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Subject: Governance

Important aspects of Society

  • Are nicotine pouches beyond the law?

    Why in the News

    A study led by the ICMR-National Institute of Cancer Prevention and Research has found that nicotine pouches are reaching Indian cities through online platforms, hookah shops and gig delivery services. The study follows a World Health Organization (WHO) warning issued in May 2026 on the dangers these products carry. No Indian statute clearly governs them. The two laws written for tobacco and for vaping each exclude the product for a different reason, and its status under the drugs law and the food law is contested. The gap is not a drafting accident, since the executive already holds the power to restrict a product’s import and sale on health grounds.

    What is a nicotine pouch?

    1. The product: A nicotine pouch is a small, tobacco-free sack shaped like a tea bag, containing nicotine, flavourings and plant-based fibres.
    2. How it is used: The user places the pouch between the lip and the gum for up to an hour. Nicotine is absorbed directly into the bloodstream.
    3. What distinguishes it: There is no smoke, no vapour and no spitting. That absence is what keeps it outside the definitions written for cigarettes and for electronic cigarettes.

    Does the Cigarettes and Other Tobacco Products Act, 2003 cover nicotine pouches?

    1. What the Act governs: The Cigarettes and Other Tobacco Products Act, 2003 (COTPA) regulates the marketing, advertising and sale of cigarettes and other tobacco products.
    2. The definitional limit: The Act’s definition of tobacco products does not extend to every product containing nicotine. A legislature intending to cover every extract of the tobacco plant could have said so.
    3. Strict construction applies: Restrictions on the freedom of trade and commerce are construed strictly. Nicotine pouches are not among the products listed in the Act, so they fall outside it.

    Is a nicotine pouch a drug under the Drugs and Cosmetics Act, 1940?

    1. Nicotine is unscheduled: Nicotine is not listed as a drug in any schedule of the Drugs and Cosmetics Act, 1940.
    2. Some nicotine products are approved as drugs: Nicotine patches and gums have been approved as drugs by the Drug Controller General of India for therapeutic use in treating nicotine addiction.
    3. The Schedule K exemption cuts both ways: Schedule K under the Drugs and Cosmetics Rules, 1945 lists gums and lozenges and exempts them from licensing and prescription requirements where they contain less than 2 mg of nicotine. An exemption for some nicotine products implies that the rest were meant to be regulated.
    4. The counter-reading: A pouch makes no therapeutic claim and does not purport to treat addiction. It functions as a substitute for a cigarette, which places it outside the character of a drug.

    Why does the ban on vapes not reach nicotine pouches?

    1. What the vaping law does: The Prohibition of Electronic Cigarettes Act, 2019 (PECA) bans the import and sale of vapes.
    2. Its enactment carries an implication: A separate statute would not have been needed had vapes been drugs, since the government could then have regulated them or refused licences under the drugs law. The enactment indicates that the drugs law did not give adequate power to ban them.
    3. The product does not fit the definition: A nicotine pouch contains no electronic device and produces neither smoke nor vapour, so the 2019 Act does not reach it.

    Could a nicotine pouch be treated as food?

    1. The statutory definition is wide: The Prevention of Food Adulteration Act and the Food Safety and Standards Act define food as any processed, partially processed or unprocessed substance intended for human consumption.
    2. Courts have read it widely: Rulings on supari and chewing tobacco establish that the definition has a very wide amplitude and covers items that are chewed rather than swallowed.
    3. The consequence: On that reading a nicotine pouch falls within the definition of food, which would bring it under the food safety regime rather than the tobacco or drugs regime.

    What governs the import of nicotine pouches?

    1. Two statutes supply the power: The Foreign Trade (Development and Regulation) Act, 1992 empowers the Central government to prohibit, restrict or regulate imports. Section 11 of the Customs Act, 1962 allows the government to prohibit goods wholly or partly by notification, on grounds that include the protection of human, animal or plant life.
    2. Who administers it: The Directorate General of Foreign Trade (DGFT) administers the trade statute and publishes the ITC-HS classification (the Indian Trade Clarification code list, which records whether a good is free, restricted or banned).
    3. A new customs sub-category exists: After the World Customs Organization updated the Harmonized System, code 2404 91 30 was introduced for tobacco-free single-use oral nicotine pouches and 2404 91 90 for other oral nicotine products not meant for therapeutic use. These replaced a residual category for other manufactured tobacco substitutes.
    4. The medicament codes do not apply: Codes for medicaments apply only where a product is strictly a cessation aid, which a pouch is not.
    5. The status is “restricted”, not free and not banned: Goods under 2404 91 30 cannot be cleared merely on payment of duty, and they are not prohibited outright as e-cigarettes are. They require a specific licence or permission, and the DGFT cross-references the health and other ministries before deciding.

    Can nicotine pouches be sold at duty-free shops?

    1. They are on sale now: Nicotine pouches are currently available at a few duty-free stores at Indian airports.
    2. The stores are licensed under Indian law: Duty-free stores are licensed under Section 58 of the Customs Act, 1962 and cannot claim to sit entirely outside Indian law.
    3. What the Calcutta High Court actually held: In Flemingo Duty Free Shop Pvt. Ltd. v. Shri Kaushik Bhattacharya (2024), the Court held that a duty-free store did not “import” goods into India. It was deemed located outside India for the purposes of the Customs Act, so legal metrology labelling requirements did not apply to it.
    4. The holding is narrow: Reading it as excluding all Indian law would leave no court and no police station with jurisdiction over a crime committed inside such a store.
    5. The permitted list does not include them: Cigarettes, alcohol, jewellery, watches, food and small electronic items are permitted at duty-free shops. A nicotine pouch qualifies only if it is treated as food, and its restricted customs classification makes an import licence unlikely to have been granted.

    Challenges to regulating nicotine pouches in India

    1. The sales channel sits outside every enforcement design: Tobacco control law assumes a physical shop with a visible point of sale, so an online order routed through a delivery platform meets no check. Eg. The draft Cigarettes and Other Tobacco Products (Amendment) Bill, 2020 proposed banning online sale of tobacco products and has never been enacted.
      The Fix: Place the compliance duty on the delivery platform and the payment gateway, so liability attaches where the transaction is actually recorded.
    2. Youth uptake runs ahead of regulation: Flavoured oral nicotine is marketed as a lifestyle product rather than a tobacco product, which removes the stigma that deters first use. Eg. The Global Youth Tobacco Survey conducted in India in 2019 found that 8.5 per cent of students aged 13 to 15 used tobacco in some form.
      The Fix: Prohibit characterising flavours in oral nicotine products, which is the single measure that has cut youth initiation wherever it has been applied.
    3. State action produces a patchwork rather than a rule: Food safety commissioners issue prohibition orders that lapse and must be renewed, so the legal position differs by State and by year. Eg. State bans on gutkha and pan masala are issued under Section 30(2)(a) of the Food Safety and Standards Act, 2006 and are renewed one year at a time.
      The Fix: Notify a national product standard through the food safety regulator, so the position holds across States without annual renewal.
    4. A restricted classification is not self-enforcing: Goods requiring a licence still enter through courier consignments and passenger baggage, where the volume of parcels exceeds inspection capacity. Eg. Customs seizures of e-cigarettes at Indian airports have continued in every year since the 2019 ban.
      The Fix: Add the oral nicotine codes to the risk-management system used for courier and baggage screening, so consignments are flagged automatically rather than by sampling.
    5. Health evidence is thin at the point where a decision is needed: Long-term data on the cardiovascular and oral effects of tobacco-free nicotine is limited, which lets manufacturers argue harm reduction against combustible tobacco. Eg. The current Indian evidence base rests on an institute-led study of market availability rather than on outcome data.
      The Fix: Commission a national surveillance study on oral nicotine use and its health outcomes, with its results fixed as the trigger for regulatory review.

    Conclusion

    The legal position is intricate and the remedy is not. The executive already holds the power to prohibit import and sale on health grounds, and a notification exercising it would take minutes to issue. The cost of not issuing it is known from the vaping episode: demand settles first, the ban arrives after, and smuggling replaces the legal market it was meant to close. The question before the government is therefore about timing, not about which statute applies.

    Back2Basics

    1. What it is: The ICMR-National Institute of Cancer Prevention and Research is an institute of the Indian Council of Medical Research (ICMR), the country’s apex body for biomedical research, functioning under the Department of Health Research.
    2. Where it is: It is located at Noida in Uttar Pradesh.
    3. Earlier name: It functioned as the Institute of Cytology and Preventive Oncology before being renamed in 2016.
    4. Mandate: It works on cancer prevention, early detection and population screening, and carries a substantial tobacco control research programme.

    Matching Previous Year Question

    “[2023] With reference to India, consider the following pairs: Action: The Act under which it is covered 1. Unauthorized wearing of police or military uniforms : The Official Secrets Act, 1923 2. Knowingly misleading or otherwise interfering with a police officer or military officer when engaged in their duties : The Indian Evidence Act, 1872 3. Celebratory gunfire which can endanger the personal safety of others : The Arms (Amendment) Act, 2019 How many of the above pairs are correctly matched? (a) Only one (b) Only two (c) All three (d) None ANSWER: (b)”

  • Failing at ABC

    Why in the News

    An investigation across Tamil Nadu and Puducherry into the outsourced Animal Birth Control (ABC) programme, under which local bodies contract organisations to sterilise and vaccinate community dogs, records starved animals, botched mass surgeries, broken vaccine cold chains and fabricated organ counts.

    What do the Animal Birth Control Rules, 2023 require?

    1. Humane capture and return to the same place: Capture with nets, feeder outreach before capture, and geotagging of both capture and release at the same location.
    2. Surgical and shelter standards: Closed circuit cameras in the operation theatre, pre-operative and post-operative care, clean and spacious kennels, food twice a day and water at all times.
    3. Verification tied to billing: Organ inspection committees are to be constituted to count organs against billing claims.
    4. Disposal after the count: Organs are to be destroyed immediately by deep burial or incineration.

    What did the investigation find at the centres?

    1. Oulgaret, Puducherry: An internal municipal dossier recorded 50 emaciated dogs released from an ABC centre in late 2025, 20 dog deaths and 50 complaints against the veterinarian. The animals were released hastily just before an inspection, with sutures falling apart.
    2. Velankanni, Nagapattinam district: On 23 July dogs were found alive with loose sutures and no post-operative care, and carcasses were found in garbage with bloody sutures and with wires and ropes around their necks, both banned in the catching process. The District Animal Welfare Officer’s report recorded 70 dogs, 64 males and six females, sterilised in three days by two veterinarians.
    3. Mannargudi, Tiruvarur district: On 2 September a female dog was found alive with its intestines spilling out after sterilisation at the centre there.
    4. Pollachi: At a board-run centre the post-operative care unit sits 2 km away from the surgery centre, and a female dog died of evisceration after surgery.
    5. Relocation instead of return: Dogs picked up for sterilisation are extensively relocated in violation of the Rules, and a healthy dog returned to its own locality is the community’s only real-time audit of the money spent.

    Why do the surgeries fail?

    1. Suturing is rushed: The distance between two suture bites should be under half a centimetre, which takes time. Centres press young veterinarians to complete more surgeries instead.
    2. Pain relief is skipped to cut cost: Multi-modal analgesia is omitted, so the animal licks the surgical site and opens the sutures.
    3. Suture material is reused: Leftover material causes surgical site infections.
    4. The faster male technique is the unsuitable one: The on-scrotal method leaves gaps between sutures for fluid drainage and raises infection risk on unhygienic shelter floors. A veterinarian left an organisation that insisted on more on-scrotal procedures.

    How does the payment design create the incentive?

    1. The rate is fixed per dog: Rs 1,650 is allocated per dog, including Rs 450 for sterilisation and vaccination and Rs 200 for catching and release.
    2. Payment follows projected numbers, not outcomes: Local bodies reward claimed counts rather than verified results, which turns sterilisation into assembly-line work at scale.
    3. Catchers are paid per catch: Pups, lactating dogs, pregnant dogs and already sterilised dogs are picked up to raise the count.
    4. Ethical care is affordable and skipped anyway: Factoring in economies of scale, a centre can make about Rs 66,000 in profit while still meeting ethical standards of care.

    What is the state of verification?

    1. Bills clear on the contractor’s own evidence: Payment rests on the organisation’s claims, photographs of surgery, photographs of dogs and occasional organ counts by municipal sanitation officers.
    2. The organ count is gamed: A bucket of organs stored at the Oulgaret centre was transported to Neyveli township in Cuddalore district in 2025 to supply an organ counting committee inspection, with the same veterinarian performing surgeries at Neyveli.
    3. The committees arrive after the money: In Tiruppur the organ counting committee was constituted only after more than 9,000 surgeries had been billed.
    4. The audit questions went unanswered: The Director of Municipal Administration did not answer whether time-tagged photographs, videos of the organ count and destruction of organs were audited for each batch of sterilisation bills, or what the targets were.
    5. The corrective is administrative and recent: Corporations have withheld payment on bills raised over the last three months, and a member of the State Monitoring Committee has written to the Municipal Administration Department to withhold bills and constitute panels. Activists have asked instead that community animals be brought under an animal management framework of the Animal Husbandry Department.

    Why does blacklisting fail to remove a contractor?

    1. Recognition is scarce and contracting is not: Only six organisations hold recognition for ABC procedures in the State, against about 15 contractor organisations operating in the space.
    2. A blacklisted operator is re-engaged elsewhere: Pranimitran’s contract was terminated by the Hosur Corporation over animal mutilation, botched surgeries and non-disclosure, and it was blacklisted by the Animal Welfare Board of India. The Tiruppur Corporation engaged it anyway, stating that no replacement contractor could be found.
    3. Others continue in place: Jeeva Karunyam of Nagercoil and Rajeshwari Goshala of Tirunelveli continue to work for their local bodies, and two First Information Reports were filed against International Peace Trust at Avadi in Chennai.
    4. A criminal case does not interrupt a contract: A First Information Report was filed against Pranimitran over the death of two pups in Tiruppur, and in April 2026 an already sterilised six-year-old dog with a notched ear was found anaesthetised at its centre.

    What does the broken cold chain mean for rabies control?

    1. Refrigeration is missing: A large majority of centres lack refrigerators capable of holding anti-rabies vaccine at 2 degrees Celsius.
    2. Vaccination is simply skipped: A doctor who worked at the Hosur centre states that no vaccines were administered across an average of 650 surgeries a month, with power cuts, no generator and no fresh vaccine batches supplied.
    3. Responsibility is contested: The organisation’s position is that the cold chain is supplied and inspected by the Corporation, and that ineffective vaccines would have produced a rabies outbreak.
    4. Half the programme then disappears: Sterilisation without a viable vaccine delivers population control alone, and leaves the rabies control purpose of the programme unmet.

    Conclusion

    The programme’s failure is not a supervision gap that better inspection would close. Payment attaches to a number the contractor supplies, the committee that would verify the number is constituted late or supplied with borrowed evidence, and the certificate that would screen the contractor has been made optional. Blacklisting is therefore a label rather than a disqualification, and a contractor removed in one district is hired in the next. Until money moves against a verified sterilisation and a verified vaccination rather than against a claimed count, no participant in the chain carries a cost for the outcome.

    Back2Basics: Animal Welfare Board of India

    1. Statutory origin: Established in 1962 under Section 4 of the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals Act, 1960, as the first national animal welfare body of its kind.
    2. Function: It advises the Government of India on animal welfare laws and on measures to prevent unnecessary pain to animals, and its recommendations are advisory.
    3. Role in this programme: It issues Project Recognition Certificates to organisations conducting Animal Birth Control work, and can blacklist an organisation for violations.
    4. Administrative location: It works under the Department of Animal Husbandry and Dairying, and its headquarters moved from Chennai to Ballabhgarh in Haryana.

    [2014] Consider the following statements:

    1. Animal Welfare Board of India is established under the Environment (Protection) Act, 1986.

    2. National Tiger Conservation Authority is a statutory body.

    3. National Ganga River Basin Authority is chaired by the Prime Minister.

    Which of the statements given above is/are correct?

    (a) 1 only

    (b) 2 and 3 only

    (c) 2 only

    (d) 1, 2 and 3

  • Why does India’s food safety system need a Clint Eastwood?

    Why does India’s food safety system need a Clint Eastwood?

    Why in the News

    India’s food safety regulation fails at disclosure and enforcement rather than at data collection. Between May and July a Maharashtra Food and Drug Administration drive led by a 2005 batch Indian Administrative Service officer inspected 3,137 restaurants, issued 764 improvement notices and shut 165 eateries.

    What is FoSCoS?

    1. The regulator’s integrated digital platform: The Food Safety Compliance System (FoSCoS) is the Food Safety and Standards Authority of India’s single platform for licensing, inspections, laboratory results and penalties, with the compliance chain digitised and connected.
    2. The designed sequence: A violation is found, a laboratory test is ordered, results are analysed, an audit is conducted, adjudication follows, a penalty issues and the establishment is closed.
    3. The record is held, never published: The platform accumulates violation data that never reaches the person choosing where to eat.

    Why does the enforcement chain stall?

    1. The design is a series of checkpoints: A violation sits in audit, then in adjudication, then in enforcement.
    2. No step carries a closing clock: Each checkpoint can hold a file indefinitely, so a violation is never formally disposed of.
    3. The system has more blockers than doers: The count of officers who can stop a file exceeds the count who can conclude one, so enforcement resumes only when a senior officer personally drives it.

    What did the Maharashtra drive actually demonstrate?

    1. A crackdown is not a system: The drive produced closures at a scale the routine machinery had not, using powers the routine machinery already held.
    2. A folk hero is evidence of failure: Celebrating an enforcement officer amounts to conceding that the enforcement design does not work without one.
    3. The output is not durable: An enforcement wave attached to one officer’s posting ends with that posting, and the platform returns to recording violations nobody acts on.

    What do the disclosure regimes elsewhere show?

    1. Singapore publishes the result where the customer stands: Inspections and rules resemble India’s. A failed inspection produces a rating displayed on the storefront and online.
    2. The pressure that works is commercial: The owner fears customers who see a failed grade and walk away, not the inspector or the fine. Revenue falls the same week and the problem is fixed at once.
    3. Denmark and Australia publish within days: Violations become public within days and the media carries them.
    4. Publication also disciplines the regulator: A lenient district looks bad against a neighbouring district’s published record, so an official cannot let files sit unseen.

    Why would publication work where inspection has not?

    1. The system is built for the wrong user: The compliance chain is designed for the convenience of the regulator, and the customer, who bears the risk, sees none of its output.
    2. Automatic publication is the specific proposal: Violation data should go public online within 48 hours, in food delivery apps and in restaurant windows, so a customer knows before ordering.
    3. A working regulator is invisible: Countries with published hygiene ratings generate no news coverage of their food safety enforcers, because enforcement there is routine rather than exceptional.

    Where else would published regulatory data change behaviour?

    1. Real estate: Buyers cannot tell whether a building was flagged for structural problems. Municipal violation history displayed in property listings would move demand away from flagged buildings and force developers to remedy them.
    2. Television channels: Official data exists on complaints against news channels for fake news, hate speech and bias, and never appears at the point where a viewer chooses a channel.
    3. Schools: Education departments inspect schools and record violations that parents never see while comparing institutions.
    4. Hospitals: Data on doctor complaints, disciplinary action and malpractice cases is held and withheld, so a patient chooses on reputation alone.

    Challenges to the food safety regulator’s enforcement design

    1. Testing capacity and procedure are the weak link: An enforcement order stands only if the sampling and laboratory chain behind it survives challenge. Eg. The 2015 national recall order on Maggi noodles was set aside by the Bombay High Court in August 2015, partly over how the samples had been tested.
      The Fix: Accredit a referral laboratory for every zone and publish its sample turnaround time against a fixed standard.
    2. Penalties are capped in absolute rupees: A ceiling fixed in the statute does not scale with the turnover of the business penalised. Eg. Section 52 of the Food Safety and Standards Act, 2006 caps the penalty for sub-standard food at Rs 5 lakh.
      The Fix: Link the penalty for a repeat violation to declared annual turnover rather than to a flat statutory ceiling.
    3. Most food businesses are registered rather than licensed: Small operators below a turnover threshold need only registration, which carries a lighter inspection and record obligation. Eg. Street food vendors and small eateries fall almost entirely into the registration category.
      The Fix: Extend a simplified published hygiene grade to registered outlets, so the lighter compliance route still produces a visible signal.
    4. The regulator sets standards and does not enforce them: Designated officers and food safety officers are appointed and paid by State commissioners, so the national platform records violations that no national authority can act on. Eg. An enforcement drive in one State changes nothing about a chain’s outlets in the next State.
      The Fix: Publish State-wise enforcement counts and pendency on the platform, so a State’s inaction is visible against its neighbours.

    Conclusion

    The instrument that would change behaviour is already built and already loaded, and it is pointed at the regulator instead of at the customer. Disclosure converts a compliance record into a commercial consequence, which is the one pressure a restaurant answers within the week. What is worth watching is whether any State food safety commissioner makes publication automatic and time-bound rather than discretionary, since the platform holding the data is national and the decision to open it is not.

    Laws and Rules Governing Food Safety Regulation

    1. Food Safety and Standards Act, 2006: Consolidated the earlier food laws into a single statute and created the Food Safety and Standards Authority of India as the standard-setting regulator.
    2. It repealed the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954, which had governed food adulteration for five decades.
    3. Food Safety and Standards (Licensing and Registration of Food Businesses) Regulations, 2011: Split food businesses into registration and licensing categories by turnover and scale of operation.
    4. Food Safety and Standards (Labelling and Display) Regulations, 2020: Fixed the mandatory declarations and the display obligations for food service establishments.
    5. Consumer Protection Act, 2019: Created the Central Consumer Protection Authority, which acts against misleading advertisements and unsafe goods independently of the food regulator.

    Government Initiatives for Food Safety

    1. Eat Right India: The regulator’s national movement combining regulatory measures, industry self-compliance and consumer awareness on safe and healthy food.
    2. Food Safety Training and Certification (FoSTaC): Mandatory training and certification of food safety supervisors for licensed food businesses.
    3. Clean Street Food Hub and Eat Right Station certification: Audited hygiene certification for street food clusters and railway stations.
    4. BHOG, Blissful Hygienic Offering to God: Hygiene certification programme for places of worship that prepare and distribute prasad.

    [2018] Consider the following statements:

    1. The Food Safety and Standards Act, 2006 replaced the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954.

    2. The Food Safety and Standard Authority of India (FSSAI) is under the charge of Director General of Health Services in the Union Ministry of Health and Family Welfare.

    Which of the statements given above is/are correct?

    (a) 1 only

    (b) 2 only

    (c) Both 1 and 2

    (d) Neither 1 nor 2

  • The political cost of UCT schemes

    Why in the News

    Unconditional cash transfer schemes aimed at women have become a standard electoral instrument in India since 2020, and the argument now is that they carry a political cost their designers cannot remove.

    What is an unconditional cash transfer scheme?

    1. Cash paid without a behavioural condition: The transfer reaches an identified beneficiary on eligibility alone, with no requirement to enrol a child, attend a clinic or perform work.
    2. The named State schemes: Kalaignar Magalir Urimai Thittam in Tamil Nadu, Lakshmir Bhandar in West Bengal and Gruha Lakshmi Yojana in Karnataka are the principal instances.
    3. The stated welfare purpose: The schemes provide financial support to women, and partially advance Sustainable Development Goal 5.4 (recognition and valuation of women’s unpaid domestic and care work).

    Why can beneficiary targeting not be made accurate?

    1. Incomes are not observable: Governments cannot directly observe the incomes of most workers in the informal sector.
    2. Proxies stand in for income: Eligibility is inferred from land ownership, electricity consumption or household assets.
    3. Both errors follow from the proxy: Inclusion errors send benefits to ineligible households. Exclusion errors leave eligible households out.

    What does the Kalaignar Magalir Urimai Thittam experience show?

    1. The promise was universal: Rs 1,000 a month was promised to all women-headed households before the 2021 election.
    2. The launch was restricted: Fiscal constraints produced eligibility limits on income, land ownership and other criteria at launch in September 2023, covering about 1.13 crore women.
    3. Expansion followed complaints, not review: Another 16.94 lakh beneficiaries were added in December 2025 after widespread complaints from women who believed they met the criteria. The scheme cost Rs 13,807 crore in 2025-26.
    4. The expansion did not settle the grievance: Women who considered themselves unfairly excluded became more aggrieved when beneficiaries received an advance of three months’ entitlement along with a special summer relief payment.

    Why does a perceived error cost as much as a real one?

    1. Belief drives grievance, not eligibility: An individual who fails the official criteria may still believe the treatment was unfair, and votes on that belief.
    2. Qualifying households attract resentment: A household that legally qualifies may be regarded as undeserving where it appears relatively affluent.
    3. The two logics pull in opposite directions: Economics favours targeting so that scarce public resources reach those most in need. Politics rewards broader inclusion, because voters weigh benefits they believe were unfairly denied to them.
    4. Small shifts decide outcomes: The precise electoral impact cannot be measured, and modest shifts in voter preference decide closely contested constituencies.

    What is the fiscal case against unconditional transfers?

    1. The national bill: States are expected to spend about $18 billion on unconditional cash transfers in 2025-26, according to the latest Economic Survey.
    2. The money is switched rather than raised: Financing requires expenditure switching or a larger fiscal deficit.
    3. Productive spending is displaced: Resources available for employment generation and self-employment programmes fall.
    4. Withdrawal is not an option once dependence sets in: Parties escalate the amount instead of ending the transfer, which produces competitive welfarism.

    Does a conditional design perform better?

    1. The benefit is tied to an outcome: Conditional and incentive-linked transfers link payment to a socially desirable behaviour, so the money buys a developmental gain alongside relief.
    2. Self-selection replaces verification: Participation in Tamil Nadu’s Midday Meal Scheme depends on school enrolment, so beneficiaries select themselves and grievances fall.
    3. The political cost falls with the targeting burden: A programme tied to education or another desirable behaviour needs no proxy means test, so it generates no perceived exclusion error.

    Challenges to unconditional cash transfers

    1. There is no current income record to target on: Welfare lists rest on a deprivation ranking that ages faster than household circumstances change. Eg. The Socio-Economic and Caste Census of 2011 remains the base for several central and State beneficiary lists.
      The Fix: Re-run the deprivation survey on a fixed cycle and publish the ranking rules, so exclusion can be contested against a stated test.
    2. Exclusion falls hardest on those without documents: Authentication failure removes a household that is eligible on every substantive criterion. Eg. Aadhaar authentication failures in ration distribution in Jharkhand’s Simdega district were linked to a starvation death in 2017.
      The Fix: Mandate an offline exception route at every disbursement point, with the exception count published monthly.
    3. The transfer amount is fixed in nominal terms and erodes: Inflation cuts the real value of a flat monthly figure that no rule revises. Eg. The maternity benefit under the Pradhan Mantri Matru Vandana Yojana has stayed at Rs 5,000 since 2017.
      The Fix: Index the transfer to the consumer price index with an automatic annual revision.
    4. Cash cannot substitute for a service that does not exist: A transfer lets a household buy a service only where a provider is present. Eg. A cash benefit cannot purchase schooling or primary care in a block that has neither a functioning school nor a health centre.
      The Fix: Pair every new transfer with a published service-availability audit for the districts it covers.

    Conclusion

    Targeting error is not an implementation defect in an unconditional cash transfer. It is a property of paying cash on an inferred income in an economy where income cannot be observed. The design therefore buys relief at a political price the government cannot negotiate down, and raising the amount does not buy it down either. The alternative on offer is not universality but conditionality: tie the payment to a behaviour the household chooses, and the household sorts itself.

    Cash Transfer Based Welfare in India

    1. About: Benefit is paid in cash directly into a beneficiary’s bank account in place of a subsidised good, a price support or an in-kind entitlement.
    2. The delivery rails: The Jan Dhan-Aadhaar-Mobile combination supplies the account, the identity and the confirmation, and the Public Financial Management System routes the payment.
    3. Where it began at scale: Cooking gas subsidy transfer under the PAHAL scheme in 2014-15 was the first large national rollout.
    4. Present spread: Direct Benefit Transfer now runs across more than 300 central schemes in addition to State transfers.

    Government Initiatives for Cash Transfer Based Welfare

    1. Pradhan Mantri Kisan Samman Nidhi: Rs 6,000 a year in three instalments to landholding farmer families, run by the Ministry of Agriculture and Farmers’ Welfare.
    2. National Social Assistance Programme: Old age, widow and disability pensions to below poverty line households, run by the Ministry of Rural Development.
    3. Direct Benefit Transfer Mission: Housed in the Cabinet Secretariat, it coordinates transfer implementation across ministries and maintains the scheme-wise public dashboard.

    [2022, GS2, 10 marks] Reforming the government delivery system through the Direct Benefit Transfer Scheme is a progressive step, but it has its limitations too. Comment.

  • Bihar makes consent mandatory for CBI to probe public servants

    Why in the News

    The Bihar Home Department has issued a notification regulating the jurisdiction of the Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI) in the State under Section 6 of the Delhi Special Police Establishment Act, 1946. It widens the agency’s standing general consent over offences involving employees of the Government of India, central Public Sector Undertakings (PSUs) and private persons implicated alongside them. A proviso then removes that automatic authority over public servants appointed in connection with the affairs of the Bihar government and over State-owned, State-controlled and State-aided bodies. The notification supersedes every previous notification on the subject. The result is a two-tier regime. The same agency needs no permission to investigate a central employee in Bihar. It needs case-by-case permission to investigate a State employee.

    What is consent under Section 6 of the Delhi Special Police Establishment Act, 1946?

    1. The statute is the CBI’s source of police powers: The CBI cannot ordinarily exercise its powers and jurisdiction inside a State without that State government’s consent.
    2. Two forms of consent: General consent allows the agency to investigate specified offences or categories of cases without seeking permission each time. Specific consent is granted for an individual case.
    3. Consent is tied to a notified offence list: The offences the agency may investigate are notified under Section 3 of the Act, so a State’s general consent operates only over that notified list.

    What does the Bihar notification alter on each side of the line?

    1. The offence list under general consent is widened: Consent now covers offences under the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023, the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023, the Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023, the Information Technology Act, 2000, cybercrime, and the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 as amended.
    2. Whom the wider consent covers: It applies to employees of the Government of India, employees of PSUs under the Government of India, and private persons implicated alongside them.
    3. The proviso carves out the State’s own establishment: Prior consent of the Bihar government is mandatory for any probe of public servants appointed in connection with the affairs of the State, and of persons in any corporation, company or bank owned by, controlled by, or receiving financial assistance from the State.
    4. The State decides each request individually: On receiving a proposal from the Delhi Special Police Establishment, the State government considers it and takes a decision on granting powers of investigation case by case.

    Why is the order read as widening the agency’s reach rather than curbing it?

    1. The two-pronged reading inside the police establishment: The stated reading is that the first part of the order lets the CBI investigate cases that were the State’s prerogative, and the second part balances that by requiring the State’s permission.
    2. It is read as a template for other States: The assessment within the agency is that Bihar may have set a precedent for other States, and that the order gives the CBI more scope rather than less.
    3. The consent bar binds the executive alone: The requirement of State consent applies only to executive action by the CBI. It does not restrict a High Court or the Supreme Court from ordering a CBI investigation within a State without the State government’s consent.

    Challenges to the general consent mechanism

    1. Consent is revocable at will and leaves probes suspended: A State can withdraw general consent at any time, and the agency must then seek permission for every fresh case in that State. Eg. West Bengal withdrew its general consent in November 2018 and has required case-by-case permission since.
      The Fix: Prescribe a statutory period within which a State must decide a case-by-case request, with reasons recorded for a refusal.
    2. The agency has no charter of its own: The CBI rests on a 1946 police establishment law and a 1963 executive resolution, so its very constitution has been litigated. Eg. The Gauhati High Court in Navendra Kumar v. Union of India (2013) held the 1963 resolution constituting the CBI to be invalid, and the Supreme Court stayed that order within days.
      The Fix: Enact a dedicated CBI statute fixing its composition, its jurisdiction over notified central offences and the limits of State consent.
    3. Corruption probes against State officials face two separate gates: Consent under Section 6 is only the first permission, and a further approval is needed before an inquiry into a public servant’s official decisions can begin. Eg. Section 17A of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988, inserted in 2018, requires prior approval of the competent authority before any enquiry into a recommendation made or decision taken by a public servant in discharge of official functions.
      The Fix: Run both approvals through a single time-bound window, so a refusal at either gate is recorded once and is appealable.
    4. Selective consent invites a political reading of every case: The State controls access to its own officials, so each grant or refusal is readable as a political act rather than a legal one. Eg. The Supreme Court described the agency as a “caged parrot speaking in its master’s voice” in the coal blocks allocation matter in 2013.
      The Fix: Publish an annual statement of consent requests received, granted, refused and pending, State by State, so the pattern is visible rather than inferred.
    5. Joint cases now straddle two consent regimes: One case involving a central employee and a State public servant is fully open on one accused and permission-dependent on the other, which splits a single investigation. Eg. A corruption case in a centrally funded scheme executed by a State department typically names officials of both.
      The Fix: Provide that where a case includes even one accused covered by general consent, the State decides on the whole case within a fixed period rather than on each accused separately.

    Conclusion

    The notification is in force and it supersedes every earlier consent order in the State. It settles nothing about the underlying arrangement, which lets the same agency be widened and fenced by a single executive order that no legislature debated. What is worth watching is whether other States adopt the split model, and whether Bihar attaches any timeline to the permissions it has now reserved to itself. A permission with no deadline is a refusal that never has to be written down.

    Back2Basics: Central Bureau of Investigation

    1. Constitution: The CBI was set up by a resolution of the Ministry of Home Affairs in 1963, and it is not a statutory body created by its own Act.
    2. Administrative control: It functions under the Department of Personnel and Training in the Ministry of Personnel, Public Grievances and Pensions.
    3. Superintendence is split: For offences under the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988, superintendence vests in the Central Vigilance Commission. For all other matters it vests in the Central Government.
    4. Appointment of the Director: The Director is appointed on the recommendation of a committee of the Prime Minister, the Leader of the Opposition in the Lok Sabha and the Chief Justice of India or a Supreme Court judge nominated by the Chief Justice.

    Matching Previous Year Question

    “The jurisdiction of the Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI) regarding lodging an FIR and conducting probe within a particular State is being questioned by various States. However, the power of the States to withhold consent to the CBI is not absolute. Explain with special reference to the federal character of India.”

  • Census advanced in four poll-bound States, formally deferred in Manipur

    Why in the News

    The Union government has advanced the population enumeration phase of Census 2027 in the poll-bound States of Uttar Pradesh, Punjab, Uttarakhand and Goa, scheduling it from November 16, 2026 to January 4, 2027, ahead of the nationwide enumeration planned for February 2027. The same notification formally deferred the Census exercise in Manipur till further declaration. The reference date for the four States is fixed at 00.00 hours on January 5, 2027, against March 1 for the rest of the country and October 1, 2026 for Ladakh and the snow-bound areas of Uttarakhand, Jammu and Kashmir and Himachal Pradesh. The second phase carries 40 questions and includes an open-ended field for recording caste details. The tension is that a single count needs a single moment of reference, and the schedule now bends to the electoral calendar in four States and to a citizenship register demand in one.

    What does the revised schedule change?

    1. The legal basis: The notification was issued by the Registrar General and Census Commissioner of India under the Census Act, 1948.
    2. The order of operations in the four States: Residents have the option of self-enumeration through a dedicated portal between November 16 and November 30, ahead of the door-to-door survey, which begins on December 1.
    3. The revisional round: Population enumeration in the four States is followed by a revisional round from January 5 to January 9, 2027, immediately after the reference moment.
    4. The stated reason for the advance: The exercise is being completed in these four States before assembly elections due early next year.

    What does the second phase ask?

    1. The scale of the schedule: The second phase carries 40 questions, of which at least 13 are new compared with the 2011 Census.
    2. Caste is recorded without a fixed list: The schedule includes an open-ended field for caste details. Respondents may also decline to disclose their caste or state that they do not belong to any caste.
    3. The new identity and household questions: Spouse’s name, nationality, father’s particulars and mother’s particulars are being asked for the first time.
    4. The new asset, document and service questions: Digital literacy, permanent residential address, place of Covid-19 vaccination, number of bank accounts, passport number, availability of a driving licence and a mobile phone, and Aadhaar and voter ID numbers where available.

    Why has Manipur been left out?

    1. The deferral is open ended: The notification defers the Census exercise in the State indefinitely, with no revised date attached.
    2. The demand behind it: A large section of civil society groups from the Meitei and Naga communities has demanded that a National Register of Citizens (NRC) be compiled first, before the Census is undertaken in the ethnic violence-hit State.
    3. The communities involved: Manipur has three major communities, the Meitei, the tribal Naga and the Kuki-Zo, and the demand as reported comes from groups within two of them.
    4. What deferral costs: A State counted at a different time cannot be compared with the rest of the country on the same reference date, which is the property that makes Census data usable for allocation.

    What is the Opposition’s objection?

    1. The planning objection: The Congress has said the fresh notification shows shoddy planning, since the population enumeration due in February 2027 has been advanced in four States where elections were already known to be due.
    2. The timing objection: It has framed the sudden revision as driven by political calculation rather than statistical need, given how long the schedule had been settled.
    3. The caste question objection: It has argued that the caste question is deliberately very poorly designed and will render the whole caste census exercise meaningless.
    4. The procedural complaint: The Leaders of the Opposition in the Lok Sabha and the Rajya Sabha wrote to the Prime Minister on August 20, 2026 on the caste question, and no mid-course correction followed.

    Challenges to Census 2027

    1. An open-ended caste field cannot be aggregated: Self-reported caste names arrive in many spellings, synonyms and sub-group labels, and no total can be produced from them without a coding frame prepared in advance. Eg. The Socio Economic and Caste Census of 2011 threw up roughly 46 lakh distinct caste entries, and its caste data was never released.
      The Fix: Publish a draft State-wise caste list for public objection before enumeration, and code every response against that list at the point of collection.
    2. A delayed count ages every entitlement built on it: Welfare coverage fixed as a share of population continues to use the last enumerated population until a new one exists. Eg. Coverage under the National Food Security Act, 2013 remains anchored to the 2011 Census, so population added since then sits outside the ration entitlement.
      The Fix: Provide in the enumeration notification for automatic revision of population-linked entitlement ceilings once provisional totals are published.
    3. Self-enumeration presumes the capability being measured: A portal-first round shifts the first pass onto respondents who need a device, connectivity and the confidence to file. Eg. Digital literacy is itself one of the questions being asked in this schedule, which indicates it cannot be assumed across households.
      The Fix: Treat the portal response as one input into the door-to-door visit rather than as a substitute for it, and verify every self-filed record in the field round.
    4. The count competes with the election machinery for the same staff: Enumerators in India are largely school teachers and local officials, who are also the staff deployed on electoral roll work and poll duty. Eg. The advanced enumeration in the four States runs in the months immediately preceding their assembly elections.
      The Fix: Ring-fence the enumeration workforce from election duty for the enumeration and revisional rounds, and record the deployment so overlaps are visible.

    Conclusion

    The count is now running on two clocks, one set by the electoral calendar and one by the need for a common moment of reference. Comparability survives only if enumeration in each region closes cleanly before the next begins, and an advanced schedule in four States narrows that margin. The revisional round that follows the advanced enumeration is the last point at which its errors can be corrected. Manipur’s deferral carries no end date, so the country’s first count in over a decade will be incomplete until the demand that produced the deferral is settled.

    Back2Basics: Census Act, 1948

    1. It provides the legal basis for taking the Census in India and empowers the Centre to notify the schedule, the questions and the reference date.
    2. The exercise is conducted by the Registrar General and Census Commissioner of India, which functions under the Ministry of Home Affairs.
    3. Individual returns are confidential, are not open to inspection and are not admissible as evidence in any court; only aggregated data is published.
    4. Answering the Census questions is a legal obligation on the respondent, and giving false information or refusing to answer is a punishable offence.

    Matching Previous Year Question

    “Consider the following statements : 1. Between Census 1951 and Census 2001, the density of the population of India has increased more than three times. 2. Between Census 1951 and Census 2001, the annual growth rate (exponential) of the population of India has doubled. Which of the statements given abova is/are correct ? (a) 1 only (b) 2 only (c) Both 1 and 2 (d) Neither 1 nor 2”

  • NAMASTE Cards distributed to waste pickers in Najafgarh zone

    NAMASTE Cards distributed to waste pickers in Najafgarh zone

    Why in News

    The Ministry of Social Justice and Empowerment (MoSJE) inaugurated distribution of NAMASTE Cards to waste pickers in the Municipal Corporation of Delhi (MCD) Najafgarh Zone on 4 September 2026.

    Core facts

    1. Scheme name: NAMASTE stands for National Action for Mechanised Sanitation Ecosystem. It is a central scheme for the safety and dignity of sanitation workers.
    2. Implementing bodies: The scheme is run jointly by the MoSJE and the Ministry of Housing and Urban Affairs (MoHUA).
    3. Event substance: Profiled waste pickers received NAMASTE identity cards. The cards formally recognise the worker and link the worker to scheme benefits.
    4. Officeholder: The distribution was inaugurated by the Union Minister of State for Social Justice and Empowerment. The individual identity is not material to the policy content.

    Static Context

    1. Objective: NAMASTE targets zero fatalities in sanitation work in India. It seeks to end direct human contact with faecal matter in sewer and septic tank cleaning.
    2. Coverage expansion: NAMASTE originally covered sewer and septic tank workers (SSWs). The scheme was later extended to enumerate and cover waste pickers. A national digital application for profiling waste pickers was launched on World Environment Day 2025.
    3. Benefits design: The scheme provides occupational profiling, Personal Protective Equipment (PPE) kits, Ayushman Bharat health cover, and a capital subsidy for sanitation related livelihoods.
    4. Predecessor: NAMASTE subsumed the earlier Self Employment Scheme for Rehabilitation of Manual Scavengers (SRMS).
    5. Governing law: Manual scavenging is prohibited under the Prohibition of Employment as Manual Scavengers and their Rehabilitation Act, 2013.

    Prelims angle

    1. Scheme full form and nodal ministries: NAMASTE is run by the MoSJE with the MoHUA. Expect a purpose or ministry match question.
    2. Beneficiary categories: Sewer and septic tank workers, and waste pickers. The waste picker inclusion is the newest hook.
    3. Benefit bundle: PPE, Ayushman Bharat health cover, capital subsidy, occupational profiling.
    4. Predecessor scheme: SRMS. Governing Act: Manual Scavengers Act, 2013.

    Mains angle

    GS Paper 2, welfare schemes for vulnerable sections. A question can frame the shift from a rehabilitation model (SRMS) to a mechanisation and formalisation model (NAMASTE), and ask whether profiling and card based inclusion secures the rights of informal sanitation workers.

    “[2016] Rashtriya Garima Abhiyaan’ is a national campaign to

    (a) rehabilitate the homeless and destitute persons and provide them with suitable sources of livelihood

    (b) release the sex workers from their practice and provide them with alternative sources of livelihood

    (c) eradicate the practice of manual scavenging and rehabilitate the manual scavengers

    (d) release the bonded labourers from their bondage and rehabilitate them.

  • Centre’s rationale for not using OBC lists for caste enumeration is flawed, say associations

    Centre’s rationale for not using OBC lists for caste enumeration is flawed, say associations

    Why in the News

    Associations representing Other Backward Classes (OBC) have rejected the Union government’s stated reason for not using the Central and State OBC lists in the caste enumeration component of the 2027 Census. The government’s position is that those lists record classes rather than castes, so caste names cannot be drawn and codified from them. Castes other than the Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes will instead be recorded through an open column, in which the enumerator writes down what the respondent states. The associations argue that a government which recognises these communities as OBCs for reservation cannot disregard their caste identities when it collects population data. What is contested is whether an enumeration run without a pre-coded caste frame can produce a usable OBC population figure at all.

    How would the two methods of enumeration differ?

    1. The open column method: Castes other than the Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes are recorded as stated by the respondent, without a pre-coded list of caste names for the enumerator to select from.
    2. The list based alternative: Caste names would have been drawn from the Central and State OBC lists and codified in advance, so responses map onto a fixed set of entries.
    3. Where the lists already exist: The Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes are enumerated against notified lists, which is the precedent the associations point to.

    What is the government’s reason, and how do the associations answer it?

    1. The stated rationale: The OBC lists identify backward classes rather than castes, so caste names cannot be lifted from them for enumeration.
    2. The associations’ core objection: The All India OBC Students’ Association (AIOBCSA) calls the class and caste distinction artificial, arguing that a government recognising these communities as OBCs for reservation and other affirmative action cannot then disregard their caste identities when collecting population data.
    3. Fix the lists rather than drop them: The associations say that if the existing lists are inadequate or carry inconsistencies for enumeration, the government should use experts to draw and rationalise the caste names from them, not “drop them altogether”.
    4. Administrative records already do both: The AIOBCSA points out that certificates and official records routinely identify communities by their specific social and caste identities, and that even Economically Weaker Section certificates identify the beneficiary through prescribed social or category criteria. Administrative classification and social identity therefore coexist in practice.
    5. A charge of bad faith: The OBC Public Representatives Forum said the justification adds to the perception that the government agreed to enumerate castes with no real intention of doing it properly.

    Why do the associations link this to the EWS estimate?

    1. The estimate behind EWS: When the Economically Weaker Section (EWS) quota was introduced, the government worked with an estimate that the population outside the Scheduled Castes, Scheduled Tribes and OBCs was about 35 to 40 percent.
    2. What a rigorous count would do to it: The Backwards Classes Intellectual Forum argues that a scientific enumeration of OBC populations would show that estimate to be an overestimation.
    3. The alleged motive: The same body argues that the refusal to codify existing caste names and count caste group populations, as is done for Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes, is intended to cover up the basis on which EWS reservation was justified.

    Why has the OBC count been the core of the caste Census demand?

    1. The figure has never been counted: The OBC population across the country has only ever been estimated in India, based on the caste Census data of 1931.
    2. The demand was built on that gap: Enumerating the OBC population has historically been the principal argument driving the demand for a caste Census.
    3. The method is what is now questioned: Senior Opposition leaders have questioned the utility of the open column methodology for enumerating every caste other than the Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes.

    Challenges to caste enumeration through an open column

    1. Free text responses multiply into unusable entries: A column with no pre-coded frame collects spellings, surnames, sub castes and clan names as separate answers, and classifying them afterwards becomes a second exercise larger than the count. Eg. The Socio Economic and Caste Census, 2011 returned roughly 46 lakh distinct caste and related entries, and its caste data was never released.
      The Fix: Publish a codified caste directory built from the Central and State lists and State commission reports before enumeration, and let the open column carry only the entries that directory does not hold.
    2. No single classification governs across States: Central and State OBC lists differ, so the same caste name can carry backward class status in one State and not in another or at the Centre. Eg. Jats were added to the Central OBC list in 2014 and the inclusion was set aside by the Supreme Court in Ram Singh versus Union of India (2015), while several States continue to list them.
      The Fix: Record the State of enumeration against each caste entry, so the count can be read against the list actually applicable to that respondent.
    3. Data collected without a publication commitment invites contest: A count whose tables and methodology are not released cannot settle any claim, and every group then disputes its own number. Eg. Bihar’s caste survey of 2023 was challenged in court, and several communities publicly disputed the figures recorded for them.
      The Fix: Fix a statutory deadline for publishing the caste tables together with the methodology note.
    4. Self declaration can be strategic: Where recognition carries reservation benefits, the answer given to an enumerator responds to the benefit rather than to the record. Eg. Sections of the Maratha community in Maharashtra have pressed for recognition as Kunbi in official records in order to access OBC reservation.
      The Fix: Cross check declared entries against existing caste certificate records at the tabulation stage rather than at the point of enumeration.

    Conclusion

    The same administration recognises these communities by caste for the purpose of reservation and declines to name them by caste for the purpose of counting. That is the contradiction the associations have put on the record, and no procedural reason offered so far reconciles the two positions. The decision also determines whether the coming enumeration produces a number that can be used in policy or one that has to be reclassified before anyone can read it. What to watch is whether a codified caste directory is issued to enumerators before fieldwork begins.

    Back2Basics: Economically Weaker Section reservation

    1. What it is: A 10 percent reservation in government jobs and educational institutions for economically weaker sections outside the Scheduled Castes, Scheduled Tribes and Other Backward Classes.
    2. Its constitutional basis: It was introduced by the Constitution (One Hundred and Third Amendment) Act, 2019, inserting Articles 15(6) and 16(6).
    3. How eligibility is set: Eligibility rests on income and asset criteria notified by the government, not on social or educational backwardness.
    4. Its judicial status: The Supreme Court upheld the amendment in Janhit Abhiyan versus Union of India (2022) by a majority of three to two.

    [2022, GS2, 10 marks] Discuss the role of the National Commission for Backward Classes in the wake of its transformation from a statutory body to a constitutional body.

  • Govt has deferred Census in Manipur amid calls for NRC to be carried out

    Govt has deferred Census in Manipur amid calls for NRC to be carried out

    Why in the News

    The Union government has decided to defer the 2027 Census in Manipur. The decision followed a meeting of the Union Home Minister with the Governor and the Chief Minister of Manipur, and the State government said it came out of discussions on the demand that the Census be held only after a National Register of Citizens (NRC), a register of persons verified as Indian citizens, is implemented in the State. Meitei and Naga organisations want citizenship settled before any population figure is recorded. Kuki-Zo organisations want the reverse order, arguing that the Census is the credible data source against which citizenship allegations should be tested. The count is contested because the same figures will eventually decide how Assembly seats are shared between the valley and the hills.

    Why is the Census being opposed?

    1. Citizenship and demographic change: Meitei civil society groups in the valley and Naga communities in the hill districts allege that migration from Myanmar and elsewhere has altered Manipur’s demographic composition. They want an exercise distinguishing Indian citizens from illegal immigrants before population figures are recorded.
    2. Displacement from the ethnic conflict: Thousands remain displaced more than three years after the violence that began in May 2023. Meitei groups say a count taken while people live away from their homes would record the consequences of displacement rather than the underlying population pattern.
    3. Political representation: Census figures will eventually govern delimitation, and Manipur has had no fresh delimitation implemented since the 1970s.

    How old is the NRC demand?

    1. It predates the current conflict: The demand existed before the May 2023 violence, and the influx from Myanmar and the conflict later gave it a sharper political and security dimension.
    2. A joint memorandum in 2022: In June 2022 the Coordinating Committee on Manipur Integrity (COCOMI), representing Meitei civil society, and the United Naga Council (UNC) jointly demanded an NRC and a State Population Commission.
    3. The Assembly endorsed it twice: The Manipur Assembly adopted a resolution seeking both on 5 August 2022, and reaffirmed it on 1 March 2024.
    4. The growth figures the resolution cited: The resolution recorded population growth of 153.3 percent between 1971 and 2001 and 250.9 percent between 2001 and 2011 in the hill districts, against 94.8 percent and 125.4 percent respectively in the valley. Those figures do not by themselves establish illegal immigration.
    5. An institution was created: The State government constituted the Manipur State Population Commission in February 2023.

    What did the Myanmar crisis add?

    1. Displacement across the border: Fighting in Myanmar’s Chin State and adjoining areas after the 2021 military coup drove thousands across the border into India.
    2. Ethnic links on both sides of the border: Many of those arriving belonged to Chin and related communities with ethnic and familial ties to the Kuki-Zomi population in Manipur.
    3. The State government’s framing: The Manipur government linked the influx to new settlements, poppy cultivation, encroachment and demographic change.
    4. The counter position: Kuki organisations disputed that framing, arguing that legitimate Indian citizens were being conflated with recent arrivals from Myanmar.
    5. A border policy change: The Centre scrapped the Free Movement Regime with Myanmar in February 2024, citing security and demographic concerns.

    What are the Meitei and Naga groups demanding now?

    1. A fixed sequence: The UNC stated on 18 August, “NRC first: No Census, No Delimitation Before Implementation of NRC in Manipur.”
    2. An old base year: It demanded an NRC with 1951 as the base year, followed by the Census and then delimitation.
    3. The demand cuts across party lines: The State Congress president, himself a former Chief Minister, supported the demand for an NRC before the Census on 19 and 20 August, placing the two main parties broadly on the same side.

    Why do the Kuki-Zo groups oppose it?

    1. A national exercise, not a State one: The Kuki-Zo Council called an NRC before the Census “premature and unjustified”, stating on 23 August that there is no provision for a community or a State government to unilaterally initiate a separate NRC in one State.
    2. Allegations should be tested against data: It argued that the demand rests on unsubstantiated allegations about the Kuki-Zo community, and that such claims should be tested against credible demographic data. The Census is the appropriate source of that data.
    3. It supports delimitation on verified data: The Council has backed delimitation once verified demographic figures exist.
    4. The documentary cut off is the underlying fear: Kuki, Zomi and Chin communities straddle the India-Myanmar border, so a register built on an old documentary cut off could raise doubts about people who have lived in Manipur for generations.

    Why does delimitation matter so much here?

    1. The present seat split: Manipur has 60 Assembly seats, 40 in the valley and 20 in the hills.
    2. The demographic map behind it: The State’s 16 districts divide broadly into hills, where Nagas and Kuki-Zomis predominate, and the valley, where Meiteis are in the majority.
    3. The map is more than fifty years old: The present political map goes back to the 1973 delimitation, which was based on the 1971 Census.
    4. Manipur was left out of the last exercise: A national delimitation based on the 2001 Census ran between 2002 and 2008, and Manipur, Assam, Arunachal Pradesh and Nagaland were excluded after the Centre deferred it in 2008, citing security concerns and challenges to the credibility of the 2001 Census data in the region.
    5. The disputed 2001 figures: In nine hill subdivisions the increase between 1991 and 2001 was over 40 percent, and in four it exceeded 100 percent.
    6. What the valley’s political class fears: A new Census followed by delimitation could move the 40:20 distribution to something closer to 35:25 or 30:30.

    Can an NRC be held only in Manipur, and what else is the Centre weighing?

    1. The usual national sequence is stalled: A nationwide NRC is supposed to follow an update of the National Population Register (NPR), a register of usual residents, and the government has not notified the NPR to be taken up with the 2027 Census.
    2. No legal bar on a State specific exercise: Section 14A of the Citizenship Act, 1955 vests the power to compulsorily register citizens and maintain the National Register of Indian Citizens in the Centre. No statutory requirement makes simultaneous nationwide deployment necessary.
    3. The decision is political rather than legal: The Centre could in principle notify the exercise for a particular State or border region, and the recorded position is that this is a political call.
    4. An alternative route already exists: A High-Level Committee on Demographic Change, announced in May this year, is examining demographic change arising from illegal immigration and other abnormal causes, and will recommend policy, legislative and administrative measures. Its findings could form the basis of a policy specific to Manipur.

    Challenges to holding the Census in Manipur

    1. Displacement distorts where people are counted: An enumeration records a person where they are living on the reference date, so a district hosting relief camps absorbs the population of the district people fled. Eg. Displaced Kashmiri Pandit families have been counted in Jammu and Delhi rather than in their home districts across successive Censuses.
      The Fix: Record a home district field for persons enumerated in relief camps, so displacement is visible in the data instead of silently altering district totals.
    2. A register built on an old base year excludes documented residents: Citizenship registration turns on producing legacy documents, which the poorest and the most mobile are least able to hold. Eg. Assam’s updated register, worked against a 1971 cut off, left 19,06,657 persons out of the final list published in August 2019, and the appeals process has still not concluded.
      The Fix: Publish the documentary standard and a binding appeal timeline before enumeration begins, so exclusion is contestable within a fixed period.
    3. A deferred count leaves the State on stale data: Allocations for welfare programmes are pegged to Census population, so a State that is skipped keeps running on figures more than a decade old. Eg. Coverage under the National Food Security Act, 2013 is still fixed against the 2011 Census population.
      The Fix: Notify an alternative statutory data source, such as updated ration and electoral rolls, for allocations in the deferred State until enumeration is held.
    4. The credibility of the count is itself contested in the region: A count that any side believes is inflated cannot settle the question it is being deferred to answer. Eg. Nagaland recorded decadal growth of about 64 percent in the 2001 Census and a fall of about 0.6 percent in 2011, and the earlier count was widely described within the State as inflated.
      The Fix: Publish subdivision level growth anomalies alongside post enumeration survey results, so a disputed count is audited rather than defended.

    Conclusion

    Deferring the count postpones the dispute without resolving either question behind it. The two demands cannot be met on the same timetable, since one side wants citizenship settled before people are counted and the other wants the count to test the citizenship allegations. A deferral also leaves the State without the current population data that its own programmes and its own representation ultimately rest on. What to watch is whether the Centre fixes a date for enumeration in the State or lets the deferral run open ended.

    Back2Basics: National Register of Indian Citizens

    1. What it is: A register of persons verified as citizens of India, maintained by the Centre.
    2. Its statutory basis: Section 14A of the Citizenship Act, 1955 empowers the Centre to compulsorily register every citizen and to issue national identity cards.
    3. How it is meant to be built: The rules contemplate verification of the particulars collected in the National Population Register to sort residents into citizens and doubtful cases.
    4. Where it has been done: The only State level exercise so far was in Assam, carried out under Supreme Court supervision, with the final list published in 2019.

    “[2009] Consider the following statements :

    1. Between Census 1951 and Census 2001, the density of the population of India has increased more than three times.

    2. Between Census 1951 and Census 2001, the annual growth rate (exponential) of the population of India has doubled.

    Which of the statements given abova is/are correct ?

    (a) 1 only

    (b) 2 only

    (c) Both 1 and 2

    (d) Neither 1 nor 2

  • [4th September 2026] The Hindu OpED: For newborns, the answer is hospital plus home

    [4th September 2026] The Hindu OpED: For newborns, the answer is hospital plus home

    Question (2024, GS2): “In a crucial domain like the public healthcare system, the Indian State should play a vital role to contain the adverse impact of marketisation of the system. Suggest some measures through which the State can enhance the reach of public healthcare at the grassroots level.
    Linkage: The proposed solution to move a portion of newborn care back to the home is a direct attempt to “enhance the reach of public healthcare at the grassroots level”. This question prompts candidates to suggest structural measures to decentralise care, relieving the burden on overloaded urban hospitals.

    Mentor Comment

    Three newborns died in an accidental fire at the government women’s hospital in Amravati, Maharashtra. That episode is placed alongside a list of clustered newborn deaths in government institutions since 2017, running from BRD Medical College in Gorakhpur and a government hospital in Ahmedabad through JK Lon Hospital in Kota, and on to district and medical college hospitals in Shahdol, Bhandara, Bhopal, Ambikapur, Nanded, Jhansi and Budaun. The argument drawn from that list is that these are a recurring pattern produced by the system, not a series of isolated accidents. The tension is that the policy success which moved birth out of the home is what has overloaded the units that receive the sick newborn, and the proposed answer is to move part of newborn care back to the home.

    What is home based newborn care?

    1. Trained community health workers deliver care where the baby is: They identify and manage neonatal infections at home, support breastfeeding and warmth, and manage low birth weight and preterm babies.
    2. It is already a package inside the public system: The Ministry of Health and Family Welfare adopted it in 2011, and roughly 8,00,000 Accredited Social Health Activists (ASHAs) have been trained on modules built from the Gadchiroli experience.
    3. It does not replace intensive care: A baby with severe prematurity, respiratory distress, shock, severe sepsis or serious birth asphyxia needs immediate facility based treatment.

    Why are newborn deaths clustering in government units?

    1. Overcrowding is the first reason: Institutional deliveries rose from 39 percent in 2005-06 to 90 percent in 2023-24 under the National Family Health Survey-6, and the absolute number of institutional deliveries rose from 109 lakh to 194 lakh. Admissions to public Special Newborn Care Units (SNCUs), the secondary level units that treat sick newborns, rose 28 percent in two years, from 11.3 lakh in 2021-22 to 14.45 lakh in 2023-24.
    2. The case mix has become sicker: Government hospitals now receive premature, low birth weight and sick newborns referred from peripheral facilities, alongside the normal deliveries they always handled.
    3. Infrastructure failure is the third reason: The Gorakhpur deaths of August 2017 were attributed by a district level inquiry to oxygen deprivation following an interruption in supply. Fires at Bhandara in January 2021, Bhopal in November 2021 and Jhansi in November 2024 show the electrical and fire risk in units running warmers, incubators and ventilators.
    4. Infection and staffing form the fourth: Inadequate nurse-to-baby ratios, equipment shortages and weak infection prevention practice let hospital acquired infection spread quickly through a crowded unit.

    What is the evidence that care at home works?

    1. A field trial cut neonatal mortality by 62.2 percent: The Society for Education, Action and Research in Community Health (SEARCH) ran the trial in rural Gadchiroli using trained community health workers, and published the result in The Lancet in 1999.
    2. Most small babies were managed without a bed: Between 1996 and 2003, 97 percent of low birth weight and preterm babies in Gadchiroli, including those above 1,800 g and beyond 34 weeks of gestation, were managed at home with a very low case fatality rate, published in the Journal of Perinatology in 2005.
    3. The delivery channel already exists nationally: India does not have to invent a system, so the binding constraint is training, supervision and support of the workers already deployed.

    What is the three part strategy proposed?

    1. Decongest the neonatal units: Strengthen home based care by ASHAs so that appropriate, stable newborns receive care at home rather than occupying a scarce SNCU bed.
    2. Staff and equip the units properly: Adequate numbers of doctors and nurses, appropriate nurse-to-baby ratios, functioning equipment, reliable oxygen and electricity with backup systems, and rigorous infection prevention.
    3. Make the units intrinsically safe: Fire detection and suppression systems, electrical and oxygen system safety measures, emergency evacuation drills and independent safety audits, all made mandatory rather than advisory.

    Challenges to home based newborn care

    1. The worker carrying the package is not an employee: An ASHA is an honorary volunteer paid through task linked incentives, so an expanded clinical role rests on availability that is not contractually owed. Eg. The fixed monthly incentive for routine tasks is Rs 2,000, with the remainder paid activity by activity.
      The Fix: Create a semi-formal cadre under the National Health Mission with a fixed salary component, insurance and pension attached to the newborn care role.
    2. Skill retention needs supervision that is not staffed: A worker trained once and never observed loses the clinical judgement the package depends on. Eg. The Auxiliary Nurse Midwives who supervise ASHAs also carry immunisation, antenatal and reporting duties at the same sub-centre.
      The Fix: Fund a dedicated supervisory post per cluster of workers with a fixed monthly schedule of observed home visits.
    3. Home care fails when referral fails: A baby that deteriorates at home needs transport and a bed within hours, and neither is guaranteed. Eg. A newborn deteriorating at night depends on a district ambulance network reached through the 102 service.
      The Fix: Link every worker to a live bed availability record for her referral unit and a guaranteed transport response window.
    4. The model was proven rural and remains rural: Urban newborns in slum and peri-urban households sit largely outside the package. Eg. Urban worker deployment norms are pitched at one worker per 1,000 to 2,500 slum population, and non-slum urban households fall outside that count.
      The Fix: Extend the package through urban primary health centres with a stated urban deployment norm and a defined household list.

    Conclusion

    Institutional delivery moved birth out of the home and saved both mothers and babies. It did not create the capacity to look after every newborn who arrives with the mother. The next phase has to divide the work, sending the sick newborn to a unit that is staffed and safe and keeping the stable newborn with a trained worker at home. The measure to watch is whether SNCU admissions fall and neonatal mortality keeps falling, since that combination is what separates decongestion from denial of care.

    Newborn and Child Health in India

    1. The mortality position: The Neonatal Mortality Rate stands at about 17 per 1,000 live births, the Infant Mortality Rate at about 25 and the Under-5 Mortality Rate at about 28 per 1,000 live births.
    2. Maternal mortality has fallen alongside it: The Maternal Mortality Ratio is about 80 per lakh live births.
    3. Immunisation coverage is high: Full immunisation coverage reached 93.5 percent under Mission Indradhanush 5.0.
    4. The disease mix has shifted: The share of communicable, maternal and neonatal conditions in India’s total disease burden fell to 33 percent, from 61 percent in 1990.

    Government Initiatives for Newborn and Child Health

    1. Janani Shishu Suraksha Karyakram: Provides free and cashless treatment to sick infants up to one year of age in government institutions, covering drugs, diagnostics and transport.
    2. Rashtriya Bal Swasthya Karyakram: Screens children for the four Ds, meaning defects at birth, deficiencies, diseases and developmental delays, with tertiary care for those identified.
    3. Mission Indradhanush 6.0: Targets 95 percent full immunisation coverage and tracks every pregnant woman and child through the U-WIN portal.
    4. Saksham Anganwadi and Poshan 2.0: Delivers supplementary nutrition aimed at reducing stunting and wasting among children under six.

    Key Facts about Newborn and Child Health

    1. National Newborn Week is observed from 15 to 21 November each year.
    2. The India Newborn Action Plan, 2014 set the goal of a single digit neonatal mortality rate by 2030.

    Challenges in Newborn and Child Health

    1. Specialist posts at the referral tier stay unfilled: A district newborn unit needs a paediatrician on its roster, and the sanctioned post is often vacant. Eg. Rural Community Health Centres carry a shortfall of about 80 percent against sanctioned specialist posts.
      The Fix: Build district paediatric cadres with a rural service obligation tied to postgraduate admission.
    2. Nursing supply is the binding constraint on every unit level standard: A nurse-to-baby ratio cannot be enforced where the nurses do not exist. Eg. India needs an additional 6.5 lakh nurses by 2030 to meet basic World Health Organization staffing norms.
      The Fix: Fund nursing school expansion in the districts with the highest birth volumes rather than in State capitals.
    3. Public health spending sits below its own policy target: Unit upgrades compete with every other demand inside a constrained health budget. Eg. Public health expenditure stands at about 1.9 percent of gross domestic product against the National Health Policy, 2017 target of 2.5 percent.
      The Fix: Ring-fence a newborn care line within National Health Mission allocations so unit safety upgrades are not crowded out.

    Back2Basics

    1. Janani Suraksha Yojana was launched in 2005 under the National Rural Health Mission, now the National Health Mission.
    2. It is a conditional cash transfer paid to promote institutional delivery among poor pregnant women.
      • Its benefits are differentiated between low performing and high performing States, and between rural and urban beneficiaries.
    3. The ASHA is its link worker, escorting the woman to the facility for a performance linked incentive.