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GS Paper: GS2-18.Bilateral, regional and global groupings and agreements involving India and/or affecting India’s interests.

  • Russia-India-China: A triangle that is still relevant

    RIC engagement started on the promising note but the geopolitical changes over the last two decades have set the three countries on diverging paths. It is against this backdrop, the article articulates why RIC is still relevant.

    Background of RIC

    • The RIC dialogue commenced in the early 2000s.
    • At that time the three countries were positioning themselves for a transition from a unipolar to a multipolar world order.
    •  It was not an anti-U.S. construct though.
    • The initial years of the RIC dialogue coincided with an upswing in India’s relations with Russia and China.
    • The 2003 decision to bring a political approach to India-China boundary dispute and to develop other cooperation, encouraged a multi-sectoral surge in relations.
    • An agreement in 2005, identifying political parameters applicable in an eventual border settlement, implicitly recognised India’s interests in Arunachal Pradesh.

    Growing India-U.S. relations

    • During the same period in which RIC dialogues took place, India’s relations with the U.S. surged.
    • This involved trade and investment, a landmark civil nuclear deal and a burgeoning defence relationship.
    • This rising relations with the U.S. met India’s objective of diversifying military acquisitions away from a near-total dependence on Russia.
    • The U.S. saw value in partnering with a democratic India in Asia as China was rapidly emerging as a challenger.

    How India-U.S. relations affected RIC

    • China went back on the 2005 agreement.
    • It launched the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor and worked to undermine India’s influence in its neighbourhood.
    • And expanded its military and economic presence in the Indian Ocean.
    • As U.S.-Russia relations imploded in 2014 after the annexation/accession of Crimea.
    • Russia’s pushback against the U.S. included cultivating the Taliban in Afghanistan and enlisting Pakistan’s support for it.
    • The western campaign to isolate Russia drove it into a much closer embrace of China.

    Thus, the RIC claim of overlapping or similar approaches to key international issues, sounds hollow today. But it is still holds significance.

    Why RIC is still significant for India

    1) SCO

    • Central Asia is strategically located, bordering our turbulent neighbourhood.
    •  Pakistan’s membership of SCO and the potential admission of Iran and Afghanistan heighten the significance of the SCO for India.
    • It is important for India to shape the Russia-China dynamics in this region, to the extent possible.
    • The Central Asian countries have signalled they would welcome such a dilution of the Russia-China duopoly.
    • The ongoing India-Iran-Russia is an important initiative for achieving an effective Indian presence in Central Asia, alongside Russia and China.

    2) Significant bilateral relations

    • India’s defence and energy pillars of partnership with Russia remain strong.
    • Access to Russia’s abundant natural resources can enhance our materials security.
    • With China too, while the recent developments should accelerate our efforts to bridge the bilateral asymmetries, disengagement is not an option.

    3) The Indo-Pacific issue

    • For India, it is a geographic space of economic and security importance, in which a cooperative order should prevent the dominance of any external power.
    • China sees our Indo-Pacific initiatives as part of a U.S.-led policy of containing China.
    • Russia’s Foreign Ministry sees the Indo-Pacific as an American ploy to draw India and Japan into a military alliance against China and Russia.
    • India should focus on economic links with the Russian Far East and the activation of a Chennai-Vladivostok maritime corridor.
    • This may help persuade Russia that its interests in the Pacific are compatible with our interest in diluting Chinese dominance in the Indo-Pacific.

    4) Strategic autonomy of India

    • The current India-China stand-off has intensified calls for India to fast-track partnership with the U.S.
    • National security cannot be fully outsourced.
    • India’s quest for autonomy of action is based on its geographical realities, historical legacies and global ambitions.

    Consider the question “The changing geopolitical landscape should not dampen the importance of India’s engagement in the RIC (Russia-India-China) triangle. Comment.” 

    Conclusion

    India should continue its engagement in the RIC while keeping and protecting its interests.

  • Global coalition of democracies amid Chinese assertion

    In the recent speed Mike Pompeo, the US Secretary of State, floated the idea of an ‘alliance of democracies’. This article discusses its implications for India.

    Two propositions on China

    • The US Secretary of State laid out two propositions.
    • One is that nearly five decades of US engagement with China have arrived at a dead-end.
    • Second is that the US can’t address the China challenge alone and called for collective action.
    • He mused on whether “it’s time for a new grouping of like-minded nations, a new alliance of democracies.”

    How it matters for India?

    • Both the propositions signal the breakdown of the relationship between the world’s two most important powers.
    • They also reflect on the need to create new frameworks to cope with emerging global challenges.
    • China, is a large neighbour of India and America, is India’s most important partner makes the new context rather different from the Cold War.

    Concerns for India in the propositions

    •  Many in Delhi would like to know if the current direction of China policy will endure if Joe Biden wins the presidential election in November.
    • India must pay close attention to the unfolding China debate in the US.
    • India also note the structural changes in American engagement with China over the last two decades.
    •  Delhi will certainly avoid calling the group proposed by US Secretary of State an “alliance”.
    • India would rather have it described as a “coalition of democracies”.

    Idea of ‘Coalition of democracies’

    • Over the last many years, India has become comfortable with the idea of a political partnership with the world’s leading democracies.
    • India also supported past US initiatives like-Clinton Administrations “Community of Democracies”, Bush Administrations democracy promotion fund at the UN.
    • Delhi has also welcomed President Trump’s initiative to convene an expanded gathering of the G-7 leaders.
    • The idea of democracies working together has an enduring appeal for the US.
    • India figures in this American vision is relatively new. So is Delhi’s readiness to reciprocate.

    Consider the question “In the ongoing geopolitical situation the U.S. has proposed the idea of ‘alliance of democracies’. Where does India feature in this vision and what are the implications of it for India.”

    Conclusion

    Constructing a global coalition of democracies will take much work and quite some time. But engaging with that initiative, amidst the rise and assertion of China, should open a whole range of new possibilities for Indian foreign and security policies.

    Original article:

    https://indianexpress.com/article/opinion/columns/us-india-democracy-china-cold-war-global-economy-6526409/

  • Indian foreign policy and decline in soft power in neighbourhood

    The article examines the issue of declining political capital in India’s neighbourhood and the factors responsible for this. 

    India’s standing in neighbourhood: Past

    • Not long ago, India was seen as a natural rising power in South Asia and the Indian Ocean Region.
    • It was the de facto leader of the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC).
    • It has historical and cultural ties with Nepal.
    • It enjoyed traditional goodwill and influence in Sri Lanka and Bangladesh.
    • It had made investments worth billions of dollars in Afghanistan and cultivated vibrant ties with the post-Taliban stakeholders in Kabul.
    • It had committed itself to multilateralism and the Central Asian connectivity project, with Iran being its gateway.
    • It was competing and cooperating with China at the same time.

    India’s relations in with the neighbourhood: Present

    • India is perhaps facing its gravest national security crisis in 20 years, with China along the Line of Actual Control (LAC).
    • SAARC is defunct.
    • Nepal has turned hostile having adopted a new map and revived border disputes with India.
    • Sri Lanka has tilted towards China.
    • Bangladesh is clearly miffed at the Citizenship (Amendment) Act, 2019.
    • When Afghanistan is undergoing a major transition, India is out of the multi-party talks.
    • Iran has inaugurated a railway link project connecting the Chabahar port, on the Gulf of Oman, to Zahedan.

    What are the factors responsible for this?

    When we dig deep, three problems can be found which are more or less linked to this decline.

    1) Alignment with US

    • As India started moving away from non-alignment, there has been a steady erosion in India’s strategic autonomy.
    • India’s official policy is that it is committed to multilateralism.
    •  When India started deepening its partnership with the United States, New Delhi began steadily aligning its policies with U.S. interests.
    • The case of Iran is the best example.
    • India’s deepening defence and military ties with the U.S.  probably altered Beijing’s assessment of India.
    • One of the reasons for the shift could be Beijing’s assessment that India has already become a de facto ally of the U.S.
    • The forceful altering of the status quo on the border is a risky message as much to New Delhi as it is to Washington.

    2) Domestic politics

    • The passing of the CAA is regionalisation of the domestic problems of the countries in India’s neighbourhood.
    • Bangladesh took offence at the CAA and the National Register of Citizens, there were anti-India protests even in Afghanistan.
    • CAA also drove new wedges between India and the countries that had a Muslim majority and were friendly to India in the neighbourhood.
    • The abrogation of the special status of Jammu and Kashmir was another such move.
    • But it damaged India’s reputation as a responsible democratic power and gave propaganda weapons to Pakistan.
    • The change of status quo in Jammu and Kashmir, could be another factor that prompted the Chinese to move aggressively towards the border in Ladakh.

    3) Misplaced confidence

    • Great powers wait to establish their standing before declaring that they have arrived.
    • China bided its time for four decades before it started taking on the mighty U.S.
    • India should learn from at least these modern examples.
    • If it did, it would not have used high-handedness in Nepal during the country’s constitutional crisis and caused a traditional and civilisational ally to turn hostile.
    • The updated political map which India released in November rubbed salt into the wound on the Nepal border.

    Consider the question “India’s standing in its neighbourhood has been on the decline for some time now. Examine the factors responsible for this.”

    Conclusion

    To address the current crises, India has to reconsider its foreign policy trajectory. It does not lack resources to claim what is its due in global politics. What it lacks is strategic depth.

    Original article:

    https://www.thehindu.com/opinion/lead/needed-a-map-for-indias-foreign-policy/article32206877.ece

  • Deepening ties with South Korea

    South Korea’s technological advancement and manufacturing capabilities can be helpful in India’s economic growth and human resource development. Seoul’s successful development story of the last few decades can complement Modi’s vision of making a “New India” by 2022.

  • India should not jump to conclusion in dealing with Iran

    Two events which happened in quick succession raised concern in India. Iran’s decision to continue the railway project on its own and the reports of deal with China, both the events weighs heavily on India’s interests. This article examines the future course of action which India must adopt in such a situation.

    Context

    • Iran and China are close to concluding a 25-year strategic partnership.
    • This is being linked to reports that Iran has decided to undertake the construction of the Chabahar-Zahedan railway line on its own.
    • The project has not been handed over to China — at least not yet — so the “India loses, China wins” narrative is premature.

    What does the China-Iran deal indicate?

    • China attaches importance to Iran, which is a key source of energy supplies, a part of Belt and Road Initiative, and a potentially lucrative market.
    • However, like India, China has also in parallel cultivated closer relations with Saudi Arabia and the UAE.
    • China continues to have a strong relationship with Israel.
    • As China’s economic, military and technological capabilities have increased, its profile in this strategically important region has also expanded.

    What should be India foreign policy approach towards Iran

    • While acknowledging changed regional geopolitical landscape, India should pursue continue the policy of maintaining positive relations with Iran, the Arab states and Israel.
    • India will have more room for manoeuvring in the region by continuing to maintain a strong and friendly relationship with Iran.
    • One should also not exclude the possibility of a Democratic US President reviving the Iran nuclear deal.
    •  The revival of the deal will open the door for US and European companies to resume business with Iran.
    • It is the reinstatement of severe economic sanctions that has led Iran to turn to China, but the latter has remained cautious.
    • The pursuit of a closer security partnership with the US does not mean that India should follow the US lead on its other important relationships.

    Concerns for India

    • While maintaining the relations, India should not monitor closely the development of relations between China and Iran, which could complicate our security interests on our western flank. 
    • Of particular concern is a reference to China constructing a new port at Jask at the mouth of the Hormuz strait.
    •  If the port were operated by China, India’s maritime security would be at further risk.
    • It would also be of deep concern to the Arab states who will suffer from any closing of the Hormuz Strait while Iran remains less affected.
    • This is an issue on which the Arab states may well react adversely to China.
    • India, too, should press its concerns on Iran while working on a counter-strategy.

    Consider the question “Balancing the contrasts has been the basis of India’s relations with Iran. Comment.”

    Conclusion

    India should continue its engagement with Iran while pressing for its concerns at the same time in particular when it comes to Iran’s relations with China endangering India’s interest.

  • Costs of neglecting new Arabian business

    The article contrasts the over-emphasis put on the ties with Iran with the neglect of ties with Arab countries in India’s foreign policy. It explores the inherent difficulties in dealing with Iran. And opportunities for India in Arab countries.

    Context

    • Iran is accorded high priority in India’s foreign policy.
    • This stands in stark contrast to the under-appreciation of relationship with Arab countries.

    Reasons for a special relationship with Iran

    • Historical connections.
    • Civilisational bonds.
    • Energy supplies.
    • Regional security.
    • Geographic and demographic size, the geopolitical location next door.
    • Natural resources and the extraordinary talents of its people.

    Importance of Arab countries for India

    • Millions of Indian immigrants in the Arab nations.
    • Massive hard currency remittances from them, and the density of commercial engagement with the Arab Gulf is important for India.
    • The UAE and Saudi Arabia have, in recent years, extended invaluable support in countering terrorism and blocked attempts to condemn India in the Muslim world.

    Let’s analyse the issue of railway contract in Iran

    • Large countries with major foreign investments and projects win some and lose some.
    • Then there is no escaping the political risk associated with foreign projects.
    • And politics, both domestic and international, is all-consuming in Iran.
    • The sanctions regime imposed by the US has crippled the Iranian economy.
    • India is careful not to attract the US sanctions.
    • India did gain an exemption from the US sanctions regime for its participation in the Chabahar port project in Iran.
    • But they don’t apply to some of the partners suggested by Iran in the railway project.
    • So, Iran would like India to break the US sanctions regime.
    • A prudent India is resisting that temptation.
    • It would rather lose the railway contract than get into the raging crossfire between the US and Iran.

    Issue of balancing the relations with Iran and U.S.

    • India’s Iran policy cannot be seen as a test of India’s “strategic autonomy”.
    • Some expect Delhi to conduct its relationship with Iran without a reference to either a cost-benefit calculus or Iran’s troubled relationship with others with whom India has important partnerships.
    • No government in Delhi can buy into that proposition.
    • Criticism of the government policy is similar to what happened in 2005 over India’s stance on Iran’s covert nuclear programme.
    • Delhi’s vote against Iran in the International Atomic Energy Agency drew criticism.
    • But governments stand proved right when Iran concluded a nuclear deal of its own with the US and major powers, a decade later.
    • Iran surely can take care of its own interests, and there is little reason why Delhi must back Tehran in every one of its fights with Washington.

    India should focus on Arab countries

    • The Arab world has had its doors open for political, economic and technological cooperation with India.
    • Three moderate Arab nations — Egypt, Saudi Arabia and the UAE — are confronting radical forces in the region and are valuable partners for India in countering forces of destabilisation.
    •  There is real Chinese economic action in the Arab world as the region embraces China’s Belt and Road Initiative.
    • India is no minor economic force in the Arab world, having had a much longer engagement with the region than China.
    • Delhi must up its own commercial game in the Arab world, and one of the new possibilities for India lies in the domain of new technologies.
    • There is emerging sentiment among the Gulf Arabs to reduce the over-dependence on oil, promote alternative energy sources, invest in higher education, and develop technology hubs.

    Consider the question “India’s relations with Iran has always been driven by the geopolitical contexts. This poses an inherent challenge for both countries. In light of this examine the importance of Iran for India and challenges India’s foreign policy faces in dealing with Iran.”

    Conclusion

    India must focus on elevating India’s economic partnership with the Arab world to the next level. For India, the costs of neglecting the new possibilities for wide-ranging Arabian business are far higher than a lost railway contract in Iran.

  • What is the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM)?

    Non-alignment is an old concept today, and India has adopted an approach of “issue-based alignment”, according to External Affairs Minister S. Jaishankar.

    Try this question for mains:

    Q.“The gradual exit of the US from institutional geopolitics has created an ocean of opportunity for small nations”. Discuss.

    What is the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM)?

    • The NAM is a forum of 120 developing world states that are not formally aligned with or against any major power bloc.
    • The group was started in Belgrade, Yugoslavia in 1961.
    • After the UN, it is the largest grouping of states worldwide.

    Its formation

    • NAM emerged in the context of the wave of decolonization that followed World War II.
    • It was created by Yugoslavia’s President, Josip Broz Tito, India’s first PM, Jawaharlal Nehru, Egypt’s second President Gamal Abdel Nasser, Ghana’s first president Kwame Nkrumah, and Indonesia’s first President, Sukarno.
    • All five leaders believed that developing countries should not help either the Western or Eastern blocs in the Cold War.
    • As a condition for membership, the states of the NAM cannot be part of a multilateral military alliance (such as the NATO) or have signed a bilateral military agreement with one of the “big powers” involved in Great Power conflicts.
    • However, its idea does not signify that a state ought to remain passive or even neutral in international politics.

    Its relevance today

    • One of the challenges of the NAM in the 21st century has been to reassess its identity and purpose in the post-Cold War era.
    • The movement has continued to advocate for international cooperation, multilateralism, and national self-determination, but it has also been increasingly vocal against the inequities of the world economic order.
    • On the contrary, from the founding of the NAM, its stated aim has been to give a voice to developing countries and to encourage their concerted action in world affairs.

    The geopolitics of opportunity

    • Non-alignment was a term of a particular era and geopolitical landscape. One aspect was independence, which remains a factor of continuity for India.
    • The consequences of global shifts, including the US and the assertiveness of China, are opening spaces for middle powers like India, Japan, the EU and others.

    US repositioning has impacted everyone

    • The consequence of repositioning of the US, that the big umbrella is now smaller than it used to be, has allowed many other countries to play more autonomous roles.
    • India needs to take more “risks”, as the world expected it to take a more proactive stance on various issues including connectivity, maritime security, terrorism, climate change and terrorism.

  • Concerns over Australia in the Malabar Exercise

    While the idea of inviting Australia to join Malabar is being explored, we must not forget the concerns with it. This article examines such concerns.

    Context

    • India’s Ministry of Defence discussed the issue of adding Australia to the trilateral Malabar naval exercise.
    • If materialised, it will be the first time since 2007 that all members of Quad-India, U.S., Japan and Australia will participate in a joint military drill.

    Possible consequences of the move

    • The Chinese leadership sees the maritime Quadrilateral as an Asian-NATO that seeks only to contain China’s rise.
    •  India’s intention to involve Australia in the Malabar drill could only be construed as a move directed against Beijing.

    India’s perspective

    • Following the stand-off in Ladakh, many Indian analysts believe the time is right for India to shed its traditional defensiveness in the maritime domain.
    • The realists advocate an alliance with the U.S., Japan and Australia to counter Chinese moves in the Indian Ocean.

    Concerns

    1) Contrary message to China

    • While India and China are negotiating a truce, Australia’s participation in the Malabar exercise sends contrary signals to Beijing.
    • If China responded aggressively in the Eastern Indian Ocean, it could needlessly open up a new front in the India-China conflict.

    2) Only modest gains for India

    • U.S. and its Pacific partners want to form a maritime coalition to implement a ‘rules-based order’ in the Indo-Pacific littorals.
    • India’s priority is to acquire strategic capabilities to counter a Chinese naval presence in the Indian Ocean.
    •  Indian Navy is yet to develop the undersea capability to deter Chinese submarines in the eastern Indian Ocean.
    • With U.S. defence companies hesitant to share proprietary technology the gains for India, in exchange for signing up the ‘military-quad’, are modest.
    • Without strategic technology transfers, Indian Navy’s deterrence potential in the Indian Ocean Region (IOR) will not improve much.

    3) Operational issue: India will be drawn into power dynamics of the Asia-Pacific

    • With the strategic contest between the U.S. and China, there is every possibility that the military-Quad will be used to draw India into the security dynamics of the Asia-Pacific.
    • The U.S. would expect its Indo-Pacific partners, including India, to assist the U.S. Navy in its South China Sea endeavour.
    •  The U.S. and Japanese navies have little spare capacity for sustained surveillance and deterrence operations in the IOR.
    • Australia is an exception and is ready and able to partner India in securing the Eastern Indian Ocean.

    4) Timing

    • A balancing coalition must come together at a time when the nature and magnitude of the threat are wholly manifest.
    • But, despite a growing presence in the Indian Ocean, the Chines Navy is yet to physically threaten Indian interests at sea.
    • So, the onus of the first move to precipitate a crisis in the Eastern Indian Ocean lies with the Indian Navy.

    Conclusion

    Upgrading the trilateral Malabar to a quadrilateral, without acquiring the requisite combat and deterrence capability, could yield gains for India in the short term, but would prove ineffective in the long run.

  • Iran ties need quiet diplomacy

    India ties with Iran are significant for more than one reasons. Two countries share cultural bonds, Iran holds a special place when it comes to India’s energy security. Yet, India often finds itself in a difficult position as it tries to walk the tightrope between the U.S. sanction and maintaining the relations with Iran. 

    Context

    • Concerns were raised in India over its exclusion by Iran from the 628 km long rail link between Chabahar and Zahidan.
    • Iran has since clarified that it is not the case and India could join the project at a later stage.
    • It happened just as China and Iran were close to signing a deal on an economic and security partnership.

    Importance of Chabahar and the rail link

    • Chabahar could provide connectivity for Afghanistan through Iran in order to lessen its dependence on Karachi port.
    • This plan has enjoyed support in Delhi, Kabul and Tehran since 2003.
    •  Road and rail links from Chabahar to Zahidan and then 200 km further on to Zaranj in Afghanistan, need to be built.

    Progress on the project

    • Iran was under sanctions during 2005-13, so there was little progress.
    •  Meanwhile, India concentrated on the 220 km road to connect Zaranj to Delaram on the Herat highway, and completed it in 2008.
    • After the sanctions on Iran eased in 2015,  A memorandum of understanding (MoU) was signed with Iran in 2016.
    • This MoU aimed to equip and operate two terminals at the Shahid Beheshti port as part of Phase I of the project.
    • The Trilateral Agreement on Establishment of International Transport and Transit Corridor between Afghanistan, Iran and India was signed.
    • In addition to $85 million of capital investment, India also committed to providing a line of credit of $150 million for port container tracks.
    • Phase I was declared operational in 2018 and India’s wheat shipments to Afghanistan have been using this route.
    • A special economic zone (SEZ) at Chabahar was planned but re-imposition of U.S. sanctions has slowed investments into the SEZ.
    • India was given a waiver from U.S. sanctions to continue cooperation on Chabahar.
    •  Despite the waiver, the project has suffered delays.

    Growing Iran-China relations

    • In 2016, just as sanctions were eased, Chinese President Xi Jinping visited Tehran and proposed a long-term comprehensive, strategic partnership.
    • Iran kept the negotiations going for years because of reluctance to grow too close to China.
    • Meanwhile, tensions in the region have been growing since last year with missile strikes in Saudi Arabia and a U.S. drone strike killing Gen. Qassim Soleimani.
    • As a veto-wielding member, China can help Iran at the UNSC.
    • Even so, the Iran- China comprehensive, strategic partnership road map has run into opposition in the Majlis[Iranian Parliament].

    India’s concerns over Iran-China deal

    • What is alarming for New Delhi is that Beijing is also concluding a security and military partnership with Tehran.
    • Initial reports in Iran have suggested China will deploy 5,000 security personnel to protect its projects in Iran.
    • Some reports suggest Kish Island in the Persian Gulf, located at the mouth of the Strait of Hormuz, maybe “sold” to China.
    • With a growing Chinese presence, India is also concerned about its strategic stakes around the Chabahar port project.

    Way forward for India

    • Though China has a greater capacity to resist U.S. sanctions, Iran realises the advantage of working with India as it enjoys a sanctions waiver from the U.S. for Chabahar.
    • Iran and India also share an antipathy to a Taliban takeover in Afghanistan.
    • This is why Iran would like to keep the door open.
    • Nevertheless, India needs to improve its implementation record of infrastructure projects in its neighbourhood.
    • There are numerous tales of Indian cooperation projects in Nepal, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, Myanmar, etc suffering delays and cost overruns that only make it easier for China to expand its footprint in India’s neighbourhood.

    Consider the question “India-Iran ties circumscribed by each other’s compulsion and geopolitical constraints. Comment.”

    Conclusion

    India should continue to remain politically engaged with Iran so that there is a better appreciation of each other’s sensitivities and compulsions.

    With inputs from:

    https://indianexpress.com/article/explained/explained-in-china-iran-indias-concerns-6511177/

  • U.S.-Asia coordination to preserve global order

    The focus of this article is on the U.S. policy in the Indo-Pacific and its relations with its allies there in countering China.

    Instances of China’s aggression

    • Galwan Valley is not an exception in Beijing’s recent behaviour in Asia.
    • China has also engaged in a tense geopolitical confrontation with its other neighbours.
    • Stand-offs with Vietnam and Malaysia in the South China Sea and threatening Australia with boycotts are a few examples.

    Response to China

    • Beijing’s aggressiveness is fueling debates about the underlying costs of reliance on China.
    • China’s aggression is also increasing support for closer coordination between other Indo-Pacific partners.
    • Indian, Japan, Malaysia, and Australia have all taken concrete steps to reduce their economic exposure to Beijing.
    •  India and Australia recently inked a new military logistics agreement in the “virtual summit”.
    • A similar agreement between Delhi and Tokyo may follow.
    • The Quadrilateral Dialogue between Australia, India, Japan, and the United States is growing stronger and even expanding.
    • And recently Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) issued one of their strongest statements to date on the South China Sea.
    • The ASEAN statement insisted that maritime disputes must be resolved in accordance with the UN Law of the Sea treaty.

    Asian multilateralism: Born out of crises

    • Recently the “Milk Tea Alliance”, reaction of people, born to forge solidarity between Taiwanese, Hong Kongers, and Southeast Asians online to deal with Chinese cyberbullying.
    • The Chiang Mai Initiative — a financial swap mechanism between China, Japan, South Korea, and Southeast Asia — emerged in the aftermath of the late 1990s financial crisis.
    • ASEAN, created in 1967, did not convene its first heads of state meeting until fall of Saigon in 1976 in the Vietnam War.

    Role of the U.S.

    • The COVID-19 crisis is remaking the geopolitics of the Indo-Pacific.
    • The ongoing crisis has made countries aware of seriousness of Chinese dominance.
    • This situation has given the U.S. opportunity it has long sought: 1) More credible multilateral coordination among allies, 2) Pushback against online disinformation. 3) The desire to better integrate like-minded economies and supply chains.
    • But the crisis is also raising renewed questions about the American leadership.
    • The question now facing the U.S. is whether or not it can harness this new regional momentum.

    Alienating allies

    • U.S. continues to make unforced errors that create distance with U.S. allies and partners.
    • For example, its focus on cutting support for the WHO and asserting that COVID-19 originated in a Wuhan lab alienated Canberra.
    • Similarly, the administration’s suspension of various worker visas will almost certainly have serious repercussions in India.

    What should be the U.S. approach to Asia?

    • The U.S. needs to make two major shifts.
    • First, U.S. policy needs to start supporting, rather than attempting to commandeer, regional efforts to build a less China-centric future for the Indo-Pacific.
    • While Chinese aggression provides powerful motivation for coordination, U.S. partners are seeking an agenda that is framed in broader terms than simply rallying to counter Beijing.
    • If the U.S. wants to reduce reliance on Beijing and “re-couple” investments and supply chains among allied nations, it is going to have to make compromises.
    • U.S. should work with Indo-Pacific partners on the issues that they prioritise and provided them with space for independent action.
    • Second, Washington should avoid repeating Beijing’s mistakes of bullying.
    • U.S. should offer a clear alternative in word and deed to China’s “Wolf Warrior” diplomacy.
    • Moves such as demanding that a G-7 communiqué refer to COVID-19 as the “Wuhan virus” and blocking mask shipments to close allies are the kind of counterproductive bullying.

    Options for Asian countries

    • Beijing’s recent aggression is not an aberration but part of a growing pattern.
    • As Beijing’s confidence in its growing material and military power solidifies, its neighbours will need to think carefully about the long-term decisions necessary to preserve an open regional order.
    • Facing the unprecedented health and economic crises spawned by COVID-19, the U.S. and Asian partners will need to coordinate more closely.
    • Asian countries should strengthen their own regional networks.
    • This Asian network will challenge the views of those in both Washington and Beijing who would see the region only as a sparring ground.

    Conclusion

    For American and Asian leaders, the choice is stark: encourage and foster this trend, recognising that stronger regional coordination will require more compromises as well as tougher choices, or resist it and risk being left behind.