In Manipur, a flailing state, a missing political process

Why in the News

Manipur’s ethnic conflict has widened from a fight between the valley’s Meiteis and the hill Kuki-Zo, under way since May 2023, to a new Kuki-Zo and Naga conflict deep in the hill districts. At least nine people were killed in a day from the night of October 9. President’s Rule, a change of Chief Minister and heavy security deployment had all failed to end the strife.

What is Manipur’s conflict, and how has it shifted?

1. Rival claims: Manipur’s valley and hill communities compete over land, identity and constitutional protections. Like neighbours fighting over one boundary wall, each clash hardens every side’s claim.
2. Meitei and Kuki-Zo toll: This violence has continued with little respite. It has claimed around 300 lives and displaced close to 60,000 people.
3. Naga and Kuki-Zo fault line: This older rivalry produced violent clashes in the 1990s. It has now resurfaced across the hill districts.
4. Persistent failure: In three and a half years, neither the State nor the Union government has addressed the violence or the ethnic tensions beneath it.
5. The takeaway: Changing who governs Manipur and adding troops has not touched the underlying tensions, so the conflict keeps finding new fault lines.

Why has the state failed to contain the violence?

1. State capacity and Union neglect: The State government has limited capacity to control the violence, and the Union government has shown negligence towards it.
2. Failure to foresee: Neither outbreak was anticipated. This raises doubts about the state’s law enforcement and its understanding of ethnic tensions.
3. Missed chance to disarm: President’s Rule (direct Union rule over a State) ran from February 2025 to February 2026. It was a chance to recover looted weapons, and it was missed.
4. Militias as stakeholders: Militant groups and ethnic militias were never disarmed, so they still shape the violence, including the recent Kuki-Zo and Naga clashes.

Why is there no political process, and what has it cost?

1. Peace Committee unused: A 51-member Peace Committee was announced after the Union Home Minister’s visit in June 2023. It was meant to bring warring groups to talks with the Governor, but it never started work.
2. Hill councils: Manipur’s six Autonomous District Councils (ADCs) are elected bodies giving hill communities local self-government, under the Manipur (Hill Areas) District Councils Act, 1971, not the Constitution’s Sixth Schedule.
3. Overdue elections: The last ADC elections were held in 2015. The councils’ term ended in 2020, so polls are now long overdue.
4. Councils and peace: Militant activity and violence fell between 2010 and 2020, when the ADCs functioned, alongside peace agreements. Their dysfunction has cut the link between hill communities and the government.
5. Eroded social cohesion: Communities have sharply lost trust in one another, which has deepened the political failure. The state’s response has not repaired these relations.

Challenges

1. Weapons in circulation: Looted arms remain with militias, so any local dispute can escalate into armed clashes.
2. Physical separation: Meitei and Kuki-Zo areas remain divided by security-manned buffer zones, which blocks everyday contact and reconciliation.
3. Competing territorial demands: Kuki-Zo groups seek a separate administration. Naga groups claim the same hill districts for a Greater Nagalim.
4. Porous Myanmar border: Cross-border movement and drug trafficking finance armed groups. Eg. The Moreh drug corridor.

Way Forward

1. Time bound disarmament: The State and Union governments should run a joint drive to recover looted weapons from all militias.
2. ADC elections: The State government should hold the overdue council elections and give the councils direct funds.
3. Revive the Peace Committee: Convene a dialogue forum with Meitei, Kuki-Zo and Naga representatives under the Governor.
4. Smart border fencing: Complete surveillance and fencing along the Myanmar border to cut arms and drug flows.

Conclusion

Manipur shows that deploying forces without a political process holds violence down only until the next fault line opens. The test is whether the State revives elected councils and disarms the militias before the earlier gains against militancy are lost.

Government Initiatives on Manipur’s Conflict

1. Suspension of Operations (SoO) agreement (2008): Kuki groups under the Kuki National Organisation and United People’s Front agreed to halt armed operations and stay in designated camps.
2. United National Liberation Front (UNLF) accord (2023): The UNLF, the oldest valley insurgent group, signed a peace agreement with the Centre.
3. Inner Line Permit (2020): Extended to Manipur, requiring outsiders to obtain a permit to enter.
4. Free Movement Regime scrapped (2024): Visa-free movement across the Myanmar border was ended, with plans to fence it.

Matching Previous Year Question

“No direct PYQ traced in the provided files. Thematic PYQ: [2025, GS3, 15 marks] What are the major challenges to internal security and peace process in the North-Eastern States? Map the various peace accords and agreements initiated by the government in the past decade.”