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GS Paper: GS3-20.Linkages between Development and Spread of Extremism.

  • Article 244 of Indian Constitution relates to Administration of Scheduled areas and tribal areas. Analyze the impact of non-implementation of the provisions of Fifth Schedule on the growth of Left Wing Extremism

  • The persisting drives of the government for development of large industries in backward areas have resulted in isolating the tribal population and the farmers who face multiple displacements with Malkangiri and Naxalbari foci, discuss the corrective strategies needed to win the left wing extremism (LWE) doctrine affected citizens back into the mainstream of social and economic growth.

  • The north-eastern region of India has been infested with insurgency for a very long time. Analyze the major reasons for the survival of armed insurgency in this region.

  • Left Wing Extremism (LWE) is showing a downward trend, but still affects many parts of the country. Briefly explain the Government of India’s approach to counter the challenges posed by LWE.

    LWE refers to violent insurgency driven by Maoist or Naxalite ideologies, with an objective of overthrowing the government and establishing a communist society.

    LWE showing downward trend

    In 2025 alone, 317 Naxals neutralised (including top leadership), 800+ arrested, and nearly 2,000 surrendered

    From 2004-14 to 2014-24

    Violent incidents declined 53%

    Security force deaths fell 73%

    Civilian deaths dropped 70%

    However, it still affects some part of country

    Red corridor in 11 districts in Maharashtra, Chhattisgarh, MP and Andhra pradesh

    Urban Front Strategy – Urban Naxals aim to gain legal and logistical support from cities-referred to as the “.”

    Tactical Asymmetry and “Contactless” Warfare – Eg- use of Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs) and drones

    Dandakaranya region along Chhattisgarh-Maharashtra-Odisha remains a key guerrilla base due to its difficult terrain.

    Government of India’s approach to counter the challenges posed by LWE

    Security Measures

    Operation Black Forest – killing 27 Naxals, including the top Maoist leader Nambala Keshav Rao

    Naxal’s Financial chocking

    Security Related Expenditure and Special Infrastructure Scheme for strengthening State Special Forces and Special Intelligence Branches

    Technology Use – Use of UAVs/drones, AI-based tracking, GPS, satellite imagery, and modern communication systems to locate hideouts and camps.

    Civic Action Programme (CAP) under ‘Modernization of Police Forces’ scheme to bridge the gaps between Security Forces and local people. Eg- community policing like “Jan Maitri”

    Developmental measures

    Building Critical Infrastructure in LWE Areas – Eg- Road Requirement Plan (RRP-I) constructing 14000 km of roads

    Socio-economic development

    Financial Inclusion- over 1,00 bank branches have been opened in LWE affected districts since April 2015.

    Aspirational districts program

    ROSHNI Scheme for skill development and employment-linked training for youth

    Surrender and rehabilitation policy – attractive incentives and assured livelihood. Eg- stipend for professional training

    Panchayat Extension To Scheduled Areas Act (PESA) and Forest Rights Act 2006 for strengthening tribal self-governance

    To realise the goal of achieving a “Naxal-free Bharat” by March 2026, security measures need to go hand in hand with participatory and tribal led governance.

  • What are the determinants of left-wing extremism in Eastern part of India? What strategy should Government of India, civil administration and security forces adopt to counter the threat in the affected areas?

    LWE refers to violent insurgency driven by Maoist or Naxalite ideologies, with an objective of overthrowing the government and establishing a communist society.

    Determinants of Left-Wing Extremism in Eastern India

    Maoist ideology of armed class struggle, anti-state revolution, and redistribution of resources appeals to sections alienated by inequality and exclusion. Eg- narrative of a “people’s war.”

    Land Displacement – Eg- Mining-induced displacement in Jharkhand’s coal belt (Ramgarh, Hazaribagh).

    Poor implementation of FRA, 2006, and PESA. Eg- Nearly 15% of forest and community land claims under the FRA are pending.

    Historical Socio-Economic Deprivation– Eg- LWE districts like Malkangiri, Sukma have some of the lowest HDI indicators.

    Unemployment & Lack of Livelihood Options- Eg- Jharkhand’s rural districts have among the highest youth unemployment in Eastern India.

    Governance Deficit – Eg- Large parts of Southern Bastar lacked road connectivity until recent years.

    Favourable Terrain – Eg- Dandakaranya region offers natural hideouts and logistical advantages for guerrilla warfare.

    Porous and forested borders between Chhattisgarh-Jharkhand-Odisha-Maharashtra allow safe movement and sanctuary for cadres.

    Ineffective Policing & Security Gaps – Poor training, lack of mobility, and limited intelligence in forest interiors.

    Parallel Governance – Maoists run jan adalats, levy taxes, provide quick dispute resolution-gaining perceived legitimacy in ungoverned spaces.

    Strategy to Counter LWE in Affected Regions

    Government of India

    Implement the “National Policy and Action Plan (2015)” in timely manner

    Accelerate Development – Road Requirement Plan (RRP-I), mobile towers, banking, health centres, PDS reforms in LWE belts.

    Strengthening PESA –

    real-time digital dashboards for fund utilization to Gram Sabhas

    “Bottom-Up” planning model – from “state imposition” to “participatory development”

    Economic development

    “Forest-to-Market” Value Chain development through Van Dhan Vikas Kendras (VDVKs)

    Promotion of Tribal-Start-up Ecosystem in food processing – Eg- export of products like Mahua and wild honey

    Civil Administration strategy

    “The only way to end insurgency is to win the hearts and minds of people through inclusive governance.” – Rajnath Singh

    Transparent and Participatory Mining & Resource Management- Eg- share of mineral royalties to local communities through the DMF Funds

    Technology for Governance – Use GIS mapping, drones, and e-governance platforms for service delivery and monitoring.

    Build Trust with Communities – Dialogue-based approach through “administration-public interface programmes”. Eg- Janta Darbars for grievance redressal

    Security Forces Strategy

    Strengthen Intelligence & Tech-Enabled Policing – Use of drones, satellite mapping, GPS-based tracking, communication intercept tools.

    Capacity building – Eg- fortified police stations, all-terrain vehicles for deep forest movement.

    Inter-State Coordination – Coordination between Chhattisgarh-Odisha-Jharkhand-Maharashtra in tri-junction zones.

    Community Policing – Initiatives like Jan Maitri, sports outreach, and anti-propaganda programmes.

    Progress anchored in justice and inclusion is the best antidote to extremism.

  • Naxalism is a social, economic and developmental issue manifesting as a violent internal security threat. In this context, discuss the emerging issues and suggest a multilayered strategy to tackle the menace of Naxalism.

    LWE refers to violent insurgency driven by Maoist or Naxalite ideologies, with an objective of overthrowing the government and establishing a communist society.

    Naxalism issue

    Social Issues Driving Naxalism

    Jal, Jungle, Jameen – Forced labour, expropriation of resources by outsiders, evasion of land ceiling laws, denial of land claims

    Maoist ideology of armed class struggle, anti-state revolution, and redistribution of resources appeals to sections alienated by inequality and exclusion. Eg- narrative of a “people’s war.”

    Land Displacement – Eg- Mining-induced displacement in Jharkhand’s coal belt (Ramgarh, Hazaribagh).

    Historical Socio-Economic Deprivation– Eg- LWE districts like Malkangiri, Sukma have some of the lowest HDI indicators.

    Economic Issues Driving Naxalism

    Unemployment & Lack of Livelihood Options- Eg- Jharkhand’s rural districts have among the highest youth unemployment in Eastern India.

    Resource Extraction without benefit sharing- Mining projects with low local hiring.

    Absence of Market Linkages – Eg- Bamboo and lac sold at low prices.

    Developmental Issues Driving Naxalism

    Governance Vacuum – poor service delivery and law enforcement.

    Poor Infrastructure – Lack of roads, telecom, electricity, and markets leaves communities isolated.

    Low Human Development Indicators – High malnutrition, low literacy, and inadequate health facilities.

    Poor implementation of welfare schemes – Leakages, corruption, and absence of monitoring. Eg- Nearly 15% of forest and community land claims under the FRA are pending.

    Emerging issues

    Urban Front Strategy – Urban Naxals aim to gain legal and logistical support from cities-referred to as the “.”

    Tactical Asymmetry and “Contactless” Warfare – Eg- use of Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs) and drones

    Dandakaranya region along Chhattisgarh-Maharashtra-Odisha remains a key guerrilla base due to its difficult terrain.

    Recruitment of Minors and Vulnerable Youth – Eg- Reports of child soldiers in southern Bastar.

    Inter-State Coordination Challenges in intelligence sharing and joint operations.

    Over 78,000 hectares of forest land was approved for diversion across India for non-forest usage in the last four years.

    Multilayered strategy

    Policy level

    Implement the “National Policy and Action Plan (2015)” in timely manner

    Accelerate Development – Road Requirement Plan (RRP-I), mobile towers, banking, health centres, PDS reforms in LWE belts.

    Strengthening PESA –

    real-time digital dashboards for fund utilization to Gram Sabhas

    “Bottom-Up” planning model – from “state imposition” to “participatory development”

    Economic development

    “Forest-to-Market” Value Chain development through Van Dhan Vikas Kendras (VDVKs)

    Promotion of Tribal-Start-up Ecosystem in food processing – Eg- export of products like Mahua and wild honey

    Governance level

    “The only way to end insurgency is to win the hearts and minds of people through inclusive governance.” – Rajnath Singh

    Transparent and Participatory Mining & Resource Management- Eg- share of mineral royalties to local communities through the DMF Funds

    Technology for Governance – Use GIS mapping, drones, and e-governance platforms for service delivery and monitoring.

    Transparency and accountability in project implementation to address Politician-bureaucrat-corporate nexus (vohra committee)

    Security level

    Strengthen Intelligence & Tech-Enabled Policing – Use of drones, satellite mapping, GPS-based tracking, communication intercept tools.

    Capacity building – Eg- fortified police stations, all-terrain vehicles for deep forest movement.

    Inter-State Coordination – Coordination between Chhattisgarh-Odisha-Jharkhand-Maharashtra in tri-junction zones.

    Community Policing – Initiatives like Jan Maitri, sports outreach, and anti-propaganda programmes.

    Progress anchored in justice and inclusion is the best antidote to extremism.

  • What are the major challenges to internal security and peace process in the North-Eastern States? Map the various peace accords and agreements initiated by the government in the past decade.

    The N-E region comprising eight states and connected to the Indian mainland by a small Silghuri Corridor (Chicken Neck – 23 km width) has been facing the problems of insurgency for over 5 decades.

    Major challenges to internal security and peace process in North-Eastern states

    Cross-Border Dynamics– Porous Indo-Myanmar borders enable arms, insurgent movement, and illegal trade.

    “Tyranny of distance” – Policy attention from New Delhi remains inadequate due to geographic remoteness and low political representation of the region.

    Ethnic divisions – Eg- deepening Meitei-Kuki-Zo divide post-2023 riots in Manipur

    Weak peace processes – Talks with 30+ insurgent groups in Manipur and Nagaland continue without breakthroughs

    Protracted insurgencies and splintering of groups reduce prospects for a single comprehensive settlement. Eg- NSCN splits (IM/NK/R).

    Poor governance and developmental deficit sustain grievance and provide recruitment ground.

    Drug trafficking, illegal timber/mineral extraction and extortion fund insurgents and fuel local conflict. Eg- proximity to Golden Traingle

    Demographic stress – Large-scale illegal Bangladesh-origin immigration create social tensions and political mistrust. Eg- in Assam

    High Violence– In 2024, NE India experienced 266 insurgency-related incidents, causing 258 deaths and displacing 60,000 people.

    External factors

    China – Territorial claims in Arunachal Pradesh and support to insurgent groups

    Bangladesh – Anti-India shift post coup and growing Pakistan-China influence

    Myanmar – destabilised border post ‘Spring Revolution’

    Map of major peace accords

    2015 – Naga Framework Agreement for an “inclusive political solution” within the Indian Union (framework terms still being negotiated).

    2019 – Tripura NLFT (SD) Memorandum of Settlement – surrender of cadres and rehabilitation package to end insurgency.

    2020 – Bru-Reang Agreement (Tripura-Mizoram) – Repatriation and rehabilitation of Bru refugees with security and development assurances.

    2020 – Bodo Peace Accord (Phase-II) – Expansion of Bodoland Territorial Region (BTR) powers, and development funds.

    2021 – Karbi Anglong Agreement (Assam)

    2022 – Assam-Meghalaya Boundary Agreement – land demarcation to resolve long-standing boundary disputes.

    2022 – Adivasi (Assam) Peace Accord (2022) – Settlement package including rehabilitation and development measures.

    2023 – Dimasa accords – Ceasefire, surrender/rehab and local development commitments.

    2023 – ULFA Accord – bringing a major faction of ULFA into a political process in Assam

    2024 – NLFT and ATTF Agreements (Tripura) – Memoranda of Settlement leading to cadre surrender and integration

    Other supporting measures (2015-2024) –

    Extension of ceasefires with various Naga factions, multiple SoO (Suspension of Operations) agreements, and targeted MoUs with smaller groups

    AFSPA withdrawal from Tripura and MEghalaya

    Peace in the North-East requires a multipronged approach involving negotiated settlements backed by credible security, sustained development, rights protection and wide stakeholder inclusion

    Terrorism

  • The Government of India recently stated that Left Wing Extremism (LWE) will be eliminated by 2026. What do you understand by LWE and how are the people affected by it? What measures have been taken by the government to eliminate LWE?

    LWE refers to violent insurgency driven by Maoist or Naxalite ideologies, with an objective of overthrowing the government and establishing a communist society.

    Determinants of Left-Wing Extremism in Eastern India

    Maoist ideology of armed class struggle

    Land Displacement due to Mining

    Poor implementation of FRA, 2006, and PESA.

    Historical Socio-Economic Deprivation

    Unemployment & Lack of Livelihood Options

    Governance Deficit

    Geographical challenges

    Impact on people

    Over 14,000 lives were lost to Naxal violence in the last 20 years

    Infrastructure Destruction– targeting road networks, railways, and telecom towers in the “Red Corridor”.

    Extortion and “Levy”

    Human Rights Violations – Eg- abduction and killing of local leaders

    Low-growth trap increases inequality and poverty. Eg- The HDI for Malkangiri district (Odisha) – a LWE stronghold – is only 0.37, compared to the state’s average of 0.579.

    Socio-economic impact – Eg- As per MHA report, 70% population of naxal affected areas lives under BPL.

    Recruitment of Minors and Vulnerable Youth – Eg- Reports of child soldiers in southern Bastar.

    Measures taken by government

    Security Measures

    Specialised Forces- Eg- Greyhounds in Andhra Pradesh and the Bastariya Battalion in Chhattisgarh

    Naxal’s Financial chocking

    Security Related Expenditure and Special Infrastructure Scheme for strengthening State Special Forces and Special Intelligence Branches

    Developmental measures

    Building Critical Infrastructure in LWE Areas – Eg- Road Requirement Plan (RRP-I) constructing 14000 km of roads

    Socio-economic development

    Financial Inclusion- over 1,00 bank branches have been opened in LWE affected districts since April 2015.

    Aspirational districts program

    ROSHNI Scheme for skill development and employment-linked training for youth

    Surrender and rehabilitation policy – attractive incentives and assured livelihood. Eg- stipend for professional training

    Panchayat Extension To Scheduled Areas Act (PESA) and Forest Rights Act 2006 for strengthening tribal self-governance

    Progress anchored in justice and inclusion is the best antidote to extremism.

  • [23rd April 2026] The Hindu OpED: India’s post-LWE future, from red sun to new dawn

    PYQ Relevance[UPSC 2022] Naxalism is a social, economic and developmental issue manifesting as a violent internal security threat. In this context, discuss the emerging issues and suggest a multilayered strategy to tackle the menace of Naxalism.Linkage: The article reflects the shift from security-centric suppression to governance-led, multi-layered strategy, directly aligning with the PYQ’s demand. It highlights that post-LWE success now depends on inclusive development, state legitimacy, and trust-building, which form the core of a holistic strategy.

    Mentor’s Comment

    India’s declaration in March 2026 that it is free of Left Wing Extremism (LWE) marks a historic shift from decades of insurgency. This comes in the news especially after the 2010 Dantewada attack (76 CRPF personnel killed) which symbolized peak violence. This is significant as it represents a transition from a security-centric approach to governance-led transformation, highlighting that while insurgency has declined, the deeper challenge of state legitimacy, inclusive development, and trust-building in affected regions still remains unresolved.

    How did India transition from peak insurgency to near elimination of LWE?

    India’s transition from peak insurgency (2010) to the current phase of near elimination was driven by a multi-pronged National Policy and Action Plan (2015). This strategy integrated aggressive security operations with massive infrastructure and developmental pushes, reducing Left Wing Extremism (LWE) violence by over 80% since 2010. 

    1. Security consolidation: Ensures coordinated operations between Centre and States, reducing insurgent capacity; example: decline post-2010 Dantewada attack phase.
      1. Integrated Strategy: The government replaced scattered efforts with the SAMADHAN doctrine (2017), focusing on Smart leadership, Aggressive strategy, and Actionable intelligence.
      2. Expanded Infrastructure: Over the last decade, the number of Fortified Police Stations increased from 66 to 656. Since 2019 alone, 280 new security camps have been established to fill the security vacuum in core areas.
      3. Financial Choking: Dedicated verticals in the National Investigation Agency (NIA) and Enforcement Directorate (ED) have systematically dismantled Maoist funding networks, seizing assets worth over ₹90 crore.
    2. Political consensus and State capacity : Strengthens bipartisan support and sustained strategy across governments.
      1. Capacity Building: Through the Security Related Expenditure (SRE) scheme, the Centre released ₹3,331 crore over the last 11 years, a 155% increase from the previous decade, to empower state police forces. 
    3. Institutional focus: Promotes joint strategic and operational planning, ensuring continuity of efforts.
      1. Infrastructure Push: Since 2014, over 12,000 km of roads were constructed in LWE areas to break geographical isolation.
      2. Saturation of Welfare: Programs like the Aspirational Districts Programme and the Dharti Aaba Janjatiya Gram Utkarsh Abhiyan target 100% implementation of government schemes in tribal areas. 
    4. Governance intervention: Facilitates district-level developmental programs under Integrated Action Plan.
      1. Lucrative Surrender Policies: High-rank cadres now receive immediate grants of ₹5 lakh, while all surrenderees receive a monthly stipend of ₹10,000 for vocational training. Over 8,000 Naxalites have abandoned violence in the last 10 years.

    Why is the post-LWE phase more complex than the insurgency phase?

    The post-LWE (Left Wing Extremism) phase is more complex because it shifts from a clear-cut military battle to a nuanced “inclusion-led” transformation. While security forces can clear a territory, building lasting peace requires addressing deep-seated psychological and structural fractures. 

    1. Legitimacy deficit: Weakens state credibility due to historical governance gaps; example: fear-driven environments and alienation.
      1. The Trust Gap: Restoring the State’s credibility is harder than neutralizing insurgents.
      2. Parallel Governance Legacy: Maoists established parallel administrative structures; the vacuum left behind must be filled by functional, local, and accountable governance rather than just police presence
    2. Development paradox (The resource curse): LWE areas often hold India’s richest mineral deposits (iron ore, bauxite, coal) but rank lowest in human development. It sustains underdevelopment despite resource richness (resource curse).
    3. Psychological scars: The “final mile” of the LWE journey is as much psychological as administrative.
      1. Intergenerational Trauma: Entire generations have grown up normalized to “gunfire and encounters,” leading to a deep loss of self-confidence and belonging within the tribal population.
      2. Social Stigma: Surrendered cadres often face dual threats, retribution from former Maoist colleagues and social bias or suspicion from the local community and security agencies
    4. Invisible citizens: While tribal populations are formally included in the Constitution, they are often excluded from its actual benefits.
      1. Dilution of Rights: Acts like the Panchayats (Extension to Scheduled Areas) Act (PESA) and the Forest Rights Act are frequently bypassed for industrial projects, weakening tribal rights over “Jal, Jangal, Jameen” (Water, Forest, Land).
      2. The Digital Divide: As government services move online, the lack of digital access in remote tribal belts risks creating a new form of “digital exclusion”

    What structural economic transformation is required in LWE regions?

    1. Local value creation: Strengthens forest produce processing and agroforestry; example: Jungle Mahal, Saranda, Bastar models.
    2. Livelihood diversification: Supports MSMEs and community enterprises for employment generation.
    3. Community ownership: Restores control over commons to tribal communities.
    4. Infrastructure provisioning: Facilitates roads, banking, schools, and healthcare access.

    How can governance reforms ensure sustainable peace in these regions?

    1. Justice delivery: Ensures credible justice systems and grievance redressal mechanisms.
    2. Decentralisation: Strengthens Panchayati Raj institutions with financial devolution; example: Article 275(1), TSP grants.
    3. Administrative convergence: Reduces fragmentation across schemes like PM-JANMAN, DAJGUA.
    4. Accountability systems: Promotes evidence-based governance with transparency mechanisms.

    What role do social transformation and trust-building play in post-conflict recovery?

    1. Human policing: Builds trust through respectful and community-oriented policing.
    2. Rights-based approach: Ensures citizens are treated as stakeholders, not beneficiaries.
    3. Educational integration: Expands access to residential schooling and scholarships.
    4. Cultural integration: Promotes sports and identity-based belonging; example: tribal youth participation.

    Why is cooperative federalism critical in post-LWE transformation?

    1. Centre-State coordination: Ensures unified policy implementation.
    2. Local governance empowerment: Facilitates last-mile delivery at Panchayat level.
    3. Mission convergence: Integrates Aspirational Districts Programme with tribal initiatives.
    4. Policy continuity: Sustains long-term transformation beyond political cycles.

    Conclusion

    Post-LWE India represents a moral and governance threshold, where absence of violence must translate into presence of justice, dignity, and opportunity. Sustainable peace depends on state legitimacy, inclusive development, and trust-based governance.

  • Not the only path: On acting against the Maoists

    Why in the News?

    On March 20, 2025, security forces carried out two missions in Bastar, Chhattisgarh, and killed 30 Maoist people. This made the total number of Maoists killed this year more than 100.

    What were the key reasons behind the decline of the Maoist insurgency in India?

    • Strong Counter-Insurgency Operations: Security forces, including CRPF’s elite COBRA (Commando Battalion for Resolute Action) unit and state police forces, have conducted targeted operations against Maoist strongholds. Example: Operation Prahar in Chhattisgarh led to the elimination of top Maoist leaders and disrupted their logistical networks.
    • Improved Governance and Development Initiatives: Infrastructure projects like roads, electrification, and mobile connectivity have reduced Maoist influence by increasing state presence. Example: The Aspirational Districts Programme has focused on healthcare, education, and employment in Maoist-affected regions.
    • Erosion of Support Base: Maoists have lost support due to their violent tactics, including forced recruitment, extortion, and attacks on civilians. Example: The killing of Madvi Hidma, a local tribal leader, by Maoists in Bastar led to mass protests by villagers against them.
    • Surrender and Rehabilitation Policies: Government schemes like the ‘Surrender and Rehabilitation Policy’ offer financial aid, skill training, and housing to former Maoists. Example: Over 600 Maoists surrendered in Telangana and Andhra Pradesh after the government provided rehabilitation and employment opportunities.
    • Internal Divisions and Leadership Crisis: The Maoist movement has suffered from ideological splits, a lack of new leadership, and desertions. Example: The death of Kishenji (Maoist leader) in 2011 and the arrest of several senior cadres have weakened organizational unity.

    Why is a purely militaristic approach insufficient in tackling the Maoist insurgency?

    • Deep-Rooted Socio-Economic Issues Drive Insurgency: Maoism thrives in areas with poverty, land alienation, and lack of governance. Military force alone does not address the core grievances of tribal communities. Example: The displacement of tribals due to mining projects in Dantewada, Chhattisgarh, has fueled resentment, making them vulnerable to Maoist influence.
    • Risk of Civilian Casualties and Alienation: Excessive military action can lead to civilian deaths, human rights violations, and loss of trust in the state, pushing locals towards Maoists instead of the government. Example: The Salwa Judum campaign (2005-2011), a state-backed militia to counter Maoists, led to severe human rights abuses, ultimately worsening the conflict.
    • Failure to Provide a Long-Term Solution: Military operations can weaken Maoists but do not offer a sustainable path for peace and rehabilitation. A mix of governance, dialogue, and development is needed. Example: The Nepali Maoists transitioned into mainstream politics through a negotiated peace process, showing that engagement can be a more effective long-term strategy.

     

    Where are the remaining strongholds of Maoist influence in India?

    • Southern Chhattisgarh (Bastar Region): Dense forests, difficult terrain, and historical neglect in governance make it a Maoist stronghold. Example: Dantewada, Sukma, and Bijapur districts frequently witness Maoist ambushes on security forces.
    • Border Regions of Jharkhand, Odisha, and Telangana: The tri-junction of these states provides a strategic corridor for Maoist movement and arms supply. Example: Latehar (Jharkhand), Malkangiri (Odisha), and Bhadradri-Kothagudem (Telangana) remain active insurgent zones.
    • Gadchiroli District (Maharashtra): Proximity to Chhattisgarh’s Maoist belt and forested terrain offer a safe haven for Maoist cadres. Example: The Jambhulkheda encounter  saw security forces eliminate top Maoist leaders in this region.

    Who are the primary stakeholders in resolving the Maoist issue peacefully?

    • Government (Union and State Governments): Responsible for policy-making, law enforcement, and development initiatives in affected regions. Example: The Surrender and Rehabilitation Policy offers incentives for Maoists to reintegrate into society.
    • Security Forces (Police, Paramilitary, and Intelligence Agencies): Play a crucial role in counterinsurgency operations and maintaining law and order. Example: The Greyhounds (Telangana), CoBRA (CRPF), and District Reserve Guard (Chhattisgarh) specialise in anti-Maoist operations.
    • Tribal Communities and Local Populations: Often caught in the crossfire, they need protection, development, and inclusion in governance. Example: The PESA Act (1996) empowers tribal self-governance to address their grievances.
    • Civil Society and NGOs: Mediate peace talks, advocate for human rights, and support socio-economic development. Example: Swami Agnivesh’s peace efforts attempted negotiations between Maoists and the government.
    • Former Maoists and Rehabilitation Advocates: It can influence insurgents to surrender and integrate into mainstream society. Example: Former Maoist leader Gopanna Markam, who surrendered and helped bring others into the fold.

    How can lessons from international experiences, such as FARC in Colombia or Nepali Maoists? (Way forward)

    • Negotiation and Political Integration: Offering insurgents a political pathway can encourage them to abandon violence. Example: Nepali Maoists transitioned from armed struggle to mainstream politics through the 2006 Comprehensive Peace Agreement, leading to their participation in democratic governance.
    • Rehabilitation and Reintegration Programs: Providing economic and social reintegration opportunities reduces the chances of re-radicalization. Example: Colombia’s peace deal with FARC (2016) included land reforms, financial aid, and skill development programs for former rebels.
    • Addressing Root Causes through Development: Long-term peace requires addressing socio-economic grievances that fuel insurgencies. Example: Colombia’s rural development programs aimed to improve infrastructure, education, and healthcare in former conflict zones to prevent a resurgence of violence.

    Mains PYQ:

    Question: “Naxalism is a social, economic and developmental issue manifesting as a violent internal security threat. In this context, discuss the emerging issues and suggest a multilayered strategy to tackle the menace of Naxalism.” (2022)

    Reason: This question directly addresses Naxalism (Maoist insurgency) as more than just a security problem, aligning with this article. It also asks for a multilayered strategy, hinting at the need for more than just security measures, such as addressing social and economic issues.