💥Join UPSC 2027,2028 Mentorship (July Batch) + XFactor Notes & Microthemes PDF
Talk to Mentor

Civilsdaily

Login

GS Paper: GS2-19.Effect of policies and politics of developed and developing countries on India’s interests, Indian diaspora.

  • Iran, U.S. warships engage in a tense encounter

    What happened

    • An American warship fired warning shots when vessels of Iran’s paramilitary Revolutionary Guard came too close to a patrol in the Persian Gulf.
    • Footage released on April 27 by the Navy showed a ship commanded by the Guard cut in front of the USCGC Monomoy.
    • The incidents at sea almost always involve the Revolutionary Guard, which reports only to Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei.

    Context of the nuclear deal

    • Some analysts believe the incidents are meant in part to squeeze President Hassan Rouhani’s administration after the 2015 nuclear deal.
    • The incident comes as Iran negotiates with world powers in Vienna over Tehran and Washington returning to the 2015 nuclear deal.
    • It also follows a series of incidents across the Mideast attributed to a shadow war between Iran and Israel, which includes attacks on regional shipping and sabotage at Iran’s Natanz nuclear facility.

  • An unquiet neighbourhood

    The article highlights the inherent difficulty in finding a solution to the two conflicts raging on in India’s neigbourhood.

    Tale of two conflicts in neighbourhood

    • Efforts to end two major conflicts in India’s neighbourhood have become intense.
    • To the west, a peace summit on Afghanistan, seeking to end decades of conflict there, was also scheduled to take place in Istanbul over the weekend.
    • To the east, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) has produced a diplomatic opening with Myanmar’s military leadership.
    • Afghan conflict go back to the late 1970s; since then we have seen different phases of the conflict.
    • Although the crisis in Myanmar appears recent, the tension between civil-military relations is not new.
    • Back in 1988, the army annulled the huge mandate won by Aung San Suu Kyi and unleashed massive repression.

    3 Common Themes in the effort at peace and reconciliation

    1) Ending violence

    • The first is about ending violence.
    • In Afghanistan it has been near impossible to get a resurgent Taliban to agree to stop its attacks on government forces or the civilian population.
    • The ASEAN initiative in Myanmar calls for an immediate cessation of violence and utmost restraint from all sides.
    • The opposition demanding restoration of democracy might find this rather ironic, since it is the army that is employing violence and has shown scant restraint.

    2) Dialogue among all parties

    • The second theme in the ASEAN initiative — “constructive dialogue among all parties” to “seek a peaceful solution” — is also common to all peace processes.
    • The Taliban found all kinds of excuses to delay a dialogue with the Kabul government that it always saw as illegitimate. So far, it has avoided one.
    • In Myanmar, the army might be ready to engage the opposition in a prolonged dialogue and defuse international pressure; but it will be hard for the victims of the coup to accept a dialogue on the army’s terms.

    3) Third-party mediator

    • The Afghan conflict has long been internationalised.
    • All major powers, including regional actors and neighbours, have acquired stakes in the way the Afghan conflict is resolved.
    •  This unfortunately makes the construction of an internal settlement that much harder.
    • In Myanmar, the ASEAN has set the ball rolling by agreeing that a special envoy will be traveling to the region and will engage with all parties to the conflict.

    Cost-benefit in diplomacy

    • The US is hoping that the Taliban will moderate some of its hardline positions given its need for significant international economic assistance for reconstruction, political legitimacy.
    • In Myanmar, too, the international community will hope the military would want to avoid the risks of political isolation and economic punishment.
    • But how the Taliban and the Myanmar army calculate these costs and benefits could be very different.
    • Both have long experience of surviving external pressure and enduring sanctions.

    Conclusion

    Few civil wars have seen the kind of massive external effort to change the internal dynamics as in Afghanistan; but to no avail. In Myanmar, it is not clear how far the international community might go. The prospects for positive change in Afghanistan and Myanmar, then, do not look too bright in the near term.

  • What the US’s recognition of killings of Armenians as genocide mean

    What is genocide

    • According to Article II of the UN Convention on Genocide of December 1948, genocide has been described as carrying out acts intended “to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnic, racial or religious group”.

    Why Armenians were targeted

    • In a way, the Armenians were victims of the great power contests of the late 19th and early 20th centuries.
    • The resentment started building up after the Russo-Turkish war of 1877-78 in which the Turks lost territories.
    • In the Treaty of Berlin, big powers dictated terms to the Ottomans, including putting pressure on Sultan Abdülhamid II to initiate reforms “in the provinces inhabited by Armenians, and to guarantee their security against the Circassians and Kurds.”
    • The Sultan saw this as a sign of strengthening ties between the Armenians and other rival countries, especially Russia.
    • Post the treaty, there were a series of attacks on Armenians by Turkish and Kurdish militias.
    • In 1908, the Young Turks wrested control from the Sultan and promised to restore imperial glory.
    • Under the Turks, the empire became more and “Turkik” and persecution against the ethnic minorities picked up.
    • In October 1914, Turkey joined the First World War on the side of Germany.
    • In the Caucasus, they fought the Russians, their primary geopolitical rival.
    • But the Ottomans suffered a catastrophic defeat in the Battle of Sarikamish by the Russians in January 1915.
    • The Turks blamed the defeat on Armenian “treachery”.

    How the killings took place

    • As the War was still waging, the Ottomans feared that Armenians in eastern Anatolia would join the Russians if they advanced into Ottoman territories.
    • First, Armenians in the Ottoman Army were executed.
    • On April 24, the Ottoman government arrested about 250 Armenian intellectuals and community leaders. Most of them were later executed.
    • The Ottoman government passed legislation to deport anyone who is a security risk.
    • Then they moved Armenians, including children, en masse to the Syrian Desert. That was a march of death.
    • Before the First World War broke out in 1914, there were 2 million Armenians in the Ottoman Empire.
    • According to a study by the University of Minnesota’s Center for Holocaust and Genocide Studies, in 1922, four years after the War, the Armenian population in the region was about 387,800.
    • This has led historians to believe that up to 1.5 million Armenians were killed during the course of the War.

    What is Turkey’s response

    • Turkey has acknowledged that atrocities were committed against Armenians, but denies it was a genocide which comes with legal implications.
    • Turkey also challenges the estimates that 1.5 million were killed.
    • The Turkish Foreign Ministry has issued a strong statement to Mr. Biden’s announcement saying it doesn’t not have “a scholarly and legal basis, nor is it supported by any evidence”.
    • Turkey has called on the U.S. President to correct the mistake of recognition as genocide.

  • India’s refugee Policy & Issues with it

    The article highlights the issue of the lack of refugee protection framework in India and suggests enacting domestic law to deal with the issue. 

    India’s record on refugee protection

    • India, for the most part, has had a stellar record on the issue of refugee protection.
    • But this moral tradition has come under great stress of late.
    • New Delhi has been one of the largest recipients of refugees in the world in spite of not being a party to the 1951 Refugee Convention and its 1967 Protocol.

    Confusion in policies for immigrants and refugees

    • Much of the debate in India is about illegal immigrants, not refugees, the two categories tend to get bunched together.
    • Our policies towards illegal immigrants and refugees is confused is because as per Indian law, both categories of people are viewed as one and the same and are covered under the Foreigners Act, 1946.
    • The act offers a simple definition of a foreigner — “foreigner” means “a person who is not a citizen of India”.
    • There are fundamental differences between illegal immigrants and refugees, but India is legally ill-equipped to deal with them separately due to a lack of legal provisions.
    • Also, India is not a party to the 1951 Refugee Convention and its 1967 Protocol, the key legal documents pertaining to refugee protection.

    How absence of policy framework creates problems

    • The absence of legal framework for refugees leads to policy ambiguity whereby India’s refugee policy is guided primarily by ad hocism and ‘political utility’.
    • At the same time, the absence of a legal framework increases the possibility of the domestic politicisation of refugee protection and complicates its geopolitical faultlines.
    • The absence of a clearly laid down refugee protection law also opens the door for geopolitical considerations while deciding to admit refugees or not.
    • For example, India’s decision in the recent case of admitting Myanmarese refugees fleeing to India was influence by the possibility of irking the Generals in Naypyitaw.
    • However, hypothetically speaking, if New Delhi had domestic legislation regarding refugees it could have tempered the expectations of the junta to return the fleeing Myanmarese.

    Why India has not signed convention and protocol on refugee protection

    • The definition of refugees in the 1951 convention only pertains to the violation of civil and political rights, but not economic rights, of individuals.
    • If the violation of economic rights were to be included in the definition of a refugee, it would clearly pose a major burden on the developed world.
    • This argument, if used in the South Asian context, could be a problematic proposition for India too.
    • India also need to argue that the North is violating the convention in both letter and spirit, and make its accession conditional on the Western States rolling back the non-entrée (no entry) regime.
    • The non-entrée regime is constituted by a range of legal and administrative measures that include visa restrictions, carrier sanctions, interdictions, third safe-country rule, restrictive interpretations of the definition of ‘refugee’, withdrawal of social welfare benefits to asylum seekers, and widespread practices of detention.”
    • In other words, India must use its exemplary, though less than perfect, history of refugee protection to begin a global conversation on the issue.

    Way forward

    • What other options do we have to respond to the refugee situation we are faced with?
    • The answer perhaps lies in a new domestic law aimed at refugees.
    • The CAA, however, is not the answer to this problem primarily because of its deeply discriminatory nature.
    • What is perhaps equally important is that such a domestic refugee law should allow for temporary shelter and work permit for refugees.
    • India must also make a distinction between temporary migrant workers, illegal immigrants and refugees and deal with each of them differently through proper legal and institutional mechanisms.

    Consider the question “What are the reasons for India’s not singing 1951 Refugee Convention? What are the options India can explore for refugee protection? 

    Conclusion

    Our traditional practice of managing these issues with ambiguity and political expediency has become deeply counterproductive: It neither protects the refugees nor helps stop illegal immigration into the country.

  • India & NATO

    India has jettisoned many of its foreing policy shibboleths of late, however, avoiding NATO is not one of them. The article suggests engaging NATO to be in sync with the changing geopolitics.

    Why India avoided engagement with NATO in the past

    • India’s real problem is not with NATO, but with Delhi’s difficulty in thinking strategically about Europe.
    • Through the colonial era, Calcutta and Delhi viewed Europe through British eyes.
    • After Independence, Delhi tended to see Europe through the Russian lens.
    • The fall of the Berlin Wall and the collapse of the Soviet Union demanded a fresh approach to Europe.
    • But Delhi could not devote the kind of strategic attention that Europe demanded.
    • The bureaucratisation of the engagement between Delhi and Brussels and the lack of high-level political interest prevented India from taking full advantage of a re-emerging Europe.
    • In the last few years, Delhi has begun to develop an independent European framework, but has some distance to go in consolidating it.

    Ending political neglect of Europe

    • India has certainly sought to end prolonged political neglect of Europe.
    • The deepening maritime partnership with France since 2018 is an example.
    • Joining the Franco-German Alliance for Multilateralism in 2019 is another.
    • India’s first summit with Nordic nations in 2018 was a recognition that Europe is not a monolith but a continent of sub-regions.
    • India’s engagement with Central Europe’s Visegrad Four also highlighted the fact that Europe is not monolith.

    Why India should engage NATO

    • During the Cold War, India’s refusal was premised on its non-alignment.
    • That argument had little justification once the Cold War ended during 1989-91.
    • An India-NATO dialogue would simply mean having regular contact with a military alliance, most of whose members are well-established partners of India.
    • If Delhi is eager to draw a reluctant Russia into discussions on the Indo-Pacific, it makes little sense in avoiding engagement with NATO.
    • If Delhi does military exercises with China and Pakistan — under the rubric of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO), why should talking to NATO be anathema?
    • To play any role in the Indo-Pacific, Europe and NATO need partners like India, Australia and Japan.
    • Delhi, in turn, knows that no single power can produce stability and security in the Indo-Pacific.
    • India’s enthusiasm for the Quad is a recognition of the need to build coalitions.
    • A sustained dialogue between India and NATO could facilitate productive exchanges in a range of areas, including terrorism, changing geopolitics; the evolving nature of military conflict, the role of emerging military technologies, and new military doctrines.
    • More broadly, an institutionalised engagement with NATO should make it easier for Delhi to deal with the military establishments of its 30 member states.
    • On a bilateral front, each of the members has much to offer in strengthening India’s national capabilities.

    What about Russia

    • Russia has not made a secret of its allergy to the Quad and Delhi’s growing closeness with Washington.
    • Putting NATO into that mix is unlikely to make much difference.
    • Delhi, in turn, can’t be happy with the deepening ties between Moscow and Beijing.
    • As mature states, India and Russia know they have to insulate their bilateral relationship from the larger structural trends buffeting the world today.
    • Meanwhile, both Russia and China have intensive bilateral engagement with Europe.

    Consider the question “India has to end its prolonged political neglect of Europe and engage a major European institution like NATO. In light of this, examine the factors restraining India’s engagement with the Europe.“

    Conclusion

    India’s continued reluctance to engage a major European institution like NATO will be a stunning case of strategic self-denial and we should avoid it.

  • Explained: The Cairn Tax Dispute

    In December 2020, a three-member tribunal at the Permanent Court of Arbitration in the Netherlands ruled against India in its long-running tax dispute with the U.K.-based oil and gas company Cairn Energy.

    PCA Ruling against India

    • The tribunal ordered India to pay about $1.4 billion to the company.
    • Following this, Cairn Energy has successfully moved courts in five countries, including the US and the UK to recognise its claim as per the arbitration award.
    • The Netherlands, France, and Canada are the other three countries.
    • Such recognition by courts opens the door for Cairn Energy to seize assets of the Indian government in these jurisdictions by way of enforcing its claim, in case the latter doesn’t pay its dues.

    What is the dispute about?

    • The dispute started in early 2014 when Indian tax authorities started questioning Cairn Energy requesting information on the group’s reorganization in the financial year 2006-07.

    Issue over the tax due

    • This escalated, and by 2015, the authorities had sent the company a draft assessment order, assessing in the process that there was a principal tax amount of $1.6 billion that was due.
    • The year in reference, 2006-07, was one in which big corporate changes and developments took place in Cairn Energy.

    Basis of the tax demand: Sale of Shares

    • It was the year in which it not only undertook a corporate reorganization but also floated an Indian subsidiary, Cairn India, which in early 2007 got listed on the Indian Stock Market.
    • Through the corporate reorganization process, Cairn Energy had transferred all of its India assets, which were until then held by nine subsidiaries in various countries, to the newly-formed Cairn India.
    • But the tax authorities claimed that in the process of this reorganization, Cairn Energy had made capital gains worth ₹24,500 crores.
    • This, the department asserted, was the basis of the tax demand.

    Is this case similar to Vodafone’s battle with the government?

    • The Vodafone case in 2007 was triggered by Hong Kong’s Hutchinson Telecommunications’ sale of its stake in India’s Hutchinson Essar to Vodafone based out of the Netherlands.
    • The Hong Kong firm made a capital gain on this, which the Indian tax authorities deemed fit to tax.
    • They held that Vodafone should have withheld the tax, and therefore imposed liability on it.
    • The Supreme Court quashed the taxman’s demand that the sale of shares, in this case, would amount to transfer of a capital asset within the meaning of Section 2(14) of the Indian Income Tax Act”.

    What governs the Sale of Shares?

    • In the Union Budget of 2012, the Income Tax Act, 1961 was amended to make sure that even if a transfer of shares takes place outside India, such a transfer can be taxed.
    • This was done when the value of those shares is based on assets in India. And this was applied retrospectively.

    Cairn won over Retrospection

    • The action against Cairn Energy was based on this move.
    • India lost its arbitration case against Vodafone as well, with the government being asked to fork out around ₹80 crores.

    What happened after the tax claims in the Cairn Energy dispute?

    • After receiving a draft assessment order from the tax authorities, Cairn UK Holdings Ltd. appealed before the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal.
    • The tribunal, while providing the company relief from back-dated interest demands, however, upheld the main tax demand.
    • The company had initiated proceedings of arbitration under the U.K.-India bilateral investment treaty.
    • But during this time, the government sold Cairn’s almost 5% holding and seized dividends totalling ₹1,140 crore due to it from those shareholdings and set off a ₹1,590-crore tax refund against the demand.

    What was the main argument of Cairn Energy during the arbitration?

    • The claimants, Cairn Energy and Cairn UK Holdings argued that till the amendment was made to tax retrospectively in 2012, there was no tax on indirect transfers.
    • Indirect transfers here meant transfer by a non-resident of shares in non-Indian companies which indirectly held assets in India.
    • The application of the 2012 amendments, they alleged, constituted “manifest breaches” of the U.K.-India bilateral investment treaty.

    What was India’s defence during the arbitration?

    • India’s counter to the main charge of Cairn Energy was that its 2006 transactions were taxable irrespective of the 2012 amendments.
    • It argued that “Indian law has long permitted taxation where a transaction has a strong economic nexus with India”.
    • It said even if it is retrospective, it is “valid and binding applying the longstanding constitutional, legislative and legal framework in which the claimants have invested”.

    What did the arbitration tribunal rule?

    • The tribunal said the tax demand violated the U.K.-India bilateral investment treaty.
    • The tribunal said India “failed to accord Cairn Energy’s investments fair and equitable treatment” under the bilateral protection pact it had with the United Kingdom.
    • It also ordered India to compensate Cairn Energy and its subsidiary for “the total harm suffered” as a result of the breaches of the treaty.

    India’s way ahead

    • It has been reported in the media that India will appeal against the tribunal’s decision.
    • If enforcement proceedings are initiated, India is confident of addressing them and will strongly defend its interests.

    Back2Basics: Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA)

    • It is an intergovernmental organization located in The Hague, Netherlands.
    • It is not a court in the traditional sense but provides services of arbitral tribunal to resolve disputes that arise out of international agreements between member states, international organizations or private parties.
    • The cases span a range of legal issues involving territorial and maritime boundaries, sovereignty, human rights, international investment, and international and regional trade.
    • The PCA is constituted through two separate multilateral conventions with a combined membership of 122 states.
    • The organization is not a United Nations agency, but the PCA is an official United Nations Observer.

  • Factors driving India’s growing security footprints in West Asia

    The article examines the factors that are leading to a growing footprint of Asian economies in West Asia.

    Growing interest of Asian Economies  in West Asia

    • This month, a contingent of the Indian Air Force participated in a multi-nation exercise hosted by the United Arab Emirates (UAE) named Desert Flag (March 3-27).
    • Other than India and the UAE, Bahrain, France, Saudi Arabia, South Korea and the United States are also participating.
    • While joint exercises in West Asia between Arab states and their western counterparts is common, the 2021 edition’s involvement of contingents from India and South Korea.
    • This showcases the growing interests of Asian economies.
    • As net importers of crude oil, these Asian economies rely heavily on the West Asian states for their supplies,
    • And, by association, Asian economies have increased stakes in the safety and security of the region from the perspective of political and economic stability.
    • And more importantly, in the protection of vital sea lanes in areas such as the Strait of Hormuz, the Gulf of Aden and the Red Sea stretching out into the Arabian Sea and the wider Indian Ocean.

    Declining U.S. influence

    • In April 2020, Saudi Arabia was India’s top supplier of oil followed by Iraq.
    • For South Korea, in late 2019, it was also Saudi Arabia as the top supplier.
    • The participation of both India and South Korea in these exercises in the Persian Gulf is reflective of these trends and growing concerns in Asian capitals over an eroding U.S. security blanket in the region.

    Tension in Iran-U.S. relations

    • Both India and South Korea have found themselves caught in regional tensions as the pressure on Iran to restart the 2015 nuclear agreement (Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, or JCPOA) increases.
    • Both India and South Korea have faced carbon-copy consequences over the past decade as the West first negotiated with Iran, and later tried to manage the fallout of the JCPOA collapse.

    India’s role in protecting it’s energy interests

    • The idea of Asian nations having to band together to protect their energy interests in West Asia is not new.
    • Former Indian diplomats have even suggested an idea equitable to an ‘importers OPEC’ led by Asian states which today have a much larger stake in West Asia’s oil than the West.
    • The Indian Navy has made multiple port calls from the UAE and Kuwait to Iran and Qatar in recent years.
    • In 2020, India had also planned its first bilateral naval exercise with Saudi Arabia.

    Consider the question “Examine the factors responsible for India’s growing security footprint in West Asia and how India is achieving its objectives?”

    Conclusion

    Regional states will become more responsible for their own security, and as Asian economies become stronger stakeholders, their geopolitics will become more visible across this geography.

  • China’s treatment of Uighurs

    Canada’s House of Commons has voted to declare that China is committing genocide against more than 1 million Uighurs in the western Xinjiang region.

    See the hypocrisy of so-called social activists who see farmers protest, anti-terror operations as a crackdown on human rights, while cases like that of Uighurs, Kurds go unnoticed in the global arena!

    Who are the Uighurs?

    • There are about 12 million Uighurs, mostly Muslim, living in north-western China in the region of Xinjiang, officially known as the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region (XUAR).
    • The Uighurs speak their own language, similar to Turkish, and see themselves as culturally and ethnically close to Central Asian nations.
    • They make up less than half of the Xinjiang population.
    • In recent decades, there’s been a mass migration of Han Chinese (China’s ethnic majority) to Xinjiang, and the Uighurs feel their culture and livelihoods are under threat.
    • In the early 20th Century, the Uighurs briefly declared independence, but the region was brought under complete control of mainland China’s new Communist government in 1949.

    Where is Xinjiang?

    • Xinjiang lies in the north-west of China and is the country’s biggest region.
    • Like Tibet, it is autonomous, meaning – in theory – it has some powers of self-governance. But in practice, both face major restrictions by the central government.
    • It is a mostly desert region, producing about a fifth of the world’s cotton.
    • It is also rich in oil and natural gas and because of its proximity to Central Asia and Europe is seen by Beijing as an important trade link.

    Try this PYQ:

    Q. Very recently, in which of the following countries have lakhs of people either suffered from severe famine/acute malnutrition or died due to starvation caused by war/ethnic conflicts?
    (a) Angola and Zambia
    (b) Morocco and Tunisia
    (c) Venezuela and Colombia
    (d) Yemen and South Sudan

    What was the build-up to the crackdown?

    • Anti-Han and separatist sentiment rose in Xinjiang from the 1990s, flaring into violence on occasion.
    • In 2009 some 200 people died in clashes in Xinjiang, which the Chinese blamed on Uighurs who want their own state.
    • Xinjiang is now covered by a pervasive network of surveillance, including police, checkpoints, and cameras that scan everything from number plates to individual faces.
    • According to Human Rights Watch, police are also using a mobile app to monitor peoples’ behaviour, such as how much electricity they are using and how often they use their front door.
    • Since 2017 when President Xi Jinping issued an order saying all religions in China should be Chinese in orientation, there have been further crackdowns.

    What does China say?

    • China says the crackdown is necessary to prevent terrorism and root out Islamist extremism and the camps are an effective tool for re-educating inmates in its fight against terrorism.
    • It insists that Uighur militants are waging a violent campaign for an independent state by plotting bombings, sabotage and civic unrest.
    • China has dismissed claims it is trying to reduce the Uighur population through mass sterilizations as “baseless”, and says allegations of forced labour are “completely fabricated”.

  • India’s challenge in dealing with international criticism

    Tweets by international celebrities in support of farmers’ protests and the government’s response to it have brought focus the issue of international scrutiny of India’s policies. The article analyses this issue.

    Issue of external criticism of India

    • Recently, India has been at the receiving end of international criticism over its dealing with the farmers’ protests against recently passed farm laws.
    • But neither the negative international scrutiny nor the Indian nationalist rejection of it are new.
    • Mobilising nationalist sentiment and evoking territorial sovereignty in fending off external criticism have been consistent themes in the conduct of independent India’s foreign policy.
    • The intensity of international scrutiny has varied over time and space, but they are unlikely to ever disappear.
    • As India becomes more connected to the world, there will be more global interest in its internal dynamics.
    • At the same time, like all rising powers, India will push back against demands that it must always measure up to external expectations.

    Why the Western criticism matters

    • Western power to turn sensible sentiments on democracy and human rights into consistent policies is rather limited.
    • Also, the issue of human rights has never been the sole factor shaping US foreign policy towards other nations.
    • But there is no denying that the Western power to create problems is real.
    • There are also implications of needless political arguments with the US over your domestic politics.
    • Asian realists also know that it is not difficult to neutralise Western liberal critics by emphasising engagement with others that might have commercial and security interests.

    Dealing with the criticism in the U.S. Congress

    • In the early 1990s, passing resolutions against India on Punjab and Kashmir in the US Congress was routine.
    • But once Delhi began to engage with US Congress and explained the complexity of the issues involved, the tide began to turn.
    • The Indian diaspora helped by reaching out to their representatives and pressing them to reconsider their positions.
    • Within a decade, supporters of separatism in Punjab and Kashmir could not even move the resolutions in the US Congress.

    Domestic polarisation and role of diaspora in international criticism

    • India’s problem is not with external criticism, India’s real challenge is the deepening domestic political divide.
    • India’s internal conflicts have inevitably enveloped the diaspora.
    • Sections of the diaspora that are opposed to Indian policies are actively mobilising the political class in their adopted countries to raise the voice against India.
    • They are also building wider coalitions to put the Indian government on the mat.
    • If the diaspora in the past helped India overcome some difficult problems with the US, it is the counter mobilisation of the diaspora that is shaping the western criticism of India.

    Way forward

    • The government’s ability to overcome external criticism depends on rebuilding the national consensus on key policies and healing the multiple social rifts.
    • Without a visible and sincere political effort to promote unity at home, internal divisions will get worse and make India more vulnerable to external meddling.

    Consider the question “Recently, India has been at the receiving end of the international criticism for its internal issues. What are the reasons for such criticism? Suggest the strategy to deal with such criticisms.” 

    Conclusion

    India’s own experience with Sri Lanka and Nepal underlines how hard it is to persuade other societies to accept Delhi’s preferences on the rights of minorities and federalism. In the end, democracy and pluralism can never be foreigner’s gifts. The struggle to construct and preserve democracies remains an internal one.

  • US-Russia to extend New START Treaty

    The Russian lower house of Parliament, the Duma has ratified a new START nuclear treaty with the US.  Both countries had “agreed in principle” to extend the arms treaty by five years with Joe Biden swearing-in.

    The New START, INF and the Open Skies …. Be clear about the differences of these treaties. For example- to check if their inception was during cold war era etc.

    New START Treaty

    • The New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START) pact limits the number of deployed nuclear warheads, missiles and bombers and is due to expire in 2021 unless renewed.
    • The treaty limits the US and Russia to a maximum of 1,550 deployed nuclear warheads and 700 deployed missiles and bombers, well below Cold War caps.
    • It was signed in 2010 by former US President Barack Obama and then-Russian President Dmitry Medvedev.
    • It is one of the key controls on the superpower deployment of nuclear weapons.

    A reset to Trumps policies

    • In February 2020, the US withdrew from the 1987 Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF), accusing Moscow of violating the agreement.
    • Russian then had proposed a one-year extension without conditions of the last major nuclear arms reduction accord, the New START Treaty between Russia and the U.S.
    • If it had fallen, it could have been the second nuclear weapons treaty to collapse under the leadership of Trump.