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GS Paper: GS2-18.Bilateral, regional and global groupings and agreements involving India and/or affecting India’s interests.

  • BRICS Innovation Base for 5G and AI Technology

    China has made a proposal to create what it has termed a BRICS innovation base to take forward 5G and Artificial Intelligence (AI) cooperation.

    Try this question from CSP 2019:

    Q.With reference to communication technologies, what is/are the difference/differences between LTE (Long-Term Evolution) and VoLTE (Voice over Long-Term Evolution)?

    1. LTE ‘is commonly marketed as 3G and VoLTE is commonly marketed as advanced 3G.
    2. LTE is data-only technology and VoLTE is voice-only technology.

    Select the correct answer using the code given below.

    (a) 1 only

    (b) 2 only

    (c) Both 1 and 2

    (d) Neither 1 nor 2

    BRICS Innovation Base

    • China is considering the establishment of a BRICS innovation base in China, in order to strengthen practical cooperation with the BRICS.
    • It has urged fellow nations, including India, to boost cooperation in areas including 5G and AI in partnership with Huawei.
    • The move could pose an awkward question for India, which is the only country in the grouping that is leaning towards excluding Chinese participation in the roll-out of India’s 5G networks.

    Huawei in BRICS

    • In South Africa, Huawei is providing services to three of its telecom operators in the roll-out of their 5G networks.
    • Brazil has allowed participation in trials but yet to take a final call.
    • India is unlikely to allow Chinese participation in 5G, particularly in the wake of recent moves to tighten investment from China and national security concerns.

    Back2Basics: BRICS

    • BRICS is an acronym for the grouping of the world’s leading emerging economies, namely Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa.
    • The BRICS Leaders Summit is convened annually. It does not exist in form of organization, but it is an annual summit between the supreme leaders of five nations.
    • On November 30, 2001, Jim O’Neill, a British economist who was then chairman of Goldman Sachs Asset Management, coined the term ‘BRIC’ to describe the four emerging economies of Brazil, Russia, India, and China.
    • The grouping was formalized during the first meeting of BRIC Foreign Ministers on the margins of the UNGA in New York in September 2006.
    • The first BRIC Summit took place in 2009 in the Russian Federation and focused on issues such as reform of the global financial architecture.
    • South Africa was invited to join BRIC in December 2010, after which the group adopted the acronym BRICS.

  • India’s strategic autonomy and its evolution

    The article analyses the evolution of India’s approach to strategic autonomy from the unipolar world dominated by the U.S. to now when the Chinese threat has been looming large.

    Context

    • Addressing a Southeast Asian forum last week, external affairs minister outlined India’s new quest for “strategic autonomy” in its global economic engagement.

    Connection with Atmanirbhar Bharat

    • This new quest for “strategic autonomy” is the natural external complement to new economic strategy, described as “Atmanirbharata” or “self-reliance”.
    • The concept carries so much ideological baggage, its revival by Government inevitably raised many questions
    • Senior ministers and officials of the NDA government sought to reassure India’s partners that Delhi was not marching backwards.
    • When applied to the foreign policy framework, “self-reliance” becomes “strategic autonomy”.

    Evolution of the idea of strategic autonomy

    • America towered over the world after the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991.
    • India’s past emphasis on strategic autonomy was in the context of the “unipolar moment” [dominated by the U.S.] that emerged after the Cold War.
    • On the one hand, India needed Western capital as well as technology and better access to its markets.
    • On the other hand, Delhi had to protect some of its core national interests from the threats of US intervention.

    India-U.S. Relations: Evolution after the Cold war

    • In the early 1990s, the Clinton Administration strong desire to resolve the Kashmir dispute between India and Pakistan.
    • The Clinton Administration saw the nuclear and Kashmir disputes as one and the same thing.
    • Indian diplomacy for the next two decades tried to change the US policy on both Kashmir and nuclear issues.
    • Under President George W Bush, the US discarded the long-standing temptation to insert itself in the Kashmir dispute.
    • The US also went out of the way to resolve the nuclear dispute with India by changing its domestic laws and international norms on nuclear proliferation.
    • The Obama and Trump Administrations have stayed the course since then.

    China challenge for India

    • On the atomic front, as the US sought to lift the prolonged atomic blockade against India, China sought to block the process.
    • China turned an obstacle to India’s membership of the Nuclear Suppliers Group.
    • China takes up the Kashmir issue regularly in the United Nations Security Council.
    • Today, India’s strategic autonomy is about coping with China’s challenge to India’s territorial integrity and sovereignty.
    •  China today is viewed in Delhi as a major threat to India’s economic development.
    • The bilateral trade deficit reached nearly $55billion in 2019.
    • India pulled out of an Asia-wide free-trade arrangement called the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership late last year, sensing the threat posed by China-led economic order.
    • Ladakh aggression forced India to go from a passive commercial withdrawal to an active economic decoupling from China.

    Way forward

    • The logic of strategic autonomy from China nudges India to look for strong security partnerships with the US, Europe, Japan and Australia.
    • On the economic front, India is exploring various forms of collaboration with a broad group of nations that have a shared interest in developing trustworthy global supply chains.

    Consider the question “Delineate the evolution of India’s approach towards the idea of strategic autonomy. How it differs from the past?”

    Conclusion

    Threats to either territorial integrity or economic prosperity are powerful enough on their own to compel drastic changes in any nation’s policies. Coming together, they promise to make strategic autonomy from an assertive China an enduring theme of India’s economic and foreign policies in the years ahead.

  • Explained: Pakistan-Saudi Rift

    The rift between Pakistan and Saudi Arabia over Jammu and Kashmir is out in the open after a delegation led by Pak Army Chief was denied a meeting with Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman (MBS).

    Try this question:

    Q. Discuss the new geopolitical realignment in the Arab world and India’s role in it.

    Take a look after how the ties emerged and deteriorated:

    Saudi-Pakistan ties: A Recap

    • The relationship between Saudi Arabia and Pakistan was most prominent during the 1971 war between India and Pakistan.
    • Saudi Arabia is also reported to have transferred arms and equipment including the loan of some 75 aircraft to Pakistan.
    • After the war, Saudi Arabia consistently supported the call for the return of Pakistan’s prisoners of war and for dropping the Dacca (Dhaka) Trial against 195 of them.
    • After the war, Saudi Arabia gave loans to Pakistan enabling it to buy arms worth about $1 million by 1977, including F-16s and Harpoon missiles from the US.
    • Saudi oil and dollars have kept Pakistan’s economy on its feet after sanctions following the nuclear tests.
    • Over the last two decades, Saudi Arabia has provided oil on deferred payments to Pakistan whenever it ran into economic difficulty.
    • Saudi funding of madrasas has also led to their mushrooming, later giving rise to religious extremism.
    • In 1990, Pakistan sent its ground forces to defend Saudi Arabia against Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait.

    Alignment over Kashmir

    • The alignment over Kashmir at the Organisation of Islamic Conference (OIC) crystallized since 1990 when the insurgency in J&K began.
    • While the OIC has issued statements over the last three decades, it became a ritual of little significance to India.
    • Last year, after India revoked Article 370 in Kashmir, Pakistan lobbied with the OIC for its condemnation of India’s move.
    • To Pakistan’s surprise, Saudi Arabia and the UAE issued statements that were nuanced rather than harshly critical of New Delhi.
    • Over the last year, Pakistan has tried to rouse the sentiments among the Islamic countries, but only a handful of them — Turkey and Malaysia — publicly criticised India.

    The Saudi perspective

    • Saudi Arabia’s change in position has been a gradual process under Crown Prince MBS.
    • As it seeks to diversify from its heavily oil-dependent economy, it sees India as a valuable partner in the region.
    • New Delhi, for its part, has wooed the Arab world over the last six years.
    • From Saudi Arabia to the UAE, it worked the diplomatic levers through high-level visits and dangled opportunities for investment and business
    • MBS, who is looking to invest in India, has taken a realistic view, along with UAE’s crown prince Mohammed bin Zayed.

    Energy connection to India

    • Saudi Arabia is India’s fourth-largest trade partner (after China, US and Japan) and a major source of energy: India imports around 18% of its crude oil requirement from the Kingdom.
    • Saudi Arabia is also a major source of LPG for India.
    • And, with India stopping oil imports from Iran due to the threat of US sanctions, Saudi Arabia is key in this respect as well.

    Saudi-Pakistan tension

    The tension between Saudi Arabia and Pakistan has been brewing for some time.

    • In 2015, Pakistan’s Parliament decided not to support the Saudi military effort to restore an internationally recognised government in Yemen.
    • Later, Pakistan’s then army chief General Raheel Sharif led the Saudi-led Islamic Military Alliance to Fight Terrorism, comprising 41 Muslim countries.
    • In February 2019, after the Pulwama terror attack, it was Saudi Arabia and the UAE that pulled their weight to get Wing Commander Abhinandan released, apart from the US.
    • The Saudi Crown Prince visited Pakistan and India at that time and made it clear that he valued economic opportunities. He did not wade into the Kashmir issue in India or the terrorism issue in Pakistan.

    Frustration over Kashmir

    A year after Article 370 was revoked, Qureshi belled the cat.

    • Pak accuses that Saudi Arabia has failed to deliver on the Kashmir and OIC had not played a leadership role in backing Pakistan against India.
    • This angered Saudi Arabia, which in November 2018 had announced a $6.2 billion loan package for Pakistan.
    • The package included $3 billion in loans and an oil credit facility amounting to $3.2 billion.
    • Riyadh demanded the return of the $3 billion loans and refused to sell oil to Islamabad on deferred payment. Pakistan immediately returned $1 billion, displaying the rift.
    • But, in the current economic situation, Pakistan is unable to pay the next tranche.
    • What has also angered Saudi Arabia is that Pakistan has been trying to pander to Turkey and Malaysia.

    The China factor

    • Pakistan and China have called themselves “all-weather allies” and “iron brothers” (during FMs meet).
    • Over the last year, Beijing has supported Pakistan on Kashmir, raising the issue at the UN Security Council thrice.
    • China has also emerged as Pakistan’s biggest benefactor through its funding of the CPEC.
    • Saudi Arabia too has invested in CPEC projects, to the tune of $10 billion, but Pakistan now looks towards Beijing for both diplomatic and economic support.

    Implications for India

    • Saudi’s silence on J&K as well as CAA-NRC has emboldened the Indian government.
    • At a time when India and China are locked in a border standoff, India has to be wary of Pakistan and China teaming up.
    • But with Saudi Arabia in its corner, for now, it may have leverage over Pakistan — Riyadh would not want a conflict and regional instability.
    • What is key to India’s calculus is that the Pakistan-China and the Pakistan-Saudi axes are not fused together at the moment: It is not a Saudi-Pakistan-China triangle.

  • Importance of close alignment with moderate Arab centre

    The article analyses the threat the Arab countries faces from the new geopolitical realignment and India’s role in it.

    Geopolitical realignment in the middle east

    • Agreement on the normalisation of relations between the United Arab Emirates and Israel was signed recently.
    • At the same time, there is an equally significant reorientation of the Subcontinent’s relationship with the region.
    • This is marked by Pakistan’s alignment with non-Arab powers.

    Deteriorating relation of Pakistan with Arab world

    • Pakistan has been angry with UAE’s invitation to India to address the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation in early 2019.
    • Saudi Arabia’s reluctance to convene a meeting to condemn Indian actions in Kashmir last August has angered Pakistan.
    • While Pakistan appears to be dreaming of a new regional alliance with Turkey and Iran.
    • Pakistan is also betting that a rising China and an assertive Russia will both support this new geopolitical formation as part of their own efforts to oust America from the Middle East.

    Threat to the Arab world

    • Saudis and Emiratis see sharpening existential threats to their kingdoms from both Turkey and Iran.
    • Both Turkey and Iran now intervene with impunity in the internal affairs of the Arab world.
    • Two other states have joined this Great Game.
    • Malaysia’s Mahathir fancied himself as a leader of the Islamic world.
    • Arab Qatar, which is locked in a fraternal fight with the Saudis and the Emiratis, wants to carve out an outsized role for itself in the Middle East.

    India’s should follow five principles for Arab Sovereignty

    • 1) India must resist the temptation of telling the Arabs what is good for them.
    • India should support their efforts to reconcile with non-Arab neighbours, including Israel, Turkey and Iran.
    • 2) Oppose foreign interventions in the Arab world. In the past, those came from the West and Israel.
    • Today, most Arabs see the greatest threat to their security from Turkish and Iranian interventions.
    • 3) Extend support to Arab economic integration, intra-Arab political reconciliation and the strengthening of regional institutions.
    • 4) Recognise that India’s geopolitical interests are in close alignment with those in the moderate Arab Centre — including Egypt, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, the UAE and Oman.
    • 5) India can’t be passive amidst the unfolding geopolitical realignment in West Asia.
    • Some members of the incipient alliance — Turkey, Malaysia and China — have been the most vocal in challenging India’s territorial sovereignty in Kashmir.

    Consider the question “Examine the importance of India’s relations with Arab countries. What are the threats the region faces to their sovereignty and how India can play an important role to ensure their sovereignty.”

    Conclusion

    Standing up for Arab sovereignty and opposing the forces of regional destabilisation must be at the very heart of India’s new engagement with the Middle East.

  • Strategic autonomy in foreign policy

    India has been maintaining strategic autonomy in its foreign policy since Independence. But the end of Cold War and growing closeness towards the U.S. raises concerns. This article addresses this issue.

    India’s foreign policy: characterised by autonomy

    • India has historically prided itself as an independent developing country which does not take orders from or succumb to pressure from great powers.
    • Indian maintained this stance in its foreign policy when the world order was bipolar from 1947 to 1991, dominated by the U.S. and Russia.
    • Also, when the world was unipolar from 1991 to 2008, dominated by the U.S.
    • Or when it is multipolar as at the present times.
    • The need for autonomy in making foreign policy choices has remained constant.

    Flexibility in foreign policy

    • However, strategic autonomy has often been adjusted in India’s history as per the changing milieu.
    • During the 1962 war with China, Prime Minister Nehru, had to appeal to the U.S. for emergency military aid.
    • In the build-up to the 1971 war with Pakistan, Prime Minister Indira Gandhi had to enter a Treaty of Peace, Friendship and Cooperation with the Soviet Union to ward off both China and the U.S.
    • And in Kargil in 1999, India welcomed a direct intervention by the U.S. to force Pakistan to back down.
    • In all the above examples, India did not become any less autonomous when geopolitical circumstances compelled it to enter into de facto alliance-like cooperation with major powers.
    • Rather, India secured its freedom, sovereignty and territorial integrity by manoeuvering the great power equations and playing the realpolitik game.

    Concerns over India’s growing closeness to the U.S.

    • As India is facing China’s growing aggression along the LAC, Non-alignment 2.0 with China and the U.S. makes little sense.
    • Fears that proximity to the U.S. will lead to loss of India’s strategic autonomy are overblown.
    • Because independent India has never been subordinated to a foreign hegemon.

    What should be India’s strategy

    • In the threat environment marked by a pushy China, India should aim to have both- American support and stay as an independent power centre by cooperation with middle powers in Asia and around the world.
    • For India complete dependence on the U.S. to counter China would be an error.
    • Such complete dependence would be detrimental to India’s national interest such as its ties with Iran and Russia and efforts to speed up indigenous defence modernisation.
    • A wide and diverse range of strategic partners, including the U.S. is the only viable diplomatic way forward in the current emerging multipolar world order.

    Consider the question “Does India’s close alignment with the U.S. harms its strategic autonomy? Suggest the strategy to balance India’s security concerns and maintaining strategic autonomy.”

    Conclusion

    We are free and self-reliant not through isolation or alliance with one great power, but only in variable combinations with several like-minded partners. India is familiar with the phrase ‘multi-vector’ foreign policy. It is time to maximise its potential.

  • A new direction for India-U.S. ties

    This article analyses what the new shift in the India-U.S. ties will require for the mutual benefit.

    Following 12 factors would influence the depth and longevity of the India-U.S. ties.

    1) Outcome of the  U.S. Presidential elections

    • The success of India’s new bonding with the U.S. will depend on the outcome of the U.S. Presidential elections.
    • The Democratic party candidate with the Left wing and liberals in the U.S. has been highly critical of the Citizenship (Amendment) Act.

    2) Need to build trust with the U.S.

    • India purchased of the S-400 air defence missile system from Russia disregarding the U.S. concerns.
    • India refused to send Indian troops to Afghanistan.
    • We need to build trust with the U.S. that we will give to the U.S. as good as it gives us.
    • For this structuring we must realise that India-U.S. relations require give and take on both sides.
    • What India needs to take today is for dealing with the Ladakh confrontation with China.
    • India needs U.S. hardware military equipment.

    3)  Fighting the U.S. enemy in neighbourhood

    • The U.S. needs India to fight her enemies in the neighbourhood such as in Afghanistan.
    • India should send two divisions gradually to Afghanistan and relieve U.S. troops to go home

    4) Intelligence sharing and cooperation

    • India needs the support of the U.S. and its ally, Israel, in cyberwarfare, satellite mappings of China and Pakistan.
    • There is a need for sharing intercepts of electronic communication, hard intelligence on terrorists, and controlling the military and the Inter-Services Intelligence in Pakistan.

    5) Developing naval bases

    • India needs the U.S. to completely develop the Andaman & Nicobar, and also the Lakshadweep Islands as a naval and air force base.
    • These naval bases can be used by the U.S  and shared along with its allies such as Indonesia and Japan.

    6) Economic relations and India’s concerns

    • The economic relations must be based on macroeconomic commercial principles.
    • Free, indiscriminate flow of U.S. foreign direct investment (FDI) is not in India’s national interest.

    7) Technology sharing

    • India needs technologies such as thorium utilisation, desalination of sea water, and hydrogen fuel cells.

    8) U.S. should allow import of agricultural product

    • The U.S. must allow India’s exports of agricultural products including Bos indicus milk, which are of highly competitive prices in the world.

    9) FDI in India

    • FDI should be allowed into India selectively from abroad, including from the U.S.
    • FDI in India should be based on the economic theory of comparative advantage and not on subsidies and gratis.

    10) Tariffs

    • Tariffs of both India and the U.S. should be lowered, and the Indian rupee should be gradually revalued to ₹35 to a dollar.
    • Later, with the economy picking up, the rupee rate should go below 10 to the dollar.

    11) Stay away from certain issues

    •  India should not provide the U.S. with our troops to enter Tibet, or be involved in the Hong Kong and Taiwan issue.
    • There is always a possibility of a leadership change in China.
    • Thus, China’s policy changed very favourably towards India.
    • In the cases of Tibet, Taiwan, and Hong Kong, we have made explicit agreements.
    • In the case of Tibet, two formal treaties were signed by Nehru (1954) and A.B. Vajpayee (2003).

    12) Trilateral commitment to world peace

    • In the long run, India, the U.S., and China should form a trilateral commitment for world peace provided Chinese current international policies undergo a healthy change.

    Consider the question “What are the factors influencing the India-U.S. ties? Suggest the pathway to address the issues that hamper the deepening of India-U.S. ties.”

    Conclusion

    Both countries need to recognise each other’s concern and work towards the deepening of the ties for the mutual benefit and with a view to dealing with the challenges confronting both the countries.

  • What India should consider about the proposition to isolate China

    The economic grip China exerts on the world protects it from the threat of isolation. This article examines this issue and its implications for India.

    Worsening U.S.-China ties and implications for other countries

    • After years of cooperating with one another, the U.S. and China are currently at the stage of confrontation.
    • Both are seeking allies to join their camps.
    • This places several countries in Asia, in a difficult position as most of them, loathe to take sides.
    • The U.S. may not necessarily be the first choice for many countries of Asia and the Asia-Pacific region.
    • In the case of China, it is clearly more feared than loved.

    China’s aggression

    •  Beijing’s virtual takeover of Hong Kong has only confirmed what had long been known about China’s intentions.
    • In March-April this year, China further stepped up its aggressive actions, renaming almost 80 geographical features in the region as an index of Chinese sovereignty.
    •  Taiwan, Japan, Vietnam, Indonesia and South Korea have all complained about China’s menacing postures in their vicinity.

    How countries are resisting China

    • Hardly any country in Asia is willing to openly confront China, and side with the U.S.
    • East Asian countries explain that China was always known to be over-protective of the South China Sea.
    • And China consider South China Sea a natural shield against possible hostile intervention by outside forces inimical to it.
    • No U.S. assurance and Chinese aggression has been enough to make countries in the region openly side with the U.S. and against China.

    China’s economic grip and lessons for India

    • Despite a series of diktats from Washington to restrict economic and other relations, China remains unfazed.
    • China seems confident that its stranglehold on the global economy ensures that it does not face any real challenge.
    • It would be wise for India to recognise this.
    • It is equally necessary to realise how fickle some of these countries can be when it comes to economic issues.
    •  At a recent meeting in Washington Australia (a member of the Quad) made it clear that China is important for Australia.
    • Likewise, the U.K.’s Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, recently stated in its Parliament, that the U.K. wants a positive relationship with China.
    • It is evident that few nations across the world are willing to risk China’s ire because of strong economic ties.

    India’s relations with neighbouring countries: concerns

    • India’s relations with Nepal, meanwhile, have hit a roadblock over the Kalapani area.
    • In Sri Lanka, the return of the Rajapaksas to power after the recent elections does not augur too well for India-Sri Lanka relations.
    • The strain in India-Bangladesh relations is a real cause for concern since it can provide a beachhead against Chinese activities in the region.

    Growing Chinese presence in India’s sphere of influence

    •  In July, the Chinese Foreign Minister organised a virtual meeting of the Foreign Ministers of Nepal, Afghanistan and Pakistan.
    • In this meeting, China proposed economic corridor plan with Nepal, styled as the Trans-Himalayan Multi-Dimensional Connectivity Network.
    • China has also made headway in Iran to an extent, again at India’s expense.

    Conclusion

    Geo-balancing is not happening to China’s disadvantage. This lesson must be well understood when India plan its future strategy.

  • Back in news: Indus Water Treaty (IWT)

    India has refused a request by Pakistan to hold a meeting on issues around the Indus Water Treaty (IWT) at the Attari check post near the India-Pakistan border.

    The IWT has been in existence since 1960, and reached a flash point in the aftermath of the Uri attacks in 2016 with PM declaring that “blood and water couldn’t flow together”.

    About Indus Waters Treaty, 1960

    • The IWT is a water-distribution treaty between India and Pakistan, brokered by the World Bank signed in Karachi in 1960.
    • According to this agreement, control over the water flowing in three “eastern” rivers of India — the Beas, the Ravi and the Sutlej was given to India
    • The control over the water flowing in three “western” rivers of India — the Indus, the Chenab and the Jhelum was given to Pakistan
    • The treaty allowed India to use western rivers water for limited irrigation use and unrestricted use for power generation, domestic, industrial and non-consumptive uses such as navigation, floating of property, fish culture, etc. while laying down precise regulations for India to build projects
    • India has also been given the right to generate hydroelectricity through the run of the river (RoR) projects on the Western Rivers which, subject to specific criteria for design and operation is unrestricted.

    Talks stalled on key projects

    • Among the key points on the table was evolving a procedure to solve differences on technical aspects governing the construction of the Ratle run-of-the-river (RoR) project on the Chenab in the Kishtwar district.
    • India has called for the appointment of a ‘neutral’ party while Pakistan favours a Court of Arbitration to agree upon a final resolution on the design parameters of this hydropower project.
    • According to the IWT, India has the right to build RoR projects on the three ‘western’ rivers — the Chenab, Jhelum and Indus — provided it does so without substantially impeding water flow in Pakistan downstream.
    • Pakistan believes that the project’s current design does pose a serious impediment and has told the World Bank that it wants a Court of Arbitration (CoA) set up to decide on the issue.
    • India says this is only a technical issue and mutually solvable.

  • What are Confucius Institutes, and why are they under the scanner in India?

    • The Ministry of Education (previously HRD) had sent a letter to several institutions seeking information about the activities of their Confucius Institutes (CIs) and Chinese language training centres.
    • This has brought the spotlight to China’s CI programme, a key pillar of Beijing’s global soft power effort, and raised questions about the future of India-China cooperation in the education space.

    Try this question for mains:

    Q.“It cannot be business as usual with China after the border clash.” Critically comment.

    What are the Confucius Institutes (CI)?

    • Starting with a CI in Seoul in 2004, China’s National Office for Teaching Chinese as a Foreign Language (NOCFL) known as Hanban establishes CI.
    • China has established 550 CIs and 1,172 Confucius Classrooms (CCs) housed in foreign institutions, in 162 countries.
    • As the Hanban explains on its website, following the experience of the British Council, Alliance Française and Germany’s Goethe-Institut, China began “establishing non-profit public institutions which aim to promote Chinese language and culture in foreign countries”.

    What is the presence of CIs in India?

    • India is reviewing the presence of CIs in seven universities, in addition to 54 MoUs on inter-school cooperation involving China, which is not connected to the CI programme.

    How have CIs been viewed around the world?

    • The CI arrangement has generated debate in the West, where some universities have closed the institutes amid concern over the influence of the Chinese government and it’s funding on host institutions.
    • Closures of some CIs have been reported in the United States, Denmark, the Netherlands, Belgium, France and Sweden.
    • While the closures in the West have made news, these cases still represent a minority. Faced with this backlash, China is now rebranding the programme.
    • Most of the 550 CIs and more than 1,000 CCs around the world are still active, with a presence spanning Africa, Central Asia, Latin America, and across Asia.

    What does it mean for India-China relations?

    • CIs and CCs had already been in India for more than 10 years.
    • Even prior to the border skirmishes, Indian authorities had viewed the CI arrangement somewhat warily.
    • Along with the new move to review CIs, Mandarin has been dropped from the list of foreign languages that can be taught in schools in the new National Education Policy.

    Not a perfect move

    • Recent moves by India shows that it cannot be business as usual with China after the border clash.
    • However, India’s long-term objectives are not clear.
    • De-emphasizing learning Mandarin is neither likely to impact China’s stance on the border nor help India in developing the expertise and resources it needs in dealing with China.

  • Pakistan’s new Political Map

    Recently Pakistani PM announced a new political map of Pakistan.

    Do you think that the recent launch of new political maps depicting Indian territories by Pakistan would make any difference on the international community’s stance on Kashmir?

    A chain reaction

    • With this, Pakistan became the third country to launch a new political map after India and Nepal did the same.
    • India had reiterated its territorial claims in J&K, and Ladakh with the new map; this triggered a reaction from Nepal which contested Indian claims in the Kalapani region of Pithoragarh district.

    What are the features of the new map?

    • The new political map of Pakistan has claimed the entire region of Jammu and Kashmir stretching all the way to the edge of Ladakh.
    • The map also claims Junagarh and Manavadar, a former princely State and territory, respectively that are part of present-day Gujarat.
    • Pakistan also claimed the entire territory and water bodies that fall in the Sir Creek region in the westernmost part of India.

    Defiance of old agreements

    • The territorial claims of Pakistan are, however, of a far greater extent and challenge many of the past understandings and treaties.
    • This clearly runs counter to the Simla Agreement which treated Kashmir as a bilateral matter.
    • It leaves out a claim line at the eastern end of J&K indicating Pakistan’s willingness to make China a third party in the Kashmir issue.

    How different is it from previous ones?

    • A similar map has been part of school textbooks of Pakistan for many years which highlights the territorial aspiration of Pakistan over the northern part of the subcontinent.
    • The document also maintains bits of reality on the ground as it shows the Line of Control in Kashmir in a red-dotted line.
    • The map may be used to provide legal cover for some of Islamabad’s territorial ambitions, especially in Kashmir and Sir Creek.

    A Cartographical warfare

    • The map is likely to lead to changes in Pakistan’s position on territorial disputes with India.
    • By demanding the entire J&K region, Pak is changing the main features of its Kashmir discourse as it includes the Jammu region prominently.
    • The inclusion of Junagarh and Manavadar opens fundamental issues of territorial sovereignty of India.
    • Manavadar, a princely territory, joined India on February 15, 1948, and Indian troops marched into Junagarh in September that year incorporating it into Indian Territory.
    • By normalizing Islamabad’s claims over these former princely territories, Pakistan is most likely to assert its rights over the former princely State of Hyderabad as well.

    What does Pakistan plan to gain by this exercise?

    • Sir Creek is a collection of water bodies that extend from the Arabian Sea deep inside the territory of Kutch and is rich in biodiversity and mangrove forests.
    • India’s position on Sir Creek is based on the Kutch arbitration case of 1966-69.
    • The new map can be used to reassert Pakistan’s claims regarding the Rann which it had lost in the arbitration conducted in Geneva.
    • India’s position regarding Sir Creek is based on the fact that the arbitration had granted the entire Rann and its marshy areas to India while leaving the solid land across the Rann to Pakistan.
    • By demanding the demarcation to shift towards the eastern bank, Pakistan appears to be going back also on the spirit of the Rann of Kutch arbitration where the overwhelming evidence of maps supported India’s claims.

    Are there any claims on its western borders?

    • The map is silent about territorial claims in the west and northwest of Pakistan.
    • It indicates Islamabad’s acceptance of the Durand Line as the border with Afghanistan.
    • The reality on the ground, however, shows problems that continue to haunt Pakistan on that front as well where law and order have been difficult to maintain because of free movement of armed fighters.
    • A deadly clash between Afghan civilians and Pakistani troops near its Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa province is a usual discourse.
    • The resultant situation has placed Afghan and Pakistani troops in a confrontational position.