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Type: Bills/Act/Laws

  • Why is the Supreme Court examining polygamy again?

    Why in the News

    The Supreme Court has sought the Centre's response to a petition challenging the constitutional status of polygamy under Muslim Personal Law. The court additionally asked the Centre to consider legislative steps to abolish the practice for all citizens, irrespective of religion. The dispute sets a religion specific statutory exemption against the equality guarantees the Constitution extends to every citizen.

    What is the legal basis of polygamy in India?

    1. The practice: Polygamy is the contracting of a further marriage by a person whose earlier marriage is still subsisting.
    2. The permitting provision: Section 2 of the Muslim Personal Law (Shariat) Application Act, 1937 applies Shariat rules to matters of marriage and dissolution for Muslims, and it is under this provision that polygamy is permitted.
    3. The prohibiting provision: Section 82 of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 punishes marrying another person during the subsistence of an existing marriage with imprisonment up to seven years, and it applies to non Muslims.
    4. The asymmetry at issue: The same act is a criminal offence for one set of citizens and a protected personal law entitlement for another.

    What is the current status of polygamy law in India?

    1. Permitted for Muslim men alone: Polygamy remains lawful for Muslim men under the 1937 Act, with the scriptural ceiling being four wives.
    2. A criminal offence for everyone else: Bigamy is punishable under Section 82 of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023, carrying up to seven years, and applies to Hindus, Christians, Parsis and citizens married under civil law.
    3. No compulsory registration: Muslim marriages and divorces are not universally required to be registered with State authorities, so a subsisting marriage is often not on any official record.
    4. Related practices already struck down: Instant triple talaq was invalidated by the Supreme Court in August 2017, and the Centre followed by framing the Muslim Women (Protection of Rights on Marriage) Act, 2019, making the practice a punishable offence.
    5. Polygamy and nikah halala left open: The 2017 bench refrained from ruling on polygamy and nikah halala even though both had been sought, which is why the question returns to the court now.

    Constitutional Provisions Related to Personal Law and Gender Equality

    1. Article 14: Guarantees equality before the law and the equal protection of the laws to every person within India.
    2. Article 15: Prohibits discrimination by the State on grounds of religion, race, caste, sex or place of birth.
    3. Article 16: Guarantees equality of opportunity in matters of public employment.
    4. Article 21: Protects life and personal liberty, read by the Supreme Court to include dignity and autonomy within marriage.
    5. Article 25: Guarantees freedom of conscience and the free profession, practice and propagation of religion, subject to public order, morality and health, and expressly permits the State to legislate for social welfare and reform.
    6. Article 44: Directs the State to endeavour to secure a Uniform Civil Code for citizens throughout India, as a Directive Principle.
    7. Entry 5, Concurrent List, Seventh Schedule: Places marriage, divorce, infants and minors, adoption, wills, intestacy and succession within the legislative competence of both Parliament and the State legislatures.

    What are the petitioners seeking?

    1. Criminalisation of polygamy: The five petitioners want polygamy treated as a criminal offence under Section 82 of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023, for all citizens.
    2. Striking down the enabling provision: They have challenged the constitutional validity of Section 2 of the Muslim Personal Law (Shariat) Application Act, 1937, as violating Articles 14, 15 and 16.
    3. Annulment of the exemptions: They have sought annulment of the exemptions granted to polygamy under Muslim Personal Law.
    4. Compulsory registration: They want compulsory registration of Muslim marriages and divorces with State authorities, so that a second or subsequent marriage by a man with a subsisting marriage can be prevented.
    5. Protection of the first family: Where registration is flouted, they want the first wife and her children to have the first and lasting right to the matrimonial home.
    6. Codification of Muslim Personal Law: They want the court to direct the Law Commission of India or the Union government to prepare a draft codifying Muslim Personal Law so that marriage, divorce and succession align with constitutional principles of gender equality.

    How has the Supreme Court ruled on plural marriage before?

    1. Sarla Mudgal (1995): The Supreme Court held that the second marriage of a Hindu husband after converting to Islam, without dissolving the first marriage, is void, prohibiting conversion undertaken purely to marry again.
    2. Lily Thomas versus Union of India (2000): The court reiterated the Sarla Mudgal position, holding that a second marriage contracted after a feigned conversion to Islam was illegal and punishable under Section 494 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860.
    3. Shayara Bano (2017): The court invalidated instant triple talaq on the argument that the practice violated the fundamental rights of women, on a petition in which two of the present activists were also involved.
    4. The gap the rulings leave: All three rulings addressed the abuse of conversion or the mode of divorce, none tested the validity of polygamy itself under Articles 14, 15 and 16.

    Does Islamic scripture itself sanction polygamy?

    1. The scriptural position: The Quran encourages monogamy and does not encourage polygamy, contrary to the common contention.
    2. The narrow permission: It permits a man up to four wives in special circumstances, such as marrying a widow or an orphan.
    3. The condition attached: It makes complete equality between wives incumbent on the man, and because that is a practical impossibility, it asks men to desist from multiple marriages.
    4. The text relied on: Verse 3 of Surah Nisa states that if a man fears he will fail to maintain justice, he should content himself with one wife, a verse revealed when many men had multiple spouses running into three figures.

    Major debates surrounding polygamy and personal law reform

    1. Equality against religious freedom: One position reads Articles 14, 15 and 16 as overriding a religion specific exemption, the other reads Article 25 as protecting a practice integral to a community's personal law.
    2. Judicial invalidation against legislative codification: The court can strike down Section 2 of the 1937 Act, but a durable settlement requires Parliament to codify Muslim Personal Law, which is what the petitioners are actually asking for.
    3. The essential religious practices test: The dispute turns on whether polygamy is an essential religious practice protected by Article 25 or a permitted social custom open to reform, and the two characterisations produce opposite outcomes.
    4. Uniform Civil Code against pluralism: The court's suggestion that the Centre abolish the practice for all citizens irrespective of religion moves the question toward Article 44, which reopens the standing dispute over a Uniform Civil Code.
    5. The evidence gap: There is no reliable national dataset on the current prevalence of polygamy, so both sides argue from contested estimates rather than measured incidence.
    6. Gender justice inside communities: The debate over whether reform of a minority's personal law is best driven by the courts, by Parliament or by the community itself remains unsettled.

    Challenges to abolishing polygamy through law

    1. Absence of marriage registration: Without compulsory registration, a subsisting marriage cannot be proved, so a bigamy prosecution collapses at the evidence stage. e.g. Section 494 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 has historically produced very few convictions because the prosecution must first prove a valid first marriage and then a valid second one.
    2. The essential practices doctrine: Courts must first decide whether the practice is essential to the religion before they can regulate it, which is a theological inquiry judges are poorly placed to conduct. e.g. the Sabarimala reference of 2019 sent exactly this question to a larger bench, where it remains pending.
    3. Standing and enforcement: A first wife who depends on her husband economically has little incentive to complain, so a criminal provision goes unused. e.g. the low prosecution rate for dowry related matrimonial offences despite a wide statutory framework.
    4. Community resistance to codification: Attempts to codify a minority's personal law are read as an intrusion on identity rather than a gender reform. e.g. the reversal of the Shah Bano ruling through the Muslim Women (Protection of Rights on Divorce) Act, 1986.
    5. Displacement rather than abolition: Criminalisation can push plural unions outside the legal record, leaving second wives and their children without maintenance or inheritance rights. e.g. Hindu bigamy has continued through unregistered customary unions despite being an offence since 1955.
    6. Federal complexity: Marriage and divorce sit on the Concurrent List, so State level marriage registration laws vary and a national standard needs Parliamentary action.

    Conclusion

    The dispute before the court is not about the scriptural permissibility of polygamy but about whether a statutory exemption can hold when the same conduct is a criminal offence for other citizens. A judicial strike down of Section 2 of the Muslim Personal Law (Shariat) Application Act, 1937 would remove the permission without supplying the registration and maintenance machinery that makes a prohibition workable. The Centre's response to the notice, and whether it accepts the court's invitation to legislate for all citizens, is the next milestone in the case.

    What is Personal Law in India?

    1. About: Personal law is the body of rules governing marriage, divorce, maintenance, guardianship, adoption, succession and inheritance, applied to a person according to their religious community rather than their territory.
    2. Rationale: It survived as a distinct legal category because the colonial state declined to legislate on the family affairs of religious communities, and the Constitution retained it while placing the subject on the Concurrent List.
    3. The four principal systems:
    4. Hindu law: Codified through four statutes in 1955 and 1956, covering Hindus, Buddhists, Jains and Sikhs.
    5. Muslim law: Largely uncodified, applied through the Muslim Personal Law (Shariat) Application Act, 1937, with limited statutory intervention on divorce and maintenance.
    6. Christian law: Governed by the Indian Christian Marriage Act, 1872 and the Indian Divorce Act, 1869.
    7. Parsi law: Governed by the Parsi Marriage and Divorce Act, 1936.
    8. The secular alternative: The Special Marriage Act, 1954 offers any two citizens a civil marriage independent of religion, along with a uniform succession regime.

    Key Concerns Regarding Personal Law

    1. Unequal entitlements between citizens: Rights on divorce, maintenance and inheritance differ by religion, so two women in identical situations receive different legal protection.
    2. Gender asymmetry within systems: Several personal law systems give men wider rights over the dissolution of marriage and over property than they give women.
    3. Uncodified rules resist reform: Where the law is not written into a statute, amending it requires either judicial intervention or community consensus, both of which are slow.
    4. Weak registration infrastructure: Absent compulsory registration across all communities, the State has no record against which to enforce even the rules it has enacted.
    5. Article 44 remains unimplemented: The Directive Principle on a Uniform Civil Code has produced State level initiatives rather than a national framework, leaving the constitutional aspiration unfulfilled.

    Laws and Rules Governing Marriage and Personal Status in India

    1. Indian Divorce Act, 1869: Governs the dissolution of marriage among Christians.
    2. Indian Christian Marriage Act, 1872: Governs the solemnisation of Christian marriages.
    3. Muslim Personal Law (Shariat) Application Act, 1937: Applies Shariat rules to Muslims in matters including marriage, dissolution, maintenance and succession.
    4. Section 2 is the provision under challenge, since it is the route through which polygamy is permitted.
    5. Parsi Marriage and Divorce Act, 1936: Governs marriage and divorce among Parsis.
    6. Special Marriage Act, 1954: Provides a civil marriage available to any two citizens irrespective of religion, with its own divorce and succession rules.
    7. Hindu Marriage Act, 1955: Codified Hindu marriage law and made bigamy void and punishable.
    8. Hindu Succession Act, 1956: Codified intestate succession for Hindus, amended in 2005 to make daughters coparceners by birth.
    9. Muslim Women (Protection of Rights on Divorce) Act, 1986: Enacted after the Shah Bano ruling to govern maintenance for divorced Muslim women.
    10. Prohibition of Child Marriage Act, 2006: Sets the minimum age of marriage and makes child marriage voidable at the option of the minor party.
    11. Muslim Women (Protection of Rights on Marriage) Act, 2019: Made the pronouncement of instant triple talaq void and a punishable offence.
    12. Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023: Section 82 punishes bigamy with up to seven years, replacing Section 494 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860.

    Back2Basics: Muslim Personal Law (Shariat) Application Act, 1937

    1. What it is: A short central statute that directs courts to apply Muslim personal law to Muslims in the matters it lists.
    2. Enacted: 1937, by the Central Legislative Assembly in British India.
    3. Subjects covered: Intestate succession, special property of females, marriage, dissolution of marriage including talaq, maintenance, dower, guardianship, gifts, trusts and wakfs.
    4. Effect of Section 2: It displaces custom and usage in these matters and substitutes Shariat as the rule of decision.
    5. What it does not do: It does not codify Muslim personal law, it only directs which body of rules applies, which is why the substantive rules remain uncodified.
    6. Present relevance: It is the statute whose Section 2 is under constitutional challenge in the polygamy petition before the Supreme Court.

    Way Forward

    1. Enact compulsory marriage registration: A uniform registration requirement for all marriages and divorces, irrespective of religion, creates the record without which any bigamy prohibition is unenforceable.
    2. Codify Muslim Personal Law: A codified statute drafted with the community, as the petitioners seek from the Law Commission of India, converts contested custom into reviewable law.
    3. Secure the first family's rights first: Statutory protection of the first wife's and children's right to the matrimonial home and to maintenance addresses the harm even where the marriage itself is not annulled.
    4. Use the Special Marriage Act, 1954 route: Simplifying and publicising civil marriage gives couples an existing exit from personal law without waiting for its reform.
    5. Build the evidentiary base: A national survey of the prevalence of plural marriage would replace contested estimates with measured data on which any legislation must rest.
    6. Sequence reform through Parliament: A legislative framework, rather than a bare judicial strike down, supplies the transitional provisions, penalties and remedies that a court order cannot create.

    Matching Previous Year Question

    “[2019] Which Article of the Constitution of India safeguards one's right to marry the person of one's choice? (a) Article 19 (b) Article 21 (c) Article 25 (d) Article 29 Answer: (b)”

  • District Collectors in six border States, Jammu and Kashmir and Ladakh empowered to grant citizenship

    Why in the News

    The Union Home Ministry has notified the Citizenship (Third Amendment) Rules, 2026, authorising District Collectors in six border States and two Union Territories to grant registration or naturalisation to applicants found fit and proper. The power now sits with a single district officer in place of the Empowered Committees and Designated Officers that previously exercised it, in exactly the regions where citizenship determination is most contested.

    What do the Citizenship (Third Amendment) Rules, 2026 provide?

    1. Delegation of power: The Rules authorise District Collectors in the specified States and Union Territories to process applications seeking citizenship by registration or naturalisation.
    2. The operative provision: The Collector, on being satisfied with the suitability of the applicant, that he is a fit and proper person to be registered or naturalised, shall grant him the citizenship of India.
    3. Full processing authority: The gazette notification authorises Collectors to receive, scrutinise and dispose of such applications in accordance with the laid down parameters.
    4. Replacement of earlier authorities: Collectors in these States replace the Empowered Committees and Designated Officers that previously held these powers, and all pending applications with those committees are to be transferred immediately to the relevant Collector.

    What is the difference between registration and naturalisation?

    1. Registration: Acquisition of citizenship under Section 5 of the Citizenship Act, 1955 by persons with a defined connection to India, such as persons of Indian origin, spouses of Indian citizens and minor children of Indian citizens, on shorter residence conditions.
    2. Naturalisation: Acquisition under Section 6 of the Citizenship Act, 1955 by a foreigner with no such prior connection, on satisfying the longer residence and other conditions set out in the Third Schedule.

    What is the current status of citizenship acquisition in India?

    1. Single citizenship: India provides for a single citizenship of the Union with no separate State citizenship, and there is a single domicile for the whole territory.
    2. Five modes of acquisition: The Citizenship Act, 1955 provides for acquisition by birth under Section 3, descent under Section 4, registration under Section 5, naturalisation under Section 6, and incorporation of territory under Section 7.
    3. Naturalisation threshold: The Third Schedule requires residence in India for twelve months immediately preceding the application, and residence or government service for eleven years in the aggregate in the fourteen years preceding those twelve months.
    4. Reduced threshold under the 2019 amendment: The Citizenship (Amendment) Act, 2019 reduces the aggregate residence requirement to five years for Hindus, Sikhs, Buddhists, Jains, Parsis and Christians from Afghanistan, Bangladesh and Pakistan who entered India on or before 31 December 2014.
    5. Birth rule as it now stands: A person born in India on or after 3 December 2004 is a citizen by birth only if both parents are citizens, or one parent is a citizen and the other is not an illegal migrant at the time of birth.
    6. Loss of citizenship: Citizenship may be lost by renunciation under Section 8, termination on voluntary acquisition of foreign citizenship under Section 9, and deprivation by the Union government under Section 10 on specified grounds including fraud and disloyalty.

    Constitutional Provisions Related to Citizenship

    1. Article 5: Confers citizenship at the commencement of the Constitution on persons domiciled in India who were born in India, or either of whose parents was born in India, or who had been ordinarily resident in India for at least five years.
    2. Article 6: Confers citizenship on persons who migrated to India from Pakistan, subject to conditions of date of migration and registration.
    3. Article 7: Deals with persons who migrated to Pakistan after 1 March 1947 and later returned to India under a permit for resettlement.
    4. Article 8: Confers citizenship on persons of Indian origin residing outside India who register with an Indian diplomatic or consular mission.
    5. Article 9: Bars a person from being a citizen of India if that person has voluntarily acquired the citizenship of a foreign State.
    6. Article 10: Provides that every person who is or is deemed to be a citizen continues to be so, subject to any law made by Parliament.
    7. Article 11: Empowers Parliament to regulate the right of citizenship by law, which is the source of the Citizenship Act, 1955 and every amendment to it.
    8. Seventh Schedule, Union List Entry 17: Places citizenship, naturalisation and aliens exclusively within Parliament's legislative competence, which is why the Rules are made by the Union Home Ministry and not by States.

    Which regions and authorities does the new delegation cover?

    1. Six States: Gujarat, Rajasthan, Punjab, West Bengal, Assam and Tripura.
    2. Two Union Territories: Jammu and Kashmir, and Ladakh.
    3. A carve out for tribal areas: In Assam and Tripura, the Rules specifically exclude tribal areas, which remain outside the Collector's new authority.
    4. Common characteristic of the list: Every State and Union Territory in the list shares an international land border, which is what links the eight jurisdictions.
    5. Transfer of pending cases: All applications pending with the Empowered Committees and Designated Officers in the specified regions are to be transferred immediately to the relevant Collector.

    Why does routing this power through the District Collector matter?

    1. From a collegial body to a single officer: An Empowered Committee decides collectively while a Collector decides individually, which changes both the speed and the internal check on a citizenship grant.
    2. The standard is discretionary: The Rules turn on the Collector's satisfaction that the applicant is a fit and proper person, a formulation that leaves the assessment to the officer.
    3. Proximity to the applicant: The district is where residence, documents and antecedents can actually be verified, which is the administrative case for the delegation.
    4. Border districts are where determination is contested: The delegation applies precisely in the jurisdictions where migration histories, documentary gaps and citizenship disputes are most concentrated.
    5. A rules level change to a statutory power: The delegation is effected through subordinate legislation under the Citizenship Act, 1955 rather than through an amendment to the Act itself.

    Major debates surrounding citizenship determination in India

    1. Documentary burden versus lived residence: Determination rests on documents that the poorest and most mobile populations are least able to produce, which converts an evidentiary problem into an exclusion outcome.
    2. Executive determination versus judicial safeguard: Citizenship in India is decided in the first instance by executive authorities, with judicial review available only afterwards and at the individual's cost.
    3. The 2019 amendment and Article 14: The Citizenship (Amendment) Act, 2019 uses religion and country of origin as criteria for a reduced naturalisation threshold, and its consistency with the equality guarantee is before the Supreme Court.
    4. National register proposals: The relationship between the National Population Register, a National Register of Indian Citizens and the Citizenship Rules is contested, particularly on whether enumeration becomes verification.
    5. The Assam experience: The Assam National Register of Citizens exercise, with its cut off of 24 March 1971 under Section 6A of the Citizenship Act, 1955, remains the reference case for the administrative and human cost of large scale determination.
    6. Statelessness risk: A person excluded from citizenship without any other State recognising them has no status at all, and India is not a party to the 1954 and 1961 statelessness conventions.
    7. Uniformity across deciding authorities: Where dozens of district officers apply a fit and proper standard independently, the same facts can produce different outcomes in adjacent districts.

    Challenges to the Collector led citizenship grant framework

    1. Discretion without a stated test: The fit and proper standard is not defined in the Rules, so its content depends on the individual officer. e.g. two applicants with identical residence records in adjacent districts of Rajasthan can receive different outcomes.
    2. Workload of the office: A District Collector already carries revenue, magisterial, election, disaster and development functions, and citizenship scrutiny is added to that list. e.g. Collectors in border districts of West Bengal simultaneously handle electoral roll administration and law and order duties.
    3. Loss of collegial scrutiny: Replacing an Empowered Committee with a single officer removes the internal deliberation that a multi member body provided. e.g. pending applications before those committees now move to a single decision maker without any recorded transition of standards.
    4. No stated appeal route in the notification: The Rules set out the grant power without specifying an appellate forum against refusal at the district level. e.g. an applicant refused by a Collector is left to writ jurisdiction of the High Court rather than a departmental appeal.
    5. Tribal area exclusion creates a two track system: Applicants in the excluded tribal areas of Assam and Tripura continue under the earlier authorities, producing different processes within the same State. e.g. two applicants in Tripura face different deciding authorities depending on whether their residence falls inside a tribal area.
    6. Verification capacity in border districts: Establishing residence and antecedents requires police and revenue verification chains that are already stretched in border districts. e.g. the Assam National Register of Citizens exercise showed how documentary verification at scale outruns administrative capacity.

    Conclusion

    The Citizenship (Third Amendment) Rules, 2026 have been notified in the Gazette and are in force, replacing Empowered Committees and Designated Officers with District Collectors in six border States and two Union Territories, with tribal areas of Assam and Tripura excluded. The immediate next step named in the notification is the transfer of all pending applications to the relevant Collector, and the source states no further date or milestone beyond that. The change is administrative in form and consequential in effect, because it places a sovereign determination in the hands of a single district officer applying an undefined fit and proper standard. Whether the delegation speeds up disposal or widens variation depends on the guidance and appeal architecture that follows.

    What is Citizenship?

    1. About: Citizenship is the legal relationship between an individual and a State that carries full civil and political membership, including the right to vote, to hold public office and to hold an Indian passport.
    2. Rationale: It defines who belongs to the political community, and therefore who may claim the rights the Constitution reserves for citizens rather than for all persons.
    3. Rights reserved for citizens: Articles 15, 16, 19, 29 and 30 of the Constitution are available only to citizens. Articles 14 and 21 extend to every person.
    4. Jus soli, the territorial principle: Citizenship by place of birth, which India applied without qualification until 1987.
    5. Jus sanguinis, the descent principle: Citizenship by parentage, which India progressively adopted through the 1986, 2003 and 2004 changes to the birth rule.
    6. Naturalisation, the acquired principle: Citizenship granted by the State to a foreigner on satisfying residence, conduct and language conditions, which is the mode the new Rules deal with.

    Laws and Rules Governing Citizenship in India

    1. Citizenship Act, 1955: The principal statute, enacted under Article 11, providing for acquisition, determination and termination of Indian citizenship.
    2. 1986 amendment: Ended unqualified citizenship by birth, requiring at least one parent to be an Indian citizen for those born on or after 1 July 1987.
    3. 2003 amendment: Introduced the concept of the illegal migrant, barred illegal migrants from citizenship, and provided for a National Register of Indian Citizens and compulsory registration of all citizens.
    4. 2005 amendment: Expanded the categories eligible for the Overseas Citizen of India status.
    5. 2015 amendment: Merged the Person of Indian Origin card with the Overseas Citizen of India card, creating the Overseas Citizen of India Cardholder category.
    6. 2019 amendment: Reduced the naturalisation residence requirement to five years for six specified minority communities from Afghanistan, Bangladesh and Pakistan who entered India on or before 31 December 2014.
    7. Section 6A: Provides the Assam specific framework with the 24 March 1971 cut off, upheld by a Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court in 2024.
    8. Citizenship Rules, 2009: The principal subordinate legislation prescribing forms, procedures and authorities for applications under the Act.
    9. Citizenship (Amendment) Rules, 2024: Prescribed the application procedure and the district and empowered committee structure for grants under the 2019 amendment.
    10. Citizenship (Third Amendment) Rules, 2026: Transfers the grant power in the specified border States and Union Territories to District Collectors.
    11. Immigration and Foreigners Act, 2025: Consolidates the law on entry, stay and exit of foreigners, replacing the earlier Passport (Entry into India) Act, 1920, the Registration of Foreigners Act, 1939, the Foreigners Act, 1946 and the Immigration (Carriers' Liability) Act, 2000.
    12. Passports Act, 1967: Governs the issue of Indian passports and travel documents, for which proof of citizenship is a precondition.

    Government Initiatives Related to Citizenship

    1. Indian Citizenship Online portal: The Ministry of Home Affairs portal through which applications for citizenship by registration and naturalisation are filed and tracked.
    2. Dedicated portal and mobile application under the 2019 amendment: Launched in 2024 to receive applications from eligible applicants of the six specified communities.
    3. National Population Register: Maintained under the Citizenship Act, 1955 and the Citizenship Rules, 2003 as a register of usual residents, updated alongside the census housing phase.
    4. Long Term Visa scheme: Provides extended stay, employment and property rights to minority community migrants from Afghanistan, Bangladesh and Pakistan pending decision on their citizenship applications.
    5. Overseas Citizen of India Cardholder scheme: Provides lifelong visa free travel and parity with non resident Indians in specified economic and educational fields, without conferring citizenship or voting rights.

    Key Facts about Citizenship in India

    1. Constitutional location: Citizenship is dealt with in Part II of the Constitution, comprising Articles 5 to 11.
    2. Single citizenship: India follows single citizenship on the pattern of the United Kingdom, unlike the dual citizenship model of the United States.
    3. No dual citizenship: India does not permit dual citizenship, and voluntary acquisition of foreign citizenship terminates Indian citizenship under Section 9.
    4. Overseas Citizen of India status is not citizenship: An Overseas Citizen of India Cardholder cannot vote, hold constitutional office or purchase agricultural land.
    5. The 2004 birth rule cut off: Persons born in India on or after 3 December 2004 must have at least one citizen parent and no illegal migrant parent.
    6. Union subject: Citizenship, naturalisation and aliens is Entry 17 of the Union List in the Seventh Schedule.

    Challenges in Citizenship Determination in India

    1. Documentary proof in a low documentation society: Establishing descent and residence over decades requires records many households never held. e.g. the Assam National Register of Citizens process excluded over 19 lakh persons from the final list published in 2019.
    2. Gendered documentation gap: Married women who moved at marriage often lack independent linkage documents to a parent's record. e.g. panchayat residence certificates for married women became a contested category of proof during the Assam exercise.
    3. Adjudication capacity: Determination bodies handle far more cases than their sanctioned strength can process fairly. e.g. Foreigners Tribunals in Assam handling large pendency with limited members.
    4. Detention and post declaration limbo: A person declared a foreigner with no country willing to receive them remains in indefinite administrative limbo. e.g. the Supreme Court's directions on conditional release of long term detainees from Assam detention centres.
    5. Legal challenge to the 2019 framework: The reduced naturalisation threshold for specified religious communities is under constitutional challenge, leaving the framework unsettled. e.g. petitions against the Citizenship (Amendment) Act, 2019 pending before the Supreme Court.
    6. Variation across deciding authorities: Multiple district level authorities applying an undefined standard produce inconsistent outcomes. e.g. the fit and proper test in the 2026 Rules carrying no statutory definition.
    7. Absence of a statelessness framework: India has no domestic law on statelessness and is not party to the 1954 and 1961 conventions on the subject. e.g. persons excluded from a citizenship register having no recognised alternative legal status.

    Way Forward

    1. Issue binding guidance on the fit and proper test: Publish parameters, documentary standards and a reasoned order requirement so that Collector level discretion is structured rather than open ended.
    2. Provide a departmental appeal: Create an appellate authority above the Collector for refusals, so that recourse does not begin at the High Court.
    3. Mandate speaking orders and time limits: Require every grant and refusal to record reasons and to be disposed of within a stated period, with the position published in aggregate.
    4. Publish disposal data: Release district wise data on applications received, granted and refused, so that variation between Collectors becomes visible and correctable.
    5. Train and support district staff: Provide dedicated staff and training on citizenship law to Collectorates in the eight jurisdictions, given the additional workload placed on an already loaded office.
    6. Enact a statelessness framework: Provide in domestic law for the status, rights and documentation of persons who are found to be citizens of no country, so that exclusion does not produce legal invisibility.
    7. Harmonise the tribal area carve out: Specify which authority decides applications from the excluded tribal areas of Assam and Tripura, so that no applicant falls between two regimes.

    Matching Previous Year Question

    “[2021] With reference to India, consider the following statements: 1. There is only one citizenship and one domicile. 2. A citizen by birth only can become the Head of State. 3. A foreigner, once granted citizenship, cannot be deprived of it under any circumstances. Which of the statements given above is/are correct? (a) 1 only (b) 2 only (c) 1 and 3 (d) 2 and 3 Answer: (a)”

  • Draft rules under the SHANTI Act could favour Russia’s Rosatom in India’s nuclear opening

    Why in the News

    Draft rules issued by the Department of Atomic Energy under the Sustainable Harnessing and Advancement of Nuclear Energy for Transforming India (SHANTI) Act require any foreign nuclear technology brought into India to be design certified by the regulator in its country of origin and already operational there or in another foreign country. Only two Small Modular Reactors are operational anywhere in the world, so a clause written as a safety filter narrows India’s field of eligible suppliers to the one country that already has an operating unit.

    Mentor’s Comment

    A proven technology test is the most defensible condition a regulator can write. It is also the condition that most reliably locks out every new entrant, because nothing can be operational before someone allows it to operate somewhere first.

    What is the SHANTI Act?

    1. Full name: The Sustainable Harnessing and Advancement of Nuclear Energy for Transforming India Act, referred to as the SHANTI Act.
    2. Function: It is the statute under which India’s expansion of nuclear power generation is being governed, including the terms on which foreign nuclear technology may be sourced for an Indian plant or reactor.
    3. Rule making authority: The Department of Atomic Energy (DAE) frames the subordinate rules under the Act, and has now issued them in draft.
    4. Operative clause in the draft rules: Foreign nuclear technology sourced for a nuclear power plant or reactor in India must mandatorily carry design certification or approval from the regulatory body in its country of origin, and must already be operational there or in another foreign country.

    What is a Small Modular Reactor?

    1. Definition: A Small Modular Reactor (SMR) is an advanced nuclear reactor with about one third the generating capacity of a conventional large power reactor, built from factory made modules rather than site fabricated components.
    2. Intended use: SMRs are aimed at supplying clean electricity to remote regions with limited grid infrastructure and to individual industrial enterprises.
    3. India’s interest: India is examining SMRs for localised applications such as energy hungry data centres, and for scaling up baseload capacity quickly.

    What do the draft rules actually require of a foreign supplier?

    1. Home regulator certification: The design must be certified or approved by the regulatory body of the technology’s country of origin.
    2. Prior operating record: The technology must already be operational in that country or in another foreign country.
    3. Cumulative condition: Both tests must be met together, so a design certified but not yet built fails the rule, and a demonstration unit without home regulator certification also fails it.
    4. Practical filter: The clause screens out first of a kind designs, which is the entire category most SMR developers currently sit in.

    What does the global SMR field look like?

    1. Russia, Akademik Lomonosov: A floating power unit with two modules of 35 MWe that began commercial operation in May 2020. It is a non self propelled power barge docked at Pevek harbour, supplying heat to the Arctic port town and electricity to the regional grid, and is the world’s northernmost nuclear power plant.
    2. China, HTR-PM: A demonstration project grid connected in December 2021 that started commercial operations in December 2023, the second of the two SMRs operational globally.
    3. United States, Holtec International: The New Jersey based developer’s SMR is still in the design certification phase and is yet to be cleared by its domestic regulator.
    4. United Kingdom, Rolls-Royce SMR: Also in the design certification phase, with no operating unit anywhere.
    5. United States, GE-Hitachi BWRX-300: A boiling water reactor derived SMR, likewise awaiting domestic regulatory clearance.
    6. What the set demonstrates: Only Russia and China clear the operational test today, and Russia is the only country in the world with expertise in floating nuclear power solutions.

    What is Russia already positioned to supply in India?

    1. Existing build: Russia is already constructing conventional nuclear projects in India and holds a lead in the nascent SMR field.
    2. Kudankulam: The Kudankulam Nuclear Power Project (KKNPP) in Tamil Nadu is India’s largest nuclear power station and the flagship project of Russian and Indian energy cooperation. Units 1 and 2 use Russia’s earlier VVER-1000 light water reactors, where water cools the reactor, and are connected to the national grid supplying south India.
    3. Serial construction pitch: A key negotiating point from the Russian side is serial construction of high capacity units of Russian design in India based on the new generation VVER-1200 reactor models, with technical specifications being proposed by Russia.
    4. SMR pitch: Rosatom State Corporation has made a strong pitch for deploying its SMRs for targeted applications in India, and construction of SMRs of Russian design in India is under discussion.
    5. Floating solutions: In April 2024, Rosatom presented its Indian partners with information on its floating nuclear power solutions.
    6. Bilateral track: Progress on Kudankulam and the SMR proposal was reviewed at a working meeting in Mumbai on 10 November between the Chairman of the Department of Atomic Energy and the Director General of Rosatom.

    Why does cost also point the same way?

    1. Indigenous benchmark: India’s indigenous pressurised heavy water reactors (PHWRs) cost about Rs 18 crore per MW-electric.
    2. Russian comparison: Russian reactors are estimated at about Rs 34 crore per MW-electric, which industry insiders describe as only marginally more expensive.
    3. Western comparison: Light water reactors offered by French and United States companies are significantly more expensive than India’s indigenous PHWRs.
    4. Where the cost sits: Fuel accounts for a relatively small share of the overall cost of nuclear generation, so the capital number dominates.
    5. Financing and time: High upfront capital cost remains the key challenge for new projects, and financing costs and the length of the construction period are critical determinants of the final cost of nuclear power.

    What are the other major changes in India’s nuclear framework?

    1. Change to an existing monopoly: The reform track opens nuclear power generation beyond the exclusive preserve of state owned entities, which the Atomic Energy Act, 1962 had reserved for the government.
    2. Change to an existing liability regime: The Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage Act, 2010, whose Section 17(b) gives the operator a right of recourse against the supplier, is part of the same reform track because that provision is the standing deterrent for foreign vendors.
    3. New institutional target: A Nuclear Energy Mission for Viksit Bharat carries an outlay of Rs 20,000 crore for research and development on Small Modular Reactors, with at least five indigenously designed SMRs targeted to be operational by 2033.
    4. New capacity goal: A national target of 100 GW of nuclear capacity by 2047 anchors the entire framework, against present installed capacity of under 9 GW.
    5. New subordinate rules: The draft rules now released are the first set of subordinate legislation under the SHANTI Act governing sourcing of foreign nuclear technology.

    Does a proven technology test buy safety at the cost of competition?

    1. The case for the clause: A design already certified and operating abroad carries demonstrated safety performance, which is the strongest assurance a regulator can demand before a first Indian deployment.
    2. The cost of the clause: Almost every SMR developer is in the design certification phase, so a rule keyed to operating status excludes the field rather than ranking it.
    3. Competition effect: With Holtec, Rolls-Royce SMR and the GE-Hitachi BWRX-300 all outside the gate, price discovery for Indian projects narrows to one supplier’s quotation.
    4. Reciprocity problem: India’s own first of a kind designs have no operating record either, so a mirror clause applied abroad would keep Indian reactors out of foreign markets.
    5. Strategic dependence: Serial construction of VVER-1200 units plus SMR supply from the same country deepens a single supplier relationship in a sector with sixty year asset lives.

    Challenges to the design certification and prior operation clause

    1. The eligible field collapses to two countries: Only Russia and China have an operating SMR, e.g. Akademik Lomonosov since May 2020 and HTR-PM since December 2023, so every other developer is excluded until its home regulator acts.
    2. First of a kind Indian designs get no reciprocal entry: An indigenous SMR has no operating unit anywhere, e.g. the Bharat Small Modular Reactor of about 200 MWe exists only on paper, so a comparable foreign rule would bar it abroad.
    3. Supplier liability still deters western vendors independently of this clause: Section 17(b) of the Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage Act, 2010 has kept projects frozen, e.g. the Jaitapur project with French supply has been under negotiation since 2010 without a single unit built.
    4. Construction period risk dominates project cost: Long build times inflate financing cost, e.g. Kudankulam Unit 1 was sanctioned in 1988 and reached criticality only in 2013.
    5. Fuel supply remains external for safeguarded reactors: Imported uranium underpins the light water fleet, e.g. India sources uranium from Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Russia and Canada under Nuclear Suppliers Group waiver arrangements.
    6. Local acceptance and land acquisition delay siting: Public opposition has stalled commissioning, e.g. protests at Kudankulam through 2011 and 2012 delayed the first unit by over a year.
    7. SMR economics depend on serial factory production: A handful of units cannot amortise a module factory, e.g. Pevek’s barge served a single Arctic town, which is not a template for grid scale Indian demand.

    Conclusion

    The rules under the SHANTI Act are at the stage of a draft released by the Department of Atomic Energy for public comment, and the operative clause requires foreign nuclear technology to be design certified in its country of origin and already operational there or abroad. The next milestone is the close of the comment window on 4 September 2026, after which the rules are to be finalised and notified. As drafted, the clause leaves Rosatom as effectively the only qualifying SMR supplier, with Holtec International, Rolls-Royce SMR and the GE-Hitachi BWRX-300 all still in design certification.

  • A secular republic’s sacrilege problem and the legal price of criticising holy writ

    Why in the News

    Punjab’s Governor assented in April 2026 to the Jaagat Jot Sri Guru Granth Sahib Satkar (Amendment) Act, which provides punishment up to life imprisonment for sacrilege. The Act also covers words, signs, visible representations and electronic means, raising debate over the boundary between sacrilege and blasphemy.

    What is the Act?

    • Applies to wilful and deliberate desecration of the Guru Granth Sahib.
    • Covers physical acts such as damage, defacement, burning, tearing and theft of Saroop.
    • Also covers certain spoken/written words, signs, visual representations and electronic acts.
    • Emerged against the backdrop of the 2015 Bargari and Burj Jawahar Singh Wala incidents.

    Key Legal Provisions

    Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 (BNS)

    • Replaced the Indian Penal Code, 1860 from July 2024.
    • Section 298: Offences involving injury/defilement of places of worship.
    • Section 299: Deliberate and malicious acts intended to outrage religious feelings, including through electronic means.
    • Section 299 carries forward the substance of former Section 295A, IPC.

    Constitutional Provisions

    • Article 19(1)(a): Freedom of speech and expression.
    • Article 19(2): Permits reasonable restrictions, including for public order.
    • Article 25: Freedom of conscience and religion, subject to public order, morality and health.
    • Article 14: Equality before law.
    • Article 51A(e): Promotes harmony and common brotherhood.
    • Article 51A(h): Promotes scientific temper, inquiry and reform.
    • Secularism: Part of the basic structure of the Constitution.

    Sacrilege vs Blasphemy

    • Sacrilege: Physical or conduct-based desecration of something sacred.
    • Blasphemy: Expressive acts showing contempt or irreverence towards religious beliefs.
    • Concern: Punjab’s law potentially merges the two by treating certain expressive acts as sacrilege.

    Historical Background of Section 295A

    • Rangila Rasul pamphlet triggered controversy in Lahore in 1924.
    • Section 295A IPC was enacted in 1927 to criminalise deliberate and malicious acts intended to outrage religious feelings.
    • The Supreme Court upheld its constitutionality in Ramji Lal Modi v. State of Uttar Pradesh (1957) under the Article 19(2) public order exception.

    Key Concerns

    • Chilling effect on speech, scholarship and satire.
    • Subjective interpretation of religious hurt.
    • Potential misuse by organised complainants.
    • Risk of vigilante violence despite criminalisation.
    • Digital communication expands the potential reach of the offence.
    • Different States may prescribe different levels of punishment.

  • Prevention of Insults to National Honour (Amendment) Act, 2026 makes obstructing Vande Mataram an offence

    Why in the News

    Parliament passed the Prevention of Insults to National Honour (Amendment) Act, 2026 in the recently concluded Monsoon Session, making it an offence to attempt to stop or prevent the singing or playing of Vande Mataram. The amendment lands on a live political dispute over whether public rendition may be confined to the first two stanzas, a practice the principal Opposition party traces to a 1937 Congress Working Committee resolution and the ruling party contests against the Constituent Assembly declaration of 24 January 1950. A statute now attaches criminal liability to conduct around a symbol whose status rests on a Presidential declaration in the Constituent Assembly rather than on any article of the Constitution.

    What is the Prevention of Insults to National Honour Act, 1971?

    1. Purpose: The Prevention of Insults to National Honour Act, 1971 penalises insults to India’s national symbols, and is the parent statute the 2026 amendment modifies.
    2. Protection of the Flag and the Constitution: Section 2 penalises burning, mutilating, defacing, defiling, disfiguring, destroying or showing contempt to the Indian National Flag or the Constitution of India.
    3. Protection of the National Anthem: Section 3 penalises intentionally preventing the singing of the National Anthem or causing disturbance to any assembly engaged in singing it.
    4. Punishment: Contravention attracts imprisonment of up to three years, or a fine, or both.
    5. Disqualification for repeat offenders: Section 3A provides for disqualification from contesting elections to Parliament and State legislatures for a specified period on a second or subsequent conviction.
    6. Earlier amendments: The Act has been amended previously, including in 2003 to extend the prohibition on improper use of the Flag and in 2005 to permit specified respectful uses.

    What does the 2026 Amendment change?

    1. New offence created: The amendment makes it an offence to attempt to stop or prevent the singing or playing of Vande Mataram.
    2. Extension of the Section 3 principle to the national song: The parent Act protected the National Anthem from obstruction, and the amendment extends comparable protection to the national song.
    3. Trigger for the amendment: The controversy over the national song began after Parliament passed the amendment in the recently concluded Monsoon Session.
    4. The conduct targeted is obstruction, not abstention: The offence attaches to attempts to stop or prevent rendition, which distinguishes it from a duty to sing.

    What other provisions of the parent framework does the amendment sit alongside?

    1. The Flag Code of India, 2002: Governs display and use of the National Flag, and was amended in 2021 to permit polyester and machine made flags and in 2022 to permit display by night.
    2. The Orders relating to the National Anthem of India: Issued by the Ministry of Home Affairs, they specify the occasions for the full and short versions and the playing time of 52 seconds.
    3. The Emblems and Names (Prevention of Improper Use) Act, 1950: Bars improper commercial and professional use of specified names and emblems, including the National Flag.
    4. The State Emblem of India (Prohibition of Improper Use) Act, 2005: Regulates use of the State Emblem, adapted from the Lion Capital of Ashoka at Sarnath.
    5. No parallel protection exists for the national song in the parent Act: Before this amendment, the 1971 Act protected the Flag, the Constitution and the National Anthem, but not Vande Mataram.

    Why does the two stanza convention exist?

    1. The 1937 resolution: The Congress Working Committee passed a resolution in 1937 on the public rendition of the national song.
    2. The stated reason: Leading figures of the freedom movement, including Mahatma Gandhi and Rabindranath Tagore, backed limiting public rendition to the first two stanzas to avoid verses containing specific religious imagery.
    3. Continuity claimed: The Congress president stated that the version sung was the same one sung by Mahatma Gandhi, Jawaharlal Nehru, Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel and former Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee.
    4. The 90 year framing: The party position is that it has continued a practice in place for 90 years, and that a governing party’s preference does not by itself set a national standard.
    5. State units following the same line: The Karnataka unit stated that only the first two stanzas would be sung at its programmes, in keeping with existing practice.
    6. The counter allegation: The ruling party alleged that the Congress entered into a pact with the Muslim League in 1936-37, under whose pressure only two stanzas were to be sung.

    What did the Constituent Assembly decide on 24 January 1950?

    1. The declaration: Dr Rajendra Prasad, as President of the Constituent Assembly, declared on 24 January 1950 that Jana Gana Mana would be the National Anthem and Vande Mataram the national song.
    2. Equal honour, unequal legal treatment: The declaration accorded the national song honour equal to the anthem, without conferring on it the same statutory protection the anthem later received in 1971.
    3. The source of authority: The status of both symbols rests on this declaration and subsequent executive practice, not on any article of the Constitution.
    4. Historical lineage invoked: The contributions of Bankim Chandra Chattopadhyay, Rabindranath Tagore and Bal Gangadhar Tilak were recalled, with the song described as a major source of inspiration during the freedom struggle.
    5. The political point pressed: The ruling party emphasised that the person who made the declaration was himself a Congress member and later the President of India.
    6. The broader charge: The Congress was accused of compromising national symbols and the core values of its own freedom movement.

    Why does criminalising obstruction of a national song raise a free speech question?

    1. The anthem precedent cuts both ways: Section 3 of the 1971 Act penalises preventing the singing of the anthem, and the Supreme Court has separately held that respectful silence is not an offence.
    2. Bijoe Emmanuel v. State of Kerala, 1986: The Court held that expelling students who stood respectfully but did not sing the anthem violated Article 19(1)(a) and Article 25.
    3. The definitional problem of attempt: An offence framed around an attempt to stop or prevent rendition turns on intention, which is inferred from conduct at a charged political event.
    4. Partial rendition is not obstruction: Singing two stanzas of a five stanza song is a choice about what to sing, distinct from preventing others from singing.
    5. Article 19(2) is the test: Any restriction must fall within the enumerated grounds, and the sustainability of this offence depends on locating it within public order or decency.
    6. The unresolved consequence: The dispute has moved from a convention about rendition into a question about who can be prosecuted at a public event, without the constitutional status of the national song itself being settled.

    Challenges to enforcing the amended Act

    1. Proving intention to obstruct: Distinguishing deliberate obstruction from ordinary disorder at a crowded event is evidentially difficult, e.g. complaints under Section 3 of the 1971 Act arising from cinema hall incidents have frequently collapsed for want of proof of intent.
    2. Risk of politically motivated complaints: A criminal provision attached to a contested symbol invites first information reports as a campaign instrument, e.g. the current dispute arose from rendition at an Independence Day event at a party headquarters and a subsequent event in Goa.
    3. Conflict with the respectful silence doctrine: Enforcement can slide from obstruction into compelled participation, e.g. Bijoe Emmanuel v. State of Kerala, 1986 protected students who declined to sing while standing in respect.
    4. No settled authoritative text or duration: Unlike the anthem, the national song has no notified official version or playing time, e.g. the Orders relating to the National Anthem fix a playing time of 52 seconds with no counterpart for Vande Mataram.
    5. Judicial reversal risk from over enforcement: Courts have withdrawn mandatory rendition directions when enforcement produced harassment, e.g. the 2016 direction making the anthem compulsory in cinema halls was made optional in 2018.
    6. Federal enforcement variation: Police being a State subject, prosecution practice will differ across States, e.g. identical conduct at party events in different States can attract different responses.

    Conclusion

    The amendment converts a ninety year old convention about how much of a national song is sung in public into a matter capable of criminal prosecution, without resolving the underlying question of what legal status the national song holds. The 1971 Act protected the Flag, the Constitution and the National Anthem because each has a notified form, and the national song has none, so the offence rests on a symbol defined only by the Constituent Assembly declaration of 24 January 1950. The stage reached is that Parliament passed the Prevention of Insults to National Honour (Amendment) Act, 2026 in the recently concluded Monsoon Session. The source names no commencement date, rules or further milestone, so the next step on the record is notification bringing the amendment into force.

  • Tribunals Reforms Bill, 2026 creates National Tribunals Commission after a decade-long tussle with the Supreme Court

    Why in the News

    Parliament passed the Tribunals Reforms Bill, 2026, which creates a National Tribunals Commission, fixes member tenure at five years and repeals the Tribunals Reforms Act of August 2021. The measure ends a decade in which the Centre re-enacted provisions the Supreme Court had struck down, most recently in November 2025 when a Bench called the 2021 re-enactment an impermissible legislative override. It concedes the institution the Court had demanded while retaining the appointment, funding and rule making levers that produced the dispute.

    What is the National Tribunals Commission?

    1. An independent oversight body for tribunals: The National Tribunals Commission is created to sever the dependence of tribunals on their parent government ministries for administrative and financial needs.
    2. Composition: It will be headed by a former Supreme Court judge or a former Chief Justice of a High Court, with two judicial members and two technical members.
    3. Qualification for technical members: Technical members must have at least 25 years of experience in fields such as public administration, finance or law.
    4. Core functions: The Commission will conduct the selection process for vacancies, review the performance of tribunals and oversee inquiries into complaints against members.
    5. Data function: It will maintain a National Tribunals Data Grid.
    6. Executive appointment retained: The Centre appoints the chairperson and members, with the chairperson and judicial members appointed after consulting the Chief Justice of India.

    What is the National Tribunals Data Grid?

    1. A central case data repository: The National Tribunals Data Grid is the consolidated database of tribunal case and disposal data to be maintained by the Commission.
    2. Purpose: It supplies the performance data on which the Commission’s review of tribunal functioning will rest, mirroring the role the National Judicial Data Grid performs for courts.

    What is an impermissible legislative override?

    1. Re-enacting a struck down provision: A legislative override is impermissible when a legislature re-enacts the same provision a court has declared unconstitutional, without removing the defect the court identified.
    2. The settled distinction: A legislature may cure the basis of a judgment by changing the underlying law, but it cannot simply nullify the judgment by restoring the identical text.

    Why did the Centre and the Supreme Court end up in a decade long confrontation?

    1. Finance Act, 2017: The statute empowered the Centre to frame rules for tribunals, transferring service conditions and qualifications to executive rule making.
    2. Constitution Bench ruling, 2019: A Constitution Bench struck down those rules for undermining judicial independence.
    3. New rules and a judicial recommendation, 2020: The Centre notified fresh rules, and the Court recommended several modifications, including a five year tenure for members.
    4. Ordinance, April 2021: Instead of incorporating those suggestions, the Centre promulgated an Ordinance fixing tenure at four years, setting a minimum appointment age of 50, and requiring selection committees to recommend a panel of two names.
    5. Provisions struck down as arbitrary: The Court struck down those provisions.
    6. Tribunals Reforms Act, August 2021: Parliament then passed an Act re-enacting the exact provisions the Court had just declared unconstitutional.

    What did the Supreme Court hold in November 2025?

    1. Re-enactment condemned: A two judge Bench struck down provisions of the 2021 Act, calling the re-enactment an impermissible legislative override of earlier judgments.
    2. Criticism of persistent non compliance: The Court criticised the government for its persistent refusal to adhere to its pronouncements.
    3. Four year tenure held anti merit: The Court ruled that a short four year tenure is anti-merit and increases interference by the executive, jeopardising the independence of the judiciary.
    4. Panel of two names rejected: It held that the government could not demand a panel of two names, since this gave the executive undue discretion in appointments.
    5. Direction to create the Commission: It reiterated the need for a National Tribunals Commission and directed the Centre to establish one within four months.
    6. Transitional protection: It protected certain existing appointments and selections while the new framework was being put in place.

    What are the other major changes proposed?

    1. Repeal of the 2021 Act (change to an existing provision): The 2026 Bill repeals the Tribunals Reforms Act of August 2021 in its entirety.
    2. Tenure fixed at five years (change to an existing provision): Chairpersons and members will hold office for a term of five years, replacing the contested four year tenure.
    3. Age ceilings specified (change to an existing provision): The maximum age limit is set at 70 years for chairpersons and 67 years for members.
    4. Reappointment permitted (new provision): Chairpersons and members can be considered for reappointment.
    5. Search cum selection committee restructured (new provision): The committee for members will be headed by a judicial member of the Commission and will include a retired High Court judge, a government secretary, a technical member and experts.
    6. One name per vacancy (change to an existing provision): The committee will recommend one suitable candidate for each vacancy, with one additional name kept on a waiting list, replacing the panel of two.
    7. Appointment deadline imposed (new provision): The government must make the appointment within three months of receiving the recommendation.
    8. Stated legislative intent: The Statement of Objects and Reasons says the Bill is introduced in consonance with the directions of the Supreme Court, to improve efficiency and ensure independence, transparency and uniformity in the functioning of tribunals.

    Why does the Bill not fully sever executive control?

    1. Appointment power retained: The Centre appoints the chairperson and members of the Commission itself, so the body meant to insulate tribunals is constituted by the executive.
    2. Consultation is not concurrence: The chairperson and judicial members are appointed after consulting the Chief Justice of India, a formulation that does not bind the government to the advice.
    3. Secretariat under the Centre: The Centre appoints the Commission’s secretary, which places the administrative machinery of the oversight body within executive reach.
    4. Financial dependence continues: The Centre provides grants to the Commission, reproducing at one remove the funding dependence the Court objected to.
    5. Rule making powers preserved: The Centre retains rule making powers over several aspects of tribunal members’ qualifications and service conditions.
    6. Reappointment as a pressure point: Permitting reappointment gives the appointing authority a continuing hold over a serving member’s prospects.

    Challenges to the National Tribunals Commission

    1. Vacancies outlast reform statutes: Tribunal benches sit without presiding officers for long periods, e.g. the National Green Tribunal has functioned with single member or non functional zonal benches for extended stretches.
    2. Parent ministry conflict of interest persists in adjudication: A tribunal often decides cases against the very ministry that shapes its service rules, e.g. the Armed Forces Tribunal adjudicates disputes against the Ministry of Defence.
    3. Appeal architecture keeps burdening the Supreme Court: Several statutes provide a direct appeal from a tribunal to the Supreme Court, e.g. appeals from the Telecom Disputes Settlement and Appellate Tribunal go straight to the Supreme Court, bypassing the High Courts.
    4. Technical member dominance dilutes judicial character: Benches weighted toward administrative expertise weaken the adjudicatory function, e.g. the Court in the Madras Bar Association line of cases repeatedly objected to bench composition tilted against judicial members.
    5. Uneven infrastructure and geographic access: Litigants travel long distances because benches are concentrated in a few cities, e.g. the abolition of appellate bodies in the 2021 rationalisation pushed those appeals to High Courts already carrying large backlogs.
    6. Rationalisation without capacity transfer: Abolishing a tribunal shifts its docket to courts without a matching increase in judicial strength, e.g. the 2021 rationalisation abolished nine appellate tribunals including the Intellectual Property Appellate Board and moved their work to High Courts.
    7. Non compliance with judicial directions: The record of the last decade shows directions being met with re-enactment rather than implementation, e.g. the 2021 Act reproduced the very four year tenure the Court had struck down months earlier.

    Conclusion

    A decade of contest between the legislature and the Court has ended with the Centre conceding the institution, since the Bill creates the National Tribunals Commission the Court had demanded and restores the five year tenure the Court recommended in 2020. The concession stops short of independence, because the Centre still appoints the Commission’s chairperson, members and secretary, funds it through grants and retains rule making powers over qualifications and service conditions. The measure has reached the stage of passage by both Houses of Parliament as the Tribunals Reforms Bill, 2026, and awaits Presidential assent and notification before it can take effect. The next milestone named in the record is the constitution of the National Tribunals Commission, which the Supreme Court’s November 2025 judgment directed the Centre to complete within four months.

  • Parliament curbs States’ power to tax mineral rights through MMDR Amendment Bill, 2026

    Why in the News

    Parliament has passed the Mines and Minerals (Development and Regulation) Amendment Bill, 2026, which restricts the power of States to impose levies on mineral rights and mineral bearing lands. The change follows a Supreme Court ruling that had upheld exactly that State taxing power and permitted recovery of arrears going back to 1 April 2005. A legislative measure aimed at investor certainty now sits directly against a judicially affirmed source of State revenue.

    What is the Mines and Minerals (Development and Regulation) Act, 1957?

    1. Governing statute: The Mines and Minerals (Development and Regulation) Act, 1957 (MMDR Act) is the central law regulating the grant of mineral concessions and the development of mines in India. It is administered by the Ministry of Mines.
    2. Union declaration: Section 2 of the Act declares it expedient in the public interest that the Union take control of the regulation of mines and mineral development, which activates Parliament’s competence over the field.
    3. Concession regime: No person may undertake reconnaissance, prospecting or mining except under a licence or lease granted under the Act and the rules made under it.
    4. Auction based allocation: The 2015 amendment made auction the sole method for granting mineral concessions for major minerals, replacing discretionary allotment.
    5. Minor minerals carve out: Section 15 empowers State governments to frame rules for granting concessions in respect of minor minerals, while the power to notify a mineral as minor rests with the Central government.

    What is royalty in mining?

    1. Definition: Royalty is the payment a lessee makes to the State for the privilege of extracting and removing a mineral from the land, calculated per tonne or as a percentage of sale value.
    2. Statutory rates: Royalty rates for major minerals are fixed in the Second Schedule of the MMDR Act by the Central government, so a State cannot revise them on its own.

    What is a tax on mineral bearing land?

    1. Definition: A tax on mineral bearing land is a State levy imposed on the land itself, with the mineral yield of that land used as the measure of the tax.
    2. Distinct head: It is levied separately from royalty and from the auction premium a bidder pays to win a mine, and it is the head of levy the current amendment restricts.

    Current status of States’ power to tax mineral rights in India

    1. Judicially affirmed right: The Supreme Court upheld the right of States to impose taxes on mineral rights and mineral bearing lands, and separately permitted recovery of arrears going back to 1 April 2005.
    2. State levies already in force: Jharkhand imposed a mineral bearing land tax on iron ore at Rs 100 per tonne, subsequently hiked, and Tamil Nadu set a tax on limestone at Rs 160 per tonne.
    3. Scale of the levy structure: States impose 14 types of taxes, charges, fees and levies, including royalty and auction premium, and the rates of royalty and taxes vary across States.
    4. Statutory deductions already fixed centrally: Lessees additionally pay into the District Mineral Foundation (DMF) and the National Mineral Exploration Trust (NMET) at rates pegged to royalty, which the Centre sets.
    5. Position after the amendment: The new law restricts the State levies on mineral rights and mineral bearing lands, and a government fact sheet states that States will continue to receive the overwhelming share of mining revenue.

    Constitutional provisions related to the taxation of mineral rights

    1. Article 246 with the Seventh Schedule: Distributes legislative competence between Parliament and the State legislatures across the Union, State and Concurrent Lists.
    2. Entry 54, List I: Gives Parliament power over the regulation of mines and mineral development to the extent declared by law to be expedient in the public interest.
    3. Entry 23, List II: Gives States power over the regulation of mines and mineral development, expressly subject to Entry 54 of List I.
    4. Entry 50, List II: Gives States the power to levy taxes on mineral rights, expressly subject to any limitations imposed by Parliament by law relating to mineral development.
    5. Entry 49, List II: Gives States the power to levy taxes on lands and buildings, the head under which mineral bearing land taxes are framed.
    6. Article 265: Bars the levy or collection of any tax except by authority of law.

    Why has Parliament moved to restrict State levies?

    1. Certainty and predictability: The stated rationale is to provide greater certainty and predictability in the mining sector for project developers.
    2. Investment flows: A stable levy structure is intended to facilitate investment flows into a sector the Union treats as vital to growth.
    3. Cost pass through: Higher State levies feed into the price of minerals and therefore into infrastructure costs downstream.
    4. Price uniformity: The change is also read as a bid to bring some degree of uniformity in the prices of major minerals, since royalty and tax rates currently differ from State to State.
    5. Critical minerals push: The Union government has launched a critical mineral mission, and a more predictable framework is meant to support that programme.

    Why do States read the amendment as an erosion of fiscal federalism?

    1. Loss of an affirmed revenue head: States moved to raise revenue from mining only after the Supreme Court affirmed that they could, and the amendment removes that opening.
    2. Concentration of dependence: For mineral rich States such as Odisha, Jharkhand and Chhattisgarh, revenue from this channel accounts for a significant share of non tax revenue.
    3. Narrow revenue base: State governments already have limited avenues to raise resources on their own, so each restriction on a taxing head weighs heavily.
    4. Arrears at stake: The right to recover arrears from 1 April 2005 represented a large one time accrual that the restriction places in doubt.
    5. Centre State friction: The apprehension is expressed as a concern about State revenues in particular and fiscal federalism in general, which needs to be addressed rather than assumed away.

    What does the tax burden on Indian mining actually look like?

    1. Effective tax rate: The effective tax rate in India is higher than 50 percent of revenues, according to a report on States’ Best Practices in Mining by FIMI-EY.
    2. Comparative burden: The same report places the effective rate in other countries at 35 to 40 percent of revenues.
    3. Cumulative structure: The Indian figure is the result of stacking royalty, auction premium, statutory contributions and State levies, and not of any single rate.
    4. Rationalisation as the fix: Rationalisation of taxes and royalties is presented as the step that would facilitate greater investor interest in the sector.

    What do cross country comparisons show, and how far does the evidence go?

    1. Limits of the source evidence: The comparison offered is a single aggregate figure of 35 to 40 percent, with no individual country named, so it establishes a gap rather than a model to copy.
    2. Australia: Mineral royalties are a State subject, and Western Australia levies ad valorem royalties on iron ore without a federal ceiling on State rates.
    3. Chile: The mining royalty law of 2023 combines an ad valorem component with a margin linked component on large copper producers, and caps the combined burden on a firm.
    4. South Africa: The Mineral and Petroleum Resources Royalty Act, 2008 sets a formula based royalty that moves with the producer’s profitability and with whether the mineral is refined.
    5. Canada: Mining taxes are levied by provinces such as Ontario and Quebec on mine profits, layered above federal corporate income tax.

    Why does the amendment set investor certainty against a judicially affirmed State right?

    1. Reversal of an outcome, not of a principle: The Court affirmed the competence of States under the Constitution, and Parliament has used its own competence to restrict the exercise of that power.
    2. Two legitimate claims: A predictable national mining framework is a genuine requirement for large, long gestation projects. A stable taxing head is a genuine requirement for a State with few own revenue sources.
    3. Uniformity has a price: Uniform mineral prices across States are achieved by removing the very differentiation that reflected each State’s own fiscal need.
    4. Arrears create the sharpest edge: The recovery window from 1 April 2005 was the largest single revenue expectation created by the ruling, and it is the first casualty of the restriction.
    5. Assurance without a mechanism: The assurance that States will keep the overwhelming share of mining revenue rests on royalty and statutory contributions whose rates the Centre alone fixes.

    Major debates surrounding the taxation of mineral rights

    1. Is royalty a tax: A seven judge Bench in India Cement Ltd. v. State of Tamil Nadu (1989) held royalty to be a tax, and a nine judge Bench in Mineral Area Development Authority v. Steel Authority of India (2024) held by an 8 to 1 majority that royalty is a contractual consideration and not a tax, restoring the States’ Entry 50 power.
    2. Legislative override: The dispute is whether a statute that removes a taxing power after a ruling is a permissible change in the legal basis or an impermissible override of a binding judgment under Article 141.
    3. Retrospective recovery: Recovery of arrears from 1 April 2005 raises the question of whether long settled project economics can be reopened, against the States’ claim to revenue already lawfully due.
    4. Uniformity versus autonomy: National price uniformity for major minerals is set against the constitutional design that lets a State calibrate levies to its own resource endowment.
    5. Compensation gap: There is no settled empirical answer on what mineral rich States lose in absolute terms, since the 14 State levies are not reported on a common basis across States.

    Challenges to the mineral concession framework after the amendment

    1. Revenue substitution for mineral States: States losing a taxing head have no equivalent replacement within their own competence. e.g. Odisha, which draws a large part of its non tax revenue from mining, has no comparable own source levy to fall back on.
    2. Litigation risk: A statute narrowing a power the Court affirmed invites a fresh constitutional challenge, prolonging exactly the uncertainty the amendment targets. e.g. the India Cement to Mineral Area Development Authority sequence ran for 35 years before a settled answer emerged.
    3. Auction premium distortion: Aggressive premium bidding in auctions inflates costs regardless of tax rationalisation. e.g. several iron ore blocks in Odisha were won at premiums exceeding 100 percent of sale value, squeezing operating margins.
    4. Exploration deficit: Rationalising levies does not fix the shortage of drilled and proved resources that investors actually need. e.g. India has explored only a small fraction of its obvious geological potential area despite the National Mineral Exploration Trust being funded since 2015.
    5. Clearance and land bottlenecks: Forest, environment and land acquisition delays, not levy rates, hold up most mine starts. e.g. blocks in the Hasdeo Arand coalfield in Chhattisgarh have stalled for years over forest clearance and Gram Sabha consent.
    6. District Mineral Foundation utilisation: Funds meant for mining affected communities remain unspent or diverted, weakening the social licence for expansion. e.g. DMF collections have exceeded Rs 1 lakh crore cumulatively, with large unspent balances reported in mineral rich districts.
    7. Critical mineral import dependence: Domestic levy reform does not address dependence on imported processed minerals. e.g. India imports the bulk of its lithium and cobalt requirements for battery manufacturing.

    Conclusion

    Parliament has restricted the States’ power to tax mineral rights and mineral bearing lands, undoing in law the revenue consequence of a ruling that had affirmed that power and allowed arrears from 1 April 2005. Investor certainty has been purchased with the tax autonomy of the States that hold the minerals, and the assurance that States keep the overwhelming share of mining revenue rests on rates the Centre alone sets. The measure has been passed by both Houses of Parliament; the source states no further date or next step beyond that stage. Resolving the resulting Centre State friction, not the levy structure alone, is what will determine whether the new framework actually attracts investment.

    Foundational Context: Mining in India

    1. Scale of the sector: India produces 95 minerals, covering fuel, metallic, non metallic, atomic and minor minerals, and mining contributes roughly 2.5 percent of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) including the associated quarrying activity.
    2. Global standing: India is among the world’s largest producers of coal, iron ore, bauxite, chromite and mica, and is the second largest coal producer globally.
    3. Ownership principle: Minerals vest in the State government where they occur, except in offshore areas and for atomic minerals, where they vest in the Union.
    4. Classification: Minerals are divided into major minerals and minor minerals, with minor minerals such as sand, ordinary clay and building stone regulated by State rules under Section 15 of the MMDR Act.
    5. Institutional set up: The Geological Survey of India (GSI) carries out regional exploration, the Indian Bureau of Mines (IBM) oversees conservation and scientific mining, and the Directorate General of Mines Safety (DGMS) regulates safety.

    Constitutional Framework Governing Mineral Taxation and Federal Finance

    1. Article 245: Sets the territorial extent of laws made by Parliament and by State legislatures.
    2. Article 246: Distributes legislative power across the three Lists of the Seventh Schedule.
    3. Entry 54, List I: Union control over the regulation of mines and mineral development to the extent declared by Parliament.
    4. Entry 23, List II: State power over regulation of mines and mineral development, subject to Entry 54 of List I.
    5. Entry 50, List II: State power to tax mineral rights, subject to limitations imposed by Parliament by a law relating to mineral development.
    6. Entry 49, List II: State power to tax lands and buildings.
    7. Article 141: Makes the law declared by the Supreme Court binding on all courts within India.
    8. Article 265: Bars levy or collection of any tax except by authority of law.
    9. Article 280: Provides for the Finance Commission, which recommends the sharing of Union taxes with the States.

    Laws and Rules Governing Mining in India

    1. Mines and Minerals (Development and Regulation) Act, 1957: The parent statute for mineral concessions and mineral development.
    2. Second Schedule: Fixes royalty rates for major minerals centrally.
    3. Section 15: Empowers States to make rules for minor mineral concessions.
    4. MMDR Amendment Act, 2015: Introduced auction as the sole route for granting major mineral concessions.
    5. Section 9B and Section 9C: Created the District Mineral Foundation for mining affected communities and the National Mineral Exploration Trust for exploration funding.
    6. MMDR Amendment Act, 2021: Removed the distinction between captive and merchant mines and eased the transfer of mineral concessions.
    7. MMDR Amendment Act, 2023: Created the exploration licence for deep seated minerals and empowered the Centre to exclusively auction 24 critical and strategic minerals.
    8. MMDR Amendment Act, 2025: Widened support for critical mineral recovery, including recovery from mine waste and tailings.
    9. Mines Act, 1952: Governs the health, safety and working conditions of persons employed in mines.
    10. Offshore Areas Mineral (Development and Regulation) Act, 2002: Regulates mineral development in India’s territorial waters and exclusive economic zone.
    11. Mineral Conservation and Development Rules, 2017: Prescribe scientific mining, conservation and mine closure obligations.
    12. Minerals (Evidence of Mineral Contents) Rules, 2015 and Mineral (Auction) Rules, 2015: Govern the exploration thresholds and the auction procedure for major minerals.

    Back2Basics: National Critical Mineral Mission

    1. What it is: A central mission to build self reliance across the critical mineral value chain, from exploration and mining to processing, recycling and recovery from waste.
    2. Approved: By the Union Cabinet in January 2025.
    3. Administering ministry: The Ministry of Mines.
    4. Duration: Covers the period from 2024-25 to 2030-31.
    5. Outlay: An outlay of about Rs 16,300 crore, with a further expected investment of about Rs 18,000 crore by public sector undertakings and other agencies.
    6. Exploration target: A large programme of exploration projects by the Geological Survey of India within India, along with exploration in offshore areas.
    7. Overseas component: Acquisition of critical mineral assets abroad by Indian public and private entities, supported by trade and diplomatic engagement.
    8. Circularity component: Promotion of recycling of end of life products and recovery of critical minerals from mine tailings and overburden.
    9. Stockpiling: Creation of a stockpile of critical minerals to insulate domestic industry from supply disruption.
    10. Regulatory support: Fast tracking of regulatory approvals for critical mineral projects, alongside the exclusive Central auction of the notified critical and strategic minerals.

    Government Initiatives

    1. National Critical Mineral Mission: Secures the critical mineral supply chain through domestic exploration, overseas asset acquisition, recycling and stockpiling under the Ministry of Mines.
    2. National Mineral Policy, 2019: Sets the policy framework for sustainable mining, exploration incentives and a transparent auction regime.
    3. Star Rating of Mines: A self assessment and verification system run by the Indian Bureau of Mines rating mines on scientific mining and sustainability parameters.
    4. Pradhan Mantri Khanij Kshetra Kalyan Yojana (PMKKKY): Implemented through District Mineral Foundations to fund drinking water, health, education and livelihood works in mining affected districts.
    5. National Geoscience Data Repository and the exploration licence regime: Open access geoscience data and a dedicated licence to draw private explorers into deep seated mineral search.

    Key Facts about Indian Mining

    1. Ministry: The Ministry of Mines administers the MMDR Act, other than for coal, lignite, petroleum, natural gas and atomic minerals.
    2. Critical minerals list: India notified a list of 30 critical minerals in 2023, of which 24 are auctioned exclusively by the Centre.
    3. District Mineral Foundation contribution: Lessees contribute 10 percent of royalty for concessions granted after 12 January 2015 and 30 percent for earlier concessions.
    4. National Mineral Exploration Trust contribution: Set at 2 percent of royalty paid by the lessee.
    5. Geological Survey of India: Established in 1851, headquartered at Kolkata, and the principal agency for regional mineral exploration.

    Challenges in the Mining Sector

    1. Long clearance timelines: A block cleared at auction still waits years for forest, environment and consent approvals. e.g. bauxite mining in the Niyamgiri hills of Odisha was halted after Gram Sabhas exercised their veto under forest rights law.
    2. Illegal mining: Unregulated extraction of minor minerals erodes State revenue and damages river systems. e.g. sand mining in the Yamuna and Sone river beds has repeatedly drawn National Green Tribunal intervention.
    3. Rehabilitation deficit: Displacement from large mines is inadequately compensated and land losers rarely regain livelihoods. e.g. displacement in the Talcher and Ib Valley coalfields of Odisha has produced long running resettlement disputes.
    4. Mine safety: Accidents in underground and rat hole operations continue despite the Mines Act framework. e.g. the Ksan mine flooding in Meghalaya in December 2018 trapped and killed rat hole miners in an illegal coal pit.
    5. Low value addition: India exports raw and semi processed ore and imports finished products. e.g. iron ore fines are exported while high grade steel inputs are imported back.
    6. Exploration underinvestment: Private participation in greenfield exploration remains thin despite the exploration licence. e.g. only a small share of India’s obvious geological potential area has been explored in detail.
    7. Import dependence in critical minerals: Processing capacity, not deposits alone, is the binding constraint. e.g. India relies on imports for nearly all its rare earth magnet requirements.

    Way Forward

    1. Institutionalise Centre State consultation on levies: Route mineral levy changes through a standing Centre State forum so that revenue impacts are quantified before a restriction is legislated.
    2. Publish a common levy dashboard: Report the 14 State levies on a uniform basis so that the effective tax rate claim of over 50 percent of revenues can be verified block by block.
    3. Compensate the transition: Provide a time bound, formula based transfer to mineral rich States for the revenue head withdrawn, on the model used for other tax transitions.
    4. Rationalise auction premium: Cap or stagger premium payments so that the auction price, rather than the tax rate, stops inflating the delivered cost of minerals.
    5. Front load exploration: Expand National Mineral Exploration Trust funded drilling and release geoscience data before auction so that bids reflect proved resources.
    6. Ring fence District Mineral Foundation spending: Enforce end use audit of DMF funds on drinking water, health and education in mining affected districts to rebuild the social licence for expansion.

    “[2025] Consider the following statements:
    Statement I: In India, State Governments have no power for making rules for grant of concessions in respect of extraction of minor minerals even though such minerals are located in their territories.
    Statement II: In India, the Central Government has the power to notify minor minerals under the relevant law.
    Which one of the following is correct in respect of the above statements?
    (a) Both Statement I and Statement II are correct and Statement II explains Statement I
    (b) Both Statement I and Statement II are correct but Statement II does not explain Statement I
    (c) Statement I is correct but Statement II is not correct
    (d) Statement I is not correct but Statement II is correct

  • ID cards issued to transgender persons remain valid: Centre

    Why in the News

    The Union government assured a three judge Bench of the Supreme Court that transgender identity cards issued before the Transgender Persons (Protection of Rights) Amendment Act, 2026 came into force continue to remain valid. The assurance was given in a challenge arguing that the amendment, in force since 30 March, dismantles the right to self identification recognised in the National Legal Services Authority v Union of India (2014) line of cases. The dispute turns on whether gender identity is declared by the person or certified by the State.

    What is the Transgender Persons (Protection of Rights) Amendment Act, 2026?

    1. About: It amends the Transgender Persons (Protection of Rights) Act, 2019, the statute that governs recognition of transgender identity and the certificate of identity issued to a transgender person.
    2. Commencement: It came into force on 30 March 2026.
    3. Core objection to it: Petitioners argue that it dismantles the right to self identification and gives the State unfettered authority to determine gender identity.
    4. Status of earlier cards: The Solicitor General assured the Court that identity cards issued before the amendment remain valid, and their validity is unaffected by the new law.
    5. Judicial position so far: The Court had already indicated in the previous hearing that the 2026 law should not operate retrospectively to invalidate cards issued under the earlier legislation.
    6. Forum: The challenge is before a three judge Bench headed by the Chief Justice of India.

    What is self identification of gender?

    1. About: Self identification is the principle that a person’s gender is determined by that person’s own declaration of identity, without any requirement of medical examination or third party certification.
    2. Legal origin in India: The Supreme Court recognised it in National Legal Services Authority v Union of India (2014), holding that the right to determine one’s gender is integral to dignity under Article 21.

    What is a transgender identity card?

    1. About: A certificate of identity issued to a transgender person that provides official recognition of the person’s self identified gender.
    2. Practical use: It is used to support changes to name and gender across official records, and the government’s transgender portal expressly enables such changes.

    What is the current status of gender identity recognition in India?

    1. Statutory basis: Recognition runs through the certificate of identity issued under the Transgender Persons (Protection of Rights) Act, 2019 and the rules made under it.
    2. Application route: An application is made to the District Magistrate, who issues a certificate of identity as a transgender person and a revised certificate after gender affirming surgery.
    3. Third gender status: Transgender persons are recognised as a third gender for the purposes of state welfare and identity documents.
    4. Prohibition of discrimination: The 2019 Act bars discrimination in education, employment, healthcare, access to public goods and the right to residence.
    5. Reservation position: No reservation in education or public employment has been extended to transgender persons as a class, despite the direction in the 2014 judgment to treat them as socially and educationally backward.
    6. Position after the amendment: The 2026 Amendment Act is in force from 30 March 2026, and its validity is under challenge before a three judge Bench.
    7. Position of existing card holders: Cards issued before the amendment continue to remain valid on the government’s own assurance to the Court.

    Constitutional Provisions Related to gender identity

    1. Article 14: Guarantees equality before the law and equal protection of the laws to every person, not only to men and women.
    2. Article 15: Prohibits discrimination on grounds of religion, race, caste, sex or place of birth, with sex read to include gender identity.
    3. Article 16: Guarantees equality of opportunity in matters of public employment and permits reservation for backward classes.
    4. Article 19(1)(a): Protects freedom of expression, which includes expression of gender identity through dress, speech and behaviour.
    5. Article 21: Guarantees life and personal liberty, read to include dignity, personal autonomy and the right to determine one’s gender.
    6. Article 15(4) and Article 16(4): Permit special provisions and reservation for socially and educationally backward classes, the route directed in the 2014 judgment.
    7. Article 32: Provides the remedy through which the present challenge to the amendment has been brought.
    8. Article 23: Prohibits trafficking and forced labour, relevant to the exploitation the community faces in the absence of livelihood options.

    What did the National Legal Services Authority judgment establish?

    1. Recognition of a third gender: The Supreme Court held in April 2014 that transgender persons must be recognised as a third gender for the purposes of law.
    2. Right to self identification: It held that the gender to which a person belongs is to be determined by that person’s own identification and not by biological or medical criteria.
    3. Constitutional grounding: It located the right in Articles 14, 15, 16, 19(1)(a) and 21, treating gender identity as an aspect of dignity and personal autonomy.
    4. Backward class direction: It directed the Centre and the States to treat transgender persons as socially and educationally backward for the purposes of reservation.
    5. Positive obligations: It directed provision of separate public toilets, medical facilities, welfare schemes and measures to address social stigma.
    6. The wider line of cases: Puttaswamy v Union of India (2017) recognised privacy and decisional autonomy, Navtej Singh Johar v Union of India (2018) decriminalised consensual same sex relations, and Arunkumar v Inspector General of Registration (2019) upheld the marriage rights of a transgender person.

    What do the petitioners argue against the 2026 amendment?

    1. Loss of self determination: The amendment allows the State unfettered authority to determine gender identity, displacing the person’s own declaration.
    2. Conflict with binding precedent: Self identification was recognised as a constitutional right in 2014, and a statute cannot narrow a right located in Article 21.
    3. Value of existing documents: The importance of transgender identity cards already issued cannot be trifled away, since name and gender across official records depend on them.
    4. Retrospective effect: Any reading that invalidates earlier cards would strip recognition already granted under a previous legislation.
    5. Who is before the Court: The petitioners include community members and activists, so the challenge is brought by the group the law regulates.

    Can the State certify gender identity without displacing the right to determine it?

    1. Two claims in tension: The State has an interest in a verifiable identity document, and the individual has a constitutional right to declare gender without external validation.
    2. Where certification becomes control: A certificate that records a declaration is administrative, and a certificate that decides the declaration is determinative of the right itself.
    3. Documentary dependence: Name and gender in every other official record follow from the certificate, so control over the certificate is control over legal personality.
    4. Precedent against statute: The right was recognised through Article 21 in 2014, and the amendment operates on the same subject through ordinary legislation.
    5. The retrospectivity carve out: Protecting existing cards resolves the immediate hardship of current holders and leaves the question of future applicants untouched.
    6. The unresolved core: The assurance settles who keeps a card already issued, not who will be entitled to one under the amended procedure.

    Major debates surrounding gender self identification

    1. Declaration against certification: Whether recognition should follow a self declaration or require screening by a district authority.
    2. Medicalisation of identity: Whether any surgical or medical requirement for a revised certificate is consistent with autonomy under Article 21.
    3. Appeal and remedy: Whether refusal of a certificate by a District Magistrate should carry a statutory appeal, which the 2019 Act was criticised for omitting.
    4. Reservation for transgender persons: Whether the 2014 direction to treat the community as socially and educationally backward requires a horizontal reservation across categories.
    5. Penalty asymmetry: Whether the lower punishment for sexual violence against transgender persons under the 2019 Act compared with the general criminal law is constitutionally sustainable.
    6. Family and residence: Whether the requirement to reside with the natal family or in a rehabilitation centre respects the autonomy of adults who leave hostile homes.
    7. Data and enumeration: Whether recognition can be operationalised at all without accurate population data, since the last enumeration of the community was in Census 2011.

    Challenges to the transgender rights framework

    1. Certification bottleneck: Recognition depends on a single district officer with no statutory appeal against refusal. e.g. applicants under the Transgender Persons (Protection of Rights) Rules, 2020 have reported long delays in issue of the certificate of identity.
    2. Absence of reservation: The 2014 direction on backward class status has not been operationalised at the national level. e.g. Karnataka became the first State to provide a one per cent reservation in public employment in 2021, and most States have not followed.
    3. Weak penalty structure: Offences against transgender persons carry lower punishment than equivalent offences in the general criminal law. e.g. the 2019 Act prescribes six months to two years for sexual abuse of a transgender person.
    4. Healthcare exclusion: Gender affirming care and mental health support are unevenly available and rarely insured. e.g. Ayushman Bharat TG Plus was created precisely because transgender persons were excluded from mainstream health coverage.
    5. Livelihood and employment: Discrimination pushes the community towards begging and sex work despite a statutory bar on discrimination. e.g. the SMILE scheme’s livelihood component was designed to move persons out of begging.
    6. Documentation mismatch: Records in education certificates, bank accounts and property documents do not update automatically after a change in gender. e.g. the government’s transgender portal exists specifically to enable name and gender changes across records.
    7. Data invisibility: Policy runs on a 2011 count with no subsequent enumeration. e.g. Census 2011 recorded 4.88 lakh transgender persons, a figure widely regarded as an undercount.

    Conclusion

    The assurance protects existing card holders and leaves the constitutional question untouched, since the dispute is about whether gender identity is declared or certified. The Transgender Persons (Protection of Rights) Amendment Act, 2026 remains in force from 30 March 2026, and its validity is pending before a three judge Bench of the Supreme Court on a challenge grounded in the 2014 line of cases. The Court has recorded that the law should not operate retrospectively and the government has accepted that position on the record. The source names no next date for the hearing, so the stage reached is the government’s undertaking and the pending challenge.

    [2024] Under which of the following Articles of the Constitution of India, has the Supreme Court of India placed the Right to Privacy?
    (a) Article 15
    (b) Article 16
    (c) Article 19
    (d) Article 21

  • The Centre-states tussle over the Mines and Minerals Bill

    Why in the News

    Parliament passed the Mines and Minerals (Development and Regulation) Amendment Bill, 2026 last week, barring States from imposing specified levies on mineral rights and on mineral bearing land. The bar removes the very taxing power the Supreme Court had affirmed for States on 25 July 2024. Mineral bearing States say the change strips out a revenue stream they control fully, while the Centre says uncapped State levies raise the cost of minerals for the whole economy.

    What is the Mines and Minerals (Development and Regulation) Amendment Bill, 2026?

    1. About: It amends the Mines and Minerals (Development and Regulation) Act, 1957, the parent law governing grant of mineral concessions and regulation of mines.
    2. Core bar: It restricts States from imposing specified levies on mineral rights and on mineral bearing land.
    3. Extinguishment of past dues: It wipes out unpaid or unrecovered dues arising from such levies imposed before the amendment comes into force.
    4. Scale of the dues: Estimates place outstanding dues of this kind across the mining sector at about Rs 2 lakh crore.
    5. Ceiling design: Mines Ministry officials state that about 14 levies in the mineral sector will survive, subject to a combined percentage ceiling.
    6. Stated purpose: The Centre frames the measure as fiscal certainty for mining companies over their total statutory burden.

    What is royalty on minerals?

    1. About: Royalty is the payment a lease holder makes to the State government for every unit of mineral extracted under a mining lease.
    2. Who fixes it: Rates are specified in the Schedules to the Mines and Minerals (Development and Regulation) Act, 1957 and revised by the Union government, not by the State that receives the money.

    What is the District Mineral Foundation?

    1. About: A non profit trust set up in every mining affected district, funded by a statutory contribution from lease holders, created by the 2015 amendment.
    2. Use of funds: Money is spent on people and areas affected by mining under the Pradhan Mantri Khanij Kshetra Kalyan Yojana.

    What is the National Mineral Exploration Trust?

    1. About: A trust created by the 2015 amendment and funded by a contribution equal to 2 per cent of royalty paid by lease holders.
    2. Use of funds: It finances regional and detailed mineral exploration through accredited agencies.

    What is the current status of State powers to tax mineral rights in India?

    1. Judicial position: A nine judge Constitution Bench held on 25 July 2024 that States hold legislative competence to tax mineral rights and mineral bearing land.
    2. Precedent overruled: That ruling overruled India Cement Ltd v State of Tamil Nadu (1989), which had treated royalty as a tax and placed the subject beyond State competence.
    3. Statutory position now: The 2026 amendment bars the specified levies, so a power the Court restored stands narrowed by ordinary legislation.
    4. Levies that survive: About 14 levies continue, including environmental and pollution cesses, subject to a combined ceiling still to be fixed.
    5. Centrally fixed payments: Royalty, District Mineral Foundation contributions and National Mineral Exploration Trust contributions remain set under central law.
    6. Effect on accrued claims: Levies imposed before commencement lose their recoverability, so demands already raised become unenforceable.

    Constitutional Provisions Related to taxation of mineral rights

    1. Article 246: Distributes legislative power between Parliament and State legislatures through the three lists of the Seventh Schedule.
    2. Entry 54, Union List: Regulation of mines and mineral development to the extent Parliament declares expedient in the public interest.
    3. Entry 23, State List: Regulation of mines and mineral development, expressly subject to Entry 54 of the Union List.
    4. Entry 49, State List: Taxes on lands and buildings, the entry States have relied on for a mineral bearing land cess.
    5. Entry 50, State List: Taxes on mineral rights, subject to any limitations imposed by Parliament by law relating to mineral development.
    6. Article 265: Bars the levy or collection of any tax except by authority of law.
    7. Article 300A: Bars deprivation of property save by authority of law, the provision invoked when accrued statutory dues are extinguished.
    8. Article 39(b): Directs the State to ensure that ownership and control of material resources are distributed to subserve the common good.

    Why does the 25 July 2024 ruling sit at the centre of the dispute?

    1. What was decided: The Court upheld the power of States to tax mineral rights and mineral bearing land as a distinct field from royalty.
    2. What was overruled: The 1989 India Cement position, that royalty is itself a tax, had blocked States from taxing the same subject for 35 years.
    3. What States did next: Several mineral bearing States began framing fresh cesses on mineral bearing land after the judgment.
    4. What the Centre saw: Mines Ministry officials describe the resulting levies as excessive cesses stacked on top of existing statutory payments.
    5. How Parliament responded: The amendment uses the limitation power built into Entry 50 to restrict what the Court had permitted.

    Why do mineral bearing States say the Bill damages their finances?

    1. Dependence on mining: Mining revenue accounted for about 84.9 per cent of Jharkhand’s own non tax revenue in the 2024 to 2025 financial year.
    2. Forgone cess: The Mineral Bearing Land Cess was expected to yield about Rs 11,000 crore a year for Jharkhand alone.
    3. Dues written off: Outstanding dues across the mining sector estimated at about Rs 2 lakh crore cease to be recoverable.
    4. Fiscal capacity argument: The Jharkhand Chief Minister wrote to the Prime Minister that mineral revenues are a critical component of the State’s fiscal capacity and not marginal receipts.
    5. Federal objection: The Kerala Chief Minister has raised concerns over the implications of the amendment for India’s federal structure.
    6. Political response: Jharkhand has threatened protests against the amendments.

    What is the Centre’s case for restricting State levies?

    1. Cost of key minerals: Unchecked State levies raise mineral prices and feed into inflation and infrastructure costs.
    2. Predictability for industry: A single combined ceiling gives mining companies certainty over their total fiscal burden across States.
    3. Cumulative burden: Companies already pay royalty, District Mineral Foundation and National Mineral Exploration Trust contributions and environmental and pollution cesses.
    4. The largest single addition: Industry assessment identifies the mineral bearing land tax as the biggest additional burden of the recent levies.
    5. A ceiling, not abolition: About 14 levies survive, with the combined percentage to be fixed after consulting all States.
    6. Limited realised loss: Industry view holds that most of these levies were legally contested for decades, so little was actually collected.

    Does fiscal certainty for industry justify overriding a power the Court has just affirmed?

    1. Two legitimate claims: Investment certainty in a capital heavy sector sits against the fiscal autonomy of the States that hold the minerals.
    2. A judicial gain reversed: States won the power in 2024 and lost its practical use in 2026 without any change in the constitutional text.
    3. The retrospective element: Extinguishing accrued dues removes revenue already claimed, which goes further than limiting future levies.
    4. Sequence of consultation: The ceiling is to be fixed after the bar is enacted, so States negotiate the number after losing their leverage.
    5. Who gains and who pays: The saving accrues to mining companies and mineral consuming States, the loss falls on a small group of mineral bearing States.
    6. Cost borne locally: Land loss, displacement and pollution stay with the producing State even after its claim on the rent is narrowed.

    Major debates surrounding taxation of mineral rights

    1. Royalty as tax or as consideration: India Cement treated royalty as a tax, the 2024 ruling treated it as contractual consideration, and that classification decides State competence.
    2. Reach of the Entry 50 limitation: How far Parliament may hollow out a State taxing entry through a limitation clause remains legally contested.
    3. Recovery of past dues: The 2024 ruling allowed staggered recovery of past demands, the amendment extinguishes them outright.
    4. Producer against consumer States: Mineral bearing States argue they carry the ecological and social cost while value addition and tax revenue accrue elsewhere.
    5. Cooperative against unilateral federalism: The Centre frames the change as integration of a national market, States frame it as unilateral action on their own revenue base.
    6. Deepening vertical fiscal imbalance: Non tax mineral revenue is one of the few sources States control fully, so its removal raises dependence on central transfers.

    Challenges to the Mines and Minerals Amendment Bill

    1. Litigation risk: States can challenge the bar and the extinguishment of accrued dues as a colourable exercise of legislative power. e.g. Jharkhand and Kerala both registered formal objections within days of the Bill’s passage in August 2026.
    2. Concentrated revenue shock: A small set of States carries almost the entire loss. e.g. Odisha and Jharkhand together account for the bulk of India’s iron ore and coal output.
    3. Undecided ceiling: The combined percentage is unfixed at the point of enactment, leaving States unable to plan budgets. e.g. the Mines Ministry states only that the figure will follow consultation with all States.
    4. Weak district level spending: Money already collected for mining affected areas is poorly used. e.g. audits have repeatedly flagged large unspent District Mineral Foundation balances in mining districts.
    5. Unpriced ecological damage: Removing land based levies weakens the price signal for land degradation. e.g. the Shah Commission findings preceded the suspension of iron ore mining in Goa in 2012.
    6. Certainty alone does not unlock supply: Fiscal predictability does not resolve clearance and land bottlenecks. e.g. several auctioned coal blocks remain unoperationalised for want of forest clearance.
    7. Weak consultation machinery: Resource disputes between the Union and States lack a standing forum for settlement. e.g. the Inter State Council has met only rarely since its creation in 1990.

    Conclusion

    The dispute is about who captures the rent from a fixed natural resource, not about the rate of any single cess. Parliament has passed the Mines and Minerals (Development and Regulation) Amendment Bill, 2026, and the measure now moves to Presidential assent and commencement. The next concrete step named by the Mines Ministry is fixing the combined percentage ceiling on the roughly 14 surviving levies after consulting all States. Until that ceiling is notified, mineral bearing States carry a quantified loss against an unquantified entitlement.

    “[2025, GS2, 15 marks] Examine the evolving pattern of Centre-State financial relations in the context of planned development in India. How far have the recent reforms impacted the fiscal federalism in India?”

  • Can SHANTI Act override court on compensation for nuclear disasters, asks SC

    Why in the News

    A three judge Bench of the Supreme Court issued notice to the Union government and the Atomic Energy Regulatory Board (AERB) on whether the Sustainable Harnessing and Advancement of Nuclear Energy for Transforming India (SHANTI) Act, 2025 can bar constitutional courts from awarding fair compensation to victims of a nuclear accident. The Act caps operator and government liability and exempts suppliers, which sets a statutory ceiling against the constitutional power to award damages for a legal wrong. The Bench also asked whether Section 17(4), which lets the government appoint the AERB Chairperson and Members, creates a conflict of interest.

    What is the SHANTI Act, 2025?

    1. About: The Sustainable Harnessing and Advancement of Nuclear Energy for Transforming India (SHANTI) Act, 2025 is the statute that replaced the Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage Act, 2010 as the law governing liability for nuclear damage in India.
    2. Core function: It fixes who pays for a nuclear accident, how much they pay, and the outer financial limit of that obligation.
    3. Operator ceiling: Liability of the largest plant operator in India is capped at Rs 3,000 crore.
    4. Government residual liability: The Union government’s residual liability is capped at 300 million Special Drawing Rights, stated in the proceedings as about Rs 4,500 crore.
    5. Supplier position: Suppliers, manufacturers and similar entities are exempted from liability under the Act.
    6. Regulatory provision: Section 17(4) vests in the government the power to appoint the Chairperson and Members of the AERB.

    What are Special Drawing Rights (SDRs)?

    1. About: Special Drawing Rights are an international reserve asset created by the International Monetary Fund (IMF), whose value is set by a basket of major currencies.
    2. Use here: Nuclear liability ceilings are expressed in SDRs because international nuclear liability conventions use the unit, which keeps the ceiling insulated from movement in any single national currency.

    What is the doctrine of absolute liability?

    1. About: Absolute liability holds an enterprise carrying on a hazardous activity fully liable for harm caused by that activity, with no exceptions and no ceiling on the amount.
    2. Origin: The Supreme Court laid it down in the oleum gas leak case, M.C. Mehta v Union of India (1987), rejecting the older English rule that allowed defences such as an act of a stranger.
    3. Relevance to the case: The petitioners argue that capping the liability of a nuclear operator directly contradicts this settled principle.

    What is channelling of liability?

    1. About: Channelling means directing all legal liability for a nuclear accident to one named party, the operator, so that victims sue a single identified entity instead of tracing fault across the supply chain.
    2. The trade off: Channelling gives victims a quick and certain defendant, and it simultaneously insulates equipment suppliers from any claim for a defective part.

    Who is the Atomic Energy Regulatory Board (AERB)?

    1. About: The AERB is the national regulator for radiation and nuclear safety, constituted in 1983 under the powers of the Atomic Energy Act, 1962.
    2. Mandate: It frames safety codes, licenses nuclear installations and enforces radiation safety across nuclear and non nuclear users of radioactive material.
    3. Structural feature: It is a body created by executive notification rather than by a standalone statute, and it reports to the Atomic Energy Commission.

    What exactly did the Supreme Court ask?

    1. The compensation question: The Bench asked whether the statutory thresholds in the SHANTI Act preclude constitutional courts from determining a fair and just compensation after a nuclear mishap.
    2. The reasoning offered: The Chief Justice of India observed that a constitutional court can always grant suitable compensation against a legal tort, and that a cap imposed by Parliament does not by itself bar the courts.
    3. The regulator question: The Bench separately asked whether the power under Section 17(4) to appoint the AERB Chairperson and Members creates a conflict of interest.
    4. Parties noticed: Notice was issued to the Union government and the AERB on both issues.
    5. The petition: The challenge is to the provisions limiting the liability of operators, suppliers and manufacturers of nuclear installations.

    Why do the petitioners say the caps are inadequate?

    1. The Chernobyl comparison: The loss from the Chernobyl nuclear disaster has been estimated at between $235 billion and $700 billion.
    2. The Fukushima comparison: Cleanup costs at the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant accident of 2011 in Japan have been estimated at approximately $400 billion to $445 billion.
    3. The mismatch: Against these magnitudes, the Act caps the largest Indian operator’s liability at Rs 3,000 crore.
    4. The residual cap: The government’s residual liability of 300 million Special Drawing Rights was described as ensuring that victims of death, injury or property damage cannot recover even a small fraction of actual losses.
    5. The supplier exemption: Exempting suppliers from any liability is argued to encourage manufacturers and suppliers to maximise profit without bearing accident risk.

    How does a liability cap change operator behaviour?

    1. The moral hazard argument: A known ceiling converts an unlimited risk into a budgeted cost, so the incentive to spend beyond that ceiling on safety falls away.
    2. The submission made: Petitioners argued that unless the court states that the liability of operators, suppliers and the government will be judicially determined regardless of the cap, operators and suppliers will cut corners that endanger lives.
    3. The precedent invoked: Indian law has held that a person running a hazardous industry bears absolute and unlimited liability for an accident arising from it.
    4. The claimed violation: Petitioners submitted that this principle has been clearly violated by the statutory ceiling.
    5. Concentration of exposure: With suppliers exempt and the operator capped, the residual cost of a large accident falls on the exchequer and on victims.

    Why is the regulator’s independence in question?

    1. Appointment power: Section 17(4) gives the government the power to appoint the Chairperson and Members of the AERB, and the government is also the promoter of nuclear power in India.
    2. Operator and regulator overlap: The AERB itself has a role connected to nuclear plants while also playing a significant role in regulating them.
    3. International benchmark: Petitioners submitted that this arrangement violates the principle of independence of the regulatory body laid down in international conventions.
    4. Long standing criticism: The absence of a statutorily independent nuclear regulator has been flagged in India for over a decade, including by the Comptroller and Auditor General.
    5. Consequence: A regulator dependent on the promoter for appointments has weaker authority to halt or penalise a plant it supervises.

    Does a liability cap serve investment or does it shift risk to victims?

    1. The investment rationale: The court observed that the limit may exist only to make the nuclear project more attractive to foreign investors.
    2. The counter position: Petitioners argued that investment should not come at the cost of the safety of thousands of lives.
    3. The design logic of caps: Nuclear vendors demand a liability ceiling because unlimited exposure makes an insurance market for the risk impossible to build.
    4. The distributional effect: A cap does not reduce the cost of an accident, it decides who absorbs the part of the cost above the ceiling.
    5. The constitutional question this raises: The dispute is whether Parliament can, by fixing a financial ceiling, foreclose the remedy a constitutional court can grant under Article 32 or Article 226.

    What alternative did the petitioners place before the court?

    1. Solar potential: The government’s own assessment puts India’s solar power potential at 3,343 gigawatts (GW) using 6 per cent of wasteland.
    2. Scale comparison: That potential is 14 times India’s peak power demand of 256 GW.
    3. Build time: Solar capacity can be built in about three months, against the multi year construction cycle of a nuclear plant.
    4. Cost comparison: The per unit cost of solar power was stated as one fifth that of nuclear energy.
    5. Risk comparison: Solar generation carries no comparable accident hazard, so it raises no liability question at all.

    Challenges to the SHANTI Act, 2025 framework

    1. Insurance market depth: The Indian Nuclear Insurance Pool has limited capacity, so even the capped liability may not be fully insurable domestically. e.g. the pool set up in 2015 was capitalised at only about Rs 1,500 crore at inception.
    2. Supplier exemption and quality control: Removing supplier liability weakens the commercial incentive to guarantee component quality. e.g. the supplier recourse clause of the 2010 law was the reason foreign vendors stayed away from Jaitapur and Kovvada for over a decade.
    3. Claims administration capacity: A nuclear claims process needs medical registries and long term follow up that India has struggled to sustain. e.g. Bhopal gas leak claims took decades of adjudication and revision of the settlement figure.
    4. Absence of a statutory regulator: The AERB derives authority from executive notification rather than its own Act. e.g. the Nuclear Safety Regulatory Authority Bill, 2011 lapsed and was never re enacted.
    5. Land acquisition and local consent: New reactor sites face sustained local opposition that liability caps do not address. e.g. the protests at Kudankulam delayed commissioning of the first unit by several years.
    6. Radioactive waste management: India has no operating deep geological repository for high level waste. e.g. spent fuel from operating reactors is stored on site in pools and in away from reactor storage facilities.
    7. Private entry and accountability: Opening the sector to private operators multiplies the number of entities whose safety culture the regulator must supervise. e.g. the sector so far has been run almost entirely by the Nuclear Power Corporation of India Limited and its joint ventures.

    Conclusion

    The dispute is whether a statutory financial ceiling can displace the constitutional power of a court to award compensation for a legal wrong. The Act does not reduce the cost of a nuclear accident, it decides who bears the part of that cost above the ceiling, and at present that is the victim and the exchequer. The measure has reached the stage of an enacted and operating law facing a constitutional challenge, having already replaced the Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage Act, 2010. The next milestone is the response of the Union government and the AERB to the notice issued on the compensation and Section 17(4) questions.

    Nuclear Energy in India

    1. About: Nuclear energy is generated by fission of heavy nuclei such as uranium 235 and plutonium 239, releasing heat that raises steam to drive a turbine.
    2. Three stage programme: India follows a three stage programme designed by the founder of its atomic energy programme, moving from pressurised heavy water reactors, to fast breeder reactors, to thorium based reactors.
    3. Resource logic: The design exists because India has modest uranium reserves and among the world’s largest thorium reserves, concentrated in the monazite sands of Kerala, Tamil Nadu and Odisha.
    4. Installed base: India operates around 24 nuclear power reactors with an installed capacity of about 8.18 GW, contributing roughly 3 per cent of total electricity generation.
    5. Stated target: The government has set a target of 100 GW of nuclear capacity by 2047 as part of the energy transition plan.
    6. Institutional structure: The Department of Atomic Energy administers the sector, NPCIL builds and operates plants, and the AERB regulates safety.
    7. Global position: India is among the few countries operating a closed fuel cycle with reprocessing, and it operates outside the Nuclear Non Proliferation Treaty while holding a safeguards agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency.

    Constitutional and Statutory Framework Governing Nuclear Liability

    1. Entry 6 of the Union List: Places atomic energy and mineral resources necessary for its production exclusively with Parliament.
    2. Article 21: Guarantees the right to life, read to include a right to compensation for violation caused by a hazardous activity.
    3. Article 32: Empowers the Supreme Court to issue writs and award compensation for violation of fundamental rights.
    4. Article 226: Gives High Courts a parallel and wider writ power, including the award of compensation in public law.
    5. Article 48A and Article 51A(g): Direct the State and citizens respectively to protect and improve the environment.
    6. Article 253: Enables Parliament to legislate to implement international conventions, the basis for aligning Indian liability law with the Convention on Supplementary Compensation.
    7. Article 246 with Entry 13 of the Union List: Covers participation in international conferences and implementation of decisions taken there.

    Laws and Rules Governing Nuclear Energy in India

    1. Atomic Energy Act, 1962: Gives the Union exclusive control over atomic minerals, production and use of atomic energy, and the licensing of nuclear installations.
    2. Atomic Energy (Radiation Protection) Rules, 2004: Set radiation dose limits and licensing conditions for radiation facilities.
    3. Atomic Energy (Factories) Rules, 1996: Govern safety in factories handling radioactive material.
    4. Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage Act, 2010: Created a no fault liability regime channelled to the operator, with a right of recourse against the supplier.
    5. Section 17(b): Allowed the operator recourse against a supplier for a patent or latent defect, the clause foreign vendors objected to.
    6. Sustainable Harnessing and Advancement of Nuclear Energy for Transforming India (SHANTI) Act, 2025: Replaced the 2010 Act, capped operator and government liability and exempted suppliers.
    7. Draft rules under the Act: Released by the Department of Atomic Energy for public comment, with the comment window closing on 4 September 2026.
    8. Environment (Protection) Act, 1986: Provides the environmental clearance and pollution control regime applicable to nuclear installations.
    9. Disaster Management Act, 2005: Places nuclear and radiological emergencies within the national disaster response framework.
    10. Convention on Supplementary Compensation for Nuclear Damage: Ratified by India in 2016, providing a tier of international funds after national compensation is exhausted.

    Back2Basics: Atomic Energy Regulatory Board (AERB)

    1. Governing Act: Constituted under the powers conferred by the Atomic Energy Act, 1962.
    2. Year established: 1983, by an executive order of the Government of India.
    3. Headquarters: Mumbai.
    4. Reporting line: Reports to the Atomic Energy Commission, and its Chairperson is appointed by the government.
    5. Jurisdiction: Covers nuclear power plants, research reactors, fuel cycle facilities, and every industrial and medical user of radiation sources in India.
    6. Mandate: Frames safety codes and standards, grants consent at each stage from siting to decommissioning, conducts regulatory inspections and enforces compliance.
    7. Enforcement powers: Can suspend or cancel authorisation and direct shutdown of a facility that violates safety conditions.

    Government Initiatives in the Nuclear Sector

    1. Nuclear Energy Mission for Viksit Bharat: Announced with an outlay of about Rs 20,000 crore for research and development of small modular reactors, targeting five indigenously designed reactors by 2033.
    2. Bharat Small Reactors: Compact reactors planned for captive use by energy intensive industry, to be set up in partnership with private players on their own land.
    3. Three Stage Nuclear Programme: The long term plan to use natural uranium, then plutonium in fast breeder reactors, and finally the domestic thorium reserve.
    4. Prototype Fast Breeder Reactor at Kalpakkam: The stage two demonstration project built by Bharatiya Nabhikiya Vidyut Nigam Limited.
    5. Joint venture route: ASHVINI, the joint venture of NPCIL and NTPC, was created to add nuclear capacity using public sector balance sheets.
    6. Indian Nuclear Insurance Pool: Formed by general insurers with GIC Re to provide insurance cover for operator and supplier liability.
    7. Fleet mode construction: Bulk approval of ten pressurised heavy water reactors of 700 MW each to build in series and cut per unit cost.

    Key Facts about Nuclear Energy in India

    1. First reactor: Apsara, commissioned in 1956 at Trombay, was Asia’s first research reactor.
    2. First power station: The Tarapur Atomic Power Station in Maharashtra, commissioned in 1969, is India’s oldest nuclear power plant.
    3. Largest station: Kudankulam in Tamil Nadu, built with Russian cooperation, is India’s largest nuclear power station by capacity.
    4. Indigenous workhorse: The 700 MW pressurised heavy water reactor, first at Kakrapar in Gujarat, is the indigenous standard design.
    5. Fuel type: Indian pressurised heavy water reactors use natural uranium as fuel and heavy water as moderator and coolant.
    6. Safeguards status: India signed a safeguards agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency in 2009 after the civil nuclear cooperation waiver.
    7. Sector regulator: AERB, with the Directorate of Radiation Safety in some States handling medical radiation sources.

    Challenges in India’s Nuclear Energy Sector

    1. Slow capacity addition: Nuclear capacity has grown far slower than the targets repeatedly announced. e.g. installed capacity remains near 8 GW against a 2047 target of 100 GW.
    2. Fuel supply constraint: Domestic uranium is limited and of low grade, forcing dependence on imports. e.g. India imports uranium from Kazakhstan, Russia, Canada, France and Uzbekistan under bilateral agreements.
    3. Cost and time overruns: Long gestation and heavy civil works push project costs well beyond estimates. e.g. the Prototype Fast Breeder Reactor at Kalpakkam has slipped many years past its original commissioning date.
    4. Public opposition and land acquisition: Communities near proposed sites resist acquisition and fear radiation exposure. e.g. the Jaitapur project in Maharashtra has faced sustained local opposition since 2010.
    5. Waste management gap: No permanent disposal route exists for high level radioactive waste. e.g. spent fuel remains in interim storage rather than a deep geological repository.
    6. Regulatory independence: The safety regulator lacks statutory autonomy from the promoter of the sector. e.g. the Comptroller and Auditor General flagged the AERB’s dependence on the Department of Atomic Energy in a 2012 performance audit.
    7. Liability and vendor hesitation: Uncertainty over the liability regime has stalled foreign built projects. e.g. the Kovvada and Jaitapur projects agreed with United States and French vendors have not reached financial close.
    8. Human resource pipeline: Reactor operations need specialised health physicists and reactor engineers trained over years. e.g. a fleet mode expansion to 100 GW would require a multiple of the current trained workforce.

    Way Forward

    1. Enact a statutory nuclear regulator: Replace the executive constituted AERB with an authority created by its own Act, with fixed tenure and financial autonomy.
    2. Index and review the liability ceiling: Provide a statutory mechanism to revise the operator and government caps periodically, so the figures do not lose meaning with inflation.
    3. Preserve judicial remedy expressly: Clarify that the statutory ceiling governs the no fault claim route and does not oust the writ jurisdiction of constitutional courts.
    4. Deepen the insurance pool: Expand the Indian Nuclear Insurance Pool with reinsurance support so the capped liability is genuinely backed by paid capacity.
    5. Build a claims administration system: Establish standing medical registries and a claims commissioner framework in advance rather than after an accident.
    6. Commit to a waste repository programme: Begin site characterisation for a deep geological repository with a published timeline.
    7. Balance the energy mix: Pair nuclear expansion with the far faster and cheaper solar build out, treating nuclear as firm baseload rather than the primary route to the clean energy target.

    Matching Previous Year Question

    “[2018, GS3, 15 marks] With growing energy needs should India keep on expanding its nuclear energy programme? Discuss the facts and fears associated with nuclear energy.”