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GS Paper: GS2-18.Bilateral, regional and global groupings and agreements involving India and/or affecting India’s interests.

  • China’s new Maritime Law

    China’s new maritime rules designed to control the entry of foreign vessels in what Beijing calls “Chinese territorial waters” take effect.

    What is the new Maritime Law?

    • Foreign vessels, both military and commercial, will be henceforth required to submit to Chinese supervision in “Chinese territorial waters,” as per the new law.
    • Operators of submersibles, nuclear vessels, ships carrying radioactive materials, and ships carrying bulk oil, chemicals, liquefied gas, and other toxic and harmful substances are required to report their detailed information upon their visits to Chinese territorial waters.
    • Vessels that “endanger the maritime traffic safety of China” will be required to report their name, call sign, current position and next port of call, and estimated time of arrival.
    • The name of shipborne dangerous goods and cargo deadweight will also be required.

    Impact of the move

    • The move is expected to have far-reaching consequences for the passage of vessels, both commercial and military, in the disputed South China Sea, East China Sea, and Taiwan Strait.
    • It is likely to escalate the existing tension with the US and its neighbors in the region.

    Why is this important?

    • South China Sea: The South China Sea, which lies between China, Taiwan, the Philippines, Brunei, Malaysia, Indonesia, and Vietnam, is of great economic importance globally.
    • Shipping: Nearly one-third of the world’s shipping passes through its lanes, and the waters house numerous important fisheries.

    Significance for India

    • The South China Sea is a critical route for India, both militarily and commercially.
    • It plays a vital role in facilitating India’s trade with Japan, South Korea, and ASEAN countries, and assists in the efficient procurement of energy supplies.
    • More than 55% of India’s trade passes through the South China Sea and Malacca Straits.
    • India is also involved in oil and gas exploration in offshore blocks in the margins of the Sea, which has led to standoffs with Chinese authorities.

    The actual row

    • The waters around China are hotly contested.
    • Under a “nine-dash line” map, China claims most of the South China Sea as its sovereign territory.
    • This claim is contested by its neighbors in the region and by the United States, which, though it has no claim in the Sea, backs the smaller nations in the fight against Chinese overreach.

    International position

    • Currently, international maritime activities are governed by an international agreement called the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS).
    • China, India, and over a hundred other countries are signatories of UNCLOS (the US, significantly, is not).
    • Accordingly, states have the right to implement territorial rights up to 12 nautical miles into the sea.
    • The UNCLOS also states that all vessels have the right of “innocent passage” through this region – China’s new law violates this.

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  • India must rethink ‘wait and watch’ Afghan policy

    Context

    After the collapse of the government in Kabul, India has adopted a wait and watch approach in its dealing with the Taliban.

    Taliban’s position in Afghanistan

    • The Taliban grip over Afghanistan will only strengthen unless there is a popular revolt against it in the cities.
    • The Panjshiri defiance is unlikely to go anywhere without considerable and abiding support from the US and a firm commitment from Tajikistan.
    • After a talk between leaders of the extinguished Afghan Republic and the Taliban on central government formation, there has been no news of the process for more than a week.
    • There is continuous pressure on Taliban leaders and Pakistan from the Western donor community for the formation of a government acceptable to it.
    • Some Taliban leaders would want financial flows to continue to prevent a collapse of the Afghan economy.

    The approach of the international community toward the Taliban

    • Assurances would be sought from the Taliban not only by the West but also by Russia and China that there will be no attempt to put in place the 1990s practices of the Islamic Emirate on gender issues and the more medieval manifestations of the Sharia.
    • Commitment to anti-terrorism: US will keep close scrutiny on the Taliban to honor its commitment to al Qaeda and will demand that it continues to cooperate on ISIS-K extermination, an objective shared by Russia.
    • Diplomatic recognition of a Taliban government, including allowing it to occupy the United Nations seat in the forthcoming future will depend on its acceptability.
    • However, the US and EU will not be reluctant to maintain open and direct contact with a Taliban government.

    Issues with India’s wait and watch policy

    • India continues to “wait and watch” Afghan developments.
    • What is being overlooked is that “strategic patience” cannot be an alibi for inaction.
    • The invocation of the British Raj policy of “masterly inactivity” by some scholars defies logic for it applied in a completely different context.
    • Recognition v. legitimacy: Besides, while diplomatic recognition or its denial is a specific act of a country in inter-state relations, “legitimacy” is more applicable in the internal jurisdiction of countries.
    • India “waited and watched” Afghan developments from the sidelines, at least since the US-Taliban deal.
    • How long will India continue to “wait and watch”?

    Way forward

    • Establish open contact: To explore the Taliban’s approaches towards India there is an obvious need to establish open and direct contacts with it.
    • That will also allow India to convey its red lines.
    • This should not be confused with diplomatic recognition.
    • Welcome Afghans: The establishment of open contacts with the Taliban will not be contradictory to actively welcome those Afghans, irrespective of their faith, who are closely connected with India.

    Consider the question “What are the implications of the return of the Taliban in Afghanistan for India? What should be India’s approach in dealing with the Taliban controlled Afghanistan?”

    Conclusion

    It would damage India’s reputation greatly and into the future, if perceptions grow, as they are growing, that India has abandoned its friends in Afghanistan at the time of their need.

  • Taliban and new realpolitik

    Context

    As the last American soldiers fly out of Kabul airport and the world adapts to the return of the Taliban, three uncomfortable but enduring features of international politics have come into sharp focus.

    1) The normalisation of the Taliban by the International community

    • That victories on the battlefield have political consequences is one of the fundamental features of international politics.
    • There is no reason for India to be surprised at the rapid normalisation of the Taliban by the international community.
    • Whether it likes the new and victorious sovereign or not, a government has the obligation to secure its national interests — ranging from the protection of its citizens and property to maintaining the regional balance of power.
    • India is not immune to this essential principle of international relations and will find ways to protect its stakes in Afghanistan under Taliban rule.

    2) Future U.S. relations with the Taliban

    • The second enduring feature of world politics — that there are no permanent friends or enemies, only permanent interests.
    • Convergence of interests: The US would want to explore if the Taliban can help secure long-term American interests in preventing a regrouping of international terror outfits like the al Qaeda and ISIS in Afghanistan.
    • The Taliban on the other hand would want American and Western support in rebuilding Afghanistan.
    • It is by no means clear if such a deal can be clinched, given the big risks it presents to both sides.
    • The US engagement with the Taliban to counter the ISIS-K has been met with derision across the world.
    • Critics say all these groups are part of the same school of terror, driven by similar religious zeal and nurtured in Pakistan’s sanctuaries.

    3) Exploit the differences between adversaries: Way forward for India

    • The third feature of international politics is that differences even among the closest of friends are natural and always offer openings to adversaries.
    • For India, the main interest is in preventing Afghan soil from being used by anti-India terror groups.
    • At least a section of the Taliban is eager to continue political and commercial engagement with India.
    • This is part of a natural quest for a diversified set of international partnerships.
    • India would be right to wait patiently on the Taliban’s ability to deliver on these promises and stand up against the Pakistan army’s pressures to keep India out.
    • Exploit the contradictions: India should not rule out contradictions between Pakistan and the terror groups it has nurtured as well as among various jihadi organisations.
    • Despite its powerful appeal, religious ideology has failed to build durable political coalitions within and across nations.

    Conclusion

    Given this history, it is unwise for Delhi to paint the external challenges arising from the Afghan tumult as a single coherent force. The Panchatantra has a more sensible strategy to offer — try and divide your potential adversaries and strengthen your internal unity.

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  • India must leverage its unique strengths in remaining engaged with Kabul

    Context

    In the chaos that has followed the Taliban takeover of Kabul on August 15, India has been relatively silent.

    India’s role in Afghanistan’s development

    • India’s role spanned three areas in Afghanistan:
    • In terms of infrastructure building and development assistance, encompassing all 34 provinces of the country.
    • In terms of building democracy, helping script the Constitution and hold elections.
    • In terms of educational investment, allowing thousands of young Afghans to study, be trained as professionals and soldiers, and become skilled in India.
    • India was the first country that Afghanistan signed a strategic partnership with.
    • India was the only country that undertook perilous but ambitious projects such Parliament, the Zaranj-Delaram Highway, and the Chabahar port project in Iran for transit trade.
    • India was by far the one country that polled consistently highly among countries that Afghan people trusted. 
    • What should India do now? India should not choose to simply walk away from such capital, regardless of the developments in Afghanistan, domestic political considerations in India and geopolitical sensitivities.

    The marginalisation of India’s role in negotiations over Afghanistan

    • No other power from the west to the east has considered India’s interests while charting its course on Afghanistan.
    • India has found itself cut out of several quadrilateral arrangements: the main negotiations held by the “Troika plus” of the United States-Russia-China-Pakistan that pushed for a more “inclusive government” including the Taliban.
    • The alternative grouping of Russia-Iran-China-Pakistan that formed a “regional arc” that has today seen them retain their embassies in Kabul.
    • Neither India’s traditional strategic and defence partner, Russia, nor its fastest growing global strategic partner, the United States, thought it important to include India.
    • It is time to accept that India is in need of a new diplomatic strategy.

    Way forward for India

    1) Leveraging its position at the UN

    •  India needs to begin by rallying the United Nations, to exert its considerable influence in its own interest, and that of the Afghan “republic”, which is an idea that cannot be just abandoned.
    • Next, India must take a leading role in the debate over who will be nominated to the Afghan seat at the UN depending on the new regime in Afghanistan committing to international norms on human rights, women’s rights, minority rights and others.
    • As Chairman of the Taliban Sanctions Committee (or the 1988 Sanctions Committee), India must use its muscle to ensure terrorists such as Sirajuddin Haqqani must not be given any exemptions: on travel, recourse to funds or arms.

    2) India’s engagement with Afghanistan

    • The question of whether India should convert its back-channel talks with the Taliban and with Pakistan in the past few months into something more substantive remains to be debated.
    • This becomes more important as India now faces a “threat umbrella” to its north, including Pakistan’s cross-border terrorism, Afghanistan’s new regime and China’s aggression at the Line of Actual Control.
    • A more broad-based and consultative process of engaging all political parties would be required.
    • While not directly dealing with the Taliban, India must ensure stronger communication with those who are dealing directly, including leaders such as former Afghanistan President Hamid Karzai, to ensure its interests.
    • As a part of its engagement, India must consider whether to revive its assistance to the resistance, which at present includes Ahmad Shah Massoud Jr., Amrullah Saleh, Abdul Rashid Dostum and Atta Mohammad Noor.

    3) Engagement with the Afghan people

    • The Government must embrace its greatest strength in Afghanistan — its relations with the Afghan people — and open its doors to those who wish to come here.
    • In particular, India must continue to facilitate medical visas for Afghan patients and extend the education visas for students who are already admitted to Indian colleges.

    Conclusion

    It is India’s soft power, strategic autonomy or non-alignment principles and selfless assistance to those in need, particularly in its neighbourhood, that has been the strongest chords to its unique voice in the world. The moment to make that voice heard on Afghanistan is now.

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  • India &Arctic ocean

    It is tempting to view the current geopolitics of the Arctic through the lenses of the ‘great power competition’ and inevitable conflict of interests.

    Current geopolitical scenario in the Arctic: US-Russia Spat

    • It is mainly viewed as the growing tensions between North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) allies and Russia.
    • By the end of the Cold War, the geopolitical tensions and security concerns in the Arctic were almost forgotten.
    • The perceived ‘harmony’ was broken in 2007, when the Russian explorers planted their flag on the seabed 4,200m (13,779ft) below the North Pole to articulate Moscow’s claims in the Arctic.
    • This move was certainly viewed as provocative by other Arctic State.
    • The regional tension increased after the Russia-Ukraine conflict in 2014.
    • Consequently, relations between the U.S. and Russia reached their lowest point again.

    Note: Five Arctic littoral states — Canada, Denmark (Greenland), Norway, Russia and the USA (Alaska) — and three other Arctic nations — Finland, Sweden and Iceland — form the Arctic Council (estd. 1996).

    Try mapping them.

    Caution: India became an Observer in the Arctic Council for the first time in 2013. And, India isn’t a full-time observer.

    China’s vested interests in Arctic

    • China, for example, with its self-proclaimed status of a ‘near Arctic state’, has been actively engaged in various projects across the region.
    • The importance of the Arctic region for China mostly stems from its energy security issues and the need to diversify shipping lanes.

    Why China focuses on Arctic?

    • Transport routes from China to Europe through the Arctic are not only much shorter but also free from the challenges associated with the Malacca Strait and South China Sea.
    • In the latter case, China will continue facing a backlash from many Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) members, supported by US forces and Quad.

    Impact of Climate change on Arctic

    • The Arctic is warming nearly twice as fast as the rest of the planet with consecutive record-breaking warm years since 2014.
    • The Arctic is likely to begin experiencing ice-free summers within the next decade, with summers likely to be completely free of sea ice by mid-century.

    Conclusion

    • Given the significance of the region, the Arctic will continue to draw increased attention.
    • Hence, countries should refrain from mutual provocations, excessive militarisation, and quid pro quo tactics.
    • All Arctic actors should have a long-term vision and strategic goals as compared to immediate short-term gains.
    • Instead of creating a potential battleground that is reminiscent of the Cold War, the parties concerned should utilise their expertise and create the required synergy to achieve shared goals.
    • Climate change and its dramatic consequences must be a catalyst for Arctic cooperation.

    Back2Basics: Arctic Council

    • It is an advisory body that promotes cooperation among member nations and indigenous groups as per the Ottawa Declaration of 1996.
    • Its focus is on sustainable development and environmental protection of the Arctic.
    • The Arctic Council consists of the eight Arctic States: Canada, the Kingdom of Denmark (including Greenland and the Faroe Islands), Finland, Iceland, Norway, Russia, Sweden and the United States.
    • In 2013, six Observers joined the Arctic Council, including China, Japan, India, Italy, South Korea, and Singapore, bringing their total number to 13.

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  • The legal challenges in recognising the Taliban

    Context

    The Taliban’s takeover of Afghanistan has triggered a new debate in international law on the issue of recognising an entity that claims to be the new government of a state.

    Legal challenge of recognising a government

    • Questions of recognition do not arise when the change of government within a state occurs when political power is transferred through legal means.
    • However, things are different when the change of government happens through extra-legal methods like ousting the sitting government using unconstitutional means.
    • China and Russia, two of the five permanent United Nations Security Council members, have seemingly shown readiness to recognise a Taliban-led government.
    • Whereas countries like Canada have opposed it.
    • Recognition of governments under international law is vital for several reasons.
    • Recognition of government Vs. Recognition of State: Malcolm Shaw, the international lawyer, writes, “a change in government, however, accomplished, does not affect the identity of the State itself.”
    • Thus, in the current debate, the issue is not about the recognition of Afghanistan, whose legal personality remains intact it’s about the recognition of government.

    Two doctrines in Internation laws for recognising a government

    1) Effectiveness

    • According to this principle, to recognise a government means to determine whether it effectively controls the state it claims to govern.
    • Under this doctrine, it is immaterial how the new government occupied office.
    • Since there is hardly any doubt that the Taliban now effectively controls Afghanistan, as per this test, it would be recognised as Afghanistan’s government for international law and thus, international relations.

    2) Democratic legitimacy

    •  According to this doctrine, recognition of a government also depends on whether it is the legitimate representative of the people it claims to govern.
    • The end of the Cold War, the subsequent spread of democracy in the world, and the growing demand for universal respect for human rights gave an impetus to this doctrine in the last three decades.
    • This doctrine has led many countries to bestow de jure recognition (legal recognition) on governments in exile in place of governments exercising effective control.
    • Two recent examples include recognition by some states of Yemen’s government in exile since 2015.
    • Second, the Nicolás Maduro government in Venezuela is not recognised by several countries due to the alleged lack of democratic legitimacy.
    • The Taliban regime, despite exercising effective control over Afghanistan, lacks democratic legitimacy.
    • Thus, it would fail to be recognised as the legitimate representative of Afghanistan if the doctrine of democratic legitimacy is applied.
    • Nevertheless, there is no binding legal obligation on countries to withhold recognition citing democratic legitimacy.
    • Thus, if Russia and China were to formally recognise the Taliban regime due to its effective control of Afghanistan, it would be consistent with international law.

    Way forward for India

    • India will have to find a way to engage with the Taliban given India’s huge investments in Afghanistan and stakes in the South Asian region.
    • India should adopt a clear policy that it will deal with the Taliban simply because it is the de facto government, not because it is a legitimate one.
    • This principle should be followed for bilateral relations and also for multilateral dealings such as within the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation.

    Consider the question “What are the doctrines in international law in recognising the government of State? What should be India’s course of action in dealing with the Taliban in Afghanistan?” 

    Conclusion

    Given the Taliban’s brutal past, India is within its right to withhold de jure recognition of the Taliban regime. However, India has to devise a policy to deal with the Taliban as a de facto government.

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  • India must bet on patience in Afghanistan

    Context

    Notwithstanding the current triumphalism in Pakistan at “overthrowing” the US-backed order in Kabul and “pushing” India out of Afghanistan, India can afford to step back and signal that it can wait.

    Uncertainties about the future

    Two interconnected political negotiations unfolding are likely to determine Afghanistan’s immediate future.

    1) Setting up political order

    • One is focused on building a new political order within Afghanistan.
    • More than a week after President Ghani fled Kabul, there is no government, let alone an inclusive and internationally acceptable one, in sight.
    • Before Pakistan can get the Taliban to share power with other groups, it has to facilitate an acceptable accommodation between different factions of the Taliban.
    • Then there is the problem of including the non-Taliban formations in the new government.

    2) Gaining international recognition

    • The international community has set some broad conditions for the recognition of the Taliban-led government.
    • Besides an inclusive government at home, the world wants to see respect for human rights, especially women’s rights, ending support for international terrorism, and stopping opium production.
    • Pakistan will hope to get some of its traditional friends like China and Turkey or new partners like Russia to break the current international consensus.
    • Pakistan and the Taliban, however, know Chinese and Russian support is welcome but not enough.
    • They need an understanding of the US and its allies to gain political legitimacy as well as sustained international economic assistance.
    • The West, too, needs the Taliban to facilitate the evacuation of its citizens from Kabul and, sooner rather than later, deliver humanitarian assistance.

    How India differs from Pakistan in its approach towards Afghanistan?

    • India has never been in strategic competition with Pakistan in Afghanistan. India’s lack of direct geographic access to Afghanistan has ensured that.
    • Both their strategies have roots in the 19th-century policies of the Raj.
    • Forward policy: The Pakistan Army’s quest for strategic depth in Afghanistan harks back to the “forward policy” school that sought to actively control the territories beyond the Indus.
    • The forward policy seeks political dominance over Afghanistan in the name of a “friendly government” in Kabul.
    • Masterly inactivity: India, in contrast, stayed with a rival school in the Raj that called for “masterly inactivity” — a prudent approach to the badlands beyond the Indus.
    • India’s strategy seeks to strengthen Kabul’s autonomy vis-à-vis Rawalpindi and facilitate Afghanistan’s economic modernisation.
    • The Afghan values that India supports — nationalism, sovereignty, and autonomy — will endure in Kabul, irrespective of the nature of the regime.

    Consider the question “What are the implications of the return of Taliban in Afghanistan for India? What should be India’s approach in dealing with the Taliban controlled Afghanistan?” 

    Conclusion

    Strategic patience coupled with political empathy for Afghan people, and an active engagement will continue to keep India relevant in Kabul’s internal and external evolution.

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  • The fall of Kabul, the future of regional geopolitics

    Context

    The fall of Kabul in the wake of the American withdrawal from Afghanistan will prove to be a defining moment for the region and the future shape of its geopolitics.

    Implications of the US withdrawal for India

    1) Increase in threat from China

    • The manner in which the United States withdrew from Afghanist created the regional power vacuum in the Eurasian heartland.
    • An axis of regional powers such as China, Pakistan, Iran, Russia, and the Taliban, have already started filling this power vacuum.
    • Advantageous for China: The post-American power vacuum in the region will be primarily advantageous to China and its grand strategic plans for the region.
    • BRI expansion: Beijing will further strengthen its efforts to bring every country in the region, except India, on the Chinese Belt and Road Initiative bandwagon, thereby altering the geopolitical and geoeconomic foundations of the region
    • The much-feared Chinese encirclement of India will become ever more pronounced.
    • Even in trade, given the sorry state of the post-COVID-19 Indian economy, India needs trade with China more than the other way round.
    • Unless India can find ways of ensuring a rapprochement with China, it must expect Beijing to challenge India on occasion, and be prepared for it.

    2) Terror and extremism

    • The U.S. presence in Afghanistan, international pressure on the Taliban, and Financial Action Task Force worries in Pakistan had a relatively moderating effect on the region’s terror ecosystem.
    • There is little appetite for a regional approach to curbing terrorism from a Taliban-led Afghanistan.
    • This enables the Taliban to engage in a selective treatment towards terror outfits present there or they have relations with.
    • It is unlikely that the Taliban will proactively export terror to other countries unless of course for tactical purposes, for instance, Pakistan against India.
    • The real worry, however, is the inspiration that disgruntled elements in the region will draw from the Taliban’s victory against the world’s sole superpower.

    3) Impact on India’s regional interests and outreach to Central Asia

    • The return of the Taliban to Kabul has effectively laid India’s ‘mission Central Asia’ to rest.
    • India’s diplomatic and civilian presence as well as its civilian investments will now be at the mercy of the Taliban, and to some extent Pakistan.
    • Had India cultivated deeper relations with the Taliban, Indian interests would have been more secure in a post-American Afghanistan.

    4) Impact on India’s foreign policy choices

    • Shift to Indo-Pacific: Given the little physical access India has to its north-western landmass, its focus is bound to shift more to the Indo-Pacific even though a maritime grand strategy may not necessarily be an answer to its continental challenges.
    • Improving relations with neighbours: India might also seek to cultivate more friendly relations with its neighbours.
    • India has already indicated that it would not challenge the junta on the coup and its widespread human rights violations.
    • The last thing India needs now is an angry neighbour rushing to China.
    • Stability in relations with Pakistan: The developments in Afghanistan could nudge India to seek stability, if not peace, with Pakistan.
    • Both sides might refrain from indulging in competitive risk-taking unless something dramatic happens which is always a possibility between the two rivals.
    • That said, stability between India and Pakistan depends a great deal on how politics in Kashmir plays out, and whether India is able to pacify the aggrieved sections in the Valley.

    Consider the question “What would be the fallout of the Taliban’s return in Afghanistan for India? What steps India needs to take to mitigate the impact on its interests?”

    Conclusion

    The lesson for India in the wake of these developments is clear: It will have to fight its own battles. So it must make enemies wisely, choose friends carefully, rekindle flickering friendships, and make peace while it can.

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  • The Abraham Accords as India’s West Asia bridge

    Context

    The recent visit by the Indian Air Force chief, to Israel offers a window to study how India is taking advantage of the Abraham Accords deal signed between Israel and a consortium of Arab States led by the United Arab Emirates (UAE) in 2020.

    Increasing defence cooperation between India and West Asia region

    • India’s trajectory towards an increased strategic footprint in West Asia has been in development for some time now.
    • Starting from the relatively low-key staging visit to Saudi Arabia conducted by the IAF in 2015.
    • India hosted visiting Iranian naval warships in 2018.
    • India takes an active part in the defence of the critical waterways in and around the Persian Gulf, the Arabian Sea and the extended Indian Ocean Region (IOR).
    • An Indian contingent of the Indian Air Force (IAF) will visit Israel in October to take part in multilateral military exercises.
    • India also conducted the ‘Zayed Talwar’ naval exercises with the UAE off the coast of Abu Dhabi, further deepening the fast-developing strategic cooperation between the two countries.
    • In December 2020, Indian Army chief visited the UAE and Saudi Arabia, becoming the first chief of the Indian Army to do so.
    • In 2017, India signed a deal with Oman, the home to Duqm Port  for access to the facility, including dry dock use by the Indian Navy.

    How Abraham Accords accelerated India’s engagement with West Asia region?

    • No need for balancing act: The signing of the Accords has removed a significant strategic obstacle for India — delicate balancing act India has had to play out between the Arab Gulf and Israel over the decades.
    • India had welcomed the Accords, highlighting its support for mechanisms that offer peace and stability in the region.
    • From the UAE’s perspective, Accords were to make sure the emirate along with its international centres of trade such as Dubai and Abu Dhabi do not become targets between Jerusalem and Tehran.
    • However, not all Arab States have been on board with the geopolitical shifts the Accords have pushed through.
    • Saudi Arabia has maintained a distance from this arrangement.

    India’s West Asia construct and relations with Iran

    • Iran, as part of India’s ‘West Asia’ construct, will also play a significant part in India’s outreach in the months to come as the crisis in Afghanistan deepens.
    • Connectivity projects such as Chabahar Port and Chabahar-Zahedan rail project (project discussions are still on) amongst others remain critical.
    • Recently,  strategic cooperation revitalised despite multiple obstacles in the bilateral relations, led by U.S. sanctions against Tehran and the general tensions between Israel, the Gulf and Iran via proxy battles in theatres such as Yemen, Syria and beyond.

    Conclusion

    India’s strategic play in West Asia will be reflective of its economic growth, and by association, an increasingly important place in the global order.

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  • Abraham Accords as India’s West Asia bridge

    The recent visit by the Indian Air Force chief to Israel offers a window to study how New Delhi is taking advantage of the Abraham Accords deal signed between Israel and a consortium of Arab States.

    Try this question:

    What are Abraham Accords? Discuss how the Israel-Gulf synergy could impact India’s relations with Israel.

    [wpdiscuz-feedback id=”bvxbuw1pzf” question=”Please leave a feedback on this” opened=”1″][/wpdiscuz-feedback]

    What are Abraham Accords?

    • The Israel–UAE normalization agreement is officially called the Abraham Accords Peace Agreement.
    • It was initially agreed to in a joint statement by the United States, Israel and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) on August 13, 2020.
    • The UAE thus became the third Arab country, after Egypt in 1979 and Jordan in 1994, to agree to formally normalize its relationship with Israel as well as the first Persian Gulf country to do so.
    • Concurrently, Israel agreed to suspend plans for annexing parts of the West Bank. The agreement normalized what had long been informal but robust foreign relations between the two countries.

    Do you know?

    Abraham was the first of the Hebrew patriarchs and a figure revered by the three great monotheistic religions—Judaism, Christianity, and Islam.

    New friendships

    • For common enemy: Externally, Israel, the UAE and Bahrain share the common threat perception of Iran.
    • Upholding modern values: They are relatively more modern societies that share the overarching and immediate priority of post-pandemic economic resuscitation.
    • Extended cooperation: They have lost no time to set up logistics such as Internet connectivity and direct flights to pave the way for more active economic engagement.

    India and the Gulf

    • Now India has stronger, multifaceted and growing socioeconomic engagements with Israel and the Gulf countries.
    • With over eight million Indian diasporas in the Gulf remitting annually nearly $50 billion, annual merchandise trade of over $150 billion.
    • It sources nearly two-thirds of India’s hydrocarbon imports, major investments, etc. Hence it is natural to ask how the new regional dynamic would affect India.
    • India has acquired a large and rewarding regional footprint, particularly as the preferred source of manpower, food products, pharmaceuticals, gem and jewellery, light engineering items, etc.
    • Indians are also the biggest stakeholders in Dubai’s real estate, tourism, and Free Economic Zones.
    • In the evolving scenario, there may be scope for a profitable trilateral synergy, but India cannot take its preponderance as a given.

    The Israel-GCC synergy

    • Culture: Even the Israeli Arabs may find career opportunities to bridge the cultural divide. Israel is known as the start-up nation and its stakeholders could easily fit in the various duty-free incubators in the UAE.
    • Tourism: Tourism, real estate and financial service sectors on both sides have suffered due to the pandemic and hope for a positive spin-off from the peer-to-peer interactions.
    • Defense: Israel has niche strengths in defence, security and surveillance equipment, arid farming, solar power, horticultural products, high-tech, gem and jewellery, and pharmaceuticals.
    • Technology: Further, Israel has the potential to supply skilled and semi-skilled manpower to the GCC states, particularly from the Sephardim and Mizrahim ethnicities, many of whom speak Arabic.

    The Iran link

    • Iran, as part of India’s ‘West Asia’ construct, will also play a significant part in India’s outreach in the months to come as the crisis in Afghanistan deepens.
    • The fact that New Delhi used Iranian airspace and facilities when evacuating its diplomatic staff from Kandahar in July showcases a level of strategic commonality.
    • Keeping this in mind, connectivity projects such as Chabahar Port and Chabahar-Zahedan rail project (project discussions are still on) amongst others remain critical.

    Conclusion

    • India’s strategic play in West Asia will be reflective of its economic growth, and by association, an increasingly important place in the global order.

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