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GS Paper: GS2-17.India and its neighborhood- relations.

  • Kashmir as India’s gateway to Eurasian opportunity

    Why in the News

    Mehbooba Mufti, President of the Jammu and Kashmir Peoples Democratic Party (PDP), argues India should gradually restore Jammu and Kashmir and Ladakh as a trade bridge to Central Asia by reviving historic routes, to create jobs for its youth. The proposal tests whether a frontier managed for security can also carry trade.

    What is the gateway idea, and what is an economic corridor?

    1. Gateway idea: Kashmir and Ladakh would again link India overland to Central Asia, reviving Silk Road caravan routes that also reached Tibet and carried ideas and skills, not just goods.
    2. Shah-i-Hamadan: Tradition links Mir Sayyid Ali Hamadani (Shah-i-Hamadan) with the arrival of Persian and Central Asian craftsmen who enriched Kashmir’s handicrafts.
    3. Economic corridor: A trade route built up with roads, warehouses and services, much as shops spring up along a busy highway.
    4. The takeaway: The author sees location, more than rivers, minerals or tourism, as the region’s most underused asset, because connectivity once built its economy.

    Why does the author tie connectivity to Kashmir’s youth?

    1. Demographic dividend: A large young population boosts growth, a demographic dividend, only if it is educated, skilled and employed. Otherwise it breeds disillusionment.
    2. Contrast with China: Low fertility is ageing China fast, so India’s young workforce is an advantage, but only for a window of opportunity.
    3. Aspiration and reality gap: Smartphones show youth how the world lives, but jobs lag college access, so protests erupt over recruitment and exam paper leaks.
    4. Kashmir’s added burden: Conflict and economic isolation have narrowed opportunities, and young Kashmiris are treated as security liabilities, not assets.

    What does the author propose?

    1. Beyond the border lines: Policy should look past the Line of Control (LoC) with Pakistan and the Line of Actual Control (LAC) with China.
    2. Diplomatic road map: Reopening routes needs sustained talks with neighbours, so diplomacy must accompany roads.
    3. Pakistan and China tracks: She seeks trust-building steps and trade with Pakistan, and talks with China on routes across the Himalayas where security allows.
    4. Phased pilot corridors: Revive historic routes one at a time, starting where conditions are best, then widen them.
    5. Northern economic gateway: The region would open Central Asian markets to Indian firms and draw investment and tourism.

    Can security and connectivity work together?

    1. Security acknowledged: The author accepts security matters but denies it must oppose connectivity.
    2. Interdependence argument: Regulated connectivity makes neighbours depend on each other’s trade, giving them reasons to keep the peace.
    3. Land versus air links: A land corridor spreads jobs in transport, warehousing and hospitality along its length. Air links concentrate gains at a few airports.
    4. Enterprise over conflict: The author urges seeing Kashmir through enterprise, echoing former Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee‘s call to abandon beaten paths.

    Challenges

    1. Misuse of border trade: Cross-LoC trade was exploited for smuggling. Eg. India suspended it in April 2019.
    2. Cross-border terrorism: Infiltration from Pakistan keeps agencies wary of any LoC opening. Eg. The Pahalgam attack, April 2025.
    3. Contested territory: Routes to Central Asia cross Pakistan-occupied Kashmir, which India claims. Eg. India opposes the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor there.
    4. Trust deficit with China: The eastern Ladakh standoff left the LAC militarised. Eg. The Galwan clash, June 2020.

    Way Forward

    1. Regulated pilot trade point: The Ministry of Home Affairs should reopen one border trade point with scanners, registered traders and digital tracking.
    2. Structured dialogue with China: Use the Working Mechanism for Consultation and Coordination on border affairs to test Ladakh trade proposals.
    3. Skills for corridor jobs: Train local youth in logistics, hospitality and customs work.

    Conclusion

    Kashmir’s jobs question and India’s frontier security turn on one choice: whether borders held for defence can also carry regulated trade. What to watch is whether any trade point in the region reopens, and whether talks with Pakistan move beyond crisis management.

    Government Initiatives for Connectivity with Central Asia

    1. Chabahar Port: India Ports Global Limited operates the Shahid Beheshti terminal at this Iranian port, India’s route to Afghanistan and Central Asia bypassing Pakistan.
    2. International North-South Transport Corridor (INSTC): A 7,200 km ship, rail and road network links Mumbai to Russia through Iran and Central Asia.
    3. Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan-India (TAPI) pipeline: This gas pipeline has moved slowly. Its Afghan section has been under construction since 2024, but the Pakistan and India legs face security and India-Pakistan hurdles.
    4. India-Central Asia Summit: A leaders’ forum with the five Central Asian republics on trade, connectivity and security.

    Matching Previous Year Question

    “[2026] Ships from which of the following countries have to cross the Strait of Hormuz to reach out to the Indian Ocean? 1. Bahrain 2. Syria 3. Qatar 4. Egypt (a) 1 and 2 (b) 1 and 3 (c) 2 and 3 (d) 3 and 4 Answer: B”

  • External Affairs Minister tells UN General Assembly that bids to claim immunity for terrorism will not stand

    Why in the News

    India told the United Nations General Assembly that attempts to normalise terrorism and claim immunity from its consequences will not stand. Pakistan’s Prime Minister had raised Kashmir there a day earlier and called India’s suspension of the Indus Waters Treaty an act of war.

    What is the Indus Waters Treaty and why is it in abeyance?

    1. River division: The treaty divides the Indus basin rivers between India and Pakistan, working like a title deed over river water.
    2. Origin in Partition: Partition left the works feeding the canals in India and the irrigated land in Pakistan, so the two signed in 1960 with the World Bank as a signatory.
    3. What changed: India put the treaty in abeyance after the Pahalgam terror attack of April 2025, stopping performance without ending it. Revival needs Pakistan credibly ending cross border terrorism.
    4. The takeaway: India has tied Pakistan’s water share to ending terrorism, so a water settlement now turns on behaviour rather than geography.

    What did India put to the Assembly on terrorism?

    1. Serial practitioner charge: India named Pakistan a serial practitioner of terrorism.
    2. State sponsorship of terrorism: India called terrorism with state backing and cross border reach a direct affront to the global order, and said sponsoring governments must be held accountable.
    3. Self defence and terror financing: India said it will exercise self defence, that friendship cannot coexist with terrorism and that terror financing must be exposed.

    How did India answer the Kashmir claim?

    1. Right of Reply: India answered through the Right of Reply, a state’s short answer to another’s speech at the Assembly.
    2. Territorial position restated: India described Jammu and Kashmir as an Indian Union Territory, an integral and inalienable part of India.
    3. Plebiscite claim rejected: Pakistan asked the United Nations to deliver a plebiscite, a vote on which country a territory joins. India rejected that and the alleged demographic change.
    4. The counter charge: India recalled that the 9/11 mastermind lived beside Pakistan’s premier army academy, and said Pakistan claims to uphold security by day and carries out terrorism by night.
    5. Rights inside Pakistan: India pointed to killings in Rawalakot in Pakistan occupied Kashmir and to the treatment of minorities there.

    What does the weaponisation of everything mean?

    1. Weaponisation of everything: India used the phrase for economic links turned into instruments of pressure, so countries far from the West Asia, Russia Ukraine and Israel Gaza conflicts are penalised.
    2. Chokepoints in six domains: Extreme competition creates chokepoints, single points others must pass through, in finance, market access, supply chains, technology, resources and connectivity.
    3. Tariffs on Russian energy buyers: A new United States law authorises tariffs up to 100 per cent on Russian energy buyers, including India, so nations are de risking and diversifying.
    4. Global South and sea lanes: Developing countries face a 4F crisis, insecurity of food, fuel, fertiliser and finance. India has lost over 10 seafarers in the Strait of Hormuz and Black Sea.
    5. Stability, security and predictability: Peace is more than the absence of war, and weakens if stability, security or predictability is undermined.

    Challenges

    1. Abeyance has no treaty basis: The treaty carries no clause letting one side suspend it, so the step rests on political decision.
    2. Limited physical leverage: India lacks the storage and diversion capacity on the western rivers to change flows quickly.
    3. Assembly statements bind nobody: A General Assembly speech creates no obligation, so accountability depends on other forums.

    Way Forward

    1. Build what the treaty allows: Complete the storage and power projects the treaty already permits on the western rivers.
    2. Terror financing route: Take Pakistan’s record to the Financial Action Task Force, which grades countries on countering terror financing.
    3. Secure the sea lanes jointly: Expand naval escort cooperation and attack reporting with Indian Ocean partners.

    Conclusion

    The Assembly exchange has turned a water sharing treaty into counter terrorism pressure. Watch whether another member state adopts that condition, because pressure applied alone can be waited out.

    Back2Basics: Indus Waters Treaty

    1. Rivers to each side: The Ravi, Beas and Sutlej go to India, the Indus, Jhelum and Chenab to Pakistan.
    2. What India may still do: India may use the western rivers for non consumptive purposes, limited irrigation and run of the river power, which stores no water.
    3. How a dispute is settled: The Permanent Indus Commission handles questions first, differences go to a Neutral Expert and disputes to a Court of Arbitration.

    Matching Previous Year Question

    “[2016, GS1, 12.5 marks] Present an account of the Indus Water Treaty and examine its ecological, economic and political implications in the context of changing bilateral relations.”

  • ‘Has no legal basis’: India rejects Pakistan-China ‘boundary commission’

    Why in the News

    The Ministry of External Affairs has rejected the boundary joint commission constituted by Pakistan and China. Its stated ground is that the body has no legal basis to decide on arrangements related to Indian territory under illegal occupation. The rejection followed the first meeting of the Pakistan-China Boundary Joint Commission in Islamabad. India holds that it has never recognised the China-Pakistan Boundary Agreement of 1963, under which Pakistan handed over the Shaksgam Valley to China, and treats that agreement as illegal and invalid. The Ministry restated that the Union Territories of Jammu and Kashmir and Ladakh are integral and inalienable parts of India, and called on Pakistan to vacate the areas under its illegal occupation. The tension is that a standing commission gives institutional form to a transfer India treats as void, while India’s non-recognition changes nothing about who administers the ground.

    What is the 1963 China-Pakistan Boundary Agreement?

    1. What it did: The agreement demarcated a boundary between China and the part of Kashmir under Pakistan’s control. Pakistan ceded about 5,180 sq km of the Shaksgam Valley, north of the Siachen region, to China.
    2. India’s legal objection: India holds that Pakistan has no sovereignty over the territory and therefore no capacity to transfer any part of it. On that reasoning there is no boundary between Pakistan and China at all.
    3. The agreement’s own provisional clause: The 1963 text itself records that the boundary is provisional, and provides for renegotiation with the sovereign authority once the Kashmir dispute is settled. Both signatories therefore acknowledged on the face of the document that the question of title was open.

    What exactly did India object to?

    1. Denial of a boundary: India’s position is that no boundary exists between Pakistan and China, so no commission can be constituted to administer one. The objection goes to the existence of the subject matter, not to the commission’s composition or procedure.
    2. Rejection of legitimisation attempts: India stated that it resolutely opposes attempts to alter the status of the occupied territories or to legitimise illegal occupation. Any so-called boundary cooperation between China and Pakistan concerning Indian territories would have no bearing whatsoever on India’s sovereignty.
    3. Demand for vacation: India called on Pakistan to immediately vacate the areas under its illegal and forcible occupation, rather than engage in such proceedings. The demand converts the rejection from a protest into a stated precondition.
    4. Consistency as the argument: India framed its position as clear and consistent rather than as a new response. Consistency is itself the legal point, since acquiescence over time is what would weaken a non-recognition claim.

    Why does the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor feature in this objection?

    1. Route through occupied territory: India has opposed the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), the flagship connectivity and energy project linking Xinjiang to Gwadar port, because part of it passes through Pakistan-occupied Kashmir (PoK). The objection is territorial rather than commercial.
    2. Infrastructure as evidence of control: Roads, power projects and administrative arrangements built along a disputed alignment create facts on the ground and a record of undisturbed use. A boundary commission performs the same function in legal form that the corridor performs in physical form.
    3. Link to the wider connectivity initiative: CPEC is the leading component of China’s Belt and Road Initiative, which India has declined to join on sovereignty grounds. India stayed away from the Belt and Road Forum held in Beijing in May 2017 for that reason.

    Challenges to India’s non-recognition position

    1. Non-recognition does not alter control: China has administered the Shaksgam Valley since 1963 and India’s objection has produced no change in possession. Eg. India’s sustained objection to CPEC since 2017 has not slowed construction along the corridor.
      The Fix: Pair the legal position with continued infrastructure and force posture development on the Indian side of the Siachen and Karakoram sector, so the claim is backed by presence.
    2. Institutional practice accumulates over time: A commission that meets periodically builds a documented record of bilateral practice that third parties may treat as settled. Eg. The 1963 agreement itself has been treated as operative for over six decades despite its own provisional clause.
      The Fix: Record a formal protest after each meeting of the commission, so the record shows continuous objection rather than a single statement.
    3. No forum adjudicates the claim: No international court or tribunal has jurisdiction over the question without the consent of all parties, and neither China nor Pakistan will give it. Eg. India has consistently treated Jammu and Kashmir as a bilateral matter and declined third party adjudication.
      The Fix: Build the position into bilateral and plurilateral documents India signs, so partners record the Indian claim rather than staying silent on it.
    4. Two front linkage in the same sector: The valley sits adjacent to the Siachen region, so Chinese presence there connects the Pakistan front and the China front in one theatre. Eg. The Siachen Glacier has been held by Indian forces since Operation Meghdoot in April 1984, at high cost in men and logistics.
      The Fix: Treat the northern Ladakh sector as a single operational theatre in planning, rather than as two separate bilateral borders.

    Conclusion

    India’s rejection restates a position of long standing, and it is the institutional form of the Pakistan-China arrangement that is new. A commission that sits, meets and records outcomes is an attempt to convert a contested transfer into ordinary bilateral administration. The next marker is whether the commission acquires a schedule of meetings and published outcomes, since a body that meets once is a statement and a body that meets regularly is a practice.

    Matching Previous Year Question

    “The China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) is viewed as a cardinal subset of China’s larger ‘One Belt One Road’ initiative. Give a brief description of CPEC and enumerate the reasons why India has distanced itself from the same.”

  • The 1991 treaty violated by Pak ship that collided with Indian vessel

    Why in the News

    A Pakistani ship closed on an Indian Navy vessel and collided with it in international waters. India has summoned Pakistan’s Charge d’Affaires over the conduct and placed it in direct contravention of Article 10 of the 1991 Agreement between India and Pakistan on Advance Notice on Military Exercises, Manoeuvres and Troop Movements. Article 10 bars naval ships and submarines of the two countries from closing within three nautical miles of each other while operating in international waters. The last comparable episode was in 2011, when the Pakistan Navy ship PNS Babur brushed past the Indian Navy frigate INS Godavari in the Gulf of Aden and damaged the frigate’s helicopter safety net. The contested point is whether a set of confidence building measures written in the late 1980s and early 1990s still restrains conduct at sea, when the only consequence of a breach is a diplomatic protest.

    What is the 1991 Agreement on Advance Notice on Military Exercises, Manoeuvres and Troop Movements?

    1. Purpose: The agreement establishes a standing mechanism for the two countries to inform each other about military exercises and troop movements. Its stated object is to prevent a crisis arising from a misreading of the other side’s intentions.
    2. Scope: It lays down rules for the land, naval and air forces of both countries. Major exercises close to the other’s territory are to be avoided, and where they take place the other party is to be informed.
    3. Naval threshold: A major naval exercise is defined as one involving six or more ships of destroyer or frigate size and above, exercising in company and crossing into the other country’s Exclusive Economic Zone (the maritime belt extending up to 200 nautical miles from the baseline, over which a coastal State holds resource rights).
    4. Article 10: Naval ships and submarines of the two countries are not to close less than three nautical miles from each other in international waters, so as to avoid an accident. One nautical mile is about 1.85 km.

    Why did the two countries build this agreement when they did?

    1. Nuclear weapons programmes: Accelerating weapons work on both sides through the 1980s raised the cost of any war to a level neither government could absorb. That escalation is what made a standing notification mechanism attractive to both.
    2. Soviet invasion of Afghanistan: The December 1979 invasion made Pakistan and the United States keen to avoid disturbance on Pakistan’s eastern border with India. Pakistan’s western commitment created the space for an eastern arrangement.
    3. Exercise Brass Tacks IV: India carried out a massive military exercise in Punjab and Rajasthan along the India-Pakistan border in January 1987, mobilising some 150,000 troops. The scale of the exercise alarmed Pakistan and produced the specific demand for advance notice that the 1991 treaty answers.
    4. Clarification rights: The agreement allows either side to seek clarification on the assembly of forces, and on the direction, extent and duration of an exercise. That right is the operative response to the uncertainty Brass Tacks IV created.

    What else does the confidence building architecture of this period contain?

    1. Joint commission, 1983: The Agreement for the establishment of a joint commission between India and Pakistan was signed on 10 March 1983. It was the first of the structured bilateral mechanisms of this phase.
    2. Agreement on the Prohibition of Attack against Nuclear Installations and Facilities, 1988: Finalised on 31 December 1988, it bars each country from attacking the other’s nuclear installations. The two sides exchange lists of their nuclear installations every 1 January, and that exchange has continued without a break since 1992.
    3. Cultural Cooperation Agreement, 1988: Signed on the same day as the nuclear installations agreement. It shows the period’s approach of pairing a military restraint measure with a civilian one.
    4. Agreement on Prevention of Air Space Violations, 1991: Signed on 6 April 1991, the same day as the advance notice agreement, it also permits over flights and landings by military aircraft. Air and land restraint were therefore settled together, and the naval rule sits inside the same package.

    What does the recurrence of naval incidents show about the agreement’s reach?

    1. Long gap between incidents: The previous close quarters episode was in 2011 in the Gulf of Aden, far from either country’s coast. The rule has held for long stretches, which is why each breach is treated as a signal rather than as routine.
    2. Distance from the exercise framework: Both incidents occurred during ordinary deployments, not during a notified major exercise. The agreement’s notification machinery is built for planned exercises and does not reach the day to day operations where contact actually happens.
    3. Response limited to protest: India’s recorded response in both cases was a diplomatic communication. No joint inquiry, shared navigational record or agreed finding of fault follows a breach.

    Challenges to the 1991 Agreement

    1. No verification or monitoring machinery: The agreement provides for notification and for clarification on request, and creates no inspection body or joint verification procedure. Eg. Neither side produced an agreed account of the 2011 PNS Babur and INS Godavari incident, which closed without a finding.
      The Fix: Attach a standing naval point of contact on each side with a fixed timeline for exchanging navigational data after a close quarters incident.
    2. No incidents at sea instrument: Article 10 fixes a separation distance and prescribes nothing about signalling, manoeuvring or harassment at close range. Eg. The United States and the Soviet Union addressed exactly these behaviours through the Incidents at Sea Agreement of 1972, which India and Pakistan have no equivalent of.
      The Fix: Negotiate a dedicated incidents at sea agreement covering signalling procedure and prohibited manoeuvres, separate from the exercise notification framework.
    3. Dependence on the political climate: Each measure in this architecture survives only while the wider relationship permits it, and none carries a self executing renewal. Eg. The composite dialogue that carried most bilateral confidence building work has been suspended for extended periods after terror attacks.
      The Fix: Insulate the technical measures from the political dialogue by giving the military to military channels their own standing mandate.
    4. Silence on non-state and hybrid activity: The instruments of this period address regular forces and declared exercises, and say nothing about maritime infiltration, unattributed vessels or fishing fleet incidents. Eg. The 26 November 2008 Mumbai attackers reached the city by sea after hijacking a fishing trawler.
      The Fix: Extend the notification framework to a maritime incident register covering non-naval vessels operating in the other country’s declared zones.
    5. Asymmetry in the dispute settlement route: A breach produces a summons, and the agreement names no arbiter, no penalty and no suspension clause. Eg. India’s protest in the present case ends with the summons, whatever the outcome of the collision.
      The Fix: Provide for a joint review at the level of the two naval headquarters within a fixed period of any reported breach of Article 10.

    Conclusion

    The 1991 Agreement remains in force, and both navies continue to operate in the same international waters. India’s response has stopped at a summons, which is the whole of what the instrument provides. The gap the collision exposes is procedural rather than political: the two countries have a rule on separation at sea and no shared means of establishing what happened when it is broken. What to watch is whether the exchange of nuclear installation lists due on the next 1 January proceeds as usual, since that is the one measure of this architecture that has run unbroken and is the readiest indicator of whether the rest still holds.

    Matching Previous Year Question

    “Terrorist activities and mutual distrust have clouded India-Pakistan relations. To what extent the use of soft power like sports and cultural exchanges could help generate goodwill between the two countries? Discuss with suitable examples.”

  • [MENTION] Indian Naval Ship Kulish arrives at Ream Naval Base, Cambodia

    [MENTION] Indian Naval Ship Kulish arrives at Ream Naval Base, Cambodia

    Why in News

    A Ministry of Defence release recorded that Indian Naval Ship (INS) Kulish arrived at Ream Naval Base, Cambodia on 13 September 2026.

    Static Context (the exam value sits here)

    1. Ream Naval Base: It lies near Sihanoukville on Cambodia’s coast, on the Gulf of Thailand. It sits close to the southern approaches to the Strait of Malacca.
    2. Strategic weight: The base’s expansion drew attention over a possible expanded external military presence in the region. It bears on maritime access to the South China Sea.
    3. INS Kulish: It is an indigenous Kora class missile corvette of the Indian Navy.
    4. Diplomatic function: Naval port calls project presence and build maritime partnerships across the region India frames as the Indo Pacific.

    Prelims angle

    The location of Ream Naval Base on the Gulf of Thailand, its proximity to the Strait of Malacca, and the identity of India’s coastal states and maritime neighbours are map based hooks.

    Mains angle

    General Studies Paper II (GS2), India and its neighbourhood and maritime strategy. A question can use the port call as an example of India’s maritime outreach near key sea lanes.

    Matching Previous Year Question

    “[2026] Ships from which of the following countries have to cross the Strait of Hormuz to reach out to the Indian Ocean?
    1. Bahrain
    2. Syria
    3. Qatar
    4. Egypt
    (a) 1 and 2
    (b) 1 and 3
    (c) 2 and 3
    (d) 3 and 4
    Answer: (b)”

    “[2010] Which one of the following can one come across if one travels through the Strait of Malacca ?
    (a) Bali
    (b) Brunei
    (c) Java
    (d) Singapore
    Answer: (d)”

  • Xi, Modi agreed both nations should be partners: Wang Yi

    Why in the News

    China and India should be partners. China’s Foreign Minister has described that as the most important consensus reached by the Chinese President and the Prime Minister when they met on the sidelines of the 18th BRICS Summit in New Delhi. The meeting closed the Chinese President’s first visit to India in seven years, and it was the third leaders’ meeting since the border agreement of October 2024. The two sides agreed to jointly maintain peace and tranquility in border areas and to support each other as rotating chair of BRICS. What is unsettled is whether a relationship rebuilt through air links, pilgrimage routes and summit language holds while the boundary question itself stays where it is.

    What did the two leaders agree on?

    1. Border areas: The two leaders agreed to jointly maintain peace and tranquility in border areas.
    2. BRICS chairmanships: Each country will support the other as rotating chair of the grouping. China takes over as BRICS chair for 2027.
    3. Multilateral coordination: The two sides agreed to strengthen coordination within the United Nations, the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) and the G20.
    4. A multipolar order: They agreed to advance cooperation across the Global South, promote a more multipolar world order, and act as a stabilising force in a period of global uncertainty.
    5. Mutual development: The Chinese President said the two countries can draw on each other’s strengths, support one another and pursue common development.
    6. Scale of the constituency: The improvement in relations has been welcomed by over 2.8 billion people of both nations, and is cast as an essential pillar of stronger cooperation across the Global South.

    What terms has India set for the reset?

    1. Independent foreign policy: India has an independent foreign policy and will not allow any force to engage in anti China activities on its territory. China’s Foreign Ministry cited that statement approvingly.
    2. The three mutuals: Future ties are to be guided by mutual respect, mutual sensitivity and mutual interest.
    3. Differences and disputes: Differences should not be allowed to become disputes.
    4. A new chapter: The Prime Minister described the talks as the beginning of a new chapter in bilateral relations.

    Where does the boundary question sit in this framing?

    1. Subordinated to the wider relationship: China’s Foreign Minister, who is also a member of the Political Bureau of the Communist Party of China Central Committee, said the border issue should be viewed in proper perspective within the broader context of the bilateral relationship.
    2. India’s stated approach: India has always approached relations with China from a strategic standpoint.
    3. The sequence of meetings: The two leaders met at Kazan in Russia in 2024 and again in September 2025, and the New Delhi meeting was their third since the breakthrough in ties.
    4. What the language covers: The agreed formulation extends to peace and tranquility in border areas, and carries no statement on the boundary itself.

    How is connectivity between the two countries being restored?

    1. Direct flights: China Southern Airlines announced the resumption of passenger services on the Guangzhou to New Delhi route from 21 September, after a six year break.
    2. Why they had stopped: Direct air service was suspended after the Covid pandemic and after tensions following the Doklam and Galwan standoffs.
    3. Pilgrimage route: The Kailash Mansarovar Yatra resumed in 2024, following the border understanding.

    Challenges to the India China normalisation

    1. Trade imbalance: India’s merchandise deficit with China is its largest with any trading partner, and it widens as electronics and machinery imports grow. Eg. Solar modules, electronic components and active pharmaceutical ingredients are sourced overwhelmingly from Chinese suppliers.
      The Fix: Tie any market access concession in the reset to measurable movement on the non tariff barriers facing Indian pharmaceutical and agricultural exports.
    2. Border infrastructure asymmetry: Road, rail and airfield construction on the Chinese side of the Line of Actual Control outpaces India’s build out in the same sectors. Eg. The Sichuan Tibet railway and forward airfield upgrades opposite Ladakh and Arunachal Pradesh.
      The Fix: Hold the Border Roads Organisation’s project list to dated completion milestones reported annually.
    3. Third country military supply: China’s defence supply relationship with Pakistan runs irrespective of the state of its relations with India. Eg. JF 17 combat aircraft and naval frigates supplied to Pakistan.
      The Fix: Raise third country military supply as a standing item in the Special Representatives dialogue rather than leaving it to summit level language.
    4. Dependence on leader level understanding: The reset rests on understandings between two leaders rather than on an institutional mechanism that survives a crisis. Eg. The border agreements of 1993 and 1996 did not prevent the 2020 standoff in eastern Ladakh.
      The Fix: Require the Working Mechanism for Consultation and Coordination on India China Border Affairs to report publicly after each round.

    Conclusion

    The relationship has been restored at the level of contact rather than at the level of the dispute. Flights, pilgrimages and chairmanship courtesies are reversible instruments, and each of them was withdrawn once already. The thing to watch is whether the standing border mechanisms meet and produce a recorded outcome before the next leaders’ meeting, because that is the only part of this reset that cannot be undone by a single incident.

    Back2Basics: The border agreement of October 2024

    1. An understanding between India and China on patrolling arrangements along the Line of Actual Control in eastern Ladakh.
    2. It addressed the friction points at Depsang and Demchok, where patrolling had been blocked since 2020.
    3. It led to disengagement of troops at those points and the resumption of coordinated patrolling.
    4. It reopened the space for leader level meetings and for the phased restoration of pilgrimage and travel links.

    Matching Previous Year Question

    “[2014, GS2, 12.5 marks] With respect to the South China sea, maritime territorial disputes and rising tension affirm the need for safeguarding maritime security to ensure freedom of navigation and over flight throughout the region. In this context, discuss the bilateral issues between India and China.”

  • India & China are at a Nash equilibrium. Will it hold – that’s the question

    Why in the News

    India and China issued an Eight Points of Outcomes and Consensus statement on the border on 25 August 2026, directing their negotiators to seek an early and substantial harvest on the boundary question. The Prime Minister and the Chinese President then met at the just concluded 18th BRICS Summit in New Delhi. Read together, the statement and the two national readouts indicate that the two sides have settled into a Nash equilibrium on the border. The assessment is that neither can improve its position by negotiation and neither can improve it by force, so the current line holds by default rather than by agreement. The tension is that a stable outcome nobody chose is also an outcome nobody is defending, and two specific contingencies could remove it.

    What is a Nash equilibrium?

    1. Nash equilibrium, defined: A Nash equilibrium is an outcome in a non cooperative game in which no player’s expected outcome can be improved by changing one’s own strategy.
    2. Application to the India China border: India and China at least tacitly recognise that in any foreseeable future neither can aspire to or achieve a better position in the border quarrel.
    3. Room left for friction along the LAC: The two sides may still spar diplomatically and militarily on occasion, as they have since 2013, and the intermittent exchange of words and of hardware over the high Himalaya can only move the Line of Actual Control (LAC) slightly.

    Why has 45 years of negotiation produced only one agreement?

    1. Continuity of negotiation since 1981: India and China have been negotiating a border deal almost without interruption since 1981.
    2. The three negotiating mechanisms: The Secretary and Vice Minister level talks (1981-88), the Joint Working Group (1989-2005) and the Special Representative Mechanism (2003 to the present).
    3. The pace of engagement: Over more than 45 years the two sides have met once a year on average.
    4. The 2005 agreement as the single substantive outcome: The 2005 Political Parameters and Guiding Principles for the Settlement of the India China Boundary Question is the single substantive outcome of that entire period.

    What did the 2005 agreement actually fix?

    1. A package deal principle: A settlement would be reached as a package, meaning nothing is settled until everything on the border is settled.
    2. The political settlement standard: The final agreement would be a political settlement.
    3. Criteria the settlement must weigh: It would consider strategic concerns, history, national sentiment, practicality, geography and the interests of settled populations in the borderlands.

    What is the package deal principle?

    1. The rule itself: A package deal principle requires that every sector of a disputed boundary be settled in a single agreement, so no stretch of the border is treated as closed on its own.
    2. Why a package rule was adopted: It stops either side from banking a concession in an easy sector and then reopening a hard one, since a party that has already pocketed a gain has no reason to compromise on what is left. Eg. The 2005 agreement applies the principle across the western, middle and eastern sectors together.
    3. What an early harvest does inside it: An early harvest lets negotiators work one sector at a time, and the result stays provisional until the remaining sectors are agreed. Eg. The August 2026 eight point statement directs an early and substantial harvest without altering the ratification condition.
    4. What the principle rules out: A standalone sectoral treaty, a partial exchange of territory, and any agreed line that takes legal effect before the whole boundary is settled.

    What does the August 2026 eight point statement change?

    1. Early harvest and the package rule: The statement directs negotiators to seek an early and substantial harvest on the border, and this does not violate the package deal idea.
    2. Sector by sector sequencing: It suggests the two sides focus on success in one area instead of negotiating everything everywhere at once, and then move on to another section of the border.
    3. The ratification condition: Under the 2005 agreement, each sectional success would only be finally accepted and ratified when the entire border is settled.
    4. The BRICS summit readouts: Nothing in the two readouts from the leaders’ meeting alters either the 2005 agreement or the eight point early harvest statement.

    Why can neither side improve its position by negotiation or by force?

    1. India’s maximal objective: India seeks to recover Aksai Chin up to its original claim and to keep everything it holds in the other sectors.
    2. China’s maximal objective: China seeks Arunachal Pradesh all the way to the southern slopes, which is most of the State, and to keep everything else it holds.
    3. Limits of diplomatic bargaining: It is inconceivable that Indian or Chinese negotiators can achieve their maximal objectives, so diplomatic bargaining now or in the future cannot close the gap.
    4. Conquest as an unavailable option: India cannot conquer Aksai Chin up to its original claim line, and China cannot conquer Arunachal Pradesh up to the southern slopes.
    5. Terrain, climate and logistics: Terrain, climate, logistics and military defences make any dramatic and lasting military gain almost impossible.
    6. Basis of the current stability: Short of extremely bad strategy by commanders or internal political chaos that distracts from deterrence, the status quo on the border is stable.

    What could break the equilibrium?

    1. The succession to the Dalai Lama: Beijing will eventually appoint its preferred Dalai Lama and the Tibetans will almost certainly choose their own, leaving New Delhi caught in the middle.
    2. The 1962 precedent: India China tensions could consequently spiral, and China could lash out as it did in 1962, when instabilities in Tibet were a factor leading to war.
    3. An India Pakistan conflict that pulls China in: In 2025 New Delhi detected a Chinese helping hand to Pakistan during Operation Sindoor, and in a future South Asian confrontation China might be more openly involved.
    4. A two front war for India: New Delhi or Beijing could then be drawn into a fight that threatens the status quo, and for India that means a two front war.
    5. Insulation offered by the present détente: The current détente promises trade, visas, supply chain resilience and river water cooperation, and the open question is whether those gains can insulate the relationship from a Tibet transition or a South Asian conflict.

    Challenges to a settlement of the India China boundary

    1. The line itself is undefined on the ground: The 3,488 km LAC has never been mutually delineated, so patrolling limits rather than a map decide where each side believes it may go. Eg. Friction points such as the Depsang Plains and Charding Ninglung Nala remain unresolved even after disengagement elsewhere.
      The Fix: Complete the exchange of maps sector by sector as a technical exercise separated from the sovereignty claim, so incidents arise from choice rather than from ambiguity.
    2. The two sides inherit different colonial alignments: In the western sector India relies on the Johnson Line of 1865 while China claims the Macartney MacDonald Line of 1899, so each reads the same ground from a different document. Eg. In the eastern sector the LAC follows the McMahon Line drawn at the Simla Convention of 1914, which China does not accept.
      The Fix: Anchor the negotiation on the 2005 agreement’s own criteria of settled populations and practicality, since neither colonial line can be conceded by the other side.
    3. Ground realities are being changed while talks continue: Incremental construction alters what a future settlement would have to ratify, which reduces the incentive to conclude one. Eg. Dual use border villages and road networks shift the position on the ground without a single formal claim being advanced.
      The Fix: Extend the confidence building agreements to cover permanent construction within an agreed depth of the LAC, with mutual verification.
    4. Economic dependence cuts against leverage: A widening trade imbalance gives the larger supplier a channel of pressure that has nothing to do with the border. Eg. India’s trade deficit with China reached an all time high of about $112.16 billion in March 2026, with the bulk of imports being industrial goods.
      The Fix: Convert the China plus one opening into domestic capacity in the specific intermediate goods where import dependence is highest, so the deficit narrows at the source.
    5. China Pakistan axis as an embedded third party: China’s relationship with Pakistan turns any India Pakistan conflict into a potential two front problem, which is the precise contingency the article identifies. Eg. Infrastructure built under the China Pakistan Economic Corridor runs through territory India claims.
      The Fix: Build the capability and the deployment posture for a simultaneous two front contingency, so the possibility does not itself become a bargaining lever.

    Conclusion

    A stalemate that holds because neither side can improve on it is not the same thing as a settlement, and it carries no mechanism of its own to survive a shock. The whole of the negotiating record, from 1981 to the eight point statement, has produced one agreement on principles and no agreed line. What should now be examined is whether the gains from the present détente can be built into insulation against the two contingencies named, the succession in Tibet and a South Asian conflict that draws China in. The marker to watch is whether the early harvest approach produces a settled sector, since that is the first test of whether sequencing can do what package bargaining could not.

    India China Relations in Brief

    1. The diplomatic starting point: On 1 April 1950 India became the first country outside the socialist bloc to establish diplomatic relations with the People’s Republic of China.
    2. The founding framework: The Panchsheel Agreement of 29 April 1954 set out five principles, mutual respect for territorial integrity and sovereignty, mutual non aggression, mutual non interference, equality and mutual benefit, and peaceful coexistence.
    3. The rupture and the reopening: The 1962 border conflict was a serious setback, and the Prime Minister’s visit in 1988 began a phase of improvement in bilateral relations.
    4. The Peace and Tranquility Agreement of 1993: The Agreement on the Maintenance of Peace and Tranquility along the Line of Actual Control was signed in 1993.

    Back2Basics: Operation Sindoor

    1. Scope of the strikes: Indian armed forces strikes launched on 6 and 7 May 2025 against terror infrastructure in Pakistan and Pakistan occupied territory.
    2. Trigger, the Pahalgam attack: It followed the terror attack at Pahalgam on 22 April 2025.
    3. Targets struck: Leadership and headquarters of the Lashkar e Taiba and Jaish e Mohammed networks were targeted, along with Pakistani military assets.
    4. Policy declared after the operation: India declared that any future act of cross border terrorism emanating from Pakistan would be treated as an act of war, and that nuclear blackmail would no longer be a restraining factor.

    Matching Previous Year Question

    “[2026, GS2, 15 marks] “China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) has transformed South Asia from a regional space into a theatre of great power competition.” Analyse the strategic implications of the BRI for India’s security and regional influence in South Asia.”

  • Farakka treaty nearing expiry, JDU revives campaign against barrage

    Why in the News

    Janata Dal (United), a partner in the ruling coalition in Bihar, has launched a campaign across 12 districts of the state along the Ganga demanding that the Farakka barrage be dismantled, and opposing any renewal of the India-Bangladesh Ganga water sharing treaty. The treaty it is targeting was signed in December 1996 and set a 30 year framework for sharing Ganga waters at the barrage during the dry season. That framework lapses this December, which converts a standing state grievance into a live negotiating question. The state government’s own position is narrower, that Bihar’s interest should be guarded in the treaty, with the Chief Minister stating in Munger that the state receives Ganga water for only four months of the year against a need for year round flow. A bilateral water sharing arrangement is the Union government’s to negotiate, and what is now being pressed is not a better share but the removal of the structure the sharing is measured at.

    What does the 1996 Ganga water sharing treaty do?

    1. Who it binds and what it covers: It is a bilateral agreement between India and Bangladesh, signed in December 1996, regulating the sharing of Ganga waters at the Farakka barrage in West Bengal.
    2. The season it governs: It applies primarily to the dry season, running from 1 January to 31 May, which is when the flow available at the barrage is least able to meet both countries’ requirements.
    3. Why a 30 year term was written in: The treaty established a binding framework for 1996 to 2026 to replace the earlier short term stopgap arrangements and give both sides predictable distribution.
    4. Where it now stands: That framework lapses this December, so continuation requires a fresh negotiation rather than an automatic rollover.

    Why was the barrage built, and what did it change on either side?

    1. The purpose it was built for: The barrage was built in 1975 to divert water from the Ganga into the Hooghly river, to flush out silt and keep Kolkata Port navigable.
    2. The downstream effect in Bangladesh: The diversion reduced downstream flow into Bangladesh, producing severe water shortages, increased soil salinity and ecological stress in the south of that country.
    3. The upstream effect Bihar reports: Heavy silt trapped behind the barrage has raised the Ganga’s riverbed, destroying the river’s natural storage capacity and driving seasonal floods.
    4. One structure sits behind both complaints: The diversion that sustains a port channel downstream is the same arrangement that holds sediment upstream, so the barrage is what both sets of grievances point at.

    What is Bihar’s stated grievance?

    1. A flood and parch cycle upstream: The state government’s position is that the barrage has created a severe flood and parch dynamic upstream of it, alternating inundation with shortage rather than steadying the flow.
    2. Four months of water against a year round need: The Chief Minister has stated that Bihar currently receives Ganga water only from July to October, and requires flow throughout the year.
    3. What the state asks of the Union government: Its stated demand is that the treaty safeguard Bihar’s interest, which places a riparian state’s claim inside a negotiation it is not a party to.

    What is the campaign demanding, and how is it being run?

    1. A demand to dismantle, not to renegotiate: The party is demanding that the barrage be dismantled, citing a stance its chief and former Chief Minister has repeatedly taken with the Union government that the structure causes heavy siltation and floods.
    2. Outright opposition to renewal: The party’s stated position is that it is completely against renewal, on the ground that the treaty fails to serve the state’s interests and remains a primary cause of flooding.
    3. Where it is being taken: The ‘Nitish Samvad’ campaign covers the 12 districts through which the Ganga flows in Bihar, and has so far covered four, Buxar, Bhojpur, Begusarai and Khagaria.
    4. How it is being conducted: It is led by the party’s national working president, a Rajya Sabha member, and carries recorded audio messages of the party chief, who is not travelling for it.
    5. The timetable it is working to: The party intends to finish the campaign well before the treaty ends in December, which places it ahead of any decision on renewal.

    Challenges to renegotiating the Ganga water sharing framework

    1. A riparian state has no seat at the table: Water is a State subject, and a treaty with a foreign country is the Union government’s exclusive power, so a state can press a claim and cannot block an agreement. Eg. The India-Bangladesh Teesta water sharing draft has remained unsigned since 2011 over West Bengal’s objections, without the state being a party to it.
      The Fix: Constitute a standing consultative mechanism with the basin states before negotiation opens, with their submissions placed on record as part of the Indian position.
    2. The sharing formula rests on historical flows: The arrangement was built on the average dry season availability recorded at the barrage over four earlier decades, and that baseline no longer describes current or projected flows. Eg. Its operation depends on how much water actually arrives at the barrage in each ten day period of the dry season.
      The Fix: Write the next arrangement on a rolling flow record revised at fixed intervals, rather than on a single fixed historical average.
    3. Sediment has no institutional owner: The dispute Bihar raises is about silt rather than volume, and no authority holds the power to order desilting or to set a sediment budget for the river. Eg. The approach channel at Farakka itself requires repeated dredging to stay open, which relocates silt rather than reducing the load.
      The Fix: Attach a sediment management protocol to the barrage’s operating rules, naming the responsible authority and the annual dredging and disposal obligation.
    4. The flood peaks are set outside India: The Kosi and the Gandak, the rivers that deliver Bihar’s worst flood peaks, rise in Nepal, so peak discharge is governed by catchments and structures beyond this treaty’s scope. Eg. The Kosi and Gandak barrages stand in Nepalese territory and are operated by India under the 1954 Kosi Agreement and the 1959 Gandak Agreement.
      The Fix: Pair the Ganga negotiation with a flow data sharing and release coordination arrangement with Nepal on the Kosi and Gandak.
    5. Removing the structure moves the problem rather than ending it: Dismantling the barrage would restore downstream flow and withdraw the diversion that keeps the Bhagirathi-Hooghly channel and the Kolkata port route navigable. Eg. The feeder canal at Farakka exists solely to carry that diverted flow into the Bhagirathi-Hooghly system.
      The Fix: Commission an independent flow and sediment study of the barrage’s upstream and downstream effects, so the dismantling demand is tested against measured alternatives rather than settled politically.

    Conclusion

    A dry season sharing arrangement is now being contested on grounds it was never written to address, since the demand from Bihar concerns sediment and flood behaviour rather than the volume of water allotted. That mismatch is what makes renewal harder than an extension of terms. The decision to watch is whether the Union government opens the negotiation with a stated position on siltation upstream of the barrage, or confines it to the dry season allocation. Confined to allocation, a new agreement settles the bilateral question and leaves the domestic one exactly where it started.

    Back2Basics: Farakka Barrage

    1. Where it stands: Across the Ganga in Murshidabad district of West Bengal, a short distance upstream of the point where the river enters Bangladesh.
    2. Its scale: The barrage runs about 2,240 metres across the river and carries a road and rail link over it.
    3. How the diversion works: A feeder canal roughly 38 km long carries water from above the barrage into the Bhagirathi-Hooghly, the channel the diversion was designed to sustain.
    4. Who operates it: The Farakka Barrage Project authority, under the Union Ministry of Jal Shakti, runs the structure and its regulating gates.

    Matching Previous Year Question

    “[2016, GS1, 12 marks] Present an account of the Indus Water Treaty and examine its ecological, economic and political implications in the context of changing bilateral relations.”

  • What the recent trajectory of India-China ties means for the summit

    Why in the News

    The Chinese President arrives in India for the BRICS leaders’ summit, his third visit since assuming the presidency and the first after a gap of seven years. The summit is the stated reason for the trip, and its bilateral weight comes from what the visit interrupts, the border standoff that began in eastern Ladakh in 2020 and marked the low point of the relationship, now in its seventh year. Years of diplomatic and military-level talks produced a disengagement of troops in 2024, and a sequence of normalisation steps has followed, from direct flights to eased visas. The structural disputes behind the standoff are untouched by those steps, and the trade deficit and market access questions sit exactly where they did. That fault line, alongside a turbulent global environment, will shape what the summit can agree.

    What is the record of India-China border standoffs?

    1. The two early conflicts: The 1962 war was followed by border clashes in Sikkim in 1967.
    2. The Ladakh standoffs of the last decade: Major standoffs occurred at Depsang in Ladakh in 2013 and at Chumar in Ladakh in 2014.
    3. Doklam: A standoff at Doklam followed in 2017, in a sector away from Ladakh.
    4. Eastern Ladakh since 2020: The standoff that began in eastern Ladakh in 2020 is still ongoing, with about 50,000 Indian troops deployed along the Line of Actual Control, meaning the undelineated line separating the two sides’ positions.
    5. The casualties of June 2020: The clashes of June 2020 killed 20 Indian defence personnel, including an officer of Colonel rank, and at least four Chinese defence personnel.

    What has changed since the 2024 disengagement?

    1. The talks produced a withdrawal: Years of diplomatic and military-level talks led to a disengagement of troops in 2024, and incremental steps have since been taken to stabilise the relationship.
    2. Connectivity restored: Direct flights between the two countries resumed and visa restrictions were eased.
    3. Pilgrimage resumed: The Kailash Mansarovar Yatra was restarted.
    4. Investment rules relaxed: Restrictions on Chinese investments in India were relaxed.
    5. The visit itself is the signal: Travel to India after a seven year gap is read as a positive signal, and only to a degree.

    What has not changed?

    1. The trade imbalance: A massive trade deficit remains the defining feature of the economic relationship.
    2. Market access runs one way: The lack of market access for Indian businesses in China is frequently flagged as an issue.
    3. Enforcement action continues: India is acting against Chinese firms for tax evasion.
    4. Trust is the deeper casualty: Strategic and political trust has been diminished by a border standoff now in its seventh year.
    5. The Pakistan factor deepened it: Collusion between China and Pakistan during Operation Sindoor further worsened the crisis of trust and credibility.

    How far have the founding economies diverged since BRIC was named?

    1. The origin of the label: Goldman Sachs analysts described India, China, Brazil and Russia as the world’s emerging economies in 2001, and BRIC was born as a grouping in the immediate aftermath of the 9/11 attacks.
    2. China: It has become the second-largest economy in the world after the United States.
    3. India: It has grown at a modest rate and been outpaced by Beijing.
    4. Russia and Brazil: Russia has faced challenges from wars of its own making, and Brazil has floundered amid frequent regime changes and scandals.
    5. South Africa: A later entrant to the grouping, it has not lived up to expectations.
    6. The 2009 turning point: The first BRICS leaders’ summit was held in the shadow of the global financial crisis, and China emerged from that crisis stronger than many Western nations.

    How does China’s assertiveness show up beyond the border?

    1. Military growth follows economic growth: China has grown militarily, with big-power ambitions to dethrone the United States.
    2. Where the posture is visible: Its increasingly aggressive and assertive stance shows in its neighbourhood, in its actions in the South China Sea, in the Indo-Pacific, and on the borders it shares with India.
    3. India absorbs a disproportionate share: India has faced the brunt of border standoffs frequently, and the belligerence of the Chinese state under the current President has been greater than at any time in the recent past.

    Is BRICS an anti-West grouping or a non-Western one?

    1. The two framings are not the same: China and Russia have attempted to frame BRICS as an “anti-West” grouping, and India sees it as a “non-Western” grouping.
    2. India’s position rules out the first: India has built robust ties with the United States over the last 25 years and is courting Europe, Australia, Canada and other Western nations, so it is decidedly not anti-West.
    3. The dependence is stated plainly: India needs the West for access to capital and technology, and as a destination for its people, more than China or Russia do.
    4. Beijing’s self-placement within the bloc: China has viewed itself as the “first among equals” in the grouping, and long supported enlarging it beyond the original five, which produced the 2023 expansion to the present strength of 11 members.
    5. Western action against members complicates the divide: US tariffs on Brazil and political disagreements with South Africa cut across the distinction the members are arguing over.

    What does the convergence against US tariffs actually buy?

    1. The shared exposure: The US President’s arbitrary tariff moves have cornered countries around the world, including China and India, and the two now find themselves on the same side in attempting to counter the effects.
    2. China’s own position has weakened: After years of high economic growth, China has revised its expectations for the near future.
    3. India’s use of the summit: India is hosting the summit partly to signal to the United States that it has other partners in fields ranging from technology to fuel security.
    4. What those partners supply: The United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia have been investing in the Indian economy, Russia has stepped in as an energy supplier amid the closure of the Strait of Hormuz, and Brazil is ready to partner on critical minerals.

    How has the West Asia war split the grouping?

    1. The sovereignty question it raises: The US war on Iran has raised questions about powerful nations violating the territorial integrity and sovereignty of others, and both China and Russia are guilty of the same in their own neighbourhoods.
    2. The economic cost is common: Energy prices and inflation have risen, and BRICS countries, as part of the Global South, are bearing the brunt.
    3. Members sit on opposite sides of the same war: Iran is attacking US military bases in West Asia, and the United Arab Emirates hosts several US military bases and personnel.
    4. Why this needs China: Moving those two members towards cooperation and presenting a more unified flank requires Chinese weight alongside India’s hosting role.
    5. The scale of attendance raises the stakes: Leaders of over 30 countries and groupings are attending, so a failure to reconcile positions is visible well beyond the membership.

    Challenges to stabilising India-China ties

    1. The trade deficit is structural, not tariff driven: India’s imports are concentrated in the intermediate and capital goods its own manufacturing runs on, so restricting imports raises domestic costs rather than closing the gap. Eg. Active pharmaceutical ingredients, the chemical inputs a finished medicine is made from, are sourced largely from China even as India exports the finished formulations.
      The Fix: Tie the production incentive schemes for bulk drugs and electronic components to measured reductions in import dependence, with the baseline published.
    2. Disengagement is not de-escalation: Withdrawal from friction points leaves the roads, airfields and habitat built up behind the line in place, so force can return faster than it left. Eg. Both sides have retained the forward infrastructure constructed after 2020.
      The Fix: Negotiate a verifiable de-induction of forces and a written restoration of patrolling norms, rather than treating troop separation as settlement.
    3. There is no agreed line to defend: The Line of Actual Control is not delineated on a map both sides accept, so the same patrol is routine to one side and an incursion to the other. Eg. Each side maintains its own claim line across the Depsang plains.
      The Fix: Task the Special Representatives mechanism with a sector-by-sector exchange of maps, beginning with the sectors where no standoff has occurred.
    4. A third country sets the floor under India’s threat assessment: The military supply and intelligence relationship between China and Pakistan means a bilateral understanding does not reduce the threat India plans against. Eg. Chinese-origin platforms form the bulk of Pakistan’s recent fighter and naval inductions.
      The Fix: Keep the normalisation track and the security track formally separate and say so publicly, so trade and travel measures are not treated as concessions on security.
    5. Economic opening is being restored without reciprocity: Relaxing investment rules restores Chinese capital’s access to India without restoring Indian firms’ access to the Chinese market. Eg. Press Note 3 of 2020 required government approval for investment from countries sharing a land border with India, and its relaxation is not matched by a Chinese commitment.
      The Fix: Make each relaxation sector specific and conditional on a named market access commitment of comparable value.

    Conclusion

    The visit restores high level contact without touching what caused its absence. India and China now share an exposure to US trade measures, and shared exposure produces a common grievance more readily than a common position, since each retains the option of settling separately with Washington. The unresolved tension is that India needs Chinese weight to hold the grouping together on trade and energy, and needs the grouping not to be read as anti-Western, which is the framing Beijing prefers. What to watch is whether the summit declaration carries a joint position on unilateral trade measures, and whether the normalisation sequence extends from travel and pilgrimage to market access, which is the test of whether anything structural has moved.

    Back2Basics: Operation Sindoor

    1. What it was: Indian military strikes in May 2025 on terrorist infrastructure located in Pakistan and in Pakistan-occupied Jammu and Kashmir.
    2. What prompted it: It followed the April 2025 attack on tourists at Pahalgam in Jammu and Kashmir.
    3. How it ended: Several days of exchanges across the border were followed by an understanding between the two militaries to stop military action.
    4. Why it appears in an India-China item: Chinese support to Pakistan during those exchanges is cited as having deepened India’s trust deficit with China, separately from the border dispute.

    Matching Previous Year Question

    “[2017, GS2, 10 marks] ‘China is using its economic relations and positive trade surplus as tools to develop potential military power status in Asia’, In the light of this statement, discuss its impact on India as her neighbor.”

  • India, Sri Lanka sign three defence sector MoUs during Rajnath’s visit

    Why in the News

    India and Sri Lanka have signed three Memoranda of Understanding (MoU) on defence equipment and training. The agreements cover the upgradation of L70 guns for the Sri Lanka Air Force and cooperation between the National Cadet Corps and the National Defence Colleges of the two countries. They follow the seven MoUs signed during the Prime Minister’s visit to Sri Lanka in 2025, one of which was an overarching defence sector agreement. This is the first visit by an Indian Defence Minister to Sri Lanka in nearly 40 years. Colombo used the meeting to repeat that its territory will not be used against India’s security interests, and to state that it enters agreements with countries around the world as a sovereign State.

    What do the three agreements cover?

    1. Air defence equipment: One MoU covers the upgradation of L70 guns for the Sri Lanka Air Force. The L70 is a 40 mm towed anti-aircraft gun of Bofors design, in service with air defence units across South Asia.
    2. Cadet training: A second covers cooperation between the National Cadet Corps of the two countries, the youth military training organisations that run school and college level cadet programmes.
    3. Professional military education: The third covers cooperation between the National Defence Colleges, which train senior officers and civil officials in national security strategy.

    What else did the two sides take up?

    1. The scope of the talks: The Defence Minister and the Sri Lankan President held extensive discussions on strengthening the defence, economic, maritime and regional partnerships between the two countries.
    2. Narcotics: The Sri Lankan President briefed the visiting Defence Minister on an islandwide programme recently launched to combat drug trafficking.
    3. Fisheries: The two leaders paid special attention to the fisheries issue in the Palk Strait.

    How did Colombo frame its assurance to India?

    1. The security assurance repeated: The Sri Lankan President recalled his interactions with the Prime Minister and reiterated that Sri Lanka would never allow its territory to be used for activities inimical to India’s security interests.
    2. A sovereignty qualifier alongside it: His office stated that Sri Lanka takes its decisions considering both national and regional interests.
    3. Room left for other partners: The same statement said Sri Lanka enters agreements with countries around the world as a sovereign State, remaining mindful of regional security.

    Challenges to India-Sri Lanka defence cooperation

    1. The fisheries dispute cuts against the security relationship: Bottom trawling by Indian vessels in Palk Bay waters produces arrests of Indian fishermen by the Sri Lanka Navy every year. Eg. Sri Lankan authorities detained hundreds of Indian fishermen and dozens of boats in 2024.
      The Fix: Convert the Joint Working Group on Fisheries into a scheduled mechanism with a funded deep-sea transition plan for Tamil Nadu trawler owners.
    2. Third-country naval access remains unsettled: Port calls by foreign research and survey vessels sit outside the bilateral defence understanding and are settled politically each time. Eg. The Chinese vessel Yuan Wang 5 docked at Hambantota in August 2022, and Sri Lanka later announced a one-year moratorium on foreign research vessels from January 2024.
      The Fix: Agree a standing notification and clearance protocol for survey and research vessels, so each visit follows a rule rather than a negotiation.
    3. Colombo’s fiscal position limits what it can absorb: Defence modernisation competes with debt servicing. Eg. Sri Lanka defaulted on its external debt in April 2022 and entered an International Monetary Fund programme in March 2023.
      The Fix: Structure transfers as grant-funded upgrades and training rather than as credit lines that add to the external debt stock.
    4. Political turnover reopens settled agreements: An understanding reached with one government has been cancelled by the next. Eg. The 2019 agreement with India and Japan to develop the East Container Terminal at Colombo Port was cancelled by Sri Lanka in 2021.
      The Fix: Anchor cooperation in institution-to-institution channels such as the annual defence dialogue and the Colombo Security Conclave, so continuity does not rest on one leadership.

    Conclusion

    Defence cooperation with Colombo has moved from a framework agreement to named equipment and training projects. Colombo has given the assurance India wanted and has paired it with a stated right to sign agreements elsewhere. Those two positions have not yet had to be reconciled in a concrete case, and the next one will define the limit of the assurance. The fisheries question is the immediate test, since both sides flagged it at this meeting and neither resolved it.

    Matching Previous Year Question

    “[2022, GS2, 10.0 marks] India is an age-old friend of Sri Lanka.’ Discuss India’s role in the recent crisis in Sri Lanka the light of the preceding statement.”