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GS Paper: India & Its Neighborhood – Relations

  • Armenia, Azerbaijan agree on peace deal

    Armenia and Azerbaijan agreed on a deal with Russia to end fierce clashes over Nagorno-Karabakh after a string of Azerbaijani victories in its fight to retake the disputed region.

    Ending up the bloodshed

    • During the course of the conflict, over 1200 have lost their lives as per the Nagorno-Karabakh authorities, while thousands have been displaced.
    • Since the conflict started in September, multiple ceasefire agreements have been signed between the two sides, but none so far have been successful.
    • The deal is meant to end the conflict between the two nations.
    • Russia’s role in the conflict has been somewhat opaque since it supplies arms to both countries and is in a military alliance with Armenia called the Collective Security Treaty Organisation.

    What is the Nagorno-Karabakh region?

    • Straddling western Asia and Eastern Europe, Nagorno-Karabakh is internationally recognised as part of Azerbaijan, but most of the region is controlled by Armenian separatists.
    • It has been part of Azerbaijan territory since the Soviet era.
    • When the Soviet Union began to collapse in the late 1980s, Armenia’s regional parliament voted for the region’s transfer to Armenia; the Soviet authorities turned down the demand.
    • Years of clashes followed between Azerbaijan forces and Armenian separatists.
    • The violence lasted into the 1990s, leaving tens and thousands dead and displacing hundreds of thousands.
    • In 1994, Russia brokered a ceasefire, by which time ethnic Armenians had taken control of the region.

    Consider this PYQ:

    Q.The area is known as ‘Golan Heights’ sometimes appears in the news in the context of the events related to: (CSP 2015)

    a) Central Asia
    b) Middle East
    c) South-East Asia
    d) Central Africa

    Who controls it?

    • While the area remains in Azerbaijan, it is today governed by separatist Armenians who have declared it a republic called the “Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast”.
    • While the Armenian government does not recognise Nagorno-Karabakh as independent, it supports the region politically and militarily.

    Ethnicity and the conflict

    • Ethnic tensions from decades ago have a crucial role in the dispute.
    • While the Azeris claim that the disputed region was under their control in known history, Armenians maintain that Karabakh was a part of the Armenian kingdom.
    • At present, the disputed region consists of a majority Armenian Christian population, even though it is internationally recognised as a part of Muslim-majority Azerbaijan.

  • [pib] Mission Sagar – II

    As part of ‘Mission Sagar-II’, Indian Naval Ship Airavat had entered Port Sudan.

    Mission SAGAR, unlike other missions, can create confusion with the name and its purpose. Make note of such special cases. UPSC can ask such questions as one liner MCQs.

    Mission Sagar – II

    • Mission Sagar-II, follows the first ‘Mission Sagar’ undertaken in May-June 2020, wherein India reached out to Maldives, Mauritius, Seychelles, Madagascar and Comoros, and provided food aid and medicines.
    • As part of Mission Sagar-II, Indian Naval Ship Airavat will deliver food aid to Sudan, South Sudan, Djibouti and Eritrea.
    • This mission is in line with the Prime Minister’s vision of Security and Growth for All in the Region ‘SAGAR’ and highlights the importance accorded by India to relations with her maritime neighbours.

    Back2Basics

    SAGAR Programme (Security and Growth for All in the Region)

    • SAGAR is a term coined by PM Modi in 2015 during his Mauritius visit with a focus on the blue economy.
    • It is a maritime initiative which gives priority to the Indian Ocean region for ensuring peace, stability and prosperity of India in the Indian Ocean region.
    • The goal is to seek a climate of trust and transparency; respect for international maritime rules and norms by all countries; sensitivity to each other`s interests; peaceful resolution of maritime issues; and increase in maritime cooperation.
    • It is in line with the principles of the Indian Ocean Rim Association.

    IORA (Indian Ocean Rim Association)

    • Established in 1997 in Ebene Cyber City, Mauritius.
    • First established as Indian Ocean Rim Initiative in Mauritius on March 1995 and formally launched in 1997 by the conclusion of a multilateral treaty known as the Charter of the IORA for Regional Cooperation.
    • It is based on the principles of Open Regionalism for strengthening Economic Cooperation particularly on Trade Facilitation and Investment, Promotion as well as Social Development of the region.

  • India-Myanmar relations

    The Foreign Secretary and Chief of the Army Staff have recently visited Myanmar reflected India’s multidimensional interests in the country.

    Try this question:

    Q.Myanmar is the key in linking South Asia to Southeast Asia and the eastern periphery becomes the focal point for New Delhi’s regional outreach. Analyse.

    India-Myanmar relations

    • There are two lines of thinking that drive India’s Myanmar policy: engagement with key political actors and balancing neighbours.
    • For Myanmar, the visit would be viewed as India’s support for its efforts in strengthening democratization amidst criticisms by rights groups over the credibility of its upcoming election.

    Non-interference in internal politics

    • The political logic that has shaped India’s Myanmar policy since the 1990s has been to support democratization driven from within the country.
    • This has allowed Delhi to engage with the military that played a key role in Myanmar’s political transition and is still an important political actor.
    • A key factor behind the military regime’s decision to open the country when it initiated reforms was, in part, to reduce dependence on China.

    India as an alternative

    • By engaging Myanmar, Delhi provides alternative options to Naypyidaw.
    • This driver in India’s Myanmar policy has perhaps gained greater salience in the rapidly changing regional geopolitics.

    Recent initiatives

    • Like in other neighbouring countries, India suffers from an image of being unable to get its act together in making its presence felt on the ground.
    • The inauguration of the liaison office of the Embassy of India in Naypyidaw (the capital) may seem a routine diplomatic activity.
    • However, establishing a permanent presence in the capital where only a few countries have set up such offices does matter.
    • Interestingly, China was the first country to establish a liaison office in Naypyidaw in 2017.
    • India has also proposed to build a petroleum refinery in Myanmar that would involve an investment of $6 billion.

    Strategic calculus

    • This is an indication of Myanmar’s growing significance in India’s strategic calculus.
    • It also shows India’s evolving competitive dynamic with China in the sector at a time when tensions between the two have intensified.
    • Another area of cooperation that has expanded involves the border areas.
    • Furthermore, the recent announcement that India was transferring a Kilo-class submarine to Myanmar demonstrates the depth of their cooperation in the maritime domain.

    The balancing act

    • For Delhi, the balancing act between Bangladesh and Myanmar remains one of the keys to its overall approach to the Rohingya issue.
    • Delhi has reiterated its support for “ensuring the safe, sustainable and speedy return of displaced persons” to Myanmar.
    • By positioning as playing an active role in facilitating the return of Rohingya refugees, India has made it clear that it supports Myanmar’s efforts and also understands Bangladesh’s burden.
    • For Delhi, engaging rather than criticizing is the most practical approach to finding a solution.

    Conclusion

    • For India, Myanmar is key in linking South Asia to Southeast Asia and the eastern periphery becomes the focal point for New Delhi’s regional outreach.
    • Delhi’s political engagement and diplomatic balancing seem to have worked so far in its ties with Myanmar.
    • Whether it has leveraged these advantages on the ground to the full is open to debate.
    • The aforementioned initiatives could be the beginning of change on the ground by establishing India’s presence in sectors where it ought to be more pronounced.

  • Places in news: Taiwan Strait

    A U.S. warship sailed through the Taiwan Strait in what the American military described as a “routine” passage on but enraging China, which claims sovereignty over the island and surrounding seas.

    Try this PYQ:

    Q.Which one of the following can one come across if one travels through the Strait of Malacca?

    (a) Bali

    (b) Brunei

    (c) Java

    (d) Singapore

    Taiwan Strait

    • The Taiwan Strait, also known as the Formosa Strait, is a 180 km wide strait separating Taiwan and mainland China.
    • The strait is currently part of the South China Sea and connects to the East China Sea to the north. The narrowest part is 130 km wide.
    • The entire strait is on Asia’s continental shelf.
    • Historically both the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and Taiwan espoused a One-China Policy that considered the strait part of the exclusive economic zone of a single “China”.

    Tap to read more about One China Policy at:

  • Challenges India faces in managing relations in neighbourhood

    The article analyses the inherent challenges India faces in managing good relations with its neighbours.

    Duality challenge

    • Even for the Britishers, it was an unceasing struggle to sustain its primacy in the region.
    • The notion of regional primacy certainly persisted in the Nehru era.
    • Primacy was hard to sustain after Independence even within the immediate neighbourhood.

    Five reasons stand out

    1) Partition of the subcontinent

    • The problems generated by the great division of the Subcontinent on religious lines continue to animate the region.
    • Partition created the challenges of settling boundaries, sharing river-waters, protecting the rights of minorities, and easing the flow of goods and people.
    • The burden of the Subcontinent’s history is not easily discarded.

    2) Unification of China

    • The unification of China amidst the Partition of India had profoundly transformed the geopolitical condition of India.
    • Beyond the bilateral territorial dispute in the Himalayas, the emergence of a large and purposeful state on India’s frontiers was going to be a problem given the ease with which it could constrain Delhi within the Subcontinent.

    3) India’s choice in favour of de-globalisation

    • Independent India’s conscious choice in favour of de-globalisation led to a steady dissipation of commercial connectivity with the neighbours.
    •  India’s economic reorientation since the 1990s and the rediscovery of regionalism did open possibilities for reconnecting with its neighbours.
    • Delhi today is acutely aware of the need to revive regional connectivity.
    • There is much progress in recent years — note, for example, the recent launch of a ferry service to the Maldives or the reopening of inland waterways with Bangladesh.
    • Integrating India’s regional economic and foreign policy remains a major challenge-Consider the recent fiasco of onion exports to Bangladesh.

    4) Rise of political agency in the neighbourhood

    • India ignores the rise of political agency among neighbourhood elites and mass politics that they need to manage.
    • Their imperatives don’t always coincide with those of Delhi.
    • It is unlikely that Delhi can completely insure itself against the intra-elite conflicts in the neighbourhood.

    5) Influence of domestic politics on foreign policy

    • Can India persistently champion Tamil minority rights in Sri Lanka without incurring any costs with the Sinhala majority?
    • But asking that question takes us to India’s own domestic politics.
    • Can Delhi ignore sentiments in India’s Tamil Nadu in making its Sri Lanka policy?
    • Indian Prime Minister did not attend the Colombo Commonwealth Summit in 2013 because of the Tamil minority issue.
    • The Teesta Waters agreement was not concluded due to political reasons.

    Ways forward

    • Timely responses to problems.
    • Preventing small issues from becoming big.
    • Aligning Delhi’s regional economic policy with India’s natural geographic advantages .
    • These are some important elements of any successful management of India’s perennial neighbourhood challenges.

    Conclusion

    There are no easy answers to the regional difficulties that trouble all governments in Delhi. The source of the problem lies in the deeply interconnected nature of South Asian societies administered by multiple sovereigns.

  • India needs a China plan

    The article discusses the issue of dealing with China in the aftermath of clashes on the border.

    Understanding the importance of Tibet

    • Tibet is the roof of the world, with vast mineral and natural resources.
    • The mighty rivers that emanate from its expansive glaciers — such as the Brahmaputra, the Yangtse, the Yellow river, the Mekong, the Salween and the Indus — together with thousands of their tributaries have nurtured civilisations in peripheral countries for centuries.
    • The Kailash Mansarovar is centered in this region.
    • In an act of naked aggression, China occupied Tibet in 1959.
    • A buffer was eliminated, and the de facto boundary of China became contiguous to that of India.
    • That boundary was deliberately left undemarcated to enable further expansion.

    Understanding China’s stand

    • China has land borders with 14 neighbours covering an estimated 22,100 kilometres.
    • Post-independence, and as its economic status increased, so did its military muscle.
    • China embarked on claims based on perceived imbalances of treaties forced on countries when they were weak.
    • Some of these have since been resolved after bloody clashes such as with Russia and Vietnam, while others have been resolved using a combination of lucrative offers.
    • Russia accepted half of China’s claim, Kazakhstan was given lucrative economic deals, Kyrgyzstan retained 70% of the land, ceding just 30%, and so on.

    Way forward

    • The road ahead will have to be evolved and based on a study of the manner in which China has negotiated its boundary disputes with 12 of its neighbours.
    • Under the prevailing circumstances, it has become imperative to form a group of experts.
    • This group will plan and prepare, short-, medium- and long-term goals to achieve them within a suggested time frame.

     Conclusion

    Let us play down the rhetoric and adopt a pragmatic approach. It can no longer be a part-time issue to be addressed only when a crisis occurs. The crisis is upon us now.

  • Role for India in Afghan peace push

    The U.S. objectives

    • Following  4 were the states as objectives of the Afghan peace process.
    • 1) An end to violence by declaring a ceasefire.
    • 2) An intra-Afghan dialogue for a lasting peace.
    • 3) The Taliban cutting ties with terrorist organisations such as al Qaeda.
    • 4)  U.S. troop withdrawal.

    Evolving Indian stand in the peace process

    • India’s vision of a sovereign, united, stable, plural and democratic Afghanistan is one that is shared by a large constituency in Afghanistan, cutting across ethnic and provincial lines.
    • At Doha meeting, India’s External Affairs Ministerreiterated that the peace process must be “Afghan led, Afghan owned and Afghan controlled”.
    • But Indian policy has evolved from its earlier hands-off approach to the Taliban.
    • U.S. and Russian representatives suggested if India had concerns regarding anti-India activities of terrorist groups, it must engage directly with the Taliban. In other words.

    Limited interest of the major powers

    • Major powers have limited interests in the peace process.
    • The European Union has made it clear that its financial contribution will depend on the security environment and the human rights record.
    • China can always lean on Pakistan to preserve its security and connectivity interests.
    • For Russia, blocking the drug supply and keeping its southern periphery secure from extremist influences is key.
    • That is why no major power is taking ownership for the reconciliation talks, but merely content with being facilitators.

    Conclusion

    A more active engagement will enable India to work with like-minded forces in the region to ensure that the vacuum created by the U.S. withdrawal does not lead to an unravelling of the gains registered during the last two decades.

  • Indus Water Treaty turns 60

    September 19 this year marks the 60th anniversary of the Indus Water Treaty (IWT) between India and Pakistan.

    Tap to read more about Indus River System:

    Drainage System | Part 3

    Indus Waters Treaty, 1960

    • The Indus Waters Treaty is a water-distribution treaty between India and Pakistan, brokered by the World Bank signed in Karachi in 1960.
    • According to this agreement, control over the water flowing in three “eastern” rivers of India — the Beas, the Ravi and the Sutlej was given to India
    • The control over the water flowing in three “western” rivers of India — the Indus, the Chenab and the Jhelum was given to Pakistan
    • The treaty allowed India to use western rivers water for limited irrigation use and unrestricted use for power generation, domestic, industrial and non-consumptive uses such as navigation, floating of property, fish culture, etc. while laying down precise regulations for India to build projects
    • India has also been given the right to generate hydroelectricity through the run of the river (RoR) projects on the Western Rivers which, subject to specific criteria for design and operation is unrestricted.

    Based on equitable water-sharing

    • Back in time, partitioning the Indus rivers system was inevitable after the Partition of India in 1947.
    • The sharing formula devised after prolonged negotiations sliced the Indus system into two halves.
    • Equitable it may have seemed, but the fact remained that India conceded 80.52 per cent of the aggregate water flows in the Indus system to Pakistan.
    • It also gave Rs 83 crore in pounds sterling to Pakistan to help build replacement canals from the western rivers. Such generosity is unusual of an upper riparian.
    • India conceded its upper riparian position on the western rivers for the complete rights on the eastern rivers. Water was critical for India’s development plans.

    India plays resilient

    • That the treaty has remained “uninterrupted” is because India respects its signatory and values trans-boundary Rivers as an important connector in the region in terms of both diplomacy and economic prosperity.
    • There have been several instances of terror attacks which could have prompted India, within the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, to withdraw from the IWT.
    • However, on each occasion, India chose not to do so.

    Significance of the treaty

    • It is a treaty that is often cited as an example of the possibilities of peaceful coexistence that exist despite the troubled relationship.
    • Well-wishers of the treaty often dub it “uninterrupted and uninterruptible”.
    • The World Bank, which, as the third party, played a pivotal role in crafting the IWT, continues to take particular pride that the treaty functions.

    Need for a rethink

    • The role of India, as a responsible upper riparian abiding by the provisions of the treaty, has been remarkable.
    • However, of late, India is under pressure to rethink the extent to which it can remain committed to the provisions, as its overall political relations with Pakistan becomes intractable.

  • Our larger China picture

    Context

    • After the skirmish at the border, Beijing started to concentrate troops, armoured vehicles and munitions opposite our posts in Aksai China at Galwan.

    2 interpretations of China’s move

    • First believes that the Chinese exercise was a territorial snatch in Aksai Chin, which they believe is entirely theirs.
    • The move was accompanied by a “lesson” to the Indians on aggressive Indian behaviour in not conceding Aksai Chin.
    • The second school of thought in India believes that territory has nothing to do with it.
    • They believe that, due to growing economic power, Beijing will lay down the rules of world governance.

    How it matters for India

    • India contest China’s entire southern border, refuse to join the Belt and Road initiative, create an anti-China maritime coalition, compete with them for influence in South East Asia and Africa.
    • India is also unsupportive of their crackdown on Taiwan, Hong Kong and Xinjiang and move ever closer to the United States.
    • When China assumes hegemonic power after 2030, India is going to get a nasty surprise.
    • Secularism, democracy and the rights of man will play no part in Chinese foreign policy.
    • China will overturn every international, financial, trade, diplomatic, arms control and nuclear agreement that the world has put together in seven decades.

    Way forward

    • We in India need to conduct a large and vociferous debate on Chinese intentions.
    • If the Chinese intention is to “teach us a lesson” we need a new national strategy, combining diplomatic and military means.
    •  If our national goal is to concentrate on the creation of wealth and growing GDP, let us proclaim it, tighten our belt, look down and avoid conflict.

    Conclusion

    What China wants is Indian acceptance of Beijing’s benign superiority, and that is a purely Chinese trait, not to be confused with the known rules of international diplomacy. Talking from a position of inferiority will not lead to an equitable solution. But first, a national debate.

  • Neither war nor peace between India and China

    The article analyses the challenges in the India-China border dispute and the recent events of Chinese aggression.

    Trust deficit

    • The recent Chinese actions have set back trust between the two countries by decades.
    • Trust made sense when both sides could assume that the other side either did not have the capacity or would not rapidly deploy troops in strategic positions at the border.
    • With the building of infrastructure on both sides, this trust was bound to break.
    • Even after temporary disengagement, both sides will now have distrust about the deployment of the other side.
    • An infrastructure-thick environment will require a permanent presence and closer deployments.

    Challenges

    •  At the level of the army, India seems to have consistently misread the PLA’s intentions.
    •  The closer the armies get, the greater the risks.
    • There is a political logic that does not bode well. There is still speculation on why the Chinese are taking an aggressive posture.
    • The very fact that we are not sure of Chinese motives means it is hard to know their endgame.

    Chinese fears

    • At a basic level, they will want to secure their interests in CPEC.
    • Tibet issue has also been a sensitive issue for China.
    •  Chinese interest in Nepal is less to encircle India. It is to ensure Nepal is not used as a staging ground of resistance in Tibet.

    Tibet issues in India-China relations

    • On Tibet issue India is in an awkward situation.
    • Due to the presence of the Dalai Lama in India, China will see it as a potential threat to its cultural hegemony in Tibet.
    • Ladakh and Tawang are also important pieces in that cultural consolidation.
    • The Sino-India peaceful relations were premised on keeping the Tibet issue in check.
    • But just as we are not sure of Chinese motives, they may not be sure of our motives either.

    New paradigm in India’s foreign policy

    • India growing power means it needs a new paradigm of foreign policy.
    • This policy will supposedly safeguard India’s interests more assertively.
    • If diplomatically not well managed, this change also causes great uncertainty in the international system.
    • India’s Pakistan policy is premised entirely on keeping them guessing on what we might do, including possible military options and altering the territorial status quo.
    • Our domestic ideological articulation of India’s position ranges from reclaiming PoK to Aksai Chin.
    • We cannot abandon Tibetans.
    • This underscores a narrative of uncertainty over our intentions.

    Conclusion

    Our own trumpeted departure from the past, without either the diplomatic preparation, domestic political discipline, and full anticipation of military eventualities, does not make it easy for others to understand our endgame.