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Subject: International Relations

  • The Gulf is calling and New Delhi must listen

    The Gulf is calling and New Delhi must listen

    Why in the News

    Saudi Arabia, Türkiye and Pakistan have entered a collective defence arrangement, the Mecca Joint Defence Agreement, at India’s western maritime doorstep. The agreement follows an American retreat into an unpredictable “selective engagement” posture, which has opened a security vacuum that regional states are now filling with new partners. India’s West Asia policy was built for the opposite condition. The United States guaranteed regional security and kept sea lines of communication open, so India could hedge between Riyadh, Tehran, Tel Aviv and Abu Dhabi without accepting security obligations to any of them. That posture, called multi alignment, bought influence while the region wanted markets, labour and capital. The region now wants security guarantees, and India has none on offer.

    What is the Mecca Joint Defence Agreement?

    1. Three capabilities in one arrangement: It links Gulf capital to Turkish defence technology and to Pakistani military manpower and skill, inside a collective defence framework.
    2. It is framed as defensive: The pact is presented as a way of managing shared vulnerabilities among its members rather than as a bloc aimed at any particular state.
    3. Its significance is structural: It signals that West Asia’s security framework is being rewritten, and that the rewriting is being done by actors whose strategic interests run counter to India’s long term objectives.

    What did India’s multi alignment rest on?

    1. The region was read as an economic hinterland: West Asia was treated as a critical source of crude oil, a reliable destination for outbound labour and a vital conduit for remittances.
    2. Hedging was the default in a crisis: India balanced relations between competing power centres and declined security obligations to any single capital.
    3. The framing was macroeconomic: The region’s geography, oil and gas reserves, capital accumulation and appetite for imported labour and skills positioned it as the bridge between a debt burdened West and a rising Asia.
    4. Distance was itself the asset: Being friendly to all without being too friendly to any was the point of the policy, since an obligation to one power centre would have cost access to another.

    What has changed in the region’s security market?

    1. Distancing has lost its value: West Asian capitals no longer treat non alignment or multi alignment as a virtue, and are actively seeking dependable security partners.
    2. Diplomatic and commercial offers no longer buy influence: What is sought is naval patrols, intelligence sharing, defence industrial collaboration and credible counter terrorism capability, not platitudes and routine economic cooperation.
    3. The vacuum is filled by whoever arrives first: Türkiye has already converted the opening into a treaty commitment, and regional security arrangements will coalesce with or without Indian participation.
    4. The exposure is concrete: Hostile regional pacts and the growing influence of external powers bear directly on India’s trade routes, its energy security and the welfare of millions of Indian citizens in the Gulf.

    Why does economic infrastructure not buy security?

    1. Low cost weapons defeat capital intensive assets: The eruption of hostilities involving Iran showed that state of the art port facilities, energy networks and logistics corridors remain vulnerable to low cost drones in grey zone, asymmetric warfare, meaning attacks kept below the threshold of declared war and carried out by deniable or irregular means.
    2. A secure enclave is not secure: Hyper secure economic zones stay exposed to spillover from the instability around them, because the perimeter is not where the risk originates.
    3. The Gulf model is hostage to perception: The economy runs on foreign corporations and expatriate labour, so talent and capital exit as rapidly as they arrived once security risk crosses a psychological threshold.
    4. A corridor is only as strong as its worst link: Disruption at a narrow naval chokepoint or along an overland route stalls the whole supply chain, whatever the quality of the infrastructure at either end.

    What hard moves are available to India?

    1. Build presence at the chokepoints: The named priorities are the Strait of Hormuz, the Gulf of Oman, the Gulf of Aden, the waters off the Somali coast and the Bab el-Mandeb.
    2. Convert presence into standing arrangements: Joint maritime patrols, permanent logistics access arrangements and interoperable surveillance networks with friendly Gulf states are what turn deployments into a net security provider role.
    3. Sell capability rather than only buying it: India’s defence manufacturing base can offer West Asian states an alternative source of hardware and technology, with collaborative ventures, exercises carrying real operational content and deep intelligence sharing replacing procurement discussions.
    4. Use minilaterals rather than alliances: Security frameworks with the United Arab Emirates or Israel, and separately with Saudi Arabia, build a counterweight against hostile axes without the rigidity of a Cold War style alliance.

    Challenges to an Indian security role in West Asia

    1. India holds no base of its own in the region: Sustained naval presence at several chokepoints needs repair, replenishment and crew rotation ashore, which an access agreement does not guarantee during a crisis. Eg. India’s logistics in the western Indian Ocean rest on access to Port Duqm in Oman rather than on infrastructure it controls.
      The Fix: Convert existing access arrangements into pre stocked logistics hubs with agreed wartime access clauses, so replenishment does not turn on a host government’s decision mid conflict.
    2. A Gulf security partnership collides with the Iran relationship: Deeper security alignment with Riyadh and Abu Dhabi narrows the space for India’s connectivity investments in Iran. Eg. The Chabahar port project has already run into payment and equipment difficulties because of exposure to United States sanctions.
      The Fix: Keep the maritime role functional rather than political, built around freedom of navigation and anti piracy tasks from which Iran also benefits.
    3. Pakistan’s institutional depth in Gulf security cannot be matched quickly: Decades of troop deployments, training missions and personnel exchanges give it standing that a new partner cannot replicate through joint exercises. Eg. Pakistani personnel have served in Saudi Arabian training and internal security roles across successive decades.
      The Fix: Compete where the incumbent is weak, in maritime domain awareness, satellite surveillance and cyber defence, rather than in ground manpower.
    4. The defence export base is small relative to the offer: Supplying a serious regional partner requires sustained production, spares and lifecycle support, which the Indian ecosystem has demonstrated in a narrow band of systems. Eg. India’s defence exports remain concentrated in components, subsystems and a small number of complete platforms.
      The Fix: Anchor offers to systems with a proven service record and a committed spares chain, instead of promising a full spectrum supplier relationship the industrial base cannot yet sustain.
    5. A guarantor role imports the region’s own quarrels: Standing commitments make India a party to disputes among partners who are themselves in conflict with each other. Eg. Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates backed rival factions in Yemen while both are named as prospective Indian partners.
      The Fix: Restrict commitments to maritime and counter terrorism tasks with defined geographic limits, excluding participation in intra regional ground conflicts.

    Conclusion

    The currency of influence in West Asia has changed from investment to protection, and India’s instruments were built for the older one. Trade volume and a large resident population do not translate into a seat in a security arrangement, which is what the region is now assembling. The marker to watch is whether the Mecca arrangement acquires operational content, meaning a joint command, basing rights or a published exercise calendar, since that is the point at which a signed pact becomes a standing capability. India’s answer will register in the same currency or it will not register at all.

    India and West Asia

    1. The policy has a named progression: A pro Arab, Non Aligned Movement era stance gave way to full diplomatic ties with Israel in 1992, a “Look West” policy in 2005 centred on the Gulf Cooperation Council, and a “Think West” approach from 2014 that added maritime security, counter terrorism and investment to oil and diaspora.
    2. Energy is the base of the relationship: The region supplies nearly 60 percent of India’s crude oil and about 70 percent of its liquefied petroleum gas and liquefied natural gas requirements.
    3. The Gulf is India’s largest trading bloc: India-GCC bilateral trade stood at $178 billion in FY 2024-25, making the Gulf Cooperation Council India’s largest trading partner bloc.
    4. The human link is the largest anywhere: About 10 million Indians live and work in West Asia, and the region contributes roughly 38 percent of India’s global remittances.

    Government Initiatives and Frameworks for India-West Asia Relations

    1. I2U2: A grouping of India, Israel, the United Arab Emirates and the United States, working on joint projects in food and energy security.
    2. India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor (IMEC): A rail and shipping corridor intended to link India to Europe through the Gulf, bypassing the Suez route.
    3. India-UAE Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement (CEPA): A bilateral trade agreement that removed tariffs across most trade lines and deepened investment flows between the two countries.
    4. Chabahar port agreement: A ten year contract signed in 2024 to operate the Shahid Beheshti terminal in Iran, giving India a land and sea route to Afghanistan and Central Asia that avoids Pakistan.

    Challenges in India’s West Asia Engagement

    1. Energy import concentration: A large share of India’s crude and gas comes from a single region whose export routes run through two narrow straits. Eg. Qatar supplies roughly 40 percent of India’s liquefied natural gas imports.
      The Fix: Expand long term contracts with West African, American and Australian suppliers, so no single region carries a majority of the import basket.
    2. Remittance dependence at the State level: Household incomes and State finances in parts of India rest on Gulf transfers that fall the moment the regional economy contracts. Eg. Kerala reported roughly a 20 percent decline in monthly Gulf inflows during the 2026 crisis.
      The Fix: Widen the destination mix for emigrant workers through skill mobility agreements with Japan, Germany and Australia, so remittance flows are not tied to one region’s business cycle.
    3. Fertiliser and food input exposure: Gulf sourced urea and phosphate underpin Indian crop cycles, so a shipping disruption reaches the farm within a season. Eg. Long term potash and phosphate supplies from Jordan and Oman are central to India’s fertiliser availability.
      The Fix: Hold buffer stocks timed to the Rabi and Kharif input calendars, and widen phosphate sourcing towards Morocco, so one corridor’s closure does not hit a sowing season.

    [2018, GS2, 15 marks] In what ways would the ongoing US-Iran Nuclear Pact Controversy affect the national interest of India? How should India respond to this situation?”

  • ‘UN Convention on the Law of the Sea is still the constitution of oceans’

    ‘UN Convention on the Law of the Sea is still the constitution of oceans’

    Why in the News

    The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) remains the governing framework for the world’s oceans, in the assessment of Tommy Koh. He presided over the Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea, and led more than 150 nations to adopt the Convention in 1982. He is among this year’s Ramon Magsaysay award winners. He puts the number of parties at 172 and treats that as near universal. The United States has never ratified the Convention and still regards it as the authoritative law of the sea. Iran is not a party either, and the regime of transit passage binds it as customary international law. The Convention’s authority is therefore being tested in the Strait of Hormuz against a state that never accepted the treaty.

    What is UNCLOS?

    1. What it is: A comprehensive treaty setting the legal order for the world’s oceans, adopted in 1982 after nine years of negotiation and in force since 1994.
    2. What it allocates: It fixes the maritime zones a coastal state may claim and the rights it holds in each, running outward from the territorial sea to the exclusive economic zone, the continental shelf and the high seas.
    3. What it does with the deep seabed: Part XI treats the deep seabed and its minerals as the “common heritage of mankind”, to be administered for all states rather than claimed by any one of them.
    4. Why it is described as a constitution: It settles jurisdiction, resource rights and dispute settlement in one instrument, so later ocean agreements are negotiated inside its framework rather than beside it.

    Why has the United States never ratified UNCLOS?

    1. The objection was to the seabed regime, not to the law of the sea: The Reagan Administration rejected Part XI as incompatible with free enterprise and private property norms.
    2. It reversed an earlier American position: The stance taken during the Carter Administration was changed under President Reagan, and the demands that followed were rejected by the developing countries.
    3. The 1994 repair did not change the outcome: A separate agreement in 1994 revised the Part XI arrangements to meet those objections, and ratification still did not follow.
    4. Non ratification is not confined to one objector: Iran and a number of other states have also stayed outside the Convention.

    What binds a state that is not a party?

    1. The count itself does the work: With 172 parties, the Convention’s rules describe general state practice rather than the internal arrangements of a treaty club.
    2. Custom reaches the non party: Transit passage through international straits has passed into customary international law, so it binds Iran although Iran never joined the Convention.
    3. The dispute is political rather than legal: There was no trouble in the Strait of Hormuz before the war, so the priority is ending the war rather than rewriting the law that governs the strait.
    4. A fourth conference answers the wrong question: Reopening the Convention to bring the remaining states in would put a settled architecture back on the negotiating table, and near universal participation already exists without it.

    Where does the Convention not reach?

    1. Dark fleet enforcement is happening outside it: States are designating vessels as a “dark fleet” and taking punitive material action against them, including on the high seas.
    2. The forum named for that problem is the IMO: The International Maritime Organization, rather than a law of the sea conference, is where the practice should be addressed.
    3. Boundary disputes are read as application, not failure: Exclusive economic zone and seabed contests in the South China Sea and over Indian Ocean boundaries are treated as arguments inside the Convention’s architecture rather than as evidence that the architecture has stopped working.

    Conclusion

    A treaty honoured by states that never signed it is strong in one sense and weak in another. Its rules describe how states actually behave, which is precisely what turns them into custom. It carries no way of compelling a state that decides to behave differently, because the states outside it are the ones its dispute settlement machinery cannot reach. That gap is where a closed strait sits, and no further round of accessions would close it.

    Back2Basics: International Maritime Organization

    1. What it is: The United Nations specialised agency responsible for the safety and security of shipping and for preventing marine pollution by ships.
    2. When it was established: It was created by a convention adopted in 1948, began functioning in 1959, and is headquartered in London.
    3. What it produces: Its principal instruments are the International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS) and the International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships (MARPOL).
    4. How it enforces: It sets standards that flag states then apply to ships registered with them, so it regulates through member state implementation rather than by direct enforcement at sea.

    [2022] With reference to the United Nations Convention on the Law of Sea, consider the following statements :

    1. A coastal state has the right to establish the breadth of its territorial sea up to a limit not exceeding 12 nautical miles, measured from baseline determined in accordance with the convention.

    2. Ships of all states, whether coastal or land-locked, enjoy the right of innocent passage through the territorial sea.

    3. The Exclusive Economic Zone shall not extend beyond 200 nautical miles from the baseline from which the breadth of the territorial sea is measured.

    Which of the statements given above are correct ?

    (a) 1 and 2 only

    (b) 2 and 3 only

    (c) 1 and 3 only

    (d) 1, 2 and 3

  • Rajnath releases new framework for defence diplomacy

    Rajnath releases new framework for defence diplomacy

    Why in the News

    The Defence Minister has released Raksha, a strategic framework setting out India’s road map for defence diplomacy and global defence partnerships over the next ten years.

    Pillars of the Raksha framework

    1. Bilateral and multilateral defence partnerships: Deepening defence relationships with individual states and within groupings is the first stated pillar.
    2. Joint military exercises: The framework provides for expanding the scale and range of joint exercises with partner forces.
    3. Capacity building with friendly countries: Training and capability assistance to partner militaries is treated as a distinct instrument rather than a by-product of exercises.
    4. Indigenous defence exports and maritime security: Promoting exports of indigenously developed systems under Make in India, and strengthening maritime security, complete the set of pillars.

    How does the framework use defence exports as a diplomatic instrument?

    1. The industrial objective is tied to the diplomatic one: Export promotion is placed inside a diplomacy document, so a sale is treated as a partnership rather than as a transaction.
    2. The positioning sought: The framework seeks to establish India as a reliable global defence manufacturing partner.
    3. The route named: International cooperation is to be expanded around indigenously developed defence technologies, rather than around licensed or assembled platforms.

    What does the net security provider role commit India to?

    1. A first responder duty: The framework places India as a net security provider and first responder in the Indian Ocean Region, which requires capacity to act before a partner state formally requests help.
    2. A stated regional commitment: The road map records a commitment to ensuring peace, stability and security across the region.
    3. Maritime security as the operating theatre: The Indian Ocean Region framing makes the maritime domain the principal arena in which the other pillars are exercised.
    4. A decade long planning horizon: A ten year design replaces case by case engagement, which changes what can be promised to a partner and over what period.

    Challenges to India’s defence diplomacy

    1. Exports remain concentrated in low value items: Much of India’s defence export value is components and subsystems supplied to foreign manufacturers rather than complete platforms. Eg. Aerostructures, forgings and subsystems account for a substantial share of the export figure India reports each year.
      The Fix: Set platform level export targets by category in the framework’s review, reported separately from the aggregate value.
    2. Capacity building commitments outrun training capacity: Offering training slots to partner militaries requires physical capacity at Indian institutions, which is finite and allotted well in advance. Eg. Foreign officer vacancies at Indian staff and war colleges are limited and booked years ahead.
      The Fix: Fund dedicated foreign trainee capacity at named institutions inside the framework, rather than from existing service training budgets.
    3. First responder assets are committed elsewhere: The same ships and aircraft carry out relief, escort and patrol tasking in overlapping waters. Eg. Naval units deployed for anti piracy escort in the western Indian Ocean are the units nearest to most regional relief tasks.
      The Fix: Ring fence a standing humanitarian assistance and disaster relief task group with pre positioned stores in the region.
    4. Export promotion collides with partner sensitivities: A sale to one regional state can strain relations with its rival, which turns a commercial decision into a political one. Eg. India’s supply of BrahMos missiles to the Philippines drew objections from China.
      The Fix: Publish a case by case political clearance process for defence exports, so industry can price the risk of refusal before bidding.
    5. A framework document carries no reporting duty: A ten year horizon with no interim review point cannot be tested against performance at any stage before it ends. Eg. The document states pillars without naming an annual reporting mechanism against them.
      The Fix: Fix a mandatory annual report against each pillar, carrying indicators for exercises held, officers trained and export value.

    Conclusion

    Defence diplomacy has been run through individual visits, exercises and agreements decided one at a time. A published decade long framework changes the planning horizon and states the objective, and it does not by itself create an institution to execute it. The marker to watch is whether the framework acquires a named owner and an annual review reporting against each pillar, or remains a statement of direction.

    Back2Basics: Net security provider

    1. What the term means: A state that supplies security to others in its region, rather than only securing itself, through presence, capability and assistance extended to partner states.
    2. How India uses it: The formulation entered Indian strategic vocabulary around 2009 and is applied to the Indian Ocean Region, where India’s navy is the largest resident force.
    3. What it involves in practice: Anti piracy patrols, humanitarian assistance and disaster relief, evacuation of nationals, hydrographic survey support and maritime domain awareness shared with partner states.
    4. The policy vehicles: The Security and Growth for All in the Region (SAGAR) vision, the Indian Ocean Naval Symposium, and coastal radar chains built for partner countries.

    [2025, GS3, 15 marks] Why is maritime security vital to protect India’s sea trade? Discuss maritime and coastal security challenges and the way forward.”

  • India and Belgium ramp up bilateral defence cooperation

    India and Belgium ramp up bilateral defence cooperation

    Why in the News

    India and Belgium have signed three government level defence agreements, ramping up a defence relationship that had carried no framework instrument.

    What was signed at the government level?

    1. A Letter of Intent on Defence Cooperation: Signed by the two defence ministries, it covers training, officer exchanges, research and development, seminars, joint exercises and maritime security.
    2. An industry to industry Memorandum of Understanding (MoU): It links the Belgian Security and Defence Industry association with the Society of Indian Defence Manufacturers.
    3. A law enforcement MoU: The Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI) and the Belgium Federal Police agreed to cooperate on transnational organised crime, cybercrime and related matters.

    Which capability areas does the defence cooperation target?

    1. Maritime and undersea systems: Mine countermeasures, autonomous maritime systems, underwater robotics and sensors are named focus areas.
    2. Critical infrastructure protection: The list extends to protection of ports, pipelines and subsea data cables.
    3. Conventional and emerging systems: Ammunition, radar, electro optical sensors, command and control, and counter drone systems are covered.
    4. The engagement machinery: The two Defence Ministers agreed to expand contact through a defence cooperation dialogue, high level visits, training and capacity building, and acknowledged the need for greater maritime security collaboration in the Indo-Pacific.

    What was announced alongside the signed instruments?

    1. A resident defence presence in Brussels: India announced the appointment of a Defence Attache at its Embassy in Brussels.
    2. A trade and investment channel: A fast trade mechanism was established to handle trade and investment, alongside a commitment to double bilateral trade over the next five years.
    3. A Consular Dialogue: A standing consular channel was established between New Delhi and Brussels.
    4. Private sector agreements: At least ten private defence agreements were sealed during the visit, including production of Belgian military items such as rockets in India.

    Where does the economic relationship currently stand?

    1. Merchandise trade: Bilateral trade stood at $13.01 billion in 2025-26.
    2. Investment: Belgian foreign direct investment into India was about $4.2 billion between April 2000 and December 2025.
    3. The Belgian trade position: The Belgian side described the global situation as turbulent and called for free trade and an end to the unilateral imposition of tariffs.

    What did the two sides agree on regional and global security?

    1. The Pakistan assurance: India raised concerns over Belgian defence technology or expertise reaching Pakistan, and received an assurance that there is no question of such cooperation.
    2. Terrorism: The Belgian side supported India’s campaign against cross border terrorism and condemned the Pahalgam terror attack.
    3. Maritime routes: The joint statement called for the safety and security of maritime routes and for safe and unimpeded maritime shipping, in the context of the conflicts in West Asia and Ukraine.
    4. Conflict resolution: Both sides supported efforts aimed at an early end to the conflicts in Ukraine and West Asia, and backed a just peace in Ukraine consistent with the United Nations Charter.
    5. A shared historical marker: The two leaders paid tribute to the more than 9,000 Indian soldiers who died at Flanders Fields during the First World War.

    Challenges to India Belgium defence cooperation

    1. A Letter of Intent creates no obligation: It records agreed areas of work and binds neither side to a contract, a value or a timeline. Eg. India’s defence industrial roadmaps with European partners have taken years to convert into signed production contracts.
      The Fix: Attach a dated work plan with a named nodal agency on each side, reviewed at every defence cooperation dialogue.
    2. Export clearance does not sit with the federal government alone: Belgian arms export licences are issued at regional government level and operate under the European Union common position on arms exports. Eg. Flanders and Wallonia license equipment produced in their own regions separately.
      The Fix: Negotiate a programme level licence assurance at the time of contract, instead of clearance obtained shipment by shipment.
    3. Joint production usually stops at final assembly: Technology transfer in Indian defence tie ups has historically covered assembly rather than the propellant, seeker or sensor core. Eg. Several ammunition and rocket partnerships have delivered kits assembled in India from imported subsystems.
      The Fix: Write a phased indigenous content schedule into each private agreement, measured at component level rather than by value.
    4. A political assurance is not a contractual clause: An undertaking on third country transfers given in a bilateral meeting is not enforceable in any signed instrument. Eg. The assurance on Pakistan was conveyed through officials rather than recorded as a treaty obligation.
      The Fix: Convert the undertaking into an end use and non transfer clause in every follow on agreement signed under the Letter of Intent.
    5. The trade base is narrow: The exchange is dominated by a single commodity group, so a doubling target rests on a thin sectoral spread. Eg. Antwerp’s diamond trade accounts for the bulk of India Belgium merchandise flows.
      The Fix: Set named non gem sectoral milestones under the fast trade mechanism, so the target is measured outside the diamond trade.

    Conclusion

    A relationship built largely on trade has acquired a defence framework in the space of a single visit. What has been signed is intent, an industry linkage and a police cooperation channel, and the substance now depends on what follows them. Two things are worth watching: whether the private production agreements reach contract, and whether the trade target is pursued in sectors outside the commodity group that currently dominates the exchange.

    Back2Basics: Society of Indian Defence Manufacturers

    1. What it is: The apex industry body representing Indian defence manufacturers, which acts as the single interface between the domestic defence industry and the Ministry of Defence.
    2. Origin: It was set up in 2017, promoted by the Confederation of Indian Industry.
    3. Membership: It spans defence public sector undertakings, large private manufacturers and micro, small and medium enterprises in the defence supply chain.
    4. What it does: It signs cooperation agreements with counterpart industry associations abroad, and represents industry positions on procurement policy and indigenisation.

    [2023, GS2, 15 marks] ‘The expansion and strengthening of NATO and a stronger US-Europe strategic partnership works well in India.’ What is your opinion about this statement? Give reasons and examples to support your answer.

  • India joins the 26th SCO Summit in Bishkek

    India joins the 26th SCO Summit in Bishkek

    Why in the News

    The Prime Minister participated in the 26th Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) Heads of State Summit in Bishkek, Kyrgyz Republic, on 1 September 2026.

    Core Facts

    1. Host: The Kyrgyz Republic hosted the summit at Bishkek, and it holds the rotating SCO chair for the 2025 to 2026 cycle.
    2. India’s status: India is a full member of the SCO.
    3. Focus areas: The SCO works on regional security, counter terrorism, and connectivity.

    Static Context

    1. Founding: The Shanghai Cooperation Organisation, a permanent intergovernmental security and economic bloc, was founded in 2001 at Shanghai, growing from the Shanghai Five grouping of 1996.
    2. Members: Members include China, Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, India, Pakistan, Iran and Belarus.
    3. India’s accession: India became a full member in 2017 at the Astana Summit.
    4. Institutions: The Secretariat is in Beijing, and the Regional Anti Terrorist Structure (RATS), the SCO body for security and counter terrorism coordination, is in Tashkent.

    Prelims Angle

    1. SCO founding year is 2001, the RATS headquarters is at Tashkent and the Secretariat is at Beijing.
    2. India joined as a full member in 2017.
    3. Membership of the SCO versus other bodies is a classic trap.

    Mains Angle

    1. GS2, groupings and agreements affecting India’s interests: A question can ask how India balances its role in the SCO amid China and Russia dominance.
    2. The functional side: It can probe counter terrorism cooperation and connectivity.

    “[2022] Consider the following :

    1. Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank

    2. Missile Technology Control Regime

    3. Shanghai Cooperation Organisation

    India is a member of which of the above ?

    (a) 1 and 2 only

    (b) 3 only

    (c) 2 and 3 only

    (d) 1, 2 and 3

  • ‘Bihar’s concerns on Ganga treaty will be considered’

    ‘Bihar’s concerns on Ganga treaty will be considered’

    Why in the News

    The External Affairs Minister has written that India will decide on the renewal of the Ganga Water Treaty, 1996 with Bangladesh while keeping Bihar’s interests in consideration. The letter answers a Janata Dal (United) Member of Parliament, a former Bihar Water Resources Minister, who had called on the government not to renew the treaty on the ground that it had negatively impacted the State. The treaty expires on 31 December 2026, and its renewal is one of the major items on this year’s diplomatic calendar for the two countries. The tension is that a bilateral instrument negotiated as a foreign policy commitment is now being contested by the riparian State that says it carries the domestic cost of that commitment.

    What is the India-Bangladesh Ganga Water Treaty, 1996?

    1. What it does: It governs the sharing of Ganga waters between India and Bangladesh at the Farakka Barrage in West Bengal during the dry season, from 1 January to 31 May each year, when flows are lowest and competition for water is sharpest.
    2. How the sharing works: Availability at Farakka is measured in ten day cycles, and the water is divided between the two countries according to a formula fixed to the flow observed in that cycle rather than to a fixed annual quantity.
    3. Its term and oversight: The treaty was signed for 30 years, and a Joint Committee of officials from both countries observes flows at Farakka and reports on implementation.

    What is Bihar’s objection to renewal?

    1. The State says the costs fall upstream: Maintaining the assured flow at Farakka is held to have contributed to silt accumulation upstream in Bihar’s stretch of the Ganga, raising the riverbed and worsening flooding.
    2. The demand is framed as an entitlement, not a concession: Bihar is described as asking only for what its own scientific assessment establishes, so that 13 crore people are not left short of water for drinking, irrigation and industrial supply for another 30 years.
    3. The characterisation of the original bargain: The treaty is described as a remnant of the Gujral Doctrine era, which projected a generous image of India in the neighbourhood without serving Bihar’s interests.
    4. The demand itself: Reading the data across the treaty’s 30 years, the State’s position is that India should allow the treaty to lapse rather than renew it.

    How does the Centre say the decision will be taken?

    1. The process is inter ministerial, not purely diplomatic: Consultations involving relevant stakeholders have been held under the leadership of the Ministry of Jal Shakti to ensure broad based consultation on the future of the treaty.
    2. Bihar was represented in them: An authorised representative of the Government of Bihar participated in consultations held on 22 August 2023, 30 October 2023, 15 March 2024 and 31 May 2024.
    3. No decision has been announced: The stated position is that the government will take the appropriate decision while keeping these factors in focus.

    Why does the renewal question arrive at a difficult bilateral moment?

    1. Political contact between the two governments has thinned: The renewal is in focus partly because top level political meetings between India and Bangladesh have not been taking place.
    2. A planned visit collapsed: Talks for a New Delhi visit by Bangladesh’s Prime Minister broke down over a virtual press conference given in New Delhi by the deposed former Prime Minister of Bangladesh.
    3. The clock is fixed while the diplomacy is not: The expiry date is unaffected by the state of political contact, so the negotiating window narrows regardless of whether high level engagement resumes.

    Challenges to renewing the Ganga Water Treaty

    1. The treaty measures flow but does not allocate sediment: A water sharing formula fixed to discharge at a barrage says nothing about the silt that the same regime deposits upstream. Eg. Bihar’s objection turns on riverbed aggradation upstream of Farakka rather than on the volume of water it receives.
      The Fix: Add a sediment management protocol to the renewed instrument, with joint measurement of bed levels upstream and downstream of the barrage.
    2. A riparian State bears the cost of a Union treaty with no channel to price it: Foreign affairs is a Union subject while water is a State subject, so the State that absorbs the consequence has no formal standing in the negotiation. Eg. Bihar’s participation here was through inter ministerial consultations, which are advisory and produce no binding record of its position.
      The Fix: Institutionalise a standing riparian States consultation under the Ministry of Jal Shakti for every transboundary river negotiation, with its recommendations placed on record before signature.
    3. The lean season formula does not survive a drying trend: A sharing arrangement written around observed historical flows becomes unworkable when the flows themselves decline. Eg. Reduced Himalayan glacier melt contribution and increased upstream withdrawal both cut dry season discharge in the Ganga basin.
      The Fix: Build a variable review clause into the renewed treaty, triggering renegotiation when measured dry season flow falls below a defined threshold for consecutive years.
    4. The basin is shared by more than two countries: Bilateral treaties on a river rising in Nepal and China cannot govern the augmentation that would actually solve the shortage. Eg. Proposals to augment lean season Ganga flow depend on storage in Nepal, which is not a party to this treaty.
      The Fix: Pursue a basin level arrangement in parallel, beginning with data sharing and joint storage feasibility studies with Nepal.
    5. Non renewal is not a costless option: Allowing the treaty to lapse removes the only agreed mechanism regulating dry season flows and hands the issue to unilateral action. Eg. The pre 1996 period saw recurring disputes over Farakka withdrawals with no settled sharing formula.
      The Fix: Treat renegotiation on revised terms, rather than lapse, as the fallback position, so the sharing mechanism survives while the formula changes.

    Conclusion

    The dispute is not really about whether the treaty is renewed. It is about the absence of a mechanism to price a domestic cost inside a foreign policy decision. A State that carries the physical consequence of a river agreement participates only through consultations that leave no binding record of what it asked for and no obligation to answer it. What to watch is whether the scientific assessment Bihar rests its case on is placed on the record of the negotiation, since a claim that is never formally examined cannot be formally rejected either.

    [2026, GS1, 10 marks] “Water resources are both an asset and a source of conflict in South Asia.” Examine this statement giving examples.”

  • [3rd September 2026] The Hindu OpED: Reducing India’s exposure to U.S. tariff risks

    [3rd September 2026] The Hindu OpED: Reducing India’s exposure to U.S. tariff risks

    Question (2025 – GS2): “Energy security constitutes the dominant kingpin of India’s foreign policy, and is linked with India’s overarching influence in Middle Eastern countries.” How would you integrate energy security with India’s foreign policy trajectories in the coming years?
    Linkage: This question directly addresses the concept of energy security as a “kingpin” of foreign policy. The U.S. sanctions act forces India to navigate its sovereign energy import strategy (specifically from Russia) while attempting to shield its vital foreign policy trajectories and trade arrangements with Western partners from massive tariff penalties.

    Mentor comment

    The U.S. Senate has passed the Lindsey O. Graham Sanctioning Russia and Iran Act of 2026, authorising tariffs of up to 100% on countries among the top five importers of Russian crude or gas. Combined with existing forced-labour tariffs, India’s cumulative U.S. tariff exposure could reach 110%. The Act exposes a conflict between India’s energy security strategy and its trade relationship with the United States.

    Why has Russian crude become a trade exposure rather than an energy choice?

    1. Diversification of supply produced concentration of risk: India moved towards Russian crude to reduce its import bill and gain room to manoeuvre amid global uncertainty, and that single decision now determines its tariff status in an unrelated market.
    2. The volumes are still rising: Imports nearly doubled within 2026, from 4.54 million metric tonnes (MMT) in January to 8.96 MMT in May.
    3. The cost is diplomatic before it is fiscal: Securing the supply has complicated the management of ties with the United States, which seeks to discourage these purchases, and the Russia sanctions legislation is the formal expression of that pressure.

    How does India’s cumulative tariff reach 110 per cent?

    1. A tariff was already imposed before this Bill: The United States applied forced labour tariffs on 60 countries, including India, under Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974, adding a 10% tariff on India in place of an expired 10% duty levied under Section 122.
    2. The sanctions provision stacks on top: If the Russia sanctions legislation becomes law, the additional 100% authorisation takes India’s cumulative tariff to 110%, among the highest applied to any country.
    3. The comparator is also India’s competitor: China’s cumulative tariff would reach 112.5%, since both countries are major importers of Russian crude, so relative price competitiveness in the United States market shifts less than the absolute number suggests.

    What does a tariff confrontation cost the Indian economy?

    1. The method: Two global trade simulations were run using the Global Trade Analysis Project (GTAP) dataset and model, a general equilibrium framework that traces how a tariff shock in one market propagates through production, demand and trade flows in every other.
    2. The sanction scenario: Modelling a 110% United States tariff on India, with other countries facing forced labour tariffs and China facing 112.5%, India’s welfare declines by nearly $47 billion, and gross domestic product, output, domestic demand, exports and imports all contract.
    3. The trade contraction is the largest single effect: Aggregate exports fall by 5.1% and imports by 5.2%, reflecting disrupted trade flows and weaker economic activity. A prolonged tariff confrontation imposes substantial costs on India’s growth and trade performance.

    Does export diversification offset the shock?

    1. The second scenario changes only the destination mix: The same tariff environment was modelled alongside export diversification, proxied by a full India-European Union free trade agreement.
    2. The direction of the result reverses: Welfare improves by $26.3 billion, gross domestic product turns positive, and sectoral output and domestic demand recover by around 1%.
    3. Trade integration replaces the lost market: Aggregate exports rise by 3.1% and imports by a moderate 2.6%, indicating stronger production and deeper integration with alternative markets.
    4. The policy implication is separable from the oil question: Even if India continues procuring Russian crude for energy security, the adverse effects of the tariffs are mitigated to a large extent by diversifying where it exports.

    Why is diversification not a sufficient answer on its own?

    1. It depends on demand India does not control: Diversification works only to the extent that other markets can absorb additional Indian exports, and without adequate external demand it remains limited on paper.
    2. The United States cannot be written off: It remains one of India’s largest export destinations, so diversification is an addition to that market rather than a replacement for it.
    3. Domestic constraints cap the gain: Trade facilitation delays, non tariff barriers, weak logistics and standards, and a product mix concentrated in lower value goods all limit how much of a new market India can actually capture.

    Challenges to export diversification as a response to tariff risk

    1. A free trade agreement is not the same as realised exports: Tariff concessions deliver nothing where Indian exporters cannot meet the destination market’s standards and compliance requirements. Eg. Indian shrimp and spice consignments have faced repeated European Union border rejections over antibiotic and pesticide residue limits.
      The Fix: Fund accredited testing and certification laboratories at export clusters, so conformity assessment happens before shipment rather than at the importing port.
    2. Rules of origin can neutralise a preference: A partner country can grant duty free access and still block goods that use imported inputs beyond a stated value addition threshold. Eg. Indian electronics assembly relies heavily on imported components, which restricts qualification under strict origin rules.
      The Fix: Negotiate cumulation provisions that count inputs sourced from other partner economies towards the value addition requirement.
    3. Logistics cost erodes the tariff advantage: Higher freight and dwell times offset the duty saved when the alternative market is farther away than the one being replaced. Eg. Container dwell time and inland haulage costs remain a recognised drag on the delivered price of Indian goods.
      The Fix: Sequence dedicated freight corridor and port connectivity completion against the entry into force dates of the trade agreements being signed.
    4. Concentration simply moves rather than disappears: Replacing dependence on one large market with dependence on one large agreement reproduces the same vulnerability under a different flag. Eg. The exposure being addressed here arose precisely because a single destination carried a disproportionate share of Indian exports.
      The Fix: Set a ceiling share for any single destination in the export promotion strategy, and target Africa, Latin America and West Asia alongside the European Union.

    Conclusion

    The finding that matters here is that the loss is a function of market concentration rather than of the tariff itself. That reframes the policy problem: the question is not how to make the tariff go away, but how to make the destination mix wide enough that a tariff in any one market cannot set the direction of the whole economy. Trade agreements deliver that only when the supply side can use them, which means testing and certification capacity, faster clearance, and movement up the goods quality ladder have to be built before the agreements enter into force rather than after. The measure of success is not the number of agreements signed but the share of exports the largest single destination accounts for.

    About India-United States Trade and Investment Ties

    1. Scale of the relationship: Bilateral trade between the two countries stood at $149.84 billion in 2025-26.
    2. India runs a surplus, and it is narrowing: India’s trade surplus with the United States narrowed to $34.4 billion in 2025-26 from $40.89 billion in the previous financial year.
    3. Investment flows both ways: The United States is the third largest investor in India, with cumulative foreign direct investment inflows of $70.65 billion between 2000 and 2025.
    4. Indian capital in the United States: About 163 Indian companies operating there have created over $40 billion in tangible investments.

    Challenges in India-United States Relations

    1. Preferential access has already been withdrawn once: Trade concessions granted unilaterally can be revoked without negotiation, which makes them an unreliable base for export planning. Eg. The United States revoked India’s benefits under the Generalized System of Preferences in 2019, citing a lack of equitable access.
      The Fix: Convert the interim trade arrangement into a binding bilateral trade agreement, so market access rests on treaty commitment rather than on unilateral grant.
    2. Digital and data rules pull in opposite directions: Indian data localisation requirements conflict with the operating models of United States technology firms. Eg. The Digital Personal Data Protection Act, 2023 and its rules govern cross border transfer of personal data on terms those firms have contested.
      The Fix: Negotiate an adequacy style mutual recognition arrangement covering data transfer, so compliance is assessed once rather than jurisdiction by jurisdiction.
    3. Intellectual property standards remain contested: India is placed on the United States Priority Watch List for what is described as weak patent protection in pharmaceuticals. Eg. The dispute centres on Section 3(d) of the Patents Act, 1970, which bars patents on new forms of known substances without enhanced efficacy.
      The Fix: Run a standing bilateral working group on patent examination practice, so the disagreement is litigated technically rather than through annual watch list designations.
    4. Mobility restrictions hit India’s largest services export: Immigration and visa restrictions raise the cost of the delivery model on which Indian information technology services depend. Eg. A $100,000 fee on H-1B petitions materially changes the economics of onsite deployment.
      The Fix: Conclude a social security totalisation agreement and push services mobility commitments into the trade negotiation rather than treating them as an immigration matter.

    Back2Basics: Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974

    1. What it is: A provision of United States trade law that allows the United States Trade Representative to act against a foreign country’s acts, policies or practices that are found to be unjustifiable or unreasonable and to burden United States commerce.
    2. What action it permits: It authorises retaliatory measures, including additional duties on imports from the country concerned, without requiring a prior finding by any multilateral body.
    3. Why it is contentious: Unilateral retaliation under it sits uneasily with the World Trade Organization dispute settlement system, which requires disputes to be adjudicated before countermeasures are applied.
    4. How India has encountered it: India has been the subject of Section 301 action before, including the investigation into its equalisation levy on digital services.
  • ‘Early Harvest’ — larger but not necessarily safer

    ‘Early Harvest’ — larger but not necessarily safer

    Why in the News

    India and China have revived the formulation of an “Early and Substantial Harvest” on the boundary question in a joint document. The 25th round of talks between the Special Representatives (SRs), the designated political channel for the India-China boundary question, was held in Beijing. The readouts issued that evening avoided the phrase. An “Eight Points of Outcomes and Consensus” released a day later restored it. Point 3 tasked the Expert Group on Boundary Delimitation and the Working Group on Border Management with advancing discussions on an Early and Substantial Harvest of boundary delimitation and border management. Both bodies were set up a year ago under the Working Mechanism for Consultation and Coordination (WMCC), the official level channel that manages border affairs between the two foreign ministries, and their first task is still to agree on their own terms of reference. The phrase is India’s own coinage, and its reappearance does not establish that Beijing has accepted the Indian version of it rather than a partial settlement confined to the stretches where the two claims already coincide.

    What is an “Early and Substantial Harvest”?

    1. A partial settlement taken ahead of a full one: It settles the boundary in the sectors where the two positions are closest, and leaves the harder sectors for later negotiation.
    2. India’s own formulation: After Beijing proposed settling the Sikkim Sector alone, India responded around 2019 with a counter proposal covering the Sikkim Sector together with the entire Middle Sector, with the boundary delineated along the watershed. China rejected it.
    3. The version China was willing to take: In later discussions Beijing agreed to include the Sikkim Sector and some undisputed areas of the Middle Sector only, which India found unacceptable.

    Why does a sector by sector settlement cut against India’s negotiating position?

    1. Beijing accepting India’s terms would be expensive for it: The Indian formulation requires China to give up its claim to roughly 2,450 square kilometres in the Middle Sector, all of it south of the watershed boundary, covering Barahoti, Giu-Kaurik, Nilang-Jadhang, Sangcha Malla and Lapthal.
    2. The likelier outcome is an “agreement with holes”: A settlement can nominally cover both sectors while being confined to stretches where the claims already coincide, leaving the trijunctions and the contested pockets of the Middle Sector undefined.
    3. The asymmetry runs one way: India concedes ground where its own position is strong, with no movement in the Eastern and Western Sectors, where Beijing holds to “dong tiao xi rang”, meaning meaningful adjustments by India in the East and corresponding concessions by China in the West.
    4. It abandons the package principle: Article III of the Agreement on Political Parameters and Guiding Principles for the Settlement of the India-China Boundary Question, 2005 calls for a package settlement covering all sectors, precisely because the four sectors are strategically interlinked and require cross sector give and take.

    Is the Sikkim Sector the settled case it is presented as?

    1. The agreed basis is internally contradictory: Both sides accept the Anglo-Chinese Convention of 1890 as the basis of the alignment. Article I of that Convention makes the watershed crest the boundary in its first sentence, then names Mount Gipmochi as the starting point on the Bhutan frontier in its second.
    2. The map record favours the watershed reading: British Indian maps of 1907 and 1913 placed the trijunction not at Gipmochi but roughly 6.5 kilometres to its north, on the true watershed crest.
    3. The two readings point to different trijunctions: India and Bhutan treat the watershed principle as controlling and place the trijunction at Batang La. China uses the literal reference to Gipmochi to push the trijunction south, onto the Jampheri Ridge.
    4. Silence would be read as concession: A Sikkim delimitation built on the 1890 text, unless it expressly repudiates Gipmochi, would be read in Beijing as India conceding the southern trijunction.

    What would a Sikkim settlement do to Bhutan and to the Siliguri Corridor?

    1. India loses the standing to counsel Bhutan: Even a settlement that reserves the trijunction leaves India having settled out of turn nearby, which weakens its case against a bilateral Bhutan China deal.
    2. China’s standing offer to Bhutan gains momentum: Beijing’s package proposal would relinquish about 495 sq km of its claims in northern Bhutan in exchange for Bhutan ceding about 269 sq km in the northwest, including the Doklam Plateau.
    3. The strategic consequence is a line of sight: That exchange deepens China’s presence in the Chumbi Valley and opens a path to the Jampheri Ridge, from which the entire Siliguri Corridor, India’s sole overland link to its northeastern States, comes under direct observation.
    4. The ground has already shifted: Since the 2017 Doklam standoff China has spent years building roads, villages and military facilities across western Bhutan, and has gained de facto control over Doklam.

    What would a genuine Early and Substantial Harvest require?

    1. Delineation on the highest watershed principle: The principle must apply across the entire stretch in both sectors, not selectively along the segments where the two positions already converge, since selective delineation serves no Indian purpose.
    2. Trijunctions kept out of the mandate: Batang La and any comparable point adjacent to a third country in the Middle Sector must be explicitly excluded from the Expert Group’s mandate and settled only in consultation with the country concerned, as the 2012 Common Understanding between the two SRs stipulates.
    3. Terms of reference that extend the Indian proposal: The mandate must carry the 2019 proposal forward in good faith rather than dilute it beyond recognition. Without acceptance of the highest watershed principle, silence on the trijunction is filled on the ground in Beijing’s favour in Bhutan.

    What do the Eight Points leave unanswered?

    1. Package and piecemeal have not been reconciled: The Chinese readout reiterates a commitment to a package settlement, and no explanation has been offered for how that sits with a sector by sector approach.
    2. An Expert Group has been created without a framework: Article X of the 2005 Agreement requires the SRs to arrive at an agreed framework for a boundary settlement, which is then to provide the basis for delineation and demarcation by officials and surveyors of the two sides. No agreed framework exists yet.
    3. The operative word is not in the treaty: The 2005 Agreement does not use the term “delimitation” at all, and Chinese usage treats delimitation and demarcation as interchangeable. The open question is whether the SRs will pursue the agreed framework or leave it in abeyance while officials run a partial delimitation without one.

    What else did the Eight Points carry, and what did they leave out?

    1. Incremental measures that belong to a separate track: Additional meeting points and hotlines for the General Level Mechanisms in the Eastern and Middle Sectors, continued pilgrimage and border trade, and a September meeting on trans border rivers are confidence building measures, not boundary settlement, and conflating the two in public discussion overstates the progress.
    2. Silence on the upstream dam: The document says nothing about the Medog County project on the Yarlung Tsangpo River. It records only that both sides will maintain communication on trans border river issues, including hydrological data sharing and renewal of the relevant memoranda of understanding, with no progress reported.
    3. The risk the September meeting has to raise: The project is the world’s largest hydropower plant, is being built close to the border in the Eastern Sector, and sits in a highly earthquake prone zone. Eg. The flash floods in Nepal on 26 August underscored what failure in such terrain does downstream.
    4. The 2005 Agreement is the only substantive result of the process: Twenty three years of SR talks have produced that one instrument, and China has sought to reinterpret and undermine it since its conclusion.

    Challenges to an “Early and Substantial Harvest” settlement

    1. Nothing binds a partial settlement to the completion of the rest: A sector closed early removes the negotiating currency that was meant to buy movement elsewhere. Eg. The 1993 and 1996 agreements on peace and tranquillity along the Line of Actual Control did not prevent the 2020 standoff in eastern Ladakh.
      The Fix: Write a linkage clause into the terms of reference making entry into force of any sectoral delimitation conditional on an agreed framework for the remaining sectors.
    2. Delimitation on paper is not demarcation on the ground: A settled alignment still has to be surveyed and pillared across high altitude terrain where the two sides use different survey baselines. Eg. Friction points such as the Depsang Plains and Charding Ninglung Nala remain unresolved even after disengagement in eastern Ladakh.
      The Fix: Constitute joint survey teams on an agreed geodetic datum before any delimitation text is initialled.
    3. Infrastructure asymmetry keeps building while talks continue: Negotiation does not freeze construction, so the ground position moves during the negotiation itself. Eg. China’s dual use border villages along the Line of Actual Control settle civilians in disputed pockets and create a permanent presence.
      The Fix: Tie each stage of the Expert Group’s work to verified parity in border infrastructure and force levels, reported to the WMCC.
    4. No domestic ratification route exists for a territorial settlement: A boundary agreement alters the territory of the Union without any settled parliamentary process to approve it. Eg. Transferring enclaves under the 2015 Land Boundary Agreement with Bangladesh required the 100th Constitutional Amendment.
      The Fix: Commit in advance to placing any boundary settlement before Parliament, so the negotiating mandate carries domestic legitimacy rather than acquiring it afterwards.

    Conclusion

    India’s boundary diplomacy now carries two objectives that do not sit together. One is to demonstrate movement after a long period without any. The other is to keep every sector on the table, so that a concession in one can be paid for in another. A settlement that closes the ground where India’s case is strongest, while the Eastern and Western Sectors stay frozen on Beijing’s terms, satisfies the first and forfeits the second. What to watch is whether the negotiating mandate now being drafted is narrow enough to keep third country trijunctions outside it, because silence on a trijunction is settled on the ground rather than at the table.

    About the India-China Boundary Question

    1. An undefined line, not a boundary: The Line of Actual Control (LAC) runs about 3,488 km and has never been mutually delineated or demarcated, which is why patrolling patterns rather than an agreed line determine where standoffs occur.
    2. Western Sector: India relies on the Johnson Line of 1865 while China claims the Macartney-MacDonald Line of 1899. China occupies about 38,000 sq km of Aksai Chin.
    3. Eastern Sector: The alignment follows the McMahon Line drawn at the Simla Convention of 1914. China claims about 90,000 sq km of Arunachal Pradesh as “South Tibet”.
    4. The first framework instrument: The Agreement on the Maintenance of Peace and Tranquillity along the Line of Actual Control, 1993 committed both sides to resolve the question peacefully and to keep forces to a minimum along the line.

    Challenges in India-China Relations

    1. A structurally lopsided trade relationship: India’s trade deficit with China reached an all time high of $112.16 billion in March 2026, which limits how much economic leverage India can apply in a political dispute. Eg. 98.5% of Indian imports from China are industrial goods, so a supply disruption transmits straight into Indian manufacturing.
      The Fix: Tie production linked incentive disbursement in electronics, pharmaceutical intermediates and capital goods to verified reduction in single source imports.
    2. Market access is not reciprocal: Indian information technology and pharmaceutical firms face opaque non tariff barriers in the Chinese market while Chinese goods enter India freely. Eg. Indian generic drug approvals in China have moved slowly despite India being the largest supplier of generics globally.
      The Fix: Make market access parity a stated precondition in every sectoral dialogue, with a published register of pending Indian applications in China.
    3. Beijing blocks India’s multilateral advancement: China withholds consensus on India’s entry to the Nuclear Suppliers Group and opposes a permanent seat for India on the United Nations Security Council. Eg. It repeatedly placed technical holds on listing Pakistan based terrorists at the UN, delaying the designation of Masood Azhar until 2019.
      The Fix: Build the plurilateral route instead, converting Quad, Indo Pacific and export control group partnerships into standing sponsorship of India’s candidature.
    4. The China Pakistan axis converts a bilateral dispute into a two front problem: The China Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), a corridor of about $62 billion linking Kashgar to Gwadar, passes through territory India claims. Eg. It runs through Gilgit Baltistan, which is why India has formally protested the corridor’s alignment.
      The Fix: Sustain the two front capability build up through the Vibrant Villages Programme and border road completion, rather than treating the western and northern borders as separate planning theatres.

    [2026, GS2, 15 marks] “China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) has transformed South Asia from a regional space into a theatre of great power competition.” Analyse the strategic implications of the BRI for India’s security and regional influence in South Asia.”

  • Chinese overcapacity is a problem for the world

    Chinese overcapacity is a problem for the world

    Why in the News

    Chinese manufacturing overcapacity is being framed as a global structural challenge rather than a bilateral trade irritant. China is the world’s largest trade surplus economy, with a surplus valued at $1.2 trillion, and accounts for roughly 30 per cent of global manufacturing output. Cheap Chinese supply lowers input and consumer prices everywhere it lands. The same supply also removes the space in which importing economies would build their own manufacturing capability. What is contested is whether import dependence on the world’s most competitive producer thwarts capability building and upgradation in manufacturing value chains.

    What is Chinese overcapacity?

    1. Capacity built beyond profitable demand: Chinese industry carries production capacity well past what commercial returns justify, sustained by state support rather than by market profitability.
    2. The subsidy and credit mechanism: State backed industrial subsidies and a state directed financial system supplying cheap credit allow firms to expand without being concerned about profits and returns against their international competitors.
    3. How it shows up in prices: Firms operating on razor thin or negative margins run zero sum price wars at home and abroad to expand market share, producing a self defeating race to the bottom.

    How did China build an “absolute advantage” in manufacturing?

    1. The advantage is not price alone: China’s success reflects scale, supplier networks, infrastructure, technological capabilities and state supported industrial ecosystems, not only low cost production.
    2. Breadth of the product range: The same base manufactures textiles, machinery, electronics, solar photovoltaic (solar PV) modules, batteries and electric vehicles (EVs) at competitive prices.

    What does China’s low cost supply give the rest of the world?

    1. Gains accrue to rich and poor economies alike: China’s rise has produced significant economic gains for both developed and developing countries.
    2. Cheaper inputs, not only cheaper consumption: Low cost Chinese goods reduce the prices of consumer goods, machinery, clean technology products and intermediate inputs.
    3. A development effect: Those cheaper inputs support industrial transformation and infrastructure development in developing economies.

    Why does the same cheap supply weaken manufacturing in developing countries?

    1. Asymmetric competitive pressure: Producers in developing countries face difficulty competing with Chinese producers, creating what is termed a “late industrialisation dilemma”.
    2. Upstream capability erodes: The pressure gradually weakens both the incentives and the capabilities to foster domestic upstream industries.
    3. The question is dependence, not efficiency: The issue is not whether Chinese imports are efficient and competitive, but whether import dependence blocks capability building and upgradation in manufacturing value chains.

    How is China’s dominance reshaping global value chains?

    1. Control of critical nodes: In the EV sector China controls 65 per cent of lithium refining, 70 per cent of cobalt refining and over 80 per cent of battery manufacturing.
    2. A position across multiple stages: China occupies a dominant and critical position across multiple stages of manufacturing value chain networks, which is transforming the geography of those networks.
    3. The paradox of dominance: The most competitive supplier in the system is also the source of strategic vulnerability for every country that relies excessively on a single supplier.

    What does Chinese overcapacity mean for India’s self reliance?

    1. Import concentration: China accounts for roughly 17 per cent of India’s imports, with dependence concentrated in solar PV modules, telecom components, electronics and active pharmaceutical ingredients (APIs).
    2. The MSME layer takes the hit: Chinese imports have affected micro, small and medium enterprise (MSME) led domestic manufacturing, undermining India’s manufacturing imperatives.
    3. A component bottleneck: India’s electronics industry faces a shortage of printed circuit boards because of geopolitical headwinds and supply chain impediments, which affects downstream manufacturing.
    4. The pincer dilemma: Chinese export curbs could restrict India’s access to key inputs such as solar wafers, cells and batteries. India’s Production Linked Incentive (PLI) scheme for solar and EVs is at the same time challenged at the World Trade Organization (WTO) for violating local content rules.

    Challenges to rebalancing Chinese overcapacity

    1. No effective multilateral discipline on industrial subsidies: Trade rules reach export and local content subsidies, and reach unreported state support and cheap state bank credit only weakly. Eg. China’s subsidy notifications to the WTO have been repeatedly counter notified as incomplete by the United States, the European Union and Japan.
      The Fix: Negotiate a subsidy transparency code with automatic counter notification, so unreported support carries a rebuttable presumption of injury.
    2. Rebalancing depends on Chinese household demand, which stays weak: Household consumption remains under 40 per cent of Chinese output, so domestic absorption cannot take the place of exports. Eg. The property sector downturn after 2021 cut household wealth and pushed precautionary saving higher.
      The Fix: Tie any coordinated adjustment to verifiable social security and household income targets rather than to currency movement alone.
    3. Tariffs shift trade rather than retire capacity: Duties raise the price of arriving goods and leave the surplus plants that produced them in operation. Eg. Duties on Chinese solar cells were followed by assembly routed through Southeast Asia, later covered by circumvention findings.
      The Fix: Pair every trade remedy with rules of origin and value addition thresholds, so relief is not defeated by transshipment.
    4. Alternative suppliers do not exist at the required scale: Refining and processing capacity outside China takes years to build even where the ore is available. Eg. Indonesia’s nickel processing expansion was itself built largely with Chinese capital and technology.
      The Fix: Fund refining and processing capacity through pooled offtake guarantees among importing countries rather than through single country subsidies.
    5. No forum acts on the surplus itself: Existing instruments discipline individual programmes and individual shipments, not aggregate industrial capacity. Eg. WTO subsidy disputes are brought against named schemes one at a time.
      The Fix: Open a global dialogue on gradually rebalancing the Chinese economy in partnership with the United States and other major economies, on the pattern of the 1985 Plaza Accord.

    Conclusion

    The argument over Chinese overcapacity is not an argument about efficiency. Cheap supply and domestic capability building pull against each other, and no importing economy has yet found a way to hold both. The unresolved question is whether a surplus economy will accept an adjustment that no external rule obliges it to accept.

    What is Global Trade Governance?

    1. About: Global trade governance is the body of rules framing trade between nations, administered mainly through the World Trade Organization, founded in 1995 as successor to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT).
    2. Membership: The WTO has 166 members covering over 98 per cent of world trade.
    3. Rationale: The system exists to make market access predictable and to lower barriers. Average industrial tariffs fell from around 40 per cent in 1947 to about 4 per cent today.
    4. Core principles: Most Favoured Nation treatment requires favourable terms offered to one member to extend to all, and National Treatment bars discrimination against imported goods once they enter a market.

    Laws and Rules Governing Global Trade Governance

    1. Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, 1995: Classifies subsidies and permits an affected member to impose countervailing duties where a subsidised import causes injury.
    2. Agreement on Trade Related Investment Measures, 1995: Prohibits investment conditions that discriminate against imports, including local content requirements.
    3. Customs Tariff Act, 1975: Sections 9 and 9A give India its statutory power to levy countervailing and anti dumping duties.
    4. Foreign Trade (Development and Regulation) Act, 1992: Provides the legal basis for India’s import and export policy and for the Director General of Foreign Trade.

    Challenges in Global Trade Governance

    1. The dispute settlement tier is paralysed: Appeals cannot be heard, so a losing member can appeal into a void and avoid compliance. Eg. The Appellate Body has been non functional since December 2019 after appointments were blocked.
      The Fix: Restore an automatic and binding two tier dispute settlement system with appointments delinked from any single member’s consent.
    2. Unilateral measures bypass the rulebook: Members increasingly act outside the agreed remedy process, which removes the predictability the system was built to supply. Eg. Sweeping reciprocal tariffs imposed in 2025 were applied without recourse to WTO procedures.
      The Fix: Strengthen the organisation’s standing to act against politically motivated tariff action rather than leaving each dispute to bilateral settlement.
    3. The negotiating function has stalled: Multilateral talks have produced little since 2008, so the rulebook does not cover the trade that has grown since. Eg. The 2026 ministerial conference closed without an overall declaration and the electronic commerce duty moratorium lapsed.
      The Fix: Modernise the rules to cover electronic commerce, digital trade and cross border data flows, and consider majority voting for defined categories of agreement.

    Back2Basics: Plaza Accord

    1. What it was: An agreement reached in 1985 among the United States, Japan, West Germany, France and the United Kingdom to act jointly on exchange rates.
    2. What it did: The five agreed to intervene in currency markets to depreciate the US dollar against the Japanese yen and the Deutsche Mark.
    3. Why it is cited: It remains the standard example of major economies coordinating to correct a large trade imbalance rather than each acting through tariffs.

    “[2025, GS3, 10 marks] What are the challenges before the Indian economy when the world is moving away from free trade and multilateralism to protectionism and bilateralism? How can these challenges be met?”

  • At SCO, Modi seeks dismantling of terror infra as Pak’s Shehbaz listens

    At SCO, Modi seeks dismantling of terror infra as Pak’s Shehbaz listens

    Why in the News

    The Prime Minister told the leaders of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) (the ten member Eurasian security grouping that includes India, Pakistan, China, Russia and Iran) that the crisis in West Asia demonstrates that a conflict in one region does not remain confined there. He said it impacts global energy security, maritime trade and supply chains, and that the Global South bears the brunt of the consequences.

    Why did India put the West Asia war at the centre of its SCO message?

    1. Security has widened: In an interconnected world the scope of security has expanded significantly, so a regional war becomes an energy, shipping and supply chain problem for every member.
    2. The meeting with Iran: Iran’s President was among the leaders at the summit. The Prime Minister met him on Monday, their first meeting since the start of the war.

    What did India demand on terrorism, and what gives the demand its weight?

    1. Beyond action and reaction: With Pakistan’s Prime Minister listening, the Prime Minister said terrorism remains a grave challenge for all of humanity and that the fight cannot be limited to a mere “action-reaction” mindset.
    2. Dismantle the whole ecosystem: He called for dismantling the entire ecosystem of terror financing, recruitment, radicalisation and safe havens, and for members to speak in one voice that there is no room for double standards.
    3. Terrorism as state policy: Countries that use terrorism as an instrument of state policy and shelter terrorists must be sent a strong message that terrorism cannot be a strategic asset for anyone.
    4. The Operation Sindoor antecedent: In May 2025, days after the Pahalgam terror attack, India launched Operation Sindoor, striking terror targets in Pakistan-occupied Kashmir and Pakistan. Four days of hostilities followed and ended with Pakistan seeking a ceasefire.
    5. The Tianjin precedent: At the SCO summit in Tianjin on August 31 and September 1 last year, the Prime Minister called the Pahalgam attack the “most heinous face of terrorism” and an open challenge to every nation, and said double standards on terrorism are unacceptable.

    What are the three pillars India set out for the SCO’s next 25 years?

    1. The framework: India’s vision for the SCO rests on three pillars, S for Security, C for Connectivity and O for Opportunity. Over 25 years the grouping built a tradition of dialogue across Eurasia, and the goal for the next 25 is to translate that cooperation into tangible results.
    2. Security: This pillar is the terrorism agenda set out above, carried as a demand on the grouping rather than as a bilateral grievance.
    3. Connectivity: Its scope must expand beyond roads, railways and air corridors to simplifying customs procedures, promoting digital documentation and enhancing the efficiency of logistics networks.
    4. Opportunity: The benefits of cooperation must directly reach people, with people-to-people ties at the heart of the next 25 years. The yardstick of success is new opportunities for youth, new markets for entrepreneurs, farmers benefiting from technology and improvement in citizens’ lives.
    5. Shared geography: As the world navigates uncertainty and instability, the task is to transform shared geography into shared opportunities.

    Why is connectivity the pillar that divides the members?

    1. Sovereignty as the condition: India supports all initiatives that connect markets, facilitate trade and open growth avenues, on the condition that respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of all nations is paramount, which it described as the core spirit of the SCO Charter.
    2. The Iran route: India wants to access Central Asia through Iran, since Pakistan has denied India overland transit to the region.
    3. The corridor objection: The China-Pakistan Economic Corridor is an irritant for India because it runs through territory India claims and so violates its territorial integrity and sovereignty.

    What follows the summit?

    1. The Delhi BRICS summit: The Chinese President and the Russian President attended, and the Prime Minister met them informally during the leaders’ group photograph. Both are expected at the BRICS summit in New Delhi on September 12 and 13.
    2. A Pakistan-hosted summit: Pakistan hosts the next SCO summit in 2027, and India’s participation will be watched closely by members of the grouping.

    Conclusion

    India has made no double standards on terrorism the price of its engagement with the SCO. The grouping’s next chair is the country that demand is aimed at. Two dates now test the position: the BRICS summit in New Delhi on September 12 and 13, where the same Chinese and Russian leaders reconvene, and the next SCO summit under the Pakistani chair, where India must decide whether and at what level to attend.

    [2026] Which of the following countries are members of the European Union?

    1. Belarus

    2. Poland

    3. Germany

    4. Switzerland

    (a) 1, 2 and 4 (b) 1 and 4 only (c) 2 and 3 (d) 2 and 4 only