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Type: Bills/Act/Laws

  • The copyright stakes in the EU FTA

    Why in the News

    The European Commission has formally asked European Union member states to approve the signing and conclusion of the India EU Free Trade Agreement (FTA), and the commitments accepted in the covered areas, including intellectual property, have now been revealed. The draft intellectual property chapter affirms both parties’ commitments to the WIPO Copyright Treaty (WCT) and the Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) Agreement, while omitting the WCT from the National Treatment clause at Article 10.8. It simultaneously carries the WCT’s enforcement mandates on technological protection measures and rights management information as binding obligations. The tension is that India would take on the treaty’s enforcement side without its public interest exceptions, which means the exceptions students, security researchers, archivists and Internet service providers currently rely on under the Copyright Act, 1957 would rest on the agreement’s own narrow test rather than on a treaty floor.

    What is the WIPO Copyright Treaty (WCT)?

    1. What it covers: The treaty was adopted specifically for the protection of works and the rights of their authors in the digital environment, with particular attention to software and databases.
    2. The enforcement side: It provides for technological protection measures (TPMs), meaning the encryption and digital access controls that restrict copying of a digital work, and for rights management information attached to that work.
    3. The balancing side: Article 10 of the treaty provides for limitations on and exceptions to copyright for digital works, which is what keeps authors’ rights balanced against public interest uses in education and research.
    4. Its place in Indian law: The Copyright Act, 1957 as it stands is in conformity with the WCT and with the TRIPS Agreement.

    What is the asymmetry inside the draft intellectual property chapter?

    1. The omission: The chapter leaves the WCT out of the National Treatment clause at Article 10.8, which means the limitations and exceptions for digital works that the treaty provides would no longer be available to India.
    2. The retained obligation: Footnote 1 of Article 10.8(1) expands “protection” to cover enforcement measures against the circumvention of technological protection measures at Article 10.18 and against interference with rights management information at Article 10.19.
    3. The narrowed exception route: Article 10.21 of the agreement supplies limitations and exceptions through a narrow “three step test” borrowed from European Union copyright statutes, which is a tighter gate than the treaty’s own Article 10.
    4. The net effect: The chapter abandons the treaty’s principle of balancing authors’ rights against public interest exceptions while keeping its enforcement mandate rigid.

    How would this reach the Copyright Act, 1957?

    1. The amendment obligation: The draft provisions would necessitate amendments to the Copyright Act, 1957, obliging Parliament to remove the exceptions covering digital works regardless of whether the user was engaged in lawful research.
    2. Fair dealing becomes challengeable: If the existing exceptions are not preserved, foreign rightsholders could challenge the exceptions for digital works available under Section 52, the fair dealing provision, including transient or incidental storage of a work purely in the technical process of electronic transmission.
    3. Civil and criminal exposure: Article 10.11 of the agreement would subject such uses to civil and criminal remedies rather than leaving them within a statutory exception.
    4. The threat to Section 65A: Section 65A of the Copyright Act, 1957 governs technological protection measures, and Section 65A(2) provides the exceptions under which a protection measure may lawfully be circumvented, so a student or researcher bypassing a digital lock to perform an act protected under Section 52 attracts no criminal liability today.
    5. Beyond the negotiating mandate: By agreeing to the draft text the negotiators have gone beyond the mandate Parliament set in the Copyright Act, 1957.

    What changes in classrooms and laboratories?

    1. The existing permission: Sections 52(1)(ab) and 52(1)(ac) permit engineering students and security researchers to observe, test and reverse engineer software, either to achieve interoperability or to uncover critical security vulnerabilities.
    2. Why the permission is conditional on circumvention: Modern software is almost universally guarded by encryption and digital access controls, so the lawful act cannot be performed without first bypassing a protection measure.
    3. The effect of a strict regime: Under a strict anti circumvention rule, a computer science student breaking a digital lock to inspect code for system compatibility or security flaws becomes a legal offender.
    4. The wider cost: Security research that depends on examining protected code is the mechanism by which vulnerabilities are found before they are exploited, and a rule that criminalises it removes that route.

    Why are libraries and archives exposed?

    1. The preservation practice: Historical documents, literature and research are increasingly distributed in digital formats burdened by Digital Rights Management (DRM), and librarians depend on format shifting to archive out of print works and preserve fragile collections.
    2. The loss of legal cover: A strict anti circumvention rule strips archivists of the legal right to bypass digital locks for preservation, which converts a routine archival act into an infringement.
    3. The reach into higher education: As higher education relies more on electronic materials, paywalls and DRM controls could effectively overwrite the public interest protections Indian courts established in rulings such as the DU Photocopy Case.

    Why are Internet service providers exposed?

    1. The existing safe harbour: Sections 52(1)(b) and 52(1)(c) shield Internet service providers (ISPs) and digital intermediaries from liability for the temporary and transient copies created in random access memory and server caches during routine data routing.
    2. What the safe harbour supports: The notice and takedown regime established under Rule 75 of the Copyright Rules, 2013 rests on those statutory safe harbours, so removing them unsettles the takedown machinery as well.
    3. The unqualified reproduction right: Article 10.11(a) of the agreement grants rightsholders an exclusive and unqualified right over all “temporary or permanent” reproductions.
    4. The treaty position it contradicts: The Agreed Statements to Articles 8 and 10 of the WCT exempt transient network copies from copyright liability, so the draft text departs from the treaty India already follows.
    5. The consequence: With the WCT excluded from the National Treatment exception, European rightsholders could expose Indian intermediaries to systemic liability for routine routing.

    Challenges to the draft intellectual property chapter

    1. Enforcement obligations travel faster than exceptions: An anti circumvention mandate is a single prohibition that applies immediately, while an exception has to be pleaded case by case in a domestic court. Eg. The Copyright (Amendment) Act, 2012 inserted Section 65A together with its express exceptions as a package, a pairing the draft chapter does not reproduce.
      The Fix: Make the agreement’s anti circumvention obligation expressly subject to the exceptions in Sections 52 and 65A(2) of the Copyright Act, 1957.
    2. India’s fair dealing is a closed list, not an open standard: Section 52 enumerates permitted purposes, so a narrowing of those purposes leaves no residual doctrine for a court to fall back on. Eg. United States law applies an open ended fair use standard that a court can extend to a new use, while Indian courts work from the enumerated purposes.
      The Fix: Insert a residual clause permitting non commercial educational and research uses that satisfy the three step test, so the list is not the outer limit.
    3. The safe harbour rests on subordinate legislation: The notice and takedown machinery sits in the Copyright Rules, 2013 rather than in the Act, and a rule can be amended by the executive without returning to Parliament. Eg. Rule 75 of the Copyright Rules, 2013 carries the takedown procedure that intermediaries follow.
      The Fix: Move the intermediary safe harbour and the takedown procedure into the Act itself, so any narrowing needs a parliamentary amendment.
    4. Cross border enforcement is asymmetric in cost: A rightsholder in the European Union can fund sustained litigation in India, while an Indian intermediary, library or university cannot mirror that in Europe. Eg. Academic publishers pursued the DU Photocopy Case in the Delhi High Court through a first instance suit and an appeal before withdrawing.
      The Fix: Negotiate a defence cost and mutual recognition provision in the agreement’s dispute chapter for non commercial educational defendants.
    5. Treaty text once signed is hard to reopen: A trade agreement is renegotiated as a whole rather than clause by clause, so a concession in the intellectual property chapter is not correctable in isolation later. Eg. The intellectual property chapter of the agreement was settled in the same package as market access and services commitments.
      The Fix: Press to re insert the WCT into the National Treatment clause before signature rather than seeking an interpretive declaration afterwards.

    Conclusion

    India’s copyright flexibilities are a policy asset rather than a bargaining chip, and the draft chapter converts them into one. What remains unreconciled is that the agreement asks India to enforce a treaty’s protections without granting India the exceptions that same treaty wrote to balance them, and no amount of domestic drafting can restore a balance that the National Treatment clause has already removed. The immediate thing to watch is whether the European Union member states approve signature with the clause as drafted, since the window for negotiators to insist on re inserting the treaty into that clause closes at signature rather than at ratification.

    Back2Basics: The DU Photocopy Case

    1. What it was: Three academic publishers sued Delhi University and a licensed photocopy shop on its campus over course packs compiled from copyrighted textbooks.
    2. The provision at issue: The dispute turned on Section 52(1)(i) of the Copyright Act, 1957, which exempts reproduction of a work by a teacher or a pupil in the course of instruction.
    3. What the court held: The Delhi High Court held that the exemption covers course packs prepared for students and read no quantitative limit into the provision, so the reproduction was not an infringement.
    4. Why it is cited here: It is the leading Indian authority for the proposition that copyright exceptions serve a public interest in access to education rather than operating as a narrow concession.

    Matching Previous Year Question

    “In a globalised world, intellectual property rights assume significance and are a source of litigation. Broadly distinguish between the terms – copyrights, patents and trade secrets.”

  • Serious escalation

    Why in the News

    The U.S. Russia Sanctions Act has been signed into law, giving the U.S. President authority to levy tariffs of up to 100% on countries such as India that import large quantities of Russian oil and gas. The escalation of reciprocal tariffs to 50% on India last year rested on an Executive Order and could have been rescinded by the same method. This Act has been passed by the U.S. Congress, so it carries a higher order of legal permanence, and the President must justify any waiver in writing to Congress. The tension is that the tariff India must now negotiate against is both larger and far harder to reverse, and it stacks on levies already in force at a moment when Russia supplies more than half of India’s crude and the alternative sources are constrained.

    What does the U.S. Russia Sanctions Act do, and why is it harder to reverse?

    1. The authority it creates: The Act authorises the U.S. President to impose tariffs of up to 100% on countries importing large quantities of Russian oil and gas.
    2. Statute rather than executive instrument: The measure was passed by Congress, which gives it a higher order of legal permanence and authority than the Executive Order that carried last year’s 50% reciprocal tariffs.
    3. The waiver is constrained: Any waiver the President wishes to grant must be justified in writing to Congress.
    4. The rate is a ceiling, not a floor: The phrasing authorises tariffs of up to 100%, which leaves room for a lower rate to be set without amending the Act.

    What does the tariff stack do to Indian exports?

    1. Three levies at once: The 100% tariffs would sit over and above the 10% forced labour tariffs and the 50% Section 232 tariffs on steel and aluminium.
    2. The market at risk: The United States is India’s largest export destination, accounting for about 20% of total goods exports.
    3. How the 50% was absorbed: Exporters mitigated the earlier 50% tariffs by sharing the cost with their American customers, which was a financially devastating and unsustainable way to retain them.
    4. Why that cannot be repeated: Sharing a 100% tariff will be impossible for India’s exporters, who are largely micro, small and medium enterprises.
    5. The net effect: Indian exports to the United States become too uncompetitive to sustain should the new tariffs take effect.

    What three options does India have?

    1. Cut Russian oil imports: India reduces its purchases of Russian crude to fall outside the Act’s trigger.
    2. Retain imports and absorb the tariff: India continues buying Russian oil and bears the tariff, which would be a significant blow to its export ambitions and to its micro, small and medium enterprises.
    3. Negotiate a low rate: India persuades the United States to set a low tariff using the up to 100% phrasing already in the law.

    Why is replacing Russian crude difficult?

    1. Dependence level: Russia accounted for more than 51% of India’s oil imports as of July 2026.
    2. The alternative route is constrained: Supplies through the Strait of Hormuz remain constrained, which limits the Gulf as a substitute at short notice.
    3. Port capacity is the bottleneck: India will have to press countries such as Oman to accelerate the expansion of alternative ports.
    4. Price conditions are adverse: Oil remains well above $100 a barrel, which makes favourable terms with new suppliers increasingly difficult to obtain.

    What is the negotiating window, and what does the record suggest?

    1. The time available: Thirty days remain before the United States can levy the tariffs.
    2. The diplomatic occasion: The Union Commerce Minister is scheduled to travel to the United States at the end of the month for the G20 Trade Ministerial.
    3. What the record shows: Historical data show India has usually complied with U.S. pressure to cut oil imports from particular countries, Russia included, irrespective of vocal claims of strategic autonomy.
    4. The test: India’s ability to secure a low rate rather than a waiver is the measure of what the bilateral relationship at the leadership level can deliver.

    Challenges to the U.S. Russia Sanctions Act

    1. Origin of crude is hard to trace: Sanctioned barrels move through blending, ship to ship transfer and re export, so a measure keyed to the origin of oil is difficult to administer. Eg. Russian crude refined in India and exported as diesel to Europe has been treated as an Indian origin product.
      The Fix: Key the measure to refinery level crude import records rather than to the origin declared on a finished product shipment.
    2. Waiver discretion is narrowed but not removed: The written justification requirement raises the political cost of a waiver without barring one, so relief remains available and remains uncertain. Eg. The Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act, 2017 carried a national interest waiver that the U.S. administration left unexercised in India’s S 400 air defence procurement.
      The Fix: Seek a defined low rate under the up to 100% phrasing, since a rate is set by the President while a waiver must be defended to Congress.
    3. A tariff on the buyer raises the price for every buyer: Removing a large purchaser from discounted Russian barrels tightens the non sanctioned market and lifts the global benchmark. Eg. The G7 price cap of 2022 was built around a discount ceiling precisely to keep Russian barrels flowing rather than withdraw them from supply.
      The Fix: Press for a price cap style mechanism permitting purchase below a ceiling, in place of a tariff levied on the importing country.
    4. Legislated tariffs outlast the dispute that produced them: A measure in statute survives a change of administration and a settlement of the underlying conflict, so relief later requires a fresh Act of Congress. Eg. The Jackson Vanik amendment of 1974 continued to apply to Russia until its repeal in 2012, long after the emigration restrictions it targeted had ended.
      The Fix: Negotiate a sunset clause or a certification trigger tied to a settlement, so that relief does not depend on fresh legislation.

    Conclusion

    The instrument has changed character, and that is what makes this escalation different from the last one. A tariff resting on an Executive Order was reversible by the office that imposed it, and a tariff resting on an Act of Congress is not. India’s three options are all costly, and the cheapest of them, a negotiated low rate under the ceiling already written into the law, has to be secured inside the thirty day window and without the leverage that a reversible instrument once gave both sides. The G20 Trade Ministerial at the end of the month is the point at which that attempt is made.

    Back2Basics: Section 232 tariffs

    1. The statute: Section 232 of the U.S. Trade Expansion Act of 1962 is the national security trade provision of U.S. law.
    2. The process: It authorises the U.S. Commerce Department to investigate whether imports of a specified product threaten to impair national security.
    3. The power it triggers: On an affirmative finding, the President may adjust imports of that product through tariffs, quotas or other restrictions.
    4. How it applies: Section 232 measures attach to a product rather than to a country, so steel and aluminium tariffs imposed under it apply to imports from all origins.

    Matching Previous Year Question

    [2025, GS2, 15] “Energy security constitutes the dominant kingpin of India’s foreign policy, and is linked with India’s overarching influence in Middle Eastern countries.” How would you integrate energy security with India’s foreign policy trajectories in the coming years?”

  • India’s NGOs at a new funding crossroads

    India’s NGOs at a new funding crossroads

    Why in the News

    The Foreign Contribution (Regulation) Amendment Bill, 2026 would vest foreign contributions and every asset created from them in a government appointed designated authority where a Foreign Contribution (Regulation) Act (FCRA) certificate is cancelled, surrendered or allowed to lapse. The first Foreign Contribution (Regulation) Act was passed in 1976 under a government of a different political composition, and it rested on the same apprehension that foreign powers could destabilise the country by funding civil society organisations. The present Bill has not been enacted, held up by opposition from political parties and from civil society groups, particularly Christian organisations. The tension runs in two directions at once. The Bill tightens the foreign funding route at precisely the point when bona fide foreign donors are withdrawing from India of their own accord, which makes the operative question not whether foreign funding is curtailed but whether domestic philanthropy will fund the traditional service delivery organisations that foreign aid has been sustaining.

    What does the FCRA Amendment Bill, 2026 propose?

    1. Vesting on cancellation: Foreign contributions and all assets created from them vest in a government appointed designated authority where a certificate is cancelled, surrendered or automatically lapses.
    2. Provisional and permanent vesting: The organisation recovers the assets if registration is restored within the prescribed period, and vesting becomes permanent only if it is not. Restoration during the provisional vesting period returns both the assets and the unused foreign contribution.
    3. Disposal of assets: Where a fresh certificate is not obtained within the prescribed period, the assets may be sold or transferred to a government department, with the proceeds going to the Consolidated Fund of India.
    4. Remedies: The Bill provides for revision and for an appeal to the District Judge.

    What case does the government make for tighter control?

    1. An opaque channel: The stated position is that foreign funding into the NGO sector operates as a vast and intricate web, with thousands of crores of unmonitored capital entering annually under the banners of development, human rights and social welfare.
    2. Bypassing state accounting: Much of that money is said to deliberately avoid state accounting mechanisms.
    3. End uses alleged: The funds are said to reach politically charged campaigns, highly selective local advocacy, and aggressive proselytisation and religious conversion networks.

    Why do NGOs and their beneficiaries object?

    1. Doubts over religion neutrality: Christian organisations, which the government says receive a larger share of the funds among religious associations, are concerned that the legislation will not operate in a religion neutral way.
    2. Beneficiaries bear the loss: The organisations affected run schools, hospitals, old age care homes and similar institutions, and it is the people they serve who lose the service.
    3. Sole provider in some regions: Leaders from the northeast and tribal areas have pointed out that these institutions are sometimes the largest or the only providers of such services in their areas.
    4. The existing base is already narrow: FCRA registrations of 22,496 organisations have been cancelled since 2015, leaving about 14,466 active registered associations eligible to receive foreign contributions as of Ministry of Home Affairs data for September 2026.

    Why is foreign funding valued out of proportion to its size?

    1. Small in volume: The total volume of foreign aid to NGOs is small measured against government budgets, and only a small proportion of NGOs receive it at all.
    2. Flexibility is the real value: Foreign funding is an alternative source and a more flexible one, carrying fewer restrictions on how it may be used and tailored to an organisation’s needs through discussion between the NGO and the donor.
    3. The conditionality point: Different funding sources shape organisations and their effectiveness differently, which is the substance behind the observation that whoever pays the piper calls the tune.
    4. What the earlier research found: Desk research and interviews with NGOs of varying size recorded a minority reporting adverse consequences, specifically the adoption of ideas and practices from abroad unsuited to Indian conditions. Most reported that foreign funds contributed to India’s development and to the growth of the voluntary sector by bringing new ideas, techniques, technologies and organisational improvements.
    5. Why it filled a gap: Foreign aid played that role in the absence of adequate government funding and private philanthropy, and present receipts are larger than in 2006 to 2007, the last year for which comparable data were available when that research was published.

    What has changed in the funding environment?

    1. A more developed voluntary sector: The sector is more developed now than when foreign aid first became its flexible source of support.
    2. Donors are withdrawing on their own account: Bona fide foreign donors are moving away from giving to India because of economic difficulties at home and the perception that a country aiming to become the world’s third largest economy no longer needs their aid.
    3. The domestic alternative has improved: The domestic non government funding environment has strengthened over the same period.

    Can domestic philanthropy replace what is receding?

    1. The wealth base: Of 3,332 billionaires worldwide on the Forbes 2026 list, 229 are in India, the third largest number after the United States and China.
    2. Philanthropic volume: Private philanthropy was projected to reach Rs 1.43 lakh crore ($16 billion) in FY2025 per the India Philanthropy Report published by Bain and Company, with retail giving adding a further several thousand crore annually.
    3. The gap is widening, not closing: The same report projects demand growing faster than supply, with the gap reaching Rs 18 lakh crore ($210 billion) by 2030.
    4. Corporate social responsibility as the offset: CSR spending by listed companies reached Rs 22,563 crore in FY25, up 17.5%, following the Companies Act, 2013 mandate on companies above a specified size, and companies lacking internal competence in social development rely on NGOs as delivery partners.
    5. The mismatch in direction: New philanthropists, particularly entrepreneurs and technology leaders, are shifting from traditional giving toward ecosystem building, scientific research, higher education and complex institutional support. That is favourable for structural change and adverse for NGOs delivering traditional education, health and social welfare services.

    Challenges to the FCRA Amendment Bill, 2026

    1. Vesting precedes adjudication: Assets pass to the designated authority on cancellation, and the appeal to the District Judge is heard only after the organisation has lost control of them. Eg. Amnesty International India halted operations in 2020 after its accounts were frozen, before any adjudication had concluded.
      The Fix: Suspend vesting until the statutory appeal is decided, with an interim receiver operating the assets for the beneficiaries in the meantime.
    2. Services stop before culpability is established: Schools, hospitals and care homes tied to a suspended certificate halt operations during the provisional vesting period, irrespective of the eventual outcome. Eg. The Missionaries of Charity’s FCRA renewal lapsed in December 2021, suspending foreign funded operations across its homes until it was restored weeks later.
      The Fix: Ring fence frontline service assets from vesting and hand their operation to the State government of the district for the duration of the proceedings.
    3. Sale proceeds cannot be returned once absorbed: Money that reaches the Consolidated Fund of India can leave it only on an appropriation voted by Parliament, so restoration of registration cannot restore the asset. Eg. No administrative order can reverse a credit to the Consolidated Fund.
      The Fix: Hold sale proceeds in an escrow account outside the Consolidated Fund until the appeal period and any appeal are exhausted.
    4. Compliance cost falls hardest on small organisations: The 2020 amendment already required every recipient to operate a designated State Bank of India account in New Delhi, capped administrative expenses at 20% and barred sub granting, which removed the intermediary route through which grassroots bodies were funded. Eg. District level organisations that received foreign funds through a larger registered NGO lost that channel entirely.
      The Fix: Restore regulated sub granting to FCRA registered recipients with mandatory reporting on the onward transfer, along the lines of the light regulation approach the Vijay Kumar Committee proposed.

    Conclusion

    Whether the Bill is enacted decides how foreign funding ends, not whether it contracts, since the donors are already leaving. The future is not bleak if Indian domestic philanthropy steps into the space, and that requires indigenous donors and the government to become responsive to what NGOs actually need rather than replicating the conditionality that made government funding the harder money to use. What must change is the practice of funding itself: a serious dialogue on funding practice as distinct from development priorities, and the adoption by domestic donors of the flexibility that made foreign aid valuable out of proportion to its volume. The thing to watch is whether the traditional education, health and welfare organisations find a domestic source before the foreign one closes.

    NGO Sector in India

    1. What the sector is: Non governmental organisations, also described as civil society organisations, are voluntary not for profit entities operating independently of government on social, economic, environmental and political issues.
    2. Scale: India has over 34 lakh registered NGOs on the NITI Aayog Darpan portal, among the largest such sectors in the world.
    3. Three registration routes: Societies register under the Societies Registration Act, 1860; private trusts under the Indian Trusts Act, 1882 and public trusts under the relevant State legislation; and companies under Section 8 of the Companies Act, 2013.
    4. The foreign funding law: The Foreign Contribution (Regulation) Act, 2010 governs the receipt of foreign donations and requires that they be used for the purpose for which they were given.

    Government Initiatives for the NGO Sector

    1. NITI Aayog Darpan portal, 2015: Registration on the portal is mandatory to receive government grants and CSR funds, and it assigns each organisation a unique identifier and publishes its board members, projects and financials.
    2. Income Tax Act exemptions: Sections 12A and 12AB provide tax exemption to charitable trusts and NGOs, and Section 80G gives donors a 50% or 100% deduction, both subject to renewal every five years.
    3. Aspirational Districts Programme, 2018 and Aspirational Blocks Programme, 2023: NGOs are engaged as implementing and capacity building partners in identified districts and blocks.
    4. National Voluntary Sector Policy, 2007: The policy recognises the independence and autonomy of the sector, promotes multi stakeholder dialogue, and recommends simplified registration and transparent funding mechanisms.

    Matching Previous Year Question

    [2015] Examine critically the recent changes in the rules governing foreign funding of NGOs under the Foreign Contribution (Regulation) Act (FCRA), 1976.

  • To curb farm fires, Govt readies stiff ‘red entry’ rules in revenue records

    Why in the News

    The Ministry of Environment, Forest and Climate Change has published a draft of the Commission for Air Quality Management in National Capital Region and Adjoining Areas (Imposition, Collection and Utilization of Environmental Compensation for Stubble Burning) Rules, 2026. It specifies for the first time how long a red entry against a farmer’s land in the revenue record stays valid. The entry runs for 15 months from the date of the incident, and extends by a further 15 months where burning recurs or where the environmental compensation imposed is not paid. The parent Rules were notified in 2023 and carried the red entry provision without fixing its duration. A red entry makes it difficult for a farmer to raise a loan or mortgage the land, so the penalty operates through access to credit rather than through a fine alone. Farm unions have opposed the system since it was introduced, and the parliamentary standing committee on subordinate legislation has recommended a route out of it for farmers who change practice.

    What is a red entry in revenue records?

    1. The instrument: A red entry is an adverse remark recorded against a specific land parcel in the State’s revenue record, the register that establishes ownership and cultivation rights over that parcel.
    2. How it penalises: Lenders and registering authorities read the revenue record before sanctioning a loan or accepting land as security, so an adverse remark restricts credit and mortgage without any separate order being passed.
    3. What triggers it: It is made against land on which a stubble burning incident is detected, alongside the environmental compensation imposed on the basis of the size of the holding.
    4. Who maintains it: State revenue officials make and remove the entry, so a central air quality rule is enforced through a State land administration record.

    What has the draft changed?

    1. Validity fixed: The red entry is valid for 15 months from the date of the incident, which the 2023 Rules did not state.
    2. Expiry conditions: It expires where no subsequent stubble burning incident is found on that land. It also expires where the environmental compensation imposed has been deposited.
    3. Extension conditions: Where there is a subsequent incident on that land, or where the compensation imposed is not paid, the validity extends for a further 15 months.
    4. Compensation amounts untouched: The draft does not alter the compensation itself, which continues to be set by the size of the land holding.
    5. Use of the money: Compensation collected is to be spent on crop diversification programmes, biomass utilisation, research and development in crop residue management, and subsidies for residue management technology.
    6. The process ahead: The draft was published on 16 September with a two month window for objections and suggestions, so the change will not operate before the coming paddy harvest ends.

    Why does stubble burning persist in the sowing window?

    1. The cropping calendar: Farmers in Punjab, Haryana, Delhi and Uttar Pradesh sow wheat between mid September and early December, and burning clears the paddy residue in the short gap between the two crops.
    2. The pollution share: Crop residue burning contributes up to 35 percent of the pollutants in Delhi and the National Capital Region on some days.
    3. Cost of the alternative: The Bharatiya Kisan Union (Dakaunda) has asked for financial assistance for paddy stubble management in place of penalties, on the position that the machinery and its running cost fall on the farmer.
    4. Reach of the penalty: The union’s stated position is that the pollution problem cannot be settled by force, and it records that red entries made earlier were removed after protest and petitioning.

    How has the red entry worked across the States?

    1. Punjab: Farm unions there have raised grievances about loans, subsidies and the mortgaging of land arising from red entries.
    2. Haryana: In districts such as Kurukshetra, authorities have said the red entry will be made on the Meri Fasal Mera Byora portal, the State’s crop and farmer registration platform.
    3. The portal ban: A farmer marked on that portal is barred from it for two years, which removes access to the benefits of all agricultural schemes routed through it.
    4. The committee’s recommendation: In a February 2025 report, the parliamentary standing committee on subordinate legislation recommended an incentive based removal system, allowing early removal for farmers who take up sustainable farming practices or government supported stubble management programmes.

    Challenges to the red entry system

    1. Detection rests on satellite fire counts: Burning is identified from remote sensing passes that cross at fixed times of day, so a fire lit outside the pass window is not recorded and the penalty falls unevenly across farmers doing the same thing. Eg. Daily fire counts for Punjab and Haryana are compiled from the afternoon overpasses of polar orbiting satellites carrying moderate resolution imaging sensors.
      The Fix: Pair satellite detection with geotagged field verification by revenue staff before an entry is recorded against a parcel.
    2. The penalty attaches to the land, not the burner: The remark sits on the parcel, so a tenant’s act marks the owner’s title and the owner has no simple route to contest it. Eg. A large share of paddy land in Punjab is cultivated under informal tenancy that never enters the revenue register.
      The Fix: Record the cultivator’s identity alongside the entry and provide a time bound appeal to the district collector.
    3. Residue machinery reaches the larger holding first: Equipment such as the Happy Seeder and the Super Straw Management System is priced beyond a small holding, and the custom hiring centres that rent it out are unevenly spread. Eg. The Crop Residue Management scheme routes subsidised machinery through cooperative societies and custom hiring centres whose village level coverage varies widely.
      The Fix: Guarantee machinery availability by village for the two week window between harvest and sowing, with the hiring charge met from the compensation fund.
    4. Paddy straw has no standing buyer: High silica content and low fodder value mean paddy straw, unlike wheat straw, has no ready market, so burning remains the cheapest disposal route. Eg. Biomass power plants and compressed biogas units in Punjab absorb only a fraction of the paddy straw generated each season.
      The Fix: Fix an assured offtake price for straw delivered to biomass and compressed biogas plants, funded from the environmental compensation already collected.
    5. The enforcing government is not the government that gains: State revenue staff record the entry and face the same farming community on land, water and procurement, while the air quality benefit accrues to Delhi. Eg. Punjab and Haryana supply the bulk of the fire counts on which the Commission acts, and neither State is the one whose air the measure is designed to clean.
      The Fix: Fund a dedicated central verification and enforcement cadre for the sowing window, reporting its detections publicly rather than through the State revenue chain.

    Conclusion

    The draft settles how long the penalty lasts without settling what the penalty is for. A remark that blocks borrowing punishes the farmer as a debtor, while the machinery, the offtake and the alternative crop that would actually end the burning all require the farmer to be able to borrow. The comment window closes after the coming paddy harvest, so this season will run under the existing position. The point to watch is whether the final Rules carry a route out of the entry for a farmer who changes practice, since that is the one proposal on the table that ties removal to behaviour rather than to the passage of time.

    Back2Basics: Commission for Air Quality Management in NCR and Adjoining Areas

    1. What it is: A statutory body for better coordination, research, identification and resolution of problems relating to air quality in the National Capital Region and adjoining areas.
    2. Legal basis: It was constituted under the Commission for Air Quality Management in National Capital Region and Adjoining Areas Act, 2021, and it replaced the Environment Pollution (Prevention and Control) Authority.
    3. Jurisdiction: It covers Delhi and the areas of Haryana, Punjab, Rajasthan and Uttar Pradesh falling in the National Capital Region and adjoining areas, and its directions prevail over those of the State pollution control boards on air quality.
    4. Powers: It issues binding directions, imposes environmental compensation and operates measures such as the Graded Response Action Plan, and appeals against its orders lie to the National Green Tribunal.

    Matching Previous Year Question

    “[2021, GS3, 10] Describe the key points of the revised Global Air Quality Guidelines (AQGs) recently released by the World Health Organisation (WHO). How are these different from its last update in 2005? What changes in India’s National Clean Air Programme are required to achieve these revised standards?”

  • I&B Ministry notifies new film certification guidelines for CBFC

    Why in the News

    The Ministry of Information and Broadcasting (I&B) has notified revised film certification guidelines for the Central Board of Film Certification (CBFC). The guidelines retain every aspect of the detailed 1991 version and add exactly two points. One requires a disclaimer or statutory warning in scenes depicting or involving the use, consumption or trafficking of narcotic drugs or psychotropic substances. The other brings in the three new age markers under the UA (Unrestricted Public Exhibition With Parental Guidance) certificate, created by the Cinematograph Rules, 2024. The certification standards a film is judged against therefore remain those framed in 1991, while the certificate categories themselves were rewritten in 2024.

    What does the Central Board of Film Certification do?

    1. Its statutory basis: It is a statutory body under the Cinematograph Act, 1952, functioning under the Ministry of Information and Broadcasting.
    2. What it certifies: No film may be publicly exhibited in India unless it has been certified by the Board, so certification is a condition of release rather than an advisory rating.
    3. What the certificate decides: The Board may certify a film for unrestricted public exhibition, restrict it by age, restrict it to specialised audiences, or refuse certification, and it may require cuts as a condition of a category.
    4. What guides the decision: The Board applies guidelines notified by the central government under the Act, which is the instrument that has now been revised.

    What are the two additions to the guidelines?

    1. The narcotics warning: Scenes depicting or involving the use, consumption or trafficking of narcotic drugs or psychotropic substances must now carry the warning “Illicit Narcotics Destroy Health and Guarantees Imprisonment, Say No to Drugs.”
    2. The age markers: The guidelines now specify the three categories within the UA certificate, UA 7+, UA 13+ and UA 16+, marking content suitable for children aged seven, 13 and 16 respectively.
    3. What triggers an age marker: Where the Board considers it necessary to caution a parent or guardian on whether a ward may be allowed to see a film, it certifies the film for unrestricted public exhibition with an endorsement to that effect.

    What do the retained 1991 standards require?

    1. Crime and violence: The Board is to ensure that anti social activities and violence are not glorified or justified.
    2. Operational detail of crime: The modus operandi of criminals, and visuals or words likely to incite the commission of an offence, are not to be depicted.
    3. Alcohol: Scenes justifying or glorifying drinking are to be avoided.
    4. Children: Scenes showing children in violence as victims, perpetrators or forced witnesses, or subjected to any form of child abuse, are not to be presented needlessly.
    5. Disability and animals: The Board is to discourage scenes showing abuse or ridicule of persons with disabilities, and scenes showing cruelty to or abuse of animals.

    Why does the alignment with the 2024 categories matter?

    1. The gap it closes: The age bands were created in the Rules in 2024, while the guidelines the Board actually applies continued to describe a single undifferentiated UA category until this notification.
    2. What a graded band changes for a film: A film that would previously have carried one UA label now carries an age specific one, so the same content can be placed at a different point on the scale rather than cut to reach a category.
    3. Where the burden shifts: An age marker transfers the decision on viewing to the parent or guardian, since a UA film remains open to unrestricted public exhibition whatever the band.
    4. What the Board has asked of the industry: The Board’s Chairperson has asked filmmakers to study the revised guidelines before submitting applications, and asked film associations to circulate them within the industry.

    Challenges to the film certification framework

    1. Certification operates as prior restraint: A film cannot be exhibited at all until the Board clears it, so the delay in a decision has the same effect as a refusal for a film with a fixed release date. Eg. The Supreme Court upheld pre censorship of films in K.A. Abbas v. Union of India (1970), on the ground that film affects audiences differently from other media.
      The Fix: Fix a binding outer limit for the Board’s decision and treat expiry of that limit as deemed certification in the applied category.
    2. Standards are open ended in application: Terms such as glorification of violence or anti social activity are matters of judgement, so identical content can be treated differently across examining committees. Eg. The Cinematograph Act, 1952 grounds refusal in the reasonable restrictions of Article 19(2), which are broad heads rather than stated tests.
      The Fix: Publish the reasoned orders of examining and revising committees, so a standard is visible from decided cases rather than from the text alone.
    3. Extra statutory pressure after certification: A certified film still faces protest, litigation and State level obstruction, so certification does not settle the right to exhibit. Eg. In Prakash Jha Productions v. Union of India (2011) the Supreme Court held that a State cannot ban a certified film on law and order grounds and must maintain order instead.
      The Fix: Require a State suspending exhibition of a certified film to record reasons and obtain judicial confirmation within a fixed period.
    4. A single framework for unequal platforms: Films require certification while streaming content is governed by self regulation, so the same content faces different scrutiny by mode of release. Eg. Online curated content runs under the self classification and three tier grievance structure of the Information Technology (Intermediary Guidelines and Digital Media Ethics Code) Rules, 2021.
      The Fix: Align the age classification bands used in film certification with those used for online curated content, so one scale runs across platforms.
    5. Warnings substitute for classification: A mandatory on screen disclaimer is easy to add and easy to disregard, so it does little where the depiction itself is the concern. Eg. The statutory anti tobacco warning has run in Indian films for years alongside continued depiction of smoking.
      The Fix: Attach the depiction of narcotics to a defined age band in the classification scale, rather than treating the warning as the whole remedy.

    Conclusion

    The certification standards and the certificate categories were revised a generation apart, and this notification is the step that brings them into one document. The substantive tests a film is judged against remain those of 1991, so the change is one of classification rather than of standards. The guidelines are notified and in force, and the Board has asked the industry to study them before filing applications. The thing to watch is how the three UA bands are applied in practice, since a graded scale only changes outcomes if films are placed across it rather than clustered in one band.

    Back2Basics: Cinematograph (Amendment) Act, 2023

    1. What it introduced on piracy: It created offences for unauthorised recording and exhibition of films, with imprisonment of three months to three years and a fine.
    2. Age based categories: It replaced the single UA category with age based sub categories, which the Cinematograph Rules, 2024 then specified as UA 7+, UA 13+ and UA 16+.
    3. Validity of a certificate: It made a certificate valid perpetually, removing the earlier limit of ten years.
    4. Revisional power removed: It withdrew the central government’s revisional power over a certified film, in line with the Supreme Court’s ruling in Union of India v. K.M. Shankarappa (2000).

    Matching Previous Year Question

    “[2014, GS2, 12] What do you understand by the concept “freedom of speech and expression”? Does it cover hate speech also? Why do the films in India stand on a slightly different plane from other forms of expression? Discuss.”

  • JPC members question Centre on FCRA Bill’s asset takeover provisions

    Why in the News

    Parliament’s Joint Committee on the Foreign Contribution (Regulation) Amendment Bill, 2026 questioned the Centre on the Bill’s asset takeover provisions at its first meeting. The provision at issue vests foreign contributions and all assets created from them in a government appointed “designated authority” when an organisation’s Foreign Contribution (Regulation) Act (FCRA) certificate is cancelled, surrendered, or lapses automatically, without a prior hearing or a judicial determination. The Union Home Ministry defended the change as making the use of foreign contributions more transparent and accountable, and said a “prescribed authority” already exists under the present law. The tension is between an administrative gap the Ministry says it is closing and the constitutional bar on deprivation of property without due process. Opposition members of the Committee invoked Article 300A of the Constitution against the provision.

    What does the “designated authority” provision do?

    1. When it is triggered: It operates on three events, cancellation of an organisation’s FCRA certificate, its surrender by the organisation, and its automatic lapse.
    2. What vests: Foreign contributions already received and every asset created out of them pass to a government appointed designated authority.
    3. What it dispenses with: The vesting takes effect without a prior hearing for the organisation and without a judicial determination that the assets should pass.
    4. How wide the power is: The authority is to hold powers of a wide ambit over those assets, which is the specific feature the Committee’s members contested.

    What is the Ministry’s stated rationale for the change?

    1. A custodian already exists in law: The present Act provides for a “prescribed authority”, identified by a notification of 5 November 2018 as the Additional Chief Secretary or Principal Secretary (Home) of the State or Union Territory concerned.
    2. The custodian cannot act: There is no deadline on that custodianship under the current law, which leaves the prescribed authority a “passive custodian” unable to take substantive decisions on assets.
    3. No procedure for the handover: The law lays down no standard procedure for taking possession of such assets, maintaining inventories, or separating foreign contribution assets from domestically funded ones.
    4. The cost of open ended custody: Prolonged custodianship leaves States facing budgetary and manpower constraints in running vested institutions such as schools, hospitals and orphanages.
    5. Two silences in the existing law: The Act says nothing on the final disposal of vested assets and nothing on the treatment of places of worship.

    On what constitutional ground is the provision contested?

    1. The provision relied on: Opposition members of the Committee argued that deprivation of property cannot be permitted without a prior hearing, relying on Article 300A of the Constitution.
    2. What Article 300A guarantees: It states that no person shall be deprived of property save by authority of law, so a taking requires a valid law and a fair procedure even though property is no longer a fundamental right.
    3. Why automatic vesting is the pressure point: Cancellation, surrender and lapse are administrative events, so tying the transfer of assets to them removes any stage at which the organisation is heard before it loses them.
    4. What it leaves unsettled: The Ministry’s own submission records that the law is silent on final disposal, so an organisation whose certificate later stands restored has no stated route back to its assets.

    Why did the Ministry’s presentation on religious groups draw objection?

    1. What the presentation contained: It catalogued foreign contributions received by different religious groups and highlighted that a majority of the funds went to Christian organisations.
    2. The objection raised: Members questioned the rationale for segregating contributions received under religious heads at all.
    3. Why the classification matters: A regulatory case built on the religious identity of recipients shifts the test from how funds were used to who received them.

    Why is the FCRA framed as a national security law?

    1. The Ministry’s characterisation: The Home Ministry told the Committee that the latest amendment is at its core a “national security” legislation.
    2. The origin of the statute: The FCRA was enacted in 1976, amid Cold War era mistrust of Western influence and concern over threats to India’s sovereignty and democratic institutions.
    3. What preceded it: Before 1976, non governmental organisations receiving foreign funds operated under general laws such as the Societies Registration Act, the Trusts Act and the Companies Act.
    4. The gap it filled: Those general laws carried no centralised mechanism to monitor foreign contributions, which is the function the FCRA introduced.

    Challenges to the FCRA regulatory framework

    1. Sanction without a judicial stage: Cancellation, and now the vesting of assets, follow executive determination, so an organisation contests the outcome after it has already taken effect. Eg. The vesting under the Bill operates with no prior hearing and no judicial determination.
      The Fix: Require a reasoned show cause order and a hearing before vesting, with the transfer suspended until an appellate forum has ruled.
    2. Suspension operates as a penalty on its own: A certificate suspended pending inquiry stops foreign funds immediately, so service delivery halts before any finding is recorded. Eg. Registration of the Centre for Policy Research was cancelled in 2024 after a prolonged suspension, ending its foreign funded research programmes.
      The Fix: Cap the suspension period in the statute and require the inquiry to conclude within it or the certificate to revive automatically.
    3. Compliance costs fall hardest on small organisations: Annual returns, a designated single bank account and renewal every five years require dedicated staff that a small grassroots body does not have. Eg. The 2020 amendment required every recipient to route foreign funds through a designated account at a single branch of the State Bank of India in New Delhi.
      The Fix: Set a simplified filing track and a longer renewal cycle for organisations below a stated annual receipt threshold.
    4. A ban on transfers breaks the funding chain: Prohibiting an FCRA holder from passing funds to another organisation cuts off smaller field level bodies that never receive foreign money directly. Eg. The Foreign Contribution (Regulation) Amendment Act, 2020 barred transfer of foreign contribution to any other person, including another FCRA registered body.
      The Fix: Permit onward transfer to a registered recipient with reporting of the transfer, so the audit trail is preserved without ending sub granting.
    5. Regulatory reach shapes advocacy as much as accounting: Where funding status turns on administrative discretion, an organisation adjusts its public positions to protect its registration. Eg. The Supreme Court upheld the 2020 amendments in Noel Harper v. Union of India (2022), holding that no organisation has a vested right to receive foreign contribution.
      The Fix: Publish the grounds and the evidentiary standard for every cancellation, so refusal is testable against a stated rule rather than inferred.

    Conclusion

    The Bill is at the start of committee scrutiny and the disagreement is already about process rather than purpose. Both sides accept that custody of assets after a certificate ends is currently unregulated, and they differ on whether the answer is an authority that can act at once or a procedure that must be completed before it acts. The unresolved question is what happens to an organisation that succeeds on appeal after its assets have already vested, since the Ministry’s own submission records that the law is silent on final disposal. The next milestone is the Joint Committee’s examination of the Bill and the report it returns to Parliament.

    Back2Basics: Foreign Contribution (Regulation) Act, 2010

    1. What it replaced: It repealed and replaced the 1976 Act, and is administered by the Ministry of Home Affairs.
    2. What it regulates: It governs the acceptance and utilisation of foreign contribution and foreign hospitality by persons and associations, to ensure they do not act against the national interest.
    3. Registration and its renewal: An association must hold registration or prior permission to receive foreign contribution, and registration is valid for five years and renewable.
    4. Who is barred outright: Election candidates, judges, government servants, members of a legislature, journalists and editors of registered newspapers, and political parties are prohibited from accepting foreign contribution.

    Matching Previous Year Question

    “[2015, GS2, 12] Examine critically the recent changes in the rules governing foreign funding of NGOs under the Foreign Contribution (Regulation) Act (FCRA), 1976.”

  • What is the Uniform Civil Code debate?

    Why in the News

    The Union Home Minister has indicated that the Uniform Civil Code (UCC) would be implemented in all 21 States ruled by the National Democratic Alliance (NDA) by 2029. The statement builds on enactment that has already begun. Uttarakhand has had a UCC in force since January 2025, and UCC bills passed by the legislatures of Assam, Gujarat and Madhya Pradesh are awaiting Presidential assent. The tension the debate turns on is between two constitutional claims. Article 44 directs the State to endeavour to secure a UCC, while Article 25 guarantees the right to practise a religion of one’s choice and Article 29 protects the right of any section of citizens to conserve its distinct culture.

    What is a Uniform Civil Code?

    1. What it does: A UCC would apply the same set of secular personal laws to all people, irrespective of religion, caste or tribe.
    2. Its constitutional basis: Article 44 provides that the State shall endeavour to secure a UCC for citizens throughout India.
    3. What is already uniform: India already has uniform criminal laws, and common civil laws covering matters such as taxation, contracts and negotiable instruments.
    4. What is not: Marriage, divorce and inheritance of property remain governed by personal laws based on religious doctrines.

    How are personal matters governed today?

    1. Hindus: Governed by laws such as the Hindu Marriage Act (1955) and the Hindu Succession Act (1956).
    2. Tribals within the Hindu religion: Many may follow customary family laws under constitutional exceptions rather than the codified Hindu statutes.
    3. Jains, Buddhists and Sikhs: Covered by Hindu laws, with Sikh marriages also registrable under the Anand Marriage Act (2012).
    4. Christians and Parsis: Each community has its own personal laws.
    5. Muslims: Governed by the Muslim Personal Law (Shariat) Application Act (1937).

    Why did the Constituent Assembly place the UCC in Part IV?

    1. The Assembly was divided: The framers did not reach agreement on whether a UCC belonged in the Constitution at all.
    2. The case for a Fundamental Right: Some members wanted it made a Fundamental Right, to ensure uniformity in civil laws and secure equal rights for women.
    3. The objection raised: Many members of the Muslim community opposed its inclusion, on the ground that a uniform civil code would violate the fundamental right to religion guaranteed in Part III.
    4. The settlement reached: The provision was placed in the non justiciable Part IV, the Directive Principles of State Policy, so it directs the State without being enforceable in a court.

    What are the arguments in favour of a UCC?

    1. Secularism in substance: Subjecting all citizens to the same personal laws would make India secular in the true sense, rather than leaving the State to administer a different law for each community.
    2. Gender justice: A UCC would ensure equal rights for women across religions in the matters governed by personal laws, which is described as the most vital argument for it.

    What are the arguments against a UCC?

    1. Conflict with the right to religion: Article 25 guarantees every person a fundamental right to practise a religion of one’s choice, and a UCC’s provisions on personal matters may run contrary to the scriptures of a religion.
    2. Conflict with cultural rights: Article 29 gives any section of citizens a fundamental right to conserve its distinct culture, which the codification of family matters may cut across.
    3. The tribal exemption: All four States that have enacted a UCC have exempted the tribal population from its ambit, on the grounds of constitutional safeguards protecting tribal culture and the belief that many tribal customs already provide adequate rights to women.
    4. Why that exemption is contested: Exempting one section of society while making the code compulsory for all other groups, including religious minorities, is discriminatory on its face.

    How have the courts and the Law Commission framed the way forward?

    1. Article 25 is not unqualified: The right to religion is subject to constitutional morality and to other fundamental rights, including equality.
    2. The Supreme Court on cultural protection: In the Section 6A of the Citizenship Act, 1955 (2024) case, the Court held that practices such as casteism and gender discrimination, which run against the spirit of the Constitution, would not receive protection under Article 29.
    3. Ambedkar’s voluntary route: In the Constituent Assembly, B.R. Ambedkar advocated a UCC but suggested it could remain voluntary, with Parliament providing for it to apply to citizens who declare they are willing to be bound by it.
    4. The Law Commission’s position: Its Consultation Paper on Reform of Family Law (2018) held that a UCC was neither necessary nor desirable at this stage, and argued instead for reforming discriminatory provisions across personal laws.
    5. The standard it proposed: The emphasis should be on achieving “equality within communities” between men and women, rather than “equality between communities”, through legislative reform of marriage, divorce, custody, adoption, maintenance, succession and inheritance.

    Challenges to a Uniform Civil Code

    1. No published draft to debate: The argument runs on positions rather than on text, because no model code has been placed in the public domain for the country as a whole. Eg. The 22nd Law Commission sought public views on the UCC in 2023 without circulating a draft code alongside the notice.
      The Fix: Publish a model draft code for consultation before further State enactments, so objections attach to clauses rather than to the idea.
    2. State by State enactment fragments uniformity: Personal law sits in the Concurrent List, so separate State codes can produce different rules on the same subject and defeat the uniformity the code is named for. Eg. Entry 5 of the Concurrent List covers marriage, divorce, infants and minors, adoption, wills and succession.
      The Fix: Anchor the State codes to a central framework law so the substantive rules converge even where each State enacts its own.
    3. Scope creep beyond family law: A code enacted to equalise rights in marriage and succession can extend into regulating private arrangements that no personal law governed. Eg. Uttarakhand’s code makes registration of a live in relationship compulsory, with a penalty for failure to register.
      The Fix: Confine the code to marriage, divorce, maintenance, adoption and succession, and drop registration duties that create fresh offences.
    4. Adjudication capacity: Codification moves disputes into family courts that already carry long pendency, so a new right delivers slowly in practice. Eg. Family courts constituted under the Family Courts Act, 1984 carry pendency running into lakhs of cases.
      The Fix: Expand family court benches and statutory mediation capacity before any commencement date is notified.

    Conclusion

    The debate is no longer only about Article 44 in the abstract, since four States have already legislated and the stated target is all 21 NDA ruled States by 2029. The unresolved question is whether equality in personal law is better reached by replacing the personal laws or by reforming the discriminatory provisions inside each of them, which is the choice between the State codes and the Law Commission’s 2018 position. The immediate marker is Presidential assent for the codes passed by the legislatures of Assam, Gujarat and Madhya Pradesh.

    Back2Basics: Directive Principles of State Policy (DPSP)

    1. Where they sit: Part IV of the Constitution, Articles 36 to 51, setting out goals the State is to pursue in making law and policy.
    2. Their legal force: Article 37 makes them non justiciable, so no court can enforce them, while declaring them fundamental in the governance of the country.
    3. Their source: The idea was drawn from the Irish Constitution, which in turn borrowed it from the Spanish Constitution.
    4. Their relationship with rights: They are read alongside the Fundamental Rights in Part III, and courts use them to interpret the scope of those rights rather than to override them.

    Matching Previous Year Question

    “[2015, GS2, 12] Discuss the possible factors that inhibit India from enacting for its citizens a uniform civil code as provided for in the Directive Principles of State Policy.”

  • Mining amendment is unfair to States

    Mining amendment is unfair to States

    Why in the News

    Section 9D of the Mines and Minerals (Development and Regulation) Amendment Act, 2026 restricts State governments from imposing taxes, cesses or other levies on mineral rights or mineral-bearing land, except in accordance with conditions prescribed by the Centre. The provision follows Mineral Area Development Authority vs. Steel Authority of India (2024), in which a nine-judge Bench of the Supreme Court held that royalty payable on minerals is not a tax. The same Bench recognised the States’ legislative power to tax mineral rights and held that mineral-bearing land falls within the States’ taxation power over land. The tension is that Entry 50 of the State List lets Parliament limit State taxation of mineral rights, while the new section extends its restriction to levies on mineral-bearing land, a separate power under Entry 49 of the State List. What is contested is not the revenue States receive today but the levies they may be barred from raising tomorrow.

    What does Section 9D do?

    1. Scope of the restriction: It bars States from imposing taxes, cesses or other levies on mineral rights or on mineral-bearing land except as the Centre prescribes.
    2. Where the discretion sits: The conditions under which a State may levy are set by the Central government, so future State levies depend on a framework the Centre controls.
    3. What it does not touch: Royalty, the auction premium and the other mineral revenues States currently receive are not altered by the section.

    What is the Centre’s case for a uniform levy framework?

    1. Predictability for investors: The stated objective is to create a predictable tax environment, prevent excessive levies and encourage long-term investment in mining.
    2. Project horizons: Mining projects involve enormous investment and operate over decades, so investors need assurance that financial rules will not change unpredictably from one year to the next.
    3. Revenue assurance offered: The Centre’s position is that 90% of mining sector revenue accrues to the States and that this will continue.

    Why do mineral-rich States object?

    1. Uneven distribution of the resource: India’s mineral wealth is concentrated rather than spread evenly. Odisha, Jharkhand, Chhattisgarh and Karnataka hold enormous reserves of coal, iron ore and other minerals that feed industries across the country.
    2. Costs land on the host State: The host State handles resettlement of displaced groups, environmental damage, pressure on public infrastructure and the long-term consequences of extracting minerals that can never be replaced.
    3. Budgets tied to mining receipts: NITI Aayog’s Fiscal Health Index has recognised the role mining receipts play in the strong revenue mobilisation performance of Odisha and Chhattisgarh. Mining accounts for a large proportion of Odisha’s non-tax revenue.
    4. Higher spending needs in mineral districts: Mineral producing districts require greater public expenditure precisely because they bear the costs of mining.
    5. Loss of a natural advantage: A mineral-rich State ordinarily expects some ability to convert that advantage into resources for its own development, and the section substantially reduces that freedom.

    What is the constitutional objection to Section 9D?

    1. Entry 50 and its built-in limit: The Constitution gives States the power to tax mineral rights under Entry 50 of the State List, subject to limitations Parliament may impose through laws relating to mineral development.
    2. Entry 49 is a separate power: The power to tax lands and buildings under Entry 49 of the State List is a distinct constitutional head and carries no equivalent parliamentary limitation clause.
    3. Where the section goes further: By extending the restriction to taxes or levies on mineral-bearing land, the section reaches a power Entry 50 does not authorise Parliament to limit.
    4. Risk to the 2024 ruling: The amendment risks rendering the impact of the nine-judge ruling nugatory, since a power the Court affirmed can be neutralised by prescription rather than by overruling.
    5. The question it raises: How far can a Central law dealing with mineral development restrict a State’s exclusive power to tax land is now a live constitutional question rather than a mining policy dispute.

    Challenges to Section 9D

    1. Responsibility without fiscal capacity: A federal system cannot function where States carry obligations they have no independent means to fund. Eg. Mineral districts must fund resettlement and infrastructure repair from receipts the Centre may now condition.
      The Fix: Confine the prescribed conditions to levies on mineral rights under Entry 50 and leave the Entry 49 land taxation power untouched.
    2. Predictability purchased by narrowing State choice: Uniformity makes taxation more predictable for investors and reduces the fiscal options available to States. Eg. A State cannot design a mineral-linked levy to fund a district-specific rehabilitation programme without Central prescription.
      The Fix: Set a ceiling on State mineral levies in the statute itself rather than routing each levy through Central approval, so investors get the certainty without the States losing the power.
    3. Litigation risk over a settled question: A provision that neutralises a nine-judge ruling by executive prescription invites a fresh round of constitutional challenge. Eg. Mineral Area Development Authority vs. Steel Authority of India itself ran for decades before it was settled in 2024.
      The Fix: Refer the scope of Section 9D to the Inter-State Council under Article 263 before conditions are prescribed, so the levy framework is negotiated rather than litigated.
    4. Concentration of the burden on a few States: The section’s cost is borne almost entirely by a handful of mineral-bearing States rather than spread across the Union. Eg. Odisha, Jharkhand, Chhattisgarh and Karnataka carry the bulk of the country’s coal and iron ore output.
      The Fix: Weight mineral-bearing districts explicitly in the next Finance Commission’s horizontal devolution formula, so extraction costs are recognised in transfers.

    Conclusion

    The minerals beneath a State’s soil serve the entire country, and the costs of extracting them are felt most directly by the people who live above them. A State that bears the infrastructural and social consequences of extraction must retain a meaningful stake in the economic value its natural resources generate. The unresolved point is whether a Central law on mineral development may condition a State’s power to tax land, a power the Constitution places under a separate entry and does not subject to parliamentary limitation. That question now sits between a statute in force and a nine-judge ruling that has not been overruled.

    What is Fiscal Federalism?

    1. About: It is the division of taxation powers, expenditure responsibilities and transfer arrangements between the levels of government in a federation.
    2. Rationale: It exists because the level of government best placed to raise a tax is often not the level that must spend on the service, so the design has to close that gap without destroying accountability.
    3. Vertical imbalance: The Union raises a larger share of revenue than it spends directly, while States carry the larger share of expenditure obligations, and transfers bridge the difference.
    4. Horizontal imbalance: Revenue capacity differs sharply across States of similar need, which is why devolution formulas weight income distance, area and population rather than collections alone.

    Back2Basics: NITI Aayog’s Fiscal Health Index

    1. What it is: A composite index published by NITI Aayog that ranks States on the quality of their public finances.
    2. What it measures: It scores States on sub-indices covering quality of expenditure, revenue mobilisation, fiscal prudence, debt index and debt sustainability.
    3. First edition: The maiden report was released in January 2025 and covered 18 major States.
    4. Why it matters here: It is the benchmark that records mining receipts as a driver of revenue mobilisation performance in mineral-bearing States.

    Matching Previous Year Question

    [2025] Examine the evolving pattern of Centre-State financial relations in the context of planned development in India. How far have the recent reforms impacted the fiscal federalism in India?

  • Let’s curb misuse of a legal relic that elevates the mob over the individual

    Why in the News

    Section 295A of the Indian Penal Code, 1860, re-codified as Section 299 of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita (BNS), is under fresh criticism for converting subjective offence into a cognisable, non-bailable criminal charge. The provision was introduced by the British in 1927 during the “Rangeela Rasool” controversy, after a provocative Urdu pamphlet satirising the Prophet Muhammad’s personal life sparked widespread communal riots. It survives in independent India under Article 19(2) of the Constitution, which permits speech restrictions in the interests of public order. The tension is between a criminal provision built to preserve public order and a constitutional guarantee of expression that the provision’s procedure defeats before any court examines malice.

    What does Section 299 of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita cover?

    1. The offence: It penalises deliberate and malicious acts intended to outrage religious feelings, which was the stated purpose when Section 295A was enacted in 1927.
    2. Colonial rationale: It was born of a colonial urge to police Indian subjects deemed too volatile to handle the friction of free and provocative speech.
    3. Procedural character: The offence is cognisable and non-bailable, so the police may register a case and arrest without a magistrate’s prior direction and bail is not a matter of right.
    4. Constitutional validity: Ramji Lal Modi vs State of Uttar Pradesh (1957) upheld Section 295A, reading the words “deliberate and malicious” as the narrowing element that keeps it within Article 19(2).

    How does the provision create a heckler’s veto?

    1. Offence converted into an offence in law: Translating the subjective and volatile idea of “emotional hurt” into a criminal charge hands a permanent “heckler’s veto” to the most intolerant segments of society.
    2. Inverted hierarchy of rights: It creates a perverse incentive for outrage by elevating “the right to be offended” above the right to free speech.
    3. Low threshold to trigger the state: One aggrieved individual filing a First Information Report (FIR) in a remote corner of the country instantly triggers the machinery of the state.
    4. Who it is triggered against: Writers, filmmakers, stand-up comedians and publishers face it for speech that a court often finds, years later, was never malicious at all.
    5. Incentive for entrepreneurs of grievance: Political entrepreneurs, religious zealots and competitive vigilante groups find that claiming wounded sentiment is the easiest path to public relevance.

    What does the resulting self-censorship look like?

    1. Withdrawal of a published work: Penguin Books India withdrew distribution of Joe Sacco’s graphic novel on the Muzaffarnagar riots.
    2. Pulping of an academic work: The same publisher had earlier pulped copies of Wendy Doniger’s *The Hindus*.
    3. Pre-emptive editing: Cuts were sought to Sonia Gandhi’s memoirs that the publisher’s global arm had not considered necessary for the international edition.
    4. None of it was legally required: None of these texts was legally proscribed, so each was a pre-emptive surrender in which commercial risk aversion replaced constitutional principle.
    5. Spread beyond publishing: Galleries pull provocative paintings, studios quietly cancel scripts and academics choose safer research topics, leaving a public square reduced to bland conformity.

    Why is the process itself the punishment?

    1. Arrest precedes any finding: The law allows arrest before a trial can establish whether malice existed, so the element that makes the act criminal is tested last.
    2. Cost of defending the case: Multi-city court appearances, jail time and financial ruin break the spirit of an artist or author irrespective of the eventual verdict.
    3. Behavioural consequence: When the cost of creative expression is the potential loss of personal liberty, most creators choose to pull their punches.

    What did the 2008 Delhi High Court ruling on M F Husain establish?

    1. What the judgment did: It quashed criminal proceedings against the self-exiled painter M F Husain and set out a defence of artistic liberty against intolerance.
    2. How the charges were answered: The ruling dismantled the obscenity and blasphemy charges by placing Husain’s abstract nude depiction of Bharat Mata within India’s four-millennia-old heritage of sacred, pluralistic and erotic iconography, from Khajuraho to Konark.
    3. The warning it recorded: It critiqued the “new puritanism” pursued by self-appointed guardians of cultural purity and warned that such a society would push India backward.
    4. The principle it fixed: One disapproving viewer cannot hold the right to restrict free expression, which is the constitutional shield the ruling established for creative dissent.

    What reforms would reverse the incentive structure?

    1. Prior sanction before the FIR: Government sanction should be required before an FIR under BNS 299 is registered, rather than after the accused has already endured an investigation and a chargesheet.
    2. Consolidation of parallel FIRs: Multiple FIRs on the same subject lodged in different States should be consolidated immediately into a single proceeding.
    3. Fast-tracking of quashing petitions: BNS 299 cases should be fast-tracked so that frivolous proceedings are quashed early rather than after years.
    4. Costs on vexatious complainants: Vexatious complainants should face costs or other punitive consequences, so the incentive structure of the provision is reversed rather than reinforced.

    Conclusion

    Scrutiny of intent currently arrives at the end of the process, by which point the prosecution has already imposed the cost the provision was never meant to impose. Moving that scrutiny to the point before registration is what separates a public order safeguard from a licence for organised offence-taking. The unresolved conflict is between a constitutional test that turns on deliberate malice and a procedure that reaches arrest before malice is examined at all. Until the procedure is changed, the outcome of a case will continue to matter less than the fact of one.

    What is freedom of speech and expression under the Constitution?

    1. About: Article 19(1)(a) guarantees every citizen the right to freedom of speech and expression, read to include the right to receive and circulate information.
    2. Rationale: The guarantee protects the process by which citizens form and contest opinions, so it exists to shield unpopular expression rather than agreeable expression.
    3. The restriction clause: Article 19(2) permits reasonable restrictions on eight grounds, the sovereignty and integrity of India, the security of the State, friendly relations with foreign States, public order, decency or morality, contempt of court, defamation and incitement to an offence.
    4. The reasonableness test: A restriction must fall within one of those eight grounds and must be reasonable, which is why Shreya Singhal vs Union of India (2015) struck down Section 66A of the Information Technology Act, 2000 as vague and overbroad.

    Back2Basics: Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023

    1. What it is: The statute that replaced the Indian Penal Code, 1860 as India’s principal criminal law.
    2. When it took effect: It came into force on 1 July 2024, alongside the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 and the Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023.
    3. Structure: It carries 358 sections against the 511 of the Code it replaced, with several offences merged or renumbered.
    4. Relevance here: Section 295A of the Indian Penal Code is carried forward as Section 299, so the offence survives the recodification substantially unchanged.

    Matching Previous Year Question

    “What do you understand by the concept “freedom of speech and expression”? Does it cover hate speech also? Why do the films in India stand on a slightly different plane from other forms of expression? Discuss.”

  • BJP’s states route to UCC, over one central law

    Why in the News

    The Union Home Minister has said the Uniform Civil Code (UCC) will be introduced in all 21 Bharatiya Janata Party led National Democratic Alliance ruled states before the 2029 Lok Sabha elections. The abolition of triple talaq was cited in the same statement as part of the effort to provide equal rights to Muslim women. The commitment follows a settled preference within the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS) since 2023 that states enact their own codes first, with the Centre considering an overarching law later, so what had been a state first strategy now carries a date. The tension is constitutional as much as political: Entry 5 of the Concurrent List lets every state legislate its own code, so a promise of uniformity is being delivered through four statutes that are similar but not identical, and none of which is literally universal.

    What is the Uniform Civil Code?

    1. Constitutional source: The promise stems from Article 44, which says the State shall endeavour to secure for the citizens a uniform civil code throughout the territory of India.
    2. Adoption: The Constituent Assembly adopted the Article on 23 November 1948 after a spirited debate, and had no consensus on what such a code would actually contain.
    3. Enforceability: The Article sits among the Directive Principles of State Policy, and under Article 37 those principles are fundamental to governance but are not enforceable by any court.

    Why is the code being legislated state by state rather than through one central law?

    1. Legislative competence: Marriage, divorce, adoption, wills, intestacy, succession and joint family matters fall under Entry 5 of the Concurrent List, giving both Parliament and state legislatures competence over them.
    2. Variation in personal law: A single national code would have to negotiate enormous variation in personal laws and customary practices, particularly among tribal communities and in the Northeast.
    3. Codification is not like criminal law: The recorded objection in 2023 was that a civil code could not simply be codified the way criminal law was, because a tribal community in Uttarakhand or Himachal Pradesh practises very differently from one in Chhattisgarh or the Northeast.
    4. Political utility of the state route: Legislating state by state allows different models to be tested, local customs to be accommodated and implementation to be demonstrated, without first confronting the full political and constitutional complexity of a nationwide law.
    5. The Sangh’s stated caution: The RSS position in 2023 was that the subject required deeper study and wider consultation because it affected every section of society. The RSS general secretary welcomed the Uttarakhand model in March 2024 and said it should be studied and implemented across the country.

    What do the four enacted state codes actually contain?

    1. Uttarakhand: The only code currently in force, implemented in January 2025, it provides common rules on marriage, divorce, inheritance and succession, prohibits polygamy and mandates marriage registration.
    2. Regulation of live in relationships: Its most distinctive feature requires couples to register the relationship and its termination, while recognising children born of such relationships as legitimate.
    3. Gujarat: The Assembly passed its Bill in March 2026, broadly following the Uttarakhand model on marriage, divorce, succession and live in relationships, and prohibiting bigamy.
    4. Assam: The Bill was passed in May, covering marriage, divorce, succession and live in relationships, prohibiting polygamy and making live in registration compulsory.
    5. Madhya Pradesh: The Bill was passed in July and additionally covers adoption, with provisions relating to triple talaq and nikah halala, alongside live in registration and a bar on polygamy.
    6. Scheduled Tribes are excluded: All four laws exclude Scheduled Tribes, and Uttarakhand also exempts certain communities protected by constitutional customary law provisions.

    What has the Law Commission said?

    1. The 2018 position: The 21st Law Commission, in its Consultation Paper on Reform of Family Law (2018), said a uniform civil code was “neither necessary nor desirable at this stage”.
    2. Equality within over equality between: Its emphasis was on achieving “equality within communities” between men and women rather than “equality between” communities, reforming discriminatory provisions across personal laws while preserving diversity.
    3. Piecemeal change over absolute uniformity: It preferred making piecemeal changes to imposing absolute uniformity, and flagged the constitutional protections enjoyed by tribal and northeastern communities as a complication.
    4. The issue reopened: The 22nd Law Commission reopened the matter in 2023, seeking fresh views from the public and from recognised religious organisations, on the ground that more than three years had elapsed since the 2018 consultation and that developments including court orders warranted fresh examination.

    Where do the Opposition and the NDA allies stand?

    1. The Opposition’s framing: Opposition parties have questioned whether the code is genuinely a gender equality reform or an attempt to alter the personal laws of minorities through a majoritarian framework.
    2. State level opposition: The Congress opposed the Gujarat Bill as directed against Muslims, and in Madhya Pradesh criticised the legislation as an RSS agenda.
    3. Assam’s Opposition: Opposition parties there sought wider consultation and raised concerns over the tribal exemption and the regulation of live in relationships.
    4. Janata Dal (United): The party has consistently said it is not opposed to a uniform code but wants it to emerge through consensus rather than imposition. Its president told the Law Commission that such a code should respect India’s “delicate balance” between different religious and ethnic groups.
    5. Telugu Desam Party: The party has called for discussion and consensus, and in 2024 said it would ensure that Muslim interests were protected.

    Challenges to the Uniform Civil Code

    1. Four codes do not produce one code: Legislating separately in each state produces similar but not identical statutes, so uniformity is not what the project delivers. Eg. Madhya Pradesh’s law covers adoption, triple talaq and nikah halala, while Uttarakhand’s does not.
      The Fix: Anchor state enactments to a model law drafted by the Law Commission, so the substantive rules converge even where the enacting legislature differs.
    2. Exclusion of Scheduled Tribes: A code that exempts Scheduled Tribes leaves the customary law of a large population outside the very uniformity it is named for. Eg. All four enacted codes carry the exclusion, and Uttarakhand exempts further protected communities.
      The Fix: State the constitutional basis of the exemption openly, in the Fifth and Sixth Schedule protections, rather than leaving it as a silent exception.
    3. Directive Principles create no claimable right: Article 44 gives a citizen nothing to enforce, so the pace and the content of the code are settled entirely by political choice. Eg. The Article has stood since the Constitution commenced without any central statute enacted under it.
      The Fix: Route the contested questions through parliamentary scrutiny of a draft bill, so the content is debated before it binds anyone.
    4. Registration of private relationships: Compulsory registration of a live in relationship and of its termination extends the state into conduct that was previously unregulated. Eg. Uttarakhand’s code requires both the registration and the recorded termination of such a relationship.
      The Fix: Limit registration to the consequences the state must settle, namely the legitimacy of children and maintenance, rather than the existence of the relationship itself.
    5. Federal friction on a Concurrent List subject: A later central law can override a state code on the same entry, so the states legislating first face the prospect of their statutes being displaced. Eg. Article 254 gives a central law precedence over a repugnant state law on a Concurrent List subject.
      The Fix: Reserve state codes for Presidential assent under Article 254(2), which protects them until Parliament legislates on the same matter.

    Conclusion

    The commitment now carries a date, and the instrument chosen to meet it remains the state legislature rather than Parliament. That choice buys the ability to work around customary law without arguing a national case, and it also guarantees the codes keep diverging as each state adds subjects of its own. What is unresolved is whether uniformity describes the outcome or only the ambition. The thing to watch is whether an overarching central law is eventually brought, because the moment it is, the enacted state codes become the question rather than the answer.

    Back2Basics

    1. What it is: The Law Commission of India is a non statutory executive body constituted by the Ministry of Law and Justice, and it is not created by any Act of Parliament.
    2. Term and composition: It is constituted afresh for a fixed term, normally three years, and is headed by a chairperson who is usually a retired judge, with full time and part time members.
    3. First Commission: The first Law Commission of independent India was constituted in 1955, chaired by the then Attorney General for India.
    4. Weight of its output: Its reports and consultation papers are recommendatory, so the government is free to act on them, to act against them, or to leave them unacted.

    Matching Previous Year Question

    “[2015, GS2, 12.5 marks] Discuss the possible factors that inhibit India from enacting for its citizens a uniform civil code as provided for in the Directive Principles of State Policy.”