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Type: Bills/Act/Laws

  • Centre notifies two offshore mineral blocks near Great Nicobar

    Why in the News

    The Ministry of Mines has notified two offshore mineral blocks near Great Nicobar Island in the Andaman Sea, covering 1,632 square kilometres between them, for the grant of composite licences. The same metals in the same waters found no bidder in the country’s first ever auction of offshore mineral blocks.

    What is on the seabed, and what does a composite licence allow?

    1. What is down there: Polymetallic nodules and crusts are mineral deposits lying on the ocean floor, nodules scattered like potatoes on sand and crusts formed as a coating on rock.
    2. Why India wants them: They hold nickel, cobalt, manganese, copper and rare earth elements, the inputs to batteries, magnets and electronics that India largely imports.
    3. What the licence obliges: A composite licence under the Offshore Areas Mineral (Development and Regulation) Act, 2002 is not a mining permit. The winner must first explore the block and establish its mineral potential.
    4. The takeaway: The Centre is auctioning the right to prove a deposit rather than a proven deposit, so the bidder carries the exploration cost and the geological uncertainty.

    What exactly has been notified?

    1. West Sewell Ridge 01: The larger block lies off Great Nicobar Island and covers 1,000 square kilometres.
    2. Sewell Rise 01: The second block sits in the southern part of Sewell Rise near the same island and covers 632 square kilometres.
    3. What is being sold: The ministry offers both as composite licences over polymetallic nodules and crusts, the same deposit type in the same stretch of sea.
    4. Where the blocks lie: Both sit inside India’s exclusive economic zone, the sea belt extending 200 nautical miles from the coastal baseline.

    Why did the first offshore auction find no takers?

    1. Blocks put to auction: The ministry put 13 offshore mineral blocks to auction in November 2024.
    2. Where the failure was: The seven blocks near Great Nicobar Island carrying these minerals drew no bid, so the same ground is back on offer.
    3. Auction is the only route: The 2023 amendment to the 2002 Act made competitive bidding the only way to obtain an offshore licence, so a risky block has no negotiated alternative.
    4. No rules, no price: The International Seabed Authority, which licenses seabed mining beyond national waters, has issued no exploitation rules, so a bidder cannot price the work.

    Where does this sit in India’s critical minerals push?

    1. National Critical Mineral Mission: The Ministry of Mines runs a mission launched in 2025 to secure supply of the minerals it has classed as critical, several of which these blocks carry.
    2. Deep Ocean Mission: The Ministry of Earth Sciences runs a parallel mission approved in 2021. Its Matsya 6000 submersible is built to carry a crew to the deep seabed.
    3. India already holds seabed contracts: The International Seabed Authority has granted India exploration rights for nodules in the Central Indian Ocean Basin and for sulphides on the Central Indian Ridge.

    Challenges

    1. No technology at depth: Lifting nodules from the deep seabed at commercial scale has not been demonstrated by any country.
    2. Ecological objection: The waters adjoin protected ground. Eg. Galathea National Park and leatherback turtle nesting beaches.
    3. No refining chain: India lacks the nickel and cobalt refining capacity to turn seabed ore into battery grade metal at home.

    Way Forward

    1. Publish the resource data: The Geological Survey of India and the National Centre for Polar and Ocean Research should release block level estimates before bids close.
    2. Share the exploration risk: Fund a government survey tranche first, so bidders compete over a proven block instead of over a guess.
    3. Build the downstream: Tie any offshore nickel and cobalt to refining capacity created under the critical minerals mission.
    4. Assess the sea before the lease: Require a cumulative environmental assessment for the Andaman Sea before any production lease is granted.

    Conclusion

    Two more blocks are on offer on the same terms that drew no bid, so the notification tests whether the obstacle was the terms or the geology. Watch whether a bidder appears at all, since nothing has changed about what is known to lie on that seabed.

    Matching Previous Year Question

    “[2025] Consider the following statements: Statement I: In India, State Governments have no power for making rules for grant of concessions in respect of extraction of minor minerals even though such minerals are located in their territories. Statement II: In India, the Central Government has the power to notify minor minerals under the relevant law. Which one of the following is correct in respect of the above statements? (a) Both Statement I and Statement II are correct and Statement II explains Statement I (b) Both Statement I and Statement II are correct but Statement II does not explain Statement I (c) Statement I is correct but Statement II is not correct (d) Statement I is not correct but Statement II is correct Answer: (d)”

  • Union Minister says Jharkhand’s opposition to the MMDR Act facilitates coal theft

    Why in the News

    The Union Minister of Women and Child Development has said Jharkhand opposes the Mines and Minerals (Development and Regulation) Amendment (MMDR) Act, 2026 to facilitate coal theft. Jharkhand’s Chief Minister calls it a black Bill.

    What does the MMDR Act, 2026 change?

    1. Uniform national levies: The amendment fixes mining taxes and levies nationally instead of State by State, like one national price list for every mine.
    2. Why it was brought: The stated aim is to streamline taxation under the Mines and Minerals (Development and Regulation) Act, 1957 and stop arbitrary State levies.
    3. What went wrong before: A mineral bearing State added fresh cesses, meaning charges on top of the main levy, after auctions closed, so bidders faced new demands.
    4. The takeaway: A bidder can now calculate the levy before bidding, and a mineral bearing State loses the one revenue lever it controlled alone.

    Why does the Centre say Jharkhand is resisting?

    1. Auctions not held on time: The State does not put mineral blocks to auction on schedule.
    2. Five intents alleged: The Centre’s charge names five intents behind the State’s opposition:
      • revenue kept from reaching the State exchequer;
      • mining administration kept dysfunctional;
      • facilities denied to licensed operators;
      • illegal activity allowed to rise;
      • a racket in illegal mining left to flourish.
    3. Coal theft as the motive: The opposition is put down to an interest in personal revenue rather than legitimate State revenue.
    4. Political messaging: The ruling Jharkhand Mukti Morcha (JMM), Congress and Rashtriya Janata Dal (RJD) are accused of misleading people about the Act.

    What does the Centre say the State gains?

    1. Investment and jobs: Predictable levies are expected to draw mining investment and keep young people working within the State.
    2. States already applying it: Odisha, West Bengal, Chhattisgarh, Karnataka and Kerala have implemented the Act.
    3. Opposition ruled States included: Several of those are Congress ruled and welcome the Act, which weakens the claim that it targets Jharkhand.
    4. End of red tapism: The claim is that implementing the Act will end red tapism, meaning delays caused by layers of official permission.

    Why is this a question of federal power?

    1. Minerals belong to the State: Jharkhand’s ground is that minerals and land belong to the State, so the Centre should not decide its entitlements over them.
    2. Constitutional split of power: Entry 54 of the Union List lets Parliament regulate mines once it declares central regulation expedient. Entry 50 of the State List lets a State tax mineral rights.
    3. Court upheld the State levy: A nine judge Bench held in Mineral Area Development Authority v. Steel Authority of India (2024) that royalty is not a tax, so the State’s mineral levy stayed beyond challenge.
    4. What Jharkhand stands to lose: The State holds India’s largest coal resources, so a uniform central rate hits its own revenue hardest.

    Challenges

    1. State revenue capped from outside: A mineral bearing State can no longer raise its own levy when mining income falls short.
    2. Auctions still depend on the State: The Act fixes rates, not the pace at which a State puts blocks to auction.
    3. Enforcement stays with the State: Illegal mining is detected and prosecuted by State agencies, so a tax rule cannot stop coal theft.
    4. Past dues remain unsettled: Operators still carry demands raised under the old State cesses.

    Way Forward

    1. Compensate the lost headroom: Route a share of the central mining levy back to the producing State, on a Finance Commission formula.
    2. Publish an auction calendar: The Ministry of Mines should notify State wise auction dates, with missed blocks reverting to central auction.
    3. Close the old cess demands: Notify one settlement window for dues raised after past auctions.
    4. Use Article 263: Place mineral taxation before the Inter State Council, so a producing State’s objection is answered rather than litigated.

    Conclusion

    The quarrel is not about whether a mineral is taxed but about who fixes the charge on a mineral the State owns. Watch whether Jharkhand takes its objection to court, because refusal alone cannot stop a central levy.

    Back2Basics: Mines and Minerals (Development and Regulation) Act, 1957

    1. Scope of the Act: The Act regulates mineral concessions and the development of major minerals, other than petroleum and atomic minerals.
    2. Who grants a lease: State governments grant prospecting licences and mining leases, under rules the Centre lays down.
    3. Auction and the district fund: The 2015 amendment made auction the only route to a concession and created a District Mineral Foundation in every mining district.

    Matching Previous Year Question

    “[2025, GS2, 15 marks] Examine the evolving pattern of Centre-State financial relations in the context of planned development in India. How far have the recent reforms impacted the fiscal federalism in India?”

  • Andhra Pradesh government refuses to defend Centre’s changes to transgender rights law in court

    Why in the News

    The Andhra Pradesh government has told the Supreme Court that it will not defend the 2026 amendments to the Transgender Persons (Protection of Rights) Act, 2019, since it had no role in enacting them and the law’s validity is primarily a matter for the Union. The State that issues transgender identity certificates has stepped away from defending the statute it administers.

    What did the 2026 amendments change?

    1. What the law recognised: The 2019 Act let a person’s declaration settle their gender, following National Legal Services Authority v. Union of India (2014). A two judge Bench based identity on self identification.
    2. What the amendment did: The 2026 amendments removed the right to a self perceived gender identity and tied the definition of a transgender person to physiological characteristics.
    3. The stated reason: The ground given in Parliament was that self determination would let people falsely claim a transgender identity to obtain welfare benefits.
    4. The objection: Opposition members argued that removing a right the Court recognised in 2014 attacks the dignity of transgender persons. Members of the National Council for Transgender Persons resigned as protests spread.
    5. The takeaway: A right that rested on a person’s declaration now rests on physical characteristics, which is why the change is being challenged in court.

    What has Andhra Pradesh told the Court?

    1. No independent discrimination: The State’s affidavit, filed in August, says it has taken no independent action discriminatory towards transgender persons.
    2. The Union has not answered yet: The Centre is yet to respond to at least a dozen petitions challenging the law, so only the administering States are on record.
    3. An ally against the Union’s law: Andhra Pradesh is governed by the Telugu Desam Party, an ally of the party leading the Union government.
    4. The party backed the Bill: A Telugu Desam Party member supported the Bill in the Lok Sabha in March, citing complaints of people falsely adopting a transgender identity to beg.

    How does Uttarakhand’s position differ?

    1. A State defending the amendment: The Uttarakhand government has defended the 2026 amendments in the same proceedings.
    2. Its factual claim: It submitted that the amended law has taken away none of the rights transgender persons held in the State, and that identification, certification and welfare continue as before.
    3. Its explanation: It argued that social attitudes and the way existing services are run shape the rights and healthcare transgender persons actually get, as much as the law does.

    Why does a State’s refusal matter?

    1. States run the certification: The 2019 Act gives the District Magistrate power to issue the certificate of identity, so the definition’s practical meaning is set by State machinery.
    2. The Court reads what States file: Where a central law is administered by States, their affidavits are the evidence of how it operates.
    3. A split defence: Two States governed by allied parties have taken opposite positions on the same amendment, so the Union’s law no longer has a single State defence.

    Challenges

    1. Proof shifts to a physical test: A definition tied to physiological characteristics makes recognition turn on examination, which the 2019 Act was written to avoid.
    2. Statute against a constitutional finding: A right traced to Articles 14, 15, 19 and 21 does not fall because the statute recording it was amended.
    3. Entitlements follow the certificate: Welfare access is keyed to the identity certificate, so a narrower definition narrows every scheme built on it. Eg. Garima Greh shelter homes.

    Way Forward

    1. Restore declaration as the basis: Parliament should make self declaration the basis of the certificate again, keeping medical procedure a matter of choice.
    2. One Union affidavit on operation: The Union should file one affidavit stating how the amended definition is to be applied, so District Magistrates are not left improvising.
    3. Put certification data on record: Require every State to publish applications, certificates issued and rejections each year, so the amendment’s effect is measurable.
    4. Fill the council: Reconstitute the National Council for Transgender Persons with community nominees, so objections are heard before rules are framed.

    Conclusion

    The Court is being asked whether identity rests on a person’s own declaration or on physical characteristics. What to watch is whether other States that must administer the Act also decline to defend it.

    Key numbers

    1. Identity card applications in Andhra Pradesh: 3,750 (State affidavit, 2026).
    2. Certificates issued: 3,233 of those applications.
    3. Applications not taken forward: 403.
    4. Applications still pending: 114.

    Matching Previous Year Question

    “[2026, GS2, 10 marks] Right to privacy relating to self-identity is very dear to every human being and well protected under Article 21 of the Constitution. In this context, examine the effect of the amendment in 2026, to the Transgender Persons (Protection of Rights) Act, 2019.”

  • Centre directs captive coal plants to run at full capacity from October 1

    Why in the News

    The Centre has directed about 112 captive coal based power plants to run at maximum available capacity from 1 October to 31 December. It invoked Section 11 of the Electricity Act, 2003, an emergency power, because September peak demand came close to the year’s summer peak. Plants built to supply their own factories are now a reserve for the public grid.

    What is a captive power plant, and why direct one to run?

    1. What it is: A captive power plant is a station a factory builds to power its own operations rather than to sell electricity, like a building running on its own generator.
    2. Why factories build them: Captive generation is exempt from the cross subsidy surcharge, an extra charge grid consumers pay that funds cheaper supply to other categories, so self supply costs less.
    3. What the emergency power does: Section 11 of the Electricity Act, 2003 lets the government order a station to operate as it directs in extraordinary circumstances, overriding the owner’s commercial choice.
    4. The takeaway: An emergency provision is pulling privately owned capacity into the public market, because the grid has no other reserve it can order into service quickly.

    What does the direction require?

    1. Who is covered: Every coal based captive plant of 50 megawatt and above must generate to the maximum extent of its available capacity.
    2. Surplus to the market: After meeting its own factory demand, a generator must offer the surplus on the power exchanges, where electricity is traded for the next day or the next hour.
    3. Fuel stock: Generators must hold adequate coal stock so fuel availability does not limit generation.
    4. Weekly reporting: Generators must report weekly to the Central Electricity Authority, the government’s technical adviser on power planning, on generation, captive use, exchange sales and coal stock.

    Why was it invoked in September?

    1. Out of season demand: Electricity demand rose unusually this September and approached peak summer levels, so capacity kept for May was needed out of season.
    2. A September record: Peak demand touched 269 gigawatt, the highest ever recorded in that month and almost equal to the year’s May peak.
    3. Not a first invocation: The provision has been used in earlier years during peak summer months.

    What does the Coastal Gujarat Power extension add?

    1. A second invocation: The power ministry extended the same mechanism to Coastal Gujarat Power Ltd, Tata Power’s imported coal based station, until 31 December, continuing an arrangement running since March.
    2. Why it had shut: The 4 gigawatt station sat idle for nearly six months, because imported fuel costs were high and no viable power purchase arrangement existed.
    3. A revised contract reopened it: The Gujarat government approved a revised power purchase arrangement earlier this year, clearing the way for long term supply to resume.
    4. Why only this plant: The recorded ground is that other imported coal based plants were operating without difficulty.

    Challenges

    1. An exception used as policy: Section 11 is written for extraordinary circumstances, and repeated seasonal use turns a statutory exception into a planning instrument with no fixed review.
    2. Captive generators carry the risk: An industrial user ordered to run flat out buys more coal and sells the surplus at exchange prices it does not set.
    3. Coal logistics, not capacity, binds: Maximum generation depends on coal rakes, the trainloads that carry fuel to a plant, actually arriving, which a direction cannot create.
    4. The shortfall is a few hours long: Demand peaks in the evening, so ordering stations built to run steadily all day adds energy the grid does not need.

    Way Forward

    1. Contract the reserve instead of ordering it: The Ministry of Power should buy captive surplus as a paid seasonal reserve, so capacity is available without an emergency provision.
    2. Pay for standing by: Widen the ancillary services market, which pays a generator to stay on standby for the grid operator, so flexible capacity earns for being available.
    3. Build for the evening peak: Tie battery storage and pumped hydro tenders to evening peak hours, since that is where the shortfall sits.
    4. Stock before the season: The coal ministry and the railways should fix rake plans and plant stock targets before each demand season.

    Conclusion

    The grid no longer has a single summer peak, and the Centre is meeting the new one by ordering private industrial capacity into the public market. What to watch is whether that reserve is contracted in advance or ordered again under an emergency power.

    Matching Previous Year Question

    “[2026, GS3, 15 marks] Explain the key challenges for India’s energy security. What measures do you suggest for ensuring energy security along with economic growth and sustainability?”

  • Centre notifies Kandla, JNPA, Mundra and Paradip as mega ports

    Why in the News

    The Ministry of Ports, Shipping and Waterways has notified four ports as mega ports under the Indian Ports Act, 2025, three of them major ports and one privately operated. This is the first use of the Act’s power to grade ports by size rather than by ownership. It places a privately run port in the same statutory class as ports the Union administers.

    What is a mega port under the Indian Ports Act, 2025?

    1. What it is: A mega port is a port the Centre puts in its highest class once it meets published scale criteria. It works like a size based star rating.
    2. Why the Act provides for it: The Indian Ports Act, 2025 replaced the colonial era Indian Ports Act, 1908 and made a port’s class follow notified criteria rather than practice.
    3. What the criteria say: The criteria were notified on 30 July 2026 after consulting State governments. The notification records only that all four ports meet them.
    4. The takeaway: Size now decides which ports the Centre treats as nationally significant, so being a major port is no longer what puts a port in the top tier.

    What exactly has been notified?

    1. The major ports in the set: Deendayal (Kandla), Jawaharlal Nehru (Nhava Sheva) and Paradip are major ports, administered under the Major Port Authorities Act, 2021.
    2. Two routes, one notification: The three major ports were notified under Section 73(2), and Mundra under Section 73(3), the route for a port that is not a major port.
    3. Who runs the fourth: Mundra is operated by Adani Ports and Special Economic Zone, a private company, not by a Union port authority.
    4. When it takes effect: The notification was issued on 25 September 2026 and came into force when it was published in the Gazette of India.

    Why does one private port in the class matter?

    1. Two constitutional lists: Major ports fall under Entry 27 of the Union List and every other port under Entry 31 of the Concurrent List, so the two answer to different governments.
    2. A State regulator for a mega port: Ports other than major ports in Gujarat are regulated by the Gujarat Maritime Board, so the Centre has graded a port it does not administer.
    3. Scale of the private port: Mundra is the country’s largest privately operated port by cargo handled, which is why a class defined by size could not exclude it.

    Challenges

    1. One class, two regulators: A mega port in State jurisdiction is still licensed and charged tariffs by a State maritime board, so the new label changes no regulator.
    2. Rail and road capacity binds: A port can unload more cargo than the rail lines and roads behind it carry away, so a higher class does not move cargo faster.
    3. Concentration of traffic: Grading by size rewards ports that already dominate traffic, widening the gap with smaller ports competing for the same cargo.

    Way Forward

    1. Publish the score against each criterion: The Ministry of Ports, Shipping and Waterways should publish how each port scored on every notified criterion, so the class is auditable.
    2. A common protocol with State boards: Agree one clearance and reporting protocol with State maritime boards for mega ports outside Union jurisdiction.
    3. Tie the label to connectivity targets: Link mega port status to dated rail and road milestones under the Sagarmala programme, so grading pulls connectivity investment.
    4. Fix a review cycle: Provide that a port failing the criteria on review loses the classification.

    Conclusion

    Port classification has moved from who owns a port to how much it handles, and the first list crosses the Union and State line. What to watch is what the class entitles a port to, and whether State maritime boards get a formal place in that decision.

    Back2Basics: Major Port Authorities Act, 2021

    1. What it replaced: The Act replaced the Major Port Trusts Act, 1963 and converted port trusts into Port Authority Boards.
    2. What it covers: It governs the major ports the Union administers, not ports in State jurisdiction.
    3. Tariffs: Each Board fixes its own scale of rates instead of following a central tariff authority.
    4. Composition: Each Board has independent members alongside State and central ministry representatives.

    Matching Previous Year Question

    “[2023] Consider the following pairs : Port / Well Known as 1. Kamarajar Port : First major port in India registered as a company 2. Mundra Port : Largest privately owned port in India 3. Visakhapatnam Port : Largest container port in India How many of the above pairs are correctly matched? (a) Only one pair (b) Only two pairs (c) All three pairs (d) None of the pairs Answer: (b)”

  • [26th September 2026] The Hindu OpED: The case for accountable lottery regulation in India

    [26th September 2026] The Hindu OpED: The case for accountable lottery regulation in India

    Question (2019, GS2 – 10 Marks): “From the resolution of contentious issues regarding distribution of legislative powers by the courts, ‘Principle of Federal Supremacy’ and ‘Harmonious Construction’ have emerged. Explain.
    Linkage: The B.R. Enterprises judgment is a classic example of harmonious construction and reading down a statute. The Supreme Court harmonized Union List Entry 40 (Lotteries organized by the Government of India or a State) and State List powers with Article 301 (Freedom of Trade and Commerce) to prevent discriminatory protectionism between states.

    Mentor Comment

    Prohibition of a vice with persistent demand removes legal supply and leaves the demand intact. The Lotteries (Regulation) Act, 1998 lets a State organise a lottery and lets a State prohibit lotteries organised by others. B.R. Enterprises vs State of U.P. (1999) read that second power down, so a State may exclude other States’ lotteries only by abandoning its own and becoming wholly lottery free. Faced with that trade off between revenue and regulatory control, two large States chose total prohibition and forfeited the option of running an accountable public lottery. The contest is between a State’s interest in supervising what is sold inside its territory and a legal rule built as an all or nothing choice.

    What does the Lotteries (Regulation) Act, 1998 provide?

    1. Legislative competence: Government organised lotteries fall under Entry 40 of the Union List.
    2. Section 4: The Act permits States to organise lotteries subject to the conditions in Section 4. Section 4 also permits a State to sell tickets directly, or through distributors or agents.
    3. Section 5: Section 5 empowers a State to prohibit lotteries organised by other States inside its territory.
    4. Section 6: Section 6 empowers the Union government to prohibit a lottery in violation of Sections 4 and 5.

    What harms do lotteries carry?

    1. Regressive burden: Lotteries disproportionately burden poorer households. They encourage a household to stake scarce income on a remote chance of reward.
    2. Compulsive play: Rapid draws and instant games encourage compulsive play and loss chasing.
    3. Distorted risk perception: Giant jackpots distort the perception of risk.
    4. Sales practices: Credit sales, opaque odds and manipulative advertising compound these harms.
    5. What the harms justify: These are arguments for stringent regulation, not necessarily for prohibition.

    What does a prohibition produce instead?

    1. Illegal channels: A ban pushes players towards smuggled tickets, offshore portals and unlicensed numbers betting such as matka, satta and single digit rackets.
    2. Absence of safeguards: These enterprises operate through cash agents and mule accounts. They carry no audits, no age restrictions, no secured prize funds and no effective remedy against fraud.
    3. Revenue forgone: Governments lose lottery surpluses and Goods and Services Tax (GST) revenue.
    4. Livelihoods and enforcement: Legitimate vendors, many of them poor or disabled, lose their livelihoods. Enforcement costs rise at the same time.
    5. The paradox of protection: A state seeking to protect the vulnerable leaves them at the mercy of unaccountable operators.

    Is the state’s paternalism applied evenly across classes?

    1. Permitted speculation: An affluent citizen can day trade, use leveraged derivatives or speculate in crypto assets. The risk of ruinous losses in those markets is no bar to entry.
    2. No competence test: The state does not test competence before admitting a retail trader to these markets. Securities trading involves skill, and derivatives support hedging and price discovery.
    3. The regulator’s own finding: The Securities and Exchange Board of India (SEBI) found that the vast majority of day traders, and of traders in futures and options, incurred losses.
    4. Why markets are legal: Financial markets are legal because risks are disclosed, intermediaries are regulated and fraud is punished. Adult choice is preserved alongside those safeguards.
    5. Application to lotteries: Lotteries can follow the same principle, with more stringent safeguards appropriate to games of chance.

    What does international practice show about regulating rather than banning?

    1. United States prohibition, 1920 to 1933: The United States imposed prohibition through the Eighteenth Amendment and the Volstead Act. It suppressed legal supply and left demand intact.
    2. What the ban produced: Prohibition fuelled a lucrative black market controlled by violent syndicates. Bootlegging corrupted public institutions, deprived governments of excise revenue and imposed heavy enforcement costs.
    3. The repeal: The Twenty First Amendment repealed prohibition, on the recognition that a regulated and taxed market causes fewer harms than an unenforceable ban.
    4. Controlled legality is the norm: Lotteries are legal in nearly four fifths of countries, with surpluses allocated transparently to education, health care, sports, welfare or infrastructure. Blanket prohibition survives mainly in countries enforcing strict Sharia based gambling prohibitions, such as Saudi Arabia, Iran and Brunei, and in closed ideological regimes such as Cuba.
    5. The public operator model: Nearly 70 per cent of lottery jurisdictions follow the public operator model. A government body, statutory authority or State owned company runs the lottery, and private firms supply retail and technology services.
    6. The concession model: The State regulates the lottery and grants operating rights to a private concessionaire.
    7. Federal practice: Lotteries operate in 45 of the 50 United States and Washington DC, in all 10 Canadian provinces and three territories, in all six Australian States and both mainland territories, and in all 16 German Lander.
    8. Cross border sales: Authorisation in one jurisdiction does not confer the right to sell in another. Cross border sales require the destination jurisdiction’s consent or its participation in a cooperative arrangement.
    9. Pooling without losing control: Powerball in the United States, Lotto 6/49 in Canada, the Australian lottery blocs and Germany’s national lottery bloc, the DLTB, let participating jurisdictions pool players and prizes without surrendering regulatory autonomy.

    What does Indian law do to a State that wants to regulate rather than ban?

    1. Res extra commercium: Settled Supreme Court jurisprudence treats gambling, including State organised lotteries, as res extra commercium, meaning an activity outside the protection of Article 19(1)(g), the fundamental right to trade, and of Article 301, the freedom of trade across India.
    2. The alcohol parallel: A parallel doctrine applies to potable alcohol and allows a State to restrict or prohibit consignments from outside its territory.
    3. Why the all or nothing rule is hard to justify: A State directly oversees its own lottery administration. Its oversight of another State’s operations inside its territory is necessarily indirect, and it still bears the local enforcement burden.
    4. The choice two States made: Tamil Nadu in 2003 and Karnataka in 2007 chose total prohibition. Both gave up the option of running accountable public lotteries of their own.
    5. How many States run lotteries: A Lok Sabha reply of 14 March 2023 identified nine States operating lotteries: Arunachal Pradesh, Goa, Kerala, Maharashtra, Mizoram, Nagaland, Punjab, Sikkim and West Bengal.
    6. The fiscal context: Persistent State fiscal stress makes the widespread preference for prohibition worth reconsidering.

    What would an accountable alternative look like?

    1. First amendment, to Section 5: Parliament should clarify that Section 5 applies whether or not the prohibiting State organises a lottery of its own. The consent of the destination State should be decisive, subject to uniform treatment.
    2. Uniform treatment: A State must either admit all outside lotteries or exclude them all.
    3. Second amendment, a new Section 4A: A new Section 4A should authorise two or more States to establish a common lottery by agreement, pooling players, prizes, technology and costs.
    4. Why compulsory access is no remedy: Smaller States, especially in the northeast, face exclusion from larger markets. Compulsory access is not the remedy for that exposure.
    5. Departmental operation: Marketing agents supply guaranteed revenue. Departmental operation is more transparent and opens retail distribution to small vendors, persons with disabilities, women’s self help groups and cooperatives. That widens livelihood opportunities and limits intermediary capture.
    6. The Kerala record: Kerala earned Rs 2,883.80 crore from its lottery in the 2023 to 2024 financial year. That total is Rs 1,129.71 crore in net lottery revenue and Rs 1,754.09 crore in State Goods and Services Tax.
    7. Where the surplus goes: Kerala channels its lottery surpluses into health care and welfare. Its model is a useful template for reform rather than the only one.

    Conclusion

    A vice with persistent demand does not disappear when the state withdraws the legal channel. The transaction moves to operators who keep no accounts and answer to no regulator. The real choice for a State is therefore between an auditable public supplier and an untraceable illegal one. Current law forces that choice into an all or nothing form, so a State that wants to shut out unaccountable outside operators must first shut down its own accountable one, and it is that single provision that has to change first.

    Betting and Gambling Regulation in India

    1. Scale of the market: The online betting and gaming market was valued at 5.02 billion dollars in 2024 to 2025. It is projected to reach 10.77 billion dollars by 2030.
    2. User base: India has over 517 million online gamers, of whom 155 million play money based games. India accounts for 20 per cent of the global gaming user base.
    3. Split jurisdiction: Gambling is a State subject, and online gaming has been brought under the Union. That split produces persistent legal friction.
    4. The skill and chance test: In Dr. K.R. Lakshmanan v. State of Tamil Nadu (1996) the Court established the predominance of skill test. Horse racing qualified as a game of skill on that test.

    Government Initiatives

    1. Promotion and Regulation of Online Gaming Act, 2025: The Act prohibits online money games, meaning real money betting, and permits e sports and social games.
    2. Online Gaming Authority of India: A central regulator under the Ministry of Electronics and Information Technology classifies games, issues digital certificates and handles enforcement.
    3. Blocking duty on intermediaries: Amendments to the information technology intermediary guidelines require an intermediary to block any platform flagged as a money game by the Authority.

  • Conflict and consensus: The rupture in the poll panel

    Why in the News

    The functioning of the three member Election Commission of India (ECI) is under scrutiny after an investigation reported that two Election Commissioners placed objections on record at least 14 times in 10 months. The poll body has responded that its decisions have been unanimous. It describes the recorded entries as observations that form part of the deliberative process. The dispute is over whether a recorded objection is a dissent or a step inside a deliberation that ends in agreement.

    How does the Election Commission take decisions?

    1. Article 324: Article 324 of the Constitution vests the superintendence, direction and control of the preparation of electoral rolls and of the conduct of elections in the Commission. It covers elections to Parliament, to the legislature of every State and to the offices of President and Vice President.
    2. Composition: The Commission consists of the Chief Election Commissioner (CEC) and such number of other Election Commissioners as the President may appoint, subject to the provisions of law. The CEC acts as the Chairman of the Commission.
    3. Section 17: Section 17 of the Chief Election Commissioner and Other Election Commissioners (Appointment, Conditions of Service and Term of Office) Act, 2023 requires the business of the Commission to be transacted in accordance with that Act.
    4. Section 18: Section 18 requires all business of the Commission to be transacted unanimously as far as possible. A matter on which the CEC and the other Election Commissioners differ is decided by the opinion of the majority.
    5. Equal voting rights: All three members hold one vote each, and the CEC is the first among equals. Two of the three can therefore decide a matter that is not settled unanimously.

    What does the record of past differences show?

    1. The 1993 expansion: The Commission was permanently expanded from a single member body to a three member commission in 1993. Differences have emerged between the individuals holding the posts since then.
    2. T.N. Seshan vs Union of India (1995): The then Chief Election Commissioner had challenged the appointment of the two Election Commissioners in the Supreme Court. The Court upheld the appointment and ruled that the three members hold equal status and an equal say in decision making.
    3. The 2009 removal request: In January 2009 the then Chief Election Commissioner wrote to the President seeking the removal of an Election Commissioner, citing a lack of political neutrality. No such action followed, and that Commissioner was later appointed Chief Election Commissioner.
    4. The 2019 dissent: The majority view in 2019 gave the Prime Minister and the then president of the Bharatiya Janata Party a clean chit on complaints of Model Code of Conduct violations. A member of the Commission recorded a dissent against that view, and objected that his dissent notes were not being carried into the final orders passed by the Commission.
    5. The 2020 resignation: That member was in line to take over as Chief Election Commissioner on the basis of seniority. He opted to resign from the Commission in 2020.

    How is a dissent distinguished from an observation?

    1. Recording a dissent: An Election Commissioner who disagrees with the majority view can record a dissent note on the file.
    2. The observation on the draft revision order: Before the Commission issued the order starting the Special Intensive Revision (SIR) of electoral rolls on 24 June 2025, an Election Commissioner observed on the draft order that the exercise should not lead to harassment of voters and citizens. The recorded wording asked that genuine voters and citizens, particularly the old, the sick, persons with disabilities, the poor and other vulnerable groups, should not feel harassed and should be facilitated.
    3. Treated as an observation: That entry was treated as an observation rather than a dissent, and the revision order was eventually unanimous.
    4. Objections recorded since: The two Election Commissioners have recorded objections on files several times since. The subjects include the functioning of the poll body’s information technology infrastructure and the insertion of a new declaration in the voter enrolment form, Form 6.
    5. Routine differences: Differing opinions on matters before the Commission are a routine occurrence, on the conduct of elections and on administrative matters alike. The Commission meets once or twice a week to discuss pending matters.

    What has the Election Commission said?

    1. Observations as standard practice: Operational queries or inputs raised by members of the Commission at the draft stage are described as standard administrative practice aimed at safeguarding voter rights. The suggestions given by the Commissioners are described as being for further improving the electoral processes.
    2. Part of the decision making process: Differing views and observations are described as a normal part of deliberation in any institution, arriving before a final decision is taken.
    3. Every officer may suggest: Every officer of the Commission, and not only the three Commissioners, is authorised to give suggestions for improving the electoral system.
    4. Unanimity claimed: All decisions taken in recent months are described as the outcome of unanimous decisions. The Commission cited the recent elections in Bihar, Kerala, Tamil Nadu, Puducherry, Assam and West Bengal in support.

    Conclusion

    The statute makes unanimity a preference and a majority decision lawful, so a recorded difference inside the poll body is not by itself a breach of procedure. What the record cannot settle is whether an entry on a file is a suggestion or a refusal to agree, because the Commission alone decides how that entry is finally described. Past differences ended in a resignation, in an appointment and in a court ruling on equal status, never in a published account of who disagreed with what. A requirement that a dissent be carried into the final order is the change that would put that description beyond the Commission’s own choice.

    Back2Basics: Model Code of Conduct

    1. What it is: The Model Code of Conduct is a set of non statutory norms agreed upon by political parties. It exists to prevent the ruling party from misusing state machinery and to curb unethical campaign practices.
    2. Duration: It takes effect the moment the poll body announces the election schedule and remains in force until the results are declared.
    3. Penalties: The Code carries no statutory penal provision. The Commission can issue warnings, censure a candidate or delay a poll, and criminal violations such as bribery and hate speech are prosecuted under the Representation of the People Act, 1951 and the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023.
    4. Evolution: It began in 1960 as a short set of instructions for the Kerala Assembly elections. It was consolidated into its present form in 1991.

    Matching Previous Year Question

    “[2017] Consider the following statements: 1. The Election Commission of India is a ‘ five-member body. 2. Union Ministry of Home Affairs decides the election schedule for the conduct of both general elections and bye-elections. 3. Election Commission resolves the disputes relating to splits/mergers of recognized political parties. Which of the statements given above is/are correct ? (a) 1 and 2 only (b) 2 only (c) 2 and 3 only (d) 3 only Answer: (d)”

  • Declaration part of Form 6 changed since SIR in Bihar

    Why in the News

    The declaration attached to Form 6, the application for fresh registration as a voter, has changed substantially across the phases of the Special Intensive Revision (SIR) of electoral rolls. A first time applicant must now furnish details drawn from the last revision. The declaration itself was introduced during the first phase of the revision in Bihar. Two Election Commissioners flagged the change in separate notes and letters in May 2026 and in August 2026. The dispute is whether an addition of this kind could be made at all without the Union government amending the rule the form sits inside.

    What is Form 6?

    1. Purpose of the form: Form 6 is the application a person files for inclusion in the electoral roll as a new voter. The Election Commission of India (ECI) uses it for fresh voter registrations.
    2. Statutory status: Form 6 is attached to the Registration of Electors Rules, 1960. It therefore carries the legal force of that rule and not of an administrative form.

    What did the first phase declaration ask for?

    1. Birth period brackets: The declaration used in Bihar sought to confirm the exact period of a new voter’s birth. The three brackets were birth before 1987, birth between 1987 and 2004, and birth after 2004.
    2. Applicants born before 1 July 1987: Only the applicant’s own document was needed to prove date or place of birth.
    3. Applicants born between 1 July 1987 and 2 December 2004: The applicant needed their own document along with one parent’s document, of either the father or the mother.
    4. Applicants born after 2 December 2004: The applicant needed their own document along with documents for both parents establishing date or place of birth.
    5. Parent who is not an Indian citizen: A copy of that parent’s passport and visa, valid at the time of the applicant’s birth, also had to be submitted.

    How did the declaration change in the later phases?

    1. Names in the last revision: In the second phase, a new voter filling Form 6 had to declare whether their own name or their parents’ names appeared in the last SIR.
    2. Constituency, booth and serial numbers: The applicant also had to give the assembly constituency number, the polling booth number and the serial number at which those names appeared in the electoral rolls of the last SIR.
    3. The third option on ECINet: An applicant without that information could choose a third option when filling the form online on the ECINet portal.
    4. Mandatory in practice: The field was not formally marked mandatory. An applicant could not submit the online form without completing it.
    5. Continuation into the third phase: The addition continued into the third phase of the revision. That phase was announced in May this year.

    Who has the power to change Form 6?

    1. Limits on the poll body: The ECI cannot redesign the form on its own, because the form is part of a rule it did not make.
    2. The amending authority: Only the Union government can amend the rules, acting through the Ministry of Law and Justice. The rules are made under the Representation of the People Act, 1950.

    What is the Commission’s account of the change?

    1. Approval by the full Commission: The stated position of the ECI is that adding a separate declaration form with Form 6 and with Form 8, the form used for changing particulars, was approved by the full three member Commission when the revision began in Bihar. It was ratified again in the later phases.
    2. The form itself unamended: The Commission’s account is that Form 6 was never amended and that only a declaration was added alongside it.
    3. The change in the online module: The change in the online module was made so that a person filling the form does not have to sign electronically twice.
    4. Judicial approval cited: The Commission cites a Supreme Court order of 27 May upholding the power to add the declaration form.

    Conclusion

    The declaration now asks a first time applicant for information from a revision they may never have been part of. What remains unresolved is whether an addition that operates as a condition of registration can be made without the Union government amending the rule it sits inside. The objections recorded inside the poll body put that question to the institution itself and not only to the courts. The next phase of the revision is where the answer will show.

    Back2Basics: Special Intensive Revision

    1. What it is: A Special Intensive Revision is a time bound enumeration, with Booth Level Officers visiting households in person. The routine annual exercise, the Summary Revision, carries no such door to door verification of every entry.
    2. Legal basis: Section 21 of the Representation of the People Act, 1950 authorises the poll body to carry out a special revision of the electoral roll at any time, for reasons recorded in writing.
    3. Objectives: The exercise verifies the residence of every registered voter, removes deceased, duplicate and shifted entries, and registers citizens who have newly turned 18.
    4. History: Intensive revisions have been carried out about 14 times. Eg. The exercises of 1983, 1995, 2002 and 2004, and the current cycle.

    Matching Previous Year Question

    “[2026, GS2, 10 marks] Is the right to vote a fundamental right? Discuss the position of the Election Commission of India while undertaking the revision of electoral rolls. Can it also examine the question of citizenship of voters?”

  • Bengal ‘Anti-Goonda’ Bill fails to get President’s nod due to overlap with Central legislation

    Why in the News

    The President has returned the West Bengal Public Safety and Control of Anti-Social Activities Bill, 2026 to the State for reconsideration. The Bill was introduced in the Assembly in June to curb anti social activities. The Centre’s note recorded that one clause of the Bill may create a parallel preventive detention mechanism for drug related activities. The stated objection is that this raises an issue of repugnancy under Article 254 of the Constitution. The contested point is that a State preventive detention law was stopped on duplication of a Central statute rather than on the reach of the powers it confers.

    What does the West Bengal Public Safety and Control of Anti-Social Activities Bill, 2026 do?

    1. The externment power: A District Magistrate, a Commissioner of Police or an authorised police officer not below the rank of Deputy Inspector General may order a person identified as a goonda out of a specified area, district or part of a district. The prohibition on entering or returning may run for up to one year.
    2. The reporting power: The same order may require that person to report his movements, or to report himself, at specified times to a specified authority.
    3. The trigger: The power turns on the authority’s apprehension that the person is engaging in or will engage in anti social activities. No finding on a past offence is required.
    4. The stated safeguard: The Chief Minister assured the Assembly that the legislation would not be used for political vendetta and that the preventive arrest provisions would not be misused.

    What exactly did the Centre object to?

    1. The clause in question: The Bill’s definition of goonda covers a person who commits, attempts to commit, abets, promotes, finances or facilitates any offence punishable under the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 (NDPS Act). The objection is confined to that single reference.
    2. The Central statute it collides with: The Prevention of Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1988 (PITNDPS Act) already provides a preventive detention framework for persons engaged in illicit traffic in narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances. The Centre’s note describes it as a specific Central legislation on that subject.
    3. The change asked for: The note asked that the reference to NDPS Act offences in the definition clause be deleted. Deletion is the only remedy proposed, and it leaves the rest of the Bill untouched.

    Why does a State law duplicating a Central law fail at the assent stage?

    1. The rule in Article 254: Article 254(1) makes a State law void to the extent that it is repugnant to a Central law on the same Concurrent List subject. Repugnancy does not require the State law to be objectionable in itself.
    2. The saving clause: Article 254(2) saves such a State law where it has been reserved for and has received the assent of the President. Presidential assent is therefore the only route by which an inconsistent State law can stand.
    3. The assent route: Under Article 200 a Governor may assent to a State Bill, withhold assent and return it once for reconsideration, or reserve it for the President. A Bill carrying a possible conflict with Central law travels by the third route.
    4. The ground of the return: The objection is to duplication rather than to the preventive powers. A parallel State mechanism on a subject a Central Act already occupies is precisely what Article 254 is designed to prevent.

    What happens to the Bill now?

    1. Return to the Assembly: The recorded position of the State administration is that the Bill may be tabled again once the conflicting portion is changed. It would then be sent again for the assent of the President.
    2. The six month clock: Where a reserved Bill is returned, the legislature must consider it within six months. The President is under no obligation to act if the Bill reaches him a second time.
    3. No judicially enforced deadline: State of Tamil Nadu v. Governor of Tamil Nadu (2025) required a decision within three months on a Bill reserved for the President. The Supreme Court’s later advisory opinion on the Presidential Reference under Article 143 held that courts cannot impose timelines under Articles 200 and 201.

    Challenges to the West Bengal Public Safety and Control of Anti-Social Activities Bill, 2026

    1. Procedure is the only real check: Preventive detention is tested on the fairness of its procedure rather than on guilt. Eg. Article 22 was read as a self contained code in 1950, and since 1978 the procedure for any deprivation of liberty must also be just, fair and reasonable under Article 21.
      The Fix: Write the grounds, the representation route and the review reference into the statute itself rather than leaving them to executive instructions.
    2. Central statutes already occupy the field: Each class of preventive detention already has a Central Act, so a State Act reaching the same conduct invites the objection this Bill received. Eg. Smuggling and foreign exchange violations are covered by the Conservation of Foreign Exchange and Prevention of Smuggling Activities Act, 1974 (COFEPOSA).
      The Fix: Screen a State preventive detention Bill against every Central Act on the same subject before introduction rather than at the assent stage.
    3. The assent stage has no agreed discipline: A State Bill reserved for the President can wait without a stated end date, and the reform proposals on this have not been acted on. Eg. The Punchhi Commission recommended time limits for granting assent in 2010.
      The Fix: Require the Centre’s observations on a reserved Bill to be published within a fixed period, so a State learns the objection during the same session.

    Conclusion

    The objection returned to West Bengal is narrow and curable by deleting one reference. That is also what makes it revealing. A State preventive detention law was stopped on the tidiness of the statute book rather than on the reach of the powers it grants, and nothing in the return questions the externment or reporting powers themselves. The thing to watch is whether the amended Bill goes back with only the drug reference removed, or whether the Assembly uses the reconsideration to write procedural safeguards into the text.

    Back2Basics: Preventive detention

    1. Nature of the power: Detention imposed to prevent a future act rather than to punish a past one. No trial follows, and the detention rests on executive satisfaction.
    2. Safeguards that do not apply: Articles 22(1) and 22(2) do not apply, so there is no right to be produced before a Magistrate within 24 hours and no constitutional right to counsel at the initial stage.
    3. The outer limit: Article 22(4) caps detention at three months without a reference to an Advisory Board. Parliament may extend that period under Article 22(7).
    4. The Central statutes: The National Security Act, 1980 covers national security and public order, COFEPOSA covers smuggling and foreign exchange, and the PITNDPS Act covers drug trafficking.

    Matching Previous Year Question

    “[2026, GS2, 15 marks] Discuss the position of the Governor in the federal polity of India. What is the nature of his power while giving assent to a bill passed by the State Legislature? Is he bound by the aid and advice of his Council of Ministers in all his functions?”

  • Policing the line between publicity and justice

    Why in the News

    A public interest litigation before the Supreme Court of India seeking a nationwide media protocol for police media briefings has forced a question Indian policing has quietly avoided: under what law are photographs of accused persons published, should they be published, and where should that stop. Within minutes of an arrest a handcuffed face, flanked by policemen and sometimes garlanded with placards cataloguing the crime, circulates on social media, often before the accused is produced before a magistrate. The practice rests on a patchwork of regulations written before Independence, an identification statute and the general architecture of criminal procedure. The contested point is whether a practice carried forward as police habit can bear the constitutional weight of publishing an untried person’s identity.

    What is the legal basis cited for publishing an accused person’s photograph?

    1. Court proclamation of absconders: Section 84 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita (BNSS), 2023, which replaced Section 82 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, allows courts to proclaim absconders and publish proclamations in newspapers.
    2. General powers of the investigating officer: Publication at the investigation stage rests on the investigating officer’s general powers. Every person must assist the police in preventing and investigating offences, and an investigating officer may examine anyone with relevant information.
    3. The Hue and Cry Notice: Publishing photographs on social media to solicit identification, trace absconders or find witnesses is a digital extension of the “Hue and Cry Notice” carried in State Police Manuals.
    4. Reward announcements: Rewards are typically governed by State Police Regulations framed under the Police Act, 1861, which vest sanctioning authority in a hierarchy running from the Station House Officer (SHO) to the State government.

    Why does the investigative case for publication remain strong?

    1. Crimes solved: Photographs of wanted persons and reward notices have solved crimes and brought fugitives to book years after trails went cold.
    2. Missing children recovered: The same notices have helped recover missing children.
    3. Public capacity the force lacks: An alerted public has done what a thinly stretched police force acting alone could not.
    4. Why a ban is the wrong answer: An outright ban on soliciting public assistance would be legally unwarranted and self defeating. The defect is the absence of a legal basis, not the presence of the practice.

    Where does the patchwork fail to authorise what police actually do?

    1. No enabling or prohibiting statute: No single statute permits or prohibits police from publishing photographs of accused persons.
    2. Section 84 comes too late: The proclamation process under Section 84 is triggered only after a warrant fails. It provides no basis for publicity at the investigation stage.
    3. Photographs by practice, not provision: Section 84 says nothing about photographs. Attaching one has become settled practice because it serves the purpose of securing the person’s appearance.
    4. A vocabulary from before Independence, stretched: The State Police Manual provisions predate Independence, and their language, “description of the subject”, is broad enough only to plausibly cover photographs and rewards.
    5. The Identification Act does not reach publication: The Criminal Procedure (Identification) Act, 2022 governs the taking, storage and use of measurements including photographs for identification. It says nothing about circulating them, and is often wrongly cited as enabling publication.
    6. Rewards rest on discretion, not adjudication: A reward requires no prior warrant or proclamation. It is an exercise of administrative discretion rather than a judicial precondition.

    What constitutional limits does Article 21 impose?

    1. Article 21 jurisprudence has sharpened: The protection under Article 21 has been read more strictly over time, not more loosely.
    2. Presumption of innocence: The presumption of innocence remains central to criminal justice, and a published photograph presents guilt as settled before any charge is framed.
    3. Irreversible harm: Courts increasingly recognise that broadcasting an arrested person’s face as a fait accompli of guilt can cause real and irreversible harm. The Rajasthan High Court termed such practices “institutional humiliation”.
    4. Permanence of digital circulation: Digital circulation is permanent, searchable and indifferent to a later acquittal.
    5. Categories already barred: A juvenile in conflict with the law cannot be identified except in the child’s best interest and with the permission of the Juvenile Justice Board. A sexual assault survivor’s identity is protected by law.
    6. The category left open: The unresolved case is the ordinary adult who is accused and arrested, but not yet tried.

    What distinguishes investigative necessity from publicity?

    1. The two ends of the scale: At one end publication serves legitimate investigative necessity, covering crime prevention, public order and law and order purposes. At the other end it showcases police achievements.
    2. What showcasing costs: Photographs released merely to showcase arrests serve police optics at the accused’s expense. They can prejudice public opinion before trial.
    3. The operative test: The question before any photograph is released is whether the disclosure is necessary to the investigation, or merely convenient to the narrative.

    Can publicity be permitted without conceding the presumption of innocence?

    1. United States: American law treats “wanted” notices as public record exceptions to privacy law. Agencies are trained to frame them carefully, using “alleged” and “wanted for questioning”, so the presumption of innocence survives the appeal for help.
    2. United Kingdom: British policing takes the more conservative route and withholds the identities of arrested persons altogether.
    3. What the two demonstrate: Both systems place the safeguard in a rule rather than in individual discretion. One regulates the wording of the notice and the other removes the category from publication, and neither leaves the decision to the officer making the arrest.

    Challenges to a national police media protocol

    1. Two drafts and no protocol: A manual has been drafted twice and adopted nowhere, so practice continues under the older regulations. Eg. The Bureau of Police Research and Development shared a draft manual on media briefings with the Ministry of Home Affairs (MHA) in July 2024, and in January 2026 the Supreme Court directed the States to evolve policies within three months on a manual prepared by the amicus.
      The Fix: Codify a single uniform national protocol rather than leaving each State to evolve its own policy from the same draft.
    2. Disclosure without a proportionality test: Without a stated test, a release that is necessary and a release that is convenient look identical on the file. Eg. A photograph published to solicit identification and one published to announce an arrest are both issued under the same general powers of the investigating officer.
      The Fix: Require the protocol to distinguish proportionate, need based disclosure from prejudicial publicity, and to record the ground before release.
    3. Blackout categories resting on separate statutes: The absolute bars protect only juveniles and sexual offence complainants, and each sits in its own law rather than in a police instruction. Eg. Identification of a juvenile in conflict with the law requires the Juvenile Justice Board’s permission, a step that has no counterpart for any other category.
      The Fix: Write the blackout categories into the protocol itself, so the bar reaches the officer rather than only the court.
    4. No takedown once the purpose ends: A photograph published for an investigative purpose stays online after that purpose is served, and after a discharge or an acquittal. Eg. A search against an acquitted person’s name still returns the arrest material that was circulated.
      The Fix: Require time bound review and takedown once the investigative purpose is served, or the accused is discharged or acquitted.
    5. Variation from State to State: Each State frames its own police regulations, so the same act is permitted in one State and not in another. Eg. Reward sanctioning authority under State Police Regulations runs from the Station House Officer up to the State government, and that hierarchy differs by State.
      The Fix: Apply the protocol uniformly across States, so the rule does not change with the place of arrest.

    Conclusion

    Publication of an accused person’s face is one of the few police powers in India with no statute behind it and no bar against it. The decision therefore rests where it should not, with the officer whose case the publicity also serves, and the harm falls on a person the law still treats as innocent. Two drafts of a protocol now exist and neither governs anything. The marker to watch is whether the States file the policies the Supreme Court directed, and whether those policies carry a necessity test and a takedown obligation rather than a restatement of existing practice.

    Back2Basics: Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023

    1. What it replaced: The BNSS is one of three central criminal laws that came into force on 1 July 2024, replacing the colonial era framework entirely. It replaces the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973.
    2. Trial timelines: The BNSS mandates judgment within 45 days of the completion of arguments. Trials must commence within 60 days of the first hearing.
    3. Zero First Information Report codified: The BNSS codifies the Zero First Information Report (FIR) in Section 173, so an FIR must be registered even where the offence occurred outside that station’s jurisdiction.
    4. Custody limits: Total detention without a chargesheet is 60 days for an offence punishable with less than 10 years, and 90 days where the punishment is death, life or 10 years or more. Crossing that limit makes default bail an indefeasible right.

    Matching Previous Year Question

    “[2017, GS2, 15 marks] Examine the scope of Fundamental Rights in the light of the latest judgement of the Supreme Court on Right to Privacy.”