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Subject: North East Insurgency

  • Naga leaders agree to open key Manipur highway after talks with Centre in Assam

    Why in the News

    The United Naga Council has agreed to lift its economic blockade of Manipur’s national highways temporarily, after tripartite talks with the Centre and the State government in Assam. The lifting rests only on a promise that its demands will be addressed, after more than three months of cut supplies.

    What is an economic blockade, and why does it bite in Manipur?

    1. What it is: An economic blockade is an obstruction of road traffic by a community body, not the State, so there is no order to revoke.
    2. Why Manipur is exposed: The State is landlocked and almost everything it consumes arrives by road, mainly National Highway 2 from Imphal to Dimapur.
    3. Which roads were closed: Goods traffic stopped on National Highways 2, 37, 202 and 102A.
    4. How it escalated: The blockade began on 11 June and the Council made it indefinite on 9 September.
    5. The takeaway: A blockade on a State with one supply corridor pressures the government by cutting off the population first, the protesters’ neighbours included.

    What is the United Naga Council demanding?

    1. Killing of six civilians: Six Naga civilians from Leilon Vaiphei village were abducted and killed in May, which set off the blockade.
    2. Revoke the ceasefire: The Council wants the Suspension of Operations ceasefire with Kuki armed groups revoked. That arrangement has held through the ethnic conflict since May 2023.
    3. Removal of a minister and prosecution: The Council also wants Deputy Chief Minister Nemcha Kipgen removed and justice for the six men killed, with every demand met first.
    4. Kamjong killings raised: The Council raised the recent killing of four Naga civilians in Kamjong district. The government promised to maintain law and order.

    What did the blockade do to the State?

    1. Shortages in the Imphal Valley: The Imphal Valley ran short of medicines, baby food, fresh produce and fuel as consignments stopped moving.
    2. Black market prices: Petrol sold for as much as Rs 250 a litre in the black market and a cooking gas cylinder for up to Rs 5,000.
    3. Hill districts also cut off: Kuki Zo districts depend on routes through Naga areas, so Kangpokpi, Churachandpur, Tengnoupal and Pherzawl ran short of goods and medical supplies.

    Why did the talks move now?

    1. Tripartite talks in Assam: The Council met the Union Ministry of Home Affairs and the State government at the Border Security Force frontier headquarters in Garbhanga, Assam.
    2. Earlier rounds had failed: Talks with the Chief Minister at Senapati broke down on 8 July. A round on 10 August produced only an agreement to keep talking.
    3. Concession in the parallel talks: The Centre agreed to Union Minister level participation in the Naga Peace Process, the separate Naga settlement talks long sought by the National Socialist Council of Nagaland (Isak Muivah).
    4. No official word yet: Neither the Centre nor the State government has confirmed what was agreed.

    Challenges

    1. No enforceable end: The lifting is temporary and rests only on a promise, so goods traffic can be stopped again at any time.
    2. Revocation would remove a restraint: Ending the Suspension of Operations would free Kuki armed groups from camp confinement.
    3. Justice remains a demand: The killings that triggered the blockade have produced no announced outcome.

    Way Forward

    1. Put the demands on dates: The Union Ministry of Home Affairs should record each demand against a named authority and a response date.
    2. Prosecute the killings: Hand the May abductions to a court monitored investigation with a deadline for filing charges.
    3. Protect the supply line: Notify the highways feeding Manipur as essential supply routes, with a State plan to escort convoys.
    4. Widen the table: Bring Kuki Zo and Meitei bodies into the same format, since settling with one community shifts the blockade.

    Conclusion

    Trucks will move again, but every demand that stopped them stays open, so the State has bought supplies with a promise. Watch whether those demands are recorded against dates, because nothing else stands between Manipur and the next blockade.

    Back2Basics: Suspension of Operations agreement

    1. What it is: A tripartite ceasefire signed by the Centre, the State government and an armed group that gives up violence and accepts the Constitution.
    2. What it obliges: Cadres stay in designated camps, weapons are held in monitored storage, and the agreement runs for fixed terms.
    3. When it began in Manipur: The arrangement with Kuki Zo armed groups was first signed in 2008 and has been extended since.

    Matching Previous Year Question

    “[2025, GS3, 15 marks] What are the major challenges to internal security and peace process in the North-Eastern States? Map the various peace accords and agreements initiated by the government in the past decade.”

  • Union Minister to join Naga peace negotiations; encouraging: NSCN (IM)

    Why in the News

    The Centre has agreed to include a Union Minister or a group of Union level Ministers in the Naga peace talks. The step meets a longstanding demand of the National Socialist Council of Nagalim (Isak Muivah), or NSCN (IM), for political representation in the negotiations. It follows the appointment of Ajit Lal, a former Joint Intelligence Committee chief, as the Centre’s pointsman for the talks seven months ago. The talks have run since 1997 and produced a Framework Agreement in 2015 that was never converted into a settlement. A day after welcoming the new format, the group’s External Publicity Wing described a Nagalim national flag and a Nagalim national constitution as non negotiable, two demands the Centre has said will not be met.

    What is the Naga peace process?

    1. The negotiating track: The Union government has been holding talks with the NSCN (IM) since 1997 to resolve the decades long insurgency in the Naga hills through a peace accord.
    2. The Framework Agreement: A Framework Agreement between the government and the NSCN (IM) was signed on 3 August 2015. Little was achieved after it.
    3. The interlocutor mechanism: The Centre negotiates through an appointed pointsman rather than through a minister. The post has passed from a former Indian Police Service officer to a former Additional Director of the Intelligence Bureau and now to a former Joint Intelligence Committee chief, who holds the post of Adviser (North East) in the Ministry of Home Affairs.
    4. The ceasefire boundary: Participation in the talks runs alongside a ceasefire, and a Naga armed group outside that ceasefire is outside the negotiation as well.

    What does political level representation change in the talks?

    1. The concession on format: The Centre has agreed to bring a Union Minister, or a group of Union level Ministers, into the negotiation framework. The talks so far have been conducted by an appointed official.
    2. The group’s stated expectation: The NSCN (IM) said the decision will “expedite the political process” and create the momentum for “an honourable and enduring political settlement”.
    3. The demand behind it: The security establishment’s reading is that the NSCN (IM) has always wanted the negotiations to be political, with political representatives involved, rather than conducted at the official level.

    Why did the talks stall after the Framework Agreement was signed?

    1. Disagreement over the 2015 text: The parties fell out over the Framework Agreement itself, and the dispute over what it committed either side to hardened the group’s position.
    2. Public accusations on both sides: The NSCN (IM) accused the then interlocutor of “mischief” and of attempts to “segregate Naga society”. The interlocutor called the NSCN an “armed gang” and accused it of running a “parallel government” engaged in extortion.
    3. A stalemate rather than a rupture: The exchanges virtually pushed the talks into a stalemate without ending them, and the public altercations of the early 2020s made a settlement appear more distant.
    4. A change of interlocutor did not help: The post passed to a former Additional Director of the Intelligence Bureau and the talks still failed to make much headway.

    What explains the change in the NSCN (IM)’s tone?

    1. First acceptance of the interlocutor: The group welcomed the current pointsman’s appointment as “interlocutor” for the first time, calling it a “significant and encouraging development that reflects the GoI’s renewed resolve to advance the peace process with seriousness and urgency”. He was appointed Adviser (North East) in February.
    2. Prior standing with the Nagas: He had officiated as interlocutor for five months in 2014, and his relations with the Nagas are cited as one reason the present step became possible.
    3. A State government kept inside the process: The NSCN (IM) thanked the Nagaland government for its “sincere participation and active facilitation”, and said its engagement has been instrumental in sustaining the peace process.

    How does the breakaway Eastern Flank constrain the NSCN (IM)?

    1. A rebel faction outside the ceasefire: The Eastern Flank, based in Myanmar, is a hardline faction that has refused negotiations with the government and is not under any ceasefire agreement.
    2. The defection that gave it standing: In 2024 Ikato, son of NSCN co founder Isak Chishi Swu, joined the faction, accusing the NSCN (IM) leadership of being “corrupt” and of “compromising the (Naga) national interest for their own selfish gain”. He was appointed its chairman in July this year.
    3. The legitimacy problem it creates: The chairmanship confers legitimacy because he is Isak’s son and a Naga from Nagaland. The NSCN (IM) is led by Muivah, a Tangkhul from Manipur.
    4. Popular impatience adds to it: Patience in Nagaland has been wearing thin over the delay in concluding the peace process, which builds further pressure on the NSCN (IM).

    Can a political upgrade survive the demands the Centre has ruled out?

    1. The two non negotiables: The External Publicity Wing of the NSCN (IM) asserted that the ongoing political negotiations rest on “sovereignty” between the government and the NSCN, and described the “Nagalim national flag and Nagalim national constitution” as “non negotiable”.
    2. The Centre’s stated limit: Delhi has said a Naga flag and a separate Naga constitution will not be conceded. The same two items are the group’s core demands.
    3. Hardliners narrow the room to compromise: The Eastern Flank’s position makes it costlier for the NSCN (IM) to soften on either demand, because any concession would be read against a faction that has refused to negotiate at all.

    Conclusion

    The talks have changed their format without changing their content. Ministerial participation answers a question about who sits at the table. It does not touch the two demands the Centre has ruled out, and the group restated both within a day of welcoming the new arrangement. What to watch is whether a ministerial round is actually convened, and whether the faction sitting outside the ceasefire is brought into one.

    Matching Previous Year Question

    “[2025, GS3, 15 marks] What are the major challenges to internal security and peace process in the North-Eastern States? Map the various peace accords and agreements initiated by the government in the past decade.”

  • Ensure dignity, way back for Manipur’s displaced

    Why in the News

    The Supreme Court has expressed shock at reports of deaths, including unnatural deaths, in relief camps for internally displaced people (IDPs) in Manipur. The displacement follows ethnic violence that has remained intractable for over three years. The Manipur government told the State Assembly this month that the number of people in relief camps and temporary locations has fallen to 28,899, from nearly 60,000 at the peak of the violence. The tension is between camp management and settlement. The State can staff camps and supply medicines, and neither step restores the conditions for people to go home. The Meitei and Kuki conflict remains unsettled, and it has now acquired a Naga and Kuki dimension as well.

    Why is healthcare access the sharpest cost of prolonged displacement?

    1. Concentration in the capital: Manipur’s healthcare system is heavily concentrated in Imphal, so specialist treatment is a journey rather than a local service for most of the State.
    2. The two tertiary hospitals: The Jawaharlal Nehru Institute of Medical Sciences and the Regional Institute of Medical Sciences are the State’s two tertiary government hospitals. Both are located in the capital.
    3. What segregation did to access: Once violence induced ethnic segregation set in, Kuki-Zo people from the hills could no longer travel to the Valley for treatment.
    4. The gap in the hills: Healthcare facilities in the hills lack specialists and essential equipment, so the referral chain has no second tier to fall back on.

    What does the geography of treatment now look like?

    1. Treatment outside the State: Some patients have had to seek healthcare outside Manipur. The closest destination is Aizawl, a journey of over 12 hours by road.
    2. Blockades as a health problem: Persistent blockades obstruct patients travelling to hospitals. They also obstruct the movement of medicines and of medical personnel.
    3. Nutrition in the camps: The food provided in many camps is nutritionally deficient. That compounds the burden on a health system already out of reach.
    4. A temporary refuge made permanent: What was meant to be temporary shelter has left thousands of people dependent on an inadequate and fragile healthcare system.

    What do the displacement figures show?

    1. The current count: The number of IDPs in relief camps and temporary locations stands at 28,899.
    2. The decline from the peak: The figure was nearly 60,000 at the peak of the violence, so more than half of those displaced have left the camps.
    3. What the fall does not measure: A falling count records movement out of camps. It records nothing about whether people returned to their own homes or their own areas.
    4. The duration: The displacement has run for over three years, so the population still in the camps is the population with nowhere else to go.

    Why can camp management not substitute for a political settlement?

    1. The unresolved conflict: Without a durable solution to the Meitei and Kuki conflict, the conditions for safe and sustainable rehabilitation remain out of reach.
    2. The widening fault line: The conflict has increasingly acquired a Naga and Kuki dimension, so a settlement between two communities no longer covers the dispute.
    3. What the State can do now: The State must ensure adequately staffed medical facilities at or near the camps, along with supplies of medicines and other essential services.
    4. What a settlement requires: Dialogue and confidence building measures are the route to a political settlement that ends the violence and allows displaced people to rebuild with security and dignity.

    Challenges to the rehabilitation of Manipur’s displaced

    1. Return depends on security guarantees the State cannot yet give: Displaced households will not return to mixed or frontier areas without an assurance against renewed attack, so camp exits outpace actual resettlement. Eg. Buffer zones along the Valley and hill boundary have been held by central forces since 2023 rather than dismantled.
      The Fix: Publish a village wise return plan naming the security arrangement, the timeline and the compensation attached to each village.
    2. Documentation loss blocks entitlements: People who fled without papers lose access to rations, pensions, school admission and land records, so displacement hardens into a durable loss of status. Eg. Camp residents have needed fresh identity documentation to reach welfare schemes tied to place of residence.
      The Fix: Run a single window re issue drive for identity, land and school records inside the camps, with the camp address accepted as proof of residence.
    3. India has no statutory framework for internal displacement: Relief rests on executive discretion and court direction rather than on an enforceable entitlement, so standards vary by State and by episode. Eg. The Supreme Court has had to intervene on camp conditions in place of a statutory authority enforcing them.
      The Fix: Enact a framework law defining minimum camp standards, return entitlements and a named authority accountable for each.
    4. Education loss compounds across cohorts: Children in camps lose school years that are never recovered, so the displacement transfers to the next generation. Eg. School buildings in the affected districts were used to house displaced families, removing both the premises and the schooling.
      The Fix: Attach a residential bridge school to each camp cluster, with enrolment tracked against the pre displacement register.
    5. A relief economy entrenches the camp: Sustained rations, cash relief and camp based work create a livelihood structure that competes with the decision to return. Eg. Bru families displaced from Mizoram in 1997 lived in relief camps in Tripura until the resettlement agreement of 2020.
      The Fix: Convert relief into a time bound resettlement package payable on return, rather than an open ended entitlement payable in the camp.

    Conclusion

    Displacement in Manipur has stopped being a housing problem and become a health one. The camps are the point at which an already concentrated health system fails the people furthest from it. The State’s immediate obligation is staffed medical facilities at or near the camps, with the medicines and personnel to run them. The unresolved question is political, since a return that is safe and durable now needs a settlement covering the Naga and Kuki dimension as well as the Meitei and Kuki one.

    Back2Basics: internally displaced people

    1. Who they are: Internally displaced people are persons forced to flee their homes by conflict, violence or disaster who have not crossed an international border.
    2. How they differ from refugees: A refugee crosses an international border and gains protection under international refugee law. An internally displaced person remains under the jurisdiction of their own State.
    3. The governing standard: The United Nations Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement, 1998 set out the rights of displaced people and the duties of the State, without binding treaty force.
    4. The position in India: India has no dedicated law on internal displacement, so relief and rehabilitation run through executive schemes and State level orders.

    Matching Previous Year Question

    “[2025, GS3, 15] What are the major challenges to internal security and peace process in the North-Eastern States? Map the various peace accords and agreements initiated by the government in the past decade.”

  • New fault lines

    Why in the News

    Violence between the Naga and Kuki-Zo communities has spread across Manipur’s hill districts since February, opening a second ethnic fault line in the State. It follows three years in which the conflagration of May 2023 between the Meitei and Kuki-Zo communities had slowly begun to abate. Nearly a year of President’s Rule gave way in February 2026 to a Bharatiya Janata Party led government, and two Kuki-Zo legislators have since returned to the Assembly for the first time since the community’s boycott began. The tension is that political space is reopening between the valley and the hills at the same moment as a new conflict is closing it inside the hills.

    What has moved towards normalcy since 2023?

    1. A new State government: President’s Rule ended in February 2026 with the formation of a Bharatiya Janata Party led government under a new Chief Minister. Attempts to engineer a thaw between the Meitei and Kuki-Zo communities gathered pace after it.
    2. Everyday violence abating: Routine violence between the two communities has reduced over the three years since the May 2023 conflagration.
    3. Return to the Assembly: Two Kuki-Zo MLAs attended the Assembly session this month, the first attendance since legislators from the community began boycotting it after the attacks in Imphal at the start of the ethnic conflict.
    4. Defiance of the boycott directive: The two legislators acted against a directive of the Kuki Inpi Manipur, the Kuki-Zo civil society organisation, to continue the boycott until there was a concession on the demand for a separate administration.
    5. What the attendance signals: Their presence represents an acknowledgement that the political space should reopen even while the underlying differences persist.

    What does the new Naga and Kuki-Zo conflict look like?

    1. Spread from localised disputes: Violence that began as local disputes has spread across the hill districts since February.
    2. The toll to July: At least 15 Kuki-Zo people, 11 Nagas, three security personnel and a truck driver were killed till July. More have died in the two months since.
    3. Villages burnt: Houses in both Naga and Kuki-Zo villages have been burnt down, and the newly displaced have moved into camps.
    4. Armed groups as the driver: Armed groups claiming to act on behalf of their respective communities have revived the conflict rather than the communities having drifted into it.

    Why do the hill districts keep returning to the same dispute?

    1. A 1990s precedent: The present violence echoes the Naga and Kuki violence of the 1990s, which was fought over the same questions.
    2. Control of the hills: The dispute resurrects the argument over which community controls the hill areas.
    3. Customary law: It also resurrects the question of whose customary laws prevail in those areas, which no settlement between the valley and the hills addresses.

    What are civilians bearing?

    1. Displacement that has not ended: Many of those displaced in 2023 remain in relief camps three years later.
    2. Deaths inside the camps: A reply under the Right to Information Act, 2005 puts the number who have died in these camps at over 700, many for want of access to basic health care and adequate nutrition.
    3. Blockades on essentials: Blockades imposed by partisans of each community against the other have held up essentials and medicines. The smaller Kuki-Zo community is the worse affected by them.
    4. Health system in the hills: Health centres in the hills have been left dysfunctional, so the blockades fall on a system with no reserve capacity.

    Challenges to restoring peace in Manipur

    1. Armed groups outside any political process: Groups claiming a community mandate operate without being party to a settlement, so no agreement binds them. Eg. The Suspension of Operations arrangement with Kuki militant groups has been in dispute since 2023.
      The Fix: Make continued security force restraint conditional on verified cantonment and weapons accounting for every group claiming a community mandate.
    2. Blockades used as routine leverage: Economic blockades on the highways are a standing bargaining tool, and they fall hardest on the hill districts. Eg. National Highway 2 and National Highway 37 are the only supply lifelines into the State.
      The Fix: Treat every blockade as a criminal offence with named organisers, and run dedicated escort convoys on the two national highways.
    3. Relief camps becoming permanent: A camp population that persists for years accumulates health and nutrition failures that no relief budget corrects. Eg. Residents displaced in 2023 are entering a fourth year without returning home.
      The Fix: Publish a dated resettlement plan with security guarantees for each village of return, instead of open ended camp maintenance.
    4. Land and customary rights left unsettled: Hill administration and customary village authority run alongside each other with no forum to resolve a conflict between them. Eg. The Manipur (Hill Areas) District Councils Act, 1971 governs the district councils while village chiefs exercise customary authority over land.
      The Fix: Convene a statutory settlement process on boundaries and customary rights through the Hill Areas Committee of the Legislative Assembly.
    5. Electoral timing narrows the window: Assembly elections are due next year and the government’s tenure ends soon, so a contested campaign will overlap the containment effort. Eg. Displaced residents will vote while still living in relief camps.
      The Fix: Secure an all party agreement on ground rules for communal rhetoric before campaigning opens.

    Conclusion

    Manipur’s peace effort is now being asked to hold two fronts at once. The divide between the valley and the hills is easing at the level of political participation, while a conflict inside the hills is hardening beneath it, and the arrangements built for the first do not reach the second. What the State can supply is even handedness: criminal law applied identically across communities, and protection of civilians that does not vary by ethnicity. Whether that standard survives an election campaign is the thing to watch.

    Back2Basics: The hill and valley administration of Manipur

    1. Article 371C: It carries a special provision for Manipur, empowering the President to constitute a Hill Areas Committee of the Legislative Assembly drawn from members representing the hill constituencies.
    2. What the Committee does: It considers legislation and administration affecting the hill areas, and the Governor reports annually to the President on the administration of those areas.
    3. District Councils: Six autonomous district councils function in the hill districts under the Manipur (Hill Areas) District Councils Act, 1971, outside the Sixth Schedule framework used in some other North Eastern States.
    4. The demographic split: The Imphal valley holds the bulk of the State’s population and is largely Meitei, while the surrounding hill districts are home to the Naga and Kuki-Zo communities.

    Matching Previous Year Question

    “[2025, GS3, 15] What are the major challenges to internal security and peace process in the North-Eastern States? Map the various peace accords and agreements initiated by the government in the past decade.”

  • Need to break Manipur’s cycle of reprisal (Editorial)

    Need to break Manipur’s cycle of reprisal (Editorial)

    Why in the News

    More than three years after the Meitei-Kuki clashes began, Manipur now faces a deepening Kuki-Naga fault line. Four Naga civilians were killed this week in Kuki-dominated Kangpokpi district, an episode that follows the killing of Kuki-Thadou church pastors in May, retaliatory abductions on both sides, and the recovery a month later of the bodies of six Naga men.

    How has the conflict widened beyond the original Meitei-Kuki fault line?

    1. A second, distinct fault line has opened: What began as Meitei-Kuki violence in 2023 has produced a separate Kuki-Naga confrontation, evident in this week’s killing of four Naga civilians in Kangpokpi, a district that sits between Naga-dominated Senapati to the north and Meitei-dominated valley districts to the south.
    2. A traceable chain of retaliation: The killing of Kuki-Thadou pastors in May was followed by retaliatory abductions from both communities, and the subsequent recovery of six Naga men’s bodies a month later, establishing a pattern of reprisal rather than an isolated incident.
    3. Blockades have turned roads into contested territory: Meitei, Kuki and Naga groups have separately imposed blockades that disrupt supplies, raise the cost of food and fuel, and restrict access to healthcare, with Kangpokpi the worst affected due to its position between rival-dominated districts.

    Why has the return of an elected government failed to restore order?

    1. A power-sharing arrangement has not translated into reconciliation: The state government led by Yumnam Khemchand Singh, a Meitei chief minister with deputy chief ministers from the Kuki and Naga communities, returned in February after almost a year of President’s Rule, but has found little success pulling the state back from the brink.
    2. Social segregation has outpaced political representation: The communities remain socially segregated, so political representation across the three groups in government has not by itself addressed the everyday separation that sustains distrust and enables further violence.
    3. Displacement has produced a significant, undercounted toll: Right to Information data has revealed that more than 700 internally displaced people have died in relief camps, a toll separate from and additional to deaths from direct violence.

    Challenges to a political settlement in Manipur

    1. Security forces have struggled to secure supply routes: Security forces have had very little success ensuring the safe movement of convoys carrying essential supplies through blockaded areas. Eg. Blockades imposed by Meitei, Kuki and Naga groups have repeatedly disrupted the movement of food, fuel and medical supplies into Kangpokpi and surrounding districts. Fix. Establish dedicated, jointly monitored humanitarian corridors for essential supplies, with monitoring involving representatives from all three communities rather than security forces alone.
    2. Armed groups remain undisbanded: Militant groups from multiple communities continue to operate, and a crackdown on extremist elements has not kept pace with the scale of continuing violence. Eg. The killing of four Naga civilians in Kangpokpi this week, alongside the earlier killing of Kuki-Thadou pastors, shows armed actors from more than one community remain capable of carrying out attacks. Fix. Pursue simultaneous, verifiable disarmament commitments from armed groups across all three communities rather than sequencing disarmament by community.
    3. No agreed framework exists for resolving land and identity claims: Every claim over land and identity cannot be resolved overnight, and the absence of an interim framework leaves communities without a safe basis for movement, trade or daily coexistence. Eg. The overlapping blockades by all three communities show there is currently no shared understanding of which areas each community can safely access. Fix. Prioritise an interim framework guaranteeing safe movement, trade and access to essential services, deferring final land and identity settlements to a later, dedicated political process.

    Conclusion

    The editorial’s position is that political representation alone, through a Meitei chief minister and Kuki and Naga deputy chief ministers, cannot resolve a conflict sustained by social segregation and repeated cycles of reprisal. It calls for sustained dialogue empowering civil society leaders, an interim framework for safe movement and trade, and simultaneous disarmament and action against extremist elements, alongside the immediate arrest of those responsible for this week’s killings.

    Back2Basics: What is President’s Rule?

    Central takeover of state governance: President’s Rule, imposed under Article 356 of the Constitution, allows the Union government to assume direct control of a state’s administration when its constitutional machinery is deemed to have broken down, as occurred in Manipur for nearly a year before the elected government returned in February.

    1. Remembering Niketu Iralu: Peace activist, bridge between Nagas, mainland India

      Remembering Niketu Iralu: Peace activist, bridge between Nagas, mainland India

      Why in the News

      Niketu Iralu, a Naga peace activist, died in a Delhi hospital on 18 August 2026 at the age of 91. He spent six decades on reconciliation between Naga factions and between the Naga people and the rest of India, outside every formal negotiating channel. His maternal uncle, Angami Zapu Phizo, led the Naga National Council (NNC), which declared Naga independence on 14 August 1947. The Centre constituted a new ministerial panel last week to carry forward the stalled talks on a final Naga settlement. The conflict has found no solution in the nearly eight decades since that declaration. One position holds that a final text can now be signed. The competing position is that the reconciliation work behind six decades of talks has no institutional successor.

      What is the Naga peace process?

      1. A ceasefire came before any accord: A peace camp at Chedema, on a hilltop near Kohima, negotiated a ceasefire in 1964 between the rebel Naga Federal Government and the Government of India. It was the first suspension of hostilities after more than a decade of armed insurgency.
      2. The Shillong Accord split the movement: NNC representatives signed the Shillong Accord in 1975, accepting the Constitution of India. A faction rejected it and formed the National Socialist Council of Nagaland (NSCN) in 1980.
      3. The current track opened with the 1997 ceasefire: The Centre signed a ceasefire with the NSCN (Isak-Muivah) faction in 1997. Talks under it have run for close to three decades without a final agreement.
      4. The Framework Agreement fixed the terms in 2015: The Centre and the NSCN (Isak-Muivah) signed a Framework Agreement on 3 August 2015 recognising the “unique history” of the Nagas. Its contents have never been published.

      Why did a family at the centre of the sovereignty claim produce its leading peace advocate?

      1. The lineage ran through the sovereignty movement: His father, Sevilie Iralu, was among the first Naga doctors. His maternal uncle led the council that made the 1947 declaration.
      2. He chose a different method: He committed himself to non-violence, dialogue and reconciliation rather than armed struggle. He became known across the Northeast as a peace activist rather than a political negotiator.
      3. Initiatives of Change shaped that method: He worked in Initiatives of Change, an organisation that pursues social transformation through “personal change”. Its premise is that a political conflict is resolved by first changing the people inside it.
      4. Mainland India was a discovery, not an inheritance: He left for Madras Christian College in the 1950s, his first encounter with mainland India. He described the crowds boarding trains at Kolkata as a scale of population that felt unsurvivable.
      5. His house was named for the method: His home at Sechu Zubza in Kohima district was called Kerunyu Ki, “The House of Listening”. People travelled to it for counsel rather than to a party office or a negotiating table.
      6. Recognition came as a bridge builder: He received the Bhupen Hazarika Integration Award among other honours. Hundreds gathered at Dimapur airport when his body arrived from Delhi.

      How does the Second World War figure in Naga political memory?

      1. The war reached Naga villages: The Japanese Army invaded Nagaland in 1944 during the Second World War. His village, Khonoma, was overrun and families fled into the forest.
      2. The battle of Kohima was the turning point: The Japanese retreated after the battle of Kohima. An advance past it would have taken them to the Brahmaputra valley and into mainland India.
      3. The cemetery fixed the memory: The Kohima War Cemetery carries the epitaph, “When you go home, tell them of us and say, for their tomorrow, we gave our today.”
      4. The war left a habit of seeing the enemy as human: His sister slapped a Japanese soldier helping himself to a Naga shawl, and the soldier bowed and left. He read that restraint as evidence that the soldier also had a sister at home.

      What did the 1990 repatriation of Phizo’s body show about informal mediation?

      1. The leader died in exile: Angami Zapu Phizo died in London in April 1990. He had been in exile since 1960, when he left for the United Kingdom to mobilise world opinion for the Naga cause.
      2. The request came from the insurgent side: NNC leaders asked him to help bring the body back to India. No working channel existed between the NNC and the Government of India at that point.
      3. The government feared a funeral would trigger violence: The Janata Dal led government judged that returning the body might set off violence in Nagaland. A Janata Dal member of the Rajya Sabha, who had worked with him in Initiatives of Change for three decades, argued that denying the Nagas the right to grieve was the greater risk.
      4. The ask was procedural, not financial: He told the then Finance Minister at a 5 a.m. meeting that the Nagas had collected the money themselves. He asked only for foreign exchange clearance.
      5. The state supplied the logistics: The remains were received at the technical area of Palam airport. A Home Ministry aircraft then carried the casket to Kohima for the funeral.

      Does reconciliation require a community to confront its own failures?

      1. The demand was turned inward, not outward: A tribute in Ukhrul Times described him as a man who spent decades asking Nagas to confront their failures, resist hatred and recover the courage to listen. The demand was addressed to Naga society, not to the Indian state.
      2. Moral courage was defined as internal criticism: He held that moral courage involves “telling one’s own side what it does not want to hear”. He did not treat reconciliation as a concession or as weakness.
      3. Factional politics penalises exactly that: Naga groups have fought each other as often as they have fought the state, and internal criticism reads as disloyalty inside a faction. Eg. The NSCN split of 1988 into the Isak-Muivah and Khaplang factions produced years of inter-factional killing.
      4. The obstacle is not an administrative clause: The unresolved items are a separate Naga flag and a separate Naga constitution, which are claims about identity rather than about administration. A negotiator can concede an administrative arrangement, and only the community can revise a claim about who it is.

      Challenges to the Naga peace settlement

      1. The flag and constitution demand is unresolved: The NSCN (Isak-Muivah) insists on a separate Naga flag and a separate constitution, the Yehzabo, rejected by the Centre as incompatible with Indian sovereignty. Eg. The talks declared concluded in October 2019 ended without agreement on either demand. Fix. Settle the symbolic claim as a cultural flag protected under Article 371A’s guarantee for Naga customary practice, separated from any constitutional status.
      2. The territorial claim crosses three other States: The “Greater Nagalim” demand would merge Naga inhabited areas of Manipur, Assam and Arunachal Pradesh into one unit. Eg. The Manipur Assembly has repeatedly resolved against any settlement altering the State’s boundaries. Fix. Use non-territorial autonomy, giving Naga councils outside Nagaland cultural and development powers without redrawing State boundaries.
      3. The negotiation has two competing counterparties: The Centre talks in parallel to the NSCN (Isak-Muivah) and to the Naga National Political Groups, and each rejects a settlement signed only with the other. Eg. The Working Committee of the Naga National Political Groups signed a separate Agreed Position in 2017. Fix. Convene one joint negotiating forum so a single signed text binds every group.
      4. Ceasefire ground rules are routinely breached: Cadres under ceasefire run parallel taxation in Nagaland and in Naga areas of Manipur, which keeps an armed economy alive through the negotiation. Eg. Traders and salaried employees in Dimapur pay levies to more than one faction. Fix. Publish the ceasefire monitoring group’s findings with a fixed penalty schedule for each verified breach.
      5. A text kept secret cannot be ratified: The 2015 Framework Agreement has never been published, so no legislature or public body has examined what was agreed. Eg. Nagaland’s own legislators have sought disclosure of the text on the floor of the Assembly. Fix. Table the agreed text in Parliament and in the Nagaland Assembly before signature, so ratification precedes implementation.
      6. Security law feeds the grievance the talks address: The Armed Forces (Special Powers) Act, 1958 remains in force across parts of Nagaland, sustaining the alienation a settlement is meant to end. Eg. The Oting killings of December 2021 in Mon district led the Assembly to demand repeal. Fix. Complete the district by district withdrawal already begun and move residual powers to a civil authority subject to judicial review.

      Conclusion

      The Naga settlement is stalled on claims about identity, not on administrative detail, and identity claims are revised by a community rather than conceded by a negotiator. The reconciliation work that kept six decades of talks survivable was carried by individuals with no official standing, and it has no institutional successor. A ministerial panel can reopen the file. It cannot by itself rebuild the trust that would let a signed text hold.

      “[2025, GS3, 15 marks] What are the major challenges to internal security and peace process in the North-Eastern States? Map the various peace accords and agreements initiated by the government in the past decade.”

    2. What are the major challenges to internal security and peace process in the North-Eastern States? Map the various peace accords and agreements initiated by the government in the past decade.

      The N-E region comprising eight states and connected to the Indian mainland by a small Silghuri Corridor (Chicken Neck – 23 km width) has been facing the problems of insurgency for over 5 decades.

      Major challenges to internal security and peace process in North-Eastern states

      Cross-Border Dynamics– Porous Indo-Myanmar borders enable arms, insurgent movement, and illegal trade.

      “Tyranny of distance” – Policy attention from New Delhi remains inadequate due to geographic remoteness and low political representation of the region.

      Ethnic divisions – Eg- deepening Meitei-Kuki-Zo divide post-2023 riots in Manipur

      Weak peace processes – Talks with 30+ insurgent groups in Manipur and Nagaland continue without breakthroughs

      Protracted insurgencies and splintering of groups reduce prospects for a single comprehensive settlement. Eg- NSCN splits (IM/NK/R).

      Poor governance and developmental deficit sustain grievance and provide recruitment ground.

      Drug trafficking, illegal timber/mineral extraction and extortion fund insurgents and fuel local conflict. Eg- proximity to Golden Traingle

      Demographic stress – Large-scale illegal Bangladesh-origin immigration create social tensions and political mistrust. Eg- in Assam

      High Violence– In 2024, NE India experienced 266 insurgency-related incidents, causing 258 deaths and displacing 60,000 people.

      External factors

      China – Territorial claims in Arunachal Pradesh and support to insurgent groups

      Bangladesh – Anti-India shift post coup and growing Pakistan-China influence

      Myanmar – destabilised border post ‘Spring Revolution’

      Map of major peace accords

      2015 – Naga Framework Agreement for an “inclusive political solution” within the Indian Union (framework terms still being negotiated).

      2019 – Tripura NLFT (SD) Memorandum of Settlement – surrender of cadres and rehabilitation package to end insurgency.

      2020 – Bru-Reang Agreement (Tripura-Mizoram) – Repatriation and rehabilitation of Bru refugees with security and development assurances.

      2020 – Bodo Peace Accord (Phase-II) – Expansion of Bodoland Territorial Region (BTR) powers, and development funds.

      2021 – Karbi Anglong Agreement (Assam)

      2022 – Assam-Meghalaya Boundary Agreement – land demarcation to resolve long-standing boundary disputes.

      2022 – Adivasi (Assam) Peace Accord (2022) – Settlement package including rehabilitation and development measures.

      2023 – Dimasa accords – Ceasefire, surrender/rehab and local development commitments.

      2023 – ULFA Accord – bringing a major faction of ULFA into a political process in Assam

      2024 – NLFT and ATTF Agreements (Tripura) – Memoranda of Settlement leading to cadre surrender and integration

      Other supporting measures (2015-2024) –

      Extension of ceasefires with various Naga factions, multiple SoO (Suspension of Operations) agreements, and targeted MoUs with smaller groups

      AFSPA withdrawal from Tripura and MEghalaya

      Peace in the North-East requires a multipronged approach involving negotiated settlements backed by credible security, sustained development, rights protection and wide stakeholder inclusion

      Terrorism