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GS Paper: GS2-18.Bilateral, regional and global groupings and agreements involving India and/or affecting India’s interests.

  • Swiss Neutrality in World Affairs

    Switzerland’s traditional foreign policy of neutrality has become attractive again because of the changing political reality in the world, said its Ambassador recently.

    Q.In context to foreign policy, discuss the relevance, benefits and limitations of Swiss Neutrality.(150 W)

    What is Swiss Neutrality?

    • Swiss neutrality is one of the main principles of Switzerland’s foreign policy which dictates that Switzerland is not to be involved in armed or political conflicts between other states.
    • This policy is self-imposed, permanent, and armed, designed to ensure external security and promote peace.
    • Under this, Switzerland pursues an active foreign policy and is frequently involved in peace-building processes around the world.

    Historic significance

    • Switzerland has the oldest policy of military neutrality in the world; it has not participated in a foreign war since its neutrality was established by the Treaty of Paris in 1815.
    • The European powers (Austria, France, the UK, Portugal, Prussia, Russia, Spain and Sweden) agreed at the Congress of Vienna in May 1815 that Switzerland should be neutral.
    • But final ratification was delayed until after Napoleon Bonaparte was defeated so that some coalition forces could invade France via Swiss territory.

    Swiss moves for the status

    • Since World War II, Switzerland has taken a more active role in international affairs by aiding with humanitarian initiatives, but it remains fiercely neutral with regard to military affairs.
    • It has never joined the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) or the European Union, and only joined the United Nations in 2002.

    Relevance today

    • Neutrality has become necessary as a foreign policy tool as the phase of power politics has returned in world affairs.
    • Now with big power politics, Switzerland’s neutrality and Switzerland as a place to meet is much more attractive again.

  • Sri Lanka at the UN Rights Council

    Sri Lanka is facing another UNHRC resolution for its war crimes that took place during the military campaign against the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE).

    UNHRC report on Sri Lanka

    • The report warned that Sri Lanka’s failure to address human rights violations and war crimes committed in the past had put the country on a “dangerous path”.
    • It rose that this could lead to a “recurrence” of policies and practices that gave rise to the earlier situation.
    • It flagged the accelerating militarization of civilian governmental functions, a reversal of important constitutional safeguards, political obstruction of accountability, intimidation of civil society, and the use of anti-terrorism laws.
    • The shrinking space for independent media and civil society and human rights organisations are also themes in the report.

    Try this question:

    Q.The triangulation in the ties between Sri Lanka, China and Pakistan is an emerging threat in the Indian Ocean Region. Discuss.

    The Resolution 30/1

    • The resolution 30/1 launched in 2015 deals with promoting reconciliation, accountability and human rights in Sri Lanka.
    • It extended an opportunity to make good on its promises for justice and offered extensive support to accomplish that objective.

    Sri Lanka’s intention

    • It is more than Sri Lanka has failed to – and doesn’t intend to — take the necessary, decisive, and sustainable steps necessary to achieve domestic justice and reconciliation.
    • Sri Lanka has officially sought India’s help to muster support against the resolution, which it has described as “unwanted interference by powerful countries”.

    Where India comes in

    • The UNHRC is scheduled to hold an “interactive” session on Sri Lanka where the report was to be discussed, and member countries were to make statements. India is expected to make a statement too.
    • Country-specific resolutions against Sri Lanka have regularly come up at the UNHRC in the last decade.
    • New Delhi voted against Sri Lanka in 2012 and abstained in 2014. It was spared the dilemma in 2015 when Sri Lanka joined resolution 30/1.
    • With elections coming up in Tamil Nadu, and PM declaring on a recent visit that he was the first Indian leader to visit Jaffna, Sri Lanka has begun reading the tea leaves.
    • Whichever way it goes, the resolution is likely to resonate in India-Sri Lanka Relations and for India internally, in the run-up to the Assembly elections in Tamil Nadu.

  • [pib] International Commission on Large Dams (ICOLD)

    The International Commission on Large Dams (ICOLD) Symposium was inaugurated by the Minister for Jal Shakti.

    What is the news?

    • ICOLD in collaboration with Central Water Commission (CWC) has organised a Symposium on “Sustainable Development of Dams and River Basins”.
    • The symposium is being organised to provide an excellent opportunity to Indian Dam Engineering Professionals and Agencies to share their experiences, ideas and latest developments.

    Try this PYQ:

    Q.Which one of the following pairs is not correctly matched?

    Dam: Lake River

    (a) Govind Sagar: Satluj

    (b) Kolleru Lake: Krishna

    (c) Ukai Reservoir: Tapi

    (d) Wular Lake: Jhelum

    About ICOLD

    • The ICOLD is an international non-governmental organization dedicated to the sharing of professional information and knowledge of the design, construction, maintenance, and impact of large dams.
    • It was founded in 1928 and has its central office in Paris, France.
    • It consists of 100 member national committees which have a total membership of about 10,000 individuals.
    • The official languages of the commission are English and French.

    Key initiatives: World Register of Dams

    For the purpose of inclusion in the World Register of Dams, a large dam is defined as any dam above 15 metres in height OR any dam between 10 and 15 metres in height that meets at least one of the following conditions:

    • the crest length is not less than 500 metres
    • the capacity of the reservoir formed by the dam is not less than one million cubic metres
    • the maximum flood discharge dealt with by the dam is not less than 2 000 cubic metres per second
    • the dam had especially difficult foundation problems
    • the dam is of unusual design

  • China-Taiwan conflict

    The article underscores the centrality of Taiwan in the realms of semiconductor production and how that dominant spills over in geopolitics.

    Silicon shield of Taiwan

    • Taiwan’s security situation has been worsening amidst mounting economic, political and military pressure from China.
    • Any Chinese attack on Taiwan that disrupts the flow of semiconductors would produce significant challenges not only for the US but also China that relies on semiconductor supplies from Taiwan.
    • That factor appears to be preventing the crisis from boiling over into a full-scale war that could draw the US and Japan into it.
    •  It is Taiwan’s so-called “silicon shield”.

    Taiwan’s dominance in semiconductor industry

    • Taiwan is the world’s leading producer of semiconductors and other electronic components.
    • The Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company (TSMC) has more than 55 per cent of the global market share in the production of high-end custom-made chips.
    • Of the two rival companies that have survived, US-based Intel is in trouble and Korea’s Samsung has challenges of its own.
    •  There will be no generation of data without the semiconductors.
    • It might be more accurate to say that “semiconductors are the new oil” and their production is increasingly dominated by Taiwan and the TMSC.

    Geopolitics over Taiwan

    • As its economic heft and political salience rose in the 21st century, China has ratcheted up pressure on countries that have diplomatic relations with Taiwan.
    • China has also compelled international organisations to push Taiwan out of their activities, even when Taiwan had much to contribute.
    • Amidst the deterioration of US-China relations in recent years, President Donald Trump was far more supportive of Taiwan than his recent predecessors.
    • The Biden team has also signalled continuity with Trump’s Taiwan policies.
    • All indications are that Washington will continue to seek some technological decoupling and diversification of sensitive supplies away from China.
    • Taiwan will inevitably be the key element in the American quest for resilient supply chains in the digital domain.

    Opportunity for India

    • Taiwan’s position as a semiconductor superpower opens the door for more intensive strategic-economic cooperation between Delhi and Taipei.
    • Part of the problem is that India’s strategic community continues to view Taiwan as an adjunct to India’s “One-China policy”.
    • India’s policy oscillates between keeping needless distance with Taipei when ties with Beijing are warm and remembering it when Sino-Indian ties enter a freeze.
    • This changed in the early 1990s, when it began to engage with Taiwan, but the policy remained a restricted one.
    • In the last few years, though, there has been a steady expansion of bilateral engagement.
    • Trade has increased from about $1 billion in 2001 to about $7 billion in 2018.
    • India has made a special effort to woo Taiwanese companies that are moving some of their production away from China.
    • India is yet to tap into the full range of commercial and technological opportunities possibilities with Taiwan.
    • This is particularly true of semiconductor production.

    Way forward

    • Delhi must begin to deal with Taiwan as a weighty entity in its own right that offers so much to advance India’s prosperity.
    • Delhi does not have to discard its “One-China policy” to recognise that Taiwan is once again becoming the lightning rod in US-China tensions.

    Consider the question “India needs to explore the opportunities in relationship with Taiwan even as it pursues and sticks to its One China policy. Comment.

    Conclusion

    As Taiwan becomes the world’s most dangerous flashpoint, the geopolitical consequences for Asia are real. Although Delhi has embraced the Indo-Pacific maritime construct, it is yet to come to terms with Taiwan’s critical role in shaping the strategic future of Asia’s waters.

  • New York Convention

    Cairn Energy has filed a case in a U.S. district court to enforce a $1.2 billion arbitration award it won in a tax dispute against India. Cairn aims to enforce the award under international arbitration rules, commonly called the New York Convention.

    New York Convention

    • The Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards is commonly known as the New York Convention.
    • It was adopted by a UN diplomatic conference on 10 June 1958 and entered into force on 7 June 1959.
    • It requires courts of contracting states to give effect to private agreements to arbitrate and to recognize and enforce arbitration awards made in other contracting states.
    • Widely considered the foundational instrument for international arbitration, it applies to arbitrations that are not considered domestic awards in the state where recognition and enforcement are sought.

    What was the case?

    • The Indian government has lost an international arbitration case to energy giant Cairn Plc over the retrospective levy of taxes and has been asked to pay damages worth $1.2 billion to the UK firm.
    • The Permanent Court of Arbitration at The Hague has maintained that the Cairn tax issue is not a tax dispute but a tax-related investment dispute and, hence, it falls under its jurisdiction.
    • India’s demand in past taxes, it said, was in breach of fair treatment under the UK-India Bilateral Investment Treaty.

  • The U.S. policy options and its implications for the world order

    The article spells out the U.S.’s foreign policy approach in the changing global order. Though the article doesn’t mention India, the U.S.’s policies and it’s bearing on India need no mention. From that perspective, we should follow their approach.

    Decision on the JCPOA

    • During the U.S. presidential election campaign, Joe Biden had criticised the U.S. withdrawal from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA).
    • He had then promised that subject to Iran’s compliance with its obligations, the U.S. would re-enter the agreement.
    • In office, Mr. Biden has shown little urgency on the JCPOA matter.
    • Israel has given the opposite message and said that the nuclear agreement was “bad and must not be allowed”.
    • Israel and the U.S.’s Gulf allies, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, have also insisted that they be involved with the discussions with Iran on the revival of the agreement.

    U.S.’s Policy approach

    •  The U.S. policy is likely to show more continuity than change where the U.S.’s core interests are concerned, specifically in its ties with Russia, China and Iran.
    •  Mr. Biden is likely to reverse his predecessor Donald Trump’s personal accommodative approach towards Russia and adopt the U.S.’s traditional confrontational posture.
    • Mr. Biden’s Iran policy is likely to match Mr. Trump’s hardline approach on substantive matters.
    • This approach also panders to Iran’s regional rivals who wish to see the Islamic republic weakened and isolated.
    • There will thus be no dramatic change in the U.S.’s approach to Iran on the nuclear question.

    Regional concerns and role of global powers

    • Despite the sanctions, Iran’s regional influence remains significant.
    • The Iranian ability to mobilise militants across the region is viewed by Israel and some the Gulf Arab states as threatening their security.
    • Gulf states are also concerned about Iran’s influence with their Shia populations.
    • The capabilities of Iran’s precision missiles and drones are also a matter of regional anxiety.
    •  Israel, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates will be in a face-off with Iran and its allies, Iraq, Syria and its Shia militia.
    • Alternatively, we could see a genuine regional effort to ease tensions and promote regional confidence, spearheaded by Qatar, working with Russia and, possibly, China.
    • Perhaps, Saudi Arabia and the UAE, already facing heat from the Biden administration, will see the value of this approach.
    • Russia now an influential player in the region, China, too, with its Belt and Road Initiative, has high stakes in regional stability.
    • The Sino-Iran 25 years agreement, envisages their substantial and long-term cooperation in political, security, military, economic, energy and logistical connectivity areas.

    Consider the question “How far Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) has been successful in achieving its goals? How peace in the Middle East influence India’s interests?” 

    Conclusion

    The new U.S. administration will thus witness a new world order, shaped by a coalition of Russia, China and Iran, in which the U.S. is no longer the most significant role-player.

  • New disengagement agreement in eastern Ladakh

    In the first major breakthrough in talks China’s Defence Ministry that PLA and Indian troops on the southern and northern shores of Pangong Tso began synchronized and organized disengagement.

    This newscard presents a holistic report on the ground situation of Sino-India border disputes in Ladakh.

    Also, try this PYQ from CSP 2020:

    Q.Siachen Glacier is situated to the

    (a) East of Aksai Chin

    (b) East of Leh

    (c)North of Gilgit

    (d) North of Nubra Valley

    New plan in eastern Ladakh

    • As of now, the disengagement process seems restricted to the north and south banks of Pangong Tso.
    • The process has started with the pulling back of certain columns of tanks from the south bank region by both sides.
    • At the moment, there is no pullback of troops from the friction points and the heights they are positioned on.
    • That will happen in a phased and verified manner.

    Disengagement from Pangong Tso

    • China will pull its troops on the north bank towards the east of Finger 8.
    • Similarly, India will also position its forces at its permanent base near Finger 3.
    • Similar action will be taken by both the parties in the south bank area as well.
    • Both sides have also agreed that the area between Finger 3 and Finger 8 will become a no-patrolling zone temporarily, till both sides reach an agreement through military and diplomatic discussions to restore patrolling.
    • Further, all the construction done by both sides on the north and south banks of the lake since April 2020 will be removed.

    Why is this area important?

    • The north and south banks of Pangong Tso are two of the most significant and sensitive regions when it comes to the current standoff that began in May 2020.
    • What makes the areas around the shores of the lake so sensitive and important is that clashes here marked the beginning of the standoff.
    • It is one of the areas where the Chinese troops had come around 8 km deep west of India’s perception of the Line of Actual Control.
    • China had positioned its troops on the ridgeline connecting Fingers 3 and 4, while according to India the LAC passes through Finger 8.

    Take a glimpse of all friction points along Indian borders:

    India is at an advantage

    • Further, it is in the south bank of the lake that Indian forces in an action in late August had gained a strategic advantage by occupying certain peaks, outwitting the Chinese.
    • Indian troops had positioned themselves on heights of Magar Hill, Mukhpari, Gurung Hill, Rezang La and Rechin La, which were unoccupied by either side earlier.
    • Since then, the Chinese side had been particularly sensitive as these positions allowed India to not only dominate Spanggur Gap.
    • It is a two-km wide valley that can be used to launch an offensive, as China had done in 1962, they also allow India a direct view of China’s Moldo Garrison.

    Why has this taken so long?

    • Since September, China has insisted that India first pull its troops back from the south bank of Pangong Tso, and the Chushul sub-sector.
    • However, India has been demanding that any disengagement process should include the entire region, and troops should go back to their April 2020 positions.
    • However, it seems that for now, both sides have agreed to first disengage from the Pangong Tso area only.

    Principles of disengagement

    In military and diplomatic discussions with China India expects a solution to the issue on the basis of three principles:

    1. LAC should be accepted and respected by both parties.
    2. Neither party should attempt to change the status quo unilaterally.
    3. All agreements should be fully adhered to by both parties.

    Does this mean that the standoff is resolved?

    • There are still some outstanding issues that remain regarding deployment and patrolling on LAC.
    • The Pangong Tso region is just one of the friction areas. There are other friction points, all north of the Pangong Tso, where the troops have been face-to-face since last year.
    • The situation in Depsang Plains continues to be a concern.
    • Both sides agree that complete disengagement under bilateral agreements and protocols should be done as soon as possible.
    • After the talks so far, China is also aware of our resolve to protect the sovereignty of the country.

    Need for confidence building

    • Two of the main stumbling blocks in finding a permanent resolution are lack of trust and no clarity on intent.
    • Any permanent resolution will include first, disengagement of troops from the frontlines from all friction points.
    • Then de-escalation will entail sending the troops from the depth areas to their original bases.
    • Both sides have around 50,000 troops in the region, along with additional tanks, artillery and air defence assets.

    Conclusion

    • A resolution has to include sending these troops and military equipment where they came from on both sides.
    • But neither side had been willing to take the first step to reduce their troop or military strength, as it does not trust the other side.

  • Taking the long view with China

    The article explains the various choices India faces in the geopolitical landscape shaped by emergence of two Asian giants.

    New challenges and hard choices on geopolitical front

    • As it moves to becoming the third largest economy in the world, India needs to have a clear-eyed world view and strategy as it makes hard choices.
    • It needs to reject the developing country regional mindset that has shaped India’s  national aims and foreign policy.
    • We have a “special and privileged strategic partnership” with Russia which provides more than three-quarter of India’s military equipment and a “comprehensive global strategic partnership” with the U.S.
    • India’s relationship with the U.S.-led Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (Quad), where the others are military allies, has rightly been cautious, as U.S. President Joe Biden sees China as a ‘strategic competitor’ rather than a ‘strategic rival’.
    • Realism dictates that India does not need to compromise on its strategic autonomy.
    • India faces two sides of the China conundrum: Defining engagement with its neighbour which is consolidating an expanding BRI while remaining involved with the strategic, security and technological concerns of the U.S.

    China’s dominance in financial sphere

    • In the financial sphere, there is the real possibility of the Chinese renminbi becoming a global reserve currency or e-yuan becoming the digital payments currency.
    • China is the world’s largest trading economy.
    • It could soon become the world’s largest economy.
    • China has stitched together an investment agreement with the EU and with most of Asia.
    • Relative attractiveness will determine when the dollar goes the way of the sterling and the guilder.
    • China, facing technological sanctions from the U.S., may well put in the hard work to make this happen soon.

    China: Partner, competitor, and economic rival

    • Some form of the EU’s China policy of seeing the emerging superpower as a partner, competitor, and economic rival depending on the policy area in question is going to be the global norm. 
    • This broad perspective is also reflected in India’s participation in both the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation, designed to resist the spread of Western interests, and in the U.S.-led Quad, with its anti-China stance.
    • Within the United Nations, India’s interests have greater congruence with China’s interests rather than the U.S.’s and the EU’s.
    • Sharing the COVID-19 vaccine with other countries distinguishes India, and China, from the rest.

    India’s engagement with the U.S.

    • The congruence between India and the U.S. lies in the U.S.’s declared strategic objective of promoting an integrated economic development model in the Indo-Pacific as a credible alternative to the BRI, but with a caveat.
    • Instead of an alternate development model, India should move the Quad towards supplementing the infrastructure push of the BRI in line with other strategic concerns in the region.
    • For example, developing their scientific, technological capacity and digital economy, based on India’s digital stack and financial resources of other Quad members, will resonate with Asia and Africa.

    India’s role in global governance

    • Another area where India can play a ‘bridging role’ is global governance.
    • President Xi Jinping’s “community with shared future for mankind”, and Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s “climate justice” and asking how long India will be excluded from the UN Security Council, challenge the frame of the liberal order without providing specific alternatives.
    • With respect to digital data, India has recently expressed that there must be reciprocity in data sharing, and this is the kind of ‘big idea’ for sharing prosperity that will gain traction with other countries.

    India’s growing influence

    • India’s recent policies are gaining influence at the expense of China and the West, and both know this trend will accelerate.
    • The steps to a $5 trillion economy, shift to indigenous capital military equipment, and a new Science, Technology and Innovation Policy underline impact, capacity and interests.
    • ASEAN remains keen India re-join its trade pact to balance China.
    • It is being recognised that India’s software development prowess could shape a sustainable post-industrial state different to the U.S. and China model.

    Consider the question “Examine how India’s foreing policy priorities and its role in global governance is shaped by China’s rise.”

    Conclusion

    As in the historical past, Asia is big enough for both Asian giants to have complementary roles, share prosperity and be independent of each other and of the West.

     

  • No to vaccine nationalism, yes to global cooperation

    India has been supplying vaccines to other countries even as its first phase of vaccination covers the health care workers. At the same time, the selfishness of the advanced countries has been on full display by amassing the approved vaccines. The article deals with the issue of vaccine nationalism.

    What is vaccine nationalism

    • When a country manages to secure doses of vaccines for its own citizens or residents and prioritises its own domestic markets before they are made available in other countries it is known as ‘vaccine nationalism’.
    • This is done through pre-purchase agreements between a government and a vaccine manufacturer.
    • The advance purchase contracts made by some advanced countries for potential vaccines would vaccinate their population many times: the European Union, two times, the United States and the United Kingdom, four times, and Canada, six times.

    Impact on the SDGs

    • The reversal of progress on many Sustainable Development Goals, or SDGs, such as SDG 3 (“Ensure healthy lives and promote well-being for all at all ages) could affect the health of the world population, and global growth itself.
    • Even before COVID-19, projections have shown that 6% of the global population would be in extreme poverty, which has gone up by 71 million, thereby causing enormous challenges to SDG 1 (“End poverty in all its forms everywhere”).
    • According to estimates by the International Monetary Fund, over 50% of emerging markets and developing economies that were converging toward advanced economies per capita income over the last decade are expected to diverge over the 2020-22 period.

    India’s important role

    • While advanced countries have turned their back on the need of poor countries, India has taken a position that a significant percentage of the approved doses will be permitted for exports.
    • While its exports to neighbouring counties will be under grant mode, initial shipment of vaccines to least developed countries will be free of cost.
    • Brazil has received 2 million doses of vaccine from India (as of January 23).
    • While India is in its first phase of vaccination to cover health-care workers, exports from India are helping other countries also in initiating phase one of their vaccination programme — a gesture well-appreciated globally.
    • The ability to produce large volumes of vaccine at an affordable cost underlines India’s importance to developing countries when it comes to drug access.

    Need for coordinated global efforts

    • Due to the vaccine nationalism, the arguments of public good and global cooperation have been widely neglected.
    • Nevertheless, India’s approach only reinforces the need of having coordinated global efforts in bringing COVID-19 under control.
    • This response manifests India’s unstinted commitment to global development and has consolidated its name as the world’s pharmacy.

    COVAX Project: Unique case of global cooperation

    • The COVAX project is a global risk-sharing mechanism for pooled procurement and fair distribution of COVID-19 vaccines.
    • It is based on funding from high and middle-income countries.
    • Since high and middle-income countries are buying up large amounts of the vaccine directly from suppliers, the promise by COVAX to deliver 2 billion doses by the end of 2021 seems to face new challenges.
    • Since most of the vaccines are purchased from the global south [specifically, India and China] for developing nations, the COVAX project can draw new pathways for global development.
    • Most of these vaccines are cost-effective and affordable to the global south.

    Consider the question “What is vaccine nationalism? Examine the role played by India against the backdrop of vaccine nationalism.” 

    Conclusion

    The development of vaccines is a classic story of global cooperation between the North and the South. Unfortunately, the increasing nationalist tendencies of the democratic World during the pandemic have challenged the positive narrative on global cooperation.

  • Iran rules out changes to Nuclear Deal

    Iranian President Hassan Rouhani ruled out changes to Iran’s nuclear accord with world powers and dismissed calls to broaden the terms of the deal and include regional countries.

    Do you know how the enmity between Iran and the US came into reality?  We hope you have watched the Argo (2012) movie for sure!

    What is the news?

    • The election of Joe Biden, who supports a US return to the agreement, has spurred some expectations of renewed diplomacy.
    • But Rouhani’s refusal puts this possibility at the end.

    The United States since 1979 has applied various economic, trades, scientific and military sanctions against Iran. U.S. economic sanctions are administered by the Office of Foreign Assets Control.

    Iranian Nuclear Agreement

    • The Iran nuclear agreement, formally known as the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), is a landmark accord reached between Iran and several world powers, including the US, in July 2015.
    • Under its terms, Iran agreed to dismantle much of its nuclear program and open its facilities to more extensive international inspections in exchange for billions of dollars’ worth of sanctions relief.

    What were the goals of JCPOA?

    • The P5+1 wanted to unwind Iran’s nuclear program to the point that if Tehran decided to pursue a nuclear weapon, it would take at least one year, giving world powers time to respond.
    • Heading into the JCPOA negotiations, U.S. intelligence officials estimated that, in the absence of an agreement, Iran could produce enough nuclear material for a weapon in a few months.

    Who are the participants?

    • The JCPOA, which went into effect in January 2016, imposes restrictions on Iran’s civilian nuclear enrichment program.
    • At the heart of negotiations with Iran were the five permanent members of the UN Security Council (China, France, Russia, the UK, and the US) and Germany—collectively known as the P5+1.
    • The European Union also took part.
    • Prior to the JCPOA, the P5+1 had been negotiating with Iran for years, offering its government various incentives to halt uranium enrichment.

    Disruptions after trump

    • The deal has been in jeopardy since President Donald J. Trump withdrew the US from it in 2018.
    • In response to the U.S. departure, as well as to deadly attacks on prominent Iranians in 2020, including one by the United States, Iran has resumed some of its nuclear activities.

    Why isn’t the deal yet enforced?

    • In April 2020, the United States announced its intention to keep back sanctions.
    • The other P5 members objected to the move, saying the US could not unilaterally implement the mechanism because it left the nuclear deal in 2018.
    • Meanwhile, the wide range of U.S. sanctions unrelated to the nuclear program has added to the damage.

     Iran’s current nuclear activity

    • Iran since Trump’s decisions started exceeding agreed-upon limits to its stockpile of low-enriched uranium.
    • It began enriching uranium to higher concentrations (though still far short of the purity required for weapons).
    • It also began developing new centrifuges to accelerate uranium enrichment; resuming heavy water production at its Arak facility.

    Did you know?

     

    Mined uranium has less than 1 percent of the uranium-235 isotope used in fission reactions, and centrifuges increase that isotope’s concentration. Uranium enriched to 5 percent is used in nuclear power plants, and at 20 percent it can be used in research reactors or for medical purposes. High-enriched uranium, at some 90 percent, is used in nuclear weapons.