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  • Why did the SC reject methanol rules?

    Why did the SC reject methanol rules?

    Why in the News

    The Supreme Court has struck down Maharashtra government rules requiring methanol to be denatured with a colourant and a bitterant before sale to non drug manufacturers. A Bench including Justices J.B. Pardiwala and K. Vinod Chandran held the measures disproportionate and lacking sufficient connection with the problem they sought to address, and allowed the writ petitions filed by methanol based product manufacturers. The rules struck down are Rules 18A and 18B of the Maharashtra Poisons Rules, 1972, introduced by a 2011 amendment after a 1991 hooch tragedy in Mumbai in which around 93 people died after consuming spurious liquor containing methanol. The tension is that the State’s regulatory power over poisons was upheld while the specific measure was voided, because the misuse the rules target happens in the unregulated field and the burden of the rules falls entirely on licensed industry.

    What did Rules 18A and 18B require?

    1. Rule 18A(1), licence verification: It required verification of a purchaser’s Form A licence before methanol could be sold.
    2. Rule 18A(2), mandatory additives: It required methanol sold to non drug manufacturers to be mixed with a colourant and a bitterant, so the substance would be identifiable and unpalatable.
    3. Rule 18B, confiscation: Any possession of methanol without a Form A licence was made liable to confiscation.
    4. The statutory source: The rules were framed under the Poisons Act, 1919, which permits State governments to make rules regulating the possession and sale of poisons.

    Why were these controls introduced in the first place?

    1. The triggering tragedy: Maharashtra tightened controls on methanol after the 1991 Mumbai hooch tragedy, in which around 93 people died from spurious liquor containing methanol.
    2. The inquiry: A committee headed by the then Additional Director General of Police P.R. Parthasarthy was constituted to examine the causes of the tragedy and suggest measures.
    3. The amendment: In 2011, Maharashtra amended its Poisons Rules and introduced Rules 18A and 18B.
    4. The dual character of the chemical: Methanol, or methyl alcohol, is a highly toxic substance and is also a widely used industrial raw material in products including formaldehyde, paraformaldehyde, paints and resins, which is why a blanket ban was never the option on the table.

    What did the two sides argue?

    1. The manufacturers on product integrity: Companies told the Court that colour contamination could make products unacceptable to the paint and pharmaceutical industries.
    2. The manufacturers on technical effect: They argued that the additives could affect catalysts and laboratory and pharmaceutical applications, so the denaturing damages legitimate use rather than merely marking the substance.
    3. The State on lethality: The State argued that the rules were necessary because methanol could be mixed with liquor and cause fatal poisoning.
    4. The State on deterrence by design: It argued that making methanol identifiable and bitter would itself help prevent misuse, so the additive was a preventive rather than a punitive measure.

    On what reasoning did the Court strike each rule down?

    1. The constitutional question: The central question was whether Rules 18A and 18B violated Article 14, whose basic tenet is fairness in action and non arbitrariness, and Article 19(1)(g), which protects the right to carry on an occupation, trade or business.
    2. Rule 18A(1) fails on fit: The Court held that merely verifying a Form A licence did not establish how the purchaser would use methanol, so the restriction on legitimate industrial users was disproportionate.
    3. Rule 18A(2) fails on nexus: The Court held the additive requirement had no reasonable and proximate nexus with preventing the misuse of methanol in illicit liquor, and that the State failed to show the additives would prevent diversion or the manufacture of spurious liquor.
    4. The Court’s own formulation: It observed that the rules prescribe a framework that “does not prevent the misuse of methanol in liquor which takes place in the unregulated field”, and that even in the best case of full compliance the sub rule cannot prevent the misuse it aims at.
    5. Rule 18B fails on internal contradiction: Confiscation for possession without a Form A licence could conflict with lawful possession under a Form B permit and effectively render that permit redundant, so it too failed the proportionality test.
    6. The framework applied: Applying the proportionality framework laid down in K.S. Puttaswamy v. Union of India (2017), the Court held that preventing loss of life from methanol adulterated liquor is a legitimate aim, while the restrictions were neither suitable nor necessary to achieve it.
    7. The governing principle recorded: The Court noted that a policy which is irrational, lacks rational justification, or violates any constitutional, statutory or other provision of law is liable to be struck down.

    What did the Court direct States to do instead?

    1. Enforcement across departments: States should work together through the prohibition, excise, police, transport, industries and health departments, along with non governmental organisations, to prevent illegal liquor.
    2. Where enforcement should sit: This includes checking State borders, stopping illegal transport, identifying places where illicit liquor is made or stored, and monitoring industrial units that may illegally supply the chemicals used.
    3. Licensing discipline: Licences should be granted only after proper verification and should be regularly reviewed, with suspension or cancellation for violations.
    4. Stock accountability: Industrial users should return unused or excess methanol and maintain proper stock and consumption records.
    5. Transport controls: Methanol should be transported in dedicated tankers under excise supervision and sealed in a way that prevents theft, diversion or tampering.
    6. Demand side and victim support: The Court called for more addiction treatment centres, support for affected families, and local counselling centres.
    7. The stated limit of the direction: The Court added that while it could issue directions, effective implementation ultimately depends on the police and enforcement machinery.

    Challenges to controlling methanol diversion in India

    1. The diversion happens outside the licensed chain: Illicit liquor is made from methanol that has already left the regulated market, so a control applied at the point of lawful sale never reaches it. Eg. Hooch deaths have recurred in Tamil Nadu, Bihar and Gujarat in years when licensed methanol sale rules were already in force.
      The Fix: Move to end to end electronic tracking of every methanol consignment from the manufacturer’s gate to the consuming unit, with reconciliation of stock against declared consumption.
    2. Rules are made State by State for a chemical that moves across States: A tight regime in one State pushes sourcing to a neighbouring State with lighter controls. Eg. Methanol used in hooch tragedies has repeatedly been traced to consignments purchased outside the State where the deaths occurred.
      The Fix: Frame a model set of Poisons Rules under the Poisons Act, 1919 for adoption by all States, so licensing thresholds and transport conditions do not diverge at the border.
    3. Prohibition raises the payoff from adulteration: Where lawful liquor is banned or heavily taxed, an illicit market grows and the incentive to substitute methanol for ethanol rises with it. Eg. Bihar has recorded repeated mass poisoning episodes since prohibition was imposed in 2016.
      The Fix: Pair any prohibition regime with a funded enforcement and surveillance budget and a public health reporting system for suspected poisoning clusters, rather than relying on the ban alone.
    4. Detection capacity is thin outside major cities: Confirming methanol poisoning requires laboratory testing that district hospitals often cannot perform in time to treat. Eg. The antidote regimen depends on early confirmation, and delays convert survivable exposure into blindness or death.
      The Fix: Stock fomepizole or ethanol antidote kits and rapid methanol assays at district hospitals in districts with a recorded history of illicit liquor production.
    5. Legitimate industrial demand is large and growing: Methanol is a bulk feedstock and a candidate transport fuel, so volumes in circulation rise faster than the licensing machinery expands. Eg. The methanol blending programme promoted by NITI Aayog envisages methanol use in transport and cooking fuel.
      The Fix: Tie licence capacity at the State drugs and excise departments to declared industrial consumption volumes, so inspection frequency scales with the quantity in circulation.

    Conclusion

    The ruling leaves the State’s power over poisons intact and removes the particular instrument it chose. What it establishes is that a restriction on a lawful trade must be shown to work against the mischief it names, and that a regulator cannot rely on the seriousness of the harm to carry a measure that cannot reach it. The next marker is whether States revise their Poisons Rules along the licensing, stock and transport lines the Court set out, or leave the existing rules untouched until the next poisoning episode.

    Back2Basics

    1. The proportionality test: Laid down in K.S. Puttaswamy v. Union of India (2017), it is the standard for testing whether a State restriction on a fundamental right is constitutionally permissible.
    2. Legitimate aim: The measure must pursue a goal the Constitution permits the State to pursue, which the Court accepted here in the prevention of deaths from adulterated liquor.
    3. Suitability and necessity: The means chosen must be rationally connected to that aim, and there must be no less restrictive alternative that would achieve it equally well.
    4. Balancing: The extent of the restriction must be proportionate to the benefit secured, and the State carries the burden of demonstrating that it is.

    Matching Previous Year Question

    “[2013, GS2, 10 marks] Discuss Section 66A of IT Act, with reference to its alleged violation of Article 19 of the Constitution.”

  • Why does Article 371 exist in so many different forms?

    Why does Article 371 exist in so many different forms?

    Why in the News

    The Centre has proposed inserting a new provision, Article 371K, in the Constitution to give special constitutional safeguards to Ladakh. The proposal follows an “in-principle understanding” reached between the Ministry of Home Affairs and representatives of the Apex Body, Leh (ABL) and the Kargil Democratic Alliance (KDA). That understanding is to create a directly elected Union Territory level body carrying legislative, executive, financial and planning powers. The tension is that every existing Article 371 provision was written for a State, while Ladakh is a Union Territory with no legislature at all, so the proposed clause has to create the institution before it can protect it.

    What is Article 371?

    1. The original purpose: Article 371 was not written to protect the Northeast or tribal regions. It was a transitional provision for Central supervision over the Part B States, the former princely territories that acceded to India under different historical and administrative circumstances.
    2. The Part B classification: The Constitution classified Hyderabad, Mysore, Jammu and Kashmir, Rajasthan and others separately as Part B States, because the framers were concerned about newly integrated territories functioning immediately within the same framework as the former British provinces.
    3. What it actually did: Adopted in 1950, it placed the governments of the Part B States under the general control of the President for 10 years, or for such longer or shorter period as Parliament might prescribe.
    4. How it disappeared: The States Reorganisation Act and the Seventh Constitutional Amendment of 1956 abolished the Part A, Part B and Part C classification. The original Article 371 vanished with it, and Parliament replaced it with a provision for equitable development of Vidarbha, Marathwada, Saurashtra and Kutch in Maharashtra and Gujarat.

    Why did a transitional clause become the constitutional home for special protection?

    1. Flexibility as a design choice: India’s constitutional system was built to accommodate regions whose historical circumstances, social structures or political demands differed from the rest of the country.
    2. Bespoke rather than uniform: Parliament repeatedly created individually negotiated arrangements under the same Article number, so the 371 series is a set of separate bargains and not a single doctrine of autonomy.
    3. The trigger is always political settlement: Each insertion followed an accord, a formula or a reorganisation, which is why no two clauses protect the same thing or work the same way.
    4. The number is a container, not a principle: A clause under Article 371 can mean customary law protection in one State and a minimum Assembly size in another, so the label carries no fixed content.

    What does each State specific provision actually protect?

    1. Nagaland, Article 371A: Inserted by the 13th Amendment Act, 1962 following the 16-Point Agreement of 1960. It protects Naga religious and social practices, customary law and procedure, and ownership and transfer of land and its resources.
    2. Assam, Article 371B: Inserted by the 22nd Amendment Act, 1969. It allows the President to create a committee within the Assam Legislative Assembly of members elected from the tribal areas covered by the Sixth Schedule, giving protected tribal areas a distinct voice.
    3. Manipur, Article 371C: Inserted by the 27th Amendment Act, 1971, ahead of Manipur becoming a full State in 1972. It provides a special Assembly committee of members elected from the hill areas, with the Governor responsible for reporting to the President on their administration.
    4. Andhra Pradesh and Telangana, Article 371D: Inserted by the 32nd Amendment Act, 1973 after the Six-Point Formula of 1973, and substituted by the Andhra Pradesh Reorganisation Act, 2014. It provides equitable opportunities in education and public employment across regions of the State.
    5. Sikkim, Article 371F: Inserted by the 36th Amendment Act, 1975. It was essentially a transition instrument for the integration of the erstwhile independent State, which became India’s 22nd State after a referendum.
    6. Mizoram, Article 371G: Inserted by the 53rd Amendment Act, 1986 following the 1986 Mizo Peace Accord. Parliamentary laws on Mizo religious and social practices, customary law and procedure, customary administration of justice, and land ownership do not apply unless the Mizoram Assembly agrees.
    7. Arunachal Pradesh, Article 371H: Inserted by the 55th Amendment Act, 1986 ahead of statehood in 1987. It gives the Governor a special responsibility for law and order, which is the opposite of the autonomy model used elsewhere.
    8. Goa, Article 371I: Inserted by the 56th Amendment Act, 1987. It is comparatively modest and simply requires the Goa Legislative Assembly to have at least 30 members.
    9. Karnataka, Article 371J: Inserted by the 98th Amendment Act, 2012 for the Hyderabad-Karnataka region, now Kalyana Karnataka. It addresses regional backwardness through a development board, equitable allocation of funds, and opportunities in public employment and education.

    Why does Ladakh’s demand not fit any existing 371 provision?

    1. A Union Territory without a legislature: Every existing clause operates on a State that already has an Assembly. The proposed Article 371K would apply to a Union Territory that has none, so it has to create the elected body rather than qualify one.
    2. The subject list sought: The Ministry of Home Affairs has said the body would have legislative powers over land, culture and language, forests, environment and natural resources, along with other subjects reserved for the Union Territory under Article 240.
    3. Law and order runs the other way: Article 371H gives the Governor special responsibility for law and order in Arunachal Pradesh. Ladakh’s leaders are seeking the opposite, which is control over law and order by the elected body.
    4. Land protection borrows a different model: The land protection sought resembles the design of Articles 371A and 371G, under which certain Parliamentary laws on land and customary practices do not apply automatically.

    What will decide whether Article 371K is strong or symbolic?

    1. The weak version: A provision that merely creates an elected body and lists the subjects it may legislate on would offer relatively limited protection.
    2. The demonstrated failure case: Hill tribes in Manipur have argued that Article 371C has failed to deliver on its promise of meaningful autonomy and protection, so a committee based design is not evidence that protection follows.
    3. The strong version: A clause protecting the elected body’s control over land, natural resources, recruitment and administration would be considerably stronger.
    4. The strongest version: Placing law and order and the bureaucracy under the elected executive would make the Ladakh head of government more powerful than the Jammu and Kashmir Chief Minister.

    Challenges to the proposed Article 371K

    1. Special provisions are read down by courts over time: A protective clause survives on paper while its practical scope narrows through litigation on which Parliamentary laws it actually excludes. Eg. Article 371A’s protection over land and resources has been repeatedly tested against Central directives in the petroleum and mining sectors in Nagaland.
      The Fix: Enumerate in the clause itself the Union List and Concurrent List entries that will not apply automatically, rather than leaving the exclusion to interpretation.
    2. Legislative power without fiscal capacity is nominal: An elected body can legislate on land and forests and still depend entirely on Central transfers for every scheme it runs. Eg. The Hyderabad-Karnataka development board under Article 371J operates on annual State allocations rather than an assured statutory share.
      The Fix: Attach a statutory minimum devolution to the Ladakh body, computed on a formula, so its legislative competence is matched by a predictable resource base.
    3. A committee model can be captured by the majority region: Where a special committee sits inside a larger Assembly, the protected region can be outvoted on everything the committee does not exclusively own. Eg. The hill areas committee under Article 371C in Manipur has been the standing grievance of the hill districts against the Imphal Valley.
      The Fix: Give the Ladakh body exclusive rather than advisory competence over the named subjects, so its decisions do not require ratification by a wider chamber.
    4. Two subregions with divergent demands: Leh and Kargil have historically sought different constitutional outcomes, and a single body can reproduce that contest instead of settling it. Eg. The Ladakh Autonomous Hill Development Councils were created separately for Leh in 1995 and Kargil in 2003.
      The Fix: Fix a seat and revenue sharing formula between the two districts inside the constitutional provision, rather than leaving it to the body’s own rules of business.
    5. Law and order transfer is the hardest concession to obtain: The Centre has consistently retained police and public order in Union Territories, and Ladakh sits on a live boundary with China. Eg. Delhi’s elected government has no control over the police despite having a legislature since 1993.
      The Fix: Create a staged transfer, with a Ladakh police service raised under the elected executive for civil policing while border and internal security remain with the Centre.

    Conclusion

    Article 371 has never been a single guarantee, and its nine surviving clauses were each written to close a specific political settlement. The Ladakh proposal is the first attempt to use that Article to build a legislature where none exists, which makes it a constitutional innovation rather than an extension. What to watch is whether the final text of Article 371K lists exclusive subjects and places law and order under the elected executive, or stops at creating a body and naming what it may discuss.

    Back2Basics

    1. Article 240: It empowers the President to make regulations for the peace, progress and good government of certain Union Territories, including Ladakh.
    2. Force of law: A regulation made under Article 240 has the same force and effect as an Act of Parliament, and may repeal or amend a law made by Parliament as it applies to that Union Territory.
    3. Why it matters here: The subjects reserved to Ladakh under Article 240 are the pool from which the proposed elected body’s legislative competence would be drawn.
    4. Its limit: The power belongs to the President, so a Union Territory governed under it has no democratic legislature of its own unless one is separately created.

    Matching Previous Year Question

    “[2013, GS2, 10 marks] Recent directives from Ministry of Petroleum and Natural Gas are perceived by the `Nagas’ as a threat to override the exceptional status enjoyed by the State. Discuss in light of Article 371A of the Indian Constitution.”

  • CCTV at medical stores: Why govt wants them, but chemists don’t

    Why in the News

    The Union Health Ministry has proposed mandatory closed circuit television (CCTV) surveillance at medical stores, with recordings retained for three months. The stated purpose is stricter control over prescription medicines, and the draft notification frames it as addressing “unauthorised access to and sale of Schedule H, H1 and X drugs” under the Drugs and Cosmetics Rules, 1945. The measure was first proposed in 2021 to prevent the abuse of drugs by children, and the Drugs Consultative Committee of the Central Drugs Standard Control Organisation (CDSCO) cleared it this year alongside an application based system. The All India Organisation of Chemists and Druggists has objected on cost, on rural power and connectivity, and on patient privacy. What is contested is whether a camera at the counter reaches the behaviour the rule is aimed at, or only records the transaction while leaving the prescription itself unverified.

    What do Schedules H, H1 and X cover?

    1. Schedule H: These medicines cannot be sold without a prescription from a registered medical practitioner, and they include many antibiotics and steroids.
    2. Schedule H1: These are subject to additional record keeping requirements and include certain antibiotics and anti tuberculosis medicines.
    3. Schedule X: This is the more tightly controlled category carrying additional requirements, and it includes some psychotropic medicines.

    Why has the government proposed camera surveillance?

    1. The original trigger: The measure was first proposed in 2021 to prevent the abuse of drugs by children.
    2. Deterrence is the stated mechanism: Round the clock surveillance is intended to create apprehension among medical store owners and pharmacists, so they are not inclined to sell these medicines to children without a prescription.
    3. What the footage is meant to establish: It is meant mainly to verify whether a sale was made to a minor without a prescription, and not all sales can be verified this way.
    4. Retrieval rather than inspection: Routine inspection every three months is difficult, so the data is to be retrieved when a complaint is received.
    5. Paired with a digital system: The Drugs Consultative Committee decided earlier this year to implement the application based system alongside the CCTV plan.

    How common is prescription drug addiction among children?

    1. Opioid use ranks second: Opioid use, covering heroin, opium and pharmaceutical opioids found in strong painkillers, is the second most common form of addiction among children and affects nearly 1.8 per cent of them.
    2. Cannabis leads: Cannabis use affects 19 per cent of children, according to one of the most comprehensive studies of drug use in India, conducted by the All India Institute of Medical Sciences (AIIMS) and published in 2019.
    3. Alcohol and inhalants: Alcohol use affects 1.3 per cent and inhalant use 1.17 per cent of children, and inhalant use is the only form of addiction more common in children than in adults.
    4. Where pharmaceutical opioids sit: Of an estimated 2.3 crore opioid users of all ages, 25 lakh are dependent on pharmaceutical opioids while the largest group of 63 lakh is dependent on heroin.

    What do chemists object to?

    1. Capital cost against turnover: A store may have to spend nearly Rs 1 lakh to put the system in place, which is not viable for a store with daily sales of Rs 5,000 to Rs 10,000.
    2. Rural power and connectivity: Power failures and connectivity problems in rural areas make continuous recording and retention impractical.
    3. Patient privacy: Recording every purchase captures identifiable patients buying identifiable medicines, which the organisation treats as its most important objection.

    Challenges to CCTV surveillance at medical stores

    1. The prescription itself stays unverified: A camera records who bought a medicine and not whether the prescription produced at the counter was genuine or valid. Eg. Most retail prescriptions in India remain handwritten and are not checked against any prescriber registry at the point of sale.
      The Fix: Mandate electronic prescriptions linked to a verified practitioner registry, so validity is checked at dispensing rather than reconstructed from footage afterwards.
    2. Enforcement capacity is the binding constraint: A rule generating three months of footage at every store needs inspectors and laboratories that the drug regulatory system does not have. Eg. The Mashelkar Committee report of 2003 flagged severe shortages of drug inspectors and testing laboratory capacity.
      The Fix: Fill sanctioned drug inspector posts and tie retail licence renewal to a documented compliance record rather than to a periodic fee.
    3. Surveillance without a data protection scaffold: Footage of a patient buying a specific medicine is sensitive personal data, and the draft names a retention period without naming who may access it or for what. Eg. The Digital Personal Data Protection Act, 2023 requires purpose limitation and security safeguards for personal data held by any entity.
      The Fix: Specify in the notification the authority empowered to demand footage, the permitted purpose, and a mandatory access audit log.
    4. Sales migrate to unmonitored channels: A rule that binds the physical counter pushes unprescribed demand toward online and unlicensed sellers that no store camera reaches. Eg. Draft rules to regulate e pharmacies have been under consideration since 2018 without final notification.
      The Fix: Apply the same prescription verification and record keeping obligations to online dispensing before the retail rule takes effect.

    Conclusion

    The proposal is at the draft notification stage and has cleared the Drugs Consultative Committee, so the next step is the final notification and the compliance window given to retailers. The dispute it exposes is narrower than it appears. The state is regulating the place of sale because the prescription behind the sale is not yet auditable, and until it is, a camera records evidence of a transaction rather than evidence of a violation.

    Back2Basics: Central Drugs Standard Control Organisation (CDSCO)

    1. Status: It is India’s national drug regulatory authority, functioning under the Ministry of Health and Family Welfare and headed by the Drugs Controller General of India.
    2. Statutory basis: It operates under the Drugs and Cosmetics Act, 1940 and the Drugs and Cosmetics Rules, 1945.
    3. Functions: It approves new drugs and clinical trials, lays down standards for drugs, and licenses notified categories such as vaccines and blood products.
    4. Drugs Consultative Committee: This is a statutory advisory body under the Act that advises the Centre and the States on securing uniformity in the administration of the Act.

    Matching Previous Year Question

    “[2014, GS3, 12.5 marks] Can overuse and the availability of antibiotics without doctor’s prescription, the contributors to the emergence of drug-resistant diseases in India? What are the available mechanisms for monitoring and control? Critically discuss the various issues involved.”

  • Conservation, compensation: Tackling Himachal monkey menace

    Why in the News

    A 63 year old woman in Shimla has died of injuries, including spinal damage, sustained when a pack of rhesus macaques attacked her on the roof of her house. The death has returned attention to the legal position of the species. The Wild Life (Protection) Act, 1972 had listed the rhesus macaque as a protected species under Part I of Schedule II. The Wild Life (Protection) Amendment Act, 2022 removed it from that listing. The contest now is that responsibility has passed from State forest departments to urban local bodies without the funds, the trained staff or the compensation cover moving with it.

    What changed for the rhesus macaque after the 2022 amendment?

    1. Loss of protected status: The 2022 amendment removed the rhesus macaque from Part I of Schedule II of the parent Act, ending its treatment as a protected species.
    2. Transfer of responsibility: The Chief Wildlife Warden of Himachal Pradesh has stated that State forest departments are no longer responsible for the monkey menace.
    3. Reclassification in practice: A monkey is now treated like a stray animal, which places it within the purview of civic bodies rather than of the wildlife administration.
    4. Central funding stopped: State forest departments earlier received funds from the Centre to control the monkey menace, and that flow ended once the species ceased to be protected.

    Why are urban local bodies not equipped to take this on?

    1. Absence of funds: A senior Indian Forest Service officer has identified the lack of funds as the first reason urban local bodies such as the Shimla Municipal Corporation are not fully competent to handle the task independently.
    2. No trained manpower: The second stated reason is the absence of expertise and trained manpower to capture monkeys and to sterilise the captured animals.
    3. Capacity is still being built: The Shimla Municipal Commissioner has stated that the corporation is in the process of training its manpower on how to capture monkeys, and takes the assistance of the forest department when a situation arises.
    4. Assistance is now priced: The forest department continues to intervene largely in and around forest areas and charges urban local bodies for capture and sterilisation, at a cost of Rs 700 per monkey sterilised.

    What do the population and incidence numbers show?

    1. A falling population: Official numbers show Himachal Pradesh’s estimated rhesus macaque population fell from 3,17,512 in 2004 to 2,26,086 in 2013, and then to 1,36,443 in 2019 to 2020.
    2. Sterilisation as the stated cause: The State forest department attributes much of that decline to sustained sterilisation, having sterilised 1,86,448 monkeys between 2006 and March 2024.
    3. Conflict has not fallen with numbers: Shimla Municipal Corporation officials record 50 to 55 cases of monkey attack every month in the city.

    Why has compensation become the sharper grievance?

    1. Existing entitlements: Under the Himachal Pradesh wildlife compensation policy cited by officials, severe monkey attack injuries attract Rs 75,000, permanent disability Rs 1 lakh and death Rs 4 lakh.
    2. Delisting closes the door: Since the rhesus macaque is no longer covered by the Act, officials have indicated that the deceased woman’s family is unlikely to qualify under this framework.
    3. The demand on the ground: A Shimla based non governmental organisation has protested outside the Municipal Commissioner’s office demanding compensation of Rs 5 lakh for the deceased woman.
    4. A parallel demand on behaviour: The same protest demanded stricter action against those found feeding monkeys in Shimla.

    Why is the vermin versus protected species question still unsettled?

    1. Opinion is divided: A wildlife expert has recorded that opinion remains split on whether monkeys should be treated as vermin or as a protected animal, despite rapid population growth.
    2. Human behaviour drives the conflict: Public feeding of wild animals, including monkeys, forces animals out of the forest in search of easy food, which locates the cause of conflict outside the species itself.
    3. Delisting answers only the legal question: Removing protection settles who is liable and does not settle whether culling, sterilisation or behaviour control is the correct instrument.

    Challenges to managing human macaque conflict after delisting

    1. Mismatch between mandate and capacity: Responsibility now sits with municipal bodies that have neither wildlife budgets nor trained handlers, while the expertise stays in a department that is no longer accountable for the outcome. Eg. Shimla Municipal Corporation must pay the forest department Rs 700 an animal for a service it cannot perform itself.
      The Fix: Fund a standing joint capture and sterilisation cell staffed by the forest department and paid for from the municipal budget, so the mandate and the skill sit in one unit.
    2. Compensation vanishes with protected status: A State compensation policy keyed to species listed under the Act leaves victims of a delisted species with no claim, even where the injury is identical. Eg. The Shimla family faces a death under a schedule that no longer covers the animal responsible.
      The Fix: Rewrite the State compensation policy to key entitlement to the injury and the location rather than to the schedule the animal sits in.
    3. Sterilisation without an exit point: A programme that runs for two decades without a stated target population becomes a permanent budget line rather than a solution. Eg. 1,86,448 monkeys were sterilised between 2006 and March 2024 while attack incidence in Shimla stayed at 50 to 55 cases a month.
      The Fix: Set a district level target population with published annual monitoring, so the programme is measured against conflict incidence rather than against animals processed.
    4. Food subsidy from human waste: Open garbage and religious and recreational feeding supply a reliable calorie source that sustains urban troop numbers regardless of sterilisation. Eg. Shimla’s hill slope waste collection points and temple precincts draw troops into residential areas.
      The Fix: Enforce monkey proof waste containment along the affected wards and prosecute feeding under municipal bye laws with a stated penalty.
    5. Vermin declarations are politically fraught and short lived: Section 62 of the parent Act allows the Centre to declare a species vermin for a limited period in a specified area, and such notifications draw litigation and lapse without resolving the problem. Eg. Himachal Pradesh’s earlier vermin notification for rhesus macaques was repeatedly renewed and then allowed to lapse.
      The Fix: Replace episodic vermin notifications with a standing conflict management plan that fixes responsibility, funding and compensation irrespective of the species’ schedule.

    Conclusion

    The 2022 delisting shifted the rhesus macaque from a conservation problem to a municipal nuisance without shifting the money, the staff or the compensation cover to match. The result is a hill town recording 50 to 55 attacks a month with no department fully answerable for either prevention or redress. The status question that remains open is whether responsibility is returned to the forest department with funding, or left with civic bodies and financed properly. The next marker is whether Himachal Pradesh amends its wildlife compensation policy to cover injuries caused by species the Act no longer lists.

    Back2Basics: Wild Life (Protection) Act, 1972

    1. Purpose: It is the central law providing for the protection of wild animals and plants and for the establishment of protected areas such as national parks and wildlife sanctuaries.
    2. Schedule structure after 2022: The 2022 amendment reduced the schedules, with Schedule I covering species receiving the highest protection, Schedule II covering species with lesser protection, Schedule III covering plants and Schedule IV listing species regulated under CITES.
    3. Vermin provision: Section 62 allows the Centre to declare a wild animal other than one in Schedule I to be vermin for a specified area and period, which removes protection for that duration.
    4. Administration: Each State has a Chief Wildlife Warden who exercises the Act’s powers over hunting permissions, captivity and the management of protected areas.

    Matching Previous Year Question

    “[2024] Consider the following statements: Statement-I: The Indian Flying Fox is placed under the “vermin” category in the Wild Life (Protection) Act, 1972. Statement-II: The Indian Flying Fox feeds on the blood of other animals. Which one of the following is correct in respect of the above statements? (a) Both statement I and Statement II are correct and statement II explains statement I (b) Both Statement-I and Statement-II are correct, but Statement-II does not explain Statement-I (c) Staement- I is correct , but Statement II is incorrect* (d) Statement-I is incorrect, but Statement-II is correct”

  • The copyright stakes in the EU FTA

    Why in the News

    The European Commission has formally asked European Union member states to approve the signing and conclusion of the India EU Free Trade Agreement (FTA), and the commitments accepted in the covered areas, including intellectual property, have now been revealed. The draft intellectual property chapter affirms both parties’ commitments to the WIPO Copyright Treaty (WCT) and the Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) Agreement, while omitting the WCT from the National Treatment clause at Article 10.8. It simultaneously carries the WCT’s enforcement mandates on technological protection measures and rights management information as binding obligations. The tension is that India would take on the treaty’s enforcement side without its public interest exceptions, which means the exceptions students, security researchers, archivists and Internet service providers currently rely on under the Copyright Act, 1957 would rest on the agreement’s own narrow test rather than on a treaty floor.

    What is the WIPO Copyright Treaty (WCT)?

    1. What it covers: The treaty was adopted specifically for the protection of works and the rights of their authors in the digital environment, with particular attention to software and databases.
    2. The enforcement side: It provides for technological protection measures (TPMs), meaning the encryption and digital access controls that restrict copying of a digital work, and for rights management information attached to that work.
    3. The balancing side: Article 10 of the treaty provides for limitations on and exceptions to copyright for digital works, which is what keeps authors’ rights balanced against public interest uses in education and research.
    4. Its place in Indian law: The Copyright Act, 1957 as it stands is in conformity with the WCT and with the TRIPS Agreement.

    What is the asymmetry inside the draft intellectual property chapter?

    1. The omission: The chapter leaves the WCT out of the National Treatment clause at Article 10.8, which means the limitations and exceptions for digital works that the treaty provides would no longer be available to India.
    2. The retained obligation: Footnote 1 of Article 10.8(1) expands “protection” to cover enforcement measures against the circumvention of technological protection measures at Article 10.18 and against interference with rights management information at Article 10.19.
    3. The narrowed exception route: Article 10.21 of the agreement supplies limitations and exceptions through a narrow “three step test” borrowed from European Union copyright statutes, which is a tighter gate than the treaty’s own Article 10.
    4. The net effect: The chapter abandons the treaty’s principle of balancing authors’ rights against public interest exceptions while keeping its enforcement mandate rigid.

    How would this reach the Copyright Act, 1957?

    1. The amendment obligation: The draft provisions would necessitate amendments to the Copyright Act, 1957, obliging Parliament to remove the exceptions covering digital works regardless of whether the user was engaged in lawful research.
    2. Fair dealing becomes challengeable: If the existing exceptions are not preserved, foreign rightsholders could challenge the exceptions for digital works available under Section 52, the fair dealing provision, including transient or incidental storage of a work purely in the technical process of electronic transmission.
    3. Civil and criminal exposure: Article 10.11 of the agreement would subject such uses to civil and criminal remedies rather than leaving them within a statutory exception.
    4. The threat to Section 65A: Section 65A of the Copyright Act, 1957 governs technological protection measures, and Section 65A(2) provides the exceptions under which a protection measure may lawfully be circumvented, so a student or researcher bypassing a digital lock to perform an act protected under Section 52 attracts no criminal liability today.
    5. Beyond the negotiating mandate: By agreeing to the draft text the negotiators have gone beyond the mandate Parliament set in the Copyright Act, 1957.

    What changes in classrooms and laboratories?

    1. The existing permission: Sections 52(1)(ab) and 52(1)(ac) permit engineering students and security researchers to observe, test and reverse engineer software, either to achieve interoperability or to uncover critical security vulnerabilities.
    2. Why the permission is conditional on circumvention: Modern software is almost universally guarded by encryption and digital access controls, so the lawful act cannot be performed without first bypassing a protection measure.
    3. The effect of a strict regime: Under a strict anti circumvention rule, a computer science student breaking a digital lock to inspect code for system compatibility or security flaws becomes a legal offender.
    4. The wider cost: Security research that depends on examining protected code is the mechanism by which vulnerabilities are found before they are exploited, and a rule that criminalises it removes that route.

    Why are libraries and archives exposed?

    1. The preservation practice: Historical documents, literature and research are increasingly distributed in digital formats burdened by Digital Rights Management (DRM), and librarians depend on format shifting to archive out of print works and preserve fragile collections.
    2. The loss of legal cover: A strict anti circumvention rule strips archivists of the legal right to bypass digital locks for preservation, which converts a routine archival act into an infringement.
    3. The reach into higher education: As higher education relies more on electronic materials, paywalls and DRM controls could effectively overwrite the public interest protections Indian courts established in rulings such as the DU Photocopy Case.

    Why are Internet service providers exposed?

    1. The existing safe harbour: Sections 52(1)(b) and 52(1)(c) shield Internet service providers (ISPs) and digital intermediaries from liability for the temporary and transient copies created in random access memory and server caches during routine data routing.
    2. What the safe harbour supports: The notice and takedown regime established under Rule 75 of the Copyright Rules, 2013 rests on those statutory safe harbours, so removing them unsettles the takedown machinery as well.
    3. The unqualified reproduction right: Article 10.11(a) of the agreement grants rightsholders an exclusive and unqualified right over all “temporary or permanent” reproductions.
    4. The treaty position it contradicts: The Agreed Statements to Articles 8 and 10 of the WCT exempt transient network copies from copyright liability, so the draft text departs from the treaty India already follows.
    5. The consequence: With the WCT excluded from the National Treatment exception, European rightsholders could expose Indian intermediaries to systemic liability for routine routing.

    Challenges to the draft intellectual property chapter

    1. Enforcement obligations travel faster than exceptions: An anti circumvention mandate is a single prohibition that applies immediately, while an exception has to be pleaded case by case in a domestic court. Eg. The Copyright (Amendment) Act, 2012 inserted Section 65A together with its express exceptions as a package, a pairing the draft chapter does not reproduce.
      The Fix: Make the agreement’s anti circumvention obligation expressly subject to the exceptions in Sections 52 and 65A(2) of the Copyright Act, 1957.
    2. India’s fair dealing is a closed list, not an open standard: Section 52 enumerates permitted purposes, so a narrowing of those purposes leaves no residual doctrine for a court to fall back on. Eg. United States law applies an open ended fair use standard that a court can extend to a new use, while Indian courts work from the enumerated purposes.
      The Fix: Insert a residual clause permitting non commercial educational and research uses that satisfy the three step test, so the list is not the outer limit.
    3. The safe harbour rests on subordinate legislation: The notice and takedown machinery sits in the Copyright Rules, 2013 rather than in the Act, and a rule can be amended by the executive without returning to Parliament. Eg. Rule 75 of the Copyright Rules, 2013 carries the takedown procedure that intermediaries follow.
      The Fix: Move the intermediary safe harbour and the takedown procedure into the Act itself, so any narrowing needs a parliamentary amendment.
    4. Cross border enforcement is asymmetric in cost: A rightsholder in the European Union can fund sustained litigation in India, while an Indian intermediary, library or university cannot mirror that in Europe. Eg. Academic publishers pursued the DU Photocopy Case in the Delhi High Court through a first instance suit and an appeal before withdrawing.
      The Fix: Negotiate a defence cost and mutual recognition provision in the agreement’s dispute chapter for non commercial educational defendants.
    5. Treaty text once signed is hard to reopen: A trade agreement is renegotiated as a whole rather than clause by clause, so a concession in the intellectual property chapter is not correctable in isolation later. Eg. The intellectual property chapter of the agreement was settled in the same package as market access and services commitments.
      The Fix: Press to re insert the WCT into the National Treatment clause before signature rather than seeking an interpretive declaration afterwards.

    Conclusion

    India’s copyright flexibilities are a policy asset rather than a bargaining chip, and the draft chapter converts them into one. What remains unreconciled is that the agreement asks India to enforce a treaty’s protections without granting India the exceptions that same treaty wrote to balance them, and no amount of domestic drafting can restore a balance that the National Treatment clause has already removed. The immediate thing to watch is whether the European Union member states approve signature with the clause as drafted, since the window for negotiators to insist on re inserting the treaty into that clause closes at signature rather than at ratification.

    Back2Basics: The DU Photocopy Case

    1. What it was: Three academic publishers sued Delhi University and a licensed photocopy shop on its campus over course packs compiled from copyrighted textbooks.
    2. The provision at issue: The dispute turned on Section 52(1)(i) of the Copyright Act, 1957, which exempts reproduction of a work by a teacher or a pupil in the course of instruction.
    3. What the court held: The Delhi High Court held that the exemption covers course packs prepared for students and read no quantitative limit into the provision, so the reproduction was not an infringement.
    4. Why it is cited here: It is the leading Indian authority for the proposition that copyright exceptions serve a public interest in access to education rather than operating as a narrow concession.

    Matching Previous Year Question

    “In a globalised world, intellectual property rights assume significance and are a source of litigation. Broadly distinguish between the terms – copyrights, patents and trade secrets.”

  • Serious escalation

    Why in the News

    The U.S. Russia Sanctions Act has been signed into law, giving the U.S. President authority to levy tariffs of up to 100% on countries such as India that import large quantities of Russian oil and gas. The escalation of reciprocal tariffs to 50% on India last year rested on an Executive Order and could have been rescinded by the same method. This Act has been passed by the U.S. Congress, so it carries a higher order of legal permanence, and the President must justify any waiver in writing to Congress. The tension is that the tariff India must now negotiate against is both larger and far harder to reverse, and it stacks on levies already in force at a moment when Russia supplies more than half of India’s crude and the alternative sources are constrained.

    What does the U.S. Russia Sanctions Act do, and why is it harder to reverse?

    1. The authority it creates: The Act authorises the U.S. President to impose tariffs of up to 100% on countries importing large quantities of Russian oil and gas.
    2. Statute rather than executive instrument: The measure was passed by Congress, which gives it a higher order of legal permanence and authority than the Executive Order that carried last year’s 50% reciprocal tariffs.
    3. The waiver is constrained: Any waiver the President wishes to grant must be justified in writing to Congress.
    4. The rate is a ceiling, not a floor: The phrasing authorises tariffs of up to 100%, which leaves room for a lower rate to be set without amending the Act.

    What does the tariff stack do to Indian exports?

    1. Three levies at once: The 100% tariffs would sit over and above the 10% forced labour tariffs and the 50% Section 232 tariffs on steel and aluminium.
    2. The market at risk: The United States is India’s largest export destination, accounting for about 20% of total goods exports.
    3. How the 50% was absorbed: Exporters mitigated the earlier 50% tariffs by sharing the cost with their American customers, which was a financially devastating and unsustainable way to retain them.
    4. Why that cannot be repeated: Sharing a 100% tariff will be impossible for India’s exporters, who are largely micro, small and medium enterprises.
    5. The net effect: Indian exports to the United States become too uncompetitive to sustain should the new tariffs take effect.

    What three options does India have?

    1. Cut Russian oil imports: India reduces its purchases of Russian crude to fall outside the Act’s trigger.
    2. Retain imports and absorb the tariff: India continues buying Russian oil and bears the tariff, which would be a significant blow to its export ambitions and to its micro, small and medium enterprises.
    3. Negotiate a low rate: India persuades the United States to set a low tariff using the up to 100% phrasing already in the law.

    Why is replacing Russian crude difficult?

    1. Dependence level: Russia accounted for more than 51% of India’s oil imports as of July 2026.
    2. The alternative route is constrained: Supplies through the Strait of Hormuz remain constrained, which limits the Gulf as a substitute at short notice.
    3. Port capacity is the bottleneck: India will have to press countries such as Oman to accelerate the expansion of alternative ports.
    4. Price conditions are adverse: Oil remains well above $100 a barrel, which makes favourable terms with new suppliers increasingly difficult to obtain.

    What is the negotiating window, and what does the record suggest?

    1. The time available: Thirty days remain before the United States can levy the tariffs.
    2. The diplomatic occasion: The Union Commerce Minister is scheduled to travel to the United States at the end of the month for the G20 Trade Ministerial.
    3. What the record shows: Historical data show India has usually complied with U.S. pressure to cut oil imports from particular countries, Russia included, irrespective of vocal claims of strategic autonomy.
    4. The test: India’s ability to secure a low rate rather than a waiver is the measure of what the bilateral relationship at the leadership level can deliver.

    Challenges to the U.S. Russia Sanctions Act

    1. Origin of crude is hard to trace: Sanctioned barrels move through blending, ship to ship transfer and re export, so a measure keyed to the origin of oil is difficult to administer. Eg. Russian crude refined in India and exported as diesel to Europe has been treated as an Indian origin product.
      The Fix: Key the measure to refinery level crude import records rather than to the origin declared on a finished product shipment.
    2. Waiver discretion is narrowed but not removed: The written justification requirement raises the political cost of a waiver without barring one, so relief remains available and remains uncertain. Eg. The Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act, 2017 carried a national interest waiver that the U.S. administration left unexercised in India’s S 400 air defence procurement.
      The Fix: Seek a defined low rate under the up to 100% phrasing, since a rate is set by the President while a waiver must be defended to Congress.
    3. A tariff on the buyer raises the price for every buyer: Removing a large purchaser from discounted Russian barrels tightens the non sanctioned market and lifts the global benchmark. Eg. The G7 price cap of 2022 was built around a discount ceiling precisely to keep Russian barrels flowing rather than withdraw them from supply.
      The Fix: Press for a price cap style mechanism permitting purchase below a ceiling, in place of a tariff levied on the importing country.
    4. Legislated tariffs outlast the dispute that produced them: A measure in statute survives a change of administration and a settlement of the underlying conflict, so relief later requires a fresh Act of Congress. Eg. The Jackson Vanik amendment of 1974 continued to apply to Russia until its repeal in 2012, long after the emigration restrictions it targeted had ended.
      The Fix: Negotiate a sunset clause or a certification trigger tied to a settlement, so that relief does not depend on fresh legislation.

    Conclusion

    The instrument has changed character, and that is what makes this escalation different from the last one. A tariff resting on an Executive Order was reversible by the office that imposed it, and a tariff resting on an Act of Congress is not. India’s three options are all costly, and the cheapest of them, a negotiated low rate under the ceiling already written into the law, has to be secured inside the thirty day window and without the leverage that a reversible instrument once gave both sides. The G20 Trade Ministerial at the end of the month is the point at which that attempt is made.

    Back2Basics: Section 232 tariffs

    1. The statute: Section 232 of the U.S. Trade Expansion Act of 1962 is the national security trade provision of U.S. law.
    2. The process: It authorises the U.S. Commerce Department to investigate whether imports of a specified product threaten to impair national security.
    3. The power it triggers: On an affirmative finding, the President may adjust imports of that product through tariffs, quotas or other restrictions.
    4. How it applies: Section 232 measures attach to a product rather than to a country, so steel and aluminium tariffs imposed under it apply to imports from all origins.

    Matching Previous Year Question

    [2025, GS2, 15] “Energy security constitutes the dominant kingpin of India’s foreign policy, and is linked with India’s overarching influence in Middle Eastern countries.” How would you integrate energy security with India’s foreign policy trajectories in the coming years?”

  • India’s NGOs at a new funding crossroads

    India’s NGOs at a new funding crossroads

    Why in the News

    The Foreign Contribution (Regulation) Amendment Bill, 2026 would vest foreign contributions and every asset created from them in a government appointed designated authority where a Foreign Contribution (Regulation) Act (FCRA) certificate is cancelled, surrendered or allowed to lapse. The first Foreign Contribution (Regulation) Act was passed in 1976 under a government of a different political composition, and it rested on the same apprehension that foreign powers could destabilise the country by funding civil society organisations. The present Bill has not been enacted, held up by opposition from political parties and from civil society groups, particularly Christian organisations. The tension runs in two directions at once. The Bill tightens the foreign funding route at precisely the point when bona fide foreign donors are withdrawing from India of their own accord, which makes the operative question not whether foreign funding is curtailed but whether domestic philanthropy will fund the traditional service delivery organisations that foreign aid has been sustaining.

    What does the FCRA Amendment Bill, 2026 propose?

    1. Vesting on cancellation: Foreign contributions and all assets created from them vest in a government appointed designated authority where a certificate is cancelled, surrendered or automatically lapses.
    2. Provisional and permanent vesting: The organisation recovers the assets if registration is restored within the prescribed period, and vesting becomes permanent only if it is not. Restoration during the provisional vesting period returns both the assets and the unused foreign contribution.
    3. Disposal of assets: Where a fresh certificate is not obtained within the prescribed period, the assets may be sold or transferred to a government department, with the proceeds going to the Consolidated Fund of India.
    4. Remedies: The Bill provides for revision and for an appeal to the District Judge.

    What case does the government make for tighter control?

    1. An opaque channel: The stated position is that foreign funding into the NGO sector operates as a vast and intricate web, with thousands of crores of unmonitored capital entering annually under the banners of development, human rights and social welfare.
    2. Bypassing state accounting: Much of that money is said to deliberately avoid state accounting mechanisms.
    3. End uses alleged: The funds are said to reach politically charged campaigns, highly selective local advocacy, and aggressive proselytisation and religious conversion networks.

    Why do NGOs and their beneficiaries object?

    1. Doubts over religion neutrality: Christian organisations, which the government says receive a larger share of the funds among religious associations, are concerned that the legislation will not operate in a religion neutral way.
    2. Beneficiaries bear the loss: The organisations affected run schools, hospitals, old age care homes and similar institutions, and it is the people they serve who lose the service.
    3. Sole provider in some regions: Leaders from the northeast and tribal areas have pointed out that these institutions are sometimes the largest or the only providers of such services in their areas.
    4. The existing base is already narrow: FCRA registrations of 22,496 organisations have been cancelled since 2015, leaving about 14,466 active registered associations eligible to receive foreign contributions as of Ministry of Home Affairs data for September 2026.

    Why is foreign funding valued out of proportion to its size?

    1. Small in volume: The total volume of foreign aid to NGOs is small measured against government budgets, and only a small proportion of NGOs receive it at all.
    2. Flexibility is the real value: Foreign funding is an alternative source and a more flexible one, carrying fewer restrictions on how it may be used and tailored to an organisation’s needs through discussion between the NGO and the donor.
    3. The conditionality point: Different funding sources shape organisations and their effectiveness differently, which is the substance behind the observation that whoever pays the piper calls the tune.
    4. What the earlier research found: Desk research and interviews with NGOs of varying size recorded a minority reporting adverse consequences, specifically the adoption of ideas and practices from abroad unsuited to Indian conditions. Most reported that foreign funds contributed to India’s development and to the growth of the voluntary sector by bringing new ideas, techniques, technologies and organisational improvements.
    5. Why it filled a gap: Foreign aid played that role in the absence of adequate government funding and private philanthropy, and present receipts are larger than in 2006 to 2007, the last year for which comparable data were available when that research was published.

    What has changed in the funding environment?

    1. A more developed voluntary sector: The sector is more developed now than when foreign aid first became its flexible source of support.
    2. Donors are withdrawing on their own account: Bona fide foreign donors are moving away from giving to India because of economic difficulties at home and the perception that a country aiming to become the world’s third largest economy no longer needs their aid.
    3. The domestic alternative has improved: The domestic non government funding environment has strengthened over the same period.

    Can domestic philanthropy replace what is receding?

    1. The wealth base: Of 3,332 billionaires worldwide on the Forbes 2026 list, 229 are in India, the third largest number after the United States and China.
    2. Philanthropic volume: Private philanthropy was projected to reach Rs 1.43 lakh crore ($16 billion) in FY2025 per the India Philanthropy Report published by Bain and Company, with retail giving adding a further several thousand crore annually.
    3. The gap is widening, not closing: The same report projects demand growing faster than supply, with the gap reaching Rs 18 lakh crore ($210 billion) by 2030.
    4. Corporate social responsibility as the offset: CSR spending by listed companies reached Rs 22,563 crore in FY25, up 17.5%, following the Companies Act, 2013 mandate on companies above a specified size, and companies lacking internal competence in social development rely on NGOs as delivery partners.
    5. The mismatch in direction: New philanthropists, particularly entrepreneurs and technology leaders, are shifting from traditional giving toward ecosystem building, scientific research, higher education and complex institutional support. That is favourable for structural change and adverse for NGOs delivering traditional education, health and social welfare services.

    Challenges to the FCRA Amendment Bill, 2026

    1. Vesting precedes adjudication: Assets pass to the designated authority on cancellation, and the appeal to the District Judge is heard only after the organisation has lost control of them. Eg. Amnesty International India halted operations in 2020 after its accounts were frozen, before any adjudication had concluded.
      The Fix: Suspend vesting until the statutory appeal is decided, with an interim receiver operating the assets for the beneficiaries in the meantime.
    2. Services stop before culpability is established: Schools, hospitals and care homes tied to a suspended certificate halt operations during the provisional vesting period, irrespective of the eventual outcome. Eg. The Missionaries of Charity’s FCRA renewal lapsed in December 2021, suspending foreign funded operations across its homes until it was restored weeks later.
      The Fix: Ring fence frontline service assets from vesting and hand their operation to the State government of the district for the duration of the proceedings.
    3. Sale proceeds cannot be returned once absorbed: Money that reaches the Consolidated Fund of India can leave it only on an appropriation voted by Parliament, so restoration of registration cannot restore the asset. Eg. No administrative order can reverse a credit to the Consolidated Fund.
      The Fix: Hold sale proceeds in an escrow account outside the Consolidated Fund until the appeal period and any appeal are exhausted.
    4. Compliance cost falls hardest on small organisations: The 2020 amendment already required every recipient to operate a designated State Bank of India account in New Delhi, capped administrative expenses at 20% and barred sub granting, which removed the intermediary route through which grassroots bodies were funded. Eg. District level organisations that received foreign funds through a larger registered NGO lost that channel entirely.
      The Fix: Restore regulated sub granting to FCRA registered recipients with mandatory reporting on the onward transfer, along the lines of the light regulation approach the Vijay Kumar Committee proposed.

    Conclusion

    Whether the Bill is enacted decides how foreign funding ends, not whether it contracts, since the donors are already leaving. The future is not bleak if Indian domestic philanthropy steps into the space, and that requires indigenous donors and the government to become responsive to what NGOs actually need rather than replicating the conditionality that made government funding the harder money to use. What must change is the practice of funding itself: a serious dialogue on funding practice as distinct from development priorities, and the adoption by domestic donors of the flexibility that made foreign aid valuable out of proportion to its volume. The thing to watch is whether the traditional education, health and welfare organisations find a domestic source before the foreign one closes.

    NGO Sector in India

    1. What the sector is: Non governmental organisations, also described as civil society organisations, are voluntary not for profit entities operating independently of government on social, economic, environmental and political issues.
    2. Scale: India has over 34 lakh registered NGOs on the NITI Aayog Darpan portal, among the largest such sectors in the world.
    3. Three registration routes: Societies register under the Societies Registration Act, 1860; private trusts under the Indian Trusts Act, 1882 and public trusts under the relevant State legislation; and companies under Section 8 of the Companies Act, 2013.
    4. The foreign funding law: The Foreign Contribution (Regulation) Act, 2010 governs the receipt of foreign donations and requires that they be used for the purpose for which they were given.

    Government Initiatives for the NGO Sector

    1. NITI Aayog Darpan portal, 2015: Registration on the portal is mandatory to receive government grants and CSR funds, and it assigns each organisation a unique identifier and publishes its board members, projects and financials.
    2. Income Tax Act exemptions: Sections 12A and 12AB provide tax exemption to charitable trusts and NGOs, and Section 80G gives donors a 50% or 100% deduction, both subject to renewal every five years.
    3. Aspirational Districts Programme, 2018 and Aspirational Blocks Programme, 2023: NGOs are engaged as implementing and capacity building partners in identified districts and blocks.
    4. National Voluntary Sector Policy, 2007: The policy recognises the independence and autonomy of the sector, promotes multi stakeholder dialogue, and recommends simplified registration and transparent funding mechanisms.

    Matching Previous Year Question

    [2015] Examine critically the recent changes in the rules governing foreign funding of NGOs under the Foreign Contribution (Regulation) Act (FCRA), 1976.

  • To curb farm fires, Govt readies stiff ‘red entry’ rules in revenue records

    Why in the News

    The Ministry of Environment, Forest and Climate Change has published a draft of the Commission for Air Quality Management in National Capital Region and Adjoining Areas (Imposition, Collection and Utilization of Environmental Compensation for Stubble Burning) Rules, 2026. It specifies for the first time how long a red entry against a farmer’s land in the revenue record stays valid. The entry runs for 15 months from the date of the incident, and extends by a further 15 months where burning recurs or where the environmental compensation imposed is not paid. The parent Rules were notified in 2023 and carried the red entry provision without fixing its duration. A red entry makes it difficult for a farmer to raise a loan or mortgage the land, so the penalty operates through access to credit rather than through a fine alone. Farm unions have opposed the system since it was introduced, and the parliamentary standing committee on subordinate legislation has recommended a route out of it for farmers who change practice.

    What is a red entry in revenue records?

    1. The instrument: A red entry is an adverse remark recorded against a specific land parcel in the State’s revenue record, the register that establishes ownership and cultivation rights over that parcel.
    2. How it penalises: Lenders and registering authorities read the revenue record before sanctioning a loan or accepting land as security, so an adverse remark restricts credit and mortgage without any separate order being passed.
    3. What triggers it: It is made against land on which a stubble burning incident is detected, alongside the environmental compensation imposed on the basis of the size of the holding.
    4. Who maintains it: State revenue officials make and remove the entry, so a central air quality rule is enforced through a State land administration record.

    What has the draft changed?

    1. Validity fixed: The red entry is valid for 15 months from the date of the incident, which the 2023 Rules did not state.
    2. Expiry conditions: It expires where no subsequent stubble burning incident is found on that land. It also expires where the environmental compensation imposed has been deposited.
    3. Extension conditions: Where there is a subsequent incident on that land, or where the compensation imposed is not paid, the validity extends for a further 15 months.
    4. Compensation amounts untouched: The draft does not alter the compensation itself, which continues to be set by the size of the land holding.
    5. Use of the money: Compensation collected is to be spent on crop diversification programmes, biomass utilisation, research and development in crop residue management, and subsidies for residue management technology.
    6. The process ahead: The draft was published on 16 September with a two month window for objections and suggestions, so the change will not operate before the coming paddy harvest ends.

    Why does stubble burning persist in the sowing window?

    1. The cropping calendar: Farmers in Punjab, Haryana, Delhi and Uttar Pradesh sow wheat between mid September and early December, and burning clears the paddy residue in the short gap between the two crops.
    2. The pollution share: Crop residue burning contributes up to 35 percent of the pollutants in Delhi and the National Capital Region on some days.
    3. Cost of the alternative: The Bharatiya Kisan Union (Dakaunda) has asked for financial assistance for paddy stubble management in place of penalties, on the position that the machinery and its running cost fall on the farmer.
    4. Reach of the penalty: The union’s stated position is that the pollution problem cannot be settled by force, and it records that red entries made earlier were removed after protest and petitioning.

    How has the red entry worked across the States?

    1. Punjab: Farm unions there have raised grievances about loans, subsidies and the mortgaging of land arising from red entries.
    2. Haryana: In districts such as Kurukshetra, authorities have said the red entry will be made on the Meri Fasal Mera Byora portal, the State’s crop and farmer registration platform.
    3. The portal ban: A farmer marked on that portal is barred from it for two years, which removes access to the benefits of all agricultural schemes routed through it.
    4. The committee’s recommendation: In a February 2025 report, the parliamentary standing committee on subordinate legislation recommended an incentive based removal system, allowing early removal for farmers who take up sustainable farming practices or government supported stubble management programmes.

    Challenges to the red entry system

    1. Detection rests on satellite fire counts: Burning is identified from remote sensing passes that cross at fixed times of day, so a fire lit outside the pass window is not recorded and the penalty falls unevenly across farmers doing the same thing. Eg. Daily fire counts for Punjab and Haryana are compiled from the afternoon overpasses of polar orbiting satellites carrying moderate resolution imaging sensors.
      The Fix: Pair satellite detection with geotagged field verification by revenue staff before an entry is recorded against a parcel.
    2. The penalty attaches to the land, not the burner: The remark sits on the parcel, so a tenant’s act marks the owner’s title and the owner has no simple route to contest it. Eg. A large share of paddy land in Punjab is cultivated under informal tenancy that never enters the revenue register.
      The Fix: Record the cultivator’s identity alongside the entry and provide a time bound appeal to the district collector.
    3. Residue machinery reaches the larger holding first: Equipment such as the Happy Seeder and the Super Straw Management System is priced beyond a small holding, and the custom hiring centres that rent it out are unevenly spread. Eg. The Crop Residue Management scheme routes subsidised machinery through cooperative societies and custom hiring centres whose village level coverage varies widely.
      The Fix: Guarantee machinery availability by village for the two week window between harvest and sowing, with the hiring charge met from the compensation fund.
    4. Paddy straw has no standing buyer: High silica content and low fodder value mean paddy straw, unlike wheat straw, has no ready market, so burning remains the cheapest disposal route. Eg. Biomass power plants and compressed biogas units in Punjab absorb only a fraction of the paddy straw generated each season.
      The Fix: Fix an assured offtake price for straw delivered to biomass and compressed biogas plants, funded from the environmental compensation already collected.
    5. The enforcing government is not the government that gains: State revenue staff record the entry and face the same farming community on land, water and procurement, while the air quality benefit accrues to Delhi. Eg. Punjab and Haryana supply the bulk of the fire counts on which the Commission acts, and neither State is the one whose air the measure is designed to clean.
      The Fix: Fund a dedicated central verification and enforcement cadre for the sowing window, reporting its detections publicly rather than through the State revenue chain.

    Conclusion

    The draft settles how long the penalty lasts without settling what the penalty is for. A remark that blocks borrowing punishes the farmer as a debtor, while the machinery, the offtake and the alternative crop that would actually end the burning all require the farmer to be able to borrow. The comment window closes after the coming paddy harvest, so this season will run under the existing position. The point to watch is whether the final Rules carry a route out of the entry for a farmer who changes practice, since that is the one proposal on the table that ties removal to behaviour rather than to the passage of time.

    Back2Basics: Commission for Air Quality Management in NCR and Adjoining Areas

    1. What it is: A statutory body for better coordination, research, identification and resolution of problems relating to air quality in the National Capital Region and adjoining areas.
    2. Legal basis: It was constituted under the Commission for Air Quality Management in National Capital Region and Adjoining Areas Act, 2021, and it replaced the Environment Pollution (Prevention and Control) Authority.
    3. Jurisdiction: It covers Delhi and the areas of Haryana, Punjab, Rajasthan and Uttar Pradesh falling in the National Capital Region and adjoining areas, and its directions prevail over those of the State pollution control boards on air quality.
    4. Powers: It issues binding directions, imposes environmental compensation and operates measures such as the Graded Response Action Plan, and appeals against its orders lie to the National Green Tribunal.

    Matching Previous Year Question

    “[2021, GS3, 10] Describe the key points of the revised Global Air Quality Guidelines (AQGs) recently released by the World Health Organisation (WHO). How are these different from its last update in 2005? What changes in India’s National Clean Air Programme are required to achieve these revised standards?”

  • I&B Ministry notifies new film certification guidelines for CBFC

    Why in the News

    The Ministry of Information and Broadcasting (I&B) has notified revised film certification guidelines for the Central Board of Film Certification (CBFC). The guidelines retain every aspect of the detailed 1991 version and add exactly two points. One requires a disclaimer or statutory warning in scenes depicting or involving the use, consumption or trafficking of narcotic drugs or psychotropic substances. The other brings in the three new age markers under the UA (Unrestricted Public Exhibition With Parental Guidance) certificate, created by the Cinematograph Rules, 2024. The certification standards a film is judged against therefore remain those framed in 1991, while the certificate categories themselves were rewritten in 2024.

    What does the Central Board of Film Certification do?

    1. Its statutory basis: It is a statutory body under the Cinematograph Act, 1952, functioning under the Ministry of Information and Broadcasting.
    2. What it certifies: No film may be publicly exhibited in India unless it has been certified by the Board, so certification is a condition of release rather than an advisory rating.
    3. What the certificate decides: The Board may certify a film for unrestricted public exhibition, restrict it by age, restrict it to specialised audiences, or refuse certification, and it may require cuts as a condition of a category.
    4. What guides the decision: The Board applies guidelines notified by the central government under the Act, which is the instrument that has now been revised.

    What are the two additions to the guidelines?

    1. The narcotics warning: Scenes depicting or involving the use, consumption or trafficking of narcotic drugs or psychotropic substances must now carry the warning “Illicit Narcotics Destroy Health and Guarantees Imprisonment, Say No to Drugs.”
    2. The age markers: The guidelines now specify the three categories within the UA certificate, UA 7+, UA 13+ and UA 16+, marking content suitable for children aged seven, 13 and 16 respectively.
    3. What triggers an age marker: Where the Board considers it necessary to caution a parent or guardian on whether a ward may be allowed to see a film, it certifies the film for unrestricted public exhibition with an endorsement to that effect.

    What do the retained 1991 standards require?

    1. Crime and violence: The Board is to ensure that anti social activities and violence are not glorified or justified.
    2. Operational detail of crime: The modus operandi of criminals, and visuals or words likely to incite the commission of an offence, are not to be depicted.
    3. Alcohol: Scenes justifying or glorifying drinking are to be avoided.
    4. Children: Scenes showing children in violence as victims, perpetrators or forced witnesses, or subjected to any form of child abuse, are not to be presented needlessly.
    5. Disability and animals: The Board is to discourage scenes showing abuse or ridicule of persons with disabilities, and scenes showing cruelty to or abuse of animals.

    Why does the alignment with the 2024 categories matter?

    1. The gap it closes: The age bands were created in the Rules in 2024, while the guidelines the Board actually applies continued to describe a single undifferentiated UA category until this notification.
    2. What a graded band changes for a film: A film that would previously have carried one UA label now carries an age specific one, so the same content can be placed at a different point on the scale rather than cut to reach a category.
    3. Where the burden shifts: An age marker transfers the decision on viewing to the parent or guardian, since a UA film remains open to unrestricted public exhibition whatever the band.
    4. What the Board has asked of the industry: The Board’s Chairperson has asked filmmakers to study the revised guidelines before submitting applications, and asked film associations to circulate them within the industry.

    Challenges to the film certification framework

    1. Certification operates as prior restraint: A film cannot be exhibited at all until the Board clears it, so the delay in a decision has the same effect as a refusal for a film with a fixed release date. Eg. The Supreme Court upheld pre censorship of films in K.A. Abbas v. Union of India (1970), on the ground that film affects audiences differently from other media.
      The Fix: Fix a binding outer limit for the Board’s decision and treat expiry of that limit as deemed certification in the applied category.
    2. Standards are open ended in application: Terms such as glorification of violence or anti social activity are matters of judgement, so identical content can be treated differently across examining committees. Eg. The Cinematograph Act, 1952 grounds refusal in the reasonable restrictions of Article 19(2), which are broad heads rather than stated tests.
      The Fix: Publish the reasoned orders of examining and revising committees, so a standard is visible from decided cases rather than from the text alone.
    3. Extra statutory pressure after certification: A certified film still faces protest, litigation and State level obstruction, so certification does not settle the right to exhibit. Eg. In Prakash Jha Productions v. Union of India (2011) the Supreme Court held that a State cannot ban a certified film on law and order grounds and must maintain order instead.
      The Fix: Require a State suspending exhibition of a certified film to record reasons and obtain judicial confirmation within a fixed period.
    4. A single framework for unequal platforms: Films require certification while streaming content is governed by self regulation, so the same content faces different scrutiny by mode of release. Eg. Online curated content runs under the self classification and three tier grievance structure of the Information Technology (Intermediary Guidelines and Digital Media Ethics Code) Rules, 2021.
      The Fix: Align the age classification bands used in film certification with those used for online curated content, so one scale runs across platforms.
    5. Warnings substitute for classification: A mandatory on screen disclaimer is easy to add and easy to disregard, so it does little where the depiction itself is the concern. Eg. The statutory anti tobacco warning has run in Indian films for years alongside continued depiction of smoking.
      The Fix: Attach the depiction of narcotics to a defined age band in the classification scale, rather than treating the warning as the whole remedy.

    Conclusion

    The certification standards and the certificate categories were revised a generation apart, and this notification is the step that brings them into one document. The substantive tests a film is judged against remain those of 1991, so the change is one of classification rather than of standards. The guidelines are notified and in force, and the Board has asked the industry to study them before filing applications. The thing to watch is how the three UA bands are applied in practice, since a graded scale only changes outcomes if films are placed across it rather than clustered in one band.

    Back2Basics: Cinematograph (Amendment) Act, 2023

    1. What it introduced on piracy: It created offences for unauthorised recording and exhibition of films, with imprisonment of three months to three years and a fine.
    2. Age based categories: It replaced the single UA category with age based sub categories, which the Cinematograph Rules, 2024 then specified as UA 7+, UA 13+ and UA 16+.
    3. Validity of a certificate: It made a certificate valid perpetually, removing the earlier limit of ten years.
    4. Revisional power removed: It withdrew the central government’s revisional power over a certified film, in line with the Supreme Court’s ruling in Union of India v. K.M. Shankarappa (2000).

    Matching Previous Year Question

    “[2014, GS2, 12] What do you understand by the concept “freedom of speech and expression”? Does it cover hate speech also? Why do the films in India stand on a slightly different plane from other forms of expression? Discuss.”

  • JPC members question Centre on FCRA Bill’s asset takeover provisions

    Why in the News

    Parliament’s Joint Committee on the Foreign Contribution (Regulation) Amendment Bill, 2026 questioned the Centre on the Bill’s asset takeover provisions at its first meeting. The provision at issue vests foreign contributions and all assets created from them in a government appointed “designated authority” when an organisation’s Foreign Contribution (Regulation) Act (FCRA) certificate is cancelled, surrendered, or lapses automatically, without a prior hearing or a judicial determination. The Union Home Ministry defended the change as making the use of foreign contributions more transparent and accountable, and said a “prescribed authority” already exists under the present law. The tension is between an administrative gap the Ministry says it is closing and the constitutional bar on deprivation of property without due process. Opposition members of the Committee invoked Article 300A of the Constitution against the provision.

    What does the “designated authority” provision do?

    1. When it is triggered: It operates on three events, cancellation of an organisation’s FCRA certificate, its surrender by the organisation, and its automatic lapse.
    2. What vests: Foreign contributions already received and every asset created out of them pass to a government appointed designated authority.
    3. What it dispenses with: The vesting takes effect without a prior hearing for the organisation and without a judicial determination that the assets should pass.
    4. How wide the power is: The authority is to hold powers of a wide ambit over those assets, which is the specific feature the Committee’s members contested.

    What is the Ministry’s stated rationale for the change?

    1. A custodian already exists in law: The present Act provides for a “prescribed authority”, identified by a notification of 5 November 2018 as the Additional Chief Secretary or Principal Secretary (Home) of the State or Union Territory concerned.
    2. The custodian cannot act: There is no deadline on that custodianship under the current law, which leaves the prescribed authority a “passive custodian” unable to take substantive decisions on assets.
    3. No procedure for the handover: The law lays down no standard procedure for taking possession of such assets, maintaining inventories, or separating foreign contribution assets from domestically funded ones.
    4. The cost of open ended custody: Prolonged custodianship leaves States facing budgetary and manpower constraints in running vested institutions such as schools, hospitals and orphanages.
    5. Two silences in the existing law: The Act says nothing on the final disposal of vested assets and nothing on the treatment of places of worship.

    On what constitutional ground is the provision contested?

    1. The provision relied on: Opposition members of the Committee argued that deprivation of property cannot be permitted without a prior hearing, relying on Article 300A of the Constitution.
    2. What Article 300A guarantees: It states that no person shall be deprived of property save by authority of law, so a taking requires a valid law and a fair procedure even though property is no longer a fundamental right.
    3. Why automatic vesting is the pressure point: Cancellation, surrender and lapse are administrative events, so tying the transfer of assets to them removes any stage at which the organisation is heard before it loses them.
    4. What it leaves unsettled: The Ministry’s own submission records that the law is silent on final disposal, so an organisation whose certificate later stands restored has no stated route back to its assets.

    Why did the Ministry’s presentation on religious groups draw objection?

    1. What the presentation contained: It catalogued foreign contributions received by different religious groups and highlighted that a majority of the funds went to Christian organisations.
    2. The objection raised: Members questioned the rationale for segregating contributions received under religious heads at all.
    3. Why the classification matters: A regulatory case built on the religious identity of recipients shifts the test from how funds were used to who received them.

    Why is the FCRA framed as a national security law?

    1. The Ministry’s characterisation: The Home Ministry told the Committee that the latest amendment is at its core a “national security” legislation.
    2. The origin of the statute: The FCRA was enacted in 1976, amid Cold War era mistrust of Western influence and concern over threats to India’s sovereignty and democratic institutions.
    3. What preceded it: Before 1976, non governmental organisations receiving foreign funds operated under general laws such as the Societies Registration Act, the Trusts Act and the Companies Act.
    4. The gap it filled: Those general laws carried no centralised mechanism to monitor foreign contributions, which is the function the FCRA introduced.

    Challenges to the FCRA regulatory framework

    1. Sanction without a judicial stage: Cancellation, and now the vesting of assets, follow executive determination, so an organisation contests the outcome after it has already taken effect. Eg. The vesting under the Bill operates with no prior hearing and no judicial determination.
      The Fix: Require a reasoned show cause order and a hearing before vesting, with the transfer suspended until an appellate forum has ruled.
    2. Suspension operates as a penalty on its own: A certificate suspended pending inquiry stops foreign funds immediately, so service delivery halts before any finding is recorded. Eg. Registration of the Centre for Policy Research was cancelled in 2024 after a prolonged suspension, ending its foreign funded research programmes.
      The Fix: Cap the suspension period in the statute and require the inquiry to conclude within it or the certificate to revive automatically.
    3. Compliance costs fall hardest on small organisations: Annual returns, a designated single bank account and renewal every five years require dedicated staff that a small grassroots body does not have. Eg. The 2020 amendment required every recipient to route foreign funds through a designated account at a single branch of the State Bank of India in New Delhi.
      The Fix: Set a simplified filing track and a longer renewal cycle for organisations below a stated annual receipt threshold.
    4. A ban on transfers breaks the funding chain: Prohibiting an FCRA holder from passing funds to another organisation cuts off smaller field level bodies that never receive foreign money directly. Eg. The Foreign Contribution (Regulation) Amendment Act, 2020 barred transfer of foreign contribution to any other person, including another FCRA registered body.
      The Fix: Permit onward transfer to a registered recipient with reporting of the transfer, so the audit trail is preserved without ending sub granting.
    5. Regulatory reach shapes advocacy as much as accounting: Where funding status turns on administrative discretion, an organisation adjusts its public positions to protect its registration. Eg. The Supreme Court upheld the 2020 amendments in Noel Harper v. Union of India (2022), holding that no organisation has a vested right to receive foreign contribution.
      The Fix: Publish the grounds and the evidentiary standard for every cancellation, so refusal is testable against a stated rule rather than inferred.

    Conclusion

    The Bill is at the start of committee scrutiny and the disagreement is already about process rather than purpose. Both sides accept that custody of assets after a certificate ends is currently unregulated, and they differ on whether the answer is an authority that can act at once or a procedure that must be completed before it acts. The unresolved question is what happens to an organisation that succeeds on appeal after its assets have already vested, since the Ministry’s own submission records that the law is silent on final disposal. The next milestone is the Joint Committee’s examination of the Bill and the report it returns to Parliament.

    Back2Basics: Foreign Contribution (Regulation) Act, 2010

    1. What it replaced: It repealed and replaced the 1976 Act, and is administered by the Ministry of Home Affairs.
    2. What it regulates: It governs the acceptance and utilisation of foreign contribution and foreign hospitality by persons and associations, to ensure they do not act against the national interest.
    3. Registration and its renewal: An association must hold registration or prior permission to receive foreign contribution, and registration is valid for five years and renewable.
    4. Who is barred outright: Election candidates, judges, government servants, members of a legislature, journalists and editors of registered newspapers, and political parties are prohibited from accepting foreign contribution.

    Matching Previous Year Question

    “[2015, GS2, 12] Examine critically the recent changes in the rules governing foreign funding of NGOs under the Foreign Contribution (Regulation) Act (FCRA), 1976.”