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GS Paper: GS3-20.Linkages between Development and Spread of Extremism.

  • Naga leaders agree to open key Manipur highway after talks with Centre in Assam

    Why in the News

    The United Naga Council has agreed to lift its economic blockade of Manipur’s national highways temporarily, after tripartite talks with the Centre and the State government in Assam. The lifting rests only on a promise that its demands will be addressed, after more than three months of cut supplies.

    What is an economic blockade, and why does it bite in Manipur?

    1. What it is: An economic blockade is an obstruction of road traffic by a community body, not the State, so there is no order to revoke.
    2. Why Manipur is exposed: The State is landlocked and almost everything it consumes arrives by road, mainly National Highway 2 from Imphal to Dimapur.
    3. Which roads were closed: Goods traffic stopped on National Highways 2, 37, 202 and 102A.
    4. How it escalated: The blockade began on 11 June and the Council made it indefinite on 9 September.
    5. The takeaway: A blockade on a State with one supply corridor pressures the government by cutting off the population first, the protesters’ neighbours included.

    What is the United Naga Council demanding?

    1. Killing of six civilians: Six Naga civilians from Leilon Vaiphei village were abducted and killed in May, which set off the blockade.
    2. Revoke the ceasefire: The Council wants the Suspension of Operations ceasefire with Kuki armed groups revoked. That arrangement has held through the ethnic conflict since May 2023.
    3. Removal of a minister and prosecution: The Council also wants Deputy Chief Minister Nemcha Kipgen removed and justice for the six men killed, with every demand met first.
    4. Kamjong killings raised: The Council raised the recent killing of four Naga civilians in Kamjong district. The government promised to maintain law and order.

    What did the blockade do to the State?

    1. Shortages in the Imphal Valley: The Imphal Valley ran short of medicines, baby food, fresh produce and fuel as consignments stopped moving.
    2. Black market prices: Petrol sold for as much as Rs 250 a litre in the black market and a cooking gas cylinder for up to Rs 5,000.
    3. Hill districts also cut off: Kuki Zo districts depend on routes through Naga areas, so Kangpokpi, Churachandpur, Tengnoupal and Pherzawl ran short of goods and medical supplies.

    Why did the talks move now?

    1. Tripartite talks in Assam: The Council met the Union Ministry of Home Affairs and the State government at the Border Security Force frontier headquarters in Garbhanga, Assam.
    2. Earlier rounds had failed: Talks with the Chief Minister at Senapati broke down on 8 July. A round on 10 August produced only an agreement to keep talking.
    3. Concession in the parallel talks: The Centre agreed to Union Minister level participation in the Naga Peace Process, the separate Naga settlement talks long sought by the National Socialist Council of Nagaland (Isak Muivah).
    4. No official word yet: Neither the Centre nor the State government has confirmed what was agreed.

    Challenges

    1. No enforceable end: The lifting is temporary and rests only on a promise, so goods traffic can be stopped again at any time.
    2. Revocation would remove a restraint: Ending the Suspension of Operations would free Kuki armed groups from camp confinement.
    3. Justice remains a demand: The killings that triggered the blockade have produced no announced outcome.

    Way Forward

    1. Put the demands on dates: The Union Ministry of Home Affairs should record each demand against a named authority and a response date.
    2. Prosecute the killings: Hand the May abductions to a court monitored investigation with a deadline for filing charges.
    3. Protect the supply line: Notify the highways feeding Manipur as essential supply routes, with a State plan to escort convoys.
    4. Widen the table: Bring Kuki Zo and Meitei bodies into the same format, since settling with one community shifts the blockade.

    Conclusion

    Trucks will move again, but every demand that stopped them stays open, so the State has bought supplies with a promise. Watch whether those demands are recorded against dates, because nothing else stands between Manipur and the next blockade.

    Back2Basics: Suspension of Operations agreement

    1. What it is: A tripartite ceasefire signed by the Centre, the State government and an armed group that gives up violence and accepts the Constitution.
    2. What it obliges: Cadres stay in designated camps, weapons are held in monitored storage, and the agreement runs for fixed terms.
    3. When it began in Manipur: The arrangement with Kuki Zo armed groups was first signed in 2008 and has been extended since.

    Matching Previous Year Question

    “[2025, GS3, 15 marks] What are the major challenges to internal security and peace process in the North-Eastern States? Map the various peace accords and agreements initiated by the government in the past decade.”

  • Union Minister to join Naga peace negotiations; encouraging: NSCN (IM)

    Why in the News

    The Centre has agreed to include a Union Minister or a group of Union level Ministers in the Naga peace talks. The step meets a longstanding demand of the National Socialist Council of Nagalim (Isak Muivah), or NSCN (IM), for political representation in the negotiations. It follows the appointment of Ajit Lal, a former Joint Intelligence Committee chief, as the Centre’s pointsman for the talks seven months ago. The talks have run since 1997 and produced a Framework Agreement in 2015 that was never converted into a settlement. A day after welcoming the new format, the group’s External Publicity Wing described a Nagalim national flag and a Nagalim national constitution as non negotiable, two demands the Centre has said will not be met.

    What is the Naga peace process?

    1. The negotiating track: The Union government has been holding talks with the NSCN (IM) since 1997 to resolve the decades long insurgency in the Naga hills through a peace accord.
    2. The Framework Agreement: A Framework Agreement between the government and the NSCN (IM) was signed on 3 August 2015. Little was achieved after it.
    3. The interlocutor mechanism: The Centre negotiates through an appointed pointsman rather than through a minister. The post has passed from a former Indian Police Service officer to a former Additional Director of the Intelligence Bureau and now to a former Joint Intelligence Committee chief, who holds the post of Adviser (North East) in the Ministry of Home Affairs.
    4. The ceasefire boundary: Participation in the talks runs alongside a ceasefire, and a Naga armed group outside that ceasefire is outside the negotiation as well.

    What does political level representation change in the talks?

    1. The concession on format: The Centre has agreed to bring a Union Minister, or a group of Union level Ministers, into the negotiation framework. The talks so far have been conducted by an appointed official.
    2. The group’s stated expectation: The NSCN (IM) said the decision will “expedite the political process” and create the momentum for “an honourable and enduring political settlement”.
    3. The demand behind it: The security establishment’s reading is that the NSCN (IM) has always wanted the negotiations to be political, with political representatives involved, rather than conducted at the official level.

    Why did the talks stall after the Framework Agreement was signed?

    1. Disagreement over the 2015 text: The parties fell out over the Framework Agreement itself, and the dispute over what it committed either side to hardened the group’s position.
    2. Public accusations on both sides: The NSCN (IM) accused the then interlocutor of “mischief” and of attempts to “segregate Naga society”. The interlocutor called the NSCN an “armed gang” and accused it of running a “parallel government” engaged in extortion.
    3. A stalemate rather than a rupture: The exchanges virtually pushed the talks into a stalemate without ending them, and the public altercations of the early 2020s made a settlement appear more distant.
    4. A change of interlocutor did not help: The post passed to a former Additional Director of the Intelligence Bureau and the talks still failed to make much headway.

    What explains the change in the NSCN (IM)’s tone?

    1. First acceptance of the interlocutor: The group welcomed the current pointsman’s appointment as “interlocutor” for the first time, calling it a “significant and encouraging development that reflects the GoI’s renewed resolve to advance the peace process with seriousness and urgency”. He was appointed Adviser (North East) in February.
    2. Prior standing with the Nagas: He had officiated as interlocutor for five months in 2014, and his relations with the Nagas are cited as one reason the present step became possible.
    3. A State government kept inside the process: The NSCN (IM) thanked the Nagaland government for its “sincere participation and active facilitation”, and said its engagement has been instrumental in sustaining the peace process.

    How does the breakaway Eastern Flank constrain the NSCN (IM)?

    1. A rebel faction outside the ceasefire: The Eastern Flank, based in Myanmar, is a hardline faction that has refused negotiations with the government and is not under any ceasefire agreement.
    2. The defection that gave it standing: In 2024 Ikato, son of NSCN co founder Isak Chishi Swu, joined the faction, accusing the NSCN (IM) leadership of being “corrupt” and of “compromising the (Naga) national interest for their own selfish gain”. He was appointed its chairman in July this year.
    3. The legitimacy problem it creates: The chairmanship confers legitimacy because he is Isak’s son and a Naga from Nagaland. The NSCN (IM) is led by Muivah, a Tangkhul from Manipur.
    4. Popular impatience adds to it: Patience in Nagaland has been wearing thin over the delay in concluding the peace process, which builds further pressure on the NSCN (IM).

    Can a political upgrade survive the demands the Centre has ruled out?

    1. The two non negotiables: The External Publicity Wing of the NSCN (IM) asserted that the ongoing political negotiations rest on “sovereignty” between the government and the NSCN, and described the “Nagalim national flag and Nagalim national constitution” as “non negotiable”.
    2. The Centre’s stated limit: Delhi has said a Naga flag and a separate Naga constitution will not be conceded. The same two items are the group’s core demands.
    3. Hardliners narrow the room to compromise: The Eastern Flank’s position makes it costlier for the NSCN (IM) to soften on either demand, because any concession would be read against a faction that has refused to negotiate at all.

    Conclusion

    The talks have changed their format without changing their content. Ministerial participation answers a question about who sits at the table. It does not touch the two demands the Centre has ruled out, and the group restated both within a day of welcoming the new arrangement. What to watch is whether a ministerial round is actually convened, and whether the faction sitting outside the ceasefire is brought into one.

    Matching Previous Year Question

    “[2025, GS3, 15 marks] What are the major challenges to internal security and peace process in the North-Eastern States? Map the various peace accords and agreements initiated by the government in the past decade.”

  • The Greyhounds last leap

    Why in the News

    The Greyhounds, the counter insurgency force raised in 1989 to fight Maoists in the forests of undivided Andhra Pradesh, is being repurposed after the Union Home Minister’s declaration in May that the country is free of Naxal activity. The force’s strength has fallen to 650 personnel from a peak of over 2,000. Telangana was earlier declared totally free of Maoist armed formations, after a surrender driven strategy that brought in 817 rebels between December 2023 and April this year. The tension is over mandate. A unit built for jungle warfare against an armed insurgency is now being pointed at marijuana cultivation in the same remote hills, an activity the State Security Adviser warns could evolve into a violent crime syndicate.

    What is the Greyhounds force and how is it manned?

    1. Origin and purpose: It was created in 1989 by Indian Police Service (IPS) officer K.S. Vyas, after conventional policing proved inadequate against the growing armed strength of the Maoists in undivided Andhra Pradesh.
    2. A deputation unit, not a recruited one: There is no separate recruitment for the force. Personnel volunteer from the Special Police, the Armed Reserve and the Civil Police, and are screened for physical fitness, mental resilience and determination.
    3. The service incentive: Personnel deputed to the force receive an additional 60 percent of their basic pay and dearness allowance for the duration of the posting.
    4. Unit structure and composition: In erstwhile Andhra Pradesh the force ran 41 units of 35 personnel each, with a Deputy Superintendent of Police, an inspector and three sub inspectors in every unit. No woman has ever headed the force or served in any of its operational units.

    How did the Greyhounds become a model for other forces?

    1. The training design: Narayan Singh Bhati, a former Deputy Inspector General of the Special Security Bureau, now the Sashastra Seema Bal, built the training programme and stayed on as a consultant for nearly four decades. He was awarded the Padma Shri and died in June 2023 at the age of 92.
    2. State forces modelled on it: Odisha raised its Special Operations Group, Maharashtra its C-60, West Bengal its Counter-Insurgency Force and Chhattisgarh its District Reserve Guard on the same design.
    3. The central force it shaped: The Central Reserve Police Force (CRPF) drew on the Greyhounds model for its Commando Battalion for Resolute Action (CoBRA), its own jungle warfare unit.
    4. Embedded in police training: An attachment with the Greyhounds is mandatory for IPS officers under training at the National Police Academy. Officers allotted to the Telugu States serve a separate posting with the force.
    5. The intelligence backbone: The Special Intelligence Branch (SIB), raised alongside the force, tracked the movement and activities of the rebels and supplied the targeting that operations depended on.

    What does the operational record show?

    1. The tally in undivided Andhra Pradesh: The force neutralised 693 rebels and seized 1,250 firearms.
    2. The tally after bifurcation: Since the formation of Telangana on 2 June 2014, it has killed 92 Naxals and recovered 360 weapons.
    3. The targeting rule: A person in olive green uniform carrying a weapon was not by itself treated as a target, since a hunter or a village resident could fit that description. Identification required a self loading rifle, an AK series rifle or a .303 rifle in hand.
    4. Cross border operations: Teams crossed into neighbouring Maharashtra and Chhattisgarh to strike targets operating from across State borders.
    5. What operations turned on: An operation at Manala in Nizamabad in March 2005 located a concealed group only after an officer spotted a glint of metal on a hilltop, and ten rebels were killed there.

    What did the force lose?

    1. Personnel killed: The Greyhounds lost over 60 men over the years, including six after the formation of Telangana.
    2. The Balimela ambush: On 29 June 2008, Maoists ambushed a returning team on the Balimela reservoir in Odisha and sank its boat, killing 37 people including 32 commandos.
    3. The founder killed: K.S. Vyas was shot dead on 27 January 1993 while jogging at a stadium in Hyderabad, by five members of the CPI (ML) People’s War Group.
    4. Officers targeted as policy: Vyas was one of three IPS officers killed by the rebels in Andhra Pradesh, alongside G. Pardesi Naidu in November 1993 and C. Umesh Chandra in September 1999.

    Why did surrenders rather than encounters end the insurgency in Telangana?

    1. The surrender policy: A surrender policy announced by the Chief Minister of Telangana was the operative instrument, with the Special Intelligence Branch working the approaches to cadre.
    2. The numbers it produced: Between December 2023 and 30 April this year, 817 rebels surrendered, including four central committee members and 22 State committee members. A further 138 were arrested and 325 weapons were seized, including 56 AK-47 rifles.
    3. What it did to the organisation: The CPI (Maoist) was left headless, leaderless and rudderless once its leadership tier came out.
    4. Why the method mattered: Encounters and arrests can turn rebels into martyrs within sections of society. A surrender removes that status and demoralises the cadre left behind.
    5. The declaration that followed: The State was declared totally free of Maoist armed formations.

    What is the force’s mandate after the Naxal free declaration?

    1. The new target: Intelligence inputs are to be used to detect marijuana cultivation in the same remote hills that were insurgent strongholds.
    2. Why the pivot is being made now: Roads and development are reaching those areas. That opens them to cultivation as much as to administration.
    3. The precedent being cited: Marijuana cultivation is rampant along the Andhra Odisha Border, and the stated concern is that such cultivation evolves into a violent crime syndicate over time.
    4. How the two units divide the work: The Special Intelligence Branch identifies the activity, and the Greyhounds are then deployed to ensure cultivation does not take hold.

    Challenges to the Greyhounds after the Naxal free declaration

    1. A specialised skill decays without use: Jungle warfare proficiency is perishable and depends on continuous operations, so a force held in reserve loses the capability it was built for. Eg. The unit has no recruitment of its own, so its capability rests entirely on the officers deputed in at any given time.
      The Fix: Fix a minimum annual field exercise and cross deployment schedule with other jungle warfare units, so proficiency survives the absence of an active insurgency.
    2. Declaring an insurgency over invites premature withdrawal: A formal end date creates pressure to cut force levels and budgets before the conditions that produced the insurgency are addressed. Eg. Maoist activity in Andhra Pradesh revived after the collapse of the 2004 peace talks with the State government.
      The Fix: Tie any reduction in counter insurgency deployment to measured delivery of the development and land administration commitments in the affected districts.
    3. Narcotics enforcement is a different discipline: Detecting and prosecuting cultivation needs financial investigation, revenue records and forensic chain of custody, not assault capability. Eg. Cannabis moving out of the Andhra Odisha Border area travels through transport and financing networks that sit outside a strike force’s remit.
      The Fix: Pair every deployment against cultivation with a narcotics investigation team empowered to pursue the trafficking and financing chain.
    4. Surrender without rehabilitation produces returnees: A surrendered cadre with no livelihood and no protection has a route back to the organisation or into organised crime. Eg. Surrender and rehabilitation packages across Left Wing Extremism affected States differ widely in cash, housing and skilling terms.
      The Fix: Standardise a surrender and rehabilitation entitlement across the affected States, with a named district officer accountable for each case for a fixed period.
    5. A deputation model limits institutional memory: Personnel rotate back to their parent units, so operational learning leaves with them unless it is written down. Eg. The training programme rested for nearly four decades on a single external consultant rather than on a standing doctrine cell.
      The Fix: Establish a permanent doctrine and after action review cell inside the force, staffed independently of the operational rotation.

    Conclusion

    The Greyhounds reaches the end of its founding mission with the insurgency it was raised against declared finished and no equivalent adversary in view. The decision in front of the State is whether a force built for armed contact is the right instrument for narcotics enforcement, or whether it is being retained because it exists. The deployment has already been committed to the former strongholds as roads reach them. The thing to watch is whether that deployment is paired with investigative and prosecutorial capacity, since cultivation is broken by cases rather than by operations.

    Back2Basics: CPI (Maoist)

    1. Formation: The Communist Party of India (Maoist) was formed in 2004 by the merger of the People’s War Group and the Maoist Communist Centre of India.
    2. Legal status: It is banned as a terrorist organisation under the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967, along with its front organisations.
    3. Structure: It runs through a politburo and a central committee, with State committees below them, and its armed wing is the People’s Liberation Guerrilla Army.
    4. Area of operation: Its strength lay in the forested districts of central and eastern India, the belt security agencies describe as the Red Corridor.

    Matching Previous Year Question

    “[2025, GS3, 10] The Government of India recently stated that Left Wing Extremism (LWE) will be eliminated by 2026. What do you understand by LWE and how are the people affected by it? What measures have been taken by the government to eliminate LWE?”

  • Ensure dignity, way back for Manipur’s displaced

    Why in the News

    The Supreme Court has expressed shock at reports of deaths, including unnatural deaths, in relief camps for internally displaced people (IDPs) in Manipur. The displacement follows ethnic violence that has remained intractable for over three years. The Manipur government told the State Assembly this month that the number of people in relief camps and temporary locations has fallen to 28,899, from nearly 60,000 at the peak of the violence. The tension is between camp management and settlement. The State can staff camps and supply medicines, and neither step restores the conditions for people to go home. The Meitei and Kuki conflict remains unsettled, and it has now acquired a Naga and Kuki dimension as well.

    Why is healthcare access the sharpest cost of prolonged displacement?

    1. Concentration in the capital: Manipur’s healthcare system is heavily concentrated in Imphal, so specialist treatment is a journey rather than a local service for most of the State.
    2. The two tertiary hospitals: The Jawaharlal Nehru Institute of Medical Sciences and the Regional Institute of Medical Sciences are the State’s two tertiary government hospitals. Both are located in the capital.
    3. What segregation did to access: Once violence induced ethnic segregation set in, Kuki-Zo people from the hills could no longer travel to the Valley for treatment.
    4. The gap in the hills: Healthcare facilities in the hills lack specialists and essential equipment, so the referral chain has no second tier to fall back on.

    What does the geography of treatment now look like?

    1. Treatment outside the State: Some patients have had to seek healthcare outside Manipur. The closest destination is Aizawl, a journey of over 12 hours by road.
    2. Blockades as a health problem: Persistent blockades obstruct patients travelling to hospitals. They also obstruct the movement of medicines and of medical personnel.
    3. Nutrition in the camps: The food provided in many camps is nutritionally deficient. That compounds the burden on a health system already out of reach.
    4. A temporary refuge made permanent: What was meant to be temporary shelter has left thousands of people dependent on an inadequate and fragile healthcare system.

    What do the displacement figures show?

    1. The current count: The number of IDPs in relief camps and temporary locations stands at 28,899.
    2. The decline from the peak: The figure was nearly 60,000 at the peak of the violence, so more than half of those displaced have left the camps.
    3. What the fall does not measure: A falling count records movement out of camps. It records nothing about whether people returned to their own homes or their own areas.
    4. The duration: The displacement has run for over three years, so the population still in the camps is the population with nowhere else to go.

    Why can camp management not substitute for a political settlement?

    1. The unresolved conflict: Without a durable solution to the Meitei and Kuki conflict, the conditions for safe and sustainable rehabilitation remain out of reach.
    2. The widening fault line: The conflict has increasingly acquired a Naga and Kuki dimension, so a settlement between two communities no longer covers the dispute.
    3. What the State can do now: The State must ensure adequately staffed medical facilities at or near the camps, along with supplies of medicines and other essential services.
    4. What a settlement requires: Dialogue and confidence building measures are the route to a political settlement that ends the violence and allows displaced people to rebuild with security and dignity.

    Challenges to the rehabilitation of Manipur’s displaced

    1. Return depends on security guarantees the State cannot yet give: Displaced households will not return to mixed or frontier areas without an assurance against renewed attack, so camp exits outpace actual resettlement. Eg. Buffer zones along the Valley and hill boundary have been held by central forces since 2023 rather than dismantled.
      The Fix: Publish a village wise return plan naming the security arrangement, the timeline and the compensation attached to each village.
    2. Documentation loss blocks entitlements: People who fled without papers lose access to rations, pensions, school admission and land records, so displacement hardens into a durable loss of status. Eg. Camp residents have needed fresh identity documentation to reach welfare schemes tied to place of residence.
      The Fix: Run a single window re issue drive for identity, land and school records inside the camps, with the camp address accepted as proof of residence.
    3. India has no statutory framework for internal displacement: Relief rests on executive discretion and court direction rather than on an enforceable entitlement, so standards vary by State and by episode. Eg. The Supreme Court has had to intervene on camp conditions in place of a statutory authority enforcing them.
      The Fix: Enact a framework law defining minimum camp standards, return entitlements and a named authority accountable for each.
    4. Education loss compounds across cohorts: Children in camps lose school years that are never recovered, so the displacement transfers to the next generation. Eg. School buildings in the affected districts were used to house displaced families, removing both the premises and the schooling.
      The Fix: Attach a residential bridge school to each camp cluster, with enrolment tracked against the pre displacement register.
    5. A relief economy entrenches the camp: Sustained rations, cash relief and camp based work create a livelihood structure that competes with the decision to return. Eg. Bru families displaced from Mizoram in 1997 lived in relief camps in Tripura until the resettlement agreement of 2020.
      The Fix: Convert relief into a time bound resettlement package payable on return, rather than an open ended entitlement payable in the camp.

    Conclusion

    Displacement in Manipur has stopped being a housing problem and become a health one. The camps are the point at which an already concentrated health system fails the people furthest from it. The State’s immediate obligation is staffed medical facilities at or near the camps, with the medicines and personnel to run them. The unresolved question is political, since a return that is safe and durable now needs a settlement covering the Naga and Kuki dimension as well as the Meitei and Kuki one.

    Back2Basics: internally displaced people

    1. Who they are: Internally displaced people are persons forced to flee their homes by conflict, violence or disaster who have not crossed an international border.
    2. How they differ from refugees: A refugee crosses an international border and gains protection under international refugee law. An internally displaced person remains under the jurisdiction of their own State.
    3. The governing standard: The United Nations Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement, 1998 set out the rights of displaced people and the duties of the State, without binding treaty force.
    4. The position in India: India has no dedicated law on internal displacement, so relief and rehabilitation run through executive schemes and State level orders.

    Matching Previous Year Question

    “[2025, GS3, 15] What are the major challenges to internal security and peace process in the North-Eastern States? Map the various peace accords and agreements initiated by the government in the past decade.”

  • New fault lines

    Why in the News

    Violence between the Naga and Kuki-Zo communities has spread across Manipur’s hill districts since February, opening a second ethnic fault line in the State. It follows three years in which the conflagration of May 2023 between the Meitei and Kuki-Zo communities had slowly begun to abate. Nearly a year of President’s Rule gave way in February 2026 to a Bharatiya Janata Party led government, and two Kuki-Zo legislators have since returned to the Assembly for the first time since the community’s boycott began. The tension is that political space is reopening between the valley and the hills at the same moment as a new conflict is closing it inside the hills.

    What has moved towards normalcy since 2023?

    1. A new State government: President’s Rule ended in February 2026 with the formation of a Bharatiya Janata Party led government under a new Chief Minister. Attempts to engineer a thaw between the Meitei and Kuki-Zo communities gathered pace after it.
    2. Everyday violence abating: Routine violence between the two communities has reduced over the three years since the May 2023 conflagration.
    3. Return to the Assembly: Two Kuki-Zo MLAs attended the Assembly session this month, the first attendance since legislators from the community began boycotting it after the attacks in Imphal at the start of the ethnic conflict.
    4. Defiance of the boycott directive: The two legislators acted against a directive of the Kuki Inpi Manipur, the Kuki-Zo civil society organisation, to continue the boycott until there was a concession on the demand for a separate administration.
    5. What the attendance signals: Their presence represents an acknowledgement that the political space should reopen even while the underlying differences persist.

    What does the new Naga and Kuki-Zo conflict look like?

    1. Spread from localised disputes: Violence that began as local disputes has spread across the hill districts since February.
    2. The toll to July: At least 15 Kuki-Zo people, 11 Nagas, three security personnel and a truck driver were killed till July. More have died in the two months since.
    3. Villages burnt: Houses in both Naga and Kuki-Zo villages have been burnt down, and the newly displaced have moved into camps.
    4. Armed groups as the driver: Armed groups claiming to act on behalf of their respective communities have revived the conflict rather than the communities having drifted into it.

    Why do the hill districts keep returning to the same dispute?

    1. A 1990s precedent: The present violence echoes the Naga and Kuki violence of the 1990s, which was fought over the same questions.
    2. Control of the hills: The dispute resurrects the argument over which community controls the hill areas.
    3. Customary law: It also resurrects the question of whose customary laws prevail in those areas, which no settlement between the valley and the hills addresses.

    What are civilians bearing?

    1. Displacement that has not ended: Many of those displaced in 2023 remain in relief camps three years later.
    2. Deaths inside the camps: A reply under the Right to Information Act, 2005 puts the number who have died in these camps at over 700, many for want of access to basic health care and adequate nutrition.
    3. Blockades on essentials: Blockades imposed by partisans of each community against the other have held up essentials and medicines. The smaller Kuki-Zo community is the worse affected by them.
    4. Health system in the hills: Health centres in the hills have been left dysfunctional, so the blockades fall on a system with no reserve capacity.

    Challenges to restoring peace in Manipur

    1. Armed groups outside any political process: Groups claiming a community mandate operate without being party to a settlement, so no agreement binds them. Eg. The Suspension of Operations arrangement with Kuki militant groups has been in dispute since 2023.
      The Fix: Make continued security force restraint conditional on verified cantonment and weapons accounting for every group claiming a community mandate.
    2. Blockades used as routine leverage: Economic blockades on the highways are a standing bargaining tool, and they fall hardest on the hill districts. Eg. National Highway 2 and National Highway 37 are the only supply lifelines into the State.
      The Fix: Treat every blockade as a criminal offence with named organisers, and run dedicated escort convoys on the two national highways.
    3. Relief camps becoming permanent: A camp population that persists for years accumulates health and nutrition failures that no relief budget corrects. Eg. Residents displaced in 2023 are entering a fourth year without returning home.
      The Fix: Publish a dated resettlement plan with security guarantees for each village of return, instead of open ended camp maintenance.
    4. Land and customary rights left unsettled: Hill administration and customary village authority run alongside each other with no forum to resolve a conflict between them. Eg. The Manipur (Hill Areas) District Councils Act, 1971 governs the district councils while village chiefs exercise customary authority over land.
      The Fix: Convene a statutory settlement process on boundaries and customary rights through the Hill Areas Committee of the Legislative Assembly.
    5. Electoral timing narrows the window: Assembly elections are due next year and the government’s tenure ends soon, so a contested campaign will overlap the containment effort. Eg. Displaced residents will vote while still living in relief camps.
      The Fix: Secure an all party agreement on ground rules for communal rhetoric before campaigning opens.

    Conclusion

    Manipur’s peace effort is now being asked to hold two fronts at once. The divide between the valley and the hills is easing at the level of political participation, while a conflict inside the hills is hardening beneath it, and the arrangements built for the first do not reach the second. What the State can supply is even handedness: criminal law applied identically across communities, and protection of civilians that does not vary by ethnicity. Whether that standard survives an election campaign is the thing to watch.

    Back2Basics: The hill and valley administration of Manipur

    1. Article 371C: It carries a special provision for Manipur, empowering the President to constitute a Hill Areas Committee of the Legislative Assembly drawn from members representing the hill constituencies.
    2. What the Committee does: It considers legislation and administration affecting the hill areas, and the Governor reports annually to the President on the administration of those areas.
    3. District Councils: Six autonomous district councils function in the hill districts under the Manipur (Hill Areas) District Councils Act, 1971, outside the Sixth Schedule framework used in some other North Eastern States.
    4. The demographic split: The Imphal valley holds the bulk of the State’s population and is largely Meitei, while the surrounding hill districts are home to the Naga and Kuki-Zo communities.

    Matching Previous Year Question

    “[2025, GS3, 15] What are the major challenges to internal security and peace process in the North-Eastern States? Map the various peace accords and agreements initiated by the government in the past decade.”

  • Dimagi Naxal frames the mind as a security question

    Why in the News

    The Prime Minister’s Independence Day address named the dimagi Naxal, the intellectual Naxal, as a target of the state’s response to Left Wing Extremism (LWE). The address is defended as doing what Indian political discourse had avoided for four decades. The war against Naxalism had been measured in body counts, arms recoveries and district maps turning from red to green, and the architecture of ideas behind the insurgency was rarely confronted. The claim now advanced is that naming the ideological network forces a final battle on the deadliest terror threat to have plagued India. What that opens is a contest over whether a state can move against an ideology without moving against protected speech.

    What does the term dimagi Naxal name?

    1. The ideological support network rather than the armed cadre: The term identifies those who supply the intellectual and organisational scaffolding of the insurgency instead of carrying weapons for it.
    2. Why the coinage matters: Naming that layer shifts the counter insurgency target from territory held to ideas circulated, which no previous formulation did.
    3. Where it was used: The formulation was made from the Red Fort on Independence Day, which places it in the government’s highest profile annual statement of priorities.

    Why does the argument treat Naxalism as an ideology before a militia?

    1. The founding case: Naxalism was always an ideology before it was a militia, and the ideologue of Naxalbari theorised, organised and incited others towards armed revolution rather than acting out of personal deprivation.
    2. The social origin of the leadership: Naxal leadership across generations has been drawn from comfortable, often landed or urban intellectual backgrounds.
    3. The stated political objective: Naxals seek to overthrow the Republic of India along with its bourgeois constitution and to establish a communist state. That state is to liquidate class enemies by armed revolution.
    4. The view of the Indian state itself: Underground cadre, overground members and sympathisers hold that India is an artificial and illegitimate entity denying the right of self determination to different nationalities and working at the behest of international capital.

    What did the shift to urban expansion after 2009 change?

    1. The decision and its trigger: After Operation Green Hunt in 2009, Maoists decided to expand aggressively in urban centres and to hide in plain sight.
    2. The cover adopted: Cadre positioned themselves as human rights activists, university professors, journalists and even corporate employees.
    3. The functions assigned: The stated aims are to act as couriers, to provide safe houses for cadres of banned outfits, to stall action against terror groups, to wage an ideological war on the Indian state and to promote anarchy.
    4. The vocabulary used: Propaganda is packaged in acceptable terminology such as human rights, Dalit assertion, farmer issues and individual rights, with the ostensible aim of justice for the marginalised.
    5. What is not stated publicly: The theoretical framework behind that vocabulary associates freedom from hunger and poverty with the balkanisation of India, which makes it a messianic cult in the form of a secular ideology.

    Why did the ecosystem’s attack shift to development itself?

    1. The doctrine that worked: The government’s counter Naxal doctrine has rested on a triad of security, rehabilitation and development.
    2. The response it provoked: Because the doctrine worked on the ground, the Naxal intellectual ecosystem shifted its attack to development itself.
    3. What is now opposed: Nuclear power projects, agricultural modernisation programmes and infrastructure corridors have been opposed by a recurring cast of civil society groups.
    4. The stated basis of the objection: The objection advanced is not a specific local grievance or a flaw in the project but the writ of the Indian state in that territory.

    What does the movement’s own history suggest about resurgence?

    1. The first wave and its collapse: The first wave of Naxalism was crushed by the mid 1970s.
    2. The interval before its return: It resurfaced two decades later, which shows that suppression of the armed layer alone does not settle the question.
    3. The peak of the second wave: By the mid 2000s nearly a third of the country’s territory lay in the Red Corridor.

    How has the mode of ideological transmission changed?

    1. The old method: Ideologues had to organise physically, travel to villages, print pamphlets and hold clandestine meetings.
    2. The new method: Their successors use smartphones and build a following on Instagram, YouTube and X by monetising a persona built around resistance.
    3. What has and has not changed: The medium has changed and the incitement is more diffuse, and the function is unchanged, which is manufacturing moral cover for anti state violence and instability.
    4. Why participation has widened: Others join for the allure of resistance as a cultural posture or for the profit that anti establishment content generates, without following where the argument leads.

    Can the state contest an ideology without policing lawful dissent?

    1. The stake as the argument puts it: If the Naxals succeed there will be no freedom or liberty, no police but a party militia, no rule of law or courts but kangaroo courts, and intellectuals and professors sent to labour camps.
    2. Why bluntness is defended: People must know what the ideology stands for and the consequences that follow if it prevails.
    3. The asymmetry that closes the argument: A government can be voted out at the next election, and a state that collapses cannot be voted back.
    4. The unresolved edge: The categories the formulation names are professors, journalists and activists, so the test of the doctrine is whether it distinguishes material support for a banned organisation from lawful advocacy that the state finds inconvenient.

    Challenges to the counter Naxal doctrine

    1. A security vacuum follows the withdrawal of central forces: Handing territory back to thin State police forces creates gaps that splinter groups and criminal networks occupy. Eg. Areas cleared in earlier operations in the 1970s were reoccupied two decades later. Fix. Convert forward operating bases into permanent State police stations with local recruitment before central armed police forces are drawn down.
    2. Former cadre turn to organised crime: An insurgency deprived of ideology retains its weapons, terrain knowledge and extortion networks. Eg. Maoist financing in Jharkhand and Chhattisgarh already ran on levies from contractors and transporters. Fix. Tie surrender and rehabilitation payments to verified livelihood placement over several years rather than to a one time cash grant.
    3. Absentee administration in the cleared districts: Security gains do not hold where teachers, doctors and revenue officials do not report to their posted stations. Eg. Interior blocks of Bastar have run on deputation and vacancy for years. Fix. Pay a hardship differential and fix minimum tenure norms so that posting to an interior block is a career step rather than a punishment.
    4. Rejected forest rights claims reopen the original grievance: Land alienation is the grievance the insurgency was built on, and the statutory remedy is under used. Eg. Community Forest Rights claims face high rejection rates in the same districts that were worst affected. Fix. Audit rejected claims at the district level under the Scheduled Tribes and Other Traditional Forest Dwellers (Recognition of Forest Rights) Act, 2006 and record reasons for each rejection in writing.
    5. Peace attracts the extraction that caused the conflict: A district declared safe becomes available for mining and industrial investment, which brings displacement back. Eg. Iron ore and bauxite belts overlap almost exactly with the former Red Corridor. Fix. Require Gram Sabha consent under the Panchayats (Extension to the Scheduled Areas) Act, 1996 and transparent use of District Mineral Foundation funds before new leases are cleared.
    6. Prosecuting the overground network is evidentially hard: Cases built on association rather than on an act collapse in court and produce long undertrial detention in the interim. Eg. Several urban prosecutions under anti terror law have run for years without trial beginning. Fix. Require sanctioning authorities to record specific evidence of material support before charges are framed, and impose statutory timelines on trial commencement.

    Conclusion

    The formulation moves counter insurgency from a territorial contest to a contest over ideas, at the point where the armed movement has been declared defeated and its support network has not. The government’s own record shows that suppression of the armed layer without settling the grievance produced a second wave two decades later, which is the case for confronting the ideology rather than only the militia. What remains unresolved is the line between the material support network the state may lawfully dismantle and the criticism a democracy is obliged to tolerate, and that line will be drawn by courts rather than by speeches.

    “[2025, GS3, 10 marks] The Government of India recently stated that Left Wing Extremism (LWE) will be eliminated by 2026. What do you understand by LWE and how are the people affected by it? What measures have been taken by the government to eliminate LWE?”

  • After Naxalism, a development corridor

    Why in the News

    The Centre declared the country free from Naxalism on 31 March 2026, closing a security campaign that ran for decades across the forests of Chhattisgarh, Jharkhand and the rest of the former Red Corridor. The tension this exposes is that the military defeat of an insurgency does not by itself produce the economic activity that must occupy the space the guns have vacated.

    What is Left Wing Extremism and what was the Red Corridor?

    1. The movement: Left Wing Extremism (LWE), commonly called Naxalism, is an armed insurgency pursuing the capture of state power through protracted rural armed struggle, drawing on Maoist doctrine.
    2. The territory: The Red Corridor was the contiguous belt of forested and mineral-rich districts across central and eastern India where Maoist cadres exercised effective control and the state's writ was contested.
    3. What that control looked like: For decades the region was associated with ambushes, armed cadres and Maoist control rather than with routine administration.
    4. The declared end point: The Centre declared the country free from Naxalism on 31 March 2026, which is treated as a turning point rather than as the end of the task.

    What are CoBRA units?

    1. What they are: Commando Battalion for Resolute Action (CoBRA) is the specialised jungle warfare and guerrilla warfare force raised within the Central Reserve Police Force for anti-Naxal operations.
    2. Their role here: CoBRA units, deployed alongside state police forces, carried out the operations that dismantled strongholds which had remained difficult to penetrate for years.

    What was the strategy that dismantled the insurgency?

    1. Intelligence-led operations: Operations were driven by actionable intelligence on cadre location and movement rather than by area domination alone.
    2. Centre and state coordination: Greater coordination between central and state forces removed the seams across state borders that cadres had used to evade pursuit.
    3. Disruption of Maoist financing: Agencies targeted the financial networks that sustained the insurgency, cutting the flow that paid, armed and supplied cadres.
    4. Rehabilitation: A surrender policy sought to bring former cadres back into civilian life through financial assistance, training and support for reintegration.
    5. Sustained expansion of the security grid: The security presence was expanded continuously rather than surged and withdrawn, so that recovered territory was held.
    6. Political direction from the top: Repeated engagement by the Union Home Minister, including visits to Bastar and security review meetings on the ground, kept the Centre involved in an operational challenge requiring coordination between Delhi, state governments and personnel deployed deep inside difficult terrain.

    Which operations broke the strongholds?

    1. Black Forest: One of the named operations conducted by CoBRA units alongside state police forces.
    2. Octopus: A second named operation in the same series.
    3. Double Bull: A third named operation in the same series.
    4. Chakrabandha: A fourth named operation in the same series.
    5. The common outcome: Together these operations helped dismantle strongholds that had remained difficult to penetrate for years, which is what allowed a more permanent state presence to be established.

    What has the development push delivered since 2014?

    1. Security infrastructure: 408 new security camps and 597 fortified police stations have been established in LWE-affected areas since 2014.
    2. Road connectivity: More than 12,000 km of roads have been constructed in the affected regions.
    3. Formal finance: 1,804 bank branches and 1,321 ATMs have been added.
    4. Postal reach: 6,025 post offices have been added.
    5. Telecommunications: Mobile connectivity has expanded across most villages in the affected regions.
    6. Education and skills: Eklavya Model Residential Schools, Industrial Training Institutes and skill development centres have been established alongside the physical infrastructure.

    Why does a road, a bank branch or a tower change more than the statistic suggests?

    1. Roads change access, not distance: A road changes access to a market and to a hospital, converting a physical distance into a usable one.
    2. Bank branches change the terms of credit: A bank branch connects households to formal finance and displaces the informal lender who set the terms in its absence.
    3. Towers change the relationship to the state: A telecom tower brings a remote village closer to the rest of the country, which affects everything from grievance redress to remittances.
    4. Schools change the option set: A school or a skill centre expands the choices available to young people, which is the mechanism by which recruitment into an insurgency loses its appeal.
    5. The sequencing that made it possible: These interventions became feasible only once security forces could establish a more permanent presence in areas where the state had previously struggled to maintain one.

    Why is the end of armed conflict the easier half of the task?

    1. The achievement is a milestone, not an outcome: The guns going silent is an important milestone, and the harder task is ensuring that the space they leave behind is filled with roads, schools, businesses, livelihoods and functioning institutions.
    2. The nature of the state's presence must change: The objective now is a state presence defined by institutions and opportunity rather than by the security challenge that once dominated the landscape.
    3. Infrastructure is an input, not a result: Roads, branches and towers must begin to generate sustained economic activity, better education and greater integration with the rest of India, which is not automatic.
    4. The next phase is less visible: The coming phase will be less dramatic than the operations that made the headlines, and could be more important in determining the legacy of the campaign.
    5. Reversibility is the risk: Rehabilitation must hold, since the surrender policy's purpose is to prevent former cadres from returning to the movement and to prevent the movement from replenishing its ranks.
    6. The test stated: The former Red Corridor becomes a development corridor only when the infrastructure now reaching these regions begins to generate sustained economic activity, which is where the larger test begins.

    Conclusion

    The military campaign against Left Wing Extremism succeeded through intelligence-led operations, central and state coordination, disruption of financing, rehabilitation and a sustained security grid, and the Centre declared the country free from Naxalism on 31 March 2026. The infrastructure that followed, 408 camps, 597 fortified police stations, over 12,000 km of roads, 1,804 bank branches, 1,321 ATMs and 6,025 post offices, has changed the physical reach of the state. What remains unresolved is whether that reach converts into sustained economic activity and institutions, since the durability of the achievement will be judged on that conversion and not on the operations.

    Left Wing Extremism in India

    1. What it is: Left Wing Extremism is an armed movement seeking to overthrow the state through protracted people's war, organised around rural base areas, guerrilla zones and armed squads.
    2. Origin: The movement takes its popular name from the 1967 peasant uprising at Naxalbari in West Bengal.
    3. Present organisation: The Communist Party of India (Maoist) was formed in 2004 through the merger of the People's War Group and the Maoist Communist Centre of India, and is proscribed as a terrorist organisation.
    4. Geographic concentration: Activity was concentrated in a forested, mineral-rich and tribal-majority belt spanning Chhattisgarh, Jharkhand, Odisha, Bihar, Maharashtra, Andhra Pradesh, Telangana, Madhya Pradesh and West Bengal.
    5. Structural drivers: The movement drew on land alienation, displacement by mining and infrastructure projects, denial of forest rights, absence of administration and the weakness of local grievance redress in Fifth Schedule areas.
    6. The doctrinal frame: The Union government's approach has been organised around the SAMADHAN doctrine, which sets out the components of the counter-insurgency response.
    7. Institutional lead: The Ministry of Home Affairs coordinates the response through the Left Wing Extremism Division, with the Central Reserve Police Force as the principal central force deployed.

    Laws Governing the Response to Left Wing Extremism

    1. Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967: The principal central law used to proscribe the Communist Party of India (Maoist) and its front organisations and to prosecute membership and support.
    2. The 2019 amendment allows the designation of individuals, not only organisations, as terrorists.
    3. Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002: The instrument used to trace and attach the financial networks that sustained the insurgency.
    4. Chhattisgarh Special Public Security Act, 2005: A state law empowering the declaration of organisations as unlawful and criminalising membership and assistance in the most affected state.
    5. Andhra Pradesh Public Security Act, 1992: The corresponding state instrument in the southern part of the former corridor.
    6. Arms Act, 1959 and Explosive Substances Act, 1908: Govern possession and use of weapons and explosives, which are the principal charges alongside the terrorism statutes.
    7. Provisions of the Panchayats (Extension to the Scheduled Areas) Act, 1996 (PESA): Extends panchayat provisions to Fifth Schedule areas and vests the Gram Sabha with powers over land, minor minerals and local plans, addressing a grievance the insurgency mobilised.
    8. Scheduled Tribes and Other Traditional Forest Dwellers (Recognition of Forest Rights) Act, 2006: Recognises individual and community forest rights, addressing the land and forest alienation that underpinned recruitment.
    9. Fifth Schedule to the Constitution: Governs the administration of Scheduled Areas through the Governor and the Tribes Advisory Council, and is the constitutional frame within which most affected districts sit.

    Government Initiatives for Left Wing Extremism Affected Areas

    1. National Policy and Action Plan, 2015: The overarching framework combining security measures, development interventions, rights and entitlements of local communities, and public perception management.
    2. Security Related Expenditure (SRE) Scheme: Reimburses state governments for security-related expenditure including training, operational costs, ex gratia payments and the surrender and rehabilitation of former cadres.
    3. Special Central Assistance (SCA) for the most affected districts: Funds public infrastructure and services in the districts of highest concern, filling critical gaps identified by district administrations.
    4. Special Infrastructure Scheme (SIS): Strengthens state police infrastructure, including special forces and fortified police stations, in affected states.
    5. Road Connectivity Project for LWE Affected Areas (RCPLWEA): Successor to the Road Requirement Plan, it constructs and upgrades roads and bridges to open isolated blocks to administration and markets.
    6. LWE Mobile Tower Project: Installs mobile towers in affected districts to extend telecommunications where commercial operators would not otherwise invest.
    7. Eklavya Model Residential Schools: Provide residential schooling for tribal children in blocks with high Scheduled Tribe population, extending secondary education in the affected belt.
    8. Aspirational Districts Programme: Targets the least developed districts, a large share of which fall in the former corridor, on health, nutrition, education, agriculture, financial inclusion and infrastructure indicators.
    9. Civic Action Programme: Funds central armed police forces to conduct welfare activities that build confidence between security forces and local communities.

    Back2Basics: The SAMADHAN Doctrine

    1. What it is: SAMADHAN is the Union government's stated doctrine for countering Left Wing Extremism, articulated as an eight-point formulation.
    2. S, Smart leadership: Leadership capable of directing an operation that spans police, intelligence and administration.
    3. A, Aggressive strategy: A posture of sustained offensive operations rather than defensive holding.
    4. M, Motivation and training: Continuous training and morale management for deployed forces.
    5. A, Actionable intelligence: Intelligence specific enough to act on, which is the input the campaign was built around.
    6. D, Dashboard-based key result areas and key performance indicators: Measured performance targets for units and districts.
    7. H, Harnessing technology: Use of surveillance, communications and data tools in operations.
    8. A, Action plan for each theatre: A theatre-specific plan rather than a uniform national approach.
    9. N, No access to financing: Cutting the financial networks that sustain cadres, weapons and logistics.

    Key Facts about the Left Wing Extremism Campaign

    1. The declaration: The Centre declared the country free from Naxalism on 31 March 2026.
    2. Central Reserve Police Force: The largest central armed police force, it marked its Raising Day on 27 July and has been the principal force deployed in the campaign.
    3. CoBRA: The Commando Battalion for Resolute Action is the Central Reserve Police Force's specialised jungle and guerrilla warfare unit for anti-Naxal operations.
    4. Named operations: Black Forest, Octopus, Double Bull and Chakrabandha are the operations named as having dismantled entrenched strongholds.
    5. Bastar: The Bastar division of Chhattisgarh was the operational centre of the campaign and the site of repeated ministerial review visits.
    6. Infrastructure since 2014: 408 new security camps, 597 fortified police stations, over 12,000 km of roads, 1,804 bank branches, 1,321 ATMs and 6,025 post offices in affected areas.
    7. The origin marker: The movement is named after Naxalbari in West Bengal, the site of the 1967 uprising.

    Challenges in Consolidating the Post-Insurgency Transition

    1. Infrastructure without economic activity: Physical assets do not automatically generate livelihoods, e.g. more than 12,000 km of roads open access to markets only where there is production to move.
    2. Reversibility of surrender: Rehabilitation fails where former cadres find no economic footing, e.g. surrendered cadres receiving one-time financial assistance without sustained employment remain vulnerable to re-recruitment.
    3. Unsettled land and forest rights: The grievance that fed recruitment persists where titles remain unrecognised, e.g. pending individual and community claims under the Forest Rights Act, 2006 in Fifth Schedule districts.
    4. Displacement from mining and industry: Development in a mineral-rich belt can reproduce the alienation the insurgency mobilised, e.g. resettlement disputes around iron ore and coal projects in Bastar and Jharkhand.
    5. Thin administrative capacity: Newly opened blocks lack the staffing to run the institutions now built, e.g. teacher and health worker vacancies in interior blocks leave schools and health centres nominally functional.
    6. Security-first institutional habits: Areas administered through a security grid do not convert automatically to civil administration, e.g. 408 security camps and 597 fortified police stations remain the most visible state presence in many blocks.
    7. Justice system backlog: Cases registered during the campaign remain unresolved and undercut confidence, e.g. long undertrial detention of tribal accused under the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967.
    8. Residual and displaced cadres: Movement remnants may relocate rather than dissolve, e.g. cadre movement across inter-state boundaries has historically shifted the problem rather than ended it.
    9. Fragile fiscal continuity: Development spending contingent on the insurgency's salience declines once the emergency is declared over, e.g. schemes framed as LWE-specific lose their justification the moment the region is declared free.

    Way Forward

    1. Shift funding from security-tagged to development-tagged windows: Convert LWE-specific central assistance into sustained district development funding, so financing does not lapse with the security declaration.
    2. Complete forest rights recognition: Clear the backlog of individual and community forest rights claims in the former corridor, which addresses the grievance the movement recruited on.
    3. Staff the institutions already built: Fill teacher, health worker and revenue staff vacancies in the newly connected blocks, since a building without staff does not constitute a functioning institution.
    4. Link infrastructure to production: Tie the road, banking and connectivity network to minor forest produce value chains, agro-processing and local enterprise credit, so that access converts into income.
    5. Make rehabilitation employment-linked: Extend the surrender policy beyond financial assistance into guaranteed placement in skill centres, Industrial Training Institutes and public works, so reintegration is durable.
    6. Strengthen PESA implementation: Operationalise Gram Sabha powers over land, minor minerals and local plans under the Provisions of the Panchayats (Extension to the Scheduled Areas) Act, 1996, so local consent governs the next phase of development.
    7. Fast-track pending cases: Establish dedicated courts to clear the backlog of insurgency-era cases, since prolonged undertrial detention undermines the legitimacy the campaign gained.

    Matching Previous Year Question

    “[2025, GS3, 10 marks] The Government of India recently stated that Left Wing Extremism (LWE) will be eliminated by 2026. What do you understand by LWE and how are the people affected by it? What measures have been taken by the government to eliminate LWE?”

  • Kondapalli in Bastar shows what state presence looks like after the Maoist withdrawal

    Why in the News

    Kondapalli, a village of 600 people in Chhattisgarh’s Bijapur district that served as the base of the most dreaded Maoist battalion, now has a road, a bus, grid electricity, a cellphone tower and a new school. The change moves the test of the insurgency’s end from the absence of armed cadre to the delivery of ordinary services, since a surrendered commander now demands from the State the borewell, pond, land rights and visiting doctor he once took up arms against it over.

    How does the forward base model work in the Red Corridor?

    1. Step one, the camp: A central armed police force announces a forward operating base inside a village previously controlled by the Maoists.
    2. Step two, clearing operations: A series of encounters follows, which pushes the armed cadre out of the area.
    3. Step three, the road: An engineering agency opens a motorable road to the camp, which ends the physical isolation the insurgency depended on.
    4. Step four, civil administration: Grid electricity, telecom towers, schools, anganwadis, ration shops, Aadhaar enrolment and bank accounts follow the road.
    5. Step five, the political process: Elections resume and elected panchayat bodies begin to function.
    6. Application in Kondapalli: The Central Reserve Police Force (CRPF) announced its forward base in the village in November 2024, and this sequence has run there since.

    What is the People’s Liberation Guerrilla Army (PLGA)?

    1. About: The PLGA is the armed wing of the Communist Party of India (Maoist), organised into platoons, companies and battalions.
    2. Its role here: Kondapalli served as the base of Battalion No. 1, the most dreaded unit of the PLGA.

    What was Battalion No. 1?

    1. About: Battalion No. 1 was the main armed formation of the Maoists in south Bastar, camped in the jungle outside Kondapalli.
    2. Present position: The battalion is gone from the area and security forces now camp in the same space.

    What is a Revolutionary People’s Committee?

    1. About: It is a grassroots governing body of the Maoists that ran village level administration, land distribution and dispute settlement in areas under their control.
    2. Its role here: A former commander of one such committee surrendered in Kondapalli in March 2025.

    What is the Bal Sangam?

    1. About: The Bal Sangam is the children’s wing of the Maoists, used to recruit and indoctrinate minors in areas under their control.

    What is the Chetna Natya Manch?

    1. About: The Chetna Natya Manch is the Maoists’ cultural troupe, which used song and theatre on themes such as jal, jungle and zameen to mobilise villagers.

    What was the Salwa Judum?

    1. About: The Salwa Judum was a civilian counter insurgency force set up in Chhattisgarh in 2005, which armed villagers against the Maoists.
    2. Legal status: The Supreme Court declared it illegal in 2011 and ordered the disarming of the appointed special police officers.

    What is the Red Corridor?

    1. About: The Red Corridor is the belt of forested, mineral rich and largely tribal districts across central and eastern India where Maoist influence was concentrated.
    2. Scale in Chhattisgarh: Kondapalli was one of nearly 400 villages in the State’s Red Corridor where the state had little say or presence.

    What is the Border Roads Organisation (BRO)?

    1. About: The BRO is a road construction agency under the Ministry of Defence that builds and maintains roads in border and strategically sensitive areas.
    2. Its role here: It began work on the Tarrem to Kondapalli road soon after security forces pushed the Maoists back in November 2024.

    What is a Bailey bridge?

    1. About: A Bailey bridge is a portable, prefabricated steel truss bridge assembled on site without heavy equipment, used where permanent bridges cannot be built quickly.
    2. Its use here: The BRO installed nine Bailey bridges over river streams on the stretch past Kondapalli.

    What is the Mahtari Vandan Yojana?

    1. About: It is a Chhattisgarh government scheme that transfers Rs 1,000 a month to eligible married women through direct benefit transfer.
    2. Its role here: One villager’s mother opened a bank account last year and now receives this transfer.

    How did the Maoists govern Kondapalli?

    1. Territorial claim: Kondapalli lay in the Maoists’ South Bastar division, part of what they called the Liberated Zone.
    2. Strength of the formation: The division was one of the strongest Maoist formations and among the last to fall, and could gather the support of 400 to 500 people at short notice.
    3. Economic function of the village: Kondapalli mattered to the Maoists because their supplies came from its local market.
    4. Commemorative gatherings: Hundreds of villagers were assembled every year at a 64 foot tall memorial in Komatpalli, part of the Kondapalli gram panchayat, for Martyrs’ Week.
    5. Land and housing: The Maoists redistributed land and helped villagers build their houses, which is how they gained trust.
    6. Local public works: They built small roads and a pond, and asked villagers to donate money for the treatment of anyone who fell sick.
    7. Forest rule: Cutting trees was punishable under their order.
    8. What was withheld: Residents describe the arrangement as delivering a sense of security and of being seen, with little development alongside it.

    How was that order enforced?

    1. Conscription pressure: At least one person from every village had to join, which put pressure on families to give up their sons or daughters.
    2. Recruitment through front organisations: A boy recruited as a teenager passed through the Bal Sangam and then the Chetna Natya Manch, singing about saving jal, jungle and zameen.
    3. Fear of dispossession: Recruits were told the government would steal their land and that they would eventually have to leave the village.
    4. Control of movement: Villagers leaving the Kondapalli gram panchayat were questioned on their return.
    5. Public punishment: Wrongdoers were beaten publicly under a tree.
    6. Killing of suspected informers: Those suspected of informing to the police were killed, and others left the village.
    7. Destruction of state assets: The Maoists burnt down the only school and the adjoining hostel in the 2000s to stop security forces sheltering there, and destroyed the electric poles the administration brought.
    8. Withdrawal of officials: Forest officials and the patwari, the village records keeper, stopped coming to Kondapalli.
    9. Control of communication: Phones were seized and villagers were told not to use them.
    10. Cost on the other side: Villagers were caught in the middle, and one resident’s uncle was killed by security forces on the suspicion that he was a Maoist.

    What ended the Maoist hold on Kondapalli?

    1. The forward base: The CRPF announced in November 2024 that it was establishing a forward base in Kondapalli.
    2. Encounters: A series of encounters followed, after which the Maoists were pushed into Telangana.
    3. Surrender of the formation: The cadre pushed into Telangana laid down arms in March 2026.
    4. Village level surrender: A former commander of the Revolutionary People’s Committee surrendered in March 2025 along with 12 other villagers.
    5. Rehabilitation in practice: He opened a kirana store with the money received under the State’s rehabilitation policy.
    6. Losses in the campaign: A villager’s 18 year old daughter, who left home in December 2022 to join the Maoists, was among about 30 Maoists killed in a security operation in Telangana’s Karregutta hills last year.
    7. Scale of the insurgency: The decades long insurgency claimed at least 4,741 lives in the Bastar region alone since 2000.
    8. National declaration: The Union Home Minister has declared the country Maoist free, 80 years after Independence.

    Which markers of state presence have appeared in the village?

    1. Grid electricity: Kondapalli received electricity from the grid last July, after years of solar lamps and then of darkness once those failed.
    2. Telecom: A cellphone tower was erected on the edge of the village in December last year, rising above the mud houses and small shops.
    3. School building: A new government school building came up in the summer of 2025, painted bright blue and standing by the main road.
    4. School capacity: The school runs classes 1 to 8 with 158 students and seven teaching staff, all male, and has blackboards and benches.
    5. What preceded it: After the school was burnt down children studied in a shanty in the same compound, and an asbestos shade was put up there in 2020.
    6. Anganwadi and residential school: An anganwadi and a residential school are under construction in the village.
    7. Panchayat and ration infrastructure: Panchayat bhawans have been built and the new ration shop is painted in the colours of the Tricolour.
    8. Identity and banking: Villagers were called to the police camp where they were enrolled under Aadhaar and given birth certificates and bank accounts.
    9. Cash transfer: A household bank account opened last year now receives Rs 1,000 from the State under the Mahtari Vandan Yojana for women.
    10. Return of the vote: The village voted for the first time last year, in the local body polls, having been told under the Maoists to make no demands of the government.
    11. Political visit: The Chhattisgarh Chief Minister visited Kondapalli on 2 June, a first for the village.
    12. Announced pipeline: The Bijapur District Collector stated that over the next two years the village will get a cricket ground, a health centre, a cement road and government scheme benefits.
    13. Security presence: Security forces now camp in the jungle outside the village where Battalion No. 1 used to camp.
    14. Private consumption: A villager bought a Redmi phone for Rs 10,000 after the Maoists left, and uses it to watch films, news and skill tutorials.

    How has connectivity changed?

    1. Bus service: A blue bus from Cherla in Telangana has run since March 2025 under the State’s rural bus scheme, making two trips a day.
    2. What it connects: The bus carries villagers to Bijapur, 79 km to the north, and to Cherla in Telangana, where many young men work as daily wage labourers.
    3. The road agency: The Border Roads Organisation began work on the Tarrem to Kondapalli road soon after November 2024.
    4. Engineering on the road: On the stretch running past Kondapalli into Telangana, the BRO installed nine Bailey bridges over river streams and 43 precast culverts to keep the road usable during the rains.
    5. Present condition: The road is still a work in progress, carrying the occasional motorcycle or truck with construction material.
    6. Travel before the road: A circuitous journey of 209 km taking five hours through Cherla was the only way to travel from Bijapur to Kondapalli.
    7. Travel now: A 90 minute car ride from Bijapur reaches the village without crossing into Telangana, passing the junctions of Awapalli and Basaguda and reaching Tarrem on the Sukma and Bijapur border.
    8. Map lag: For the 18 km beyond Tarrem, Google Maps still recommends the older and longer route through Telangana.
    9. What the road replaced: Villagers earlier walked two days to Telangana carrying 30 kg of rice, stayed 45 days and worked plucking chillies on farms.
    10. A generation without a bus: The bus stopped after the Maoists came from Telangana in 1985, and an entire generation grew up without ever seeing one.
    11. Border geography: Kondapalli sits on the Telangana border and is closer to Cherla at 46 km than to its own district headquarters at Bijapur, 79 km away.

    What distances still separate the village from basic services?

    1. Health care: The nearest doctor requires a journey of over 30 km to Basaguda.
    2. Schooling beyond class 8: Students travel 33 km to Basaguda or 23 km to Pamed to continue past class 8.
    3. Higher education: The village’s first graduate could finish his education only by leaving during the Salwa Judum years for a hostel in Basaguda and then a college in Dantewada.
    4. A second case of leaving to study: A CRPF recruit from the village completed school while staying in a hostel in Usoor in Bijapur.
    5. Schooling in the earlier generation: The village head travelled 27 km by bus to school in Awapalli in the 1980s.
    6. Food supply: Villagers earlier travelled to Awapalli even to buy rice, which took a full day.
    7. Maternal health: Women died in labour or on the way to hospital because there was no medical facility nearby and no road, and were carried on cots.

    Why does the arrival of the state not settle the question of legitimacy?

    1. The camp changed hands rather than disappeared: Security forces occupy the same jungle space the Maoist battalion used, so the village still lives beside an armed presence.
    2. The demands are the same goods: A surrendered commander now asks the State for a borewell for irrigation, a pond, land rights, small roads and a visiting doctor, which are the goods the Maoists claimed to supply.
    3. Memory of redistribution: Residents attribute the Maoists’ trust to land redistribution and help in building houses, which the State’s works now have to match.
    4. Memory of being caught in between: Families were punished by both sides, with suspected informers killed by the Maoists and a relative killed by security forces on suspicion.
    5. The Salwa Judum legacy: A villager still recalls her father being beaten for hours in 2006 during the Salwa Judum years, and the Supreme Court declared that force illegal in 2011.
    6. Delivery remains promised: The health centre, cement road and cricket ground sit on a two year timetable, and the anganwadi and residential school are still under construction.
    7. What residents ask for next: Villagers name a health facility, a school for higher studies and a self help group for poultry, farming and other livelihoods as the unmet needs.

    Challenges to consolidating state presence in Bastar

    1. Reversibility of security gains: Cadre pushed across a State border can regroup and return if camps thin out. e.g. the cadre pushed out of Kondapalli in November 2024 moved into Telangana and laid down arms only in March 2026.
    2. Roads reach before services do: Physical connectivity arrives years ahead of health and higher education facilities, so the mortality and dropout risks persist. e.g. Kondapalli residents still travel more than 30 km to Basaguda to see a doctor.
    3. Education discontinuity beyond the primary stage: Village schools stop at class 8, so children must migrate to hostels to continue studying. e.g. Kondapalli students travel 33 km to Basaguda or 23 km to Pamed after class 8.
    4. Unsettled forest and land rights: Slow recognition of individual and community forest rights leaves the state contested on the very issue the Maoists mobilised on. e.g. community forest rights claims under the Forest Rights Act, 2006 have seen high rejection rates in Chhattisgarh’s Bastar districts.
    5. Distrust from past counter insurgency: Civilian militias and killings on suspicion leave a memory that slows cooperation with the administration. e.g. the Supreme Court struck down the Salwa Judum in Nandini Sundar versus State of Chhattisgarh (2011).
    6. Livelihood dependence on distant labour markets: Without local employment, better connectivity mainly makes it easier to migrate out. e.g. young men from Kondapalli take the daily bus to Cherla in Telangana for daily wage work.
    7. Administrative vacancy in interior blocks: Staffing in remote blocks remains thin even after the security situation improves. e.g. forest officials and the patwari stopped visiting Kondapalli entirely during the Maoist years, and the new school runs with seven teachers for classes 1 to 8.
    8. Displacement risk from mining and infrastructure: Newly accessible mineral belts raise the prospect of acquisition in Scheduled Areas without full consent. e.g. protests over iron ore mining in the Bailadila range in Dantewada in 2019.

    Conclusion

    Kondapalli shows that the end of an insurgency is measured by the return of ordinary state functions, not by the absence of armed cadre. Within two years of the CRPF forward base, the village has a road with nine Bailey bridges, a daily bus, grid electricity, a tower, a school with 158 students, Aadhaar numbers and bank accounts, and it has voted for the first time. The health centre, the cement road and the school for higher studies remain on a two year promise, and the villagers’ claims on the State now decide whether the change holds.

    Left Wing Extremism in India

    1. About: Left Wing Extremism is an armed movement that seeks to capture state power through a protracted people’s war, drawing on grievances over land, forest rights, displacement and the absence of the administration in tribal districts.
    2. Origin: It began with the peasant uprising at Naxalbari in West Bengal in 1967, which gave the movement its popular name.
    3. Principal organisation: The Communist Party of India (Maoist) was formed in 2004 by the merger of the People’s War Group and the Maoist Communist Centre of India, and is banned as a terrorist organisation.
    4. Armed wing: The People’s Liberation Guerrilla Army is its military formation, organised into platoons, companies and battalions.
    5. Geography: Influence was concentrated in the Dandakaranya belt across Chhattisgarh, Jharkhand, Odisha, Maharashtra, Telangana and Andhra Pradesh.
    6. Parallel governance: Janatana Sarkars, also called Revolutionary People’s Committees, ran village administration, land distribution and dispute settlement in areas under Maoist control.
    7. Scale of decline: The number of districts affected by Left Wing Extremism fell from 126 in 2018 to 38 in April 2024, with the worst affected districts concentrated in the Bastar division.
    8. Policy frame: The National Policy and Action Plan of 2015 combines security measures, development, entitlements for tribal groups and perception management.
    9. Constitutional position: Police and public order are State subjects, so the Centre acts through central armed police forces, funding and intelligence sharing.

    Constitutional Framework Governing Scheduled Areas and Internal Security

    1. Article 244 and the Fifth Schedule: Provide for the administration of Scheduled Areas and Scheduled Tribes, including the Governor’s power to modify the application of laws and the Tribes Advisory Council.
    2. Article 275(1): Provides grants in aid to States for tribal welfare and for raising the administration of Scheduled Areas to the level of the rest of the State.
    3. Article 338A: Establishes the National Commission for Scheduled Tribes to investigate and monitor safeguards for Scheduled Tribes.
    4. Article 355: Places on the Union the duty to protect every State against external aggression and internal disturbance.
    5. Article 356: Allows a proclamation where the government of a State cannot be carried on in accordance with the Constitution.
    6. Entry 1 of the State List: Places public order within the legislative competence of the States.
    7. Entry 2 of the State List: Places police within the legislative competence of the States.
    8. Entry 2A of the Union List: Covers the deployment of any armed force of the Union in a State in aid of the civil power.

    Laws and Rules Governing the Response to Left Wing Extremism

    1. Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967: Provides for banning unlawful associations and terrorist organisations and for offences of membership and support.
    2. Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Amendment Act, 2019: Allows the Centre to designate individuals, and not only organisations, as terrorists.
    3. Chhattisgarh Special Public Security Act, 2005: Criminalises membership of and support to organisations declared unlawful within the State.
    4. National Investigation Agency Act, 2008: Creates a central agency to investigate scheduled offences including terrorism, with jurisdiction across States.
    5. Panchayats (Extension to the Scheduled Areas) Act, 1996: Extends panchayat provisions to Fifth Schedule areas and vests the gram sabha with control over minor forest produce and consultation before land acquisition.
    6. Scheduled Tribes and Other Traditional Forest Dwellers (Recognition of Forest Rights) Act, 2006: Recognises individual and community forest rights of forest dwelling tribal groups.
    7. Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013: Requires consent, social impact assessment and rehabilitation, with additional safeguards in Scheduled Areas.
    8. Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023: Section 152 penalises acts endangering the sovereignty, unity and integrity of India.

    Back2Basics: Bastar Region

    1. Designation: Bastar is an administrative division of southern Chhattisgarh and the core of the Dandakaranya region.
    2. Districts: The division covers Bastar, Kondagaon, Narayanpur, Dantewada, Sukma, Bijapur and Kanker.
    3. Rivers: The Indravati and the Sabari are the principal rivers of the region.
    4. Protected areas: Kanger Valley National Park and the Indravati National Park and Tiger Reserve lie in the division.
    5. Landform features: The Chitrakote falls on the Indravati are the widest waterfall in India, and the Abujhmarh hills remain largely unsurveyed.
    6. Tribal groups: The Gond, Muria, Madia, Dorla, Halba and Bhatra communities live in the region.
    7. Cultural institutions: Bastar Dussehra runs for about 75 days and is among the longest festivals in the country, and the Ghotul is the traditional youth dormitory of the Muria.
    8. Mineral base: The Bailadila range in Dantewada holds some of India’s richest iron ore deposits.

    Government Initiatives for Left Wing Extremism Affected Areas

    1. SAMADHAN doctrine: The Centre’s operational framework combining smart leadership, aggressive strategy, motivation and training, actionable intelligence, dashboards, harnessing technology, action plans for each theatre and denial of financing.
    2. Security Related Expenditure Scheme: Reimburses States for the costs of security operations, training, community policing and rehabilitation of surrendered cadre.
    3. Special Infrastructure Scheme: Funds fortified police stations, secure camps and district police infrastructure in affected districts.
    4. Special Central Assistance: Provides funds for public infrastructure and services in the most affected districts.
    5. Road Connectivity Project for Left Wing Extremism Affected Areas: Builds all weather roads and bridges in affected districts, alongside the earlier Road Requirement Plan.
    6. LWE Mobile Tower Project: Installs mobile towers in affected districts to close the telecom gap.
    7. Civic Action Programme: Funds central armed police forces to run health camps, sports events and welfare activity to build local trust.
    8. ROSHNI and Eklavya Model Residential Schools: Provide skill training for youth and residential schooling for tribal children in affected districts.
    9. Aspirational Districts Programme: Targets health, nutrition, education and infrastructure indicators in the districts with the weakest outcomes, many of them in the Red Corridor.
    10. Niyad Nellanar scheme: A Chhattisgarh programme that saturates villages within a radius of new security camps with central and State scheme benefits.

    Key Facts about Left Wing Extremism

    1. Naxalbari: The movement takes its name from the 1967 uprising at Naxalbari in Darjeeling district of West Bengal.
    2. Formation of the CPI (Maoist): The party was formed on 21 September 2004 and is listed as a terrorist organisation under the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967.
    3. Decline in affected districts: Affected districts fell from 126 in 2018 to 38 in April 2024.
    4. Salwa Judum: Formed in 2005 and declared illegal by the Supreme Court in 2011 in Nandini Sundar versus State of Chhattisgarh.
    5. Specialised forces: The Greyhounds in Andhra Pradesh and Telangana, and the District Reserve Guard and Bastar Fighters in Chhattisgarh, are the principal anti Maoist units.
    6. Stated deadline: The Union government set a target of ending Left Wing Extremism by 31 March 2026.
    7. Bastar toll: The insurgency claimed at least 4,741 lives in the Bastar region alone since 2000.
    8. Karregutta hills: The hills on the Chhattisgarh and Telangana border were the site of a major operation against Maoist formations.

    Challenges in Left Wing Extremism Affected Areas

    1. Development deficit that created the grievance: Absence of roads, schools, health centres and electricity is the condition the movement recruited on. e.g. Kondapalli got grid electricity only last July and a cellphone tower only in December.
    2. Weak implementation of tribal rights law: PESA and the Forest Rights Act remain unevenly implemented, so consent and forest produce rights stay contested. e.g. community forest rights claims across the Bastar districts have been rejected in large numbers.
    3. Displacement from mining and infrastructure: Acquisition in mineral rich Scheduled Areas turns development projects into recruitment arguments. e.g. protests over iron ore mining at Bailadila in Dantewada in 2019.
    4. Human rights costs of the security response: Killings on suspicion and civilian militias damage the state’s legitimacy for a generation. e.g. the Supreme Court’s 2011 order disbanding the Salwa Judum and disarming special police officers.
    5. Financing of the insurgency: Extortion from contractors, tendu leaf traders and transporters sustains cadre even after territorial losses. e.g. levy collection on road contractors has repeatedly been cited in National Investigation Agency chargesheets.
    6. Coordination across State borders: Cadre exploit inter State boundaries where police jurisdiction ends. e.g. the Kondapalli cadre moved into Telangana after the November 2024 encounters.
    7. Rehabilitation follow through: Surrender packages fail where no livelihood follows the cash grant. e.g. surrendered cadre in Bijapur depend on small kirana shops set up with one time rehabilitation money.
    8. Sustaining services after the camp: Teachers, doctors and revenue officials remain reluctant to serve in interior blocks. e.g. the new Kondapalli school has seven teachers for classes 1 to 8 and no facility beyond that.

    Way Forward

    1. Saturate cleared villages with entitlements: Extend the saturation model so every village within reach of a new camp receives Aadhaar, bank accounts, ration cards, pensions and scheme benefits within a fixed timeframe.
    2. Complete the road and telecom grid: Finish the Tarrem to Kondapalli type links and the mobile tower programme so connectivity does not stop at the camp.
    3. Settle forest and land rights first: Clear pending individual and community claims under the Forest Rights Act, 2006 and enforce gram sabha consent under PESA before any acquisition.
    4. Extend schooling beyond class 8 locally: Upgrade village schools and expand residential schools so children are not forced to migrate 20 to 35 km to continue.
    5. Place health infrastructure with the road: Staff sub centres and mobile medical units at the same time as road completion, rather than years later.
    6. Build local livelihoods: Fund self help groups, minor forest produce processing and poultry and farming enterprises so connectivity does not only enable outmigration.
    7. Make rehabilitation a multi year programme: Follow the surrender grant with skill training, credit and market linkage, and monitor outcomes for surrendered cadre.
    8. Institutionalise inter State coordination: Sustain joint operations, shared intelligence and unified surrender policies across Chhattisgarh, Telangana, Odisha, Maharashtra and Jharkhand.

    Matching Previous Year Question

    “[2025, GS3, 10 marks] The Government of India recently stated that Left Wing Extremism (LWE) will be eliminated by 2026. What do you understand by LWE and how are the people affected by it? What measures have been taken by the government to eliminate LWE?”

  • For first time in 50 years, DGP sets foot on former Maoist bastion in Telangana

    Why in the News

    For the first time in 50 years, a Director General of Police set foot on the Telangana side of Karregutta, a hill once used to house Central Committee members of the banned Communist Party of India (Maoist). The visit marks the decline of Left Wing Extremism under Operation Kagar, with around 700 surrenders in Telangana and the top leadership largely killed, arrested, or surrendered.

    What is Operation Kagar?

    1. Definition: Operation Kagar is a coordinated anti-Maoist offensive launched by security forces in pursuit of the central government’s deadline for a Naxal-free India.
    2. Scope: It combines intensified security operations with surrender-and-rehabilitation measures across the Maoist-affected belt.

    Who are the CPI (Maoist)?

    1. Definition: The Communist Party of India (Maoist), or CPI (Maoist), is a banned Left Wing Extremist organisation that seeks to overthrow the state through armed struggle.
    2. Leadership: Its former General Secretary Muppala Lakshmana Rao, alias Ganapati, was the longest-serving general secretary of the outfit.

    What happened at Karregutta?

    1. The DGP’s visit: The Telangana Director General of Police entered the Telangana side of Karregutta accompanied by a large contingent of police and revenue personnel.
    2. The message: The delegation’s size was meant to signal that it is now safe to visit the area, where earlier only specialised forces such as Greyhounds and COBRA units operated briefly during operations.
    3. Tricolour hoisted: The contingent hoisted the national flag at the spot.
    4. Tourism plan: The DGP announced the kaccha road into the forest would be tarred and the area developed into a tourist spot.
    5. Surrender support: Surrendered Maoists are given a lump-sum grant, including the bounty announced on their heads, to start a new life.

    What is the current status of the Maoist decline?

    1. Surrenders: Around 700 Maoists surrendered in Telangana alone during the operation.
    2. Leadership losses: By March 31, several Central Committee members of the CPI (Maoist) were killed, arrested, or had surrendered.
    3. Top commander killed: Former General Secretary Nambala Keshava Rao, alias Basavaraju, was killed in a police encounter in May 2025.
    4. Factional split: After Basavaraju’s death the party split into two factions, one led by Mallojula Venugopal Rao, alias Sonu, and another by Thippiri Tirupathi, alias Devuji, who later surrendered.
    5. Few absconding: Only two to three top Maoists remain absconding, chief among them Ganapati.

    Conclusion

    A DGP entering Karregutta after five decades, followed by the hoisting of the Tricolour, signals the sharp decline of the Maoist movement in Telangana under Operation Kagar. With around 700 surrenders, the top leadership neutralised, and only a handful absconding, the insurgency’s organisational base has collapsed. The next milestone is the government’s deadline for a Naxal-free India and the rehabilitation of surrendered cadres into mainstream society.

    Back2Basics:

    Left Wing Extremism in India (Foundational Context)

    1. About: Left Wing Extremism (LWE), also called Naxalism, is an armed insurgency by Maoist groups aiming to capture state power through violence.
    2. Geography: It has historically concentrated in a forested tribal belt across Chhattisgarh, Jharkhand, Odisha, Telangana, and neighbouring States.
    3. Nodal ministry: The Ministry of Home Affairs coordinates the national response through security and development measures.

    Communist Party of India (Maoist)

    1. Formation: Formed in 2004 through the merger of the People’s War Group and the Maoist Communist Centre of India.
    2. Status: Designated a terrorist organisation under the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967.
    3. Objective: Seeks to overthrow the Indian state through protracted armed struggle.
    4. Armed wing: Operates the People’s Liberation Guerrilla Army.

    Government Initiatives against LWE

    1. SAMADHAN doctrine: An overarching strategy covering smart leadership, aggressive strategy, motivation, actionable intelligence, and technology.
    2. Security Related Expenditure Scheme: Reimburses States for security operations, training, and rehabilitation of surrendered cadres.
    3. Aspirational Districts Programme: Targets development in the most backward districts, many of them LWE-affected.
    4. Road connectivity projects: The Road Requirement Plan and RCPLWE scheme build roads to open up affected areas.
    5. Surrender and Rehabilitation Policy: Provides grants, vocational training, and support to those who lay down arms.

    Key Facts about LWE

    1. Shrinking footprint: The number of LWE-affected districts has fallen sharply over the past decade.
    2. Declining violence: Incidents and casualties have dropped substantially with intensified operations.
    3. Elite forces: Greyhounds of Telangana and Andhra Pradesh and the CoBRA units of the CRPF are specialised anti-Maoist forces.

    Challenges in Countering LWE

    1. Development deficit: Persistent gaps in roads, health, and education sustain grievances in affected areas.
    2. Difficult terrain: Dense forests and hilly terrain aid guerrilla movement and hamper operations.
    3. Tribal alienation: Displacement and land alienation feed recruitment among tribal populations.
    4. Rehabilitation gaps: Surrendered cadres struggle to find a foothold in mainstream society.
    5. Cross-border and inter-State movement: Cadres exploit State boundaries to evade coordinated action.

    Way Forward

    1. Sustained development: Extend roads, connectivity, and public services into cleared areas.
    2. Robust rehabilitation: Ensure surrendered cadres receive grants, skills, and livelihoods.
    3. Protect tribal rights: Implement the Forest Rights Act and Fifth Schedule protections effectively.
    4. Consolidate security gains: Hold cleared areas and prevent the movement’s revival across State borders.

    UPSC Relevance

    [UPSC 2018] Left Wing Extremism (LWE) is showing a downward trend, but still affects many parts of the country. Briefly explain the Government of India’s approach to counter the challenges posed by LWE.

    Linkage: The PYQ examines the Government’s approach to tackling Left Wing Extremism. Operation Kagar demonstrates the security and surrender components of this approach. The article also highlights the need for rehabilitation and development after security gains.

  • Article 244 of Indian Constitution relates to Administration of Scheduled areas and tribal areas. Analyze the impact of non-implementation of the provisions of Fifth Schedule on the growth of Left Wing Extremism