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Type: Bills/Act/Laws

  • I&B Ministry notifies new film certification guidelines for CBFC

    Why in the News

    The Ministry of Information and Broadcasting (I&B) has notified revised film certification guidelines for the Central Board of Film Certification (CBFC). The guidelines retain every aspect of the detailed 1991 version and add exactly two points. One requires a disclaimer or statutory warning in scenes depicting or involving the use, consumption or trafficking of narcotic drugs or psychotropic substances. The other brings in the three new age markers under the UA (Unrestricted Public Exhibition With Parental Guidance) certificate, created by the Cinematograph Rules, 2024. The certification standards a film is judged against therefore remain those framed in 1991, while the certificate categories themselves were rewritten in 2024.

    What does the Central Board of Film Certification do?

    1. Its statutory basis: It is a statutory body under the Cinematograph Act, 1952, functioning under the Ministry of Information and Broadcasting.
    2. What it certifies: No film may be publicly exhibited in India unless it has been certified by the Board, so certification is a condition of release rather than an advisory rating.
    3. What the certificate decides: The Board may certify a film for unrestricted public exhibition, restrict it by age, restrict it to specialised audiences, or refuse certification, and it may require cuts as a condition of a category.
    4. What guides the decision: The Board applies guidelines notified by the central government under the Act, which is the instrument that has now been revised.

    What are the two additions to the guidelines?

    1. The narcotics warning: Scenes depicting or involving the use, consumption or trafficking of narcotic drugs or psychotropic substances must now carry the warning “Illicit Narcotics Destroy Health and Guarantees Imprisonment, Say No to Drugs.”
    2. The age markers: The guidelines now specify the three categories within the UA certificate, UA 7+, UA 13+ and UA 16+, marking content suitable for children aged seven, 13 and 16 respectively.
    3. What triggers an age marker: Where the Board considers it necessary to caution a parent or guardian on whether a ward may be allowed to see a film, it certifies the film for unrestricted public exhibition with an endorsement to that effect.

    What do the retained 1991 standards require?

    1. Crime and violence: The Board is to ensure that anti social activities and violence are not glorified or justified.
    2. Operational detail of crime: The modus operandi of criminals, and visuals or words likely to incite the commission of an offence, are not to be depicted.
    3. Alcohol: Scenes justifying or glorifying drinking are to be avoided.
    4. Children: Scenes showing children in violence as victims, perpetrators or forced witnesses, or subjected to any form of child abuse, are not to be presented needlessly.
    5. Disability and animals: The Board is to discourage scenes showing abuse or ridicule of persons with disabilities, and scenes showing cruelty to or abuse of animals.

    Why does the alignment with the 2024 categories matter?

    1. The gap it closes: The age bands were created in the Rules in 2024, while the guidelines the Board actually applies continued to describe a single undifferentiated UA category until this notification.
    2. What a graded band changes for a film: A film that would previously have carried one UA label now carries an age specific one, so the same content can be placed at a different point on the scale rather than cut to reach a category.
    3. Where the burden shifts: An age marker transfers the decision on viewing to the parent or guardian, since a UA film remains open to unrestricted public exhibition whatever the band.
    4. What the Board has asked of the industry: The Board’s Chairperson has asked filmmakers to study the revised guidelines before submitting applications, and asked film associations to circulate them within the industry.

    Challenges to the film certification framework

    1. Certification operates as prior restraint: A film cannot be exhibited at all until the Board clears it, so the delay in a decision has the same effect as a refusal for a film with a fixed release date. Eg. The Supreme Court upheld pre censorship of films in K.A. Abbas v. Union of India (1970), on the ground that film affects audiences differently from other media.
      The Fix: Fix a binding outer limit for the Board’s decision and treat expiry of that limit as deemed certification in the applied category.
    2. Standards are open ended in application: Terms such as glorification of violence or anti social activity are matters of judgement, so identical content can be treated differently across examining committees. Eg. The Cinematograph Act, 1952 grounds refusal in the reasonable restrictions of Article 19(2), which are broad heads rather than stated tests.
      The Fix: Publish the reasoned orders of examining and revising committees, so a standard is visible from decided cases rather than from the text alone.
    3. Extra statutory pressure after certification: A certified film still faces protest, litigation and State level obstruction, so certification does not settle the right to exhibit. Eg. In Prakash Jha Productions v. Union of India (2011) the Supreme Court held that a State cannot ban a certified film on law and order grounds and must maintain order instead.
      The Fix: Require a State suspending exhibition of a certified film to record reasons and obtain judicial confirmation within a fixed period.
    4. A single framework for unequal platforms: Films require certification while streaming content is governed by self regulation, so the same content faces different scrutiny by mode of release. Eg. Online curated content runs under the self classification and three tier grievance structure of the Information Technology (Intermediary Guidelines and Digital Media Ethics Code) Rules, 2021.
      The Fix: Align the age classification bands used in film certification with those used for online curated content, so one scale runs across platforms.
    5. Warnings substitute for classification: A mandatory on screen disclaimer is easy to add and easy to disregard, so it does little where the depiction itself is the concern. Eg. The statutory anti tobacco warning has run in Indian films for years alongside continued depiction of smoking.
      The Fix: Attach the depiction of narcotics to a defined age band in the classification scale, rather than treating the warning as the whole remedy.

    Conclusion

    The certification standards and the certificate categories were revised a generation apart, and this notification is the step that brings them into one document. The substantive tests a film is judged against remain those of 1991, so the change is one of classification rather than of standards. The guidelines are notified and in force, and the Board has asked the industry to study them before filing applications. The thing to watch is how the three UA bands are applied in practice, since a graded scale only changes outcomes if films are placed across it rather than clustered in one band.

    Back2Basics: Cinematograph (Amendment) Act, 2023

    1. What it introduced on piracy: It created offences for unauthorised recording and exhibition of films, with imprisonment of three months to three years and a fine.
    2. Age based categories: It replaced the single UA category with age based sub categories, which the Cinematograph Rules, 2024 then specified as UA 7+, UA 13+ and UA 16+.
    3. Validity of a certificate: It made a certificate valid perpetually, removing the earlier limit of ten years.
    4. Revisional power removed: It withdrew the central government’s revisional power over a certified film, in line with the Supreme Court’s ruling in Union of India v. K.M. Shankarappa (2000).

    Matching Previous Year Question

    “[2014, GS2, 12] What do you understand by the concept “freedom of speech and expression”? Does it cover hate speech also? Why do the films in India stand on a slightly different plane from other forms of expression? Discuss.”

  • JPC members question Centre on FCRA Bill’s asset takeover provisions

    Why in the News

    Parliament’s Joint Committee on the Foreign Contribution (Regulation) Amendment Bill, 2026 questioned the Centre on the Bill’s asset takeover provisions at its first meeting. The provision at issue vests foreign contributions and all assets created from them in a government appointed “designated authority” when an organisation’s Foreign Contribution (Regulation) Act (FCRA) certificate is cancelled, surrendered, or lapses automatically, without a prior hearing or a judicial determination. The Union Home Ministry defended the change as making the use of foreign contributions more transparent and accountable, and said a “prescribed authority” already exists under the present law. The tension is between an administrative gap the Ministry says it is closing and the constitutional bar on deprivation of property without due process. Opposition members of the Committee invoked Article 300A of the Constitution against the provision.

    What does the “designated authority” provision do?

    1. When it is triggered: It operates on three events, cancellation of an organisation’s FCRA certificate, its surrender by the organisation, and its automatic lapse.
    2. What vests: Foreign contributions already received and every asset created out of them pass to a government appointed designated authority.
    3. What it dispenses with: The vesting takes effect without a prior hearing for the organisation and without a judicial determination that the assets should pass.
    4. How wide the power is: The authority is to hold powers of a wide ambit over those assets, which is the specific feature the Committee’s members contested.

    What is the Ministry’s stated rationale for the change?

    1. A custodian already exists in law: The present Act provides for a “prescribed authority”, identified by a notification of 5 November 2018 as the Additional Chief Secretary or Principal Secretary (Home) of the State or Union Territory concerned.
    2. The custodian cannot act: There is no deadline on that custodianship under the current law, which leaves the prescribed authority a “passive custodian” unable to take substantive decisions on assets.
    3. No procedure for the handover: The law lays down no standard procedure for taking possession of such assets, maintaining inventories, or separating foreign contribution assets from domestically funded ones.
    4. The cost of open ended custody: Prolonged custodianship leaves States facing budgetary and manpower constraints in running vested institutions such as schools, hospitals and orphanages.
    5. Two silences in the existing law: The Act says nothing on the final disposal of vested assets and nothing on the treatment of places of worship.

    On what constitutional ground is the provision contested?

    1. The provision relied on: Opposition members of the Committee argued that deprivation of property cannot be permitted without a prior hearing, relying on Article 300A of the Constitution.
    2. What Article 300A guarantees: It states that no person shall be deprived of property save by authority of law, so a taking requires a valid law and a fair procedure even though property is no longer a fundamental right.
    3. Why automatic vesting is the pressure point: Cancellation, surrender and lapse are administrative events, so tying the transfer of assets to them removes any stage at which the organisation is heard before it loses them.
    4. What it leaves unsettled: The Ministry’s own submission records that the law is silent on final disposal, so an organisation whose certificate later stands restored has no stated route back to its assets.

    Why did the Ministry’s presentation on religious groups draw objection?

    1. What the presentation contained: It catalogued foreign contributions received by different religious groups and highlighted that a majority of the funds went to Christian organisations.
    2. The objection raised: Members questioned the rationale for segregating contributions received under religious heads at all.
    3. Why the classification matters: A regulatory case built on the religious identity of recipients shifts the test from how funds were used to who received them.

    Why is the FCRA framed as a national security law?

    1. The Ministry’s characterisation: The Home Ministry told the Committee that the latest amendment is at its core a “national security” legislation.
    2. The origin of the statute: The FCRA was enacted in 1976, amid Cold War era mistrust of Western influence and concern over threats to India’s sovereignty and democratic institutions.
    3. What preceded it: Before 1976, non governmental organisations receiving foreign funds operated under general laws such as the Societies Registration Act, the Trusts Act and the Companies Act.
    4. The gap it filled: Those general laws carried no centralised mechanism to monitor foreign contributions, which is the function the FCRA introduced.

    Challenges to the FCRA regulatory framework

    1. Sanction without a judicial stage: Cancellation, and now the vesting of assets, follow executive determination, so an organisation contests the outcome after it has already taken effect. Eg. The vesting under the Bill operates with no prior hearing and no judicial determination.
      The Fix: Require a reasoned show cause order and a hearing before vesting, with the transfer suspended until an appellate forum has ruled.
    2. Suspension operates as a penalty on its own: A certificate suspended pending inquiry stops foreign funds immediately, so service delivery halts before any finding is recorded. Eg. Registration of the Centre for Policy Research was cancelled in 2024 after a prolonged suspension, ending its foreign funded research programmes.
      The Fix: Cap the suspension period in the statute and require the inquiry to conclude within it or the certificate to revive automatically.
    3. Compliance costs fall hardest on small organisations: Annual returns, a designated single bank account and renewal every five years require dedicated staff that a small grassroots body does not have. Eg. The 2020 amendment required every recipient to route foreign funds through a designated account at a single branch of the State Bank of India in New Delhi.
      The Fix: Set a simplified filing track and a longer renewal cycle for organisations below a stated annual receipt threshold.
    4. A ban on transfers breaks the funding chain: Prohibiting an FCRA holder from passing funds to another organisation cuts off smaller field level bodies that never receive foreign money directly. Eg. The Foreign Contribution (Regulation) Amendment Act, 2020 barred transfer of foreign contribution to any other person, including another FCRA registered body.
      The Fix: Permit onward transfer to a registered recipient with reporting of the transfer, so the audit trail is preserved without ending sub granting.
    5. Regulatory reach shapes advocacy as much as accounting: Where funding status turns on administrative discretion, an organisation adjusts its public positions to protect its registration. Eg. The Supreme Court upheld the 2020 amendments in Noel Harper v. Union of India (2022), holding that no organisation has a vested right to receive foreign contribution.
      The Fix: Publish the grounds and the evidentiary standard for every cancellation, so refusal is testable against a stated rule rather than inferred.

    Conclusion

    The Bill is at the start of committee scrutiny and the disagreement is already about process rather than purpose. Both sides accept that custody of assets after a certificate ends is currently unregulated, and they differ on whether the answer is an authority that can act at once or a procedure that must be completed before it acts. The unresolved question is what happens to an organisation that succeeds on appeal after its assets have already vested, since the Ministry’s own submission records that the law is silent on final disposal. The next milestone is the Joint Committee’s examination of the Bill and the report it returns to Parliament.

    Back2Basics: Foreign Contribution (Regulation) Act, 2010

    1. What it replaced: It repealed and replaced the 1976 Act, and is administered by the Ministry of Home Affairs.
    2. What it regulates: It governs the acceptance and utilisation of foreign contribution and foreign hospitality by persons and associations, to ensure they do not act against the national interest.
    3. Registration and its renewal: An association must hold registration or prior permission to receive foreign contribution, and registration is valid for five years and renewable.
    4. Who is barred outright: Election candidates, judges, government servants, members of a legislature, journalists and editors of registered newspapers, and political parties are prohibited from accepting foreign contribution.

    Matching Previous Year Question

    “[2015, GS2, 12] Examine critically the recent changes in the rules governing foreign funding of NGOs under the Foreign Contribution (Regulation) Act (FCRA), 1976.”

  • What is the Uniform Civil Code debate?

    Why in the News

    The Union Home Minister has indicated that the Uniform Civil Code (UCC) would be implemented in all 21 States ruled by the National Democratic Alliance (NDA) by 2029. The statement builds on enactment that has already begun. Uttarakhand has had a UCC in force since January 2025, and UCC bills passed by the legislatures of Assam, Gujarat and Madhya Pradesh are awaiting Presidential assent. The tension the debate turns on is between two constitutional claims. Article 44 directs the State to endeavour to secure a UCC, while Article 25 guarantees the right to practise a religion of one’s choice and Article 29 protects the right of any section of citizens to conserve its distinct culture.

    What is a Uniform Civil Code?

    1. What it does: A UCC would apply the same set of secular personal laws to all people, irrespective of religion, caste or tribe.
    2. Its constitutional basis: Article 44 provides that the State shall endeavour to secure a UCC for citizens throughout India.
    3. What is already uniform: India already has uniform criminal laws, and common civil laws covering matters such as taxation, contracts and negotiable instruments.
    4. What is not: Marriage, divorce and inheritance of property remain governed by personal laws based on religious doctrines.

    How are personal matters governed today?

    1. Hindus: Governed by laws such as the Hindu Marriage Act (1955) and the Hindu Succession Act (1956).
    2. Tribals within the Hindu religion: Many may follow customary family laws under constitutional exceptions rather than the codified Hindu statutes.
    3. Jains, Buddhists and Sikhs: Covered by Hindu laws, with Sikh marriages also registrable under the Anand Marriage Act (2012).
    4. Christians and Parsis: Each community has its own personal laws.
    5. Muslims: Governed by the Muslim Personal Law (Shariat) Application Act (1937).

    Why did the Constituent Assembly place the UCC in Part IV?

    1. The Assembly was divided: The framers did not reach agreement on whether a UCC belonged in the Constitution at all.
    2. The case for a Fundamental Right: Some members wanted it made a Fundamental Right, to ensure uniformity in civil laws and secure equal rights for women.
    3. The objection raised: Many members of the Muslim community opposed its inclusion, on the ground that a uniform civil code would violate the fundamental right to religion guaranteed in Part III.
    4. The settlement reached: The provision was placed in the non justiciable Part IV, the Directive Principles of State Policy, so it directs the State without being enforceable in a court.

    What are the arguments in favour of a UCC?

    1. Secularism in substance: Subjecting all citizens to the same personal laws would make India secular in the true sense, rather than leaving the State to administer a different law for each community.
    2. Gender justice: A UCC would ensure equal rights for women across religions in the matters governed by personal laws, which is described as the most vital argument for it.

    What are the arguments against a UCC?

    1. Conflict with the right to religion: Article 25 guarantees every person a fundamental right to practise a religion of one’s choice, and a UCC’s provisions on personal matters may run contrary to the scriptures of a religion.
    2. Conflict with cultural rights: Article 29 gives any section of citizens a fundamental right to conserve its distinct culture, which the codification of family matters may cut across.
    3. The tribal exemption: All four States that have enacted a UCC have exempted the tribal population from its ambit, on the grounds of constitutional safeguards protecting tribal culture and the belief that many tribal customs already provide adequate rights to women.
    4. Why that exemption is contested: Exempting one section of society while making the code compulsory for all other groups, including religious minorities, is discriminatory on its face.

    How have the courts and the Law Commission framed the way forward?

    1. Article 25 is not unqualified: The right to religion is subject to constitutional morality and to other fundamental rights, including equality.
    2. The Supreme Court on cultural protection: In the Section 6A of the Citizenship Act, 1955 (2024) case, the Court held that practices such as casteism and gender discrimination, which run against the spirit of the Constitution, would not receive protection under Article 29.
    3. Ambedkar’s voluntary route: In the Constituent Assembly, B.R. Ambedkar advocated a UCC but suggested it could remain voluntary, with Parliament providing for it to apply to citizens who declare they are willing to be bound by it.
    4. The Law Commission’s position: Its Consultation Paper on Reform of Family Law (2018) held that a UCC was neither necessary nor desirable at this stage, and argued instead for reforming discriminatory provisions across personal laws.
    5. The standard it proposed: The emphasis should be on achieving “equality within communities” between men and women, rather than “equality between communities”, through legislative reform of marriage, divorce, custody, adoption, maintenance, succession and inheritance.

    Challenges to a Uniform Civil Code

    1. No published draft to debate: The argument runs on positions rather than on text, because no model code has been placed in the public domain for the country as a whole. Eg. The 22nd Law Commission sought public views on the UCC in 2023 without circulating a draft code alongside the notice.
      The Fix: Publish a model draft code for consultation before further State enactments, so objections attach to clauses rather than to the idea.
    2. State by State enactment fragments uniformity: Personal law sits in the Concurrent List, so separate State codes can produce different rules on the same subject and defeat the uniformity the code is named for. Eg. Entry 5 of the Concurrent List covers marriage, divorce, infants and minors, adoption, wills and succession.
      The Fix: Anchor the State codes to a central framework law so the substantive rules converge even where each State enacts its own.
    3. Scope creep beyond family law: A code enacted to equalise rights in marriage and succession can extend into regulating private arrangements that no personal law governed. Eg. Uttarakhand’s code makes registration of a live in relationship compulsory, with a penalty for failure to register.
      The Fix: Confine the code to marriage, divorce, maintenance, adoption and succession, and drop registration duties that create fresh offences.
    4. Adjudication capacity: Codification moves disputes into family courts that already carry long pendency, so a new right delivers slowly in practice. Eg. Family courts constituted under the Family Courts Act, 1984 carry pendency running into lakhs of cases.
      The Fix: Expand family court benches and statutory mediation capacity before any commencement date is notified.

    Conclusion

    The debate is no longer only about Article 44 in the abstract, since four States have already legislated and the stated target is all 21 NDA ruled States by 2029. The unresolved question is whether equality in personal law is better reached by replacing the personal laws or by reforming the discriminatory provisions inside each of them, which is the choice between the State codes and the Law Commission’s 2018 position. The immediate marker is Presidential assent for the codes passed by the legislatures of Assam, Gujarat and Madhya Pradesh.

    Back2Basics: Directive Principles of State Policy (DPSP)

    1. Where they sit: Part IV of the Constitution, Articles 36 to 51, setting out goals the State is to pursue in making law and policy.
    2. Their legal force: Article 37 makes them non justiciable, so no court can enforce them, while declaring them fundamental in the governance of the country.
    3. Their source: The idea was drawn from the Irish Constitution, which in turn borrowed it from the Spanish Constitution.
    4. Their relationship with rights: They are read alongside the Fundamental Rights in Part III, and courts use them to interpret the scope of those rights rather than to override them.

    Matching Previous Year Question

    “[2015, GS2, 12] Discuss the possible factors that inhibit India from enacting for its citizens a uniform civil code as provided for in the Directive Principles of State Policy.”

  • Mining amendment is unfair to States

    Mining amendment is unfair to States

    Why in the News

    Section 9D of the Mines and Minerals (Development and Regulation) Amendment Act, 2026 restricts State governments from imposing taxes, cesses or other levies on mineral rights or mineral-bearing land, except in accordance with conditions prescribed by the Centre. The provision follows Mineral Area Development Authority vs. Steel Authority of India (2024), in which a nine-judge Bench of the Supreme Court held that royalty payable on minerals is not a tax. The same Bench recognised the States’ legislative power to tax mineral rights and held that mineral-bearing land falls within the States’ taxation power over land. The tension is that Entry 50 of the State List lets Parliament limit State taxation of mineral rights, while the new section extends its restriction to levies on mineral-bearing land, a separate power under Entry 49 of the State List. What is contested is not the revenue States receive today but the levies they may be barred from raising tomorrow.

    What does Section 9D do?

    1. Scope of the restriction: It bars States from imposing taxes, cesses or other levies on mineral rights or on mineral-bearing land except as the Centre prescribes.
    2. Where the discretion sits: The conditions under which a State may levy are set by the Central government, so future State levies depend on a framework the Centre controls.
    3. What it does not touch: Royalty, the auction premium and the other mineral revenues States currently receive are not altered by the section.

    What is the Centre’s case for a uniform levy framework?

    1. Predictability for investors: The stated objective is to create a predictable tax environment, prevent excessive levies and encourage long-term investment in mining.
    2. Project horizons: Mining projects involve enormous investment and operate over decades, so investors need assurance that financial rules will not change unpredictably from one year to the next.
    3. Revenue assurance offered: The Centre’s position is that 90% of mining sector revenue accrues to the States and that this will continue.

    Why do mineral-rich States object?

    1. Uneven distribution of the resource: India’s mineral wealth is concentrated rather than spread evenly. Odisha, Jharkhand, Chhattisgarh and Karnataka hold enormous reserves of coal, iron ore and other minerals that feed industries across the country.
    2. Costs land on the host State: The host State handles resettlement of displaced groups, environmental damage, pressure on public infrastructure and the long-term consequences of extracting minerals that can never be replaced.
    3. Budgets tied to mining receipts: NITI Aayog’s Fiscal Health Index has recognised the role mining receipts play in the strong revenue mobilisation performance of Odisha and Chhattisgarh. Mining accounts for a large proportion of Odisha’s non-tax revenue.
    4. Higher spending needs in mineral districts: Mineral producing districts require greater public expenditure precisely because they bear the costs of mining.
    5. Loss of a natural advantage: A mineral-rich State ordinarily expects some ability to convert that advantage into resources for its own development, and the section substantially reduces that freedom.

    What is the constitutional objection to Section 9D?

    1. Entry 50 and its built-in limit: The Constitution gives States the power to tax mineral rights under Entry 50 of the State List, subject to limitations Parliament may impose through laws relating to mineral development.
    2. Entry 49 is a separate power: The power to tax lands and buildings under Entry 49 of the State List is a distinct constitutional head and carries no equivalent parliamentary limitation clause.
    3. Where the section goes further: By extending the restriction to taxes or levies on mineral-bearing land, the section reaches a power Entry 50 does not authorise Parliament to limit.
    4. Risk to the 2024 ruling: The amendment risks rendering the impact of the nine-judge ruling nugatory, since a power the Court affirmed can be neutralised by prescription rather than by overruling.
    5. The question it raises: How far can a Central law dealing with mineral development restrict a State’s exclusive power to tax land is now a live constitutional question rather than a mining policy dispute.

    Challenges to Section 9D

    1. Responsibility without fiscal capacity: A federal system cannot function where States carry obligations they have no independent means to fund. Eg. Mineral districts must fund resettlement and infrastructure repair from receipts the Centre may now condition.
      The Fix: Confine the prescribed conditions to levies on mineral rights under Entry 50 and leave the Entry 49 land taxation power untouched.
    2. Predictability purchased by narrowing State choice: Uniformity makes taxation more predictable for investors and reduces the fiscal options available to States. Eg. A State cannot design a mineral-linked levy to fund a district-specific rehabilitation programme without Central prescription.
      The Fix: Set a ceiling on State mineral levies in the statute itself rather than routing each levy through Central approval, so investors get the certainty without the States losing the power.
    3. Litigation risk over a settled question: A provision that neutralises a nine-judge ruling by executive prescription invites a fresh round of constitutional challenge. Eg. Mineral Area Development Authority vs. Steel Authority of India itself ran for decades before it was settled in 2024.
      The Fix: Refer the scope of Section 9D to the Inter-State Council under Article 263 before conditions are prescribed, so the levy framework is negotiated rather than litigated.
    4. Concentration of the burden on a few States: The section’s cost is borne almost entirely by a handful of mineral-bearing States rather than spread across the Union. Eg. Odisha, Jharkhand, Chhattisgarh and Karnataka carry the bulk of the country’s coal and iron ore output.
      The Fix: Weight mineral-bearing districts explicitly in the next Finance Commission’s horizontal devolution formula, so extraction costs are recognised in transfers.

    Conclusion

    The minerals beneath a State’s soil serve the entire country, and the costs of extracting them are felt most directly by the people who live above them. A State that bears the infrastructural and social consequences of extraction must retain a meaningful stake in the economic value its natural resources generate. The unresolved point is whether a Central law on mineral development may condition a State’s power to tax land, a power the Constitution places under a separate entry and does not subject to parliamentary limitation. That question now sits between a statute in force and a nine-judge ruling that has not been overruled.

    What is Fiscal Federalism?

    1. About: It is the division of taxation powers, expenditure responsibilities and transfer arrangements between the levels of government in a federation.
    2. Rationale: It exists because the level of government best placed to raise a tax is often not the level that must spend on the service, so the design has to close that gap without destroying accountability.
    3. Vertical imbalance: The Union raises a larger share of revenue than it spends directly, while States carry the larger share of expenditure obligations, and transfers bridge the difference.
    4. Horizontal imbalance: Revenue capacity differs sharply across States of similar need, which is why devolution formulas weight income distance, area and population rather than collections alone.

    Back2Basics: NITI Aayog’s Fiscal Health Index

    1. What it is: A composite index published by NITI Aayog that ranks States on the quality of their public finances.
    2. What it measures: It scores States on sub-indices covering quality of expenditure, revenue mobilisation, fiscal prudence, debt index and debt sustainability.
    3. First edition: The maiden report was released in January 2025 and covered 18 major States.
    4. Why it matters here: It is the benchmark that records mining receipts as a driver of revenue mobilisation performance in mineral-bearing States.

    Matching Previous Year Question

    [2025] Examine the evolving pattern of Centre-State financial relations in the context of planned development in India. How far have the recent reforms impacted the fiscal federalism in India?

  • Let’s curb misuse of a legal relic that elevates the mob over the individual

    Why in the News

    Section 295A of the Indian Penal Code, 1860, re-codified as Section 299 of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita (BNS), is under fresh criticism for converting subjective offence into a cognisable, non-bailable criminal charge. The provision was introduced by the British in 1927 during the “Rangeela Rasool” controversy, after a provocative Urdu pamphlet satirising the Prophet Muhammad’s personal life sparked widespread communal riots. It survives in independent India under Article 19(2) of the Constitution, which permits speech restrictions in the interests of public order. The tension is between a criminal provision built to preserve public order and a constitutional guarantee of expression that the provision’s procedure defeats before any court examines malice.

    What does Section 299 of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita cover?

    1. The offence: It penalises deliberate and malicious acts intended to outrage religious feelings, which was the stated purpose when Section 295A was enacted in 1927.
    2. Colonial rationale: It was born of a colonial urge to police Indian subjects deemed too volatile to handle the friction of free and provocative speech.
    3. Procedural character: The offence is cognisable and non-bailable, so the police may register a case and arrest without a magistrate’s prior direction and bail is not a matter of right.
    4. Constitutional validity: Ramji Lal Modi vs State of Uttar Pradesh (1957) upheld Section 295A, reading the words “deliberate and malicious” as the narrowing element that keeps it within Article 19(2).

    How does the provision create a heckler’s veto?

    1. Offence converted into an offence in law: Translating the subjective and volatile idea of “emotional hurt” into a criminal charge hands a permanent “heckler’s veto” to the most intolerant segments of society.
    2. Inverted hierarchy of rights: It creates a perverse incentive for outrage by elevating “the right to be offended” above the right to free speech.
    3. Low threshold to trigger the state: One aggrieved individual filing a First Information Report (FIR) in a remote corner of the country instantly triggers the machinery of the state.
    4. Who it is triggered against: Writers, filmmakers, stand-up comedians and publishers face it for speech that a court often finds, years later, was never malicious at all.
    5. Incentive for entrepreneurs of grievance: Political entrepreneurs, religious zealots and competitive vigilante groups find that claiming wounded sentiment is the easiest path to public relevance.

    What does the resulting self-censorship look like?

    1. Withdrawal of a published work: Penguin Books India withdrew distribution of Joe Sacco’s graphic novel on the Muzaffarnagar riots.
    2. Pulping of an academic work: The same publisher had earlier pulped copies of Wendy Doniger’s *The Hindus*.
    3. Pre-emptive editing: Cuts were sought to Sonia Gandhi’s memoirs that the publisher’s global arm had not considered necessary for the international edition.
    4. None of it was legally required: None of these texts was legally proscribed, so each was a pre-emptive surrender in which commercial risk aversion replaced constitutional principle.
    5. Spread beyond publishing: Galleries pull provocative paintings, studios quietly cancel scripts and academics choose safer research topics, leaving a public square reduced to bland conformity.

    Why is the process itself the punishment?

    1. Arrest precedes any finding: The law allows arrest before a trial can establish whether malice existed, so the element that makes the act criminal is tested last.
    2. Cost of defending the case: Multi-city court appearances, jail time and financial ruin break the spirit of an artist or author irrespective of the eventual verdict.
    3. Behavioural consequence: When the cost of creative expression is the potential loss of personal liberty, most creators choose to pull their punches.

    What did the 2008 Delhi High Court ruling on M F Husain establish?

    1. What the judgment did: It quashed criminal proceedings against the self-exiled painter M F Husain and set out a defence of artistic liberty against intolerance.
    2. How the charges were answered: The ruling dismantled the obscenity and blasphemy charges by placing Husain’s abstract nude depiction of Bharat Mata within India’s four-millennia-old heritage of sacred, pluralistic and erotic iconography, from Khajuraho to Konark.
    3. The warning it recorded: It critiqued the “new puritanism” pursued by self-appointed guardians of cultural purity and warned that such a society would push India backward.
    4. The principle it fixed: One disapproving viewer cannot hold the right to restrict free expression, which is the constitutional shield the ruling established for creative dissent.

    What reforms would reverse the incentive structure?

    1. Prior sanction before the FIR: Government sanction should be required before an FIR under BNS 299 is registered, rather than after the accused has already endured an investigation and a chargesheet.
    2. Consolidation of parallel FIRs: Multiple FIRs on the same subject lodged in different States should be consolidated immediately into a single proceeding.
    3. Fast-tracking of quashing petitions: BNS 299 cases should be fast-tracked so that frivolous proceedings are quashed early rather than after years.
    4. Costs on vexatious complainants: Vexatious complainants should face costs or other punitive consequences, so the incentive structure of the provision is reversed rather than reinforced.

    Conclusion

    Scrutiny of intent currently arrives at the end of the process, by which point the prosecution has already imposed the cost the provision was never meant to impose. Moving that scrutiny to the point before registration is what separates a public order safeguard from a licence for organised offence-taking. The unresolved conflict is between a constitutional test that turns on deliberate malice and a procedure that reaches arrest before malice is examined at all. Until the procedure is changed, the outcome of a case will continue to matter less than the fact of one.

    What is freedom of speech and expression under the Constitution?

    1. About: Article 19(1)(a) guarantees every citizen the right to freedom of speech and expression, read to include the right to receive and circulate information.
    2. Rationale: The guarantee protects the process by which citizens form and contest opinions, so it exists to shield unpopular expression rather than agreeable expression.
    3. The restriction clause: Article 19(2) permits reasonable restrictions on eight grounds, the sovereignty and integrity of India, the security of the State, friendly relations with foreign States, public order, decency or morality, contempt of court, defamation and incitement to an offence.
    4. The reasonableness test: A restriction must fall within one of those eight grounds and must be reasonable, which is why Shreya Singhal vs Union of India (2015) struck down Section 66A of the Information Technology Act, 2000 as vague and overbroad.

    Back2Basics: Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023

    1. What it is: The statute that replaced the Indian Penal Code, 1860 as India’s principal criminal law.
    2. When it took effect: It came into force on 1 July 2024, alongside the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 and the Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023.
    3. Structure: It carries 358 sections against the 511 of the Code it replaced, with several offences merged or renumbered.
    4. Relevance here: Section 295A of the Indian Penal Code is carried forward as Section 299, so the offence survives the recodification substantially unchanged.

    Matching Previous Year Question

    “What do you understand by the concept “freedom of speech and expression”? Does it cover hate speech also? Why do the films in India stand on a slightly different plane from other forms of expression? Discuss.”

  • BJP’s states route to UCC, over one central law

    Why in the News

    The Union Home Minister has said the Uniform Civil Code (UCC) will be introduced in all 21 Bharatiya Janata Party led National Democratic Alliance ruled states before the 2029 Lok Sabha elections. The abolition of triple talaq was cited in the same statement as part of the effort to provide equal rights to Muslim women. The commitment follows a settled preference within the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS) since 2023 that states enact their own codes first, with the Centre considering an overarching law later, so what had been a state first strategy now carries a date. The tension is constitutional as much as political: Entry 5 of the Concurrent List lets every state legislate its own code, so a promise of uniformity is being delivered through four statutes that are similar but not identical, and none of which is literally universal.

    What is the Uniform Civil Code?

    1. Constitutional source: The promise stems from Article 44, which says the State shall endeavour to secure for the citizens a uniform civil code throughout the territory of India.
    2. Adoption: The Constituent Assembly adopted the Article on 23 November 1948 after a spirited debate, and had no consensus on what such a code would actually contain.
    3. Enforceability: The Article sits among the Directive Principles of State Policy, and under Article 37 those principles are fundamental to governance but are not enforceable by any court.

    Why is the code being legislated state by state rather than through one central law?

    1. Legislative competence: Marriage, divorce, adoption, wills, intestacy, succession and joint family matters fall under Entry 5 of the Concurrent List, giving both Parliament and state legislatures competence over them.
    2. Variation in personal law: A single national code would have to negotiate enormous variation in personal laws and customary practices, particularly among tribal communities and in the Northeast.
    3. Codification is not like criminal law: The recorded objection in 2023 was that a civil code could not simply be codified the way criminal law was, because a tribal community in Uttarakhand or Himachal Pradesh practises very differently from one in Chhattisgarh or the Northeast.
    4. Political utility of the state route: Legislating state by state allows different models to be tested, local customs to be accommodated and implementation to be demonstrated, without first confronting the full political and constitutional complexity of a nationwide law.
    5. The Sangh’s stated caution: The RSS position in 2023 was that the subject required deeper study and wider consultation because it affected every section of society. The RSS general secretary welcomed the Uttarakhand model in March 2024 and said it should be studied and implemented across the country.

    What do the four enacted state codes actually contain?

    1. Uttarakhand: The only code currently in force, implemented in January 2025, it provides common rules on marriage, divorce, inheritance and succession, prohibits polygamy and mandates marriage registration.
    2. Regulation of live in relationships: Its most distinctive feature requires couples to register the relationship and its termination, while recognising children born of such relationships as legitimate.
    3. Gujarat: The Assembly passed its Bill in March 2026, broadly following the Uttarakhand model on marriage, divorce, succession and live in relationships, and prohibiting bigamy.
    4. Assam: The Bill was passed in May, covering marriage, divorce, succession and live in relationships, prohibiting polygamy and making live in registration compulsory.
    5. Madhya Pradesh: The Bill was passed in July and additionally covers adoption, with provisions relating to triple talaq and nikah halala, alongside live in registration and a bar on polygamy.
    6. Scheduled Tribes are excluded: All four laws exclude Scheduled Tribes, and Uttarakhand also exempts certain communities protected by constitutional customary law provisions.

    What has the Law Commission said?

    1. The 2018 position: The 21st Law Commission, in its Consultation Paper on Reform of Family Law (2018), said a uniform civil code was “neither necessary nor desirable at this stage”.
    2. Equality within over equality between: Its emphasis was on achieving “equality within communities” between men and women rather than “equality between” communities, reforming discriminatory provisions across personal laws while preserving diversity.
    3. Piecemeal change over absolute uniformity: It preferred making piecemeal changes to imposing absolute uniformity, and flagged the constitutional protections enjoyed by tribal and northeastern communities as a complication.
    4. The issue reopened: The 22nd Law Commission reopened the matter in 2023, seeking fresh views from the public and from recognised religious organisations, on the ground that more than three years had elapsed since the 2018 consultation and that developments including court orders warranted fresh examination.

    Where do the Opposition and the NDA allies stand?

    1. The Opposition’s framing: Opposition parties have questioned whether the code is genuinely a gender equality reform or an attempt to alter the personal laws of minorities through a majoritarian framework.
    2. State level opposition: The Congress opposed the Gujarat Bill as directed against Muslims, and in Madhya Pradesh criticised the legislation as an RSS agenda.
    3. Assam’s Opposition: Opposition parties there sought wider consultation and raised concerns over the tribal exemption and the regulation of live in relationships.
    4. Janata Dal (United): The party has consistently said it is not opposed to a uniform code but wants it to emerge through consensus rather than imposition. Its president told the Law Commission that such a code should respect India’s “delicate balance” between different religious and ethnic groups.
    5. Telugu Desam Party: The party has called for discussion and consensus, and in 2024 said it would ensure that Muslim interests were protected.

    Challenges to the Uniform Civil Code

    1. Four codes do not produce one code: Legislating separately in each state produces similar but not identical statutes, so uniformity is not what the project delivers. Eg. Madhya Pradesh’s law covers adoption, triple talaq and nikah halala, while Uttarakhand’s does not.
      The Fix: Anchor state enactments to a model law drafted by the Law Commission, so the substantive rules converge even where the enacting legislature differs.
    2. Exclusion of Scheduled Tribes: A code that exempts Scheduled Tribes leaves the customary law of a large population outside the very uniformity it is named for. Eg. All four enacted codes carry the exclusion, and Uttarakhand exempts further protected communities.
      The Fix: State the constitutional basis of the exemption openly, in the Fifth and Sixth Schedule protections, rather than leaving it as a silent exception.
    3. Directive Principles create no claimable right: Article 44 gives a citizen nothing to enforce, so the pace and the content of the code are settled entirely by political choice. Eg. The Article has stood since the Constitution commenced without any central statute enacted under it.
      The Fix: Route the contested questions through parliamentary scrutiny of a draft bill, so the content is debated before it binds anyone.
    4. Registration of private relationships: Compulsory registration of a live in relationship and of its termination extends the state into conduct that was previously unregulated. Eg. Uttarakhand’s code requires both the registration and the recorded termination of such a relationship.
      The Fix: Limit registration to the consequences the state must settle, namely the legitimacy of children and maintenance, rather than the existence of the relationship itself.
    5. Federal friction on a Concurrent List subject: A later central law can override a state code on the same entry, so the states legislating first face the prospect of their statutes being displaced. Eg. Article 254 gives a central law precedence over a repugnant state law on a Concurrent List subject.
      The Fix: Reserve state codes for Presidential assent under Article 254(2), which protects them until Parliament legislates on the same matter.

    Conclusion

    The commitment now carries a date, and the instrument chosen to meet it remains the state legislature rather than Parliament. That choice buys the ability to work around customary law without arguing a national case, and it also guarantees the codes keep diverging as each state adds subjects of its own. What is unresolved is whether uniformity describes the outcome or only the ambition. The thing to watch is whether an overarching central law is eventually brought, because the moment it is, the enacted state codes become the question rather than the answer.

    Back2Basics

    1. What it is: The Law Commission of India is a non statutory executive body constituted by the Ministry of Law and Justice, and it is not created by any Act of Parliament.
    2. Term and composition: It is constituted afresh for a fixed term, normally three years, and is headed by a chairperson who is usually a retired judge, with full time and part time members.
    3. First Commission: The first Law Commission of independent India was constituted in 1955, chaired by the then Attorney General for India.
    4. Weight of its output: Its reports and consultation papers are recommendatory, so the government is free to act on them, to act against them, or to leave them unacted.

    Matching Previous Year Question

    “[2015, GS2, 12.5 marks] Discuss the possible factors that inhibit India from enacting for its citizens a uniform civil code as provided for in the Directive Principles of State Policy.”

  • Subhash Chandra case: IBBI to tighten guarantor resolution

    Why in the News

    The Insolvency and Bankruptcy Board of India (IBBI) has proposed four amendments to the insolvency resolution process for personal guarantors to corporate debtors, extending to banks and creditors safeguards already available under the corporate insolvency resolution process (CIRP) of a company. The proposals follow a special bench of the National Company Law Tribunal (NCLT) staying a single bench order that had approved a repayment plan offering creditors Rs 6.25 crore against admitted claims of Rs 22,006.57 crore. That case led experts to question the efficacy of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016, which was introduced to revive companies under heavy debt and secure repayment to banks. The contested point is that the guarantor track of the Code was built with weaker creditor protections than the corporate track, and a related party of the guarantor can currently vote on the plan that decides what creditors recover.

    What is the personal guarantor resolution process?

    1. Who a personal guarantor is: An individual, usually a promoter, who personally guarantees a company’s borrowing, so the lender can proceed against that individual’s own estate when the company defaults.
    2. How the process runs: A resolution professional is appointed, a repayment plan is prepared for the guarantor, and the plan is put to a vote of the creditors before it goes to the adjudicating authority for approval.
    3. How it differs from the corporate track: Under CIRP the plan is decided by a committee of creditors from which a related party of the debtor company is excluded from voting. In a personal guarantor resolution only an associate is barred, and the definition of associate is far narrower.

    What triggered the review?

    1. The order under stay: On August 25 the NCLT single bench approved a repayment plan involving personal guarantor and Essel Group founder Subhash Chandra, and a special bench has since stayed that order.
    2. The recovery on offer: Creditors were offered Rs 6.25 crore against admitted claims of Rs 22,006.57 crore.
    3. What the banks alleged: The banks alleged that the non bank entities voting on the plan were associates or related parties of the guarantor and had acted under his influence to push through a plan carrying a very large haircut.
    4. The gap the case exposed: The narrower associate test let entities that would fail a related party test vote on the plan. The IBBI’s own illustration is a company that habitually acts on the guarantor’s advice or instructions, without the guarantor holding any shares in it or controlling its board.

    What are the four proposed amendments?

    1. Voting rights of related parties: Any creditor who is a related party of the guarantor would get no voting right in approving the resolution plan, replacing the narrower associate test.
    2. Scrutiny of avoidance transactions: Resolution professionals would have to examine whether the guarantor was party to any avoidance transactions, meaning undervalued transactions, transactions giving preference and extortionate credit transactions, present those findings to creditors before the vote, and initiate legal proceedings with creditor approval.
    3. Independent asset valuation: A registered valuer would have to determine the fair value and the realisable value of the guarantor’s assets, and the valuation report would go to creditors along with the repayment plan.
    4. Reasoned minutes of creditor meetings: Resolution professionals would have to record creditors’ deliberations and the reasons for their decision in the minutes of creditors’ meetings.

    How do these proposals close the gap with the corporate process?

    1. Parity on the voting bar: The related party exclusion is the CIRP standard, and applying it to guarantor resolutions removes the mismatch the Chandra case turned on.
    2. A duty that does not currently exist: When a guarantor’s repayment plan is put to a vote, the resolution professional is today under no obligation to examine whether an avoidance transaction took place or whether the guarantor made full disclosure of affairs.
    3. Informed commercial judgement: The IBBI’s stated purpose for the valuation report is to let creditors assess the adequacy of the proposed security, the viability of the repayment plan and the potential recovery available from the guarantor’s assets.
    4. An auditable record: Recording only raw voting tallies leaves no record of commercial reasoning, and reasoned minutes give an appellate forum something to review beyond the arithmetic of the vote.

    Challenges to the personal guarantor resolution framework

    1. Asset shielding before the filing: A guarantor can move assets into family or trust structures well before insolvency begins, leaving little to value. Eg. Promoter assets held through family trusts have repeatedly fallen outside the estate available to lenders in large default cases.
      The Fix: Extend the look back period for avoidance transactions involving a guarantor’s relatives and require a sworn asset disclosure covering it.
    2. Proving a related party connection: The related party test is broader than the associate test and is also harder to establish, since control through habitual instruction leaves no shareholding trail. Eg. The IBBI’s own example is a company acting on the guarantor’s instructions without any shareholding or board control.
      The Fix: Place the burden on the creditor claiming unrelated status to establish it, rather than on the objecting bank to disprove it.
    3. Delay in adjudication: The guarantor track sits in the same tribunals already carrying a heavy corporate caseload, so an order and its stay can consume months while asset value erodes. Eg. The stay in this case leaves the approved plan in suspension with no fixed date for a decision.
      The Fix: Fix a statutory outer limit for disposal of a personal guarantor repayment plan and report breaches bench wise.
    4. Valuation of illiquid personal assets: Fair value and realisable value diverge sharply for unlisted shareholdings, disputed land and pledged promoter stock. Eg. Pledged promoter shareholdings lose value the moment a lender begins to sell them into the market.
      The Fix: Require two independent registered valuers where the guarantor’s estate is dominated by unlisted or pledged securities.

    Conclusion

    The guarantor track of the Code was written as a lighter version of the corporate one, and the difference has turned out to matter most in exactly the cases where recovery is largest. The four proposals move that track towards the corporate standard on voting, scrutiny, valuation and record keeping, and each of them constrains the resolution professional rather than the tribunal. The proposals sit in a discussion paper open for public comment, and the special bench’s stay holds until it decides the matter.

    Back2Basics: Insolvency and Bankruptcy Board of India

    1. What it is: The IBBI is the regulator for insolvency and bankruptcy proceedings in India, established in 2016 under the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016.
    2. Who it regulates: Insolvency professionals, insolvency professional agencies, registered valuers and information utilities.
    3. What makes it unusual: It holds regulatory, executive and quasi judicial functions over the same set of entities, which is rare among Indian regulators.
    4. Its rule making role: It frames the regulations that govern both the corporate insolvency resolution process and the resolution of personal guarantors, which is what the present discussion paper proposes to amend.

    Matching Previous Year Question

    “[2019] What was the purpose of Inter-Creditor Agreement signed by Indian banks and financial institutions recently? (a) To lessen the Government of India’s perennial burden of fiscal deficit nd current account deficit (b) To support the infrastructure projects of Central and State Governments (c) To act as independent regulator in case of applications for loans of Rs. 50 crore or more (d) To aim at faster resolution of stressed assets of Rs. 50 crore or more which are under consortium lending Answer: (d)”

  • Govt: No bank charge on UPI payment up to Rs 2,000

    Why in the News

    The Ministry of Finance has notified that no bank or system provider may impose any charge, directly or indirectly, on a payment made through RuPay debit cards or through the Unified Payments Interface (UPI), the National Payments Corporation of India’s real time system for transferring money between bank accounts using a virtual address, up to Rs 2,000. The notification does not specify any charge for transactions above that amount, which opens the way for a fee on higher value person to merchant payments. It follows the Taxation and Other Laws (Amendment) Bill, 2026, passed by Parliament last month, which removed the statutory bar on charging for these payment modes. The contested point is that a threshold covering 96 per cent of person to merchant transactions by number leaves roughly two thirds of their value open to a charge.

    What is the Merchant Discount Rate?

    1. What it is: The Merchant Discount Rate (MDR) is the fee a bank that processes a card or digital payment levies on the merchant receiving it.
    2. What it pays for: It covers transaction processing, settlement and payment infrastructure costs across the chain of banks and providers that carry the payment.
    3. The usual range: An MDR normally runs between 1 and 3 per cent of transaction value on debit and credit card payments.
    4. The exemption since 2020: No MDR has been levied on RuPay debit cards and UPI transactions since January 2020, a decision taken to promote adoption of digital payments.

    What has the notification done, and who decides a fee above the threshold?

    1. The prohibition: The notification bars any charge, direct or indirect, on RuPay debit card payments and on UPI transactions of up to Rs 2,000, whether imposed on the person making or the person receiving the payment.
    2. The silence above the threshold: The ministry did not specify charges for transactions above Rs 2,000, which is what creates the opening for an MDR on higher value person to merchant payments.
    3. The deciding body: Whether an MDR is imposed above the threshold will be decided by the UPI and Services Steering Committee, headed by the National Payments Corporation of India (NPCI), with 22 members including banks, third party application providers such as PhonePe and Google Pay, the Payments Council of India and the Indian Banks’ Association.
    4. The rate under discussion: Payments industry officials have suggested an MDR of around 0.4 to 0.5 per cent for UPI payments to large merchants, which would help meet the industry’s annual cost of about Rs 20,700 crore.

    What legal change made this possible?

    1. The provision amended: The Bill amended Section 10A of the Payment and Settlement Systems Act, 2007, which had barred any bank or system provider from imposing a charge on payments made through the electronic modes prescribed under Section 269SU.
    2. The modes covered: Those prescribed modes were RuPay debit cards, BHIM UPI and the UPI QR code.
    3. Who the underlying obligation binds: Section 269SU of the Income Tax Act, 1961 applies to businesses with a turnover of over Rs 50 crore, requiring them to offer the prescribed electronic payment modes.
    4. What the amendment enables: Removing the exemption paves the way for an MDR on UPI and RuPay debit card payments to large merchants such as e commerce platforms.
    5. The stated rationale: The amendment is presented as an enabling provision for UPI’s long term sustainability, technological advancement and resilience against emerging risks.

    Why does the Rs 2,000 threshold matter for UPI’s economics?

    1. Small share by number: Only 4 per cent of person to merchant UPI payments in 2025 to 26 were for more than Rs 2,000.
    2. Large share by value: Those same transactions accounted for about two thirds of total person to merchant UPI payment value.
    3. The base: More than 24,000 crore UPI transactions worth Rs 314 lakh crore were made during the year.
    4. What the design achieves: The threshold protects the small ticket everyday payment from any charge while leaving the value where a percentage fee actually earns revenue open to one.

    How has the state paid for zero MDR so far?

    1. The incentive scheme: The government subsidises payments of up to Rs 2,000 made to small merchants through its incentive scheme for promotion of RuPay debit cards and low value BHIM UPI person to merchant transactions.
    2. The cap and the exclusion: The incentive is capped at 0.15 per cent of transaction value, and large merchants are not covered by the scheme at all.
    3. What it costs: The Budget for 2026 to 27 estimated the payout at Rs 2,000 crore. Rs 2,196.21 crore was paid in 2025 to 26, up from Rs 1,922.77 crore in 2024 to 25.
    4. The sustainability finding: A March report of the Standing Committee on Finance recorded that the absence of MDR makes the UPI ecosystem financially unsustainable.

    Challenges to reintroducing a Merchant Discount Rate on UPI

    1. Merchant pass through to the customer: A merchant charged a percentage fee recovers it by quoting a higher price or by preferring cash for large tickets. Eg. Many small retailers added a surcharge on card payments before the Reserve Bank of India barred the practice on debit cards.
      The Fix: Bar surcharging by contract with the acquiring bank and make the ban a condition of merchant onboarding.
    2. Threshold gaming by splitting payments: A fixed value threshold invites a single large payment being broken into several below the cut off. Eg. A Rs 5,000 purchase settled as three separate UPI transfers falls entirely inside the exempt band.
      The Fix: Apply the threshold to the aggregate value settled to one merchant from one payer in a day rather than to a single transaction.
    3. Definition risk on the large merchant: The charge is designed to fall on large merchants, and the line between a large and a small merchant sits on self declared turnover. Eg. Section 269SU already uses a Rs 50 crore turnover test that a merchant can restructure across entities.
      The Fix: Anchor the classification to verified Goods and Services Tax turnover rather than to a declaration made at onboarding.
    4. Fiscal and commercial funding running in parallel: An incentive subsidy and an MDR answer the same infrastructure cost, and running both leaves the split unstated. Eg. The subsidy payout has risen each year while the industry’s stated annual cost has stayed far above it.
      The Fix: Publish a stated glide path withdrawing the incentive as MDR revenue begins, so the two do not fund the same cost twice.

    Conclusion

    The zero fee regime on UPI was paid for by the exchequer, and the bill grew every year while the payments industry’s own cost stayed several times larger. The notification shifts the funding of the large value end of the system from the Budget to the merchant, and leaves the small everyday payment where it was. What to watch is whether the UPI and Services Steering Committee sets a rate above the threshold at all, and whether merchants at that end of the market stay on UPI once it does.

    Back2Basics: National Payments Corporation of India

    1. What it is: NPCI is the umbrella organisation for retail payments and settlement systems in India.
    2. How it was set up: It was incorporated in 2008 as a not for profit company, promoted jointly by the Reserve Bank of India and the Indian Banks’ Association.
    3. Its statutory anchor: It operates under the Payment and Settlement Systems Act, 2007, which is the law governing payment systems in India.
    4. What it runs: Its systems include UPI, RuPay, the Immediate Payment Service, the National Automated Clearing House and FASTag.

    Matching Previous Year Question

    “[2023, GS3, 10 marks] What is the status of digitalization in the Indian economy? Examine the problems faced in this regard and suggest improvements.”

  • Uniform Civil Code in all 21 NDA states before 2029: Shah

    Why in the News

    The Union Home Minister has stated that the Uniform Civil Code (UCC) will be implemented across all 21 NDA ruled states before the 2029 Lok Sabha elections. The announcement completes a shift the Sangh Parivar first expressed in 2022-23, away from a single national code enacted by Parliament and towards state by state legislation, with Uttarakhand’s code as the template. Gujarat and Assam have already followed with similar laws and Madhya Pradesh’s Bill awaits assent. The tension is that a code whose entire claim is uniformity is being built through separate state statutes that already differ from each other, and all of which exclude Scheduled Tribes.

    What is a Uniform Civil Code?

    1. The scope of a uniform civil code: A UCC is a single set of civil laws on marriage, divorce, maintenance, succession and adoption applying to all citizens, in place of the separate personal laws that currently apply by religious community.
    2. Where the Constitution places it: Article 44, a Directive Principle of State Policy, directs the State to endeavour to secure a uniform civil code for citizens throughout the territory of India. A Directive Principle is not enforceable by any court.
    3. Why a state can enact one: Marriage, divorce, succession and related civil matters fall under Entry 5 of the Concurrent List, so a state legislature is competent to legislate on them.

    What does the state led approach change?

    1. The route has changed, not the objective: The stated resolve is to enforce the UCC in all 21 alliance ruled states before the 2029 Lok Sabha polls, rather than to enact one national statute.
    2. The Sangh Parivar position of 2022-23: The shift from a national push to a state led approach is a position the Sangh Parivar expressed in 2022-23.
    3. The template already exists: Uttarakhand’s code has been in force since last year and is the model the other states have worked from.
    4. Three states have followed: Gujarat, Assam and Madhya Pradesh have brought similar legislation, and Madhya Pradesh’s Bill is awaiting assent.

    What do the four state codes have in common?

    1. Polygamy is prohibited: All four state laws ban polygamy.
    2. Marriage must be registered: All four require registration of marriage.
    3. Divorce and inheritance are standardised: The laws apply common rules for divorce and for inheritance across communities.
    4. Women get equal inheritance rights: All four grant women equal inheritance rights.
    5. Live in relationships must be registered: All four mandate registration of live in relationships.

    Where do the state codes diverge?

    1. Uttarakhand builds in an exit and a protection: Its code allows deregistration of a live in relationship and recognises children born from such a relationship.
    2. Assam attaches a penalty instead: Its code penalises non registration of a live in relationship.
    3. The consequence of divergent state codes: Two codes drawn from the same template already treat the same relationship differently, which is the outcome a national statute was meant to prevent.

    Why are Scheduled Tribes excluded?

    1. The exclusion is common to all four: All four state laws exclude Scheduled Tribes from their application.
    2. The Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh concerns behind the exclusion: The exclusion was written in response to concerns raised by the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh.
    3. Two states go further: Uttarakhand and Assam add explicit protections for specific tribal customs.

    What else was placed on record as the government’s reform list?

    1. Personal law: The abolition of Triple Talaq is cited as having given equal rights to Muslim women.
    2. Constitutional change: The reading down of Article 370 is cited as having been done without violence.
    3. Criminal law: The Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita (BNS) has been enforced, with a conviction rate of 30 per cent recorded in one year.
    4. Citizenship registration: The government is in discussion with alliance partners and various groups on implementing the National Register of Citizens (NRC) in Manipur.
    5. Enforcement drives: A drive to identify and deport illegal immigrants was reiterated, alongside a zero tolerance position on Naxalism and terrorism.

    Challenges to a state led Uniform Civil Code

    1. State by state enactment produces the opposite of uniformity: Each legislature settles its own definitions and penalties, so a citizen’s civil status changes at a state border. Eg. Uttarakhand permits deregistration of a live in relationship while Assam penalises failure to register one.
      The Fix: Enact a central model code under Entry 5 of the Concurrent List that states adopt with limited variation, so Article 254 resolves conflicts instead of leaving them to accumulate.
    2. A code that exempts a category is not uniform: Excluding Scheduled Tribes preserves exactly the community specific personal law regime the code was framed to end. Eg. All four enacted or pending state codes exclude Scheduled Tribes.
      The Fix: Convert the blanket exclusion into an opt in mechanism exercisable by an Autonomous District Council under the Sixth Schedule, so the exemption is a community’s decision rather than a permanent carve out.
    3. Compulsory registration of live in relationships raises a privacy question: Registration converts a private arrangement into a state record with penal consequences for failure to file. Eg. Justice K S Puttaswamy v. Union of India (2017), a nine judge Bench, held informational privacy and decisional autonomy to be part of the right to life under Article 21.
      The Fix: Make registration voluntary and tie the statutory benefits of maintenance and legitimacy of children to it, so the incentive to register replaces the penalty for not registering.
    4. Freedom of religion sits against the directive: Article 25 guarantees the freedom to profess, practise and propagate religion, and every personal law reform is contested on that ground. Eg. The Supreme Court in Shayara Bano v. Union of India (2017) set aside instant triple talaq by a majority, and the decision was argued through the religious practice test rather than through Article 44.
      The Fix: Legislate reform head by head, on succession, on registration, on the grounds of divorce, so each provision is defended on its own constitutional footing rather than as a single omnibus code.
    5. Enforcement capacity is assumed rather than built: Universal marriage and relationship registration requires a functioning registry down to the block level, and civil registration coverage is already uneven. Eg. Registration of marriage was made a general requirement only after Seema v. Ashwani Kumar (2006), and compliance still varies widely across states.
      The Fix: Fund a digital civil registry linked to the existing birth and death registration system before a registration mandate takes effect, so the obligation lands on a system that can receive it.

    Conclusion

    The position now on record converts a manifesto commitment into a dated legislative programme with a stated count of states and a stated deadline. Four codes exist or are pending, and their differences on live in relationships are already visible, so what is being built is a family of codes rather than one. The marker to watch is Madhya Pradesh’s Bill and the assent it awaits, followed by whether the remaining alliance ruled states legislate on the Uttarakhand template or draft their own variations.

    Back2Basics: Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023

    1. Indian Penal Code, 1860: The Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 replaced the Indian Penal Code, 1860 as India’s substantive criminal law.
    2. When it took effect: It came into force on 1 July 2024.
    3. The three companion criminal statutes: It was enacted alongside the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023, which replaced the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, and the Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023, which replaced the Indian Evidence Act, 1872.
    4. New provisions added: It added community service as a form of punishment for specified minor offences and grouped offences against women and children into a dedicated chapter.

    Matching Previous Year Question

    “[2015, GS2, 12 marks] Discuss the possible factors that inhibit India from enacting for its citizens a uniform civil code as provided for in the Directive Principles of State Policy.”

  • Censor Board meets after six years, members ask who’s on film review panel

    Why in the News

    The Central Board of Film Certification (CBFC), also known as the Censor Board, has held its 149th meeting, its first in six years and the first under its new chairperson. Members used it to ask for a list of the people who have consistently headed Revising Committees in recent years, the panels that re-examine a film when a certification decision is disputed. The request follows an investigation published in September 2025, which found that three board members had been heading most Revising Committees. The Cinematograph (Certification) Rules, 2024 require the board to meet once every quarter, and the 12-member board had last met on 31 August 2019. No member has been officially reappointed since the board was reconstituted in 2017, though the tenure is three years. A body whose membership has not been renewed and which does not meet is the body from which every panel deciding a contested certification is drawn.

    What is a Revising Committee?

    1. When it is constituted: A Revising Committee re-examines a film where either the producers or the board are dissatisfied with the Examining Committee’s decision.
    2. What it sits above: The Examining Committee is the first panel to view a film and recommend its certificate.
    3. Who staffs it: It is headed by a member of the board, which is why the identity of the recurring heads decides the outcome of contested certifications.

    What did members ask for at the 149th meeting?

    1. The list of recurring panel heads: Members requested a list of those who consistently headed Revising Committees in recent years to review films.
    2. The finding behind the request: An investigation published in September 2025 found that three board members had been heading most Revising Committees.
    3. What else was on the agenda: Recent films that had generated controversy, strategies for moving forward, and industry outreach programmes were discussed at the virtual meeting.

    What do the rules require, and what happened instead?

    1. The meeting requirement: Under the Cinematograph (Certification) Rules, 2024, the CBFC board must meet once every quarter.
    2. The record against it: The 149th meeting took place on 29 August, and the board had last met on 31 August 2019.
    3. The board resolved to do what the rules already say: It was discussed that the board should meet at least once quarterly, in accordance with the rules.

    Why is the board’s own composition in question?

    1. No reappointment since 2017: None of the members of the 12-member board has been officially reappointed since that year.
    2. The tenure has long since run out: The stated tenure of a member is three years, and the board was last reconstituted on 1 August 2017.
    3. The consequence for the panels: Revising Committees are headed by board members, so an unrenewed board narrows the pool from which every contested review is drawn.

    What did the 2024 Rules change?

    1. They replaced the earlier framework: The Cinematograph (Certification) Rules, 2024 were notified in supersession of the Cinematograph (Certification) Rules, 1983, and that change itself came up for discussion at the meeting.
    2. Age-based categories replaced a single UA mark: The 2024 Rules subdivided the existing UA category into three age-based categories, UA 7+, UA 13+ and UA 16+, in place of the earlier twelve year mark.
    3. The new categories need interpretation: A request for clarification on the difference between the 16 year and the 18 year certification was made at the meeting.

    Challenges to the CBFC’s certification framework

    1. Delay operates as a decision: A certificate is the precondition for theatrical release, so time taken over a review has the same commercial effect as a refusal. Eg. A film awaiting a revision date loses the release window around which its distribution and publicity were booked.
      The Fix: Fix an outer time limit for a Revising Committee to report, with automatic escalation to the board once that limit lapses.
    2. The reviewer and the appellate reviewer come from one pool: Advisory panel members sit on Examining Committees and board members chair the panels that review them, so the second look is not independent of the first. Eg. Both tiers are constituted by the same appointing authority from the same panel lists.
      The Fix: Draw the revision tier from a separate roster with fixed terms, published in advance of any specific film.
    3. The specialist appellate tier no longer exists: The Film Certification Appellate Tribunal was abolished by the Tribunals Reforms Act, 2021, so a producer’s remedy against a certification decision now lies in a High Court. Eg. Certification disputes that the tribunal would once have heard are now filed as writ petitions.
      The Fix: Restore a specialist appellate forum, or fix a statutory hearing timeline for certification writs so the remedy matches the release cycle.
    4. Modifications are negotiated rather than adjudicated: A producer facing a restrictive category has an incentive to accept voluntary cuts instead of contesting them. Eg. Voluntary modifications are routinely offered to secure a less restrictive certificate.
      The Fix: Require every accepted modification and its stated ground to be recorded in a published certification order.
    5. The framework does not cover the largest release channel: The Cinematograph Act, 1952 governs films for public exhibition, and content released on a streaming service falls instead under the self-regulation regime of the Information Technology Rules, 2021. Eg. The same title can carry a CBFC certificate in theatres and a self-assigned rating on a streaming platform.
      The Fix: State in law which regime a release falls under by medium, and align the age categories across the two so a rating means the same thing in both.

    Conclusion

    The board has resumed meeting and has put its own functioning on the record as the first item of business. Two decisions now sit with the Ministry of Information and Broadcasting rather than with the board: reconstitution of a membership whose term expired years ago, and whether the list of recurring Revising Committee heads is supplied. What to watch is whether the next quarterly meeting is held on schedule, which is the first test of whether the six year gap was an aberration or the operating norm.

    Back2Basics: Central Board of Film Certification

    1. What it is: A statutory body constituted under the Cinematograph Act, 1952, functioning under the Ministry of Information and Broadcasting.
    2. What it does: It certifies films for public exhibition in India, and a film cannot be publicly exhibited without its certificate.
    3. The certificate categories: U for unrestricted public exhibition, UA with its age-based subdivisions, A restricted to adults, and S restricted to a specialised audience.
    4. How it is staffed: It has a chairperson and non-official members appointed by the Centre, with regional offices that constitute the Examining Committees.

    Matching Previous Year Question

    “[2022] With reference to the “Tea Board” in India, consider the following statements : 1. The Tea Board is a statutory body. 2. It is a regulatory body attached to the Ministry of Agriculture and Farmers Welfare. 3. The Tea Board’s Head Office is situated in Bengaluru. 4. The Board has overseas offices at Dubai and Moscow. Which of the statements given above are correct ? (a) 1 and 3 (b) 2 and 4 (c) 3 and 4 (d) 1 and 4 ANSWER: (d)”