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Type: Op-ed

  • Towards digital Atmanirbharta

    We need a comprehensive FDI policy on trade to take care of the needs of all the stakeholders. The article highlights the issues faced by the e-commerce sector in relation to the FDI policy.

    E-commerce as an enabler

    • With their efficient, quick and reliable logistics network, e-commerce platforms have nudged consumer behaviour patterns from an offline to an online shopping mode.
    • During the pandemic, e-commerce emerged as an enabler in ensuring the availability of essentials to the masses.
    • E-commerce is going to be increasingly important in the future of retail shopping in India and the world over.
    • It is estimated to become a $100 billion industry by 2024, which was at $38.5 billion until 2017.
    •  The trend will continue to grow with the government’s impetus on digital literacy, also supported by the increasing penetration of internet and smartphone users.
    • However, what the sector lacks is the bandwidth of operation.

    Issues with FDI policy for e-commerce

    • In addition to the FDI Policy/FEMA, other laws such as IT Act, Consumer Protection Act, and those pertaining to IP and copyright, regulate the e-commerce sector in India.
    • Of these, the FDI policy plays an important role as massive investments are needed to build and strengthen the entire ecosystem of the e-commerce sector in the country.
    • FDI policies on trade have evolved over time as policy-making was done from time to time mostly responding to the needs of the market coupled with political feasibility.
    • Thus, FDI policy in cash and carry or wholesale B2B operations is different (100 per cent FDI allowed under automatic route) compared to highly restrictive FDI policy on retail B2C trade.
    • Similarly, an artificial distinction was created between single-brand retail and multi-brand retail as opposition to multi-brand retail was strong: 100 per cent FDI is allowed under automatic route in single-brand retail whereas FDI regime in multi-brand retail is quite restricted.
    • E-commerce is not allowed under FDI policy in multi-brand retail.
    • The FDI policy on e-commerce is quite different as e-commerce platforms are allowed to work only as a marketplace with permission to provide certain specified services to sellers and buyers.
    • However, FDI is allowed in the inventory model when these platforms sell fresh farm produce made in India.
    • There is no specific policy on FDI in e-commerce for exports.

    Need for comprehensive FDI policy for trade

    • The rapid expansion of the retail, organised retail as well e-commerce sector in India in the coming years will create huge opportunities for all.
    • The policies that have evolved over time need a relook to balance the interests of all in a win-win policy.
    • Today, our small businesses employing an exceptionally large number of workers need to use e-commerce more and more to augment their sales.
    • E-commerce provides them with the means to access a much bigger market without having to overly invest in marketing. This should include more and more foreign markets.
    • Consumers have benefited enormously from e-commerce.
    • Also, the harmonious working of online and offline retailers is essential.
    • With GST and the drive towards digitisation, more small traders need to be enabled to make the transition and take advantage of the expanding opportunities.

    Consider the question “Why e-commerce sector is important for the economy of a country? What are the issues the sector faces in India?” 

    Conclusion

    Public policy on e-commerce needs to place an equal premium on the views and interests of all the stakeholders in the ecosystem to strengthen our domestic businesses and create many more jobs and livelihood opportunities in the country to fulfil the dreams of Atmanirbhar Bharat.

  • Politics, geography and demography shape Naxal movement

    The article explains the issues with the two common themes adopted for explaining the Naxal movement in India.

    Two approaches to explain Naxal movement

    1) Root cause and alienation approach

    • The recent attack in and around Tekulagudem village in Sukma district demonstrates the threat posed by Maoists.
    • The post-incident analysis of such setbacks comes in two flavours.
    • The most popular theory amongst our intelligentsia and media is the root cause and alienation approach. 
    • This approach states that it is the failure of the Indian state to provide economic development and social justice to the tribals living in these areas that has fuelled the Naxal movement and sustained it for five decades.
    • As a prescription, a development-centric approach and negotiations are suggested as the way forward.

    Issues with root cause and alienation approach

    • There are several problems with this approach.
    • First, it ignores the ideological foundations of the movement, specifically its rejection of India’s Constitution and democracy.
    • Second, it fails to see that social and economic deprivation is not unique to the jungles of Chhattisgarh.
    • Third, it doesn’t account for the possibility that while alienation and deprivation may help in igniting the spark of revolution, once lit the flames draw oxygen from many sources.
    • Fourth, the role of external forces in fomenting and sustaining this movement is deliberately underplayed.
    • Fifth, the grubby ground reality of the praxis of revolution is conveniently swept under the carpet.
    • The organised extortion racket from all economic stakeholders in the Naxal-affected areas by our alienated revolutionaries seldom gets talked about.
    • Sixth, the extensive ideological, financial and logistical ecosystem that provides sustenance to these revolutionaries in the jungle is seldom acknowledged.

    2) Leadership issue

    • According to this view, our tactical failures against the Maoists are entirely due to the poor quality of leadership provided by the Indian Police Service.
    • The when, where, how of a setback simply don’t matter.
    • When in doubt, identify the first IPS officer in the chain of command and hoist him on the petard of tactical incompetence.
    • This view completely ignores the many successes of IPS leadership in counterinsurgency operations in Punjab, Andhra Pradesh, Uttar Pradesh and most recently in Odisha.
    • Even in the Northeast and Jammu and Kashmir, where the Indian Army provides the backbone of the counterinsurgency grid, the police forces of the respective states and their IPS leadership play a crucial role in gathering intelligence and in executing operations.
    • So, the failures and setbacks in the Naxal areas of Chhattisgarh need to be placed in perspective.

    Way forward

    • The fact that the Indian state has adopted a broad policy of economic development, military restraint and gradual attrition and rejected indiscriminate violence in the Naxal theatre is the democratically prudent and morally just course of action.
    • This hasn’t dissuaded Maoist sympathisers from gaining international attention through relentless propaganda against our security forces.
    • However, such attacks also help in exposing their true nature and hardening public resolve against them.
    •  \We have enough examples of successful, police led CI Ops in our country.
    • Why we are not able to replicate these successes in Chhattisgarh is a matter of larger political issues, well beyond the narrow scope of operational tactics and individual lapses of police leadership.
    • Not just the politics, the geography and demography of the Naxal-affected areas, make it an even more complex challenge of internal security.

    Consider the question “What are the factors that make Naxal movement a persistent threat to India’s internal security? ” 

    Conclusion

    Not just the politics, the geography and demography of the Naxal-affected areas, make it an even more complex challenge of internal security.

  • Issues with ordinance in India

    Repromulgation of ordinances raises several questions and it also goes against the Supreme Court judgement. The article explains the issues involved.

    Ordinance route and issues with it

    • The central government has repromulgated the ordinance that establishes a commission for air quality management in the National Capital Region.
    • This raises questions about the practice of issuing ordinances to make law, and that of re-issuing ordinances without getting them ratified by Parliament.
    • Law making is a legislative function, this power is provided for urgent requirements, and the law thus made has an automatic expiry at the end of six weeks from the time Legislature next meets.

    How frequent is the use of ordinance route

    • In the 1950s, central ordinances were issued at an average of 7.1 per year.
    • The number peaked in the 1990s at 19.6 per year, and declined to 7.9 per year in the 2010s. 
    • The last couple of years has seen a spike, 16 in 2019, 15 in 2020, and four till now this year.
    • States have also been using the ordinance route to enact laws.
    • For example, in 2020, Kerala issued 81 ordinances, while Karnataka issued 24 and Maharashtra 21.
    • Kerala has also repromulgated ordinances.

    What the Supreme Court said

    • The issue was brought up in the Supreme Court through a writ petition by D.C. Wadhwa.
    • He found out that Bihar had issued 256 ordinances between 1967 and 1981, of which 69 were repromulgated several times, including 11 which were kept alive for more than 10 years.
    • A five-judge Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court, in 1986, ruled that repromulgation of ordinances was contrary to the Constitutional scheme.
    • The judgment did not stop the practice.
    • Instead, the Centre also started to follow the lead of Bihar.
    • For example, in 2013 and 2014, the Securities Laws (Amendment) ordinance was promulgated three times.
    • Similarly, an ordinance to amend the Land Acquisition Act was issued in December 2014, and repromulgated twice – in April and May 2015.
    • The matter came up again in the Supreme Court in  2017, a seven-judge Constitution Bench declared this practice to be unconstitutional and declared it to be a fraud on the Constitution.
    • Even this judgment has been ignored.
    • The Indian Medical Council Amendment Ordinance was issued in September 2018, and reissued in January 2019.

    Way forward

    • Ordinances are to tackle exigencies when the legislature is not in session, and expire at the end of six weeks of the next meeting of the legislature.
    • This time period is given for the legislature to decide whether such a law is warranted.
    • Repromulgation is not permitted as that would be a usurpation of legislative power by the executive.
    • As governments, both at the Centre and States, are violating this principle, the legislatures and the courts should check the practice.
    • By not checking this practice, the other two organs are also abdicating their responsibility to the Constitution.

    Consider the question “What are the issues with the repormulgation of ordinances by the government? Suggest the measures to deal with the issue.”

    Conclusion

    As the Supreme Court said, repromulgation would most certainly be a colourable exercise of power for the Government and it needs to be avoided.

  • The great Afghan microcosm

    The article highlights how players at 3 levels: global, regional and local level influence Afghan dynamics.

    Role of global powers in Afghanistan

    1) What the US exit from Afghanistan mean

    • The exit of US and NATO forces from Afghanistan underlines the end of the unipolar moment in international affairs.
    • Ending US military involvement, however, does not necessarily make Washington marginal to the future evolution of Afghanistan.
    • The US remains the most significant global power even after the end of the unipolar moment.
    • Its ability to weigh in on multiple issues is considerable.
    • President Joe Biden is under some pressure at home not to be seen as abandoning Afghanistan.
    • Nor can the US President ignore the dangers of Afghanistan re-emerging as a breeding ground for international terrorism.
    • The US will figure prominently in any Taliban strategy to win international diplomatic recognition and political legitimacy.
    • It will also need Western economic assistance for stabilising the war-torn country.

    2) Russia’s role in Afghanistan

    • Russia is determined to play an important role in the future of Afghanistan.
    • As a member of the UNSC, the joint leader of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation with China, and a major source of weapons, Russian clout is real.
    • Above all, Putin brings plenty of political will to compensate for Moscow’s loss of superpower status as we have seen across the world, from Venezuela to Myanmar and Mozambique to Syria.

    3) How China will benefit from the US withdrawal

    • If the US is a distant power, China is Afghanistan’s neighbour.
    • Unlike Russia, China can deliver massive economic resources to Afghanistan under the umbrella of the Belt and Road Initiative.
    • China’s expanding relations with the different nations of the Gulf and Central Asia and a deep partnership with Pakistan lends much potential depth to Beijing’s role in Afghanistan.
    • Both Kabul and the Taliban have seen China as a valuable partner in the pursuit of their divergent interests.
    • Beijing has often talked of extending the China Pakistan Economic Corridor to Afghanistan.
    • However, China is vulnerable to the extremist politics of the region that fan the flames of religious and ethnic separatism in its Xinjiang province.

    Regional powers influencing Afghan dynamics

    • One of the biggest concern about the Afghan future is the kind of influence Islamic radicals might regain in the country under Taliban rule and its consequences for the subcontinent, Central Asia, and the Middle East.
    • Pakistan and Iran, which share long physical borders, have had the greatest natural influence on land-locked Afghanistan.
    • When the Taliban ruled Afghanistan, Saudi Arabia and the UAE were the only countries other than Pakistan to recognise the government-run by its leader, Mullah Omar.
    • They have taken a back seat in the current round of Afghan diplomacy, but would certainly return to the centre stage sooner than later.
    • Meanwhile, bold Qatar and ambitious Turkey have injected themselves into the Afghan jousting.

    Influence of local actors

    • The local actors in Afghanistan have agency of their own.
    • All of them know how to manipulate external powers for their own ends in Afghanistan.
    • The image of the Taliban as a creature of the Pakistan army is misleading, the Taliban is quite capable of making independent deals with the rest of the world.
    • The Taliban’s opponents, too, are likely to fight for their interests and will seek out external partners.

    Consider the question “Discarding old hesitations and building new geopolitical coalitions will be critical for a successful Indian engagement with the Afghan microcosm. Comment.” 

    Conclusion

    Several contentions unfolding in and around Afghanistan promise to reorder the region again. Delhi needs much strategic activism to secure its interests and promote regional stability in this flux.

  • India and Russia look for a reset

    Avoiding military alliances and retaining its strategic autonomy could help India play an important role in geopolitics at the same time maintaining the diversity in its relationships.

    Transformation in India-Russia relations

    • The principal objective of the Russian Foreign Minister was to prepare the ground for the visit of President Vladimir Putin later this year.
    • The Indian perspective on the Indo-Pacific was conveyed to the Foreign Minister of Russia.
    •  India insists that its Indo-Pacific initiatives seek a cooperative order, that the Quad is not the nucleus of a politico-military alliance.
    • A $1 billion Indian line of credit for projects in the Russian Far East and activation of a Chennai-Vladivostok maritime corridor were announced in 2019.
    • The message was that India’s effort to restrain Chinese aggression is compatible with Russia’s vision of a Eurasian partnership.
    • Russia remains unconvinced, either because it feels India’s words do not match its actions or because of its close ties with China.

    China factor in India-Russia relations

    • India is concerned about Russia’s China embrace, encompassing close political, economic and defence cooperation: Russia accounted for 77% of China’s arms imports in 2016-20.
    • India’s apprehensions about their technology- and intelligence-sharing were heightened by Mr. Putin’s remark that he would not rule out a future Russia-China military alliance. 

    Russia-Pakistan relations

    • Foreign Minister visited Pakistan directly after India — the first time a Russian Minister has done so.
    • .He confirmed that Russia would strengthen Pakistan’s “counter-terrorism capability” .
    • Russia is now Pakistan’s second-largest defence supplier, accounting for 6.6% of its arms imports in 2016-20.
    • Their cooperation includes joint “counter-terrorism” drills and sharing perspectives on military tactics and strategic doctrines.

    Factors to consider about defence cooperation with Russia

    • Despite being a major defence supplier of China and Pakistan, Russia remains a major supplier of cutting-edge military technologies to India.
    • The Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) records that Russia supplied 49% of India’s arms imports in 2016-20.
    • SIPRI estimates that recent orders for Russian arms could boost future import figures. T
    • his is a reality check.
    • Defence cooperation is not a transactional exchange. Sharing of technologies and strategies is underpinned by a mutual commitment to protection of confidentiality.
    • Sustainable defence cooperation is based on a credible assurance that what is transferred to our adversaries will not blunt the effectiveness of our weapons systems.
    • In this already complex mix, the American sanctions legislation, CAATSA (Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act), adds an external layer of complexity.

    Criticality of geography influence India’s relationship with Russia and China

    • The Eurasian landmass to India’s north is dominated by Russia and China.
    • Strategic and security interests in Central Asia, West Asia and Afghanistan dictate our engagement with the region and the connectivity projects linking it, like the International North-South Transport Corridor through Iran.
    • India cannot vacate this space to a Russia-China condominium (with Pakistan in tow), without potentially grave security consequences.

    The broader geopolitical context

    • The principal element in this is the drive for the superpower status of a powerful, assertive China.
    • The U.S., as the pre-eminent superpower, seeks to retard this process.
    • In a deviation from classical geopolitical strategy, the U.S. is taking on both China and Russia.
    • This move is driving Russia and China together and arguably accelerating the move to bipolarity.
    • Even so, the differentials in military, economic and political power across countries may complicate the emergence of two clear poles of the Cold War variety.
    • A decline in Western hostility to Russia could add to the complexity, if Russia takes the opportunity to loosen the Chinese embrace and position itself as a pole in the multipolar world.

    Consider the question “The depth of India’s relationship with Russia will depend on the willingness and capacity of both countries to show mutual sensitivity to core security concerns. Comment.” 

    Conclusion

    India has to explore the space within these processes to maximise its global influence by steering clear of alliances and retaining the autonomy of policy.

  • Agriculture policy should target India’s actual farming population

    The article highlights the ambiguity about the number of farmers in India and related issues.

    How many farmers does India really have

    • The Agriculture Ministry’s last Input Survey for 2016-17 pegged the total operational holdings at 146.19 million.
    • The NABARD All India Rural Financial Inclusion Survey of the same year estimated the country’s “agricultural households” at 100.7 million.
    • The Pradhan Mantri Kisan Samman Nidhi (PM-Kisan) has around 111.5 million enrolled beneficiaries.
    • Agricultural households, as per NABARD’s definition, cover any household whose value of produce from farming activities is more than Rs 5,000 during a year.
    • That obviously is too little to qualify as living income.

    Who is real farmer

    • Agricultural households, as per NABARD’s definition, cover any household whose value of produce from farming activities is more than Rs 5,000 during a year.
    • That obviously is too little to qualify as living income.
    • A “real” farmer is someone who would derive a significant part of his/her income from agriculture.
    • This, one can reasonably assume, requires growing at least two crops in a year.
    • The 2016-17 Input Survey report shows that out of the total 157.21 million hectares (mh) of farmland with 146.19 million holdings, only 140 mh was cultivated.
    • And even out of this net sown area, a mere 50.48 mh was cropped two times or more, which includes 40.76 mh of irrigated and 9.72 mh of un-irrigated land.
    • Taking the average holding size of 1.08 hectares for 2016-17, the number of “serious full-time farmers” cultivating a minimum of two crops a year  would be hardly 47 million.
    • The above figure is also consistent with other data from the Input Survey.
    • These pertain to the number of cultivators planting certified/high yielding seeds (59.01 million), using own or hired tractors (72.29 million) and electric/diesel engine pumpsets (45.96 million), and availing institutional credit (57.08 million).
    • Whichever metric one considers, the farmer population significantly engaged and dependent on agriculture as a primary source of income is well within 50-75 million.
    • The current agriculture crisis is largely about these 50-75 million farm households.

    Lack of price parity

    • At the heart of farmers’ crisis is the absence of price parity.
    • In 1970-71, when the minimum support price (MSP) of wheat was Rs 76 per quintal, 10 grams of 24-carat gold cost about Rs 185.
    •  Today, the wheat MSP is at Rs 1,975/quintal, gold prices are Rs 45,000/10g.
    • The absence of farm price parity didn’t hurt much initially when crop productivity was rising.
    • Since the 1990s, yields have further gone up to 5.1-5.2 tonnes/hectare in wheat and 6.4-6.5 tonnes for paddy. But so have production costs. 
    • The demand for making MSP a legal right is basically a demand for price parity that gives agricultural commodities sufficient purchasing power with respect to things bought by farmers.

    Way forward

    • Most government welfare schemes are aimed at poverty alleviation and uplifting those at the bottom of the pyramid.
    • But there’s no policy for those in the “middle” and in danger of slipping to the bottom.
    •  When crop prices fail to keep pace with escalating costs — of not only inputs, but everything the farmer buys — the impact is on the 50-75 million surplus producers.
    • Any “agriculture policy” has to first and foremost address the problem of price parity.
    • Farmers’ interest be even better served by the government guaranteeing a minimum “income” rather than “price” support.
    • Subsistence or part-time agriculturalists, on the other hand, would benefit more from welfare schemes and other interventions to boost non-farm employment.

    Conclusion

    Whether it is crop, livestock or poultry, agriculture policy has to focus on “serious full-time farmers”, most of them neither rich nor poor. This rural middle class that was once very confident of its future in agriculture today risks going out of business. That shouldn’t be allowed to happen.

  • The Election Commission of India cannot be a super government

    The article highlights the issue of lack of clarity on the extent of the power of the Election Commission of India.

    Where ECI derives its power from

    • Supreme Court held in Mohinder Singh Gill vs Chief Election Commissioner that Article 324 contains plenary powers to ensure free and fair elections.
    • These plenary powers are vested in the ECI which can take all necessary steps to achieve this constitutional object.
    • Thus, the model code of conduct has been issued in exercise of its powers under Article 324.
    • Besides the code, the ECI issues from time to time directions, instructions and clarifications on a host of issues which crop up in the course of an election.

    The model code of conduct

    • The model code of conduct issued by the ECI is a set of guidelines meant for political parties, candidates and governments to adhere to during an election.
    • This code is based on consensus among political parties.
    • The model code is observed by all stakeholders for fear of action by the ECI.
    • However, there exists a considerable amount of confusion about the extent and nature of the powers which are available to the ECI in enforcing the code as well as its other decisions in relation to an election.

    Issues with model code of conduct

    1) Issue of enforceability

    • As the code of conduct is framed on the basis of a consensus among political parties, it has not been given any legal backing.
    • A committee of Parliament recommended that the code should be made a part of the Representation of the People Act 1951.
    • However, the ECI did not agree to it on the ground that once it becomes a part of the law, all matters connected with the enforcement of the code will be taken to court, which would delay elections.
    • But then the question about the enforceability of the code remains unresolved.
    • Paragraph 16A of the Election Symbols (Reservation and Allotment) Order, 1968 says that the commission may suspend or withdraw recognition of a recognised political party if it refuses to observe the model code of conduct.
    • But it is doubtful whether this provision is legally sustainable.
    • When the code is legally not enforceable, how can the ECI resort to a punitive action such as withdrawal of recognition?

    2) Transfer of officials

    • Observers of ECI report to it about the conduct of certain officials of the States where elections are to be held.
    • Transfer of an official is within the exclusive jurisdiction of the government.
    • It is actually not clear whether the ECI can transfer a State government official in exercise of the general powers under Article 324 or under the model code.
    • Transfer of an official is within the exclusive jurisdiction of the government.
    • It is actually not clear whether the ECI can transfer a State government official in exercise of the general powers under Article 324 or under the model code.
    • Further, to assume that a police officer or a civil servant will be able to swing the election in favour of the ruling party is extremely unrealistic and naive.

    3) ECI’s intervention in administrative decisions

    • According to the model code, Ministers cannot announce any financial grants in any form, make any promise of construction of roads, provision of drinking water facilities, etc or make any ad hoc appointments in the government. departments or public undertakings.
    • These are the core guidelines relating to the government.
    • But in reality, no government is allowed by the ECI to take any action, administrative or otherwise, if the ECI believes that such actions or decisions will affect free and fair elections.
    • A recent decision of the ECI to stop the Government of Kerala from continuing to supply kits containing rice, pulses, cooking oil, etc is a case in point.
    • The Supreme Court had in S. Subramaniam Balaji vs Govt. of T. Nadu & Ors (2013) held that the distribution of colour TVs, computers, cycles, goats, cows, etc, done or promised by the government is in the nature of welfare measures and is in accordance with the directive principles of state policy, and therefore it is permissible during an election.
    • So, how can the distribution of essential food articles which are used to stave off starvation be electoral malpractice?

    Consider the question “The model code of conduct issued by the Election Commission of India is in the forms of guidelines and lacks legal backing. In light of this, examine the issues that arise due to the lack of legal backing.”

    Conclusion

    There is no doubt that the ECI, through the conduct of free and fair elections in an extremely complex country, has restored the purity of the legislative bodies. However, no constitutional body is vested with unguided and absolute powers.

  • Vaccine diplomacy that needs specific clarifications

    Amid the second wave of covid pandemic, India’s decision to supply vaccine to foreign countries has been questioned from various quarters. The article deals with this issue.

    Issue of vaccine supply to foreign countries

    • While responding to a question  Minister of State in the Ministry of External Affairs noted that India was sending these vaccines abroad in the form of grant, commercial sales of manufacturers GAVI’s COVAX facility.
    • The supply to GAVI’s COVAX facility is an obligation since India is a member of this multilateral body and also a recipient of vaccines from this body.
    • By doing this, India wishes to signal that it is a responsible global power which does not self-obsessively think of itself alone.
    • This desire to be a good global citizen can be traced to the Objective Resolution moved by Jawaharlal Nehru in the Constituent Assembly on December 13, 1946.
    • The premise of the ideal ‘Vasudhaiva Kutumbakam’ is no different to that of the Objective Resolution.

    Factors to consider

    • The government made estimates of the vaccines that could be sent abroad on the interplay of three factors: domestic production, the demands of the national vaccine programme and requests for vaccines manufactured in India.
    • What is not known is how these factors were collectively addressed in the decision-making process.
    • It is also argued that it was obligatory to send vaccines contracted under GAVI’s COVAX facility.
    • However, sovereign states can always invoke supreme national interest to over-ride obligations.
    • Certainly, the vaccines sent as grants were voluntary and the commercial contracts of the company concerned could always be disregarded under existing laws.

    Conclusion

    The government needs to convince Indians that the vaccine exports have not been made at the cost of their health.

  • The roots of a decentred international order

    With the declining American supremacy in the global order, the world is set for new global order led by the developing countries. The article deals with this rise of alternate global order.

    Factors that explains decentred and pluralistic global order

    • The international order is under threat of the rising economic power of the BRICS nations, with China dominating in its economic and military capacity.
    • It is apparent that the future of global politics requires a significant agenda in the hands of the rising powers that are aggressively building a parallel economic order envisaging new centres of hegemonic power.
    •  It forebodes the final decline of American ascendancy.
    • It was the Bandung Conference of 1955, a meeting of Asian and African states, most of which were newly independent, that set the schema for the rise of Asia, politically and economically.
    • The confrontational stance was therefore the expected corollary in third world struggles to create a parallel order.
    •  America will continue to play a prime role in international affairs though its image representing universal brotherhood has sharply declined under the Trump regime.
    • The rising tide of far-right ultra-nationalism and ethnic purity experienced in the Brexit phenomena, in Trumpism and in the promotion of the right-wing agenda in India, has set in motion the wearing down of liberal democracy.
    • Other threats such as terrorism, ethnic conflicts and the warning of annihilation owing to climate change necessarily demand joint international action where American “exceptionalism” becomes an incongruity and an aberration.
    • This indeed has chipped away at the American global supremacy.
    • The world is, as a result, witness to a more decentred and pluralistic global order.

    New world order led by developing countries

    • Though pandemic has ravaged economies such as Brazil, India, Turkey and South Africa into a downward spiral, in the post-pandemic period, these economies would rise to meet the American-led liberal hegemonic world order.
    •  With China spearheading Asian regionalism, a serious challenge is possible.
    • China must strengthen the opposition to the West through the promotion of regional multilateral institutions.
    •  More than having individual partners or allies, China must embrace and give a push to multilateral affiliations in order to not further exacerbate regional tensions.
    • Power rivalry in a multipolar world would remain a possibility with military conflict not ruled out.
    • However, the capabilities of the rising economies cannot be underestimated.
    • China and India clearly have the age-old potential to lead as, historically, they have been pioneers of some of the oldest civilisations in the world.
    • China is indisputably a serious rival to the U.S. in the South China Sea, a world leader in renewable energy, and a formidable actor on the global stage of investment and trade, penetrating India, Israel, Ethiopia and Latin America.
    • Thus, a kind of dualism persists in the world order with no clear hegemony that can be bestowed on one single nation.

    Conclusion

    It is feared that there could be a possibility of a multipolar world turning disordered and unstable, but it is up to the rising nations to attempt to overcome territorial aspirations and strike a forceful note of faith on cultural mediation, worldwide legitimacy, and the appeal of each society in terms of its democratic values.

     

  • The march towards an equitable data economy

    The article explains the data governance norms we need to adopt to secure better societal outcomes.

    Whatsapp privacy issue

    • New terms of service circulated by WhatsApp, caused a stir among the user.
    • It informed users that data about chats with business accounts would be shared with Facebook.
    • These policies seemed unfair to India as they were not applicable to the European Union (EU), given their strong data protection policies.

    Acceptable levels of data exchange

    • Default norms provide power to the tech platforms to collect, analyse and monetize data with complete control.
    • This undergirds business models that seem undesirable for society—with harms to privacy and free speech.
    • Global discussions about alternatives to the “exchange of data for free services” are becoming nuanced.

    3 Norms in the data governance

    1) Recognition of individual and collective rights related to data

    • It was generally accepted that extraction of data to access free services was a fair exchange with individuals.
    • Emergence of existential threats related to privacy and democracy have highlighted the role of guaranteeing human and civil rights.
    • There has been significant global progress through regulations on individual data rights.
    • A United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) report claims that 128 of 194 countries have put in place legislations for data protection and privacy.
    • However, this protection is insufficient as it is centered on individuals and does not account for safety of groups.
    • The next wave of data governance ideas will seek to protect collective harms and build on the foundation of individual agency and control.

    2) Data sovereignty

    • One-size-fits all global norms of data governance are changing and being replaced by region-specific ideas.
    • Greater acceptance for “data sovereignty” assertions across India and Europe is a welcome shift towards crafting governance that is respectful of local nuances and inclusive of civic participation.
    • The EU general data protection regulation (GDPR) had created an early lighthouse example.
    • On the other hand, the US has adopted a light regulation approach—there is no comprehensive country-wide data protection law.
    • Closer home, India is finalizing the contours of a country-wide and cross-sector personal data protection bill, which reflects local norms.

    3) Value creation for all stakeholders

    • So far, data economy has operated in a completely unregulated space, creating a “winner takes all” market, with concentrated profits and little contribution to local taxes.
    • A healthy economy requires value creation for all stakeholders.
    • As tech platforms take up the profitable role of acting as the gateway to all information and social connections, they have a greater accountability and responsibility to contribute to the economy.
    • India’s digital tax through the 2% “equalization levy” is an attempt to make the tech giants pay for revenues earned in India.

    Consider the question “What should be norms of data governance we must adopt for achieving better societal outcomes?”

    Conclusion

    Formal adoption of regulations and setting up of enforcement institutions will lead to meaningful progress in the right direction.