, India and Bangladesh have cooperated on pandemic-related moves.
    • Hasina supported Modi’s call for a regional emergency fund for fighting Covid-19 and declared a contribution of $1.5 million in March 2020. India has also provided medical aid to Bangladesh.
    • The two countries have also cooperated in railways, with India giving 10 locomotives to Bangladesh.
    • The first trial run for trans-shipment of Indian cargo through Bangladesh to Northeast states under a pact on the use of Chittagong and Mongla ports took place in July.
    • Bangladesh gave its readiness to collaborate in the development of a Covid-19 vaccine, including its trial, and looks forward to early, affordable availability of the vaccine when ready.

    Among other issues

    • The two sides agreed that Implementation of projects should be done in a timely manner and that greater attention is required to development projects in Bangladesh under the Indian Lines of Credit.
    • Bangladesh sought the return of the Tablighi Jamaat members impacted by the lockdown in India.
    • Bangladesh requested for the urgent reopening of visa issuance from the Indian High Commission in Dhaka, particularly since many Bangladeshi patients need to visit India.
    • India was also requested to reopen travel through Benapole-Petrapole land port which has been halted by the West Bengal government in the wake of the pandemic.

    Way forward

    • While the Teesta project is important and urgent from India’s point of view, it will be difficult to address it before the West Bengal elections due next year.
    • What Delhi can do is to address other issues of concern, which too are challenging.
    • Now, the test will be if India can implement all its assurances in a time-bound manner.
    • Or else, the latent anti-India sentiment in Bangladesh, which has been revived after India’s CAA -NRC push can permanently damage the historic ties.

    Back2Basics: Teesta Water Dispute

  • Why has the Israel-UAE pact unsettled Palestine and Iran?

    Last week Mr Trump has announced that Israel and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) had reached a peace agreement. Many countries, including the European powers and India, have welcomed it, while the Palestinian leadership, as well as Turkey and Iran, have lashed out at the UAE.

    The strategic location of Gaza strip, West Bank, Dead Sea etc. creates a hotspot for a possible map based prelims question. 

    Consider this PYQ:

    Q. The area is known as ‘Golan Heights’ sometimes appears in the news in the context of the events related to: (CSP 2015)

    a) Central Asia
    b) Middle East
    c) South-East Asia
    d) Central Africa

    The Israel-UAE Pact

    • The UAE and Israel would establish formal diplomatic relations and in exchange, Israel would suspend its plans to annex parts of the occupied West Bank.
    • Israeli PM Netanyahu had earlier vowed to annex the Jewish settlements in the West Bank.
    • But now, as part of the agreement, Israel “will suspend declaring sovereignty over areas” of the West Bank and “focus its efforts on expanding ties with other countries in the Arab and Muslim world”.

    A timeline of Israel-Arab Conflict

    Arab-Israeli ties have historically been conflict-ridden.

    • Arab countries, including Egypt, Transjordan, Syria and Iraq, fought their first war with Israel in 1948 after the formation of the state of Israel was announced.
    • The war ended with Israel capturing more territories, including West Jerusalem than what the UN Partition Plan originally proposed for a Jewish state.
    • After that, Israel and Arab states fought three more major wars — the 1956 Suez conflict, the 1967 Six-Day War and the 1973 Yom Kippur War.
    • After the 1967 war in which Israel captured the Sinai Peninsula and Gaza Strip from Egypt, East Jerusalem and the West Bank from Jordan and the Golan Heights from Syria.
    • Arab countries convened in Khartoum and declared their famous three “‘Nos’ — no peace with Israel, no talks with Israel and no recognition of Israel.
    • But it did not last long. After the death of Egypt President Gamal Abdel Nasser, his successor Anwar Sadat started making plans to get Sinai back from Israel.
    • His efforts, coupled with American pressure on Israel, led to the Camp David Accords of 1978 with Israel’s withdrawal.

    Significance of the deal

    • It’s a landmark agreement given that the UAE is only the third Arab country and the first in the Gulf region to establish diplomatic relations with Israel.
    • In 1994, Jordan became the second Arab country to sign a peace treaty with Israel.
    • The UAE-Israel agreement comes after 26 years. If more countries in the Gulf follow the UAE’s lead, it would open a new chapter in Arab-Israel ties.

    Why did the UAE sign the agreement?

    • The old enmity between Arab countries and Israel has dissipated.
    • The Sunni Arab kingdoms in the Gulf region such as Saudi Arabia and the UAE had developed backroom contacts with Israel over the past several years.
    • One of the major factors that brought them closer has been their shared antipathy towards Iran.
    • Arab countries have signalled that they are ready to live with Israel’s occupation of Palestine.

    What do Arab countries want from Israel?

    • Arab countries expect a major change in the status quo on West Bank annexation which would put Israel under political and diplomatic pressure.
    • The UAE-Israel agreement has averted that outcome.
    • If a Democratic Party (Trump’s opposition and Obama’s allegiance) comes to power and restores the Iran deal, both the Israeli and the Arab blocs in West Asia would come under pressure to live with an empowered Iran.
    • A formal agreement and enhanced security and economic ties make the Arab and Israeli sides better prepared to face such a situation.
    • So there is a convergence of interests for the UAE, Israel and the U.S. to come together in the region.

    Where does it leave the Palestinians?

    • Unlike the past two Arab-Israeli peace agreements, Palestinians do not figure prominently in the current one.
    • In the present UAE-Israel deal, Israel has not made any actual concession to the Palestinians.
    • The Palestinians are understandably upset. They called the UAE’s decision “treason”.

    Geopolitical implications of the deal

    • The agreement could fast-track the changes that are already underway in the region.
    • The Saudi bloc, consisting of Egypt, the UAE, Bahrain and others, see their interests being aligned with that of the U.S. and Israel and their support for Palestine, which Arab powers had historically upheld.
    • Turkey and Iran now emerge as the strongest supporters of the Palestinians in the Muslim world.
    • This tripolar contest is already at work in West Asia. The UAE-Israel thaw could sharpen it further.

    Also read:

    West Bank Annexation Plan

  • UAE, Israel reach agreement to establish diplomatic ties

    The United Arab Emirates and Israel have agreed to establish full diplomatic ties as part of a deal to halt the annexation of occupied land sought by the Palestinians for their future state.

    What is the deal?

    • The deal halts Israeli annexation plans, the Palestinians have repeatedly urged Arab governments not to normalize ties with Israel until a peace agreement establishing an independent Palestinian state is reached.

    Significance

    • The announcement makes the UAE the first Gulf Arab state to do so and only the third Arab nation to have active diplomatic ties to Israel.
    • For Israel, the announcement comes after years of boasting by Israeli PM Netanyahu that his government enjoys closer ties to Arab nations than publicly acknowledged.

    West Bank  and its annexation plan

    • The West Bank is located to the west of the Jordan River.
    • It is a patch of land about one and a half times the size of Goa, was captured by Jordan after the 1948 Arab-Israeli War.
    • Israel snatched it back during the Six-Day War of 1967 and has occupied it ever since.
    • It is a landlocked territory, bordered by Jordan to the east and Israel to the south, west, and north.
    • Following the Oslo Accords between the Israeli government and the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) during the 1990s, part of the West Bank came under the control of the Palestinian Authority.
    • With varying levels of autonomy, the Palestinian Authority controls close to 40 per cent of West Bank today, while the rest is controlled by Israel.

  • Greater Male Connectivity Project (GMCP)

    India will fund the implementation of the Greater Male Connectivity Project (GMCP) in the Maldives with $500 mn packages.

    Try this question from 2014:

    Which one of the following pairs of islands is separated from each other by the ‘Ten Degree Channel’?

    (a) Andaman and Nicobar

    (b) Nicobar and Sumatra

    (c) Maldives and Lakshadweep

    (d) Sumatra and Java

    About Greater Male Connectivity Project

    • The GMCP will consist of a number of bridges and causeways to connect Male to Villingili, Thilafushi and Gulhifahu islands that span 6.7 km.
    • It would ease much of the pressure of the main capital island of Male for commercial and residential purposes.
    • When completed, the project would render the Chinese built Sinamale Friendship bridge connecting Male to two other islands, thus far the most visible infrastructure project in the islands.
    • At present, India-assisted projects in the region include water and sewerage projects on 34 islands, reclamation project for the Addl island, a port on Gulhifalhu, airport redevelopment at Hanimadhoo, and a hospital and a cricket stadium in Hulhumale.

  • Exploring options to tackle China

    There are several options which India could explore in dealing with China with less cost but significant effectiveness. Diplomacy is one of them. What are the other options? Read the article to know…

    Context

    • China’s aggression and Galwan valley incident dismantles the Border Agreements of 1993, 1996, 2005 and 2013.
    • Understanding China’s objectives become critical in this situation.

    Analysing China’s objectives

    • Humbling India in the eyes of Asia and the world was all important for China.
    • Despite China’s territorial aggression, it would be a mistake to think that China is preparing for a conflict over territory.
    • China is well aware that it cannot be certain whether it will emerge a victor from an all-out conflict with India.
    •  China cannot afford to jeopardise its future for the present.
    • China has been intent on transforming the Asian region in its own image, and, simultaneously, seeking to become a continental and a maritime power.

    What are the options to deal with China

    • India may well find non-military tools not only more cost-effective but also less risky.
    • 1)  Exploiting the current widespread opposition to China, India must try to create international opinion in its support regarding border violations.
    • 2) Cultivation of foreign leaders with a view to draw their specific attention to China’s aggressive policies and designs is the second option.
    • India’s involvement with the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) should prove invaluable in this respect.
    • 3) India must also overhaul its ‘messaging’ capacity.
    • It should make greater use of technology to send across its message and ideas in its vicinity and across the globe, highlighting its peaceful intentions in stark contrast to China’s aggressive policies and tactics.
    • 4)  India must pay particular attention to relations with countries in its neighbourhood, such as Nepal and Bangladesh, and allies such as Iran and Vietnam.
    • Relationship with these countries seems to have frayed at the edges, with India being more intent on strengthening relations with the West.
    • Smaller countries of Asia, which constantly face China’s aggressive interference in their internal affairs, have not received much support from India, and this needs India’s attention.
    • 5) India’s true strength is its unity in diversity. A truly united and resilient India is the best antidote to China’s attempts to humble India.
    • China has never been able to properly understand, the strength India seems to derive from its spiritual, religious and cultural attributes, which are a part of its civilisational heritage.
    • 6) India would do well to take pole position in propagating ‘Himalayan Buddhism’ which China has been seeking to subvert to achieve its ends.

    Consider the question “To counter the challenges manifested by China through recent events India needs to explore along with other options the subtler tools of power available to it. Examine the other tools available with India.”

    Conclusion

    Military no doubt project the country’s power but there are other options with less cost and significant benefits. India should focus on these options as well while dealing with China.